2. Socio-economic trends, growth potential and opportunities
This chapter discusses the socio-economic structure and performance of regions in Greece, with a focus on how the 2008 financial crisis affected economic structures and future regional growth potential. The diagnosis made in this chapter serves as a basis for framing regional policies to set regions on a solid and fast recovery path that can help alleviate the worsening socio-economic conditions brought about by the crisis. The uneven and deep effects of the crisis mean that regional development strategies require not only a substantial increase in economic activity and employment, but also the reallocation of resources to more productive uses. OECD analysis estimates that, between 2009 and 2018, each euro of EU Structural Funds in Greece generated an additional 64 cents of GDP. In this context, the EU funds have been key to supporting public investment and GDP growth in Greece.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Greece experienced the largest recession across OECD countries. While most OECD countries returned to gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 2010, Greece only did so in 2017 (1.3%) and 2018 (2.2%). The crisis and long recovery period had sizable consequences for the economy and its regions so that Greece’s GDP is today one-fourth smaller than in 2007. To recover what was lost across all regions, Greece would need to boost its economic growth considerably, especially in lagging regions: growing at average 2014-17 levels means Greece would only return to its pre-crisis level beyond 2050 and some underperforming regions would not recover even within this century.
This chapter discusses the socio-economic structure and performance of regions in Greece, with a focus on how the 2008 financial crisis affected economic structures and future regional growth potentials. The diagnosis made in this chapter serves as a basis for framing regional policies to set regions in a solid and fast recovery path that can help alleviate the worsening socio-economic conditions brought about by the crisis.
In Greece, unique geographical characteristics shape the distribution and access of people and resources across the territory. A mountainous terrain and island geography mean that relatively more people in Greece live in low-density rural areas with less access to cities than in other OECD countries. In fact, the share of people in remote rural areas resembles that of countries with large sparsely populated territories such as Norway and Sweden, with the difference that in Greece most people in remote regions lack adequate access to the Internet. The geographical conditions have also resulted in a high concentration at the top of the urban system, so that almost one out of two people live in one of the two main metropolitan areas, Athens (located in the Attica region) and Thessaloniki (located in Central Macedonia). In between these extremes, medium-sized cities will likely continue losing population to ageing and urban concentration in the next five decades despite recent incoming waves of international migrants.
Against this background, the analysis of the effects of the crisis and long recovery shows a fundamental change in the population composition and productive structure of regions. The loss of half a million people nationwide to outmigration had a much larger negative impact on the share of the working-age population in urban regions including Attica (11% decrease) compared to intermediate and rural regions (4% and 2.5% decrease respectively) between 2000 and 2019. Because migrants were mostly working-age, outmigration also led to an acceleration of the elderly dependency ratio especially in urban regions where, by 2016, there was one elderly person for every three working-age persons.
The productive structure of Greece changed as a response to the shock of the crisis. In the post-crisis period, resources shifted towards tourism-related sectors, allowing island regions to buffer the effects of the crisis in terms of employment and incomes. However, the bulk of sectors declined and regions specialised in manufacturing and construction were badly hurt. The economic decline that followed the crisis was mostly concentrated in Attica and Central Macedonia, where more than half of the near 725 000 jobs lost occurred. Job creation in two island regions relying on tourism was not nearly enough to compensate for the downfall of the two main regions.
Because of the combined effect of population and productive structure shocks, the largest urban regions, Attica and Central Macedonia, showed a remarkable lack of resilience to the negative economic shock compared to other island regions that rely on tourism. Particularly striking is the complete change in the role of Attica that went from leading productivity growth in the pre-crisis period to dragging the recovery in the post-crisis period, despite its strong potential.
Still, urban regions concentrated most of the economic activity in the country in 2017. Attica is the only region that hosts activities that benefit from scale economies and it is the only region with a larger share of Greek GDP (48%) compared to population (35%). The distance between Attica and the rest of the country is large: regions at the bottom produce only half a unit for every unit of GDP per capita produced in Attica. As the largest, most diverse in terms of economic structure and most educated regional economy, Athens has the potential to generate further scale effects in Attica and Greece. However, with the crisis, Athens lost ground to all other OECD cities of similar size including those over which it held an initial advantage (Barcelona, Manchester and Naples).
Employment recovery is thus key in addressing pressing social issues including low incomes, poverty and inequality across regions. The uneven and deep effects of the crisis mean that regional development strategies require not only a substantial increase in economic activity and employment but also the reallocation of resources to more productive uses. A decade after the crisis, more than half of all part-time employees are in search of full-time positions and the share of unemployed who have not had a job for more than a year is over 40 percentage points higher in Greece compared to other OECD countries. Unemployment rates in regions in Greece are amongst the highest across the OECD and in some regions more than half of young workers are unemployed. Despite the high share of university graduates that place Athens at the level of European capitals like Berlin, investment in research and development (R&D) is low and the innovation performance of regions in Greece is at the bottom across OECD regions.
Since the early 1980s, the European Union Structural Funds (now called European Structural and Investment Funds, ESIF) have provided financing aid to EU member states to promote convergence across Europe’s regions. ESIF finance several economic and social areas including public infrastructure and human capital, social policy and public administration. Greece has been a major beneficiary of these funds. Without ESIF, the crisis would have been deeper and the ongoing recovery slower. The results from two different models show that between 2009 and 2017, each euro of EU funds generated an extra 64 cents of GDP, implying a multiplier of 0.64. In this context, the EU funds have been key to supporting public investment and GDP growth. Another study estimates that EU Structural Funds in the programming period 2007-13 boosted Greece’s GDP by 2.2% a year by 2015 and by 2023; the yearly impact is predicted to increase to 2.8% (Monfort et al., 2017[1]).
This chapter contains five sections. The first section gives an overview of relevant macroeconomic trends affecting regional performance before and after the economic crisis. The second section describes the distribution of people and economic activity across the Greek territory, highlighting the role of geographical factors in their concentration. The third section analyses the effect of the crisis on regions in terms of demographic dynamics, income and poverty, employment, economic structure and productivity. The fourth section discusses the role of innovation, human capital, environmental and social capital as enabling factors for regional development. The last section discusses the impact of the EU funds on the Greek economy. Beyond immediate responses (more information on www.oecd.org/coronavirus), the medium- and long-term impacts of the recent (February 2020-ongoing) COVID-19 pandemic remain uncertain and will vary between countries and segments of the industry.
Recent macroeconomic indicators show that economic recovery in Greece is within reach but it will take time to materialise. This section analyses the evolution of the main macroeconomic indicators on economic activity, productivity, prices and external performance before and after the economic crisis.
At current growth rates, Greece would recover its pre-crisis GDP level only in 15 years
GDP in Greece grew by 1.9% in 2018, with estimates showing GDP growth at 2.3% in 2019 and 3% in 2020. While this is a positive development, GDP in Greece would recover to its 2007 GDP levels in about 15 years at this growth pace. In 2007, prior to the crisis, GDP in Greece had increased by one-third of its value in 2000, growing at a faster rate than OECD countries (Figure 2.1). With the crisis, GDP levels fell by 24% by 2016 as compared to its peak in 2007. Although GDP subsequently stabilised, by 2018, the economy had a similar size than it had in 2003 and was one-fifth smaller than before the crisis. In contrast, GDP in OECD countries recovered to pre-crisis levels by 2011 and in 2018, was 40% larger than in 2007.
Note: GDP is measured in current prices, constant purchasing power parity (PPPs), 2015 being the reference year, the unit of measure is USD. GDP is normalised to its 2007 level.
Source: OECD (2020[2]), OECD National Accounts, http://www.oecd.org/sdd/na/, (accessed on 20 February 2020).
After the crisis, GDP per capita in Greece became the third-lowest among OECD countries
Greece is one of three OECD countries where GDP per capita is lower in 2018 than in 2008. GDP per capita in Greece stood at USD 28 024 in 2018, down from USD 35 538 in 2008. Across OECD countries, only Chile and Mexico had lower GDP per capita levels in 2018. In 2008, Greece ranked slightly behind the OECD average GDP per capita, ahead of Chile, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey and Eastern European countries (Figure 2.2). The deep crisis and slow recovery of the Greek economy reflect on the overall life satisfaction of the Greek population, which fell to the lowest levels among OECD countries (Box 2.1).
Note: GDP is measured in constant prices, 2015 PPPs.
Source: (OECD, 2020[3]) Gross domestic product (GDP) (Database), https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm, (accessed on 13 August 2020).
Greece’s regions are top-scorers in the OECD for the well-being indicators of health and safety but are among the lowest when it comes to jobs and life satisfaction. Economic outcomes weigh in heavily on the well-being of Greece in multiple dimensions. Greece fares better in health outcomes, safety and work-life balance, according to the OECD Better Life Index, a composite indicator of ten well-being dimensions (Figure 2.3). Yet, subjective well-being is among the lowest in OECD countries, with Greeks grading their general life satisfaction with an average grade of 5.2, compared to 6.5 OECD average.
More than a decade after the crisis, Greece performs below OECD averages in most economic indicators of well-being, including jobs and income. Compared to the OECD average, the share of the working-age population with a job is much lower, about 52% compared to 67%. A large proportion of the unemployed are unemployed long-term and Greeks face 17.4% loss of earnings if they get unemployed, compared to 4.9% across the OECD. Job quality, measured in average wages, is far below the OECD average (USD 25 124 versus USD 44 290), as do household income and net financial wealth.
In terms of well-being indicators, “civic engagement”, which measures citizens’ participation in the political process, engagement in developing regulations and inequality, Greece has a grade 3.9 out of 10. “Voter turnout” stands at 64% in the last elections, has fallen since 2007 and is lower than 69% average across OECD countries. “Community” is 82.3 and puts Greece at the 36th place out of 38 countries. Greeks are also exposed to high air pollution and lower water quality than the OECD average.
Note: Based on the Better Life Index. Each indicator set is measured by one to four indicators from the OECD Better Life indicator set. Each indicator is normalised between scores of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).
Source: (OECD, 2017[4]), OECD Better Life Index, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/, (accessed on 16 January 2019).
Greece has a low incidence of part-time employment, high total working hours and longer average tenure as compared to other OECD countries
Reducing the costs of labour for firms is a step towards labour retention and slowing down unemployment. However, the crisis period induced structural changes and sectoral reallocation of economic activity on the labour market and therefore created large skill, sectoral and locational mismatches, resulting in high structural unemployment (Tagkalakis, 2016[5]).
Indeed, the labour market in Greece is characterised by a low incidence of part-time employment, high total working hours and longer average tenure as compared to other OECD countries. By 2017, unemployment remains high and employment rates low, more than half of all part-time employees are in search of a full-time position and the share of unemployed who have not had a job for more than a year is over 40 percentage points higher in Greece compared to other OECD countries.
In 2007, 8% of jobs were part-time, while a share of part-time work in the OECD was a double of the share in Greece. The prevalence of part-time employment increased to 11% by 2017, mainly driven by an increase in involuntary part-time employment, as 6.6% of employees would prefer a full-time job instead. Yet, despite the conditions of part-time work improving in recent years, part-time employees still face a penalty in terms of pay, job security, training or promotion (OECD, 2018[6]).
Besides high part-time employment, Greece has one of the highest annual working hours across OECD countries. An average worker in Greece worked 2 018 hours in 2017, the third-largest behind Korea and Mexico and well above the OECD average of 1 759 hours. Since the crisis, the average hours worked per employee declined, while the OECD average has been stable. Long working hours are a sign of labour market rigidities that translate into lower productivity per hour worked.
The average tenure in Greece increased in 2010, which suggest that mostly fewer senior employees were let go during the crisis period and less new hires were initiated. An average Greek employee had worked at their current employer for 12.8 years in 2017. This tenure average is close to other southern countries, including Italy and Portugal, but well above the OECD average of 10.2 years. Long-tenure workers also face a risk of long-term joblessness (OECD, 2018[6]). The average tenure in Greece reached its peak in 2013 as the labour market recovered and new workers were hired, decreasing average tenure.
Labour productivity has steadily declined since 2007
Labour productivity measures the efficiency of labour input with other factors of production in the production process and serves as a benchmark for competitive performance across countries. Potential GDP growth in Greece declined from the early 2000s, due to both falling productivity and employment growth (OECD, 2018[7]). The fall in investments during the crisis has diminished the productive capital in Greece with the capital’s depreciation rate higher than the investment rate. Low capital accumulation is also holding back growth in labour productivity and consequently hurting living standards (OECD, 2018[7]).
Greece’s labour productivity stayed below OECD average levels during the period 2000-18. Initial levels and growth rate between 2000 and 2008 were comparable to those of Slovenia. However, labour productivity in Greece declined continuously since its peak in 2007. By 2018, it had reached 90% of its pre-crisis level, similar to the level of labour productivity in some Eastern European countries that had substantially lowe productivity in 2000.
Compared to other Southern European countries, labour productivity in Greece increased faster in the period leading up to the crisis. Between 2000 and 2007, Greece improved its productivity by 15%, while productivity in Italy and Spain remained stagnant. After 2007, productivity growth picked up across European countries at a different pace, increasing by about 9% in EU28 countries during the past decade, while it declined in Greece (Figure 2.4).
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
While inflation has recently returned wage levels remain below pre-crisis levels
For most of the post-crisis period, Greece experienced deflation. Consumer prices fell continuously between 2013 and 2016 by 0.8 to 1.7% annually. The deflation trend has reversed since 2017, with prices increasing by 1.1% in 2017 and 0.6% in 2018 (Figure 2.5). Since 2012, annual inflation in Greece has remained low at under 2%. Private consumption has stabilised and investments grew by 10% in 2017, after falling each quarter between 2009 and 2013 by up to 33%.
Note: Real wage growth measured using average wages in USD 2016 PPP.
Source: OECD (2020[9]), Average Wages, Inflation CPI (indicators), https://data.oecd.org/, (accessed on 06 March 2020).
Despite recent inflation, wage pressure remains moderate. Following a continuous drop between 2010 and 2013, real wages stabilised, growing at an annual rate of 1% in 2018. Compared to their highest level in 2009, real wages were 21% lower at their peak between 2013 and 2018 (at USD 33 763), and 19% lower than in 2007. This contrasts with Italy, Portugal and Spain, where real wages are about the same as they were prior to the crisis.
Wages in Greece are among the lowest across OECD countries. In 2016, a medium-skilled worker in Greece earns as much as a worker with the same skills in Portugal, about USD 8.4 per hour worked. The skill premium for high-skilled workers is about 60% compared to medium-skilled workers, similar to the premium in the United States (60%) and under the premium in Mexico (89%), Turkey (81%), Portugal (77%), Hungary (68%), Poland (68%) and Slovenia (65%). Going from low skill to medium skill increases the hourly wage by about 28% in Greece, which is close to the average skill premium across OECD countries.
Exports recovered but shifted towards medium-low technology goods
External demand gained importance after the crisis following the crash of internal demand. The share of exports in GDP rose from 24% in 2008 to 34% in 2017 (OECD, 2018[7]). The value of exports fell sharply at the end of 2008 and in the first quarter of 2009 (Figure 2.6). Across OECD countries, the value of exports of goods fell by 22% between 2008 and 2009, and together with exports in services recovered to their pre-crisis levels by 2011.
