4. Enablers for action on climate resilience

Efforts to strengthen climate resilience rely on the availability of weather, water and climate data and information to policy makers and other state- and non-state actors. Weather and climate services, collectively categorised as meteorological services, provide information and advice on past, present and future states of the atmosphere across different timescales. These range from minutes and weeks (weather) to months, years, decades and even centuries (climate). Complementing meteorological services are i) hydrological services that focus on surface and sub-surface inland waters and cover areas such as energy and water resource management; and ii) oceanographic and marine services that address the oceans and related sectors (Luther et al., 2019[1]). The term weather and climate services broadly refers to different types of climate data products and information as summarised in Table 4.1. These can, for example, be in the form of web platforms, smartphone apps or seasonal forecasts, all with the shared goal of being easily accessible to intended users.

Weather and climate services and the underlying infrastructure that supports them are critical to guide decision making on climate resilience, as recognised by over 40 developing countries in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (Allis et al., 2019[3]). This infrastructure includes equipment to collect data, preserve and manage data records; and processes for developing and delivering weather and climate services. Development of the services must demonstrate a good understanding of the needs of decision makers and society more broadly to understand, anticipate and manage climate-related risks. They must also deliver information in a format that is relevant, accessible and credible (WMO & GFCS, 2019[4]). For decision makers, for example, information that sheds light on the impacts of climate change on their thematic or geographic areas of management will often be more valuable than data on the meteorological quantities per se (e.g. projected precipitation and temperature changes) (Hansen et al., 2019[5]).

Early and sustained engagement with different users can help ensure that data and information are decision-relevant. They must be compatible with the capacities of intended users, increasing their understanding of the issues, and in turn their confidence in using them (Weaver et al., 2017[6]; Butler et al., 2015[7]; Street et al., 2019[8]). Centralised platforms, such as the Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) spearheaded by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), can facilitate support tailored to user needs (see Box 4.1). The GFCS provides access to weather and climate data and information, including observations, forecasting, risk modelling and the latest academic findings.

Coverage of hazard, exposure and vulnerability data and information is not always available at a level of granularity suitable for national or local decision-making processes. The governance of data and information generation and dissemination can also limit access and use. This is especially the case when the cost of acquiring data falls on several individual ministries or agencies rather than a central government entity, such as a National Meteorological and Hydrological Service (NMHS) (OECD, 2020[11]).

Housing the NMHS in a ministry or agency with limited authority or capacity to co-ordinate stakeholders can also affect access and use. In some countries, one agency is responsible for weather, water and climate; in others, it may be two or more separate agencies. NMHSs can also play a critical role in supporting different stakeholders affected by climate risks (e.g. agriculture, energy, transport, health and water). They can also help provide solutions for climate resilience (e.g. infrastructure developers and insurance providers) to complement use of weather and climate data and information with that on associated socio-economic variables. Further, they can facilitate access and co-ordination with regional and global stakeholders. These could include members of the United Nations system, other international organisations, economic commissions, financial institutions and the private sector (Hewitt et al., 2020[10]) (see examples of global and regional initiatives in Box 4.2).

In addition to the production and delivery of weather and climate services, the so-called climate services value chain also includes stakeholder actions and outcomes, and evaluations of associated economic costs and benefits (see Figure 4.1). Value chains of weather and climate services that are national-regional-global in scale require continued investments across all levels. This allows them to build on progress over the past decade both to develop weather and climate services and to overcome the “last mile” barriers that can limit their use and benefits (WMO & GFCS, 2019[4]). The benefits of investing in such a national-regional-global system have been estimated to outweigh the costs by around 80:1 (Kull, Graessle and Aryan, 2016[12]). For such benefits to materialise, however, supportive policy environments, as well as human and technical resources, must be available to put the systems in place and keep them operational; this is not the case for all developing countries (Kull, Graessle and Aryan, 2016[12]). In fact, it has often proven challenging to scale up weather and climate service interventions. Some obstacles include capacity constraints, inadequate institutions and difficulties in maintaining systems beyond the pilot project stage (IPCC, 2018[13]). Overcoming these challenges requires a shift towards a long-term financing model supportive of a system that spans national, regional and global scales.

The rest of this section explores how weather and climate services can contribute to strengthened climate resilience, focusing on five priorities for governments and development co-operation to consider:

NMHSs are in many countries the primary source of weather, water and climate data and information. This work entails the design, operation and maintenance of national observation, monitoring, modelling and forecasting systems. However, it also includes data processing, management, exchange and dissemination of related products (WMO & GFCS, 2016[9]). For NMHSs to contribute to climate resilience, they must have a good understanding of users’ needs and capacity to adjust products and services accordingly. This includes both short-term forecasts and seasonal information to farmers, for example. It also includes the ability of users to assess the local implications of forecasts of planetary phenomena such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, the North Atlantic Oscillation and the Arctic Oscillation (Snow et al., 2016[15]).

NMHSs are publicly funded entities with a primary focus on generating and sharing weather, water and climate data and information. As such, they are theoretically well-positioned to collaborate with academia, government departments and other stakeholders, including international and civil society organisations (CSOs). Such partnerships can be crucial in enhancing data and information coverage and quality, and in facilitating access to the data in a timely and efficient manner (WMO & GFCS, 2016[9]).

The private sector can also play a role. However, experience from the Philippines has shown that it is not always easy to generate viable business opportunities for weather, water and climate services. For instance, a private-sector initiative called the WeatherPhilippines used to provide short-term weather forecasts for free in the Philippines. However, it has recently closed its operations. The parent company donated its automated weather stations and other weather technology assets to various government agencies, local government units and a CSO (Aboitiz, 2020[16]). There were multiple reasons for the closure, including financial constraints.

Having to compete for state budgets, NMHSs in many developing countries are often relatively poorly resourced. Many have limited human and institutional capacity to support the development of weather and climate services and limited scope for collaboration (Allis et al., 2019[3]). This translates into reduced access for state and non-state actors to data and information, critical for informed decision-making processes. In some countries, NMHSs do not manage support for weather and climate services. Rather, other national ministries or agencies, including for disaster relief, water, transportation, communications, agriculture or finance, fulfil this role (Snow et al., 2016[15]).

