Mapping Global Trade in Fakes 2025

The global dataset on customs seizures reveals that China and Hong Kong (China) were the primary sources of counterfeit goods during 2020-2021 (Figure 2.1). This continues the pattern observed before the COVID-19 pandemic.

Interviews with industry and enforcement experts reveal that trade routes for counterfeit goods are evolving. They noted, for instance, that smuggling activity along the Danube River is increasing. This is due in part to the river’s status as an international waterway, which is conducive to less restricted movement across borders.

Shifts in trade routes for counterfeit goods can be attributed to several factors. First, during the COVID-19 pandemic, border closures prompted criminal networks to explore alternative transport methods, some of which proved effective and therefore continue to be utilised. Additionally, current geopolitical tensions, such as the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, have disrupted traditional trade routes. Finally, in some cases, enforcement agencies have redirected their focus to higher-priority areas, allowing illicit traders to exploit the less-monitored channels.

Interviews with enforcement and industry experts have highlighted an increasing “localisation” of production, a practice that, while existing previously, has only recently been identified as a growing phenomenon. Localisation refers to the manufacturing of counterfeit goods close to, or even within, destination markets. These counterfeit goods are often assembled from imported subcomponents or raw materials and are packaged and labelled with logos to mirror authentic products.

Interviewed enforcement and industry experts highlight that localisation presents added challenges for counterfeit goods suppliers, as it requires establishing production facilities; these are frequently set up in some free trade zones that offer reduced oversight. This approach enables counterfeiters to circumvent detection by creating facilities closer to end markets, while capitalising on the flexibility that free trade zones offer.

Several tactics are employed by counterfeiters to help reduce the risk of detection for activities associated with localisation. One tactic involves shipping packaging materials separately from an item, which would result in only a fraction of the fake shipment being vulnerable to seizure. Additionally, components that may infringe on intellectual property rights, such as trademarks, designs or patents, are less likely to attract scrutiny if they are shipped unassembled and unbranded.

The trend towards localisation significantly changes the traditional characteristics of counterfeiting, creating new challenges for enforcement authorities. Moreover, enforcement agencies are increasingly prioritising their attention on counterfeits that pose health, safety, or environmental risks, thus lowering the focus on other locally produced counterfeit goods. Localisation allows counterfeiters to exploit this enforcement gap, particularly for items perceived as less harmful.

Seizure data corroborate the localisation trend, with a notable share (20%) of all seizures involving packaging materials, labels, and other authentication components, such as holograms or QR codes.

China remains the dominant source of counterfeit goods, accounting for 45% of all reported seizures. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, China and Hong Kong (China), continued to be the leading provenance economies for seized counterfeit goods in 2020 and 2021. Respectively 47% and 27% of the total value of seized goods originated from these two economies. In addition to China and Hong Kong (China), other regions contributing to the trade in counterfeit goods include other Asian countries, Gulf countries, and certain Latin American countries. A large number of geographically dispersed countries are thus involved in global counterfeit trade, albeit to different extents.

An interesting shift is observed with respect to Türkiye’s place in counterfeit trade’s statistics. Previously, Türkiye held a higher position on the list of provenance economies. Recent data indicate, however, a decline in the country’s share in the total value of seized counterfeit goods in 2021 compared to 2020. In contrast, the shares of China and Hong Kong (China), in the total value of seized counterfeits increased over the same period.

Türkiye’s prominence in the provenance economies for seized counterfeit goods can be attributed to some extent to its strategic geographical location and modern logistical infrastructure, which make it favoured ground for transit counterfeiting goods. In this context, Turkish customs data offers valuable insights, showing that 21% of all seizures carried out by Turkish customs authorities in 2023 were related to import procedures, while 19% and 26% involved transit and warehouse operations respectively.

A separate analysis examines the relative propensities of economies to export counterfeit goods. Unlike assessments of absolute volumes, that analysis considers the estimated share of counterfeit goods within trade flows, providing insights into the relative prevalence of fakes rather than their total export values.

