Browse by: "2016"
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A public-private partnership (PPP) is a long-term contractual arrangement whereby the government calls on a company or a consortium formed for the purpose to design, build, finance and maintain a structure or facility necessary for its public-service mission. The company or consortium is subsequently remunerated according to the availability and performance of the structure or facility. The remuneration must enable the company or consortium to repay its initial investment and cover the financing costs and the services it provides. In a broad sense PPPs have long existed in France under various names and in various forms, marking the history of the development of the country’s infrastructure networks. In the modern sense, corresponding to the partnership contract (contrat de partenariat now renamed “machés de partenariat” since 2015) created in 2004 and covering all-inclusive government-pay contracts, PPPs have made significant inroads in certain sectors of public management such as social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, prisons, etc.). As a result France topped the European PPP league table in 2011-12, though PPPs remain a niche market overall in relation to the total amount of public procurement. Now, ten years later, it is possible to take stock, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, of projects initiated and carried out. This report aims to show the impact and effects of this new public procurement resource, sector by sector, in facts and figures, and to illustrate the contributions it has made and the feedback it has generated by major type of project and by public-sector initiator, from municipalities to central government agencies.
JEL classification: H40, H5, H83
Keywords: Infrastructure, partnership contracts, public private partnerships, public procurement
Good infrastructure is crucial to a country’s development and continued success. Russia’s developmental goals require new and upgraded infrastructure throughout its territory. Private investment in capital projects will be vital for Russia to meet these goals. To facilitate private investment, the Russian government has embarked on a series of reforms aimed at improving the investment climate and creating a robust institutional framework for private sector participation in concessions and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The OECD’s 2012 Council Recommendation on Principles for Public Governance of Public-Private Partnerships (the PPP Recommendation) aims to support governments facing trade-offs between three demands inherent in a PPP project process. This article provides an overview of the alignment of the policies of the Russian Federation in the area of public governance of PPPs with these recommendations.
JEL classification: H41, H54, H57
Keywords: Council recommendations, public private partnerships, Russian Federation, value for money
Aggregate expenditure ceilings are today a feature of budgeting in many OECD countries. They are typically used either to enforce a trend-based expenditure policy, or to gradually reduce the size of government. With the increased popularity of expenditure rules, aggregate ceilings are also required to give effect to these rules. This article focuses on the key design issue of the coverage of aggregate expenditure ceilings – that is, should they cover the totality of government expenditure, or is it legitimate to exclude certain categories of expenditure? It is suggested that the distinction between “determinate” and “indeterminate” expenditure is crucial to properly answering this question. It is also argued that the appropriate coverage of aggregate expenditure ceilings is different during expenditure planning (budget preparation) and during budget execution.
JEL classification: E620, H610
Keywords: Expenditure ceilings, top-down budgeting, determinate expenditure, indeterminate expenditure, automatic changes, trend-based expenditure policy, contingency reserve, forecasting margin, sequestration, compensation mechanism, welfare cap
In this paper we describe how we included travel time variability in the national Dutch transport forecasting model and what the policy impacts of this new forecasting tool are. Until now, travel time reliability improvements for road projects were included in Dutch cost-benefit analysis (CBA) by multiplying the travel time benefits from reduced congestion by a factor 1.25. This proportionality is based on the linkage between congestion reduction and reliability improvements. However, this treatment of reliability is not useful to evaluate policies that especially affect travel time variability. From the start, this method was provisional and meant to be replaced by a better method capturing travel time variability. For this, we derived an empirical relation between the standard deviation of travel time, mean delay of travel time and length of route. This has been implemented in the national Dutch model as a post processing module. The new travel time reliability forecasting model will be incorporated in the Dutch guidelines for CBA.
Transport project prioritisation and selection processes require consideration of many aspects of costs, intended benefits and other impacts. Economic analysis methods can measure many of those factors, though the analysis methods must be specified in ways that meet the information needs of decision-makers. This paper examines how benefit-cost analysis, economic impact analysis and multi-criteria analysis approaches have evolved and been applied to address the specific form of governmental decision processes that exist in the U.S. and some other countries. It discusses how “ex-post” case studies and associated statistical studies of have been promoted and utilised to both inform and refine “ex-ante” evaluation methods. It concludes by discussing the advantages, limitations and trade-offs involved in the use of this approach for transport project decision-making.
This paper analyses three main mechanisms through which transport improvements have impacts that deliver real income gain over and above user-benefits. One is economic density and productivity, a second is induced private investment and associated land-use change, and a third is employment effects. There are relatively well-established methodologies for incorporating the first and third of these in cost-benefit appraisal, and these methodologies are reviewed in the paper. For the second, the paper outlines how transport induced investments can create consumer surplus, and describes a method for quantifying this in cost-benefit appraisal. Data issues encountered in implementing these methods are discussed.
This paper provides an overview of some alternative conceptual definitions of travel time variability, discusses their implications about behaviour, and puts them into a broader context, including deviations from the underlying assumptions regarding rational behaviour. The paper then discusses the empirical basis for assigning a value to travel time variability. This discussion leads to the conclusion that a fair amount of scepticism is appropriate regarding stated preference data and that attention should turn to the possibilities that are emerging for using large revealed preference datasets. The bottom line is that travel time variability is quantitatively important and cost-benefit analysis should account for it, using the best values we can get, in order not to imply a bias towards project that do not reduce travel time variability. Omitting the cost of travel time variability is not the neutral option.
There is a drive towards delivering and operating public infrastructure through public-private partnerships as opposed to traditional approaches. The assessment of the value for money achieved by the two alternative approaches rests on both the cost of financing, and the efficiency in delivery and operation. This paper focuses on the cost of financing, and in particular the cost associated with transferring risk from the public to private sphere. If capital markets are efficient and complete, the cost of private and public financing should be the same, with the relative delivery and operational efficiency remaining as the primary determinant of value for money. However, evidence suggests the risk transfer to a public-private partnership entails an inefficient risk pricing premium. We argue that a high price for public-private partnerships results from large risk transfers, risk treatment within the private sector, and uncertainty around the past and future performance of PPP consortiums. The corollary of the finding is that the efficiency gains from a PPP need to be much higher than previously understood to deliver better value for money than under a traditional approach.