Still other countries have centralised platforms such as National Frameworks for Climate Services (NFCS) or National Climate Forums. These provide institutional mechanisms for co-ordinating, facilitating and strengthening collaboration among national institutions and other state and non-state actors in development and use of tailored climate services (WMO & GFCS, 2019[4]). The GFCS monitors progress development of NFCS online (WMO & GFCS, n.d.[17]).

Increased recognition of the importance of weather, water and climate services has brought more development co-operation providers supporting related initiatives (Hansen et al., 2019[5]). This has in some cases resulted in a fragmented approach where NMHSs are under pressure to operate and maintain individual and sometimes overlapping initiatives. They must comply with different approaches to implementation and reporting, leaving little room to strengthen their overall capacity (Snow et al., 2016[15]). Indeed, many NMHSs face human capacity as a constraint; they lack staff with technical skills to maintain equipment and to process the data and information.

Twelve international organisations1 joined forces in 2019 to co-ordinate their support to weather and climate services in developing countries. The Alliance for Hydromet Development aims to ramp up efforts to strengthen the capacity of developing country NMHSs to produce and deliver high-quality weather forecasts, early warnings and other hydrological and climate services. Members of the Alliance have committed to strengthen collaboration in four areas (WMO, n.d.[18]):

  • Improve data quality by strengthening country capacities for sustained operation of observational systems and seek innovative ways to finance developing country observations.

  • Strengthen country capacities for science-based mitigation and adaptation planning.

  • Strengthen EWSs for improved disaster risk management by developing national multi-hazard EWSs, comprising better risk information, forecasting capabilities, warning dissemination and anticipatory response.

  • Boost investments for better effectiveness and sustainability by fostering programmatic approaches that go beyond individual projects.

A range of knowledge products have been developed that can guide efforts to strengthen the institutional capacity, mandate and recognition of National Meteorological and Hydrological Services, some of which are summarised in Table 4.2.

Data and observations, as well as related modelling capabilities, underpin all weather and climate services and related climate science research. Daily, monthly, seasonal or annual data provide essential input for planning processes in areas such as agriculture, water, energy and health. Longer data series inform analysis of the relationship between changes in the climate, the natural environment and society (e.g. migration of species across altitudes and latitudes and public health). This includes data and observations on both the processes and properties of the climate system (see examples in Table 4.3):

  • Processes: atmospheric, oceanic, terrestrial

  • Properties: physical, chemical and biological properties

The observation system is globally comprised of more than 10 000 staffed or automatic surface weather stations, 1 000 upper-air stations, 7 000 ships, 100 moored and 1 000 drifting buoys, hundreds of weather radars and 3 000 specially equipped commercial aircrafts, and 30 meteorological and 200 research satellites (WMO, n.d.[20]). Once quality controlled, the observations are made freely available through WMO’s Information System (see Box 4.4).

Despite this vast network of observations, coverage varies significantly across countries and continents. This is in part due to inadequate or unreliable investments in many developing countries in the infrastructure and human and technical capacity. However, factors such as inadequate maintenance of the equipment, unreliable energy supply hampering data transmission, conflict, vandalism and regional-scale epidemics also play an important role (Snow et al., 2016[15]).

Digital observations and automated measurement systems can help address data gaps in some contexts. Automatic weather stations can be tailored with a variety of sensors to meet different operational requirements (Snow et al., 2016[15]). Similarly, automatic hydrological observing systems have facilitated a shift from manual readings of staff gauges to automated readings that could increase coverage (Snow et al., 2016[15]). Remote sensing techniques can also address some gaps, such as atmospheric temperature and moisture profiles that inform forecasting. Further, they can shed light on historical trends such as the warming of the Polar regions or high mountain areas. However, certain factors limit the use of remote sensing techniques for many applications. These include uncertain data continuity and continued gaps in the data validation. As a result of these limits, they cannot be relied upon to overcome all data gaps (Guo, Zhang and Zhu, 2015[21]).

For observations to be accessible to weather and climate service providers and users, they must be available in a digital format. This also includes the digitalisation of historical data to fill temporal and spatial gaps. Benefits from such digitalisation or data rescue include the following (WMO, 2016[22]):

  • It helps to calibrate different models, including hydrological and climatological models.

  • It allows current weather and climate to be better placed within an historical perspective.

  • It provides a basis for assessing historical sensitivities of natural and human-made systems to climate variability and change.

Development co-operation plays a role in supporting partner countries in improving weather, water and climate observations. In some cases, it puts processes in place for generating good data and information. In others, it may scale up and maintain data and information processes already in place. Further, development co-operation can support partner countries in making the data accessible to different stakeholders across local, national and regional levels. It is also well-placed to support efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of different stakeholders to use the data and information available, especially at the local level (OECD, 2020[11]).

A country must complement the availability of data and information by its modelling capabilities to be able to project changes in the climate. When complemented with an understanding of the broader socio-economic variables, modelling can also point to the potential implications of climate change for human and natural systems. The Ghana Space Science and Technology Institute, for example, relies on meteorological data from the Ghana Meteorological Services Agency for providing policy makers with climate data and information. This includes the Institute’s involvement in climate scenario development and vulnerability assessment for the country’s National Communications (NCs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Ghana’s third NC, published in 2015, simulates and downscales data on rainfall and temperature obtained from 22 synoptic stations across the country (Government of Ghana, 2015[23]).

Development of modelling capabilities are resource-intensive and regional climate centres can play an important role in developing and making available to both state and non-state actors this critical data and information. At the global level, the WMO Regional Climate Centres and the NMHSs are supported by the WMO-designated Global Producing Centres for Long-Range Forecasts. One of these centres is the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. For example, it provides global forecasts, climate analysis and datasets that can be tailored to different user needs. These aim to show how the weather is most likely to evolve by producing an ensemble of predictions. This is complemented by the Global Producing Centres for Annual to Decadal Climate Predictions. The most recent update, for example, draws on the expertise of renowned climate scientists and computer models from world leading climate centres to produce actionable information for decision makers around the world (WMO, 2020[24]).

Table 4.4 summarises different guidance and tools that can guide national and international approaches to improve weather, climate and hydrological observations in support of strengthened weather and climate services.

