3. Updating the Codes of Ethics for Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and Members of the House of Representatives in Malta

The government of Malta could include all relevant key terms and definitions in the new Codes of Ethics

In Malta, the integrity framework for elected and appointed officials consists of different mechanisms, including the Standards Act and the Codes of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives and for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, the Constitution, relevant Standing Orders, and if approved, the Regulation of Lobbying Act. As a first step to strengthen clarity around these standards, Chapters 2 and 5 recommend to include definitions on ‘abuse of power and privileges’, ‘gift’, ‘benefit’, ‘hospitality’, ‘undue influence’ and ‘misconduct’ in the Standards Act, and ‘lobbying’ and ‘lobbyists’ in the Lobbying Act.

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Codes of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives and for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries include some additional key integrity definitions. The first Code contains definitions including on the terms ‘family members’, ‘conflict of interest’ and ‘personal interest’. The latter Code contains definitions including on the terms ‘conflict of interest’ and ‘personal interest’.

To further provide clarity and facilitate the application of integrity standards by MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, the government of Malta could also include the following definitions in the new codes: ‘abuse of power and privileges’, ‘gift’, ‘benefit’, ‘hospitality’, ‘undue influence’ and ‘misconduct’ ‘lobbying’ and ‘lobbyists. Collecting the key definitions laid out in the different integrity mechanisms in one place may strengthen awareness and understanding of the conduct expected by MPs and Ministers, facilitating their implementation in everyday activities.

The government of Malta could include key values in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives, by means of a participatory process with key stakeholders

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives include a set of nine values to guide the behaviour, actions and decisions of MPs. These nine values – i.e. sense of service, integrity, diligence, objectivity, accountability, transparency, honesty, justice and respect, and leadership – are accompanied by a short definition aiming at ensuring values are interpreted in the same way by all stakeholders. Including a set of values and providing common definitions, align with good practice that recognise the need for clear values to safeguard integrity in public service. However, the number of values proposed by the Commissioner surpass the average number recommended by cognitive science. Indeed, evidence suggests that the number of items humans can store in their working memory is limited, so a memorable set of values or key principles ideally has no more than seven elements (Miller, 1955[10]). To that end, when developing the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives, the government of Malta could reduce the number of values to make them more memorable and facilitate application in daily situations. Box ‎3.2 gives the example of Australia, where the Public Service Values were reduced from fifteen rules to five values to make them more memorable for public officials.

Additionally, values and standards of conduct should ideally be defined through a participative process to ensure that the result is both meaningful and actionable for those who are expected to follow them (OECD, 2018[9]). Indeed, to achieve a greater impact, the values and the language used in a code of ethics need to be able to activate and remind the user of their own moral reference point, to create a sense of belonging and facilitate their implementation (OECD, 2018[9]). To that end, the government of Malta could consider involving key stakeholders in the process of identifying and defining the values for the Members of the House of Representatives to create ownership, align expectations and ensure a common understanding of values that will guide MPs conduct. Similar processes have been carried out in other countries, which could be used as examples for Malta to conduct their own participatory process for the identification of MPs’ integrity standards (see Box ‎3.3).

While values should be identified and defined by the group to whom they apply, the government of Malta could consider the following comments on some of the existing definitions of the values included in the revisions proposed by the Commissioner:

• ‘Sense of service’ is defined as “Members shall be motivated by a sense of service to the community in general and the common good. Members shall not be motivated by a spirit of gain for themselves, their families, their friends, or persons close to them”. However, in the case of MPs, the community in general and the common good may be terms difficult to reconcile with the fact that MPs’ sense of service may consist of serving the needs of their constituents. This definition could be strengthened by replacing “the community in general and the common good” by “the public interest”.

• ‘Diligence’ is defined as “Ministers shall familiarise themselves with the duties, obligations and powers which arise from the position entrusted to them, with the Standing Orders and other rules on the basis of which Parliament functions, with the rules and procedures governing their work, and with the provisions of this Code and any applicable guidelines and recommendations issued by the Commissioner”. However, diligence is not only about knowing the rules but also about implementing them on a daily basis while in duties and outside. This definition could strengthen the point and express the importance not only of understanding and knowing the standards but also, and more importantly, of implementing them.

• ‘Leadership’ is defined as “Members shall embrace and be inspired by these values in order to lead by example”. However, in addition to leading by example, ethical leaders may also be responsive, credible and trustworthy to integrity ideas, questions and concerns brought forward by their employees, thus encouraging an open organisational culture and a sense of voice, community and belonging amongst the Parliament’s staff. This definition could strengthen this point and express the necessity not only of leading by example but also of encouraging an open organisation.

Finally, to further support day-to-day decision making, it is also useful to provide concrete guidance on how values can be translated in public officials’ daily activities (OECD, 2018[3]). Indeed, including practical examples in the code of ethics or complementary guidelines may help specify the generally formulated values and may serve as a practical tool for reaching ethical and lawful decisions under more specific circumstances. To help MPs better understand how public values are applied in their daily choices and actions, the Commissioner could complement the values laid out in the Code of Ethics for the Members of the House of Representatives by including examples of more concrete expected behaviours in an accompanying handbook.5 Examples from the public sector could serve as inspiration: for example, the Australian Public Service Commissioner’s Directions 2022 set out requirements for upholding each value, the Code of Conduct of the Employment and Social Development Department in Canada provides a good example of this approach, by presenting the definition of each value in juxtaposition to expected behaviours, while the Commentary on the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants in the Slovak Republic provides further information on how to read and interpret the rules contained in such Code, by means of examples that illustrate how to deal with situations that civil servants may encounter in practice while carrying out their duties (see Box ‎3.4).

