1. Pay reporting for gender equality

Across OECD countries, on average, the unadjusted gender pay gap stands at 11.9% – meaning that the median full-time working woman earns about 88 cents to every dollar or euro earned by the median full-time working man.1 This gap varies widely across countries, ranging from 1.2%2 in Belgium to 31.1% in Korea (Figure 1.1).

The gap gets even larger when looking at the income all working women and men – not only full-time workers – take home at the end of the year, as women tend to spend fewer hours in paid work than men. Women are overrepresented in part-time jobs, and men are overrepresented in jobs with long work hours, throughout the OECD (OECD, 2019[1]). This mechanically reduces pay tied to work hours, and it contributes to gender inequalities in complementary and variable components of pay as well.

The OECD average gender pay gap has gradually declined from nearly 19% in 1997, when most OECD countries began reporting this statistic (Figure 1.2). Yet progress on the wage gap has plateaued in many countries over the past decade, and these national-level estimates of gender pay gaps underestimate the extent of inequalities across different groups. There are compounding, intersecting forms of discrimination based on different background factors like socio-economic status, race/ethnicity, gender identity and sexual orientation. Box 1.1 elaborates on the measurement of the gender pay gap and presents pay gaps across the income distribution.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, a majority of government adherents to the OECD Gender Recommendation say that women being paid less than men for the same work is one of the top three gender inequality challenges facing their country (OECD, 2022[3]).

Many factors drive the gender pay gap. One issue is horizontal segregation, meaning that women and men tend to be concentrated in different sectors or jobs. Women tend to be overrepresented in fields that pay relatively lower wages, such as caregiving jobs, and underrepresented in fields with relatively higher wages, such as engineering jobs. Vertical segregation, meaning that men and women are concentrated in different job levels, also affects women’s pay (OECD, 2022[4]). Worldwide, women are underrepresented in management roles and on boards (OECD, 2021[5]; OECD, 2021[6]), a phenomenon referred to as the glass ceiling (see Box 1.1).

Enormous inequality in the distribution of unpaid work also negatively affects women’s earnings, relative to men’s (OECD Gender Data Portal, 2021[7]). Across OECD countries, women do more cooking, cleaning, and caregiving (for children and other dependent family members) than men. Time is a finite resource, and these unpaid obligations limit both the time women can spend in paid work and their possibilities to advance in the paid labour market and progress to more senior levels (OECD, 2021[8]; OECD, 2017[9]; OECD, 2019[1]). Related to this, the gender wage gap is relatively higher in jobs with inflexible work hours (Goldin, 2014[10]).

Discrimination, although difficult to identify and measure in workplaces, also drives down women’s pay. Discrimination has been proven in many randomised field experiments in which prospective employers, on average, treat fictitious, otherwise-identical job candidates differently due to their gender (Blau and Kahn, 2016[11]), with a recent review suggesting this discrimination affirms existing gender segregation in occupations (Galos and Coppock, 2023[12]).

Governments have implemented a wide array of public policies in efforts to close the gender wage gap, including improving girls’ and women’s equal access to education; passing anti-discrimination and equal pay laws; and providing work-life balance supports, like well-designed paid parental leave3 and early childhood education and care for the children of working parents (OECD, 2022[3]). While there is room for improvement in many OECD countries in building a comprehensive policy package, some countries have planned, budgeted, and implemented a holistic policy approach to improve women’s economic empowerment (OECD, 2019[21]). Yet even the most comprehensive policy approaches have not been enough to close the gender wage gap anywhere in the OECD. (OECD, 2021[6]).

Many OECD countries have therefore begun trialling new pay transparency measures as part of a renewed effort to close the gender pay gap. The OECD first took stock of the state of pay transparency across countries in the 2021 report Pay Transparency Tools to Close the Gender Wage Gap (OECD, 2021[6]), which offered an overview of governments’ use of gender pay gap reporting by firms, equal pay audits, job classification schemes, and requirements to discuss the pay gap in collective bargaining.