The relative propensity to export counterfeit goods is measured by the GTRIC-e score, a nuanced indicator that requires some interpretation. Broadly, economies with a high GTRIC-e score are those that either report substantial absolute values of counterfeit and pirated products or demonstrate a high proportion of counterfeit goods within their exports. Further information on this index is available in Annex A2.

Table 2.1 ranks the top provenance economies, based on their propensity to export counterfeit products, for the period 2020-2021. Notably, Hong Kong, Türkiye and Lebanon lead this ranking. Syria’s presence on the list is of particular interest, considering the ongoing armed conflict within its borders and the associated tendency to obscure shipping documents and facilitate trade in illicit goods.

This observation is consistent with findings from an earlier OECD report (OECD, 2022[8]), which observed that armed conflicts can create fertile ground for illicit trade. In conflict-affected regions, weak or absent governance frameworks provide opportunities for illicit actors to operate with minimal oversight. The 2018 report concluded that profits from illicit trade can act as a strong incentive to prolong conflicts. The inclusion of Syria in the current rankings supports this hypothesis, underscoring how conflict conditions can exacerbate and sustain illicit trade activities.

The range of industries affected by counterfeiting is extensive, spanning approximately 50 distinct product categories reported in global seizure data. Virtually any product protected by intellectual property (IP) rights is vulnerable to counterfeiting. As one enforcement officer remarked during interviews, “nothing can surprise me,” highlighting the pervasive reach of counterfeit operations.

Distribution of seizures, however, tends to be concentrated within a more limited set of product categories (Figure 2.3). These categories are typically associated with high profits and are more readily detectable and seizable by enforcement agencies.

In 2020-2021, ready-to-wear items remained the most frequently seized counterfeit goods, with clothing and footwear representing the highest shares in this category. Clothing accounted for 21.6% of total seizures, while footwear represented 21.4%. These categories were followed by leather goods and electronics, consistent with prior data from 2017-2019, where these four industries were already the primary targets of counterfeiters.

In terms of the value of seized goods, counterfeit watches and footwear led, representing 23% and 15% of the total seized value globally, respectively. During the 2017-19 period, watches (25%) and articles of leather (17%) accounted for the highest share of global seized value. These findings underscore the sustained focus of counterfeiters on high-value, high-demand goods across a relatively narrow selection of product categories.

The comparison between 2020 and 2021, as illustrated in Figure 2.4, presents the breakdown of seizures by year and product category. In both years, footwear, clothing, and leather goods were the most frequently seized items, indicating that these product categories experienced sustained vulnerability to counterfeiting.

Notable differences in the share of seized values occurred during 2020 and 2021. For instance, the share of seized value for watches declined, while the values of seized electronics, toys and games, and machinery increased in 2021. However, these fluctuations are not believed to indicate a lasting trend but are rather temporary variations. Such changes reflect shifts in enforcement focus or, in some cases, the success of large seizures within specific product categories.

Further analysis examines the relative propensity for counterfeiting, providing a nuanced view that considers both the total volume of counterfeit goods and the estimated share of counterfeit goods in the overall trade volume for each category. The index, shown in Table 2.2, reveals that in 2020–2021, the industries most vulnerable to counterfeiting included footwear, clothing, leather items, and tobacco. This is evidenced by high GTRIC-p scores in these categories, which signify either high absolute values of counterfeit and pirated products or a high proportion of counterfeits within these sectors.

A concerning aspect of counterfeit goods is their potential to be dangerous. Lacking any form of safety testing, these products can pose a wide range of health, safety, and environmental risks. Additionally, as no responsible company oversees these goods, accountability is absent when incidents occur.

