This section analyses counterfeit trade in greater detail, on an industry basis, with attention to trade routes. The role of the main provenance countries is examined to better highlight industry-specific aspects.
Mapping Global Trade in Fakes 2025

3. Mapping trade routes: Industry analysis
Copy link to 3. Mapping trade routes: Industry analysis3.1. Clothing sector (HS code 61)
Copy link to 3.1. Clothing sector (HS code 61)3.1.1. Trade routes
Clothing articles are among the most frequently counterfeited items. All types of clothing are counterfeited, including clothing, accessories (hats, scarves, headscarves), and a large number of brands are infringed upon. Seizure data clearly show that counterfeiters quickly adapt to fashion trends to meet consumer needs.
The analysis of the main provenance economies shows that China, Türkiye, and Hong Kong (China) remained the leading suppliers of counterfeit textile products in 2020-21. However, Figure 3.1 also reveals that new players have emerged. Notably, Colombia and Mexico ranked 5th and 7th, respectively, among the source economies of counterfeit textile products. This figure indicates a decline in the role of Asian countries (other than China and Hong Kong (China), which was more prominent in the past, in favour of Gulf countries and, more recently, Latin American countries.
The GTRIC methodology reveals that the sources of counterfeit clothing products are numerous and spread across the world, indicating a high likelihood that countries such as Bangladesh, Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye are key sources. A number of African economies (Senegal, Tanzania, Benin, and Nigeria) and European economies (Albania and Bulgaria in a lesser extent) are also likely sources, as is one country from the Caucasus region (Georgia).
Figure 3.1. Top provenance economies for trade in counterfeit clothing items, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.1. Top provenance economies for trade in counterfeit clothing items, 2020-21
Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
Table 3.1. Relative likelihood of an economy to be a source of fake clothing items
Copy link to Table 3.1. Relative likelihood of an economy to be a source of fake clothing itemsGTRIC-e world for clothing, average 2020-21
Provenance |
GTRICe |
---|---|
Bangladesh |
1 |
Hong Kong (China) |
1 |
Lebanon |
1 |
Syrian Arab Republic |
1 |
Türkiye |
1 |
Albania |
0.954 |
Senegal |
0.863 |
Georgia |
0.848 |
China |
0.846 |
Tanzania |
0.816 |
Benin |
0.764 |
Nigeria |
0.703 |
Venezuela |
0.646 |
Bahrain |
0.483 |
Iran |
0.409 |
Tunisia |
0.406 |
Bulgaria |
0.331 |
United Arab Emirates |
0.315 |
Kenya |
0.313 |
United Kingdom |
0.308 |
Oman |
0.291 |
Egypt |
0.256 |
Pakistan |
0.239 |
Colombia |
0.220 |
Note: A high score on the GTRIC index means there is a greater likelihood the economy is a source of counterfeit goods.
Source: OECD-EUIPO calculations.
Figure 3.2 shows the main country pairs of provenance and destination for counterfeit clothing products. It indicates that, in terms of seized value, the flows of counterfeit textile products are dominated by exports from Türkiye to European countries, such as France and Bulgaria, as well as exports from China to European countries.
Figure 3.2. Top provenance-destination economies for clothing, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.2. Top provenance-destination economies for clothing, 2020-21In terms of share of seized value

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
3.1.2. Conveyance methods
As shown in Figure 3.3, postal services (48%) and express courier (23%) are the most commonly used means of transport for delivering counterfeit clothing products. They are followed by road transport (15%), whose use has increased in recent years. Road transport is widely used for shipments originating from Türkiye to European countries and for intra-European flows.
Figure 3.3. Conveyance methods for trade in counterfeit clothing products, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.3. Conveyance methods for trade in counterfeit clothing products, 2020-21In terms of number of customs seizures

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
3.2. Footwear sector (HS code 64)
Copy link to 3.2. Footwear sector (HS code 64)3.2.1. Trade routes
This product category has a broad range of counterfeit items, including luxury shoes to the latest trendy sneakers or sandals. There are also numerous brands whose IP rights are violated. As with the clothing category, the trade in counterfeit footwear reflects ever-changing consumer tastes and preferences.
During 2020-21, trade in counterfeit shoes was dominated by exports from China, Türkiye, and Hong Kong (China). Nearly 83% of the seized counterfeit shoes originated in these three countries. In terms of value of the seized goods, the share of the three countries amounted to 94%. Figure 3.4 lists the main source economies. It illustrates the emergence of Colombia as a supplier of counterfeit footwear, a development which should be monitored to determine whether it represents a structural shift in suppliers.
Figure 3.4. Top provenance economies for trade in counterfeit footwear, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.4. Top provenance economies for trade in counterfeit footwear, 2020-21
Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
Figure 3.5, which shows the main provenance-destination pairs for trade in counterfeit footwear, indicates that a quarter of the seized value of counterfeit shoes flowed from China to the United States. The share of flows from China or Hong Kong (China) to European countries was also significant.
Figure 3.5. Top provenance-destination couples for the trade in fake footwear, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.5. Top provenance-destination couples for the trade in fake footwear, 2020-21In terms of share of seized value

