OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials 2025

Between 2009 and 2023, export restrictions on industrial raw materials increased more than fivefold, with the most significant increases occurring in the early 2010s, when the OECD began regularly collecting data and monitoring these measures amid growing policy tensions.1

In 2023—the final year covered by this edition of the Inventory—the pace of growth in the use of export restrictions accelerated. By the end of the year, approximately 3.4% more raw material products were subject to at least one export restriction measure compared to the end of 2022. The growth rate in the number of such products was more than double that of 2022 and nearly triple that of 2021 (Figure 2.1).

Among other factors, the marked increase in the growth rate of export restrictions in 2023 coincided with a significant rise in raw material (and energy) prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Figure 2.2), as well as escalating geopolitical tensions.

Close to 94% of net additions to the global stock of exported products subject to export restrictions in 2023 were accounted for by just seven countries. The People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), Viet Nam, and Burundi each contributed approximately 21% each, followed by the Russian Federation (hereafter “Russia”) (14%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “DRC”) (7%), Zimbabwe (6%), and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (2%).2

Most of the new export restrictions imposed by China, Viet Nam, Burundi, and Russia were introduced as tax reforms and took the form of new export taxes or revised tax rates on a range of raw materials. In the DRC and Zimbabwe, the new measures also applied to several raw materials, but took the form of export prohibitions. These were justified in the relevant legislation by strategic considerations and the need to promote local processing (Figure 2.3).3

Across all new export restrictions introduced in countries covered by the Inventory, several raw materials saw a global increase in export restriction incidence of more than 10% (Figure 2.4).

By the end of 2023, waste and scrap products faced the highest incidence of export restrictions. This reflects both environmental concerns regarding the export of such materials for disposal and a growing interest in leveraging the circular economy as a source of supply for certain metals and minerals (Figure 2.5).4

Export restrictions on ores and minerals—essentially the raw materials located upstream in critical raw material supply chains—increased more rapidly than those in other segments of the supply chain, and nearly twice as fast as the overall average for all restrictions (centre panel of Figure 2.5). This trend correlates with the high and rising concentration of production, imports, and exports in the upstream segments of the supply chain. It is also broadly aligned with the policy rationale of supporting domestic downstream industries by limiting the export of upstream products.5

Among non-waste and scrap industrial raw materials, molybdenum, potash, tungsten, zirconium, and germanium saw some of the steepest increases in the incidence of export restrictions. Products such as manganese, titanium, zirconium, germanium, copper, and other non-ferrous minor metals—including vanadium, gallium, hafnium, indium, niobium, and rhenium—recorded the highest overall levels of export restriction incidence in 2023 (Figure 2.6).

Between 2021 and 2023, approximately 14% of global trade in non-waste and scrap industrial raw materials was subject to at least one export restriction measure, up from 12% in the 2009–2011 period. During 2021–2023, more than 20% of global exports of cobalt, rare earth elements, tin, palladium, platinum, nickel, copper, iron and steel, manganese, silver, and other precious metal ores faced at least one export restriction.

For certain minerals, the shares were significantly higher—for example, 67% for cobalt and 46% for rare earth elements. In some cases, such as cobalt and nickel, the share of global trade affected by export restrictions nearly doubled between 2009–2011 and 2021–2023 (Figure 2.7).

When trade subject to at least one export restriction is expressed as a share of a country's raw material imports, it becomes clear that some countries face significantly more export restrictions than others. For some countries, this share increased between 2009–2011 and 2021–2023, while for others it declined (Figure 2.8).

Increases typically reflect a combination of two factors: a growing concentration of imports from trade flows already subject to relatively high levels of export restrictions, and a rising incidence of restrictions on existing flows (across both products and partner countries). Conversely, decreases tend to result from a shift away from trade flows with high restriction incidence, as well as a decline in restrictions affecting existing flows.

China, India, Viet Nam, Argentina, and Burundi were the top five countries in terms of the number of new export restrictions introduced between 2009 and 2023, together accounting for more than half of all measures implemented during this period (Figure 2.9).

Export taxes and licensing requirements contributed the most to the growth of the global stock of export restrictions between 2009 and 2023. These were also the two most frequently used types of restrictions in 2023. This aligns with the fact that, under WTO rules, quantitative export restrictions are generally prohibited, whereas export taxes and licensing requirements are not.6

However, the use of quantitative export restrictions—such as export prohibitions and quotas—has also been on the rise, particularly in recent years. Notably, the incidence of export prohibitions, the most restrictive form of export restriction, has increased significantly since 2019 (Figure 2.10). In fact, they were the most frequently introduced type of restriction in 2022 and the second most frequently introduced in 2023 (Figure 2.11).

For measures where information on the officially stated purpose of export restrictions is available, revenue generation was the most frequently cited purpose in 2023—and it has been the fastest-growing stated purpose since the early 2010s.

Three purposes related to industrial policy—safeguarding domestic supply, promoting further processing/value addition, and protecting local downstream industries—also appeared to grow somewhat in importance over this period. However, together they accounted for only about 10% of all new measures in 2023, down from 17% in the previous year.

In 2023, in addition to revenue-related purposes, export restrictions were more frequently justified by goals related to monitoring and controlling export activity, including the conservation of natural resources (Figure 2.12).