This report, Reporting Gender Pay Gaps in OECD countries: Guidance for Pay Transparency Implementation, Monitoring and Reform, digs deep on a public policy now used in over half of OECD countries: gender pay gap reporting requirements for private sector firms.

21 out of 38 OECD countries (55%) now require private sector firms to regularly report their company’s gender pay gap to stakeholders like workers, workers’ representatives, the government and the public. Many of these reporting schemes are embedded in equal pay audit systems, in which employers are required to determine the causes of pay gaps and develop strategies to address them.

The motivation for gender pay gap reporting is straightforward, and as a policy measure it is intuitive. By analysing, presenting, and publicising pay gaps between women and men, proponents argue, different stakeholders, including the employers, should become more aware of the gender pay gap and more motivated to close it. Pay gap reporting, if sufficiently disaggregated by job category, can also offer important information to individual workers who feel they may be unfairly underpaid. Armed with information, these workers can try to negotiate for better pay or leave for a different job. This straightforward logic may be a reason why pay transparency is so broadly supported across many OECD countries (Figure 1.4): 64% of respondents in the 27-country OECD Risks that Matter survey say that they support pay transparency to reduce wage gaps, with rates reaching nearly 80% in Portugal and Chile.

Yet there are limits to what pay transparency can do (Box 1.2). The burden of rectifying unequal pay still largely falls on the individual, and it is a significant burden in terms of time, finances, and effort. It may also be a mentally and emotionally taxing process (Box 1.3).

While pay reporting is increasingly common, no two countries’ pay reporting systems are exactly the same. This report illustrates the strengths and limitations of different approaches with an eye towards informing implementation and monitoring across countries. The full report is structured as follows:

  • Chapter 2 offers an overview of pay gap reporting systems, including reference dates for reporting and the inclusion criteria used to define which firms must report.

  • Chapter 3 presents the type of data that must be collected in each country (for example by gender-disaggregated worker subgroup like job category or level of education), overviews governments’ demands for gender-disaggregated data in employee outcomes other than pay, and briefly discusses the policy of salary transparency in job advertisements.

  • Chapter 4 offers comparative perspective on equal pay auditing systems, which are currently in place in ten OECD countries and require follow-up action by employers after their analysis of pay gaps.

  • Chapter 5 discusses different requirements for governments communicating pay reporting rules to employers, and for communicating rules and results from employers to employees.

  • Chapter 6 overviews countries’ approaches to the enforcement of pay reporting rules, including the use of third-party actors and sanctions.

  • Chapter 7 presents novel and practical tools to facilitate companies’ reporting of pay gap statistics.

Over half of OECD countries’ (21 of 38) national governments4 now require private sector employers to report pre-defined gender-disaggregated pay information to stakeholders like workers, workers’ representatives, the government, and/or the public (Figure 1.5). This is a rapidly advancing policy space.

While a national requirement to report pay gaps has been in place for several decades in certain countries like Finland and Sweden, most countries’ reporting regulations are relatively recent and have been in place for fewer than ten years. Countries with private sector pay reporting requirements at the national level include Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,5 Chile,6 Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

The same general principles of pay reporting hold across countries, but definitions of which firms must report – such as employee headcount thresholds and worker type – vary across countries (Chapter 2). When it comes to what needs to be reported, a few countries have opted for a straightforward reporting system where employers are only required to report the overall gender wage gap, or median (or average) pay for women versus men (Chapter 3). However, most countries require detailed, gender-disaggregated pay information across different categories like job classifications or level of seniority.

In almost half (10 of 21) of the countries with private sector pay reporting rules, company pay reporting requirements are embedded within more comprehensive, mandatory, equal pay auditing processes that apply to a pre-defined set of employers (defined in Box 1.5). This is similar to the concept of a joint pay assessment, language used in the forthcoming EU pay transparency legislation (Chapter 2).