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
3.2.2. Conveyance methods
The trade in counterfeit footwear is characterised by the extensive use of postal services for the delivery of goods to destination countries. Some 70% of seized counterfeit footwear was transported through this channel (Figure 3.6). Seizure data also indicate that these goods were almost exclusively shipped in small parcels, as 90% of the seizures contained fewer than ten items, and more than 67% contained only one item.
Figure 3.6. Conveyance methods for the trade in counterfeit footwear, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.6. Conveyance methods for the trade in counterfeit footwear, 2020-21In terms of share of global customs seizures

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
3.3. Cosmetics sector (HS code 33)
Copy link to 3.3. Cosmetics sector (HS code 33)The trade in counterfeit cosmetic products is extensive and encompasses many products. This category includes perfumes, creams, personal hygiene products, makeup, toothpaste and baby care products. The counterfeits, substandard, can pose a significant threat to consumer health.
3.3.1. Trade routes
Türkiye and China were the two main provenance economies for counterfeit cosmetics in 2020-21, accounting for 92% of the number of seizures in this category. Figure 3.7, which shows the main countries of origin for the trade in counterfeit cosmetic products, indicates that in terms of seized value, China and Brazil were the most significant suppliers of the counterfeits. The situation in Brazil reflects two significant seizures of nearly 30 000 and 10 000 cosmetic products originating from this country. Customs data do not provide further information regarding the destination and transport modes used for these two large seizures.
Figure 3.7. Top provenance economies for the trade in counterfeit cosmetic goods, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.7. Top provenance economies for the trade in counterfeit cosmetic goods, 2020-21
Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
The flows from China to European countries dominate the trade in counterfeit cosmetics in terms of seized value. Figure 3.8 also reveals some unusual flows, such as those from China to Morocco, as well as an intra-African flow from Mozambique to Swaziland.
Figure 3.8. Top provenance-destination pairs for the trade in counterfeit cosmetic products, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.8. Top provenance-destination pairs for the trade in counterfeit cosmetic products, 2020-21In terms of share of seized value

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
3.3.2. Conveyance methods
During 2020 and 2021, the preferred mode of transport for counterfeit cosmetics was by road, which accounted for nearly 60% of customs seizures of the products. The average size of parcels containing counterfeit cosmetics was relatively large, with nearly half of these parcels containing more than ten items.
Figure 3.9. Transport mode for the trade in counterfeit cosmetic products, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.9. Transport mode for the trade in counterfeit cosmetic products, 2020-21In terms of share of global customs seizures

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
3.4. Trade in counterfeit electronics (HS code 85)
Copy link to 3.4. Trade in counterfeit electronics (HS code 85)The most frequently seized counterfeit products are highly diverse and include phones and related accessories such as screens, chargers, back covers, but also TV or game controllers, batteries or cookers and hairstyling irons.
3.4.1. Trade routes
In 2020-21, China and Hong Kong (China) were the main provenance economies for counterfeit electronics goods seized and traded globally, representing 93% of global customs seizures of this category (Figure 3.10). Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, the third and fourth largest provenance countries, played relatively small roles.
Figure 3.10. Top provenance economies for trade in counterfeit electronics, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.10. Top provenance economies for trade in counterfeit electronics, 2020-21
Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
Figure 3.11, which shows the main provenance-destination pairs in the trade of counterfeit electronic products, indicates that a quarter of the seized value of these products was destined for Germany from China.
The United States was also a major destination for counterfeit electronic products, with 22% of the seized value of these goods from China destined for the United States, and 17% coming from Hong Kong (China).
Figure 3.11. Top provenance-destination pairs for trade in counterfeit electronics, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.11. Top provenance-destination pairs for trade in counterfeit electronics, 2020-21In terms of share of seized value

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures
3.4.2. Conveyance methods
During 2020 and 2021, counterfeit electronic products were primarily transported via postal services, with standard mail accounting for more than half of the seizures in this category and express courier representing 21%.
Figure 3.12. Conveyance method for trade in counterfeit electronics, 2020-21
Copy link to Figure 3.12. Conveyance method for trade in counterfeit electronics, 2020-21In terms of the number of customs seizures

Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.