Browse by: "2012"

This paper reviews the literature and contributes with some evidence based on the World Values Survey on the drivers of tax morale around the world, with an emphasis on developing countries. It shows that socio-economic factors such as age, religion, gender, employment status and educational attainment have a significant impact on people’s levels of tax morale. In terms of institutional determinants, it finds that the satisfaction with democracy, trust in government and the satisfaction with the quality of public services plays an important role in increasing tax morale. The paper also discusses future directions for research and policy action in this area.

The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation of the measure of capacity utilisation provided by the European Union harmonised survey on the Italian manufacturing sector. In doing so, we evaluate its ability to correctly track cyclical turning points and its contribution in explaining consumer price index (CPI) inflation. The survey based measure results are a good co-incident indicator of business cycle, however it is generally outperformed by time series models in explaining inflation. We conclude that the standard “output gap” interpretation of the survey results is broadly confirmed by the data, however we cannot rule out at this stage that survey respondents may also consider the alternative “variable capacity utilisation” concept in answering the survey question.

Keywords: Capacity utilisation, co-integration, unobserved component models, VAR.
JEL Classification: E32, C22, E37

This report examines skill trends in 24 OECD countries over the past several decades. The skill measures used include broad occupation groups, country-specific direct measures of skill requirements from international surveys, and direct skill measures from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) database applied to both United States and European labour force surveys. Each kind of data has its own strengths and limitations but they tell a consistent story.

This report provides an overview of Australia’s labour market policies, with a focus on income support benefits and employment assistance for people of working age. It traces historical developments partly since 1990 and since 1978 in the case of some data series...

Large-scale natural disasters can have long-lasting effects on the labour market in affected areas in addition to their humanitarian and economic cost. Mass evacuations and disruptions to housing, transport, social services and infrastructure can impede labour market participation. Firms may need to lay off workers, permanently or temporarily, as they deal with physical damage and loss of customers. Even if employment levels return to their pre-disaster levels, the mix of jobs and workers may have changed, so that skills shortages coexist with relatively high unemployment rates. Governments have an important role to play in helping prevent unnecessary job losses, providing income support and re-employment assistance to displaced workers while they find new jobs and creating the environment to encourage job creation as the recovery takes hold. This paper examines the labour market impact of recent natural disasters in six OECD countries, outlines labour market and income support policies implemented to help those affected and discusses the challenges of implementing such policies in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

Taxes, loans and grants, trading schemes and white certificates, public procurement and investment in R&D or infrastructure: known collectively as “economic instruments”, these tools can be powerful means of mobilising the finances needed to achieve policy goals by implementing energy efficiency measures. The role of economic instruments is to kick-start the private financial markets and to motivate private investors to fund EE measures. They should reinforce and promote energy performance regulations.

China faces the dynamic of rapid economic development that drives ever increasing energy use, primarily electricity, and consequently increasing CO2 emissions. It has taken a pledge to curb its emissions intensity, and is exploring various policy approaches to fulfil that aim, including emissions trading. This report explores the conditions needed for effective functioning of a CO2 emissions trading system in China’s electricity generation sector. It is based on extensive discussions with power generation stakeholders and observers of the electricity sector in China, as well as quantitative analyses of the impact of a CO2 emissions trading system (ETS) at plant, company and provincial levels.

At the October 2011 Governing Board Meeting at Ministerial Level, IEA member countries endorsed the IEA Electricity Security Action Plan (ESAP). The proposed electricity security work program reflects the challenge of maintaining electricity security while also seeking to rapidly reduce carbon dioxide emissions of the power systems. In particular, the large-scale deployment of renewables needed to meet low-carbon goals is technically feasible. However, it will lead to more volatile, real-time power flows, which will create new challenges for maintaining electricity security.

This research paper seeks to answer three central questions: (i) how can different forms of liberalisation be classified; (ii) how have liberalisation policies and measures affected conflict-affected and fragile states; and (iii) what are the essential institutional governance pre-conditions to manage the liberalisation-fragility interface?