Many counterfeits can present significant health and safety hazards, particularly in categories such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, food, and toys. These high-risk products are consistently prominent in seizure data, with counterfeit spare parts serving as another significant example (Box 2.1). Interviews with enforcement authorities reveal that products with serious health risks, including counterfeit cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, are specifically targeted by enforcement agencies tasked with safeguarding public welfare.

Furthermore, experts interviewed emphasise that counterfeiters are highly responsive to market trends, swiftly producing fakes of the products most in demand, using popular online platforms and services to reach consumers. This includes tactics such as embedding links to counterfeit offerings in pop-up advertisements, thereby increasing their reach.

In conclusion, it is essential to exercise caution when interpreting seizure data, as these results can be influenced by biases arising from the evolving nature of counterfeiting and shifting enforcement priorities. As previously noted, enforcement efforts are increasingly directed toward counterfeits that present health, safety, or environmental risks. For counterfeiters, this has heightened the appeal of “localising” assembly of counterfeits, and shipping packaging and labels separately from other inputs. This “localisation” of assembly may result in an underrepresentation of certain counterfeit goods, such as fertilizers, cosmetics, toys, foodstuffs, and medicines, in seizure data, despite their prevalence in the counterfeit market.

According to a customs official interviewed for this study, another potential source of bias stems from the proactive role of large corporations in supporting enforcement through additional resources and information. While this assistance has strengthened enforcement against counterfeits that infringe on these companies’ intellectual property, it may inadvertently contribute to a reduced effectiveness in detecting counterfeit goods that infringe the intellectual property rights of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Further analysis is needed to better understand the extent of this phenomenon and its impact on enforcement outcomes.

Illicit trade in counterfeit goods increasingly takes advantage of modern logistical and technological advances; legitimate trade flows are penetrated, reducing the reliance on covert smuggling. This shift is partly enabled by the relatively low priority placed on intellectual property infringing goods by enforcement agencies, which are often overwhelmed by numerous competing priorities and lack the resources to address IP infringement adequately.

In 2020-21, postal services were the primary channel for transporting counterfeit goods, with almost 60% of seized items arriving by mail (Figure 2.5). This was followed by express courier services and air cargo, which accounted for 17% and 13% of global customs seizures, respectively. The reliance on postal services highlights the adaptability of counterfeiters in leveraging conventional shipping methods to distribute illicit goods widely and inconspicuously.

It is also noteworthy that the share of the value of seized goods shipped by mail is limited (18%) and equivalent to that of counterfeit goods seized and transported by sea, while maritime transport represented only 2% of number of customs seizures. This clearly highlights the challenge posed by the shipment of counterfeit goods in small postal packages, which represent a massive volume but have a negligible value compared to other modes of transport.

An increase in road transport in illicit trade of counterfeit goods has been observed in 2020-21, both in terms of global customs seizures and the overall value of seized goods. Road shipments accounted for only 4% of global seized value in 2017-19 but rose to 18% in 2020-21. Conversely, sea shipments saw a marked decline, with the share of seized value dropping from 53% in 2017-19 to 18% in 2020-21. This shift in shipping methods, as reported by customs officers, would indicate evolving strategies by counterfeiters to bypass maritime routes and exploit other transport modes.

Counterfeit goods transported by road were primarily destined for European Union countries, and the United States. This increase underscores the need for heightened vigilance and stronger cross-border collaboration to address the spread of counterfeit goods entering these regions through road networks.

The rise in road-based shipments poses a significant challenge for customs officials, who often lack pre-shipment data and must make immediate decisions on whether to inspect or seize goods. The absence of pre-emptive information hinders effective enforcement, adding complexity to the task of detecting counterfeit goods in real time and diminishing the efficiency of seizure efforts.

The term de minimis refers to a threshold value below which shipments are exempt from import duties. This threshold was introduced to simplify customs procedures and alleviate the administrative burden on enforcement and private individuals importing gifts or small items. While the de minimis threshold primarily applies to import duties, it is also customary for shipments under this threshold to be subject to streamlined procedures, receiving limited scrutiny from enforcement agencies. This approach aims to facilitate trade and reduce processing time for low-value goods.