While exports of goods recovered to their pre-crisis level by 2011, exports in services were still below their pre-crisis peak by 2019. Manufacturing goods represent the largest share of the goods exports, while agricultural products are also important export commodities especially for the largest trading partners, as they represented 14% of exports to Italy and 10% to Germany. In contrast, exports in services had not yet reached their pre-crisis peak by 2017. Still, service exports represented more than half of total exports in 2019, making Greece one of the top countries where service sector exports represent the majority of trade. Across OECD countries, only Luxemburg (84%) and Iceland (56%) have a higher share of services in total exports.
Note: Quarterly data. The value of exports is converted to USD and seasonally adjusted.
Source: OECD (2020[10]), International Trade and Balance of Payments (database), http://www.oecd.org/sdd/its/, (accessed on 14 February 2020).
Despite increases in R&D-intensive industries exports, Greece’s export portfolio shifted towards medium-low technology exports. Between 2000 and 2017, the share of exports in medium-low technology manufacturing in total primary and manufacturing exports increased by 4.2 percentage points, from 48% in 2000 to 53% in 2017 (Figure 2.7). Almost one-third of 2016 manufacturing exports were in coke and refined petroleum products, followed by food and beverages products (18%) and basic metals (11%). Meanwhile, the share of exports in R&D intensive industries increased from 7.9% to 8.2% while the share of exports from low technology industries fell by 3.4%.
Compared to their exports, Greece imports more from industries with better technologies. Across economic sectors, the largest share of merchandise imports come from mineral fuels, lubricants and related material (23%), followed by machinery and transport equipment (22%), and chemicals (16%) (OECD, 2018[7]). Out of the total value of imports, 12% are from high and 20% from medium-high technology industries.
Note: Classification of industries by knowledge intensity is defined by Eurostat.
Source: OECD (2019[11]), Industry and Services (database), https://www.oecd.org/statistics/data-collection/industryandservices.htm, (accessed on 20 February 2019).
Because of its idiosyncratic features, geography is an important determinant of local economic outcomes in Greece. Mountainous and island geographical features are behind high population concentration in the two main metropolitan areas and the existence of sparsely populated in large parts of the territory. This section discusses main geographical features and administrative divisions of Greece, the distribution of the population across the territory and inequalities in access to cities. It then continues with a description of the distribution of economic activity, which mirrors the distribution of the population across the territory. The next section will discuss the regional dynamics before and after the crisis.
Unique geographic features shape the distribution of people across regions
Greece has a unique mountainous and island geography
Greece is located in the south-eastern part of Europe, occupying almost one-quarter of the territory of the Balkan Peninsula and two smaller peninsulas of Khalkidhiki and Peloponnese. The country borders Albania, North Macedonia, Bulgaria in the north and Turkey in the east. The Aegean Sea surrounds the east of the country, the Ionian Sea the west and the Mediterranean Sea the south.
Greece has the largest coastline in Europe and the 11th longest coastline in the world at 13 676 km in length, with around 6 000 islands1 that represent about 20% of the national territory, out of which only 227 are inhabited. The largest islands are Crete, Euboea, Lesbos and Rhodes. The remaining islands are at most two-thirds of the size of Rhodes, with 27 islands spreading over an area of at least 100 km² (see Box 2.2).
Seas and coastal areas play a very important economic and strategic role for Greece and Greece’s maritime and blue economy have great potential for innovation and growth. In 2018, the blue economy in Greece counted 14.2% of all jobs and about 5.2% of GVA. Coastal tourism and maritime transport were the larger contributors with 13% of the GVA and 3.8% of the employment, while marine living resources generated around 7% of jobs and GVA (EC, 2020[12]). Located on the crossroad of Africa, Asia and Europe, Greece holds a strategic position in global freight transport. Most of the trade in goods by volume and value is exchanged using cargo. The port of Piraeus in Athens is one of the top ten European ports in number of cargo units by 2017. In addition, it is one of the fastest-growing major European ports; the number of cargos handled more than doubled between 2011 and 2017, in line with the increase in exports in the same period. Passenger ports are also busy. In 2015 more than 8 million passengers passed through the port of Piraeus, a volume only surpassed by the ports of Calais, Dover, Helsinki, Stockholm and Tallinn in Europe. Yet, in 2015, the port of Piraeus served 25% fewer passengers than in 2010. The port of Perama, the western terminus of Athens’ port, embarked and disembarked over 7 million passengers, falling by 45% between 2010 and 2015 (Eurostat, 2015[13])
Greece is a unitary country with a two-tier sub-national system. The local government structure is represented by 325 municipalities (dimos) and 13 regions. This system is in place since the 2010 Kallikratis reform, replacing a previous organisational structure of 1 033 municipalities and communities and 54 prefectures. The average population of a municipality is 33 410 inhabitants (Brezzi et al., 2011[14]). The municipalities are further divided into 6 133 local communities (with less than 2 000 inhabitants) and municipal communities (with more than 2 000 inhabitants). The General Secretary appointed by the Ministry of the Interior leads seven deconcentrated state administrations. Greece is divided into 74 regional units for administrative purposes.
The only official definition of urban areas and rural areas is the definition of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (in the Statistical Yearbook of Greece 2009-10). It defines an urban population as the population of municipal/communal departments in which the largest population centre has 2 000 or more inhabitants; and rural population as the population of those municipal/communal departments in which the largest locality has less than 2 000 inhabitants.
Moreover, there is no clear official medium-sized cities in Greece. A population of 50 000 inhabitants is used as a threshold for medium-sized cities in Law 3852/2010 for Local Administration. Cities with a population of between 2 000-10 000 inhabitants are considered very small (previously semi-urban) and from 10 000-50 000 are considered small to medium.
Islands are grouped into seven clusters. Crete with its surrounding islands constitutes the administrative region of Crete. The Argo-Saronic Islands spread near Athens in the Saronic gulf and the administrative region of Attica. Euboea is located in Continental Greece. The North Aegean islands are located in the northeastern Aegean Sea near the west coast of Turkey. The North Aegean islands belong to the administrative region of North Aegean, with the exception of Samothrace and Thasos , which are administratively attached to the Eastern Macedonia region. The third-largest Greek island, Lesbos, is also located in this cluster. Islands in the southern part of the west Turkish coast are labelled Dodecanese islands and include Rhodos. The Cyclades is a dense cluster of islands in the central part of the Aegean Sea. The Dodecanese islands and Cyclades compose the administrative region of the South Aegean islands. Sporades is a group of islands in the Aegean Sea near the coast of Euboea in the region of Thessaly, and finally, the Ionian Islands are located in the west in the Ionian Sea. The Ionian Islands constitute the region of the same name except for the island of Kythera, which is administratively attached to Attica.
The regions in OECD countries are classified into two territorial levels that reflect the administrative organisation of the given country. Greece has 13 large regions (TL2) and 52 small regions (TL3). TL2 regions correspond to 13 Greek regions formed by the Kallikratis reform. TL3 regions correspond to regional units and a combination of regional units. According to the OECD regional typology, out of 52 TL3 regions: 8 are predominantly urban (PU), 15 are intermediate (IN), 3 are predominantly rural close to a city (PRC) and 26 are predominantly rural remote (PRR). Such typological classification is useful for comparison of indicators across countries. More details on OECD regional typology can be found in (Brezzi et al., 2011[14]).
Source: (Brezzi et al., 2011[14]), “OECD Extended Regional Typology: The Economic Performance of Remote Rural Regions”, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg6z83tw7f4-en.
Most of the Greek territory is mountainous. The Pindus range, an extension of the Dinaric Alps, spreads across Greece from the northwest to the southeast. Another part of the same mountain stretches across the Peloponnese region and the Aegean Sea under water, forming many of the islands. The Rhodope Mountains is another mountain range at the border with Bulgaria. The highest peak is Mount Olympus at 2 918 m above sea level. The Central and Western regions also contain many mountainous peaks and canyons. Forests spread across the eastern part of Greece. Central Macedonia and Thessaly territories contain lower elevation areas (Figure 2.8).
In Greece, relatively more people live in rural areas compared to other OECD countries
The population of Greece was 10.72 million in 2019, which places it at the 18th place in the ranking of the most populated OECD countries. Compared to OECD countries, predominantly urban regions in Greece contain a smaller proportion of people (45% versus 48%) and land (2.9% versus 6.1%); intermediate regions contain a smaller percentage of people (23% versus 27%) and a larger percentage of land (25% versus 11%); and predominantly rural regions contain a larger percentage of people (32% versus 25%) and a smaller percentage of land (72% versus 83%) (Figure 2.9, see Box 2.2). The share of the population in urban regions in Greece is comparable to countries of similar population size such as Portugal (47%) and Sweden (50%).
Out of 3.4 million people living in predominantly rural regions, 3 million live in rural remote regions, making Greece the country with the second-largest share of the rural population in remote regions across OECD countries (Figure 2.10), with levels similar to countries with large areas relative to population, such as Iceland and Norway.
Source: Grid elevation tiles obtained from Amazon Web Services. For a complete list of sources, see https://github.com/tilezen/joerd/blob/master/docs/data-sources.md.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
The mountainous and island geography results in relatively low and widely varying population density levels across the Greek territory. All urban small regions belong to the two main large regions of Greece that concentrate more than half of the country’s population: Attica, home to the capital Athens, and Central Macedonia, home to Thessaloniki, the second-largest city. Meanwhile, Epirus and Continental Greece are entirely composed of predominantly rural regions; the North Aegean, Peloponnese and Western Macedonia regions all have more than 73% of their population living in rural remote small regions.
Note: The country’s distribution of population among regions is listed next to the region’s name. The bars indicate the percentage of the population living in TL3 regions classified into three types of regions according to the OECD regional typology.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
The level of access to cities in Greece is comparable to that of countries with large sparsely populated regions
The proportion of people with relatively low access to a city in Greece is high compared to OECD countries. People in mountainous areas and small islands need considerable travel time to reach the closest city: about a quarter of the population in Greece lives at least a 60-minute drive from a populated centre with 50 000 inhabitants or more (Figure 2.13). Across OECD countries, this is comparable to the share of population distanced from a city in sparsely populated countries such as Canada or Iceland.
About 1 million people in Greece (approximately 973 000) must travel at least 90 minutes to reach the nearest city. Some populated areas do not have access to a city even within two or more hours of travel. It takes more than six hours on average to reach the nearest town from islands in the South Aegean region, almost three hours from the Ionian Islands region and over two hours from the North Aegean and Peloponnese regions. These differences in accessibility highly influence the incidence of seasonal activities across the territory (see Box 2.3).
Accessibility to towns and cities matters for a number of reasons. Larger agglomerations have more dynamic and diversified economies and a greater range of public and private services available, including specialist services that are unlikely to exist in smaller communities (e.g. healthcare specialists and post-secondary education institutions). In contrast, regions with more limited accessibility – like Greece’s many islands – face higher transportation costs and seasonal transport variability. Moreover, many islands are poorly connected to core energy infrastructure and obtain their electricity primarily from inefficient, expensive and polluting diesel generators (Roinioti and Koroneos, 2019[15]).
Note: Accessibility is measured as the median time in minutes to travel from the TL3 region to the closest town or city with at least 50 000 inhabitants. The accessibility to cities grid as described in Weiss, 2018[16] is used to calculate the median TL3 time to the closest city across grid-cells that fall within TL3 boundaries A city is defined as an urban centre in the GHSL SMOD layer, that is, “contiguous cells with a density of at least 1 500 per km2 or a density built up greater than 50% and a minimum population of 50 000 inhabitants” (Weiss, 2018[16]). Travel times are based on an impedance travel grid capturing the availability of roads, railroads, waterways and topographical conditions.
Source: Calculations based on Weiss, 2018[16] using the Global Human Settlement Layer (2015).
During the summer period, Greek islands are relatively well connected but transport options diminish in the winter, posing significant challenges to access to services and public goods. About 12% of the total number of subsidised ferry routes provided their services less than 52 times a year and 22% of routes are served exactly 52 times per year. About 10% of the routes have at least a daily service on average over the year (Angelopoulos, Chlomoudis and Papadimitriou, 2013[17]) The ferry schedule changes in the winter, when ferry frequency drops to two times per week. The case of the island of Anafi in the South Aegean with 271 inhabitants during the wintertime and up to 2 000 in the summer illustrates the situation: the only way to get to Anafi is maritime transport, which takes 19 hours from Athens and much longer in winter months when the ferry frequencies drop.
Regarding air transport, there are 39 airports in Greece, including 15 international, 5 serving 85% of the total air traffic. About three-quarters of tourist trips are made via air transport (ECORYS, 2007[18]) The South Aegean region has at least ten national and international airports, the North Aegean five and the Ionian Islands four.
The remaining islands that do not have an airport must rely on the ferry connections. As the cost of serving an island can be significant, ferry stops are subsidised by the national government. Public service obligation ensures transport services necessary to service provision in areas with lack of commercial potential, in concordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 36) that argues for access to services of general economic interest to promote social and territorial cohesion of the union. In 2011, public service obligation services subsidised 87 routes out of which 56 were inter-island connections.
Source: (Angelopoulos, Chlomoudis and Papadimitriou, 2013[17]) Cost Assessment of Sea and Air Transport PSO Services: The Case of Greece; (ECORYS, 2007[18]), Study on Strategic Evaluation on Transport Investment Priorities under Structural and Cohesion Funds for the Programming Period, http://www.ecorys.com.
The lack of physical access in Greece is not balanced with higher Internet access. Although access to services improved between 2006 and 2017, Greek regions remain among the bottom regions in terms of broadband Internet access. In Attica, the most economically advanced region, only 59% of households have access to broadband Internet. This level is comparable to regions in Chile, Mexico, Turkey and some, mostly remote, regions in Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Poland and the United States.
Most of the urban population in Greece is concentrated in two metropolitan areas
The share of urban population living in metropolitan areas in Greece stands out in comparison to other OECD countries. More than half (57%) of country inhabitants live in functional urban areas (hereon called cities), distributed into: 33% in a large metropolitan area; 10% in a metropolitan area; 6% in medium-sized cities; and 8% in small cities (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.14). In comparison, 39% of the OECD population lives in large metropolitan areas, 16% in metropolitan areas, 11%, in medium-sized cities and 4% in small cities. Besides small countries with no medium-sized cities (Estonia, Latvia and Luxemburg) across OECD countries, only Korea has a smaller share of the population in medium-sized cities (5%) compared to Greece (OECD, 2018[19]). Medium -sized cities in Greece are also smaller than what the rank-size rule of city size would predict (see Box 2.4).
Source: OECD (2019[20]), Functional Urban Areas, http://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionaldevelopment/Greece.pdf (accessed on 28 July 2020).
Medium-sized cities in Greece seem to be under-sized
The city size distribution in Greece compared to a rank-size rule shows that middle-size cities in Greece could potentially host a larger share of the urban population. According to the rank-size rule of the cities (Zipf’s law), the largest city is usually twice the size of the second-largest city, with this relation continuing linearly. For Greece, a graphic representation of cities with more than 75 000 inhabitants shows that the smaller cities have a population under the rank-size rule prediction. A slope smaller than minus one is indicative of primacy of the main city, Athens. Thessaloniki, which is less one-third of the size of Athens, would potentially host another 760 000 inhabitants for a perfect rank-size rule match. The gap between Thessaloniki and the third-largest city is even larger. Patras has only slightly more than one-fifth of Thessaloniki’s population, suggesting that it would be able to host another 300 000 people.