Countries with equal pay audits include Canada (under the Pay Equity Act7), Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Equal pay audits typically require more thorough analysis of highly detailed statistical information on pay and workforce characteristics across different categories of employees (Chapter 4). Some countries require employers to also assess possible indirect discrimination. For instance, gender pay differences are assessed not only across jobs that are equal, but also across jobs considered of equal value (see Box 1.5 for definitions). These equal pay auditing processes often require follow-up actions by employers to address the gaps that have been found.

Interestingly, countries including Colombia, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United States only require employers to report gender-disaggregated information other than pay, such as workforce composition by gender. At the same time, gender-disaggregated non-pay reporting rules now complement pay reporting requirements in many countries. These non-pay gender-disaggregated data reporting requirements most commonly include reporting gender gaps in employee headcounts, and often include the share of top positions held by women (Chapter 3).

A few countries use only an ad hoc approach to pay gap reporting that covers a relatively small share of employers. For example, in countries including Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Türkiye, companies targeted for labour inspections are also sometimes required to undergo gender pay gap reporting. These countries do not have more systematic, mandatory pay gap reporting rules.

Several EU countries have work in progress to introduce new pay transparency rules or expand the scope of existing measures to align with the forthcoming EU Pay Transparency Directive (see Chapter 2), which comes into force in 2023 and will apply to all EU member countries.

Despite the growing prominence of pay gap reporting regimes, only a few national systems have been evaluated quantitatively by academic or government researchers.

Yet pay reporting and equal pay audit requirements are ripe for rigorous evaluations. Pay transparency obligations typically affect firms of specific sizes who are targeted at different points in time, which allows for relatively straightforward quasi-experimental policy evaluations. Making use of the fact that policy “treatment” and “control” groups of firms are assigned almost at random – some employers barely pass the size threshold for reporting requirements (treatment), while others barely meet it (control) – it is simple to compare outcomes across these otherwise highly similar groups.8

Measuring the effectiveness of national-level pay gap reporting rules using these kinds of quasi-experimental research methods has taken place in only a handful of countries: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Although almost all research has concentrated on pay reporting measures, it seems likely that equal pay auditing systems – with more comprehensive analysis and follow-up measures – would have an even greater impact on closing the gender wage gap than basic pay reporting.

National-level pay gap reporting rules do not have a consistently positive effect on closing gender pay gaps across all countries with these systems. This suggests that policy design and implementation play an important role in the effectiveness of the system.

Indeed, in countries where national pay gap reporting rules seem to have helped reduce the gender pay gap – Denmark, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom – there is strong third-party involvement. In other words, an actor independent of the employer, employees, and employee representatives is closely involved in the pay reporting process.

In Denmark, the Ministry of Employment commissions the National Statistics Office9 to calculate the gap for employers using pre-existing data. France has a sophisticated pay transparency system: the government provides calculators and online forms for submitting data, and the French Labour Inspectorate carries out inspections and financial penalties for non-compliance. In Switzerland, the government provides a free calculator tool for different sized firms – Logib – and requires an independent audit of firms’ pay gap reporting.10 In the United Kingdom, gender pay gaps are reported to a government agency and shared with the public,11 which provides considerable visibility and informal oversight. These systems are detailed in subsequent chapters of the report.

Taking advantage of the staggered entry into force of the Austrian pay transparency law, empirical research using regression discontinuity design (Böheim and Gust, 2021[26]) and event-study design (Gulyas, Seitz and Sinha, 2021[27]) finds no effect of the pay reporting policy on gender pay gaps in affected companies in Austria. The authors suggest this may be a result of Austria’s weak enforcement mechanisms, which do not require employers to follow reporting with concrete action, as well as limited public awareness of pay reporting requirements. There is also some evidence that the female share of workers dropped in large firms affected by the rules (Böheim and Gust, 2021[26]). Similarly, no positive effects are found in an analysis of pay transparency in job advertisements in Austria.12

Sweden is one of the few governments to have assessed quantitatively the effects of its pay auditing system on wage outcomes. After a legislative change in 2009, employers with 20 to 24 employees no longer fell under the obligation to report. The study uses this group as a comparator to employers with 25 to 30 employees. Looking at this limited sample of small employers, Sweden’s National Audit Office finds only a marginal effect of pay audits in reducing the gender wage gap (Swedish National Audit Office, 2019[28]).

