8. Special focus: An overview of the impact of alcohol policies on alcohol producers and vendors

Sabine Vuik
Jane Cheatley

To reduce the health and economic impact of harmful alcohol use, many countries have introduced public health policies and initiatives to reduce alcohol consumption. In line with the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol (WHO, 2010[1]), these include price policies such as taxation or minimum unit pricing (MUP), marketing regulations and sales restrictions (see Chapter 6 for more details on alcohol policies).

In addition to affecting population health and the economy, these policies also have an impact on the industry. The alcohol industry can be defined as “developers, producers, distributors, marketers and sellers of alcoholic beverages” (WHO, 2010[1]). This chapter primarily focuses on the two largest players who are most affected by alcohol policies: producers and vendors (Box 8.1), and references to the alcohol industry indicate these two groups.

Public health interventions to reduce harmful alcohol use can affect the industry in various ways (Figure 8.1). This chapter first discusses the potential impacts of alcohol policies at the company level. For alcohol producers or vendors, policies can result in implementation costs, such as changing a marketing strategy or investing in research and development (R&D). The chapter next examines how policies can also affect companies’ income, as they may change sales revenue, profit margins or ancillary sales. Finally, it investigates the potential effects at the wider industry level, outlining how alcohol policies can have an impact on illicit and cross-border trade and employment.

The information in this chapter is based on a review of the academic and grey literature and on input from experts participating in the OECD Expert Group on the Economics of Public Health, including representatives from business and industry. To complement the information gathered from the literature, the OECD conducted a survey among alcohol industry players through the Business at OECD network. Business at OECD is an international network representing over 7 million companies of all sizes, providing a business voice to the OECD.

Owing to the scarcity of data and other resources, a full assessment of macroeconomic impacts is beyond the objectives of this special focus chapter. Instead, this review aims to give an overview of possible direct and indirect impacts of public health policies on the alcohol industry.

Policies to tackle harmful alcohol consumption can result in implementation costs for alcohol companies (Box 8.2). Any policy that affects alcohol products based on the amount of alcohol they contain may lead producers to reformulate their products. Changes in advertising regulations or pricing policies may require companies to modify their packaging and marketing strategies. The most important cost items that result from these policies are changes in marketing and advertising spend; redesign and printing costs; investment in the development of techniques to lower the alcohol content of beverages; and changes in production costs. These implementation costs are discussed below. There may also be additional compliance costs associated with employing staff or consultants to work on regulatory compliance, administration and reporting (OECD, 2020[5]). However, due to data limitations and the wide variety of policy options, policy design and countries, these topics are not addressed in this special focus chapter.

Any policy that changes the regulations around alcohol marketing – such as advertising restrictions but also policies that restrict competition on price – can have an impact on alcohol companies, which may need to develop a new advertising strategy, change their product portfolio or divert marketing funding to other channels. Some practical examples in which alcohol policies may trigger marketing costs include the following:

  • Alcohol producers may have to spend money on advertising agency fees (or commit time internally) to review and redesign their marketing strategy in response to changes in advertising regulation. The cost to the alcohol industry of redesigning marketing strategies will depend largely on the complexity of adhering to regulations. It is possible that restrictions on certain channels or types of marketing could force companies to adopt alternative, more expensive advertising options. However, in specific cases, it has been shown that current advertising practices may be adapted to meet new standards (for example, targeting an older audience or airing at a different time), without affecting the cost (Ross, Sparks and Jernigan, 2016[6]). Finally, there may be costs associated with cancelling planned advertising or sponsorships, but sufficient transition time could reduce this impact (Box 8.3).

  • Policies affecting a specific type or category of alcohol products could drive the industry to change their stock or portfolio. For example, in the case of MUP, the price increase would apply to only part of the producer’s or vendor’s portfolio of brands (Leicester, 2011[7]). Supermarkets are likely to stock both cheap and more expensive versions of each beverage type, and large producers generally have a portfolio of brands at different price points. Changing a portfolio or stock may be associated with marketing and strategy development costs.

  • Changes in advertising regulations may force companies to switch to other marketing channels. For example, the introduction of minimum prices would limit competition based on price. As a result, companies may decide to invest in non-price competition, such as media advertising (Leicester, 2011[7]). However, this may simply be a reallocation of existing funds rather than new investment.