Note: Cities refer to functional urban areas. Prediction is estimated given the size of Athens. The linear fitted lower line takes all functional urban areas.
Source: OECD (2019[20]), Functional Urban Areas, http://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionaldevelopment/Greece.pdf (accessed on 28 July 2020).
Intermediate and rural regions will shrink in the next five decades
Greece’s population is ageing – a megatrend that is common across many OECD countries. The percentage of people of 65 years of age or more is 24%, about 4 percentage points above the value for OECD countries, and has a similarly balanced distribution between females (25%) and males (22%) to OECD countries (21% females versus 18% males) (Figure 2.16). Low fertility rates have affected the proportion of young people that could potentially join the labour force within the next decade: in Greece, the proportion of people in the 0-10 age bracket is 14% whereas across OECD countries it is 17%. In turn, the elderly population increased by about 21% while the working-age population shrank by 6% between 2001 and 2017.
Intermediate and rural regions are projected to experience considerable population losses between 2015 and 2060, while population levels in urban regions are projected to remain relatively stable (Figure 2.17). Population levels in intermediate regions will decrease from approximately 2.5 million people in 2015 to approximately 1.5 million in 2060, while rural regions are projected to shrink from about 3.5 million to about 2 million.
Meanwhile, international migrants residing in Greece are mostly concentrated in Athens. According to the latest population census, in 2011, the share of foreign residents from non-EU and EU countries in the total population was 9% and 3% respectively. Besides Attica, foreign residents also cluster in Northern Greece, Central Macedonia and Continental Greece (Figure 2.18).
Source: OECD (2020[21]), Demography and Population (database), https://data.oecd.org/pop/population.htm, (accessed on 18 February 2020).
Source: Eurostat (2019[22]), Population Projections, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-projections-data, (accessed in February 2019).
Note: Analysis performed at TL2 level; The OECD migrant definition includes temporary and permanent migrants with visas, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Although this category has a diverse composition, generally speaking, it is a vulnerable group at high risk of poverty, facing unemployment, with no or limited access to services, including the financial and health system.
Source: (Eurostat, 2019[23]), Migration and migrant population statistics (Database), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics, (accessed 1 March 2019).
Economic activity concentrates in urban regions
Attica is the only region in Greece that contributes a larger share of national output compared to the population
Higher productivity of factors arising from scale economies and agglomeration effects allow large urban conglomerations to produce more output proportional to their populations (OECD, 2015[24]). Attica concentrates almost half (47%) of the country’s GDP, above its share of the population (35%) and employment (36%) (Table 2.2). In contrast, the second largest region, Central Macedonia, concentrates a larger share of the population (17%) relative to GDP (14%) and about the same share of employment (17%).
Attica is the only region in Greece with a substantial presence of industries with higher scale economies. The region concentrates the largest percentage of firms in the country (27%), absorbs the bulk of total turnover (65%) and has much higher average firm sizes compared to other regions (47 employees per firm versus an average of 14 across regions). In contrast, Central Macedonia, the second region in importance, concentrates 19% of firms but only 11% of turnover and has an average firm size of 12 employees per firm. Within the region of Attica, the sector with the largest employment-to-size ratio is monetary intermediation (where over 45 000 people work in 57 firms), followed by the manufacture of refined petroleum products and temporary employment agency activities.
Regions outside Attica and Central Macedonia have much thinner economic activity bases, composed of activities with much smaller turnover and average size. Attica concentrates 6 times more employment, 3 times more firms and 20 times more turnover, and has 35 workers more per firm on average compared to Thessaly, the third region in importance. The gap with the smallest region in terms of population, the North Aegean, is even more staggering: Attica concentrates 18 times more employment, 10 times more firms and 89 times more turnover, and has 42 more workers per firm on average.
Manufacturing activity clusters in small regions close to metropolitan areas
Higher-level services that require agglomeration economies tend to show high levels of concentration in metropolitan areas, while resource-intensive sectors tend to show large concentration near natural resources. The regional specialisation index measures the extent to which an economic sector is over- or under-represented in comparison to the national sectoral distribution. Sectors that use more mobile resources and that do not rely on specialised resources tend to show regional specialisation indices close to one, so that the share of the sector in the region is close to the national average.
The regional specialisation index shows that, indeed, higher-level services are overrepresented in Attica, including information and communication, finance and professional, scientific and technical sectors (Table 2.3). On the other hand, natural resources guide the specialisation in mining and energy of Western Macedonia in the northwest, Continental Greece, and Peloponnese in the south, and in tourism in the regions of the South Aegean and the Ionian Islands, where tourism, wholesale and retail trade, repairs, transport, accommodation and food services, contribute to over 50% of value-added.
Specialisation in manufacturing coincides with proximity to the two main metropolitan areas, Athens and Thessaloniki. In Continental Greece, located north of Attica region, manufacturing accounts for 27% of the value-added, 17 percentage points over the national average. Peloponnese, also bordering Attica, as well as the northern regions of Thessaly, Eastern and Central Macedonia – where Thessaloniki is located – also have higher than average shares of manufacturing in GVA.
Table 2.3. Regional specialisation in industries in Greece, 2017 |
|---|
Regional share of GVA of an industry as a multiple of the national average |
 |
Note: The index of specialisation is computed as a share of GVA in industry within the region over the average share of this industry across all regions. Then, the index of specialisation of magnitude 1 shows that the industry share of the region is equivalent to the national average. If the index is smaller than one, the industry is under-represented compared to the national average, and values over one indicate over-representation and therefore specialisation of the region in the given industry. The real estate sector has been excluded because it accounts for the value of real estate and employs a small share of employment, shifting the weight of the real economy. The real estate sector has had different dynamics than the rest of the sectors. Real estate GVA grew in all regions over the past decade, increasing the value-added in the sector by at least 20% over the period and almost 40% in Eastern Macedonia. Other sectors grew by smaller – if any – margin. The unit of measure is real GVA in 2015 USD. |
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020). |
The economic crisis and long recovery period had dissimilar effects across the Greek territory. This section discusses the effect of the crisis across regions and cities in five areas: demography, incomes, investment, employment and productive structure. It also includes a special focus on productivity developments across regions, focusing on the dynamics of catching up and regional characteristics that play a role in productivity shifts.
Uneven effects on population levels and composition in large and small regions
Population levels shrank after the crisis despite incoming international migration
A combination of ageing, low fertility rates and negative net migration flows resulted in an absolute loss in population of 355 000 individuals between 2011 and 2017, representing a continuous fall in population of 0.5% per year on average over the period.
Negative net migration flows were one contributor to population loss in the post-crisis period. Net migration flows started to decline in 2005 and fell rapidly in 2008 when a steady decline in net migration linked with the economic crisis began. By 2010, outflows exceeded inflows, particularly driven by outmigration from Attica. After reaching the lowest level of net migration in 2012 (about 125 000 people leaving against 58 000 entering), net migration flows rose again and became positive in 2016. The increase in inward migration is not related to return migration but to an increase in international migration mostly to Attica and some of the islands (from around 33 000 in 2014 to about 85 000 in 2017) partly originating from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (see Box 2.5).
Note: Net migration statistically adjusted (adjusted for demographic trends); regions in the sample: Attica (TL2), Central Macedonia (TL2) and national level (TL1).
Source: (Eurostat, 2019[23]), Migration and migrant population statistics (Database), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics, (accessed 1 March 2019).
International migrants represent a considerable part of the population in Greece, especially in Athens and some island regions. The OECD definition of migrants includes temporary and permanent migrants with visa, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, regardless of whether their movement is voluntary or involuntary, what the causes for the movement are or what the length of the stay is.
According to the last population census in 2011, 23% of the population in the municipality of Athens (155 000 people) had a foreign nationality background. Albanians, Filipinos, Bangladeshis and Ukrainians were the largest migrant communities. Estimates based on the number of resident permits issued show that the number of annually-issued permits decreased after the 2008 economic crisis, down to 33 000 in 2016 from about 56 000 in 2009. By 2016, some 78 000 migrants had a residence permit. Estimates on the number of refugees and asylum seekers2 show that more than 40% of refugees in Greece (around 15 000 people) are currently settled in Athens. Since 2015, the Aegean Islands have been the main destination for international migrants alongside Athens (Figure 2.20). In 2019, the Aegean Islands hosted around 14 400 refugees and migrants. Ikaria and Lesvos are in fact the top two European regions (TL3) with the highest rates of net migration.
Note: Net migration statistically adjusted (adjusted for demographic trends).
Source: (Eurostat, 2019[23]), Migration and migrant population statistics (Database), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics, (accessed 1 March 2019).
The loss in working-age population in the past decade happened mostly in urban areas
Urban areas in Greece bore the bulk of population losses in the post-crisis period. The loss of population in urban regions between 2007 and 2019 explains 84% of the national population loss of 311 390 individuals. In contrast, urban regions in OECD countries absorbed 71% of the population gains in the same period.
Urban regions bore even larger losses of working-age population due to an increase in the elderly share. The total loss of 533 140 working-age individuals over 2007-19 represented a loss of the working-age population of 11% in urban regions, 4% in rural regions and 2.5% in intermediate regions (Figure 2.21). The losses in working-age population are larger compared to the total population due to related to ageing and low birth rates in Athens and Thessaloniki, where the elderly population increased by 135 000 in the period. Lower birth rates added to population decline. The population under 15 years of age decreased by about 1% since 2002, amounting to a decrease of 31 000 young people over the decade since 2007.
Note: Population is normalised to 1 in 2007.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Dependency ratios increased rapidly in urban regions in the post-crisis period
Greece has one of the highest shares of elderly population living in urban areas across OECD countries. The share of people aged 65 and over in 2016 in urban regions in Greece was 6 percentage points higher than across OECD urban regions (30% versus 24%, or 3 working persons per every 1 elderly person as compared to 4 working persons per 1 elderly person). This gap appeared almost entirely after the crisis, as in 2002 it was only 1 percentage point (21% versus 20%) (Figure 2.22). Across OECD countries, only Greece, Poland and Portugal experienced increases in the elderly dependency ratios in urban areas between 2002 and 2016.
Despite fast increases in ageing in urban areas, elderly dependency is highest in rural regions. In 2019, the elderly dependency ratio in rural regions close to cities was 40%, close to the value for remote regions (39%) and above intermediate regions (32%). This stands in contrast with 2002 values for OECD rural regions close to cities and remote regions where the elderly dependency ratios were lower (34%).
Note: Elderly dependency ratios constructed with 65+ over 15-64 working-age population data.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Uneven effect on incomes and poverty in large regions
Large regions other than Attica have led the recent economic recovery
Attica has the highest GDP per capita among Greek TL2 regions (EUR 22 704 in 2017), more than double of the value of Eastern Macedonia (EUR 11 777) and close to its levels in 2000. This is despite a 23% fall in its levels between 2007 and 2016 that brought the region’s GDP back to its 2000 levels. The South Aegean has the second-highest GDP per capita (EUR 18 537), which is still 20% lower than Attica (Figure 2.23). By 2017, all regions in Greece ranked below the median of OECD regions in terms of income, measured in disposable income per capita.
Prior to the crisis in 2007, Attica grew at a fast pace, increasing its GDP per capita by 26.7% in period 2000-07 at an average annual growth rate of 4.5%. The North Aegean grew at a similar pace, while other regions increased their GDP per capita by about 18% between 2000 and 2007, except for Western Macedonia where growth halted in 2006. Between 2014 and 2017 and in line with national trends, most regions started growing in terms of GDP per capita again, with the exception of the North Aegean and Western Macedonia.
Despite large differences in economic size, each region in Greece has the potential to contribute to the recovery of economic growth. Greek GDP would grow by 1.4% instead of actual 0.2% between 2013 and 2016 if the Attica region was excluded. Between 2015 and 2017, regions of Attica and Western Macedonia diminished the aggregate contribution of all other regions to the national GDP by almost 50%. The fall of GDP in Attica and Western Macedonia over the period was almost equivalent to the GDP increase in Continental Greece and Thessaly combined. Central Macedonia contributed to the growth of national GDP the most over 2015-17 period, responsible for over 60% of the national GDP increase (Figure 2.24).
Note: The GDP per capita normalised to its level in 2007.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Note: Regional contribution to national growth is calculated as an interaction of region’s growth in GDP between 2015 and 2017 and 2017 share of regional in national GDP, and further normalised by overall Greek GDP growth in the given period to calculate the share. The figure portrays positive contribution if the growth rate in the region was positive, and negative if GDP fell in the region, rescaled by the size of the contribution. Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Returning to pre-crisis income levels may take some regions an additional 12 years
If regional growth rates remained at 2014 levels (the first year of economic recovery since the crisis), five Greek regions would recover to their pre-crisis GDP per capital levels by 2027. The majority of the other regions would reach this level by 2039. However, for three regions (Continental Greece, Central Macedonia and Eastern Macedonia), recovery would be even beyond 2039.
In a scenario wherein 2018 all regions would return to their average pre-crisis levels (2002-07), Attica would recover by 2023 (Table 2.4) and other regions would recover shortly after, by 2029 at the latest. However, if growth rates remained at average 2015-17 levels, Greece would not see recovery in this half of the century and some regions such as the North Aegean and Western Macedonia, with shrinking GDP in this period, will not recover. The Ionian Islands region saw the largest drop in its pre-crisis GDP, with 2016 GDP 29% below its 2007 level. This region would recover by 2051 in this scenario. Continental Greece, with the highest average annual growth rates between 2015 and 2017 would recover first in 2029. Alternatively, if Attica and Central Macedonia grew at a 3% pace each year, Greek GDP would reach its pre-crisis level by 2028, and both Attica and Central Macedonia regions would recover by 2027.
Regional household incomes decreased and regional poverty rates increased across more regions in Greece than in any other OECD country
After the crisis and during the long recovery period, most large regions in Greece experienced a decrease in household incomes while most OECD regions experienced an increase. All regions in Greece, with the exception of the Ionian Islands and South Aegean regions (with income growth of 9% and 11% respectively), had experienced an average 14% drop in their pre-crisis household income by 2017 (Figure 2.25). Meanwhile, household income across other OECD TL2 regions increased by 26% on average. In fact, between 2007 and 2017, 11 of the 12 TL2 regions with available data (246) with falling household incomes were Greek.
Such fall in income implies that by 2017, large regions in Greece had the lowest income among regions of EU countries in Southern Europe, even after accounting for the lower-than-average increase in income in many of the regions in Southern Europe. In Figure 2.25, regions located below the 45-degree line have a lower income in 2017 than in 2007, including regions in Greece and the Melilla region in Spain, while regions above the trend line grew faster than an average OECD region. Incomes across regions in Greece in 2017 were lower than in many of Eastern European regions, most of which had lower income levels than Greek regions in 2007.