On a more positive note, the Swedish study also shows that slightly more women were employed in affected companies, and similarly slightly more women were appointed as managers – indicating other potential positive effects on gender equality.

Both Austria and Sweden’s pay reporting rules have comparatively weak enforcement and compliance mechanisms, and both countries tend to rely on access to justice via the court system – a slow-moving and resource-intensive path.

Denmark, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have greater involvement of third-party actors ensuring compliance, and causal research suggests their pay gap reporting regimes have helped to close wage gaps.

Employing the introduction of Danish pay transparency rules and difference-in-differences and difference-in-discontinuities designs, research into Danish reporting requirements (Bennedsen et al., 2022[29]) shows that gender pay gaps in the affected firms reduced by about 2 percentage points (or 13% from prior to 2006).This reduction came about through a suppression in the growth of male wages. The research also finds that firms just above the reporting requirement threshold are more likely to hire female workers and to promote them than those just below the threshold (Ibid.).

In the United Kingdom, two studies exploiting the discontinuous size threshold and using difference-in-difference both find that the gender pay gap has slightly narrowed as a result of the measure (Blundell, 2021[30]; Duchini et al., 2020[31]). Like in Denmark, this appears to have been driven by a reduction in male wages rather than an increase in female wages. Duchini et al. (2020) find the UK’s pay transparency regulations are also influence hiring practices; affected employers tend to adopt practices that are more attractive to women, such as providing information about wages in job advertisement and offering flexible working arrangements. This can have large effects considering that, according to survey evidence gathered by Blundell (2020), in order to not be hired by the (hypothetical) employer with the highest gender pay gap in their industry, a majority of women would accept a 2.5% lower salary, with women prepared to accept, on average, 4.9% lower pay to avoid this high pay gap employer.

Studies of the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the pay gap reporting system froze, seem to support earlier evidence. Focusing on the temporary suspension of pay reporting requirements in the United Kingdom due to the COVID-19 pandemic, organisations that reported their gender pay gap during the year of suspension showed a 6% lower gap a year later, compared to those that did not report (Jones, Kaya and Papps, 2022[32]). This reduction is attributed to an increase in the proportion of women in the top pay quartile and a rise in the concentration of women in the overall workforce. (Jones, 2022[33]) also finds, in a descriptive analysis looking at firm-level gender wage gaps, that organisations with larger gender wage gaps have shown more improvement over time – and that comparisons with intra-industry comparators likely contributed to narrowing gaps.

In Switzerland, the introduction of the free but non-mandatory wage gap calculator Logib in 2006 corresponded with a 3.5% narrowing of the gender pay gaps (Vaccaro, 2017[34]). Employing the discontinuous size cut off and difference-in-discontinuity design, the author shows that affected Swiss employers adjusted the wages of new hires without reducing the number of new female workers.

A descriptive analysis (non-quasi-experimental) of the French pay transparency system (Briard, Meluzzi and Ruault, 2021[35]) shows that since the introduction of the measure, the average firm score in the Professional Equality Index13 has been improving, with the increase being more significant for large companies. An increase in the score implies a narrowing of the wage gap, among other things. Although firms’ performance on all five indicators is increasing, the main source of the increase is the indicator on maternity and raises, i.e. how many mothers returning from maternity leave receive the raise to which they are entitled according to French law. The authors suggest this improvement is driven by employers’ growing awareness of this law through the requirement to report on it.

