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This report uses a standard gravity setup to analyse the determinants of e-commerce, using data on online credit card payments by private Spanish customers of the multinational bank BBVA. The results show that the gravity model applies well to credit card payments, explaining up to 95% of the variation in the data. The analysis finds potentially large border effects for trade between any two regions or countries, implying that individuals tend to purchase more from their home region or domestically than from other places. The estimates also suggest that the effect of distance might be slightly less important for e-commerce transactions than for offline trade, although the death of distance hypothesis is clearly rejected by the data.
This article discusses why the composition of emergency fiscal packages in response to the COVID-19 pandemic make it important for governments to monitor and manage their balance sheets going forward. It analyses current practices with transparency and risk analysis concerning balance sheet-based measures drawn from case studies of nine OECD countries. It then identifies further steps governments should consider to increase transparency and strengthen risk analysis on COVID-19 related balance sheet-based policies that will help to strengthen fiscal frameworks.
A number of other rationales for public ownership of enterprises have been offered, including: (i) monopolies in sectors where competition and market regulation is not deemed feasible or efficient; (ii) market incumbency, for instance in sectors where competition has been introduced but a state-owned operator remains responsible for public service obligations; (iii) imperfect contracts, where those public service obligations that SOEs are charged with are too complex or malleable to be laid down in service contracts; (iv) industrial policy or development strategies, where SOEs are being used to overcome obstacles to growth or correct market imperfections...
In order to meet the challenges of providing affordable public transit services for the urban poor and at a cost that doesn’t impinge on the system’s financial sustainability, cities can consider setting fares at “cost recovery” levels for the majority of the population and targeting subsidies to those who need them most. Bogotá is a case in point—the new public transport system was designed so fares are set close to “cost recovery” levels to aim for greater financial sustainability. To provide affordable services, the city leveraged the adoption of smartcards in its new public transit system and the country’s poverty targeting instruments to implement a pro-poor public transit subsidy. This paper presents a critical analysis of Bogotá’s experience with trying to balance financial sustainability and affordability. The paper describes some of the features of Bogota’s tariff policy, namely, the concept of tariff set at “cost recovery” levels and lessons learnt in trying to achieve financial sustainability. The paper also lays out the rationale, design and implementation of Bogota’s pro-poor public transit subsidy, and the subsidy’s impact on its beneficiaries.
The main hallmarks of the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with other people’s money: excess leverage and default pressure resulting from contagion and counterparty risk. This paper looks at whether the Basel III agreement addresses these issues effectively. Basel III has some very useful elements, notably a (much too light “back-up”) leverage ratio, a capital buffer, a proposal to deal with pro-cyclicality through dynamic provisioning based on expected losses and liquidity and stable funding ratios. However, the paper shows that Basel risk weighting and the use of internal bank models for determining them leads to systematic regulatory arbitrage that undermines its effectiveness. Empirical evidence about the determinants of the riskiness of a bank (measured in this study by the Distance-to-Default) shows that a simple leverage ratio vastly outperforms the Basel Tier 1 ratio. Furthermore, business model features (after controlling for macro factors) have a huge impact. Derivatives origination, prime broking, etc., carry vastly different risks to core deposit banking. Where such differences are present, it makes little sense to have a one-size-fits-all approach to capital rules. Capital rules make more sense when fundamentally different businesses are separated.
JEL classification: G01, G15, G18, G20, G21, G24, G28
Keywords: Financial crisis, Basel III, derivatives, bank business models, distance-todefault, structural bank separation, banking reform, GSIFI banks
The main hallmarks of the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with other people’s money while gains were privatised and losses socialised. It is shown that banks need little capital in calm periods, but in a crisis they need too much – there is no reasonable ex-ante capital rule for large systemically important financial institutions that will make them safe. The bank regulators paradox is that large complex and interconnected banks need very little capital in the good times, but they can never have enough in an extreme crisis. Separation is required to deal with this problem, which derives mainly from counterparty risk. The study suggests banks should be considered for separation into a ring-fenced non-operating holding company (NOHC) structure with ring-fencing when they pass a key allowable threshold for the gross market value (GMV) of derivatives, a case which is reinforced if the bank has high wholesale funding and low levels of liquid trading assets. The pricing of derivatives and repos would become more commensurate with the risks if the NOHC proposal were to be pursued as a unifying strategy for the different national approaches. Most of the objections to this structure are summarised and rebutted. Other national proposals for separation in Switzerland, the Volcker rule, the Vickers rule, and the Liikanen proposal are argued to be inferior to the ring-fenced NOHC proposal, on the grounds that empirical evidence about what matters for a safe business model is not taken properly into account.