Note: The figure includes data only if available for both years. Northern Europe and France include regions from Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Outside Europe includes regions from Australia, Canada, Israel, Korea and the United States, Eastern European regions are from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Finally, Southern Europe is composed of regions in Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
As with household incomes, poverty rates increased in Greek large regions between 2007 and 2018 while they decreased in most European regions. The largest increases in the percentage of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion occurred in the Aegean Islands and Crete from 27.5% by 9 percentage points between 2007 and 2018, followed by Attica and Continental Greece with increases of about 6 and 3 percentage points from 23% and 32% respectively. Other European regions experienced similar changes in poverty rates in the same period were multiple regions in Spain such as Comunidad Valenciana (10 percentage points) or Canarias (7), Cantabria (9) and Ceuta (9) and the Italian regions Abruzzo (9), Campania (8), Marche (9) and Provincia Autonoma di Trento (13). The other regions where the measure is available for the period experienced smaller increases and most had seen a poverty rate drop. Some regions in Hungary, Italy and Spain are the only ones that, together with Greek regions, faced poverty rates of over 30% in 2017.3
Despite the large changes in some of the islands, Attica and Continental Greece, the regions with the highest risk of poverty in Greece before and after the crisis are located along the northern border as well as in regions within Peloponnese. In contrast, regions with medium or medium-to-high rates of risk of poverty are close to metropolitan areas (Artelaris and Kandylis, 2014[26]).
The increase in the geographical divide in household income and poverty performance across regions after the crisis was accompanied by increasing levels of interpersonal inequality at the national level. Between 2000 and 2007, Greece experienced an exceptional inequality reduction compared to other European countries, when the bottom 40% of income distribution grew at a significantly higher rate than the average national income. Yet, in the decade following the economic crisis, the dynamics reversed, and lowest income part of the distribution fell behind the average growth as in most of Northern and Western European countries (Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin, 2019[27]). This trend reversal made Greece one of a few countries (Bulgaria, Germany and the United Kingdom) with both high poverty and high inequality levels.
Note: TL2 regions are grouped as follows: Northern Greece refers to Central Macedonia, Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Epirus and Western Macedonia. Continental Greece groups Continental Greece, the Ionian Islands, Peloponnese, Thessaly and Western Greece regions. The Aegean Islands and Crete bring together Crete and the North and South Aegean Islands regions. Finally, the region of Attica remains by itself. At risk of poverty are persons with an equivalised disposable income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. For 2018, the NUTS 2 region data have been weighted by regional population and aggregated to allow comparability with 2007.
Source: Eurostat (2020[28]), People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion by NUTS 2 Regions (database), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tgs00107&plugin=1 (accessed on 14 February 2020).
Uneven effects on employment in large regions
All regions except South Aegean employ fewer people today than before the crisis
The crisis brought about significant employment losses, amounting to about 725 000 jobs between 2007 and 2018. Ten out of 13 regions in Greece employ 9% to 20% fewer people than before the crisis (Figure 2.27). In absolute terms, the largest decreases in employment between 2007 and 2018 occurred in Attica (a loss of 370 000 jobs), followed by Central Macedonia (140 000 jobs) and Western Greece (46 000 jobs). The island regions had the smallest job loss in Greece, with 1% to 4% fewer jobs in 2018 in the North and South Aegean Islands, and the Ionian Islands. The large employment losses between 2007 and 2013 in Attica and Central Macedonia took place mostly in Athens (a decline of 17%) and Thessaloniki (a decline of 24%). By 2015, Athens added 36 000 employees, which represents a 1.3% yearly increase between 2013 and 2015. Thessaloniki grew their employed workforce by about 2.5% and 18 000 jobs between 2013 and 2015.
The economic crisis and long recovery impacted negatively the labour market of all regions and worsened their position relative to other OECD regions. In 2015, Epirus, Western Greece and Western Macedonia were among the 10% bottom OECD regions in terms of employment and unemployment rates. Even the highest-ranking region in Greece, the South Aegean, ranked as the 35th worse out of 388 OECD regions.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Regional unemployment rates and spells in Greece remain high for OECD standards despite recent improvements in the labour market
The increase in unemployment following job losses hit some regions harder than others, regardless of their pre-crisis employment performance. Nationally, the unemployment rate increased to 27.5% at its peak in 2013, and subsequently fell to 23.9% in 2016 and further to 19.6% in 2018. Regions which had 2007 unemployment levels in line with average OECD regions (7%-8%) experienced also smaller increases in unemployment compared to the national average: 6% in Eastern Macedonia and 7%-8% higher unemployment in Crete, the Ionian Islands, the Peloponnese region and South Aegean by 2018 (Table 2.5). Meanwhile, regions with the highest unemployment rates in Greece in 2007, Epirus and Western Macedonia, experienced different trends: Western Macedonia still had the highest unemployment across regions in 2018 but Epirus moved down the ranking from having the second-highest unemployment rate (10.2%) in 2007 to a mid-range unemployment region (20.5%) in 2018.
Because of widespread unemployment increases, by 2018, all Greek regions moved down to the bottom 20% OECD regions in terms of unemployment rates. In comparison, about less than half of large regions in the OECD have unemployment rates higher in 2018 than in 2007, while the remaining two-thirds have unemployment rates approximately 2% lower on average in 2018 than in 2007 (Figure 2.28). In fact, Western Macedonia had the second-highest unemployment rates across OECD regions in 2018, at 27.5%. Together with two French overseas regions, four Spanish regions and one Turkish region, Western Macedonia, Western Greece and the North Aegean belong to the top 10% of regions with the highest unemployment in OECD in 2018.
Note: All TL2 regions in OECD member countries for which the unemployment rate is available for both years are displayed. In 2016, there were 300 regions; for 2006, the data are available for 391 regions. Unemployment refers to unemployment rates.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
The crisis also had a considerable and long-lasting effect on average unemployment duration across regions. In 2018, 70% of the unemployed in Greece had not had a job for at least 1 year, compared to 32% in OECD countries. Already prior to the crisis, Greece had a higher share – about one-half – of long-term unemployed workers than the OECD average but, clearly, the crisis exacerbated the problem. Across all regions in Greece, long-term unemployment rates increased between 2007 and 2018, and in 2018, the highest share of long-term unemployed was in Epirus (77.4%) and lowest in the South Aegean (32.6%) (Table 2.5).
Long-term unemployment is problematic as the integration of unemployed persons into the labour market is harder after longer unemployment spells. A large share of the workforce being long-term unemployed underlines the structural weakness of the economy as well as the mismatch of the supply and demand of skills on the labour market. Re-employment probabilities of the long-term unemployed require active labour market policies, retraining and skill improvement. Finally, the prevalence of informal hiring has increased, although it is difficult to measure precisely to what extent (see Box 2.6).
In some regions in Greece, more than half of young workers are unemployed
Regional youth unemployment rates in Greece are among the highest in Europe and can be twice as high as the general unemployment rate. The youth unemployment rate across regions in Greece ranges from 24% to 62% in 2018. Regions in Greece, together with regions in French overseas territories, the south of Italy and Spain, have the highest levels of youth unemployment in Europe. Continental Greece, North Aegean and Western Macedonia, had 51% to 63% of their youth unemployed. On the other side of the spectrum, Crete and South Aegean had around one-quarter of their youth unemployed. Youth employment rates across regions mirror unemployment rates in the regions but, in some, are slightly lower than the trend across European regions would predict, given the unemployment rate of the working-age population (Figure 2.29).
Note: Some data are reported having reduced reliability due to the sample size.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Evidence on job vacancies points to an increase in informal hiring
Despite the falling unemployment rate, the job vacancy rate is at lower levels than the average job vacancy between 2011 and 2012 when the unemployment was about the same. Structural reforms were accompanied by an outward shift in the Beveridge curve with the unemployment increasing for the same level of job vacancies (Tagkalakis, 2016[5]). The Beveridge curve is a graphical representation of the relationship between unemployment and the job vacancy rate, portraying the current state of the economy. For example, periods of recession are generally accompanied by high unemployment and low vacancy rates, displayed in the lower part of the graphic. In times of recovery, the curve moves back to the original point of departure and, traditionally, recovery in unemployment rates lagging slightly behind the recovery in job vacancy rate. The curve moving outward over time displays the falling efficiency in the labour market as job seekers are not matched with the job offers, due to changes in education, population age, immigration or deterioration of skills.
In Greece, the unemployment rate fell during the recovery period but the vacancy rate continued to fall signifying no job creation and a possible result of outmigration rather than improved matching between unemployed and firms. Another reason might be that employers avoid posting vacancy offers through official channels and rather fill the post in an informal way or via their networks.
Note: The job vacancy rate represents available job vacancies in industry, construction and services over the occupied posts. The curve is smoothed by calculating a 4-quarter running average. The unemployment rate corresponds to the percentage of unemployed of working age 15 years old and over.
Source: (Eurostat, 2019[29]), Job Vacancy Statistics, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/job-vacancies/database; (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2019[30]), Labour Force (Quarterly Data), http://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/-/publication/SJO01/ (accessed on 13 March 2019).
Increasing youth unemployment is consistent with increasing inactivity rates of young people. Across regions, average regional inactivity rates of young people increased by 7% by 2014 from 19% in 2007 (Figure 2.31). Attica, Crete and Western Greece have the most active youth, with about 16% of youth in these regions neither employed nor following any training or education. In Attica and Crete, inactivity almost doubled from 2007 to 2014 but, by 2018, stabilised to levels 2% higher than before the crisis. The regions with the most inactive youth populations are the North Aegean region, with 39%, and Continental Greece with 35% of its 18 to 24 year-olds inactive.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Female labour market participation sustained the share of employed to working-age population across regions after the crisis
The worsening of employment indicators in the post-period crisis coincided with increased female labour market participation. Nationally, female labour market participation increased from 55% to 60% of the total female working-age population between 2007 and 2018, while male participation fell in the same period by 0.5 percentage points from 77.3%. In 7 out of 13 regions, the share of males employed from the total male working-age population was still lower in 2018 in comparison with 2001. Female participation rose in all regions and disproportionally in regions with initially low shares of the female working population engaged in the workforce, such as Continental Greece and North Aegean (Figure 2.32).
Regions with the lowest female labour market participation had above-average employment rates for the male workforce in 2001. In Crete and Eastern Macedonia, where 59% and 55% of females worked, more than 80% of working-age males are employed. In North Aegean, where 2 out of 5 working-age females were engaged in formal employment, female labour market participation increased by 24 percentage points between 2001 and 2016, while male participation fell by 11 percentage points.
Note: The displayed regions are selected by their highest (Crete, Eastern Macedonia and Thrace) and lowest (North Aegean and Continental Greece) female labour market participation in 2001 among Greek regions.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Uneven effects across economic sectors in large regions
With the crisis, manufacturing lost importance in the economy in favour of tourism-related sectors
Across economic sectors, while the largest absolute losses occurred in the services sector, manufacturing lost relatively more importance in national employment shares. The share of national employment in industry sectors decreased from an already low level of 11% in 2007 to 9% in 2018, while employment share in all types of services increased from 70% to 75% (Figure 2.33). While all main economic sectors lost employment during the period, industry sectors lost a larger share of its pre-crisis employment (28% or 150 000 employees by 2018), compared to agriculture (13% or 70 000 employees) and services (7% or 241 000 employees). Construction lost half of its pre-crisis employment, equivalent to a total loss of 152 000 jobs.
Before the crisis, the top five sectors in terms of employment were wholesale and retail trade and accommodation and food services, community, social, personal and other services, and industry (including mining, manufacturing and electricity). By 2016, the top two largest sectors preserved and strengthened their status but the industry sectors lost their relative importance to agriculture and are closely followed by real estate and scientific and business activities.
Note: The full labels of the individual industries, shortened in the graphical representation, are as follows: Trade, accommodation and food service activities [G-I] (includes wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles [G], transportation and storage [H], and accommodation and food service activities [I]), community, social and personal services [O-U], agriculture, forestry and fishing [A], industry [B-E] (includes mining and quarrying [B], manufacturing [C], electricity, gas and water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities [D-E]), real estate, renting and business activities [L-N], construction [F], information and communication [J], financial and insurance activities [K].
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Regions relying on tourism were more resilient to employment losses than regions hosting metropolitan areas
While manufacturing lost relative importance, tourism-related activities gained weight in the economy. Between 2007 and 2016, the share of employment in accommodation and food services sector increased from 6.6% to 8.4% following an increase of 30 500 additional jobs (a 10% increase). The only sector that created employment in the period was another tourism-related sector, real estate, renting and business activities (see Box 2.7).
Regions with a stronger reliance on tourism were more resilient to the crisis. Regions that saw smaller reductions in their employment, notably Attica, Crete, the Ionian Islands, North Aegean and South Aegean, had a larger share of GVA in tourism-related activities in 2017, including distribution, trade, accommodation and food service activities. They also had the highest number of nights spent in tourist accommodation per inhabitant (59.6 nights per inhabitant in the South Aegean, 53.4 in the Ionian Islands, 38 in Crete, 8 in North Aegean and 7.4 in Western Macedonia) (Eurostat, 2020[31]).
International arrivals almost doubled in the past decade but income from tourism remained stagnant
Tourism represents an important part of the Greek economy. In 2018, international receipts from tourism per inhabitant were equal to USD 1 770, and for every Greek, there were 2.6 international arrivals. This places Greece in the upper third of the distribution of OECD countries in tourism intensity (Figure 2.35).
Between 2008 and 2017, Greece nearly doubled the international arrivals to over 30 million. However, the value of international receipts rose only by 8%. In terms of GDP, tourism contributed by 5.8% of its value in 2018, an increase from its 5% share in 2008. Tourism in Greece plays a more important role in the 2018 national GDP only in Iceland and Luxemburg.
A higher share of the population depends on tourism for their income, while the share of GDP from tourism is relatively smaller. Tourism accounted for a larger share of employment; with almost 10% employed in the tourism industry in 2018, or 366 000 employees, 37 000 more than in 2008 (OECD, 2020[32]).
Note: Iceland growth rates at 380% is not displayed. International receipts are a sum of international travel receipts and international passenger transport receipts.
Source: (OECD, 2020[32]), Industry and Services (database), https://www.oecd.org/statistics/data-collection/industryandservices.htm, (accessed on 19 February 2020).
StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888934167068
Source (box and figures): (OECD, 2020[32]), Industry and Services (database), https://www.oecd.org/statistics/data-collection/industryandservices.htm, (accessed on 19 February 2020).
The regions with dominant tourism also experienced a smaller fall or some gain in income and had higher employment rates in 2017 (Figure 2.36). The disposable household income grew between 2007 and 2017 only in two regions, the Ionian Islands and South Aegean by about 10%. The remaining regions had seen a drop in disposable income varying from 6% in Western Macedonia to 21% in Attica. Unlike the mining region of Western Macedonia, in the Ionian Islands and South Aegean, the relatively lower fall in income in 2007-17 is simultaneous with higher employment rates in 2017.
While tourism has been good news in terms of income and employment for regions in the post-crisis period, regions relying mostly on the tourism industry in Greece have higher levels of vulnerability because of the combined effect of seasonality and intensity of tourism (Batista e Silva et al., 2018[33]).
The public sector did not buffer employment losses despite being relatively large in some regions
The variation of public sector employment as a share of total employment is large across Greek regions. The North Aegean region has the highest share of public sector presence across regions, with 27% of employees working in the public sector in 2015. Eastern Macedonia lags slightly, with a quarter of employees in the public sector. Continental Greece and the Ionian Islands are at the other side of the spectrum with 16% of employees working for the public sector.