A significant factor in the use of postal shipments is the small parcel format, which is often treated as de minimis trade that does not warrant close inspection. Moreover, these small parcels are particularly challenging for enforcement authorities to screen and detect, as limited data is often provided on invoices. As noted earlier, descriptions of contents are frequently vague, with terms like “stuff” offering little insight and further complicating detection efforts.

The popularity of small parcels has grown notably since the COVID-19 pandemic, reflecting the rise in online marketplace purchases. Small parcels are shipped not only via mail and express services but also by air cargo and, in some instances, maritime containers, further underscoring their importance in counterfeit trade (Figure 2.5). This development presents substantial screening challenges for customs, as air cargo facilities and ports are generally ill-equipped to handle the inspection of small parcels packed within larger cargo containers.

Most shipments containing counterfeit goods are transported in small parcels, resulting in each parcel containing only a limited number of fake items. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, the size of seized shipments has generally decreased, with shipments containing fewer than ten items accounting for 79% of all seizures in 2020-21, up from 61% in 2017-19. This trend reflects the shift toward smaller, more fragmented shipments as a method to evade detection.

Small shipments, those with fewer than ten items, have been the most prevalent form of counterfeit conveyance in recent years. This pattern intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, as the boom in e-commerce prompted a shift in consumer behaviour toward online purchasing.

Global seizure data for counterfeit goods provide insights into several key phenomena, including: (1) the propensity of certain countries to export counterfeit goods, (2) the vulnerability of specific industries to counterfeit infiltration, and (3) the estimated total value of global trade in counterfeit products.

The first two points—countries’ propensity to export counterfeit goods and industry vulnerability—were discussed in previous sections. This section focuses on the third point: the total value of trade in counterfeit goods.

To estimate the total value of counterfeit trade, two significant methodological assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that countries’ propensities to export counterfeit goods and industries’ susceptibilities to counterfeiting are relatively stable and do not vary based on the destination market.

This assumption addresses the issue of incomplete data in certain importing countries, particularly those that do not enforce IP rights at their borders. A lack of IP enforcement could suggest that such countries receive counterfeit goods at higher rates, as they offer a safer environment for counterfeiters with lower risk of detection and higher profit potential.

Given this lack of enforcement at some borders, it is important to consider that the resulting estimates may be downward-biased. In reality, trade flows might contain even higher volumes of counterfeit goods than the estimates suggest, particularly in markets with low IP enforcement.

The second assumption involves a “fixed point”—the consistent proportion of counterfeit goods typically found within certain high-risk categories, originating from known counterfeit-exporting countries.

For this analysis, the fixed point is based on footwear imports from China. According to interviews with enforcement officials, approximately 27% of footwear shipments from China are counterfeit, which serves as a benchmark for this estimation model.

These two assumptions were used to calibrate an econometric model to estimate the total value of counterfeit trade, employing the same methodology as in previous studies. The details of the methodology are provided in the annex.

The resulting findings are of concern. In 2021, the global trade in counterfeit goods was valued at approximately USD 467 billion, accounting for 2.3% of total global imports (Figure 2.7). This absolute value represents an increase from 2019, when counterfeit trade was estimated at USD 464 billion; however, its relative share slightly decreased, as counterfeit trade represented 2.5% of world trade in 2019. For the European Union, the value of counterfeit goods trade was estimated at USD 117 billion, representing 4.7% of total EU imports. This represents a decrease both in absolute value and relative terms compared to 2019. All the details of the analysis of counterfeit trade in the European Union can be found in Chapter 4. The COVID-19 pandemic impacted counterfeit trade, with 2020 figures showing a decline to just under USD 320 billion, representing 2% of global trade. By 2021, counterfeit trade had rebounded, reflecting both an increase in absolute value and a relative stabilisation within global trade flows.