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Australian and Canadian pension funds have been pioneers in infrastructure investing since the early 1990s. They also have the highest asset allocation to infrastructure around the globe today. This paper compares and contrasts the experience of institutional investors in the two countries looking at factors such as infrastructure policies, the pension system, investment strategies and governance of pension funds. The ‘Canadian model’ and the ‘(new) Australian model’ of infrastructure pose a challenge to the ‘private equity model’, dominant in Europe and the USA. Important lessons can be learnt by both policy makers and investors.

As the need for investment in infrastructure continues to grow, private sector financing for infrastructure projects has developed around the world. Given the long-term growth and (potentially) low correlation aspects of infrastructure investments, pension funds have also shown interest in increasing their exposure to this area, along with their move into alternative assets. Such investments cover a wide spectrum of projects – from economic infrastructure such as transport, to social projects such as hospitals – and involve different forms of financing (primary vs. secondary, debt vs. equity, private vs. listed, direct vs. indirect). Data explaining the size, risk, return and correlations of this diverse asset class is therefore limited, which may be making pension fund investors cautious. Given investing in such assets also involves new types of investment vehicles and risk for pension funds to manage – such as exposure to leverage, legal and ownership issues, environmental risks as well as regulatory and political challenges – such caution may well be justified. However, if governments wish to help infrastructure developers tap into potentially important sources of financing such as pension funds, certain steps can be taken. This paper is designed as an overview piece, discussing if pension funds should invest in infrastructure on a theoretical basis, whether they do in practice, and, if not, how (and if) regulators can encourage and assist them to do so.

This report provides an analysis of aggregate investment performance by country on a risk adjusted basis using relatively standard investment performance measures. The report also describes privately managed pension funds around the world and the regulatory environment they face. It compares pension funds across countries according to total assets under management and asset allocation, and briefly discusses certain issues surrounding the data reported by pension funds and regulators on investment returns.

This paper provides a stylised assessment of the impact of investment-relevant pension fund regulations and accounting rules on contribution and investment strategies within the context of an asset-liability model (ALM) specifically designed for this purpose. The analysis identifies a substantial impact of regulations which, in a simplified way, resemble those in place in Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States. The ALM model shows that regulations affect funding costs primarily through the choice of investment strategy. Strict funding regulations may force sponsors to make up funding shortfalls in bad economic times and lead them to invest more conservatively, which ultimately raises net funding costs. The paper also shows that fairvalue accounting standards (with immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses) can contribute to higher funding levels than required by regulators.

Pension funds are increasingly looking at infrastructure investment with some investors actively pursuing opportunities in the sector. Different countries are at different stages in the evolution of pension fund investment in infrastructure.

A survey of a sample of the most significant actors was launched by the OECD in May 2010 within the framework of the OECD Project on Transcontinental Infrastructure 2030-20501. Based on the survey a series of barriers to investment were indentified. This paper draws largely on the results of the survey...

Drawing on the experience of the pensions and other financial sectors, this paper examines what sort of risk-management framework pension funds should have in place. Such frameworks are broken down into four main categories: management oversight and culture; strategy and risk assessment; control systems; and information and reporting. Ways in which supervisory authorities can check that such systems are operating are also considered, with a check list provided to assist pension supervisory authorities with their oversight of this important area.

The paper discusses the pros and cons of liberalising foreign investment of pension assets in developing countries, with particular reference to Chile. The positive part of the paper examines the impact on macroeconomic policy of a small country's opening its equity market for investment; the investment strategies of, and the restrictions imposed upon, privately-managed pension funds; and the specific British experience with portfolio diversification after the dismantling of capital controls in 1979. The normative part, while finding only a weak case for regulating foreign pension investment (loss of savings, domestic capital markets), discusses various techniques of such regulation ...

This paper forms part of on-going OECD work on the economic assessment of public pension systems in view of the process of the ageing of populations. It provides indicative estimates of the likely size of public pension liabilities in the main seven economies based on simplifying assumptions, and analyses various methods of financing these liabilities. The methodology developed here is based on the so-called generational accounts approach. Such accounts indicate in present-value terms the lifetime financial burden government programmes impose on present and future generations. Up to now, the methodology has been used to estimate public pension liabilities in France and Belgium, in the framework of the 1993 OECD Economic Surveys for those countries ...

• There are benefits from Latin American pension reform, but they have been overestimated. • The approaches taken in second-generation reforms and their still early results hold lessons for OECD and non-OECD countries alike. • A partial shift to funding is feasible and can be financed in different ways; partial funding of pensions can lead to greater risk diversification. • High administrative costs and uniformity of investment portfolios make the new systems inefficient; pension regulation has to be designed and implemented to lessen these negative effects.

