Browse by: "F"
Index
Title Index
Year Index
This paper provides a description of the risk sharing features of pension plan design in selected OECD and non-OECD countries and how they correspond with the funding rules applied to pension funds. In addition to leading to a better understanding of differences in funding rules across countries with developed pension fund systems, the study considers the trend towards risk-based regulation. While the document does not enter the debate over the application of riskbased quantitative funding requirements to pension funds (as under Basel II or Solvency II), it identifies the risk factors that should be evaluated and considered in a comprehensive risk-based regulatory approach, whether prescriptive or principles-based. The three main risk factors identified are the nature of risks and the guarantees offered under different plans designs, the extent to which benefits are conditional and can be adjusted, and the extent to which contributions may be raised to cover any funding gap. In addition, the strength of the guarantee or covenant from the sponsoring employer(s) and of insolvency guarantee arrangements should be carefully assessed when designing funding requirements.
One specific aspect of financial safety nets that has been in the spotlight of late is deposit insurance. As events in markets are still unfolding, it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions regarding the effects of the crisis and the adequacy of financial safety nets, including deposit insurance arrangements. Nonetheless, preliminary suggestions for policy are emerging and the article singles out four areas for special attention. First, as regards coverage, deposit insurance systems with low levels of coverage and/or partial insurance may not be effective in preventing bank runs. Second, for an explicit deposit insurance system to be effective, depositors need to understand the extent of and limits to existing deposit protection schemes. Third, when different institutions are entrusted with responsibilities that are relevant in a crisis situation, ex ante arrangements delimiting the scope of the different responsibilities as well as the respective powers may not be sufficient to ensure co-ordination that is as close and smooth as needed. Fourth, the question as to whether a specific bankruptcy regime for banks is needed remains an important issue.
During the 1960s and 1970s, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in less developed countries (LDCs) were generally viewed unfavourably, often being considered exploitative and as leading to worsening labour market conditions and job losses. However, there was a gradual shift in perception during the 1980s and 1990s, with increasing recognition of positive features of FDI such as technological spillovers and the increase in demand for domestic industry. Hence many countries, including LDCs, have introduced measures such as favourable tax treatment for foreign firms in order to attract FDI2. Against this background, FDI flows to LDCs have grown rapidly, increasing from 0.9 per cent of LDCs’ combined GDP in 1990 to a peak of 4.1 per cent in 1999, before declining slightly to 3.3 per cent in 2003 (World Bank, 2005). This article surveys the theoretical and empirical literature that describes the role of FDI in the economic growth of LDCs, and extracts its policy implications.
The OECD Competition Committee debated Facilitating Practices in Oligopolies in October 2007. This document includes an executive summary and the documents from the meeting: written submissions from Belgium, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand , Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Commission and BIAC, as well as an aide-memoire of the discussion.
This report provides guidelines on methodological and conceptual issues. Part one covers methodological aspects while part two deals with concepts, definitions and example questions. Recommendations are based on input from 14 countries...
Fiscal equalisation is a transfer of fiscal resources across jurisdictions to offset disparities in revenue raising capacity or public service cost. It covers on average 2.5% of GDP or 5% of total government expenditure across OECD countries. Equalisation reduces fiscal disparities by two-thirds on average and in some countries levels them virtually out. Strong equalisation comes at a price: on average, around 70% of a jurisdiction’s additional tax income must be dedicated to an equalisation fund. The equalisation rate is generally higher for jurisdictions with low fiscal capacity, reducing their tax effort and likely to slow down regional economic convergence. Cost equalisation is larger than revenue equalisation in terms of GDP despite smaller cost disparities, pointing at inefficiencies in the distribution formulae. Fiscal equalisation can be pro-cyclical but most countries succeed in reducing fluctuations of entitlements, sometimes at the cost of sub-central budget needs. Fiscal equalisation is very country specific, and data and analysis must be taken with care.
The OECD Competition Committee debated fidelity and bundled rebates and discounts in June 2008. This document includes an executive summary and the documents from the meeting: an issues paper by the OECD, written submissions from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Chinese Taipei, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, the United States and BIAC as well as an aide-memoire of the discussion.
This paper was prepared to support multilateral discussions of recipient country investment policies towards foreign government-controlled investors (FGCIs) at the eighth and ninth Freedom of Investment (FOI) Roundtables, convened under the auspices of the OECD Investment Committee.
institutions has been a key element of the policy response to the current financial
crisis. In the process, the design of many safety net elements, such as deposit
insurance, has been redrawn in many jurisdictions. In particular, governments
extended existing guarantees and introduced new ones. While these measures did
not address the root causes of the lack of confidence, they were nevertheless
helpful in avoiding a further accelerated loss of confidence, thus buying valuable
time.