Compared to 185 OECD TL2 regions, most Greek regions have a lower share of public sector employment than an average region at 25% in 2016. Five Greek regions belong to the bottom 10% of the OECD regions with the lowest public sector employment, among regions in the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic.
The shares of public employment in Greek regions remained stable between 2006 and 2016, increasing on average by about 1% over the period. This shows that public employment has not been a guaranteed workplace in Greece. As employment fell across regions, public sector employment fell as well, keeping the shares approximately constant.
Note: The index of performance is computed for each indicator in each region as the standard deviation from the mean. The higher the index, the better the region performs as compared to others.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Special focus: Regional productivity dynamics before and after the crisis
More regions caught up with the productivity frontier after the crisis but only because the frontier fell back
Regional dynamics can be analysed in light of the performance of regions with respect to “frontier regions”, defined as those that lead in a country in terms of labour productivity, measured by the real GDP per employee.4 Regions can have 3 different statuses at any point in time in terms of productivity: catching up with the frontier region (growing 5% faster), further diverging (grow 5% slower) or keeping pace.
Over the period 2000-16, Greece was among 14 OECD countries where large regions at the “productivity frontier” (Attica) contributed more than 50% to the overall productivity growth in their country or had a so-called regionally concentrated productivity growth model (OECD, 2019[34]). Catching-up dynamics reversed in the post-crisis period compared to 2000-07. Back then, no region was catching up with the productivity frontier (Figure 2.37). In 2008-16, more regions in Greece were keeping pace compared to regions in 29 OECD countries (69% of regions compared to 31%) as opposed to those catching up (0.7% versus 38%) or diverging (23% versus 32%) (OECD, 2018[35]).
This reversal relates not so much to improved regional performance across regions but to the relative fall of the frontier region. Between 2008 and 2016, 40% of total employment losses and 49% of GVA losses occurred in Attica and the region actually decreased national labour productivity growth by 1.8%. Meanwhile, Central Macedonia also had sizable relative losses in terms of jobs (19% of national) and GVA (less than 14% of national) but unlike Attica, it actually made a positive contribution of 6% to national labour productivity growth (Figure 2.37). Athens contributed to the fall in productivity in Attica and had a worse positioning in terms of productivity compared to OECD cities of similar size (Box 2.8). The same trends hold at the level of small regions (Box 2.9).
Note: Difference between national labour productivity growth as calculated with and without the indicated region. Attica, in black, is the frontier region in Greece. The bars highlighted in darker blue represent regions with the productivity converging with the levels at the productivity frontier, Attica. The light blue denotes regions that are keeping pace with the most productive region. Finally, the striped pattern highlights regions that are diverging from the productivity frontier.
Source: OECD (2019[36]), OECD.Stat (database), http://stats.oecd.org (accessed on 28 January 2019).
After the crisis, Athens lost ground to OECD cities of similar size
In 2015, productivity in Athens was smaller than in OECD cities of comparable size. Average labour productivity in Athens dropped from USD 90 659 in 2007 to USD 79 014 in 2015. The drop in absolute productivity values was larger than in other OECD cities and implied a fall in productivity ranking from the 39th position in 2007 to the 83rd position in 2015 among 228 OECD cities. Compared to cities in the 3-million to 4-million population bracket, Athens lost ground to cities that had lower labour productivity levels in 2007. For example, Barcelona went in this period from having about 19% lower productivity than Athens to having 6% higher productivity (Figure 2.38).
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Convergence in productivity in the post-crisis period occurred because of a fall in small frontier regions instead of robust growth in small lagging regions
In 2008-15, a relatively higher contribution of lagging regions to national productivity growth compared to small frontier regions translated into productivity convergence with the frontier region (Figure 2.39). Frontier regions in Greece at the TL3 level remain the most productive but their productivity fell by 0.73% per year since 2000. Meanwhile, productivity in lagging regions grew by 0.09% per year and the lagging regions at 75th percentile in terms of national employment rose by 0.2% a year.
Frontier small regions were 10% less productive in 2015 than in 2000. Meanwhile, lagging regions reached 2001 productivity levels in 2015 (Figure 2.40). Labour productivity grew faster in frontier as compared to lagging regions between 2000 and 2003. In 2004 and 2005, lagging small regions actually caught up with the productivity frontier. The subsequent years display a dominant convergence between frontier and lagging regions, while productivity fell in both types of regions but less in lagging regions. From 2013 onwards, productivity increased in lagging regions but fell further from the frontier (Figure 2.40).
Note: Productivity at the level of the small (TL3) region. Productivity is calculated as regional GDP over regional employment measured at the place of work. It is expressed in USD constant PPP, constant prices, reference year 2010. Frontier (lagging) regions are defined as those with the highest (lowest) productivity until the equivalent of 10% of national employment is reached. The “75% of regions” line refers to the lagging regions representing 75% of national employment.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Note: Productivity at the level of the small (TL3) region. Productivity is calculated as regional GDP over regional employment measured at the place of work. It is expressed in USD constant PPP, constant prices, reference year 2010. Frontier (lagging) regions are defined as those with the highest (lowest) productivity until the equivalent of 10% of national employment is reached. The “75% of regions” line refers to the lagging regions representing 75% of national employment.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Tradeable sectors are less dominant in diverging regions
Tradeable sectors tend to innovate and upgrade their technology more frequently than sectors that are considered as non-tradeable, including governmental services, education, healthcare, construction sector and retail. Even if not all goods and services within tradeable sectors are traded, they tend to be exposed to international competition. In Greece, the importance of tradeable sectors increased since 2007 in some large regions, such as Central and Western Greece. On the other hand, diverging regions, but also some regions that were keeping in pace (Eastern Macedonia, Epirus and Peloponnese), had seen a drop in the share of tradeable sectors (see also Psycharis-Petrakos (2016[37])).
Attica is below the average of European frontier regions in terms of the importance of the tradeable sector, which decreased in terms of employment share from 28% in 2007 to 26.3% in 2015 (Figure 2.41). Other regions that were catching up or keeping pace between 2008 and 2015 had a larger share of employment in tradeable sectors (33%-45%) than diverging regions (20%-26%) (Figure 2.41). In contrast, tradeable sectors explained a higher share of GVA in catching up regions than in diverging regions across 22 European countries (OECD, 2018[35]).
Note: Tradeable sectors group sectors: agriculture (A), mining, manufacturing, energy, electricity, water supply (BCDE), information and communication (J), financial and insurance activities (K), and other services (RSTU). Non-tradeable sectors are constructed as a sum of activity in sectors: construction (F), distributive trade, repairs, transport, accommodation, food services activities (GHI), business services (MN), and public administration (OPQ). Real estate activities sector (L) can be considered as non-tradeable services but is excluded in this figure.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
The share of the tradeable sector in GVA in regions that are keeping pace and catching up with frontier regions is also higher than the contribution of these sectors to the economy in diverging regions. In 2015, tradeable sectors in Western Macedonia, a catching-up region, contributed 60% of total GVA and 40% employment. Meanwhile, Continental Greece and Peloponnese, while keeping pace with frontier, had 53% and 46% of GVA produced by tradeable sectors and about 45% of employment. In comparison, regions that are keeping pace with frontier had smaller employment shares in tradeable sectors that were in any case higher than the corresponding shares in diverging regions.
Manufacturing sectors sustained productivity growth despite large employment losses
Between 2008 and 2014, manufacturing sustained regional productivity growth or at least decreased productivity less as compared to non-tradeable services. In some regions, this happened at the expense of employment. For example, Central Macedonia, a region that relies on manufacturing more than the average region in Greece, lost 36 000 manufacturing jobs between 2008 and 2014, yet experienced productivity growth of 1.48% in the same period (Figure 2.42). Attica lost 74 000 employees in manufacturing (a 5.9% decrease) and still, the sector drove productivity growth in the region.
Note: Labour productivity is measured as real GVA in USD in constant 2010 prices and PPPs per worker. The size of the bubble indicates the size of the sector in terms of the number of employees in 2000, while the numbers at each bubble indicate the change of employment during the period. The sector clusters are composed of multiple individual sectors. Tradeable services refer to sectors: information and communication (J), financial and insurance activities (K), and other services (RSTU). Non-tradeable services are constructed as a sum of activity in sectors: construction, distributive trade, repairs, transport, accommodation, food services activities (GHI), business services (MN), and public administration (OPQ). The real estate activities sector (L) can be considered as non-tradeable services but is excluded in this figure. The size of the circle indicates relative share of employment in the assemble of given industries in 2000.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Even in the pre-crisis period, labour productivity in manufacturing increased at the expense of employment in some regions, including Eastern Macedonia, the Ionian Islands, Peloponnese and South Aegean. Other regions saw their manufacturing labour productivity fall between 2000 and 2007, including Continental Greece (a fall of 3%), which relies more on manufacturing in terms of value-added than other regions, and Crete (a fall of 0.8%).
Non-tradeable sectors were not immune to global shocks. Prior to the crisis, the non-tradeable service sector generated the largest employment gains across Greek regions. These gains turned out to be unsustainable in the period 2008-14 and employment loses in non-tradeable service sectors were larger than previous gains. In Attica alone, non-tradeable services were responsible for the largest share of employment loss, with 257 000 jobs lost in the 7 years after the crisis, more than pre-crisis job creation (178 000 jobs).
Agriculture was also a source of job losses and, in many cases, productivity growth across regions. Agricultural GVA in Thessaly and Western Greece, 2 regions for which the sector weights relatively more in the local economy, grew by about 3% between 2008 and 2014. However, productivity and employment in agriculture in Thessaly fell in the precedent period and Western Greece lost about 5.8% of jobs, yet the agricultural productivity in this region also increased by 2.7% between 2000 and 2007.
After reviewing the uneven effects of the crisis across regions in Greece, this section focuses on four main enabling factors for future regional growth: human capital, technology, social capital and environmental capital. The section identifies gaps in the allocation of human capital to productive activities, and the need to boost investment in innovation and technology in order to strengthen regional innovation systems that can serve as a backbone for regional development.
Human capital and innovation
Attica has one of the most educated populations across OECD regions
Educational attainment is the strongest predictor of the likelihood of having a job and earning a higher salary in Greece. In many countries, it is rather higher skills and proficiency that predict employment outcomes (OECD, 2018[38]). Educational attainment in Greece is around the OECD average, with 31% of adults holding a tertiary qualification and 42% a high school diploma. Most of those with university education are bachelor’s degree holders and the proportion of people with master or doctoral education level is low (OECD, 2018[38]). This is different for the younger workforce. In the 25-34 year-old age group, 41% have a tertiary qualification. A large share of the population in Greece (27%) have completed schooling below upper secondary education level, above levels in Chile, Mexico, Turkey and other southern European countries including Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Within Greece, Attica is the region with the most educated population. In 2018, over 39% of adults had a university degree and 44% had a high school diploma (Figure 2.43). Epirus, Thessaly and Central Macedonia follow, with 34% to 32% of adults having obtained university degree, and at the same time slightly below Greece’s average share of those with a high school diploma.
Inequalities in the distribution of workers with at least secondary education across regions in Greece are substantial. Across OECD regions, Attica, with 86.9% of the labour force with at least secondary education, ranks in the top third of OECD regions by this measure. The second largest region, Central Macedonia, ranks around the bottom half OECD regions with a share of 76.2%. The least performing region, Eastern Macedonia, had a 23 percentage-point lower share in secondary education than Attica.
Demographic change and migration can shift the shares of educational attainment of the population. Young people that entered the workforce between 2013 and 2017 may have been more educated than the base working-age population. At the same time, the working-age population may have increased if a higher share of people that left the region had low educational levels, and the effect of incoming migrants with lower educational attainment levels than locals would counterbalance this effect. For international migrants, this is indeed the case, as they have lower educational attainments than the local population across all regions: the educational gap between foreign-born and native-born residents and in terms of higher education attainment is 14 percentage points at the national level and the difference varies widely across regions (Figure 2.44).
Note: Education attainment measured as a share of 25-64 year-olds. Sorted by the highest tertiary attainment in 2018.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Note: Epirus, the Ionian Islands, North Aegean and Western Macedonia are not displayed because of missing data.
Source: OECD (2019[39]), Migrants in OECD Regions: Foreign-Born Education (Database), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REGION_MIGRANTS, (accessed on 25 April 2019).
Enrolment in education increased despite a falling premium to education
Despite the many years of schooling, the benefit of premium years of education on skills in Greece is lower than in other OECD countries. Those with tertiary education score 19 points higher in literacy than those with a high school diploma, compared to the OECD average that scores 33 points higher (OECD, 2018[38]). In addition, the quality of skills of higher education graduates lags behind market needs. On-the-job training and life-long learning are not yet frequent in Greece. In combination with outmigration, about 50% of firms report missing workers with skills they need to operate (OECD, 2018[38]).
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, employment outcomes for graduates are still poor. Greece also employs the lowest share of its tertiary-educated workforce among OECD countries. In 2017, only 72% of Greeks with a university degree were in employment, compared to 85% in OECD countries. Similarly, the employment situation of those with secondary education was at the last place in OECD countries. Only 59% of those with secondary education had a job, compared to 76% in OECD countries.
The lack of employment opportunities seems to have incentivised a switch from employment to education across regions. Between 2013 and 2018, educational attainment rose across all regions, with the highest increase of those with a university degree in Crete and Western Macedonia by 5-6 percentage points to about 27% and 26% of the population between 25 to 64 years of age. In turn, the share of the population with secondary education rose from 37% to 47% in the North Aegean and from 29% to 39% in Western Macedonia. Only the North Aegean region had a higher share of university degrees in 2013 than in 2017, falling from 27% to 25%.
Despite large increases in areas outside Attica, the region still concentrates a much larger percentage of the highly educated workforce. Attica’s labour force is the most educated among Greek regions with 39% of the labour force holding a university degree (Figure 2.45). This is comparable to the most educated regions in Germany and Slovenia (Berlin region and Slovenia’s West region), and countries such as Estonia and Lithuania, but also other countries’ regions whose distribution of educated population is not concentrated in one region, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the South Aegean region has about one-half of the share of university-educated workforce of Attica and only 53 out of 233 OECD regions with available data had a lower-educated workforce than the Ionian Islands. Other OECD countries with similar regional variation in shares of educated workforce include Denmark; Germany, Norway and Turkey.
Although the relatively high availability of educated workers in some regions could facilitate the speed of hiring, high qualification mismatches threaten possible benefits to productivity (see Box 2.10).
Greece is among the OECD countries with the highest qualification mismatch rates of their workforce
While the large number of unemployed persons means that the vacancy can be filled quickly, skill mismatch implies smaller productivity and slower firm growth. In 2016, 44% of workers in Greece did not match the qualification requirement of their position. Only Chile, Ireland and Mexico had a higher mismatch of qualifications.
Out of all workers, 23.6% were overqualified and therefore had a higher level of education than required by their job. Similarly, underqualified employees filled 20% of positions. Greek public employment service (OAED) engaged with about one-quarter of the unemployed and 4% of the newly employed found a job via the employment service (OECD, 2018[7]). Strengthening and supporting the role of OAED and similar job matching agencies can enhance the capacity to match the skills with available vacancies.