In an evaluation of a more narrow pay transparency measure in Canada, (Baker et al., 2019[36]) assess the effects of salary disclosure on gender pay gaps in the context of staggered implementation across Canadian provinces of laws that require public disclosure of the salaries of individual faculty members (exceeding certain thresholds) in public universities. Utilising comprehensive administrative data and event-study research methodology, they find strong evidence that these laws have decreased the gender pay gap between male and female faculty members by around 20-40 percent.

Drawing on evidence from the 21 countries with pay gap reporting rules in place, consistent findings and policy recommendations for governments emerge:

Most OECD countries exempt small employers from pay gap reporting rules. This means a large share of workers face challenges to accessing equal pay information. This limits their ability to argue for fair pay for their work. Spain is the only country in which the requirement to collect gender-disaggregated wage data has no minimum size threshold. Otherwise, minimum size thresholds for reporting range from ten employees (Canada and Sweden14) to more than 518 employees (Israel).

Additionally, pay reporting rules typically require reporting the gender pay differentials of the regular and/or permanent workforce. While this means that a large share of a firm’s workforce is usually covered by reporting rules, workers in more precarious working conditions – such as contractors, consultants, and/or temporary workers – may be excluded. Part-time employees are included in the threshold calculations in most countries, although some countries assign part-time workers a smaller weight (Chapter 2).

Reporting average or median pay statistics disaggregated by gender at the aggregate level in a firm has benefits. It helps to reduce administrative burden on firms;15 it encourages businesses to consider how horizontal and vertical segregation contributes to the overall firm wage gap; and it helps to increase awareness of pay equity with one single, tangible statistic. Yet producing only a single wage gap statistic per firm does little to help stakeholders understand the causes of the gender gap.

To better understand drivers of the wage gap, firms should be required to assess gender-disaggregated pay outcomes at both the aggregate firm level and by key subgroups. In many countries these subgroups include job category and level of seniority, in an effort to produce gender pay gap comparisons across more comparable workers.

To note, this strategy does not address horizontal gender segregation and systematically lower pay in typically feminised professions. A pay gap reporting assessment of long-term care (LTC) workers in a single company, for example, may find little gender wage gap within this group – but these LTC workers may still be systematically underpaid for their skills and the value of their work. For this reason, when job classification systems are used to define pay transparency subgroups, it is important that job classifications be “gender-sensitive” or “gender-neutral,” as is the case in at least ten OECD countries. This is necessary to avoid embedding systematically lower pay in traditionally women’s professions (Chapter 3).

Countries should also consider disaggregating pay statistics by race/ethnicity, as is done in Canada and New Zealand, to better capture intersecting disadvantage for minority women.

For pay reporting systems to work properly, employers must clearly understand the information they need to report. While some countries offer very little guidance about what statistical analysis to perform and how to disseminate results, an increasing number of governments in the OECD provide employers with digital tools such as gender pay gap calculators (to calculate their firm’s gap themselves) or reporting portals for submitting pay data to the government (Chapter 7).

The use of pre-existing government data has also appeared as a new frontier in pay transparency. This allows governments to calculate companies’ gender pay gaps with little or no additional administrative burden on employers. Denmark (which uses data already collected in its national Structure of Earnings Survey) and Lithuania (which uses data collected as part of the social security system) offer noteworthy examples (Chapter 7).

Most OECD countries have some degree of monitoring compliance of pay gap reporting rules, although the intensity of monitoring and enforcement differs widely across countries. In general, countries that embed pay reporting within equal pay auditing systems (Chapter 4) – such as France – tend to have more comprehensive methods of monitoring compliance.

Financial penalties are commonly listed as a tool to enforce compliance, but potential fine amounts are usually small and fines are rarely issued. Other tools for compliance include more commonly used “name and shame” procedures – where companies face reputational risk for poor performance on gender equality – and equal pay certificates (Chapter 6).