    Restrictions in point-of-sale marketing, especially promotional allowances, could have an impact on the marketing budget of alcohol vendors. The 14 major alcohol companies spent USD 159 million per year in the United States on promotional allowances for alcohol vendors (Federal Trade Commission, 2014[8]).

Price policies such as taxes or minimum prices may result in costs to vendors for changing menus and price displays – both printing and labour costs. However, where prices are displayed on shelves, digitally or on single-use paper menus, these costs may be minimal.

Similarly, the introduction of warning labels on alcohol containers can incur redesign and printing costs. In 2020, Food Standards Australia & New Zealand (the statutory authority for developing food standards) undertook a review to estimate the costs the industry would incur for implementing mandatory pregnancy warning labels (FSANZ, 2020[11]). Their analysis estimated that the average cost per SKU for including a pregnancy warning label was AUD 4 924 (USD 3 420) (this could be lowered if companies combined mandatory and voluntary label replacements, which occur approximately once a year or more).

A change in labels may also lead to loss of stock, especially for slow-moving items such as spirits. To minimise the impact on the industry, the Australia and New Zealand Ministerial Forum on Food Regulation specified a three-year transition period (with permission for alcoholic beverages packaged and labelled before the end of the transition period to be sold after the transition period without having to display a pregnancy warning label) (FSANZ, 2020[11]).

If producers decide to respond to new policies by reducing the alcohol content of their products, they have to invest in R&D. While many techniques for producing lower-alcohol products exist, producers will need to experiment to find the right approach for their product. This includes costs for consumer testing of new products, as taste remains one of the main issues for acceptability of lower-alcohol products. However, limited data are available on the costs of R&D for alcohol companies.

Some governments have supported the research of production methods for lower-alcohol products by investing in research. The Lighter Wines Programme, a research imitative undertaken by the New Zealand wine industry, received NZD 8.13 million (USD 5.18 million) from the government, which was combined with NZD 8.84 million (USD 5.64 million) from the industry, to develop a number of viticulture and winery tools for the production of lower-alcohol wines (Ministry for Primary Industies, 2017[12]). In addition, the alcohol industry argues that, to justify investment in R&D for lower-alcohol products, some regulations may need to be reviewed (for example, product labelling rules need to permit lower-alcohol forms, such as low-alcohol whisky).

If producers decide to reduce the alcohol content of their products, they may also see changes in their production costs. The type of process used to produce the lower-alcohol beverage is one of the main determinants of changes in production cost – for example:

  • Limited fermentation methods: the arrested or limited fermentation process can be performed using existing production methods, and therefore requires less up-front investment (Brányik et al., 2012[13]). This process can reduce the production time and raw materials required, making the overall production cost the same or lower than for regular beverages. However, additional costs may be associated with ensuring the shelf life of these low-alcohol products. Beer and wine produced through restricted fermentation may be left with high levels of unfermented sugar, which make them more perishable (Sohrabvandi et al., 2010[14]; Schmidtke, Blackman and Agboola, 2012[15]). While there are methods to improve shelf life, such as pasteurisation, these add cost and can affect the flavour of the product.

  • Alcohol removal methods: in comparison, the capital costs of alcohol removal methods such as reverse osmosis and high vacuum distillation are high, and the removal of alcohol to below 0.45% consumes a high level of electricity per litre of ethanol removed (Schmidtke, Blackman and Agboola, 2012[15]). These methods therefore require investment in equipment and higher ongoing production costs. However, the quality of the beer and wine may be higher, as the flavour is closer to the full-alcohol product (Schmidtke, Blackman and Agboola, 2012[15]; Brányik et al., 2012[13]). The cost of buying a reverse osmosis machine – quoted as being between USD 30 000 and more than USD 2 million (Goode, 2009[16]; Goldfarb, 2007[17]) – is significant for many wine producers. Smaller producers who do not have the economies of scale for large capital investments can rent alcohol removal machines and pay per volume of wine treated. For example, in Australia this cost is estimated at AUD 0.10 (USD 0.07) per litre to reduce the alcohol content by 1% (VAF Memstar, 2018[18]).