Note: Latvia and Luxembourg have only one large region, thus a single observation.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Higher education opportunities are concentrated in Athens and Thessaloniki
Higher education opportunities are concentrated in Athens and Thessaloniki. Out of the 22 universities in Greece in the academic year 2014/15, 7 were in the Athens-Piraeus metropolitan area. Two out of 14 Technological Educational Institutes (TEIs) were located in the Athens-Piraeus area in the same academic year. Thessaloniki hosted three universities, with the highest-ranked university being the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, and one TEI.
The National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and the National Technical University rank between the 300 and 500 best universities in the world in 2018, according to the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), based on the criteria of quality of education, quality of faculty, research output and per capita performance indicators (ShanghaiRanking, 2018[40]).
The number of higher institutions with presence across regions recently changed because of a reform to the higher education system that allows universities to offer two-year technical or professional education programmes. Within this transformation, the majority of TEIs were merged with existing universities in 2018 and 2019. As part of the reform, TEIs in Attica and Crete were transformed into new universities. The additional measures of this transformation of the education system include reduction of academic departments. In the academic year 2014/15, before the reform, 191 000 students attended universities and 100 000 TEIs. About one-quarter of 18- and 19-year-olds attended the first year of higher education in university and about one-tenth attended a TEI (OECD, 2018[3]).
Attendance grew faster than public expenditure in higher education in the post-crisis period
Expenditure in higher education in Greece sits below the OECD average and has decreased since 2010. In 2015, the share of higher education in R&D expenditure in GDP was 0.37%, below the OECD average of 0.43% (OECD, 2017[41]). About 70% of public spending on R&D was allocated to universities in the same year. However, fiscal consolidation introduced since 2010 reduced the budget allocated to higher education by 13.2% between 2009 and 2010, and an additional drop of 6% in the following year. Public expenditure per student fell by an estimated 50% between 2009 and 2015. These measures imply the reduction in faculty and personnel, reduction of salaries and a considerable reduction of operational expenses.
In parallel, the share of students in higher education in the 18 to 24 year-old population increased across all Greek regions over the period 2008 to 2012. Across regions, Western Greece increased the share of its university students from 104% in 2008 to 183% in 2012, the highest share of students in education as a proportion of university-age population in Greece. Epirus followed with a 40% increase to 162%. The lowest rates of student attendance are in the South Aegean region, at 21% (Eurostat, 2020[42]).
The decrease in funding had repercussions on the availability of teachers. University attendance increased between the academic years 2008/09 and 2014/15 by about 12% while teaching staff decreased by about 18%. TEI student enrolment fell by 12% in the same period and the teaching staff fell by 62% during the crisis period (OECD, 2018[3]).
Regions in Greece are among the least innovative across OECD regions
Besides human capital, R&D investment and an educational system conducive to innovation are the basis of a regional development strategy based on knowledge. In terms of R&D expenditure, regional levels are very low with the exception of Attica, where more than half (57%) of the national R&D expenditure in 2015 was concentrated. Despite their dissimilar shares of R&D investment, Epirus and Western Greece have similar shares of personnel working in R&D activities compared to Attica. These regions have about 3% of the total workforce employed in R&D in 2015 and have a 6% and 2.8% share in total Greek R&D spending respectively (Figure 2.48). Business enterprise is a major source of R&D expenditure growth in Greece, increasing by about 46% between 2014 and 2016.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
The availability of higher educational institutions, R&D investment and human capital in regions translates into a small and highly concentrated production of knowledge. Greek regions belong to the least innovative OECD regions and can compare to regions in Chile, Mexico and Poland. As expected from the concentration of human capital and R&D investment, patent generation is also highly concentrated in Attica: the region generates about 20 patents per million inhabitants, the least innovative region by this standard, Western Greece, generates only 1.5. Yet, the least innovative regions in more than a dozen OECD countries produce more patents per capita than Attica (Figure 2.47).
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Health and safety indicators remained relatively high despite worsening economic conditions
The worsening economic conditions reflect on well-being dimensions of jobs, income and life satisfaction, in which Greek regions perform at the lowest level among OECD regions. Still, safety indicators for regions in Greece were high compared to other OECD regions. All regions in Greece are in the upper half among 395 OECD regions in terms of safety, measured by the homicide rate. South Aegean belongs to the top 10% safest regions and Epirus to the 10% healthiest OECD regions (Figure 2.48). Safety indicators actually improved or remained unchanged compared to their 2000 levels across regions.
Health is another dimension in which Greek regions fare relatively strong compared to OECD regions, both in availability and outcomes indicators. Regions in Greece have more physicians per capita than an average OECD region (Figure 2.50). Attica had 7.9 physicians per 1 000 inhabitants in 2017. Physician presence in Continental Greece, South Aegean and Western Macedonia is around its OECD regional average, with about 3 physicians for each 1 000 people, the lowest presence among the Greek regions. Attica and Thessaly also have the highest hospital beds per 10 000 people, with 51 and 54 beds in 2015. Other regions have on average 34 beds, which is below the average of 46 beds across OECD regions.
Life expectancy, a broad measure of health outcomes, is high across all regions in Greece. Life expectancy varies from 81 years in Attica to 83.4 years in Epirus. The life expectancy in Greek regions is similar to regions in Austria, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Figure 2.51). The difference in life expectancy between the best and worst region in Greece is smaller than the average difference of OECD countries.
Note: Relative ranking of the regions with the best and worst outcomes in the 11 well-being dimensions, with respect to all 395 OECD regions. The 11 dimensions are ordered by decreasing regional disparities in the country. Each well-being dimension is measured by the indicators in the table below. For access to services and safety, Greek regions correspond to a higher geographic aggregation.
Source: (OECD, 2020[43]), Regional Wellbeing (database), www.oecdregionalwellbeing.org, (Accessed on 13 March 2019).
Note: Data in the first two columns refer to average values in regions at the top and the bottom 20% of the national ranking. OECD 34 weighted average.
Source: (OECD, 2020[43]), Regional Wellbeing (database), www.oecdregionalwellbeing.org, (Accessed on 14 March 2019).
Note: Data for hospital beds are from 2015, data on active physicians are from 2017, OECD averages are calculated for 2011. The average rate for hospital beds in 208 OECD regions in Austria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The average rate of physicians in OECD regions is based on 172 regions in the same countries and Latvia and with an exception of regions in Canada, Denmark, Japan and Sweden.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Despite recent improvements, Greek cities are amongst the most polluted in Europe
Athens and Thessaloniki remain among the most polluted European metropolitan areas despite recent improvements. Both cities decreased the pollution exposure of their population between 2000 and 2016 by 18% and 21% respectively. Pollution decreased by about 20% across metropolitan areas around the OECD countries, where North American cities show the highest percentage fall in exposure to fine particles pollution (Figure 2.52). Thessaloniki faced similar pollution exposure as Berlin and Prague, with an average level of fine particles (PM2.5) of about 14.8µg/m³ in 2016, down from 18.8 µg/m³ in 2000. Athens had higher levels of pollution, at 17.4µg/m³ in 2016, comparable to Budapest and lower than metropolitan areas in Colombia, Italy, Korea, Mexico and Poland.
Car emissions and residential heating are two major sources of ambient PM pollution that determine air quality of cities. Between 1991 and 2011, Greece put in place a ban on diesel cars in metropolitan areas, paving the way to lowering nitrogen dioxide emissions from traffic in Athens and Thessaloniki. Since lifting the ban, diesel car sales in Greece increased rapidly from 4% in 2010 to 40% of all new cars sold with a diesel engine in 2012, increasing even further to 63% in 2015 (ACEA, 2017[44]).
The economic downturn reflected negatively on the environmental performance of cities in Greece. The rising cost of heating oil, a common way of residential heating in Greece, resulted in a rise in burning biomass for heating during the winter months (Amato et al., 2016[45]). Further air quality checks during the winter months determined the presence of toxic chemicals, indicating the use of previously treated wood or combustible waste as heating fuel.
Note: The 45-degree line indicates the unchanged exposure to pollution.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Pollution across Greek regions is high but decreased since 2010
Regional air pollution is not exclusive to metropolitan areas in Greece. Crete and South Aegean have had the highest pollution levels across regions over time, with a 25.1 µg/m³ of PM2.5 pollution level in Crete in 2017 and only slightly less, 23.7 µg/m³ in 2017, in the South Aegean Islands region (Figure 2.53). Other Greek regions experience considerably smaller exposure to pollution, with Continental Greece, the Ionian Islands and Thessaly being the least air-polluted regions in Greece, with the average pollution level between 12.7 to 13.5 µg/m³ in 2017. Yet, in 2017, all Greek regions have higher air pollution levels than an average OECD region.
A positive trend of reducing the air pollution is common across all regions in Greece by an average 2.7 µg/m³ drop, yet still lower than the decrease seen across OECD regions, 2.8 µg/m between 2010 and 2017. The 2 most polluted regions and the Ionian Islands saw an increase of pollution between 1990 and 2010, while other regions experienced a decrease in pollution by 6% on average, with Eastern Macedonia decreasing 1990 levels of pollution by the highest margin (12%). In this earlier period, Greece reduced pollution at a higher pace than an average OECD region and about half of Greek regions faced pollution levels close to the OECD average (Figure 2.53).
Note: The OECD 2017 average is calculated with 338 OECD regions. The 1990 average is across 323 OECD regions.
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Almost all emissions in Western Macedonia come from the energy sector. Western Macedonia is specialised in mining and energy production with 35% of value-added in 2015. Similarly, the energy sector is the main emitter of CO2 emissions in Peloponnese. In Attica, Central Macedonia, Crete, Epirus, the Ionian Islands, the North Aegean Islands and Western Greece, between 30% and 51% of emissions come from the transport sector, with the energy sector counting for 17% or less of the emissions in these regions (Figure 2.54). There are about three cars per four inhabitants of the Attica region, compared to one car per five inhabitants in Peloponnese. Car presence is also quite dominant in Central Macedonia, Crete and the Ionian Islands, all with about four cars per ten inhabitants in 2014
Source: OECD (2020[8]), Regions and Cities (database), https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed on 19 February 2020).
Since the early 1980s, the European Union Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) have provided financing aid to EU member countries to upgrade public infrastructure, strengthen human capital, accelerate the convergence between the EU regions but also lower poverty and inequality. Greece has been a large beneficiary of these funds as, according to data from the Ministry of Development and Investments, between 2000 and 2017, the EU structural funds disbursement to Greece amounted to EUR 66 billion.
This section assesses to what extent EU structural funds have helped the Greek economy during the long crisis. The evaluation of the impact used data since 2009 and therefore refers to the fourth and fifth programming periods of ESIF. 2009 is the first year when projects were financed in the context of the National Strategic Reference Framework 2007-13. The study includes the distribution of EU capital inflows to Greece and of amounts of EU co-financing (including state participation).
The remainder of the section is organised as follows: the second part includes a review of the literature on the effectiveness of EU funds with specific reference to Greece; the third part focuses on descriptive statistics about EU funds in Greece during the programming periods 2007-13 and 2014-20; the fourth starts with the presentation of the econometric models for estimating the impact of EU funds on the Greek economy. Then, the outputs of the estimations are presented, including the calculation and depiction of the impact of EU co-funded projects with a focus on the 2009-17 period.
EU Structural and Investment Funds represent an important share in Greek public investments
Public investments fell since the crisis, as Greece targeted debt reduction through a consolidation programme. Greece has received support from the European Commission through EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) (Table 2.6). During the crisis, EU funding in the fourth programming period represented the largest share of total public spending in Greece.
Since the early 1980s, European Union Structural Funds (SF) provided financing opportunities to EU member countries with the main aim of redressing regional inequalities. In the beginning, these funding initiatives were undertaken through the Mediterranean Integrated Programmes (MIP) (1986-89). Since the beginning of the 1990s, they are provided in the context of the so-called “programming periods”. Specifically, these comprise the first Community Support Framework (CSF) (1989-93), the second CSF (1994-99), the third CSF (2000-06), the National Strategic Reference Framework (ΕΣΠΑ in Greek) (2007-13) and the current Partnership Agreement for the Development Framework (also ΕΣΠΑ in Greek) (2014-20).
In the last 30 years, Greece has been a major ESIF beneficiary, with tens of thousands of projects financed all over the country, in almost every sector of the economy, ranging from the construction of motorways to activities in the agricultural sector. These projects were mainly financed by the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and EU funds providing support to the agricultural sector. Specifically, in per capita terms, Greece is the EU country that received the highest amounts of ESIF between 1996 and 2015 (Tzifakis, Liargovas and Huliaras, 2015[46]).
Source: Tzifakis, N., P. Liargovas and A. Huliaras (2015[46]), Beyond “Absorption”: The Impact of EU Structural Funds on Greece, http://www.kas.de/greece.
Between May 2010 and August 2018, Greece underwent three Economic Adjustment Programmes, aiming to eliminate severe fiscal imbalances and improve the functioning of markets and international competitiveness. The structural reforms implemented in the context of the adjustment programmes have started to improve competitiveness and conditions for starting new businesses (OECD, 2018[47]). The fiscal adjustment was unprecedented as the state budget primary balance improved by 14.5% of GDP between 2010 and 2018. In the process, GDP fell by 23% between 2009 and 2013, stabilised from 2014 to 2016 before rising by 1.4% in 2017 and 1.9% in 2018. These developments, along with the inability of Greek governments to access financial markets from the second quarter of 2010 until 2017 and the Private Sector Involvement Programme in April 2012, led to a severe dearth of liquidity that persists. From May 2010 to October 2018, the outstanding amount of bank credit to the private sector of the Greek economy (businesses, households and non-profit institutions) almost halved, from EUR 259.9 billion to EUR 174.5 billion. In this context, ESF may have at least provided liquidity that would not be available otherwise.
On the expenditure side, the average annual total amount of EU and national co-financing in the period 2009-18, including investment, other projects and transfers to the agricultural sector, was EUR 8.0 billion, with the highest value, EUR 10.1 billion, recorded at the beginning of this period (Figure 2.55). In 2012, co-funded spending recorded a significant decline year-over-year by almost 26% to EUR 7.5 billion. It then rose by 17.2% in 2013. In the following 3 years, EU co-financing declined moderately, reaching EUR 7.7 billion in 2016. The downward trend intensified in 2017-18, with the relevant spending recording the lowest levels since 2009.
The uneven distribution over time of the spending of EU funds in countries where they account for a significant share of total public investment, as in Greece, makes macroeconomic management challenging (OECD, 2018[47]). That is because EU Structural Funds are not a tool of macroeconomic management and high spending in some years (such as 2010 in Greece) may be followed by low spending in the following years.
Note: Amounts include capital and current spending.
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget review (2009-2018) – SGAAP (ΕΛΕΓΕΠ) balance sheets. Data processing: FEIR/ΙΟΒΕ.
EU co-financing through the regional administrations amounted on average to EUR 706.5 million spanning the period 2009-18. Only, in 2015, this amount exceeded EUR 1.0 billion, recording its highest value in the examined period (EUR 1.03 billion). On the contrary, in 2017, the lowest amount of co-funded spending from regions was recorded, approximately EUR 445 million.
The share of EU co-financing through the regional administrations via the respective Operational Programmes (OPs) to total EU co-spending fluctuated significantly during 2009-18. Specifically, it stood on average at 8.8% (Figure 2.56). In 2010, the relevant share accounted only for 5.2% of total EU co-spending in Greece, the lowest value in the examined period and almost two-thirds of the previous year’s proportion (8.9%). Subsequently and up until 2015, the share of expenditure made by regional administrations remained on an upward trend. In 2015, it reached its highest level (12.8%) but, as of 2010, it exhibited a sharp decline in the following year (6.5%) to its 2018 value of 9.1%.