The past decade has seen a shift in emphasis from assessing the physical nature of weather, water and climate hazards to better understanding the impacts of those hazards on people’s lives and livelihoods. With this shift, top-down assessments of the hazards based on observed and modelled climate data have increasingly been complemented with bottom-up approaches that assess the exposure and vulnerability to the hazards. This is consistent with how the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) frames climate risks as a function of hazards, exposure and vulnerability (see Figure 4.2). There continues, however, to be a gap in the availability and access to exposure and vulnerability data compared to hazard data, with the former often spread across ministries and levels of government (OECD, 2020[11]). Examples of bottom-up qualitative approaches in understanding and informing climate resilience efforts are summarised in Box 4.5.

Many guidance and tools have been developed to assess climate-related risks (see some examples in Table 4.6). While the approaches differ, they all provide information on current and projected climate-related risks of societies, economies and ecosystems alongside the dimensions of hazards, vulnerability and exposure (GIZ, EURAC & UNU-EHS, 2018[27]). The assessments help set priorities for additional action on risks. This is followed by a review of the different options, development and implementation of response measures, and monitoring, evaluation and learning.

CoastAdapt, a resource supporting climate change adaptation in coastal Australia, recognises that capacity for such risk assessments will vary across stakeholder groups. Consequently, it has developed a three-tier framework that allows public and private stakeholders to assess the risks depending on the resources and capacity available (see Table 4.5). The first-pass risk screening aims to provide a broad overview of the climate risks to a community or organisation. Stakeholder consultations inform the second-pass risk assessment of exposure and vulnerability of communities or organisations to climate risks. The third-pass risk assessment further reviews priority actions identified through the second-pass assessment (Tonmoy, Rissik and Palutikof, 2019[28]). While developed specifically for the Australian context, it could inspire similar tiered approaches in other country contexts.

It can be challenging for decision makers to navigate the wealth of guidance and tools available. Another challenge, especially at the local level, is the lack of data to feed into the assessments. Development co-operation can play a valuable role in supporting partner countries in identifying suitable approaches to their climate risk assessments. In some cases, it can also facilitate peer learning among countries with shared characteristics (e.g. nature of the climate risks, sectors at risk). Further, development co-operation should also make use of national frameworks in the projects and programmes they support when available, to further local capacity. GIZ is undertaking a comparative study of more than 100 guidelines or tools, organised according to different categories relevant for application.

EWSs can play an important role in mitigating the impact of both extreme and slow onset weather and climate events by empowering individuals and communities to take preventive measures in a timely manner. Estimates suggest that EWSs save lives and assets worth at least ten times their cost, and that a 24-hour warning of a storm or heatwave can reduce damages by 30% (GCA, 2019[30]). Similarly, an upgrade of all hydrometeorological information production and early warning capacity in developing countries could save an average of 23 000 lives annually. Furthermore, it could provide between USD 3-30 billion per year in additional economic benefits related to disaster reduction [Rogers & Tsirkunov, 2013 in (Snow et al., 2016[15])]. Out of the NDCs submitted to the Paris Agreement by Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, almost 90% identified EWSs as a top priority to support adaptation efforts in agriculture and food security, health and water management sectors (WMO, 2020[31]).

EWSs aim to ensure that risks are well understood and can be acted upon by individuals and communities, as well as established emergency services. They must therefore inform broader emergency management systems composed of, for example, health care, firefighters, police, civil protection and the army, which all have distinct and critical roles in disaster response (Hallegatte, Rentschler and Rozenberg, 2020[32]). EWSs focus primarily on weather-related risks over a few days during which specific action by law has to be taken. Longer timescales (months, years or decades) would result in forecasts, outlooks and scenarios. These could all be considered a type of early warning, although with less legal commitment to act. This difference in timescales between weather and climate projections has previously divided the respective research communities. This is gradually changing with growing recognition of the need to look at weather and climate as intimately linked processes on a continuum over time and space.

While modern EWSs combine operational scheduling (e.g. data import and processing) with built-in protocols, less resource-intensive systems can also play an important role in communicating risks and engaging local communities in generating early warning information (UNFCCC, 2020[33]). The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development has developed a community-based flood early warning system (CBFEWS). It consists of tools and plans managed by local communities that provide near real-time early warnings when rising flood waters are detected (ICIMOD, 2020[34]). Malawi is piloting the CBFEWS approach building on lessons from the Hindu Kush Himalayan region.

Four closely interlinked components must be in place for EWSs to serve their intended purpose (UNDRR, 2017[35]) (see also Figure 4.3):

  • disaster risk knowledge based on the systematic collection of data and disaster risk assessments

  • detection, monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the hazards and possible consequences

  • dissemination and communication, by an official source, of authoritative, timely, accurate and actionable warnings and associated information on likelihood and impact

  • preparedness at all levels to respond to the warnings received.

Most countries have some form of early warning systems in place. A smaller number of regional and global support mechanisms can play an important role in facilitating exchange of information and collaboration on the management of the risks. However, they rarely have authority to trigger legally binding action (UNDP, 2019[36]). These mechanisms contribute towards the overall capacity of the system but also to the accuracy of warnings. Examples include cross-border collaboration on the management of flood risk in river basins and the management of climate risks across shared terrains or landscapes such as mountainous areas. Independent of the scale, EWSs require careful planning and co-ordination between the diverse set of stakeholders (see Figure 4.3). Effectiveness of the implementation is also subject to the capacity of individual stakeholders, as well as the broader national, regional and international systems. The status of both the individual elements, and the overall capacity of the co-ordination mechanisms or partnerships that operate and maintain them, must be regularly assessed. These assessments should help target investments accordingly.

Communities dependent on natural resources are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Many communities have established traditions of responding to changes in the environment and climate through careful observation and interpretation of meteorological, hydrological and oceanographic phenomena. They also draw on local knowledge, social systems, cultural values and norms in managing the complex ecosystems they depend on (UNESCO, 2017[38]). The role and value of Indigenous knowledge has been widely recognised in areas such as agroforestry, biodiversity conservation, traditional medicine, disaster risk management (Nakashima et al., 2012[39]), and increasingly in the context of climate resilience (IPCC, 2014[40]). For example, women in the Pacific Islands have a wealth of traditional knowledge, including on gardening practices, food preservation and locations of traditional water sources that are valuable when developing activities to support the resilience of local communities to climate change (Mcleod et al., 2018[41]).

Indigenous and local knowledge complement scientific data with detailed information, often at finer spatial scales, on elements of importance to local livelihoods that scientists do not always consider (UNESCO, 2017[38]). Despite their disproportionate exposure to the impacts of climate change, and their deep understanding of the risks and solutions, Indigenous communities have often been excluded from decision-making processes, including on climate change. Due to their distinct social and cultural norms, decisions, policies and actions well-suited for mainstream society may not be appropriate to their circumstances.