  • Agricultural methods: earlier harvesting can reduce the amount of sugar in grapes, and thus reduce the alcohol content of wine (OECD, 2015[4]). However, this also affects the flavour of the wine. Instead, growers can change the leaf area to fruit weight ratio: a high ratio leads to a greater production of sugar in the grapes. By reducing the leaf area, sugar production can be delayed while still allowing time for flavour and phenols to develop. This production of lower-sugar grapes requires manual labour for leaf removal. In addition, the method carries risks, as the optimal leaf to crop ratio needs to be found to prevent excessively delayed ripening (AWRI, 2020[19]; Schmidtke, Blackman and Agboola, 2012[15]).

Many alcohol policies are designed to reduce consumption of alcohol, and will therefore affect the earnings of the industry (Box 8.4). However, the impacts of policies on the industry can differ widely. For example, taxes can affect either sales or profits; price policies have different impacts on off-trade and on-trade vendors; minimum prices and reformulation may actually increase income for the industry; and a reduction in sales of alcohol products can lead to a reduction in sales of other products.

The impact of taxation on alcohol producers and vendors is strongly dependent on the amount of tax they decide to pass on to consumers through higher prices – the pass-through rate (Box 8.5). If the tax is not passed on to the consumer in the form of a price increase, the producer or vendor will have to cover the cost, reducing their profit margin. However, if the industry passes on the tax in the form of a price increase, it has the effect of lowering sales. Therefore, the pass-through rate can either increase the cost for the industry or reduce sales.

In general, the more consumers reduce their consumption in response to a price increase (i.e. the more price-elastic the product is), the less likely the industry is to pass on taxes (Rabinovich et al., 2012[3]). The competitiveness of the market plays a role as well, as companies operating on small profit margins will be less able to absorb the additional costs. The extent to which the tax is passed through to the customer will also depend on negotiation between the producers and vendors (Leicester, 2011[7]). This in turn will depend on the relative bargaining power of these two players, as well as their assessments of price elasticity.

The industry has raised the possibility of policy-makers introducing different tax rates based on the alcohol level of beverages, to encourage reformulation (see Box 8.3). In the case of taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages, there have been examples of tiered tax rates driving reformulation and lowering the sugar content of drinks (Bandy et al., 2020[22]). However, there is currently little evidence on whether the same would work for alcoholic beverages, although one study found that a tax based on the volume of pure alcohol in South Africa led to a significant shift in advertising from higher-alcohol to lower-alcohol beers (Blecher, 2015[23]).

Just as some policies – such as sales restrictions – affect off-trade and on-trade vendors differently depending on their design, so do price policies. For alcohol vendors, taxation is likely to have a greater impact on off-trade than on-trade sales, as price elasticity is generally greater in the off-trade market (Collis, Grayson and Johal, 2010[24]; Leicester, 2011[7]). There are a number of reasons for this: a consumer may have a greater choice between brands in an off-licence vendor, increasing the importance of price; consumers of on-licence alcohol vendors have already accepted paying a higher price for the experience of drinking out; and on-licence traders charge a service mark-up, making the added tax proportionally less.

Minimum prices are unlikely to have a major impact on on-licence vendors. Studies have found that on-licence prices are between two and four times higher than for the off-licence market (Rabinovich et al., 2012[3]). As a result, prices charged in cafés and restaurants will generally be above any minimum threshold (Department of Health, 2016[25]). A study for the Welsh Government showed that only 0.2-3.4% of on-trade sales charged less than GBP 0.50 (USD 0.60) per alcohol unit – depending on the type of drink (Angus et al., 2017[26]).

The impact of minimum prices will therefore be primarily on off-licence trade, where the lowest prices are charged for alcohol. Beer, cider and spirits in particular can be affected. For example, in the United Kingdom (Wales), 61.7%, 73.1% and 60.4% of off-licence sales cost less than GBP 0.50 (USD 0.60) per unit, respectively (Angus et al., 2017[26]). Depending on the level of the minimum price, it may reduce the difference between off- and on-licence prices and encourage consumers to switch to on-licence use (Leicester, 2011[7]).