This research suggests that no single country conforms entirely to classical liberalism. Fragile states – many of which have long communist, socialist and patrimonial histories – exhibit a cocktail of economic personalities. They may best be referred to as “liberal-hybrids”. Research shows that while such states are highly exposed to global transmission channels for liberal market policies, many of these liberal hybrids fared better through the global financial crisis because of their adaptive mechanisms. There is, therefore, a great need to deepen understanding of the drivers of fragility and resilience in fragile states, and redefine proscriptive ideological approaches that drive economic and development policies in different directions. This paper focuses on four key pillars of liberal order policies: financial liberalisation, trade liberalisation, foreign direction investment and exchange rate management. These aspects are fundamental to growth, but “test” fragile institutions and societies too severely in many cases – aggravating fragility and creating inequitable growth patterns. Policy responses to mitigate risks and maximise benefits from adoption of these liberal order policies in fragile contexts have been stronger in theory (as the Post-Washington consensus era draws to a close) than in practice; fragile states are still subject to blueprint prescriptions and competitive political pressures.

Drawing on country examples, this paper proposes future avenues for international research and action: (i) grouping fragile states according to a new set of vulnerability criteria on which to base support; (ii) developing a set of leading or proxy indicators to close the action-research time gap for fragile states; (iii) modelling fragile state responses to global risks towards early warning; (iv) integrating economic and development policies at national level; (v) staggering liberalisation policies to keep pace with institutional capacities; and (vi) prioritising internal economic cohesion. To create the analytical base, three fragile state case studies could be produced exploring liberalisation adoption from ideology and prescription to uptake pattern over time. Results could be synthesised by a newly established Global & Fragile Systems Contact Group, empowered to create the new metrics required to turn the New Deal into the “real deal” for fragile and conflict-affected states.

• Le pourcentage le plus important d’élèves qui espèrent obtenir un diplôme universitaire s’observe en Corée (80 %), et le plus faible, en Lettonie (25 %).
• De nombreux élèves très performants n’envisagent pas d’aller à l’université, soit autant de talents potentiels perdus pour l’économie et la société, tandis que de nombreux élèves peu performants pensent qu’ils y parviendront, même si leurs résultats scolaires actuels semblent présager le contraire.
• Un élève sur quatre environ envisage de terminer sa scolarité à la fin du deuxième cycle de l’enseignement secondaire et nécessite donc les compétences qui lui permettront de faire une transition en douceur de la scolarité au monde du travail et à l’âge adulte. < /LI>

• The percentage of students who expect to complete university is highest in Korea (80%) and lowest in Latvia (25%).
• Many high-performing students do not expect to go to university, representing potentially lost talent to an economy and society while many low-performing students think they will make it to university, even if their current performance suggests they are not likely to succeed.
• Around one in four students expects to end his or her formal schooling at the upper secondary level and thus needs the skills to make a smooth transition into work and adulthood.

The population and labour force in the European Union are ageing. The proportion of the population in the EU-27 who are aged 55 and over rose from 25 % in 1990 to 30 % in 2010, and is estimated to reach 37 % by 2030 (Eurostat, 2012). Consequently, the workforce is also getting older – the proportion of the labour force between 55 and 69 years old increased 26.5 % between 1987 and 2010.

In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, radical Islamists are targeting fragile and conflict-affected states and encouraging the formation of groups which act against the state (either violently or subversively). These processes exacerbate existing fragility and increase conflicts among communities in countries that already suffer from poor social cohesion and integration. This paper describes the ideas and methods with which radical Islamist groups are destabilising some fragile and conflict-affected states in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Sudan, Nigeria and Chad. It also evaluates the extent to which modern communication technologies help spread these ideas among Islamists in these states. In supporting fragile and conflict-affected states that are being infiltrated by radical Islamism, international donors should tackle two related phenomena: 1) regulating the telecommunication market and use of the Internet and social media; and 2) improving education. The non-violent aspects of Islamist radicalisation processes suggest that a dialogue with radical Islamists is still possible. In this sense, some of their projects, particularly their efforts at Arabisation, could be harnessed to increase literacy levels in order to favour general education and development and diminish fragility.

The purpose of this report is to highlight energy efficiency policy action and planning in IEA member and key non-member countries over the period from September 2011 to September 2012. The report provides an overview of energy efficiency policy developments across the seven sectors covered by the IEA 25 Energy Efficiency Policy Recommendations (25 EEPR) – Crosssectoral activities, Buildings, Appliances and Equipment, Lighting, Transport, Industry and Energy Providers.