Participatory approaches to identify climate risks through the lived experiences of the community can also be effective. They can point to approaches that address those risks and increase acceptance of suggested adaptation measures. Local knowledge can, for example, play an instrumental role in identifying landscape management approaches. Similarly, it can help identify use of nature-based solutions to reduce the risks associated with sea-level rise, including flooding and saltwater intrusion. Where appropriate, this can be complemented by support for technical know-how to adopt mainstream solutions to local contexts, providing room for experimenting, learning and adjusting to local needs (LIFE-AR, 2019[42]). Local knowledge can further offer valuable insights into local social factors such as behaviours and norms that may contribute to and be used to help mitigate risks.

Weather and climate services (including early warnings, forecasts and outlooks) must consider the needs, capacities, constraints and priorities of different users in line with a whole of society approach to be translated into action. They must take particular care to consider the ability of marginalised communities to access the information. In the context of EWSs, the following issues should be considered (UNDP, 2016[43]):

  • Format: The information must be timely, accurate and accessible by the intended audience. This may entail making the content available in local languages or in non-written format by using universal symbols, basic infographics, maps or different forms of media (radio, television but also social media).

  • Information channels: Public Service Announcements, television, radio, print media, social media, schools, hospitals and so on can all serve as channels for disseminating the information.

  • Guidance/recommendation: Complementing information on the risks, the warnings should provide guidance on the response to different threat levels (e.g. yellow, orange or red), and point to where additional information or support is available. The information must also be provided at the right time and at the appropriate spatial scale to inform decision-making processes.

  • Audience: End users of the information range from farmers, communities, policy makers and the private sector. The type of information required by different stakeholders varies, as do their respective roles in disseminating or responding to the risks, and their capacities to respond to the risks. Local leaders, for example, can play an important role in ensuring that the information reaches affected communities and that appropriate response measures are in place. The private sector can be a user of the information, but in some cases also plays an important role in disseminating it, e.g. telecommunications firms.

The NDCs submitted by many developing countries highlight potential barriers for the achievement of identified domestic climate targets. Among the capacity constraints identified, 113 NDCs highlight the need for capacity building support. Other types of support identified include mitigation finance (110 NDCs), technology transfer (109) and adaptation finance (79) (Pauw et al., 2020[44]). The identified capacity needs have been grouped into three categories (ECBI, 2018[45]):

  • capacity to understand the climate science and the associated impacts to a country, region, sector, livelihoods, and human and societal well-being.

  • capacity to formulate and implement domestic climate action.

  • capacity to actively contribute to climate negotiations (to analyse, build consensus and articulate national interests) (this falls outside the scope of this guidance and is not covered).

In the Paris Agreement, capacity building in Article 11 is presented as a precondition for enhanced, sustained and co-ordinated climate action. The Article specifies that capacity building must be an iterative process guided by lessons learnt; foster country ownership; and be participatory, cross-cutting, gender-responsive and based on and responsive to country needs at national, sub-national and local levels (UNFCCC, 2015[46]). With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the Paris Committee on Capacity-building was established to address current and emerging capacity gaps (individual, technical and institutional). It also addresses the associated capacity needs related to the mainstreaming of climate considerations into domestic planning and budgeting (see Box 4.8). Article 12 of the Agreement includes a complementary focus on the importance of enhanced climate change education, training and public awareness, participation and access to information.

Despite the established focus on capacity building in international climate processes, the continued demand for support by developing countries points to the inherent challenge of building sustained and long-term capacity. The urgent need for climate action has in many cases resulted in ad-hoc, short-term and project-based initiatives. These aim to strengthen the capacity of relevant stakeholders, e.g. in the form of workshops often with external expert input (Khan, Mfitumukiza and Huq, 2020[48]). Considerations for sustainable capacity building efforts include the following (Khan et al., 2018[49]; Shakya et al., 2018[50]):

  • Understand the different levels at which capacity is needed to take the agenda forward – people, organisations, institutions and society, as well as their interactions (see Table 4.9) (while the importance of all three levels is recognised, discussion on the systematic level is covered in Chapter 3).

  • Recognise that capacity needs and the associated support is a dynamic process, given the nature of the challenge and the evolving developments in knowledge and skills.

  • Acknowledge that it is a long-term process that requires continuous investment of time and resources (see Table 4.10).

  • Ensure that capacity building efforts are an endogenous process, based on ownership, where external support can play an important role in supporting rather than driving it.

  • Strengthen institutional functions that identify and prioritise climate risks, and authorise, resource and deliver action on climate resilience.

Regional or international capacity and co-operation must complement the focus on national institutions (ECBI, 2018[45]). It may not be possible to develop climate modelling capacity in every country. In these cases, developing regional or international models that generate information that can be downscaled to different contexts may be a better approach (ECBI, 2018[45]). A focus on climate resilience further demands a good understanding of local circumstances (climate hazards, exposures and vulnerabilities) and the associated capacities required to respond effectively to the climate risks.

Taking a gender-responsive approach to strengthening climate resilience requires additional capacities within co-ordinating mechanisms (e.g. the National Adaptation Plan process) and among relevant stakeholders. As one important consideration, a gender-responsive approach will require close collaboration between actors with expertise in gender issues and social exclusion. However, they may only have limited knowledge on climate resilience. Similarly, climate experts may have limited understanding of gender and related issues. It is therefore important to consider from the outset their respective capacity needs. This will help ensure a more inclusive process in both the development and implementation of relevant policies, plans and programmes (Dazé and Church, 2019[52]).