Minimum prices can be expected to benefit sales of premium brands: the increase in price for products at the low end reduces the price gap with higher-priced, premium products, making them more attractive. However, minimum prices may also have a positive effect on revenues of producers of low-priced products. Unlike taxes, increased income from minimum prices remains with the industry. It has been estimated that, if there is no behavioural response to a minimum price of GBP 0.45 (USD 0.55) per unit, producers and retailers could expect an extra GBP 1.4 billion (USD 1.7 billion) in revenue in the United Kingdom (Leicester, 2011[7]).

Even if consumption of products subject to the minimum price decreases, the higher price charged may partly or completely offset the losses in sales. An impact assessment of minimum alcohol prices in Ireland noted that revenue to retailers is estimated to increase at any minimum unit price (Department of Health, 2016[25]). Another study estimated that a GBP 0.45 (USD 0.55) minimum price per unit of alcohol in the United Kingdom (England) would actually increase revenue for the off-trade sector by 5.6% (Brennan et al., 2014[27]). A study for the Welsh Government looking at a minimum price per unit of GBP 0.50 (USD 0.60) showed a decrease in consumption of 3.6% across the population (with, importantly, the greatest effect among harmful drinkers) but a 1.4% increase in spending (Angus et al., 2017[26]).

Recent years have seen a considerable increase in availability and sales of alcohol-free or lower-alcohol products (de Bruijn, van den Wildenberg and van den Broeck, 2012[28]; Brányik et al., 2012[13]). In Denmark, sales of low-alcohol and non-alcoholic beer increased by 2 100% between a low in 2008 and 2015 (Statista, 2019[29]). In Germany, the number of people consuming alcohol-free beer increased from 5.9 million in 2012 to 9.8 million in 2016 (Statista, 2020[30]).

The market for lower-alcohol products is expected to continue to increase considerably in the next few years: the global market for low-alcohol beer is predicted to grow by 7.9% every year between 2016 and 2021 and for low-alcohol wine by 5.4% each year (Statista, 2016[31]). This growing demand for lower-alcohol products presents an important sales opportunity for producers.

Product sales may be reduced if the lower-alcohol product replaces the original and has lower consumer acceptance. For example, it was argued that lower-alcohol beers might have an immature flavour profile, and foam less (Sohrabvandi et al., 2010[14]). However, if lower-alcohol versions are included in the brand portfolio as a line extension rather than a replacement, this can be avoided.

The lower calorie content of lower-alcohol beverages can be used as a way to market these products to people who are watching their weight (Jones and Bellis, 2012[32]). The New Zealand industry initiative aimed at developing lower-alcohol wines is marketed as “Lighter Wines”, with a focus on the lower calorie content of the wine (Miller, 2017[33]).

The rise in demand for lower-alcohol beverages can create a new revenue stream for vendors as well as producers. As part of the United Kingdom’s Public Health Responsibility Deal, a supermarket chain increased its range, space and marketing of lower-alcohol products, and saw sales grow by 135%, doubling the low-alcohol market share from 12.8% to 24.8% (Department of Health, 2014[34]). The same could apply to on-trade alcohol vendors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that pubs offering a wider range of low- or non-alcoholic drinks turned the tide on the “dry January” slump and had record sales (Walker, 2017[35]).

In addition to changing the sales of alcohol products, some alcohol policies can also affect the sales of other, non-alcohol products. A prohibition on the sale of alcohol products for a specific vendor may affect their ancillary sales, where alcohol is used as a loss leader – a product sold at a loss to attract customers – or sold to create a one-stop-shop convenience. A trade-sponsored report describes how allowing wine sales at food stores can increase sales of other products, as consumers who buy wine spend on average USD 20 more in addition to the wine (FMI, 2012[36]).

To capitalise on this effect, some off-licence vendors use cheap alcohol as a loss leader. In fact, the ban on below-cost sales discussed by the UK Government was in part developed to target this practice (IAS, 2019[37]). Supermarkets in the United Kingdom admitted to selling some alcohol products at less than wholesale prices to tempt customers to come into the store (Competition Commission, 2008[38]). The same supermarkets also indicated that they sold alcohol at below cost to be able to compete with other vendors. In this case, minimum pricing may have a positive financial benefit for the industry, as bans on below-cost sales and other minimum pricing policies can prevent unfair competitive practices by large retailers (OECD, 2015[4]).