National equal pay audit regimes, targeting the private sector in ten countries (Figure 1.5), have more intensive requirements than simple pay gap reporting. Audits typically include an analysis of the proportion of women and men in each category of employee or position, an analysis of the job evaluation and classification system used, and detailed information on pay and pay differentials on grounds of gender – and often mandate follow-up action. Equal pay audits are comparable to the concept of “joint pay assessments” in forthcoming EU legislation.

Follow-up action can apply to all relevant employers or only those where analysis reveals gender differences in remuneration. These follow-ups are sometimes referred to as gender equality “action plans”. These include an initial assessment of the situation (i.e. the process and evaluation of results of pay gap reporting), a justification of any differences found, and/or a discussion or implementation of active measures to combat differences.

The effects of national-level pay reporting rules on changes in the gender wage gap have been causally evaluated in only a handful of countries (Section 1.3), usually by academic researchers. Yet these kinds of policy evaluations are often “low hanging fruit,” from an empirical perspective. Many pay reporting programmes have been introduced with obvious discontinuities, e.g. by firm size or over time, that make for ideal quasi-experimental evaluations of effects on wages. Countries should additionally continue to monitor pay gap reporting processes to ensure that various stakeholders are participating as they should.

In general, pay transparency legislation across OECD countries would benefit from increased transparency – both in instructions to employers and in communication from employers to stakeholders (Chapter 5). Better awareness of pay transparency rules and results could improve the effectiveness of pay gap reporting regimes in actually closing gaps.

Governments’ pay gap reporting rules are rarely communicated directly to employers and are instead simply published on government websites. Employer awareness of pay gap reporting rules is not commonly measured.

The communication of pay gap results to stakeholders like workers, their representatives and the public is not always straightforward, either. Not all relevant actors are automatically informed about the results of pay gap reporting, and instructions on how employers should share results with employees should be made more explicit in most countries. Transparency to the public is a reality in only about half of OECD countries with pay reporting rules – though the public usually cannot access disaggregated pay gap results (Chapter 5).

By itself, pay transparency cannot close the gender wage gap. In many ways, pay transparency comes too late – it attempts to address inequalities that have built up over the life course, after years of gendered socialisation, educational choices, segregation into lower-paying fields, and career interruptions. Gender pay gap reporting, and pay transparency in general, must be embedded within a holistic, systematic, life-course approach to promoting gender equality in society, labour markets, governance and public policy. This includes gender-equal access and encouragement to all levels and subjects of schooling, family and work-life balance supports like childcare and parental leave, efforts to improve the division of unpaid work, anti-discrimination legislation, improving women’s access to leadership roles, and closing gender gaps in old age.

The following checklist offers simple guidance to countries interested in implementing, reforming, or monitoring their pay gap reporting system. It covers various aspects of the reporting systems, including coverage, quality of reported data, enforcement, ease of reporting, stakeholder awareness, and required follow-up actions by firms. By evaluating these factors, policy makers can identify areas for improvement and implement measures to ensure the success of gender pay gap reporting systems. The right-most choice in the following response options represents current good practice in OECD countries; the left-most choice indicates room for improvement.

Guidance for the checklist:

  • Review each section of the checklist, labelled A to F, which represents different dimensions of gender pay gap reporting systems. For each numbered item within a section, mark the checkbox (☐) that best reflects the current state or level of implementation in your country.

  • Consider the implications and importance of each item in relation to the overall design of the reporting system in the country. Use the results of the checklist to assess the strengths and weaknesses of your country’s gender pay gap reporting system.

  • Identify areas that require improvement and develop/reform policies to enhance the effectiveness of the reporting system.

  • Regularly review and update the checklist to ensure ongoing evaluation and improvement of the reporting system.

In June 2022, the OECD distributed a detailed policy questionnaire via the Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee (ELSAC) to gender, labour, and/or social ministries in every OECD country. This questionnaire sought to update and expand on a February 2021 stocktaking of wage mapping and pay transparency measures aimed at promoting equal pay between women and men. The 2022 questionnaire narrowed in on an increasingly common pay transparency tool – gender pay gap reporting – with the goal of informing countries’ implementation and monitoring.