There is no one size fits all. Instead, the most appropriate approach will depend on the circumstances and the nature of the climate risks but equally the national and sub-national development objectives and priorities. A diverse set of domestic and international actors can contribute to the capacity building process. They can do this through knowledge and skills development and exchange, as well as through financial resources, recognising this process must continuously be renewed (Khan et al., 2018[49]). With this in mind, and noting that capacity building is a cross-cutting issue that directly or indirectly is highlighted in most of the mechanisms (Chapter 3) and enablers (Chapter 4) covered by this Guidance, the rest of this section focuses on two priorities for governments and development co-operation:

Relevant stakeholders need the capacity to access and use the information available to fully understand the nature of the risks as it relates to their respective roles, funding or investment decisions and so on. This allows them to translate the growing awareness of a changing climate into measures that strengthen resilience. While scientific understanding at the global level has seen impressive progress as documented by the work of the IPCC, the analysis is often too technical for the broader public. Efforts to bridge this gap include the creation of partnerships between science and policy. UNFCCC climate negotiations, for example, facilitate collaboration between negotiators and IPCC authors (UNFCCC, n.d.[53]). IPCC authors are also encouraged to explore ways of communicating research findings effectively to the wider public (Corner, Shaw and Clarke, 2018[54]). Two examples of other initiatives that aim to enhance the accessibility of climate science, data and information include:

  • The NASA Earth Exchange Global Daily Downscaled Projections (NEX-GDDP) provides an online tool for scientists and local decision makers to help examine the impacts of climate change at local to regional levels at the spatial scale of individual towns, cities and watersheds (NASA, n.d.[55]).

  • The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a global research partnership for better food security, works to bridge academic research in climate-smart agriculture. CGIAR’s co-operation includes a farmer-led experimentation model that supports local solutions (Kristjanson and Jost, 2014[56]).

Universities or other centres of excellence also play an important role in raising awareness of climate risks. They do this through the generation of scientific information, as well as development of individual and organisational capacities through academic programmes (Khan, Mfitumukiza and Huq, 2020[48]). The capacity of universities, in developing countries, however, is often limited by human and financial resources. For example, they may be unable to fund research, buy technical equipment or gain access to global knowledge databases.

Climate resilience initiatives rely on a good understanding of local climate risks. Such risks include the hazards, exposures and vulnerabilities of people and assets in a given area. This makes universities a potentially strong partner for development co-operation, especially if they have a long-term commitment to strengthen capacity (see Box 4.9). Examples of partnership include engagements with established centres of excellence through international research collaborations; student and teacher exchanges; and access to peer-reviewed knowledge (Khan et al., 2018[49]). In addition, trainings or seminars on climate resilience could be made available to other educational institutions. These could target both students and interested alumni and professionals. Other stakeholders such as NGOs, CSOs and in some cases the private sector can play similar or complementary roles.

Media communication (e.g. television, radio, newspapers and the Internet) also plays an important role in raising awareness of, and facilitating a dialogue on, the nature and impacts of climate change (Schäfer, 2015[58]). Lack of basic knowledge on climate change is at the same time one of the largest perceived barriers to climate action (Depoux et al., 2017[59]). This suggests that in addition to raising awareness, the media can play a role in presenting possible solutions – not an easy task given how climate risks and associated responses are context-specific.

The international climate community recognises this challenge. To that end, it holds workshops for journalists in the margins of the UNFCCC climate negotiations. It also develops handbooks to strengthen the capacity of journalists to become effective messengers of climate risks and solutions. UNESCO, for example, has developed tools for journalists based in Africa (UNESCO, 2013[60]), and in Asia and the Pacific (UNESCO, 2018[61]). Media communication must be inclusive in the presentation of the risks and possible approaches. It should include different dissemination channels to ensure that alerts and risk information reach all segments of society.

At the organisational level, governments need the capacity to understand the risks. In addition, a ministry or agency in charge of climate change needs the authority and mandate to convene different stakeholders to inform climate resilience planning and budgeting. Subsequently, these stakeholders should see agreed priorities through to implementation. This mandate will also be determined in part by the nature of the climate risks in a given country, and by the priority assigned to climate action at the highest political level (OECD, 2020[11]).

Key ministries such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance and other central ministries and agencies play a key role to match allocation of roles and responsibilities with commensurate resources. For their part, local governments implement most of the policies. Independent statutory bodies, such as the Climate Change Committee in the United Kingdom, also play an important role in supporting and holding governments to account for their action on climate change. Strong political leadership can be instrumental in convening stakeholders. However, meaningful engagement resulting in ownership of agreed objectives and commitment to deliver them is not automatic. Focus must therefore be on jointly developing capacities to co-ordinate, prioritise and implement climate resilience objectives (El-Taliawi and Van Der Wal, 2019[62]).

Local governments have a critical responsibility in putting in place enabling environments for climate resilience planning and implementation. This is especially the case in countries with decentralised governance structures (see Box 4.10). In some countries, other stakeholders such as CSOs and the private sector also play an important role in strengthening climate resilience. Shared platforms that facilitate collaboration across levels of government, academia and the private sector can help identify and understand capacity-building gaps and needs.

Development co-operation plays an important role in facilitating access to available tools and guidance, and in sharing lessons learnt on different climate resilience approaches. Approaches are also being developed and jointly piloted to exchange lessons learnt, demonstrating the value of strong co-operation across stakeholder groups. The One UN Climate Change Learning is an online platform that supports countries in achieving climate action by providing learning resources offered by the UN system (UN CC:e-Learn, n.d.[63]). Examples include short tutorials on climate information and services and their application in decision-making processes, and the role of adaptation appraisal and prioritisation and tools available.

Table 4.11 summarises different guidance and tools that can guide national and international approaches to strengthen individual and organisational capacity to understand and address climate risks.

For developing countries with limited human and technical capacity, development co-operation can play a valuable role in supporting efforts to build technical capacity, facilitate learning and exchange across different communities of expertise, and support developing country representatives in the international climate process (OECD, 2020[11]; OECD, 2012[51]). As one component of this process, development co-operation can support piloting of new climate resilience initiatives. Experience from Ghana, Peru and the Philippines highlights the role of development co-operation in supporting partner countries. For example, it piloted risk financing instruments such as the Philippine City Disaster Insurance Pool and created contingent credit lines in Peru (OECD, 2020[11]). Such pilots provide valuable opportunities for relevant stakeholders to build capacity and identify examples of good practice. However, experience shows they must include clear exit, replication or scale-up plans to be sustainable. Further, it is important to align development co-operation with identified partner country priorities and to focus on strengthening country systems when possible. Recommendations include the following (OECD, 2012[51]):

  • Align capacity building measures with the climate resilience priorities of the partner country to ensure country ownership, oversight and management of the support.

  • Collaborate across domestic agencies to exploit their comparative advantages.

  • Strive to harmonise approaches among development support providers to ensure effective programme delivery, facilitate exchange of information and avoid duplicated efforts.