In addition to company-level impacts such as implementation costs and changes in sales, alcohol policies can also change the industry as a whole. Stricter regulations on price or availability may lead to an increase in unrecorded alcohol sales, such as illicit sales or cross-border trade. Policies that affect the alcohol industry can have consequences for employment in this sector. These two impacts are further discussed below.

In addition, other alcohol policies such as advertising restrictions may also have an industry-level impact on competition between companies. In particular, smaller companies and new entrants may be affected by this. However, it is difficult to make any generalised statements on this topic, as the impacts will greatly depend on the competitive landscape and alcohol market in each country, as well as the specifics of the policy. Nevertheless, previous OECD work recommends that policy-makers should consider how their regulations affect the competitive process (OECD, 2020[5]).

Unrecorded alcohol can be defined as all alcohol products that are not taxed and are outside the usual system of governmental control (WHO, 2020[39]). This includes homemade or informally produced alcohol (legal or illegal), smuggled alcohol, surrogate alcohol (which is alcohol not intended for human consumption) and alcohol obtained through cross-border shopping. The total amount of unrecorded alcohol consumption is, by definition, hard to measure, but it is estimated that people in OECD countries consume on average 1.4 litres of unrecorded alcohol per person, per year (Figure 8.2).

Markets with the highest excise taxes tend to have greater problems with illicit trade. Since taxation raises the price of alcohol products, the financial rewards for those who avoid paying the taxes can be large (OECD, 2016[41]). Other policies, such as those restricting the sale of alcohol products at certain times or places, could make illicit products seem more convenient or more available (Neufeld et al., 2019[42]). Ineffective enforcement of policies – including inadequate penalties for activities related to illicit alcohol and corruption – also play a role in enabling illicit trade of alcohol products (TRACIT, 2020[43]).

In addition to reducing income for the industry, illicit sales avoid tax; this has a negative effect on government revenues (OECD, 2016[41]). In the European Union (EU27), sales of counterfeit wine and spirits were estimated to result in an annual loss of EUR 2.7 billion for the industry and of EUR 2.2 billion in tax revenue and reduced social security contributions for governments (EUIPO, 2018[44]).

Where taxes or regulations are introduced in only one country, or where they are significantly higher or stricter in one than in other countries, this may contribute to an increase in cross-border trade – where people travel to a neighbouring country to buy certain products. Cross-border trade is driven by differences in the type of products on sales, their relative prices, and the time and money required to travel across the border (Karlsson and Österberg, 2009[45]). Policies that restrict the availability or increase the price of alcohol products in only one country can increase cross-border trade with neighbouring countries without such regulation (see Box 8.6).

Changes in alcohol sales may also have consequences for the economy through their impact on employment (Box 8.7). A reduction in revenue or profits for the alcohol industry – as a result of price policies or any other policy aimed at reducing alcohol consumption – could reduce employment in this sector. However, some evidence shows that employment in other sectors may grow.

When considering the impact of alcohol policies on the wider economy, it is important to look at the total net effect on employment. While lower alcohol consumption may result in a loss of employment in the alcohol industry, displacement of demand and jobs could cause employment in other industries to grow (IAS, 2017[51]).

For example, one study suggested that a potential small decrease in jobs in the Australian wine industry as a result of volumetric wine taxes (between 0.5% and 6.8% of total employment, depending on the tax scenario) could be met with an increase in employment in the industries taking over the irrigated regions formerly used for vines (Fogarty and Jakeman, 2011[52]).

In addition to a growth in replacement industries, employment losses in the alcohol industry may also be offset by employment growth in other industries as a result of the reinvestment of excise tax income. One study modelling reinvestment of the additional revenue generated through an alcohol tax showed an increase in overall employment (Wada et al., 2017[53]). The study considered the impact of two hypothetical alcohol tax increases (a USD 0.05 per drink excise tax increase and a 5% sales tax increase on beer, wine, and distilled spirits) on employment in the US states of Arkansas, Florida, Massachusetts, New Mexico and Wisconsin, taking into account changes in alcohol demand, average state income and substitution effects. Results from the analysis found a USD 0.05 per drink tax increase would lead to a net increase of 8 183 jobs across the five states analysed, with this figuring declining to 7 792 when introducing a 5% sales tax. In percentage terms, gains in net employment are relatively small, representing between 0.014% and 0.089% of overall employment, depending on the type of tax and state.