Source: Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Development and Investments, Data processing: FEIR/IOBE.
Regarding the allocation of EU capital inflows with respect to EU fund of origin, their major part – almost on average 48% during the period 2009-18 – was disbursed from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) (Figure 2.57). A significant amount of financing was drawn from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), with the respective average proportion to total EU funding amounting to 28.2% throughout the examined period. The respective average proportions to total EU funding from the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) amounted to 10.9% and 9.0% respectively. However, the share of ESF inflows fluctuated considerably, whereas that of CF was relatively more stable.
The share of financing from the ERDF declined considerably through time, from 36.2% in 2011 to 16.4% in 2018. On the contrary, the participation of ESF resources recorded a significant increase, reaching 13.0% in 2018 from 2.9% in 2009. This development possibly linked to the urgency of tackling the social problems that the long and strong recession in Greece during 2008-13 caused. In 2018, the capital inflows from both the EAFRD and the EAGF amounted to 58.7% of total resources originating from the EU, the largest share since 2009.
Note: EAFRD: European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development; EAGF: European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF).
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Review, Data processing: ΙΟΒΕ.
Concerning the allocation of total co-financing to activities and sectors of the Greek economy, on average the primary sector of the economy held the highest share, at a significant distance from the sector with the second highest share. Specifically, the primary sector’s share of total EU funding was on average 43% during the period 2009-18. This mainly comprised subsidies granted by the EAGF (Figure 2.58). A significant amount of EU funds was allocated to the construction of transport infrastructure, with its average share reaching 23%. These capital inflows from EU funds were used mainly for the construction of highway networks. Τhe share of EU funds allocated to projects concerning transport fluctuated significantly, reaching 18% in 2018, one of the lowest in the examined period, following a 35% share in 2016. Capital resources concerning the primary sector varied between 40%-45% of total EU funding but recorded a significant increase in 2018, to 54%.
Co-funded projects in the industry-energy sector, and in education and research are next in the classification with respect to absorption of EU funds, with an average share of 12% and 11% respectively. EU capital resources for the support of public administration amounted to 3% between 2009 and 2018. Public administration projects covered various purposes, such as digitalisation of public services, e-governance, restructuring of public services, etc. The smallest shares to EU capital flows were recorded in the health sector, as well as in the tourism-culture sector, with a magnitude of on average 1% for both, spanning the period 2009-18.
In order to assess the implementation of EU co-funded investment planning in Greece during the fourth and fifth programming periods, one can examine the absorption rate of capital resources per EU fund and in total. This information is derived from the ratio of disbursed co-financing to beneficiaries to the approved EU co-funding amounts. Concerning the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) 2007-13, the average absorption rate among EU funds was 106.3%. Analytically, the absorption rate for EFRD reached 106.6%, for ESF reached at 106.2%, while for the Cohesion Fund, the absorption rate stood at 105.3%. Similarly, concerning the Partnership Agreement 2014-20, up to the first semester of 2017 (latest data available), the absorption rate amounted to 9.9%. The absorption rate of EU funds from the EFRD, the ESF and the CF was 10.1%, while the respective rate for EAFRD amounted to 9.1%.
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget review – Public Investment Division (Ministry of Economics) - General Government Accounting Division (Ministry of Finance), Data processing: FEIR/ΙΟΒΕ.
To increase the absorption and use of EU funds in Greece, the technical support of the European Commission's Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) – now DG Reform – is providing help to improve administrative capacity for the design and implementation of reforms concerning the use of EU funds. Moreover, simplification measures were carried out in the legislation and implementation of EU structural funds, including clarifying the demarcation between political and administrative tasks, enhanced co-ordination of funds as well as reinforcement of anti-fraud measures. Greece also set up an inter-ministerial committee with the aim to lift bottlenecks in the implementation of projects and took legislative action to simplify the payment circuit of projects in order to increase absorption. A number of countries have passed reforms to improve the management and spending effectiveness of EU funds. These experiences indicate that improving capacity, greater use of electronic applications, simplified processes and greater co-ordination can help to speed up implementation (Box 2.12).
Bulgaria
Initial weakness resulted in a low absorption rate, which was mitigated by increasing advanced payments, applying electronic application and reporting procedures, simplifying and unifying tender processes, and strengthening the role of international financial institutions and banks in project preparation, evaluation and monitoring.
Czech Republic
Significant steps have been taken to improve co-ordination, capacities and framework conditions for the 2014-20 period. “Standing conferences” have been established at the national and regional levels (using the eight regional groupings channelling EU funding). These conferences include important territorial stakeholders and will prepare action plans that form the basis for calls for tender. There is also a stronger focus on integrated strategies within regions and community-led local development. The number of programmes has been reduced, procedures for managing the programmes have been simplified and a uniform methodology applied across all programmes.
Poland
A forum has been introduced for the co-ordination of strategic planning for the EU-funded investments. Project management and transparency of execution have improved as part of efforts to better absorb EU funds. Technical assistance funds have been used to train regions and beneficiaries of project funds in performance monitoring. An information system for monitoring and controlling structural and cohesion funds was put in place to highlight the financial and physical progress of projects co-financed by EU funds throughout their implementation, which was meant to facilitate the certification process for release of EU funds. Each such project was also assigned a monitoring committee that carried out systematic progress assessments over the life of the project.
Slovak Republic
Some steps have been taken to improve the administration of EU funds, such as the semi-annual publication on the implementation of EU funds that allows the authorities to react promptly in case of identified problems regarding absorption of the funds. Administrative procedures have also been simplified and allow the managing authority to request only partial project documentation upon the application submission, the rest of the documentation being required only after projects are selected. Following 2014 and 2015 government resolutions, it was decided to significantly increase the number of employees working in entities responsible for ESIF. The Analytical Unit of Central Coordination Body was created in June 2015. The main aim of this body is to provide input for evidence-based policymaking, with a special emphasis on the study of the effectiveness of EU funds. An electronic system to exchange data between managing authorities and EU fund beneficiaries has been put in place to monitor and evaluate the whole process. The managing authorities started to collaborate with regional offices to offer technical assistance and free consultations to help applicants with the application process. The recently adopted National Public Procurement Package is supposed to facilitate the application and disbursement process.
Slovenia
The government has implemented inter-ministerial co-ordination, which organises meetings with potential applicants and advises smaller companies. Slovenia has also simplified procedures for payments and improved the timeliness of public tender announcements.
Lithuania
Since joining the EU in 2004, Lithuania has taken steps to improve planning and implementation of public investment projects, particularly those financed by EU funds. To deal with an expanding pool of potential project applications to use EU funds, a competition-based project selection procedure was introduced, which meant that public entities and public service providers had to apply for financing on an equal basis and follow well-defined criteria and procedures.
Source: OECD (2018[47]), OECD Economic Surveys: European Union 2018, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-eur-2018-en;.
EU funds have significantly increased Greek economic performance
In order to analyse the impact of cohesion policy, some studies have used the QUEST III5 model, developed and used by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), supplemented by a second model, RHOMOLO.6 The latter is designed to estimate the impact of policy at the NUTS 2 regional level. The results of this model for the programming period 2000-06 show an unambiguously positive impact of EU Structural Funds financing on the GDP of member states, especially in the Greek economy. Specifically, the results of the model simulation suggest that co-funded investments during the period 2000-09 have potentially on average increased GDP in Greece by up to 1.4% annually, relative to the baseline scenario on (Figure 2.59).
Disentangling the effect of EU funds from other factors driving economic growth is not evident. It should be recognised, however, that in many countries – Greece included-, financing from the EU structural funds has amounted to a high share of public investment, which is a key driver of economic growth in less developed regions (EC, 2018[48])
Many studies on the impact of Cohesion Policy funding on growth have found significantly positive effects (Puigcerver-Penalver, 2007; Lima & Cardenete, 2008). A small part of these studies has found positive but only mild effects (Mohl & Hagen, 2010) while some other studies found an either small or statistically insignificant impact (Ederveen, Groot, & Nahuis, 2006; Bradley, Morgenroth, Untiedt, Bradley, & Morgenroth, 2003). Most of the studies carried out after 2005 usually rely on larger datasets that could capture the long-run effect of Cohesion Policy and find that EU co-funding has had broadly positive results
Starting with the impact of the second CSF 1994-99 on Greece, EU funds contributed to the creation of nearly 400 000 jobs (Beutel, 2002[49]). The effects of capital inflows in the context of the EU Cohesion Policy on the Greek Economy during the period from 2000 to 2006 were positive, contributing to an increase in GDP by 2.8% (Tzifakis, Liargovas and Huliaras, 2015[46]). They also boosted technological innovation, through investment in 23 000 enterprises and 7 000 start-ups. Moreover, it was estimated that EU funds in the third programming period generated 14 000 new jobs per year, provided vocational training for 257 000 people and improved infrastructure and accessibility to the labour market.
During the 2007-13 programming period, EU funds provided Greece with EUR 6 billion to improve transport infrastructure, EUR 5.5 billion to boost environmental condition, EUR 3.6 billion to support R&D and EUR 2.2 billion for vocational training. These financial resources led to the creation of more than 2 400 businesses and contributed to investment in over 30 000 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Tzifakis, Liargovas and Huliaras, 2015[46]). Moreover, 21 000 job positions were created, most of them in SMEs. Thanks to EU funding, 800 000 citizens gained access to broadband Internet and there was an improvement in urban transport, to the benefit of over 86 000 people.7 Investment in water supply and management benefitted 450 000 people (REMACO, 2014).8
Source: (Beutel, 2002[49])The Economic Impact of Objective 1 Interventions for the Period 2000-2006, https://opus.htwg-konstanz.de/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/21/file/FH-orschung9.pdf (accessed on 25 July 2019); Tzifakis, N., P. Liargovas and A. Huliaras (2015[46]), Beyond “Absorption”: The Impact of EU Structural Funds on Greece, http://www.kas.de/greece; (Puigcerver-Penalver, 2007[50]), (Lima & Cardenete, 2008[51]), (Mohl & Hagen, 2010[52]), (Ederveen, Groot & Nahuis, 2006[53]), (Bradley & Morgenroth, 2003[54]), (REMACO, 2014[55]).
Source: QUEST European Commission macroeconomic model 2014. Data computation with WebPlotDigitizer.
Figure 2.60). Although a boost to economic activity was estimated, this is significantly milder compared to that of the previous programming period. This outcome is partly attributable to GDP contraction due to the 2010 sovereign crisis in Greece.
ESIF can also positively impact environmental and social outcomes. During the 2007-13 programming period, an additional 5.9 million people were connected to new or improved water supply networks, 1.6 million of whom were in EU-12 countries and 3.7 million in convergence regions in the 4 southern EU-15 member states (Table 2.7). The majority were living in Spain and Greece, 1.93 million and 1.4 million respectively. Additionally, 6.9 million more people were connected to new or upgraded wastewater treatment facilities, 1.9 million of whom were in EU-12 countries and 4.6 million in the 4 southern member states, of which 370 800 in Greece.
Source: QUEST European Commission macroeconomic model 2014. Data computation with WebPlotDigitizer.
In the current programming period 2014-20, with means of a RHOMOLO model estimation, GDP in EU-13 countries in 2015 was estimated to be 2.8 percentage points higher than it would have been without EU co-funded projects (Figure 2.61). In terms of the magnitude of the impact until 2023, Greece ranks among the middle range of EU countries, with a 1.6 percentage points higher GDP growth rate compared with the case of absence of ESIF for the programming period 2014-20. The year 2023, beyond the fifth programming period, was chosen as a benchmark, because some cohesion funding, such as that for innovation process, has medium- or even long-term impact on the economy, which in some cases is higher than its short-term impact.
Source: QUEST European Commission macroeconomic model 2014. Data computation with WebPlotDigitizer.
A characteristic of the impact of ESIF is the hysteresis effect these projects can have on the local economy. Some categories of interventions have an immediate impact on employment, such as transport infrastructures, but others could affect the economy in the medium and long terms, such as R&D projects or education (Plaskovitis, 2006[56]; Tzifakis, Liargovas and Huliaras, 2015[46]). Financial support for this type of project is higher in Greece in the context of the 2007-13 and 2014-20 programming periods compared with previous ones. This may lead to higher GDP growth rates in the long run. The impact of EU co-financing on Greece’s real GDP reached 6% for the period 2000-06 (Funck and Pizzati, 2003[57]). This result came from using Hermin model simulations and comparing the GDP growth rate of the Greek economy versus a baseline scenario GDP growth rate, not including the effect of EU funds. In this study, it is assumed that structural funds had a beneficial impact on social and institutional capital, as well as through increasing the efficiency of public administration. However, it is not easy to capture the latter effect on the economy.
Τhe impact of EU funds on GDP is sizeable and robust
The effects of the EU co-funded projects on the Greek economy were approached by means of two econometric models, a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) developed by the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE) and a version of the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) model. For the calibration of the latter, recent simulation results of the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) for Greece, produced by the OECD, were taken into account. The former model was used for estimating the one-off short-term impact of EU funds on GDP during 2009-18, whereas the latter for calculating the medium-term multiplier for the same period and the long-term multiplier of EU co-funded projects (2009-23).
Specifically, assuming that the average share of national (state) participation to all EU co-funded projects, for investment and consumption purposes, was 20% over the period 2000-18, the VECM estimation result was that each euro of EU co-financing, excluding national participation, has led on average to another 64 cents of GDP (at 2008 values). This is equivalent to a claim that each euro of EU funds, including national participation, has led on average to 51 cents of GDP creation. Accordingly, 0.51 is the value of the short-term growth multiplier of EU funds. In the event the average national participation share was 14%, then the impact of each euro of co-funding on GDP would be 59 cents. Assuming that the average national participation rate is 20% and the confidence interval is close to 95% (+/- 2 standard deviations), the result is that each euro of EU funds increased GDP by a range between 17 and 111 cents (or a range between 16 and 103 cents if the average national participation was 14%).
During the whole period 2000-18, the average one-off short-term contribution of EU co-funded projects to Greek GDP was 2.0 percentage points. This outcome results in a cumulative boost of GDP by EUR 76.9 billion (in 2008 volumes), without accounting for the impact of the private sector capital resources that were mobilised due to EU co-funded projects. Τhe impact of EU funds on GDP is robust and of similar magnitude when focusing on the sub-period 2009-18, which relates to the disbursements in the context of the fourth (2007-13) and fifth (2014-20) programming periods. Due to the lower average level of GDP during 2009-18, the average first-year contribution of co-funded projects to economic activity has been slightly higher during 2009-18, around 2.1 percentage points of Greek GDP (circa EUR 4.0 billion in 2008 chain-linked volumes [CLVs]). This translates into a cumulative increase of GDP by EUR 40.0 billion during 2009-18.
According to the GIMF estimation output, the medium-term cumulative effect of the EU co-financed investment on the Greek GDP (period 2009-18) was EUR 71.0 billion in 2008 chain-linked volumes. Therefore, given that total EU co-financing of investment and other projects for this period was EUR 79.1 billion, the average multiplier of the EU funds on the Greek GDP over this period is 0.9, implying that each euro of EU funds boosted on average the country’s GDP by 90 cents. The medium-term multiplier is higher than the short-term multiplier because it inter alia captures the cumulating positive effect from productivity gains.