The response rate was 95%, with 36 out of 38 member states either completing the questionnaire in full or validating missing responses. The questionnaire requested details on the following public strategies for promoting equal pay in each country:

  • Rights to equal pay

  • Information about pay reporting measure(s)

  • Required content in reported pay gap statistics

  • Accountability to workers, workers’ representatives and government bodies

  • Enforcement of pay reporting rules

  • Transparency of pay reporting results to the public

  • Guidance and help for complying with pay reporting rules

  • Other reported (non-pay) gender-disaggregated data

  • Evaluations of pay transparency rules

  • Other pay transparency measures

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Notes

← 1. See Box 1.1 for a discussion of the differences between the unadjusted and adjusted gender pay gaps.

← 2. Belgium’s gender wage gap statistic may not provide a complete picture since it excludes significant sectors where pay gaps tend to be substantial, such as agriculture, mining, real estate, professional, technical and scientific activities, and others. Consequently, the calculation of Belgium’s low gender wage gap is significantly influenced by the overrepresentation of sectors characterised by robust collective bargaining traditions and strict collective agreements.

← 3. Such measures should include incentives for equal sharing of parental leave across mothers and fathers, as leave-taking primarily by mothers can worsen gender equality outcomes (Fluchtmann, 2023[40]).

← 4. This report focuses on national-level policies. Some OECD countries, such as the United States, have sub-national pay transparency rules for private sector firms.

← 5. The pay reporting laws in Canada only apply to federally regulated private sector employers, federally regulated Crown corporations, and other federal organisations (under the Employment Equity Act) and to federally regulated private and public sector employers, parliamentary workplaces, and the Prime Minister’s and ministers’ offices (under the Pay Equity Act).

← 6. The pay reporting law in Chile only applies to businesses under the supervision of the Financial Market Commission [Comisión para el Mercado Financiero (CMF)]. The Financial Market Commission (CMF) is a public service of a technical nature whose main objectives are to ensure the proper functioning, development and stability of the financial market, facilitating the participation of market agents and promoting the care of public faith. Companies analyse their gender equality, taking remuneration into account, in order to comply with CMF rules.

← 7. Canada’s pay reporting regulation is two-fold: Employment Equity Act and the Pay Equity Act (see endnote 5).

← 8. Of course one would need to conduct robustness checks to ensure that firms do not “sort” around (i.e. just under) a firm size reporting threshold.

← 9. Statistics Denmark (https://www.dst.dk/en).

← 10. This independent audit should be carried out by a government-certified auditor, or, alternatively, can be carried out by social partners or organisations promoting gender equality.

← 11. See https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/.

← 12. More recent evidence on a different Austrian pay transparency tool – wage transparency in job advertisements – supports earlier findings that there has been little to no effect of pay transparency in Austria. Bamieh and Ziegler (2022) assess the effects of pay transparency in job advertisements on switching occupations, e.g. by gendered sorting into better-paid occupations and firms. The paper finds the policy did not lead women to become more likely to switch to better-paid jobs. The authors suggest this may be due to strong gender preferences of Austrian employers which can limit women’s possibilities to switch to predominantly male jobs.

← 13. In France, L’Index de l’Égalité Professionnelle Entre les Femmes et les Hommes, or, in English, the Professional Equality Index (PEI) has been in force since 2019. This measure applies to both employers in the public and in the private sector. Every year, by 1 March, public and private employers with at least 50 employees (requirements differ for those employers with more than 250 employees) must report pay information by gender and carry out and submit the results of an equal pay audit. The French system is further detailed in the subsequent chapters.

← 14. Swedish reporting rules require all employers, regardless of size, to conduct pay surveys. However, only employers with more than ten employees need to document their work. As such, ensuring compliance of micro-companies is virtually impossible.

← 15. This can reduce administrative burden as firms do not need to collect and analyse disaggregated information.

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