A modelling study looking at the United Kingdom found similar results: if the government proceeds of a theoretical 10% increase in alcohol tax are used to increase spending on public services, there would be over 17 000 more full-time equivalent jobs. In addition, gross value added would increase by GBP 847 million (USD 1 039 million) (Connolly et al., 2019[54]).

It is important to note that the evidence regarding alcohol policies and employment is mostly limited to modelling studies. Moreover, these studies primarily look at the impact of taxes on trade in various industries, and do not take into account the health impacts of reduced alcohol consumption, which also affect employment. Finally, some studies suggest that there may be friction costs in the short term, which can include time off work between jobs and the costs of hiring and (re)training (Kigozi et al., 2016[55]).

Implementation of more stringent policies aimed at curbing alcohol consumption may have an impact on other sectors of the economy and associated industries. This section extends the previous analysis in this chapter by examining the potential impact of alcohol policies on other industries, using household expenditure data. Specifically, it analyses the share of household budget that is devoted to purchasing alcohol and compares spending habits between households who do and do not purchase alcohol. This will facilitate better understanding of how households may reallocate expenditure in response to a reduction in alcohol purchases. The analysis is of 19 European countries and the United States (see Annex 8.A for further details).

Figure 8.3 examines alcohol expenditure by country for alcohol-purchasing households only (i.e. households who recorded positive spending on alcohol). The results show that households across 19 European countries and the United States spent USD PPP 294-1 349 on alcohol in 2015, or around 1.0-3.4% of their total budget. A policy-induced reduction in alcohol purchases could encourage alcohol-purchasing households to switch consumption to other goods and services. For example, a reduction in purchases equal to 10% would make available an additional USD PPP 29 per household in Hungary and up to USD PPP 135 per household in Ireland, which could be reallocated to other industries.

Figure 8.4 suggests how the additional household budget resulting from reductions in alcohol purchases may be reallocated. The figure shows household expenditure bundles for all countries, according to whether the household purchases or does not purchase alcohol (i.e. whether alcohol expenditure is above zero or not). The results indicate that alcohol-purchasing households spend a higher proportion of total expenditure on discretionary (non-essential) items (ONS, 2017[57]), such as restaurants and hotels (5.9% vs. 4.9%) and recreation and culture (6.4% vs. 5.6%). Since discretionary items are more responsive to changes in income (i.e. they have higher elasticity (Jääskelä and Windsor, 2011[58])), the findings suggest that a decrease in alcohol expenditure could be offset by additional expenditure on other discretionary goods.

Implementation of policies to tackle harmful alcohol use has an impact on the alcohol industry. At the company level, alcohol producers and off- and on-trade vendors may face implementation costs, from those associated with redesigning their marketing strategy to those for developing and using techniques to reduce the alcohol content of their products. Alcohol policies can also have an impact on their income, reducing profit or sales. On the other hand, minimum prices can increase profits for the industry, and sales can be increased by responding to the market demand for lower-alcohol products. At the industry level, alcohol policies in one country can increase cross-border trade with neighbouring countries. Employment in the alcohol industry may be negatively affected by policies aiming to reduce alcohol consumption, but this may be paired with increased employment in other industries.

Overall, costs to the industry are difficult to calculate, given the lack of publicly available data. Based on available information, the review did not find evidence indicating that costs to the industry outweigh costs associated with harmful alcohol consumption (such as disease-related health expenditure and reduced labour productivity – see Chapter 4).

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Expenditure patterns were analysed for 19 European countries, which were chosen based on data availability. Data were retrieved from each country’s 2010 household budget survey micro-dataset, which includes expenditure on 12 key items including food and drink, clothing and footwear, health, transport, recreation and culture, and hotels (i.e. the United Nation’s classification of individual consumption by purpose (COICOP)).

The following European countries were analysed: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Micro-data for the United States came from the 2015 household Consumer Expenditure Survey collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Expenditure bundles were re-classified to align with the United Nation’s COICOP.

To ensure data comparability across countries, expenditure items and household disposable income were inflated to 2015 values using individual consumer price index values (OECD, 2020[59]). Once inflated, they were converted to USD PPP using PPP conversation rates (OECD, 2020[60]). To ensure that the results represented the entire population, as opposed to the surveyed population, they were adjusting using survey weights.

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