Minerals are essential to security and prosperity. They are critical to renewable energy, digitalisation, and defence. For instance, an electric vehicle requires six times more mineral inputs than a conventional car, and an onshore wind plant needs nine times more minerals than a gas-fired plant IEA (2024[1]). Minerals are also vital for semiconductors, fibre optics, superalloys, permanent magnets, and advanced electronics.
Yet, mineral extraction and processing are highly concentrated geographically and in ownership. This is due to a mix of natural endowments, economic viability, economies of scale, and policy choices. The top three producing countries account for over two-thirds of the global production of cobalt and nickel, and over 90% of rare earth elements and lithium. China alone produces around 70% of the global supply of germanium, graphite, rare earths, and magnesium. Even where deposits are widespread, mining and processing require long-term investment and face lengthy approval processes.
This concentration, combined with rising demand, is intensifying pressure on the global exchange of raw materials. The green and digital transitions, as well as economic and military security concerns, are also increasing demand. These developments are unfolding amidst growing geopolitical tensions and strategic rivalries.
This has led to more assertive management of raw materials by governments. Although this sector has long been shaped by state intervention through regulations, state ownership, subsidies, and trade measures the OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials (hereafter “Inventory”) shows a significant increase in their use over the last decade.
Export restrictions take many forms and pursue diverse objectives, including the promotion of domestic processing, protection of the environment, attracting investment, and raising public revenue. However, the effectiveness of such restrictions in achieving sustainable development goals is contested. Moreover, restrictions by one country often trigger similar actions by others—creating a cycle of rising prices and reduced global supply.
The sharp increase in export restrictions in 2023 may mark the start of a new phase. The latest OECD Inventory data, supported by media and policy reports, points to a rapid acceleration in such measures. This trend could signal a broader shift in how countries manage critical raw materials.
The OECD has tracked export restrictions since 2009. The Inventory is updated annually and provides detailed data on the incidence, type, scope, and evolution of export restrictions across countries and products. The current update covers 2009–2023, with the next release due in 2026 (covering data through 2024).