The paper describes Chile’s pension reform of 1980, which replaced the existing pay-as-you-go public pension programs by a new funded pension program managed by private companies (the “AFP´s”). It comments on the main results of this reform so far, and identifies the current challenges faced by the country’s pension system. The paper also describes the changes introduced to Chile’s pension system in March 2008 and assesses their potential impact. The Chilean case shows that parametric reforms preceding the creation of a funded program can reduce political resistance to structural pension reform. Chile’s experience also suggests that the consistency of opinions among the economic, social security and labor market authorities responsible of designing and conducting a pension reform process can help to sell the reform to the political authorities. If the decision is to replace an existing pension program by a new one, it also seems necessary to have specific rules that, in some particular circumstances and for a limited period of time, allow discontented workers to go back to their former pension program. Chile’s experience also shows that the quality of pension programs micro design is relevant since individual decisions and portfolio managers investments decisions are shaped by regulations. Results so far suggests that the reform has been successful in improving the long term sustainability of Chile’s pension system; in creating a more fair system; in promoting the development of capital markets; and in removing some distortions to the operation of labor markets. On the other side, there is some room for the new program operational costs and prices to go down, and expectations about an increase in second pillar coverage have not been met. While some regulatory changes could improve the extent and quality of the funded pension program coverage, the long-term solution to the economic problems of retirement involves the labor market. To improve future pensions more jobs in the formal sector of the economy should be created; unemployment must be reduced; and working lives should be extended.

China is currently in the process of developing the largest pension system in the world, and it is doing this at a time of unparalleled economic and demographic transition. The central government has followed a step-by-step approach to develop a system that can accommodate a rapidly aging society within a rapidly growing, but still largely underdeveloped economy. This paper analyses how far the process of creating a national old age insurance system had proceeded by the end of 2006. It provides a detailed description of this system and an assessment of to what degree it has so far achieved ?its primary goal of social security for more people? (Chinese Government, September 2006)...

The self-employed workers make up a small but significant minority of the workforce in many OECD countries. Moreover, transitions into and out of self-employment have become much more common for a larger group of workers. It is therefore of critical importance to review and assess the pension schemes available to self-employed workers across OECD countries. Given employment and income patterns commonly observed for this subgroup, it is also important to address the issue of compliance and enforcement towards a formal affiliation of this group to pension schemes on offer. This paper reviews three key aspects of pension schemes available to self-employed workers: coverage, contributions and benefits. In each part, analyses are undertaken not just by describing the rules governing these schemes but also looking into their actual functioning in terms of compliance and enforcement. Key findings include the fact that the self-employed are covered by the same pension schemes as those of employees in the majority of countries. One important difference is that, while employees share the contribution burden with their employers, the self-employed workers in most cases pay the full pension contribution from their own income. The rules for pension entitlements, on the other hand, are usually almost identical to those that apply to employees. One key conclusion emerging from this paper is that the pension provision for the self-employed is a matter of practical implementation of existing schemes rather than overhauling pension rules for these schemes. Low coverage is a common problem for this group in some OECD countries, as they belong to the informal sector and their incomes are hard to identify. Contribution evasion or under-reporting of income by the self-employed is prevalent even in some countries with high per capita income. This has implications as these self-employed workers will have lower levels of pension incomes at retirement. In some cases, low contributions coupled with relatively generous pension rights also raise an issue of equity in the provision of pensions for the self-employed and employees.

Good governance is increasingly recognised as an important aspect of an efficient private pension system, enhancing investment performance and benefit security. Yet, despite regulatory and industry initiatives, governance weaknesses persist across OECD and non-OECD countries.
This paper highlights the main governance challenges faced by policymakers (particularly with trust-based pension systems), and draws on recent policy initiatives to propose possible solutions to strengthen governance arrangements.

This paper discusses why the development of pension systems is important for the African region. It also looks at the current pension arrangements in selected African countries. The paper was designed as an overview/background document to provide context and assist discussion at the OECD/IOPS Global Forum on Private Pensions, which was held in Mombasa, Kenya on the 30th/31st October, 2008. The OECD and IOPS acknowledge the leadership of other organizations in terms of development and African specific issues – notably the World Bank, International Labor Organistaion (ILO) and IMF.

The rapid rise in inflation in 2006-07 has attracted attention – once again – both to how pensions systems should react to changes in prices, and to how they do so in practice. Although inflation is now falling as a result of lower commodity prices and weakening demand, this brings with it the risk of deflation – falling prices – which also raises questions as to how pension systems should react. Most OECD countries have a legislated commitment to indexation of pensions in payment. However, the empirical evidence in this paper shows that these rules have frequently been over-ridden. Furthermore, because indexation to price inflation rather than wage inflation is much more common – and wages can be expected to rise more rapidly than prices – the effect of following legislated indexation rules will be to reduce pensioner incomes compared with those of the working-age population. However, indexation to prices is less costly, allowing a larger initial pension than under earnings indexation for a given budget constraint. This paper sets out current, national indexation policies and historical data on how pensions have been adjusted in practice. It examines different indexation policies: to prices, earnings or a mix of the two; the choice of the price index and progressive indexation (where smaller pensions are increased more rapidly than larger).