  • Build in clear exit strategies so those doing the capacity building are no longer needed by the time they leave.

Emerging climate resilience initiatives piloted by development co-operation are diverse and relevant to every aspect of climate resilience. Illustrative examples include the following:

  • Nature-based solution (NbS): NbS focus on protecting, sustainably managing and restoring natural capital to maintain or enhance ecosystem services to address a variety of social, environmental and economic challenges (OECD, 2020[64]). With evidence emerging of the value and multiple benefits of such approaches, different countries are piloting the role of NbS for climate action (University of Oxford, n.d.[65]; UNEP, 2019[66]).

  • Forecast-based financing: An initiative that complements early warning with early action by enabling access to humanitarian funding based on in-depth forecast information and risk analysis. By using innovative technologies, data and weather forecasts in a global network, the goal is to anticipate disasters, limit their impact and reduce human suffering and losses. The approach has been pioneered by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crecent Societies, the World Food Programme, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, START Network and others with funding from different bilateral providers of development co-operation (see also Box 3.17).

Development co-operation also supports investment in local capacities. The French Development Agency and the Asian Development Bank, for instance, have supported the decentralisation reform policy in the Philippines. This aims to empower local government units and help them improve institutional and technical capacity to reduce the level of disaster risk (AFD, n.d.[67]). The World Bank and the Green Climate Fund have supported the Greater Accra Climate Resilient and Integrated Development project. Complementing a focus on infrastructure investments, the project aims to strengthen the capacity of the city of Accra to plan, co-ordinate, monitor and evaluate climate-smart urban development planning; facilitate access to climate risk information; and improve co-ordination between different stakeholders (World Bank, 2018[68]).

Development co-operation providers themselves also need capacity to enhance their ability to support partner countries effectively. Like partner countries, they are faced with the challenge of having to address multiple priorities simultaneously, including environment, gender and health. Their mandates will often be influenced by political priorities domestically, but also by technological possibilities, both of which evolve over time (OECD, 2019[69]). To integrate these different priorities effectively, the mainstreaming strategies of development co-operation providers need to account for their own capacity building needs and the importance of continuous staff development (see Box 4.12 for the approach by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency).

Technologies are a crucial enabler for strengthening the resilience of human or natural systems to climate change. Achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement requires accelerated and strengthened development and dissemination of technologies in support of climate mitigation and adaptation. They must be cost-efficient and consider potential environmental and social implications (TEC, 2017[70]; UNFCCC, 2015[46]). Such technologies should also be selected and deployed in accordance with countries’ needs, priorities and capacities (Haselip, Narkeviciute and Rogat Castillo, 2015[71]).

Technologies that support climate resilience can take different forms. They range from hardware (equipment and products, such as irrigation systems, early warning systems and sea walls) to software (processes, knowledge and skills required to use the hardware) (UNFCCC, 2006[72]; UNFCCC, 2014[73]). Many activities also combine hardware and software: for instance, an early warning system combines measuring devices with knowledge and skills that enable action in response to hazards. Understanding the difference between these technology types can be useful for exploring their synergies and complementarities, which can guide efforts by governments and development co-operation providers to identify the most effective combination of technologies for a given issue (Ajayi, Fatunbi and Akinbamijo, 2018[74]).

While this section primarily focuses on these hard and soft technologies, some literature suggests that technologies go beyond them, and include organisational technologies or “orgware”. These would encompass, for example, ownership and institutional arrangements for adoption and diffusion of hardware and software (Ajayi, Fatunbi and Akinbamijo, 2018[74]; Nygaard and Hansen, 2015[75]; Christiansen, Olhoff and Trærup, 2011[76]). Box 4.13 uses early warning systems (see section 4.1 for further discussion) to illustrate the difference between the three types of technology.

Approaches to strengthen climate resilience may employ various hard and soft technologies. These address current and future vulnerabilities to climate hazards that may be compounded by other environmental and socio-economic variables (ADB, 2014[77]). Exploring, assessing and selecting technologies that meet the need for managing a particular climate risk is a challenge in itself. A UNFCCC survey has revealed that assessing technology needs, identifying appropriate technologies for those needs and adjusting them to local conditions are among the highest priorities for countries’ capacity development in addressing climate risks (TEC, 2018[78]).

While this section does not explain individual technologies, Table 4.13 provides a non-exhaustive list to illustrate technologies that have been applied to sectors vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

This section uses the term “technology development and dissemination” to represent the different steps to develop and disseminate technology to strengthen climate resilience. The steps include research and development (R&D), pilot and demonstration, transfer (within or across countries), adoption and diffusion (Figure 4.4). International technology transfer is also an important means to address gaps in the availability of technologies supporting climate resilience (Dechezlepretre et al., 2020[80]). This is relevant especially to developing countries where domestic R&D capacity remains weak (Article 10, (UNFCCC, 2015[46]; Dechezlepretre et al., 2020[80]). In some cases, however, technologies that could support climate resilience are difficult to import. This could be due to several issues, including a lack of domestic capacity or market, or insufficient climate or trade policies to encourage import of such technologies (Hallegatte, Rentschler and Rozenberg, 2020[32]).

Countries need policy frameworks and governance that support development and dissemination of relevant technologies, between countries and within a country (Olawuyi, 2018[81]). Such arrangements may include support for clean technology entrepreneurship, mechanisms that facilitate stakeholders’ access to information about technologies for climate resilience, legal protection for innovation, trainings to strengthen domestic capacities to deploy and maintain the technologies, and more effective planning and implementation of climate and environmental regulations (Olawuyi, 2018[81]).

While innovations and cross-border transfer of newly invented modern technologies are important, technologies for climate resilience often already exist in many developing countries (Biagini et al., 2014[82]). Examples in the context of agriculture include small-scale irrigation, crop management practices, use of the more climate-resilient crops, improved crop rotation and intercropping (Nygaard and Hansen, 2015[75]; Adebayo et al., 2011[83]; Parajuli, 2017[84]).

Effective technology development and dissemination requires several key components. The characteristics of the technologies must match the needs of users and their socio-economic and environmental contexts (Biagini et al., 2014[82]; ADB, 2014[77]). There has been a long history of failed attempts of technology dissemination, due partly to a lack of understanding of user needs and circumstances (Ockwell and Byrne, 2016[86]; Forsyth, 2005[87]). In some cases, intended users had not fully understood the benefits of new technologies. In others, technologies had proven inappropriate for specific socio-economic contexts and consequently been abandoned. In still others, project proponents failed to assess the availabilities of local resources needed for operating the technology (Ockwell and Byrne, 2016[86]; Forsyth, 2005[87]) (see also Box 4.14).