The same cumulative amount of EU funds was estimated to cause a cumulative increase of the Greek GDP in the entire period 2009-23 equal to EUR 122.3 billion in 2008 CLVs. This implies a long-term multiplier close to 1.55, which is more than double the short-term effect.
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Data set
The choice of variables for this section’s empircal estimation builds upon existing literature on VECM calibration to a country’s macroeconomic outlook, including (Anderson et al., 2002[58]) on the United States economy, (Christofides et al., 2006[59]) on Cyprus, (Lyhagen et al., 2015[60]) on Sweden, and (Thanasis, 2017[61]) on Greece. This calibration considers long-term relationships among real GDP, inflation rate and employment, while adding proxies for labour productivity and the intensity of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, as measured by the government bond spread. The model assumes that all macroeconomic variables are endogenously determined and allows examining how exogenous shocks stemming from EU funds affect each endogenous variable. The data set consists of variables on a quarterly frequency during the period 2000-18. Those are presented in Annex Table 2.A.1. The proxy for EU funds is derived from the total amount of spending for EU co-funded projects, as they are mainly recorded in the state budget and state budget review.9 The EU funds series hence comprises both national and EU contribution to EU co-funded projects (expenditure codes 8300, 5300 and 5400, classified mostly under the Public Investments Programme, as well as transfers to the agricultural sector, disbursed by the Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid [ΟΠΕΚΕΠΕ in Greek]), while it excludes private sector investment for these projects. Such co-financing data is available annually; we hence construct its quarterly path following the within-year seasonality of public investment, proxied by the general government’s gross capital formation.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented in Annex Table 2.A.2. For the purpose of the Vector Error Correction Model estimation (VECM), the variables’ quarterly percentage change (quarter-over-quarter) was used, measured by the first difference of their logarithmic values. For the government bond spread (GGB variable), the first difference of its percentage level across quarters was used. In Annex Figure 2.A.1, the annualised variables’ trend during the examined time span is presented.
Source: Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE) estimates.
Model specification
In order for the VECM estimation to be well specified, a necessary condition is for the endogenous variables to be cointegrated. The general formulation of a VECM expresses a dynamic relationship between the vector of endogenous variables that are cointegrated (long-run relationship) and the vector of exogenous variables affecting the endogenous variables.10 Indicatively, a VECM can be written in the following algebraic form:
where depicts one or more cointegration relationships among the endogenous variables, expresses the short-term adjustment coefficients and represents the contemporaneous impact of exogenous variables.
Following Johansen’s cointegration rank test, we find that our set of endogenous variables exhibits one cointegrating relationship at the 95% confidence level, concerning the GDP (maximum eigenvalue criterion). We choose two as the number of optimal lags for the endogenous variables following a combination of information criteria (FPE, AIC, LR, Schwarz Information Criterion, Hannan-Quinn). Hence, the VECM specification including one cointegrating relationship among the endogenous variables and two lags is written as follows:
Estimation Results
The model’s estimation output is presented in Annex Table 2.A.3. In relation to the endogenous variables, the cointegrating equation reveals a positive long-term relationship between real GDP on one hand and employment, labour productivity but also government bond spreads, and a negative relationship between real GDP and inflation. Annex Figure 2.A.2 shows how shocks of one standard deviation magnitude on the endogenous variables affect GDP over 10 quarters. The results are intuitive in the sense that shocks in inflation and spreads negatively affect real GDP, as opposed to shocks in employment and labour productivity, which positively affect GDP.
The Variance Decomposition Analysis reveals that shocks in labour productivity and government spreads explain an increasing share of real GDP variance over time, accounting for up to 10% and 23% of GDP variance respectively after 10 quarters. The share of GDP variance, which is due to shocks in its lagged values dissipates over time, to reach 61% after 10 quarters.
After controlling for the model’s predictions in relation to the endogenous variables, the main question of interest is how does EU funding affect GDP? The estimation output (Annex Table 2.A.3) reveals that EU funds have a significant positive short-term impact on GDP. Every 1% increase of EU co-funded projects to Greece during the 2000-18 period increased on average its contemporaneous real GDP by 0.02%. Given that the average annual spending on EU co-funded projects was EUR 8.2 billion during the examined period, one can approximate the impact of EU funds in terms of the value of GDP per annum. The VECM estimation shows only the one-off short-term impact of EU funds on GDP and does not capture any dynamic effects.11
Assuming that the average share of national participation to EU co-funded projects was 20% over the period 2000-18,12 then each euro of EU inflows, excluding national participation, has led on average to 64 cents of GDP creation (at 2008 prices). This is equivalent to claim that each euro of EU funds including national participation, has led on average to 51 cents of GDP creation.13 If the average national participation share was 14%,14 then the impact of each euro on GDP, combined with the attached national funds, would be 59 cents. Based on an average national participation rate of 20% and a confidence interval of close to 95% (+/- 2 standard deviations), we conclude that 1 euro of EU funds, combined with national participation, increased GDP by a range between 17 and 111 cents (or a range between 16 and 103 cents if the average national participation was 14%). The low and high range estimates stemming from the VECM on the impact of EU funds in percentage points of annual GDP are depicted in Annex Figure 2.A.3.
During the whole period 2000-18, the average annual contribution of EU co-funded projects to Greek GDP was 2.0 percentage points. This translates into a cumulative boost of GDP by EUR 76.9 billion (at 2008 prices), without accounting for their dynamic effects or the impact of the private sector capital resources that were mobilised due to the EU co-funded projects. Importantly, the positive impact of EU funds on GDP is robust and of similar magnitude when focusing on the sub-period 2009-18, which relates to the disbursements from the fourth (2007-13) and fifth (2014-20) programming periods. Due to the lower average level of GDP during 2009-18, the average annual contribution of co-funded projects to economic activity has been slightly higher, around 2.1 percentage points of GDP. This translates into a cumulative increase of GDP during 2009-18 of EUR 39.5 billion (at 2008 prices). On average, during this period, the one-off short-term effect of EU funds on real GDP was around EUR 4.0 billion (2008 prices) per annum. Besides the findings on GDP, the results in Annex Figure 2.A.3 point out on a positive impact of EU funds on employment and labour productivity, as well as a negative impact on government bond spreads. However, these results are not statistically significant (they are significant at an 80% confidence level only).
Note: GDP impulse responses are estimated during an interval of ten quarters, following one standard deviation shock on each of the endogenous variables, following Cholesky’s method.
Source: FEIR/IOBE estimates.
Source: FEIR/IOBE, VECM estimation.
Τhe effects of EU funding on the Greek economy were also approached by means of a structural macroeconomic model. Specifically, a simulation of the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) model, which is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic model developed by the IMF, was carried out.15 A version of the model with three regions was applied, calibrated to represent Greece, the rest of the Euro Area (i.e. the Euro Area excluding Greece) and the rest of the world. The simulation was carried out in Matlab, with DYNARE. In order to examine the impact of EU financing that Greece received over the period 2009-18, that is during the previous and the current EU programming period, on the Greek GDP, the capital inflows from the EU funds headed towards co-financing projects in Greece were treated as part of the Greek Public Investment Programme.
Simulation setup
In order to capture the effect of the EU funds on the Greek economy after 2009, the model was first calibrated to the parameters of economic activity in Greece, the rest of the Euro Area and the rest of the world, as they were in the year 2008, the last year before the period of interest, using national accounts data, trade data and other statistics from Eurostat, data from the calibrations of (Kumhof et al., 2010[62]) (Anderson et al., 2013[63]), while also taking into account recent simulation results for Greece produced by the OECD using the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM).16 Throughout this exercise, just as in the VECM estimation in the previous section, EU funds are defined as the total public expenditure for projects co-financed by the EU, including both capital resources transferred from the EU Structural Funds to Greece and Greek state resources tied to these EU transfers.
To account for the fact that Greece used EU funds in 2008, the state in which the Greek economy would have been had there not been any EU funds in the country in 2008 was calculated. This state of the economy is the base, against which comparisons will be made later in the analysis. Starting from the base state, the response of the Greek economy to an exogenous change to Greek public investments, by the amount of EU co-financing in the years 2009-18 was calculated.17 The estimation of the effect of the EU co-funded projects to the Greek economy was approximated by the difference of the model-calculated Greek GDP, prompted by this exogenous shock, from the GDP in the base state.
In specific, the state in which the Greek economy would have been in 2008, had there not been for that year’s EU co-financed projects, was calculated and this hypothetical state of the economy was used as the base state.18 The model was simulated starting from the base state of the economy (a steady state) and treating public investments in Greece as an exogenous variable. Public investments were initially set to be equal in 2009 to the base level plus the annual amount of EU co-financing in that year. The same methodology was followed for 2010 and so on, up to 2018.
For each year in the simulation, the model-calculated GDP approximates the level of activity embodying the impact of EU co-financed projects and transfers. The difference between this level and the base level of GDP depicts the response of the Greek economy to EU co-financing. Annex Figure 2.A.4 illustrates the amounts of EU co-funded investment added to the base level of public investments over the ten-year period of interest.
Source: FEIR/IOBE.
Simulation results
The effects of the EU funds on the Greek economy over the period 2009-23 were examined. This period includes years 2009-18, for which it is assumed that Greece receives EU funds, as well as years 2019-23, during which it is assumed that no EU funds are disbursed to Greece. Extending the period examined from 2018 to 2023 and assuming that Greece stops receiving transfers after the former year, allows for the estimation of the long-term effects of the EU funds disbursed during 2009-18 on the Greek economy.
Annex Figure 2.A.6 illustrates the effect of EU co-funded projects on GDP over the period examined, as well as the amounts of EU co-financing. The effect on the Greek GDP increases remarkably after the first few years of the examined period, reflecting the productivity gains in the Greek economy due to the accumulated additional public investments triggered by the investment and other projects co-financed by the EU. The cumulative effect of EU funds on the Greek GDP over the period 2009-18 was estimated at EUR 71.0 billion, in 2008 based chain-linked volumes. Since the total amount of EU co-financed projects over the period 2009-18 in 2008 based chain-linked volumes was EUR 79.1 billion, the average multiplier of the EU funds on the Greek GDP over this period is 0.9, implying that each euro of EU funds boosted on average the country’s GDP by 90 cents. This medium-term multiplier is higher than the short-term multiplier of 0.51 estimated in the previous section (VECM) because it inter alia captures the cumulating positive effect from productivity gains.
Source: FEIR/IOBE
Both short-term and medium-term multiplier estimates can be compared with a long-term multiplier, calculated over the entire period 2009-23. The same cumulative amount of EU funds (EUR 79.1 billion in 2008 chain-linked volumes) was estimated to cause a cumulative increase of the Greek GDP in the entire period 2009-23 equal to EUR 122.3 billion in 2008 CLVs. This implies a long-term multiplier close to 1.55, which is higher than both short-term and medium-term multipliers due to the dynamically cumulating positive effect of EU funds. The sustained increase of the Greek GDP, even after the Greek economy is assumed to stop receiving financing aid from the EU, is caused chiefly by the productivity gains achieved by the increased economic activity made possible by EU financing.
Source: FEIR/IOBE.
Notes
← 1. Values from the Greek Tourism Organisation. Numbers can vary with island size definition.
← 2. “Refugees” are those who have successfully applied for asylum and have been granted protection in their host country, including those who are recognised on the basis of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees but also those benefitting from national asylum laws or EU legislation (Directive 2011/95/EU), such as the subsidiary protection status. “Asylum seekers” are those who have submitted a claim for international protection but are awaiting the final decision. (OECD Glossary of statistical terms).
← 3. Only the following countries with available data are considered: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
← 4. In some countries the leading region accounts for a small percentage of the total workforce. Where this is the case, the frontier is the weighted average of regions with the highest labour productivity levels accounting for 10% of the country’s total employment (OECD (2018), Productivity and Jobs in a Globalised World: (How) Can All Regions Benefit).
← 5. The model used to carry out this impact assessment is an extension of Quest III containing a representation of the effect of investment in human capital and endogenous technological change, which makes it particularly suitable for the evaluation of cohesion policy type of structural interventions. It also includes explicit cross-country linkages through bilateral trade relationships to capture spill-over effects and the interaction between EU member states.
← 6. RHOMOLO is used extensively for impact assessments of the European Structural and Investment Funds, such as ERDF and ESF, and it is used together with the European Investment Bank (EIB) for the evaluation of the macroeconomic impact of the EIB group. This model has been developed by the Joint Research Centre-Institute for Prospective Technological Studies and the DG Regional Policy.
← 7. Executive Unit of ESPA of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport: i) Annual Report 2013 of the Operational Program for Environment and Sustainable Development; an ii) Final Report of March 2017 of the Operational Programme of the Attica Region.
← 8. REMACO (2014), “Annual implementation report for 2013 for the Operational Programme Environment and Sustainable Development Programme 2007-2013” or, in Greek “Ετήσια Έκθεση Υλοποίησης Επιχειρησιακού Προγράμματος Περιβάλλον και Αειφόρος Ανάπτυξη 2007 – 2013) http://www.epper.gr/el/Documents/ethsia_ekthesi_2013_epperaa.pdf.
← 9. Data for 2000-18 are based on ex-post state budget evaluations.
← 10. For the appropriate VEC model specification, a stability test was applied on the underlying VAR specification, White test for the heteroscedasticity of residuals and LM test for autocorrelation.
← 11. The dynamic effects of EU funds on GDP growth are estimated in the following section, which presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
← 12. According to data from the Ministry of Economy, the effective national participation rate for EU co-funded projects during the 2000-06 programming period was 31%, while the arithmetic average of national participation for co-funded projects approved up to July 2018 for the 2014-20 programming period is 23%. During the 2007-13 programming, due to considerable pressure in the budgets of some countries (Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Romania), the European Commission provided in August 2011 an option for increasing the co-financing rate to 95% (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-942_en.htm). This option was activated by Greece, thus reducing national participation to 5%. The equally weighted average participation rate across the 3 programming periods is 19.7%.
← 13. The value of 0.65 can hence be interpreted as the short-term growth multiplier of the EU funds series.
← 14. According to data from the Ministry of Finance, if one excludes the 2000-06 programming period, the equally weighted average of national participation rate during the fourth and fifth programming period is, up to July 2018, 14%.
← 15. For the detailed description of the model, see (Kumhof et al., 2010[62]). For an extensive study of the properties of the model, see (Anderson et al., 2013[63]).
← 16. The NiGEM is an estimated New-Keynesian macro-econometric model developed by the British National Institute of Economic and Social Research on behalf of the OECD, and regularly used by the OECD for macroeconomic assessment and forecasting. In this study, NiGEM results were used primarily for consistency checks, e.g. see (Barrel et al., 2012[67]) for estimated fiscal multipliers for Greece.
← 17. Data for 2009-18 are based on ex post state budget evaluations.
← 18. The estimation of the base state of the economy was the result of a separate simulation of the model, starting from the calibration for 2008 (a steady state), treating public investments in Greece as an exogenous variable, setting public investments at a level equal to their 2008 actual level minus the amount disbursed in that year for EU co-funded projects and keeping public investments steady for a large number of periods, so that a new steady state is reached.
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