Gambia
Using household data from 15 countries in Latin America and Africa, this paper explores linkages between informality and education-occupation matching. The paper applies a unified methodology to measuring education-occupation mismatches and informality, consistently with the international labour and statistical standards in this area. The results suggest that in the majority of low- and middle-income developing countries with available data, workers in informal jobs have higher odds of being undereducated as compared to workers in formal jobs. Workers in formal jobs, in contrast, have higher chances of being overeducated. These results are consistent for dependent as well as for independent workers. They also hold for men and for women according to the gender-disaggregated analysis. Moreover, in the majority of countries considered in this paper, the matching-informality nexus is also related to the extent of informality in a given area: in labour markets with higher informality, informal workers in particular have a higher chance of being undereducated. The paper discusses policy implications of these findings.
Informal employment, defined through the lack of employment-based social protection, constitutes the bulk of employment in developing countries, and entails a level of vulnerability to poverty and other risks that are borne by all who are dependent on informal work income. Results from the Key Indicators of Informality based on Individuals and their Households database (KIIbIH) show that a disproportionately large number of middle‑class informal economy workers receive remittances. Such results confirm that risk management strategies, such as migration, play a part in minimising the potential risks of informal work for middle‑class informal households who may not be eligible to social assistance. They further suggest that middle‑class informal workers may have a solvent demand for social insurance so that, if informality-robust social insurance schemes were made available to them, remittances could potentially be channelled to finance the extension of social insurance to the informal economy.
Economic growth was hurt in 2011 by a harvest crop failure, but agricultural production started to recover in 2012 and real GDP growth accelerated in 2011. The outlook is optimistic for 2013 and 2014 as real GDP growth is projected to reach 4.3% and 5.1% in 2013 and 2014, respectively, on account of strong expansion in agriculture and tourism. These projections are on the high side; performance will depend on the efficacy of the drought emergency plan, as well as on the impact of government reforms implemented to sustain the agriculture sector.
Economic growth decelerated from 6.3% in 2010 to an estimated 5.5% in 2011 and is expected to stabilise around 5.6% in 2012 and 2013. Since late 2008, economic growth in The Gambia has been mainly driven by good performance in the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, poor weather conditions, which harmed crop production in 2011, and the global crisis in recent years have affected projected GDP growth negatively in the country. Reforms implemented by the government in agriculture, however, will continue to boost the economy and sustain its growth.
Gambia is a low-income country with a structural food deficit but it has managed to post relatively strong growth rates over the past three years. In 2010, growth slowed to 5.4% from 6.7% in 2009 as the global slump continued to be felt on re-exports, tourism and remittances. Growth should pick up to 5.6% this year and next. Good harvests -- especially of rice -- and gains in the construction and banking sectors drove economic growth. The newly-launched National Agricultural Investment Plan aimsto improve agricultural sector productivity.