The capabilities of domestic institutions and their networks also determine the ability of a country to develop, demonstrate, absorb, deploy and maintain technologies (TEC, 2018[78]). Enhanced domestic capacities can also promote demand-driven approaches to development and dissemination of technologies in support of climate resilience, while facilitating learning across different contexts and countries (Olawuyi, 2018[81]; Ockwell and Byrne, 2016[86]). The broader policy environment also affects the ease of developing and disseminating new or improved technologies that support climate resilience (Biagini et al., 2014[82]; Olawuyi, 2018[81]). Against these contexts, this section focuses on the following issues:

Approaches to climate resilience are highly context-specific. This is also reflected in the demand for technology in support of these approaches. A technology that works well in one country may not be appropriate or cost-efficient in another due to different economic and non-economic barriers as highlighted in Box 4.14 (TEC, 2014[91]; Haselip, Narkeviciute and Rogat Castillo, 2015[71]). Determining the technological options available for climate resilience first requires clear understanding of the needs of target sectors and stakeholders for specific actions to which technologies can be applied. Climate risk assessments will point to the most vulnerable sectors and populations. Complementary action plans can include a review of suitable technologies available to manage the risks.

Needs for and access to technologies that support climate resilience can also differ between women and men. For instance, in some low- and middle-income countries, women are 10% less likely than men to own a mobile phone and 23% less likely to use the mobile Internet, due to, for instance, affordability, literacy and digital skills (Rowntree, 2019[92]). Both women and men need to benefit from available technologies in support of climate resilience. A systematic gender analysis (see Chapter 3.1) can help governments and development co-operation better understand gender-differentiated needs for technologies and opportunities to access them (De Groot, 2018[93]).

Technology needs of vulnerable sectors or populations should be assessed in consultation with different stakeholders to understand the local climatic, environmental and socio-economic contexts that may affect the uptake of certain technologies (Boldt et al., 2012[88]) (see also Box 4.15). Technology Needs Assessment (TNA), established in the context of the UNFCCC, provides a framework to guide a country-driven, participatory process to identify, select and implement climate mitigation and adaptation technologies. TNAs also focus on barriers to technology adoption and diffusion, and solutions to overcome them (Nygaard and Hansen, 2015[75]). The overall goal is identifying technology options to support low-carbon and climate-resilient pathways. In this context, Table 4.14 proposes several steps for a TNA. As of June 2020, UNEP DTU Partnership had published about 120 TNA reports on its website (UNEP DTU Partnership, n.d.[94]).

There can be multiple criteria against which technologies in support of climate resilience can be assessed. While not exhaustive, Table 4.15 different criteria for assessing the effectiveness of a technology in addressing climate vulnerabilities of different sectors or populations. ADB (2014[77]), for instance, scores different technologies based on some of these criteria. A technology is scored “most desirable” if it is deemed highly effective to reduce vulnerabilities within a given cost, among other positive factors. It is scored “intermediate” for moderate ratings on those criteria. Finally, it is scored “less desirable” if it has a low cost-effectiveness performance or few co-benefits, or if its ratings based on the other criteria are relatively low.

Another key consideration in assessing technologies for climate resilience is to ensure the chosen technologies “do no significant harm” (DNSH) to other environmental objectives. These objectives include climate change mitigation, protection of healthy ecosystems, sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, transition to a circular economy, waste prevention and recycling, and pollution prevention and control. The Technical Annex to the EU Technical Expert Group’s final report on the EU Taxonomy provides useful descriptions of the DNSH criteria for various measures for climate change adaptation (and mitigation). These aim to specify the minimum DNSH requirements to be met (EU TEG, 2020[96]).

A range of knowledge products supports assessments of technology needs through stakeholder participation, economic and non-economic characteristics of technologies, selection of multiple criteria for such assessments and DNSH requirements (Table 4.16).

Effective development and dissemination of technologies for climate resilience also depends on capacities of key technology-related institutions within a country and networks among them (World Bank, 2010[97]; TEC, 2015[98]). A combination of individuals, institutions and their networks can support the process of developing and disseminating technologies for climate resilience. This could occur, for instance, through facilitating the exchange of knowledge and collaboration between firms, universities and research institutes (TEC, 2015[98]).

Identifying and partnering with appropriate suppliers of technologies and providers of complementary maintenance services may also determine the effectiveness and dissemination potentials of technologies (Biagini et al., 2014[82]). As one approach, governments can work with the private sector to establish an industrial cluster that comprises a group of companies, suppliers, service providers and associated research institutions (Nallari and Griffith, 2013[99]). A climate-resilient, circulatory water system for fisheries in Armenia provides an example of such an approach. The absence of suppliers to provide equipment, consulting and support to the fisheries was believed to have increased initial costs and perceived technological risks. The development of networks between suppliers of technologies, including importers and local producers, and providers of consulting and maintenance services, is important for the effective and reliable operation of such systems for Armenian fisher folks. (Government of the Republic of Armenia, 2017[89]).

Capabilities required for institutions that may develop or disseminate technologies for climate resilience within a country are diverse. They include those related to basic and applied research, development, demonstration, commercialisation and diffusion. Scientific research capacities are particularly important for the initial research phase. Meanwhile, the technology development and dissemination phases are more likely to require institutions to build engineering- and design-related capacities, as well as marketing skills. Commercialisation and large-scale diffusion require a greater degree of manufacturing capacities in refining the business models (TEC, 2015[98]; Sagar, 2010[100]).

Capacities of domestic institutions (e.g. research institutes, government agencies, companies) in understanding, selecting and adopting existing technologies, as well as developing new ones, are a crucial building block for effective technology developing and dissemination. The Technology Executive Committee of the UNFCCC stresses the importance of combining domestic research institutes, government agencies and companies, referring to the approach as a “national system of innovation”. A UNFCCC study suggests the following general strategies for governments and development co-operation to enhance the capacities of domestic institutions, recognising they need to be tailored to individual countries (TEC, 2018[78]):

  • Provide tailored, multi-level training: Climate-related technologies require many types of competencies, including that of risk assessors, technicians, legal advisers, funders and policy makers. Capacity building activities should target appropriate groups from the local to the national levels.