JEL classification: G01, G15, G18, G20, G21, G24, G28
Keywords: Financial crisis, derivatives, bank business models, distance-to-default, structural bank separation, banking reform, GSIFI banks
Banks have been lowering their high pre-crisis leverage levels and are preparing for stricter regulatory capital requirements, and in the process have been reducing their lending. With the banking sector expected to shrink considerably, other actors, especially institutional investors, and new forms of financial intermediation will have to meet the credit needs of the economy. This may not only require enhancing and enlarging the perimeter of regulatory oversight, but may also need policy incentives to encourage new forms of market based lending, especially as it concerns financing long-term investment, including infrastructure, and SMEs. This was the background for the discussions at the April 2012 OECD Financial Roundtable that this note summarises. On the current outlook, participants agreed that recent policy actions in Europe have had a positive impact but more and longer-term policy actions will be needed to restore confidence among market participants and set the basis for recovery. Deleveraging is necessary but only about half-way completed. Regulatory reforms should support this process in a balanced way, avoid unintended consequences and help the transition towards increased non-bank intermediation by not imposing bank-like regulation on, e.g., insurance companies and hedge funds. Securitisation should be revitalised – perhaps with some (initial) government and regulatory support – to close the bank lending gap, especially for SME lending. Covered bonds can contribute in this, too, but their benefits may be limited, i.a. due to asset encumbrance. Mezzanine financing instruments could be useful for SME financing, and informal forms of equity financing could help small dynamic start-up companies.
Banks are still dealing with historic losses buried in their balance sheets. As a result, the US economy is picking up only modestly and Europe is sinking further into recession, despite unprecedented low interest rates and policies to compress the term premium. The aim of this study is to explore the business activities of banks, with a special focus on their lending behaviour, and its responsiveness to unconventional monetary policy. The paper shows that deleveraging has been mainly via mark-to-market assets falling in value, and policy is now serving to reflate these assets without a strong impact on lending. A panel regression study shows that GSIFI banks are least responsive to policy. Non-GSIFI banks respond to the lending rate spread to cash rates, the spread between lending rates and the alternative investment in government bonds, and the distance-to-default (the banks solvency). The paper shows that better lending in the USA is a result of safer banks and a better spread to government bonds – yields on the latter are too attractive relative to lending rates in Europe. Finally, the paper comments on the problem of using cyclical tools to address structural problems in banks, and suggests which alternative policies would better facilitate a financial system more aligned with lending, trust and stability and less towards high-risk activities and leverage via complex products.
JEL Classification: E50, E51, E52, E58, G20, G21, G24, G28.
Keywords: Bank Lending, Bank business model, deleveraging, structural policy, unconventional monetary policy, distance to default, spreads, bank separation, GSIFI.
This paper examines the state of the Russian banking sector in 2004 and assesses the most important reform initiatives of the last two years, including deposit insurance legislation, a major reform of the framework for prudential supervision, steps to increase transparency in the sector, and measures to facilitate the development of specific banking activities. The overall conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the Russian authorities’ approach to banking reform is to be commended. The design of the reform strategy reflects an awareness of the need for a ‘good fit’ between its major elements, and the main lines of the reform address some of the principal problems of the sector. The major lacuna in the Russian bank reform strategy concerns the future of state-owned banks. Despite a long-standing official commitment to reducing the role of the state – and of the Bank of Russia in particular – in the ownership of credit institutions, there is still a need for a much more ...
The current crisis with its on-going banking sector problems has brought to the fore various cases of financial fraud and banking scandals that have additionally undermined the already low confidence in the sector. This has raised concerns about structural flaws in the way banks operate and are being regulated and supervised. Restoring investor confidence may require new approaches to redesign the incentives, rules and regulations for the financial sector. This was the backdrop for the discussions at the October 2012 OECD Financial Roundtable that this article summarises. Topics covered the current outlook and risks for banks as well as banking business models, ethics and approaches towards risks. Participants pointed out that, while downsizing and adjusting their business models, banks had already made improvements in their risk management. At the same time, the now observed renationalisation of assets could worsen the situation particularly in the European periphery. This could be attenuated by a European Banking Union that would also help to break the detrimental link between banks and sovereigns. As banks are deleveraging, non-banks are substituting for part of the reduced bank lending, but to do so would need regulatory support – while the shadow banking sector more generally will come under closer regulatory and supervisory scrutiny. Consumer groups in particular regard financial consumer protection as important to help improve the social value of financial activities that had often been unproductive, if not destructive. Bank representatives opposed regulatory separation of bank business on the grounds that it is insufficient to address problems of risk taking and control. Finally, it was pointed out that regulatory reforms need to be targeted and harness market forces by balancing penalties and rewards. Governance of regulation should also be enhanced, and regulation should be proactive and be complemented by strong macro and micro-supervision. Co-ordinating reforms should ensure a level playing field, but a one-size-fits-all approach should be avoided.