This report reviews the existing evidence on pension fund investment in infrastructure in “new” markets, covering a number of non-OECD countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa, as well as some OECD countries like Chile and Mexico. In the African, Asian, and Latin American countries surveyed, domestic pension funds invest more than USD 15 bn in infrastructure projects, around 1.3% of the total assets managed (USD 1.1 trillion as of December 2010). Foreign pension funds, given their large size, could be a potentially major source of funding, but most have only recently started investing in infrastructure projects and have focused their attention in mature markets. The report concludes with a series of policy recommendations to facilitate infrastructure investments in new markets.

In early 2011, the Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis performed a mobility analysis, focussing on recent trends. This analysis showed that, following the remarkable growth in the 1980s and 1990s, the total national mobility of people in the Netherlands has not increased since 2005. This particularly appears to apply to car use. Except for the economic crisis around 2008/2009, the reasons for this development remained unclear at the time…

In many advanced economies, car use per head, and sometimes total car traffic, has shown low growth. In some countries (and especially cities) it has declined. In a few countries, there have been similar studies of the distance travelled by all modes added together, which has shown a similar trend though with some doubts about how international air travel should be handled. It is generally agreed that the trends in the last few years must be influenced by world economic problems, but some of the possible changes in trend seem to go back ten or twenty years, with signs detectable even longer…

In most industrialised countries, it can be seen that urban mobility and car traffic have stagnated since the early 2000s. In France, the report on traffic conducted by the National Transport Accounts Commission shows a similar break in the trend, which was confirmed by household travel surveys (EMDs) in most major cities, including Lille, Lyon and Strasbourg, and later by the National Transport and Travel Survey (ENTD), which shows that the trend can be attributed primarily to people living in large urban areas and provides an overall view of mobility: trips have become less frequent (with unbroken workdays) and less exclusively taken by car (as more young adults adopt multimodal behaviours), and car ownership is decreasing in the centre of greater Paris, as, for that matter, in the centre of London.

Does this levelling-off of traffic suggest that the saturation point is near (with a decoupling of traffic and income trends in the most densely populated areas or above a certain standard of living) or, rather, a cancelling out of opposite trends (continued growth in rural and suburban areas and decline amongst residents of the most densely populated areas)? Is this a structural phenomenon (population ageing, etc.) or a cyclical one linked to rising and volatile fuel prices and the recession? We shall explore these issues in the light of data collected in France, supplemented by selected data from other developed countries, and then move on to a comparison with a number of Mexican cities in order to consider the extent to which, and in what timeframe, these trends could spread southward to the emerging economies.

Dans la plupart des pays industrialisés on assiste depuis le début des années 2000 à une stagnation de la mobilité urbaine et du trafic automobile. En France, le Bilan de la Circulation établi par la Commission des Comptes Transport de la Nation montre une rupture de tendance analogue qui a été confirmée par les Enquêtes Ménages Déplacements (EMD dans la plupart des grandes villes, notamment Lille, Lyon, Strasbourg, puis par l'Enquête Nationale Transport et Déplacements (ENTD) qui permet de l'imputer essentiellement aux habitants des grands pôles urbains et de la resituer dans une vision d'ensemble de la mobilité: les déplacements sont moins fréquents (journée continue) et moins exclusivement automobiles (comportements multi-modaux des jeunes adultes), la motorisation des ménages décroît au coeur de l'agglomération parisienne comme d'ailleurs de celle de Londres...

Ce plafonnement de la circulation traduit-il l'approche de la saturation (découplage entre évolutions des trafics et des revenus dans les régions les plus denses ou au-delà d'un certain niveau de vie?) ou plutôt la superposition d'évolutions contraires (poursuite de la croissance chez les ruraux et péri-urbains vs. recul chez les habitants des zones les plus denses) ? S'agit-il d'un phénomène structurel (vieillissement de la population...) ou conjoncturel lié à l'augmentation et à la volatilité du prix des carburants, à la récession ? Nous examinerons ces questions à la lumière de données collectées en France, complétées par quelques données de pays développés pour ensuite les comparer à quelques villes mexicaines, afin d'envisager dans quelle mesure et à quel horizon ces tendances pourraient s'étendre dans les pays du Sud.