  • Enhance capacities of national co-ordination bodies: Those bodies can play a major role in enhancing domestic capacities and local technologies. They may need support to develop their own capacity to assess technology needs, identify appropriate technologies and understand the demands and implications of processes such as TNAs and the preparation of TAPs, and other relevant policy documents.

  • Monitor progress using appropriate indicators: Countries may monitor and evaluate their progress in the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities. For this, they need indicators to measure progress. These consider each country’s needs and conditions, as well as the need for common indicators that may enhance transparency and comparability.

  • Share knowledge widely: Regular communications among stakeholders about relevant issues and best practices on enhancement of domestic capacities can help those involved with planning and reporting of activities.

Inclusive networks of governments, firms, academia, research institutes, development agencies and providers of finance are also key. They can develop, adopt and disseminate climate-related technologies based on their expertise, knowledge, views and needs (TEC, 2017[70]). Such inclusive networks may also facilitate the incorporation of Indigenous knowledge into development and dissemination of technologies. Such technologies are likely to be better suited to local environmental contexts and traditional practices on climate risk management, as well as the socio-economic and cultural circumstances (TEC, 2017[70]). Inclusive networks can also contribute effectively to the continuous development of local institutions, technical staff and their expertise required to develop, adopt and use technologies (TEC, 2017[70]). Key considerations for building an inclusive network that can support countries in developing and disseminating technologies for climate resilience, include the following [see (TEC, 2018[78]; TEC, 2014[91]; Ajayi, Fatunbi and Akinbamijo, 2018[74]) for further information]:

  • Support and engage private-sector actors, as well as national and local research institutions as part of the inclusive network to facilitate country- and locally-led development and piloting of new technologies for climate resilience.

  • Involve the users of the technology (e.g. communities, local businesses and households) at an early stage of establishing an inclusive network and in maintaining it.

  • Support local governments to promote and co-ordinate efforts to disseminate small-scale or community-led technologies, or contribute to strengthening the enabling environments for local adoption and dissemination of new or existing technologies.

  • Harness local and Indigenous people’s knowledge and understanding of the local context and needs.

  • Facilitate stakeholder discussions on the technical feasibility and cultural acceptability of technological options to determine their scalability and replicability, and whether the technology may cause culturally sensitive issues (education, health, family planning).

  • Collaborate with public and private finance institutions to explore options of de-risking or making financial solutions for the development and piloting of innovative technologies affordable.

Public policies strongly affect the rate and direction of the development and dissemination of technologies in developing countries. They also affect the capacities of technology-related institutions and networks as described in the previous sub-section (USAID, 2014[101]; Ajayi, Fatunbi and Akinbamijo, 2018[74]; de Coninck and Sagar, 2014[102]). A clear signal on climate-related policies can therefore create a demand for certain technologies in support of climate resilience. This, in turn, can incentivise private-sector actors to invest in the development and dissemination of such technologies (TEC, 2016[103]). Clear policy signals also increase the awareness and interest of potential users of those technologies. Such policies include international agreements, long-term development visions, various policies on science and technology, environmental laws and regulations, fiscal policies, administrative procedures, among others (Ajayi, Fatunbi and Akinbamijo, 2018[74]). They provide economic and regulatory incentives, determine allocation of public funding and form institutional arrangements for technology development and dissemination. Enabling policy frameworks target the supply-side (push) or demand-side (pull) aspect of development and dissemination of technologies (Nygaard and Hansen, 2015[75]). Table 4.18 summarises examples of such policy frameworks.

On the supply side, governments play a key role in developing and implementing enabling policies that encourage or incentivise public and private actors to increase their efforts to develop new technologies and make them commercially viable (TEC, 2017[70]). Examples include government grants and concessional loans to support technology-related research and demonstration, as well as technical assistance to facilitate innovations. Such assistance might entail provision of technical trainings, support of research institutions and formation of high-tech clusters. Policies to improve the quality of higher education systems are also key given their role as centres of excellence at the heart of national processes for technology development and dissemination (see also section 0). Government support in the form of loans and other financial services (e.g. with preferential interest rates) can also support dissemination and upscaling of proven technologies.

Such public policy interventions can be especially important in developing countries where public actors often do R&D. As a country develops, the private sector tends to replace the public sector as the main vehicle for R&D (OECD, 2019[104]). However, in most developing countries, government funding for R&D tends to be limited, which often compromises the quantity and quality of research outputs (USAID, 2014[101]). Government funding for research is also vulnerable to budget cuts when faced with competing development priorities with more immediate impacts. It is therefore important to secure sufficient public funding for research, development and demonstration of technologies for climate resilience but also to shield it from fluctuations (Johnstone, Haščič and Kalamova, 2011[105]).

Development co-operation can play an important role in funding research initiatives. It can facilitate cross-border knowledge transfers, provide technical trainings and demonstrations, and provide finance or co-finance to scale-up application of technologies (OECD, 2019[104]). In so doing, support by development co-operation can, for instance, share the cost of public investments and facilitate economies of scale (OECD, 2019[104]). The Renewable Energy and Adapting to Climate Technologies Window in Africa programme supported by the European Union, for example, provides risk capital to businesses with potentially transformative solutions for low-cost climate-resilient technologies. These include irrigation and water efficiency measures, as well as ones that contribute to climate mitigation (AECF, 2018[106]).

The awareness among businesses and households of the need for action on climate resilience is increasing. However, it does not always translate into demand for technological solutions on the markets (Dechezlepretre et al., 2020[80]). To address such demand-side challenges, governments can improve the enabling environments that facilitate market creation and expansion. In this way, the private sector can recognise the business potential of such markets (Dechezlepretre et al., 2020[80]; Nygaard and Hansen, 2015[75]). Examples include the planning and implementation of policies, regulations and standards that create favourable market conditions for technologies for climate resilience (e.g. public procurement of technologies in support of climate resilience). Another approach is removal of disincentives for the uptake of such technologies. Examples include agriculture subsidies, insufficient enforcement of building codes and land-use regulations (OECD, 2017[107]; OECD, 2020[11]).

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Note

← 1. The founding members are the Adaptation Fund, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Global Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, World Bank, World Food Programme and World Meteorological Organization, with the Alliance being open to other international providers of support for hydromet capacity.

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