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In 2002, the OECD launched, through the Working Party on Private Pensions and the Task Force on Pension Statistics,1 the Global Pension Statistics Project,2 which aims to establish a harmonised set of statistics and indicators related to funded pensions. This article3 is an extract from the OECD newsletter “Pension Markets in Focus”, Issue 1.

The statistical exercise covers an extensive range of indicators. At this stage of the data collection, most of the relevant information was collected on autonomous pension funds, the fund type for which most of the detailed information was provided. However, autonomous pension funds do not represent the totality of pension plans’ activities. It would thus be important to obtain additional information, in particular on book reserve systems and pension plans administered under the...

The scale and pace of pension reform worldwide has created a significant need for the development of comprehensive, comparable pension statistics that can capture the many dimensions of pension systems and assist governments in assessing their programmes and reforms. Indeed, there are presently only scattered bodies of data available on subjects such as retirement income adequacy and trends in coverage, funding and investment. In order to fill this significant data gap in pension statistics, in 2002 the OECD Financial Markets Division (within the Directorate for Financial and Enterprises Affairs), initiated a statistical project with the aim to set up an analytical database ...

This paper looks at Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (GSIFIs) and the global derivatives business. The derivatives business has grown exponentially versus global GDP in sharp contrast to the primary securities on which derivatives are based. Inter-connectedness risk and unconstrained potential leverage remain the most urgent tasks still facing the financial reform process. Concentrated oligopolistic derivatives markets and the ability of banks to shift promises and/or use their IRB models to estimate ex-ante risk capital – capital that might be needed in the event of a crisis – undermine the intent of financial reform. Nor do netting and clearing eliminate aggregate risk of losses and bankruptcy. The paper repeats the need to implement two of the OECD’s long-standing reform recommendations: a binding leverage ratio based on equity and the separation of high risk investment banking activities from traditional banking. A derivatives transactions tax is also put forward as a possible option that would counter the cross-subsidisation of risk from the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem.

Carbon leakage arises when emission reductions in countries applying a carbon tax are offset, partially or completely, by emission increases in countries that do not apply the tax or any other greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policies. Analysis using the MAGNET computable general equilibrium model indicates that a carbon tax always lowers global GHG emissions from agriculture, even when it is applied in a small group of countries, provided that producers facing the tax can make use of GHG abatement technologies. This suggests that mitigation policies should be considered in conjunction with investments in research and development on abatement practices and technologies. When a small number of countries adopt a carbon tax, about half of the direct reduction in emissions in adopting counties is offset by higher emissions in non-adopting countries; the rate of carbon leakage declines as the group of countries implementing a carbon tax expands. Higher tax rates stimulate larger global emissions reductions, but also induce higher rates of emissions leakage, thus limiting the mitigation benefits from setting higher tax rates in contexts where few countries adopt the policy.

In early March 2020, the OECD’s Interim Economic Outlook highlighted that the coronavirus outbreak had already caused a sharp decline in economic growth in China, and subsequent outbreaks in other countries were eroding prospects for economic growth. Since that time, the increasing spread of the coronavirus across countries has prompted many governments to introduce unprecedented measures to contain the epidemic. While necessary to contain the virus, these measures have led to many businesses being shut down temporarily, widespread restrictions on travel and mobility, financial market turmoil, an erosion of confidence and heighted uncertainty. This approach suggests that the shutdowns could lead to sharp declines in the level of output in many economies, with consumers’ expenditure potentially dropping by around one-third. Changes of this magnitude would far outweigh the economic recession during the global financial crisis.

During the current global crisis, capital inflows into Asian countries have increased, leading to excess liquidity and the risk of potential asset bubbles. A sudden reversal of these inflows would have negative effects on the economies in question. Given the impact of global capital movements on domestic financial systems and thereby on domestic economies, in several Asian countries certain macro-prudential regulations have been put in place, and capital controls and micro-prudential regulations have re-emerged as important tools to handle the issues related to capital inflows from outside of the region. It is important to ensure that global imbalances do not become a source of instability. The issue, thoroughly discussed after the Asian crisis a decade ago, is “using Asian savings for Asian investments” through the development of bond markets and SME’s financial inclusion. Against the backdrop of huge potential demands for infrastructure investment in the Asian region, this note proposes the issuance of “infrastructure revenue bonds” to help develop bond markets in Asia. To facilitate financial inclusion of SMEs, which outnumber other types of business in Asia, this note also proposes creating an SME database and developing regional trust funds.

The revision process of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS), Safety Series No. 115, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 1996 BSS1) has reached its final stage. After the review of the 1996 BSS in 2005, the revision process started in 2006 and the final draft of the revised BSS2 was submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in August 2011 for approval. Subsequent to the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors adopted on 12 September 2011, the competent organs of the other potential sponsoring organisations also started to adopt or acknowledge, as appropriate, the text, which then will come into force one year after the date of the respective adoption or acknowledgement by the relevant organisation.

The goods needed to vaccinate, protect and test during the COVID-19 pandemic are produced across many different countries. This brief tells the tale of three products ‒ vaccines, face masks and tests ‒ and highlights the role of trade in the fight against COVID-19. International markets and global supply chains played a pivotal role during the COVID-19 pandemic: first, by helping countries avail themselves of the goods needed to address the pandemic; second, by providing a means to ease temporary supply constraints; and third, by enabling access to key components to ramp up production to meet surging demand.

Policy makers are increasingly grappling with the stability implications of global value chains (GVCs), as widespread supply shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian Federation’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine have disrupted the economic recovery and contributed to high inflation. This paper provides a tool to assess vulnerabilities in GVCs by drawing a detailed map of dependencies based on new indicators constructed from the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables. The key findings are as follows. First, GVC dependencies increase with both the size of foreign exposures and the length of foreign value chains. Second, in some industries, such as the automotive and ICT industries, vulnerabilities from high GVC dependence are amplified by high geographic concentration of suppliers or buyers. Third, the People’s Republic of China is the most critical choke point in GVCs across a broad range of industries, both as a dominant supplier and as a dominant buyer.

This paper provides an initial assessment of the shipbuilding industry in the context of global value chains by presenting new descriptive evidence on value added generation and sourcing patterns of intermediate inputs for ship construction of major shipbuilding economies. The findings reveal that shipbuilding relies heavily on intermediate inputs as around 70-80% of the final output value of ship production is generated through supplier sectors. Concerning sourcing activity, China appears to be the most self-sufficient among the four jurisdictions studied, followed by Japan and the EU28, while Korea seems to be more globally integrated. The analysis also explores variations among the four economies in the cost structure of shipbuilding inputs, which might partly be explained by differences in the ship types produced.

This report synthesises the key findings and policy messages from recent OECD work on global value chains (GVCs) in agriculture and food. The food and agriculture sector is increasingly organised within GVC around a number of global hubs. Agro-food GVCs have broadened the gains from specialisation and trade through stronger sector and employment growth. Openness to trade, especially services trade, can positively influence domestic value added creation in agro-food GVCs. However, trade protection and distorting agricultural support policies can reduce the gains from GVC participation and impose costs along the value chain. Government policies need to focus on facilitating participation in GVCs and helping to manage any adjustments across the food and agriculture sectorKeywords: Agro-food, value added, employment, policy reform, trade.