The government of Malta could include key values in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, by means of a participatory process with key stakeholders

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries mirror the proposals in the current Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, with the following values recommended: sense of service, integrity, diligence, objectivity, accountability, transparency, honesty, justice and respect, and leadership. However, the definitions that accompany the set of values have been adjusted to avoid misinterpretation and further detail how these values translate into Ministers’ every day activities.

Regarding the number of values, again considering that a set of maximum seven principles is most suitable to achieve remembrance and meaning, the government of Malta could identify through a participatory process seven or less values for Ministers to make them more memorable and meaningful. Several OECD countries (including Denmark, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) have defined seven or less values with the aim of ensuring they are more easily applicable by public officials in their day-to-day activities and decision making (see Box ‎3.5).

Additionally, as noted above, the values and standards of conduct should ideally be defined through a participatory process with key stakeholders in order to ensure that they are both meaningful and actionable. To that end, the government of Malta could involve key stakeholders in the process of reducing the number of values for Ministers. As part of this process, key stakeholders could also be invited to build a common understanding of the values by working together in a new definition of those selected to remain in the Code of Ethics. Such definitions could be tailored to the specific challenges of Ministers and clarify, in a few words, what each value means for Ministers.

Finally, as in the case of the Code of Ethics for MPs, in order to further support day-to-day decision making, the Commissioner could elaborate concrete examples in the form of a Handbook to help Ministers to better understand how public values translate into their daily choices and actions, and how they are expected to act under more specific circumstances.6

The government of Malta could include clear provisions on the proper use of information in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives introduces a section (Section 6 on Provision and use of information) that guides MPs in properly using information they receive in the course of their duties. These suggested provisions clarify that MPs are expected not to knowingly mislead or provide inaccurate information to the House of Representatives, and that information received in confidence in the course of their duties shall be used only in connection with those duties and never for personal gain or for the benefit of an individual, group or community close to them. In preparing the new Code of Ethics, the government of Malta could include a provision based on section 6.1 of the Commissioner’s proposals, which states that “Members shall be truthful and transparent with Parliament and the public, and shall only withhold information when its disclosure would be prejudicial to the national interest. Members should correct immediately any incorrect information given”.

The government of Malta could also include an updated version of the Commissioner’s proposal in section 6.2, as currently the concept “for the benefit of an individual, group or community close to them” is ambiguous and leaves room for potential loopholes as what is interpreted as “close to them”. To address this ambiguity, the government of Malta could include a revised provision that states “Information received in confidence in the course of a Members’ duties shall be used only in connection with those duties and never for personal gain or to advantage or disadvantage any person or persons”.

Moreover, the Commissioner’s proposed revisions do not include specific provisions on improper use of information after leaving office. Although section 6.2 indicates that MPs shall “never” use confidential information for personal gain or in the benefit of selected individual(s) or group(s), considering current integrity risks and the particularities of the Maltese context, MPs would benefit from a clearer provision on this matter. To that end, the government of Malta could include an additional provision stating that “Members shall not disclose and make use of confidential information even after leaving office”.

The government of Malta could include provisions on the interactions between MPs and third parties/lobbyists in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives includes limited provisions on engaging with lobbyists or third parties who are attempting to influence policy making: Currently, section 5.1 includes a provision to protect MPs from improper influence, threats or undue pressure in the course of their duties, section 5.2 prohibits MPs from acting as lobbyists whether paid or otherwise, and section 9 lays out specific provisions on the acceptance, bestowing and registration of gifts, benefits and hospitality – which is further detailed on the additional guidelines.7 However, other relevant standards are missing to help MPs engage with lobbyists and third parties aiming at influencing them.

To address these gaps, the government of Malta could add a specific section on engaging with lobbyists and third parties in the new Code. The provision could set out the following: “Lobbying is a legitimate activity as long as it is carried out with transparency and integrity. Lobbying is a natural and beneficial part of the democratic process, as it allows different interest groups to inform public policy and decision making, but risks emerge when activities take place without due regard for transparency or integrity.” As lobbying is currently perceived negatively in Malta, including this explanation could help socialise the concept and encourage registration by both public officials and lobbyists in the corresponding registers.

The government of Malta could also include provisions on how Members are expected to engage with lobbyists/third parties, covering the main risk areas of interaction and communication between public officials and lobbyists/third parties. The provisions could state the following:

• Members shall treat lobbyists and third parties equally by granting them fair and equitable access.

• Members shall check that the lobbyist or third party is registered or intends to register in the Register for Lobbyists within the specified deadlines, and report violations to the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life.

• Members shall record all relevant communications (including meetings) with lobbyists/third parties in the Transparency Register. Providing an adequate degree of transparency on the actors who are influencing government policies or engaging in lobbying is a key element to ensure that public officials, citizens and businesses can obtain sufficient information for the public scrutiny of the public decision-making process.

Box ‎3.7 highlights good practice from Spain in this regard.

Moreover, to support MPs in assessing the reliability of information they receive from lobbyists, the government of Malta could also include a provision reminding MPs that while lobbying is legitimate, there is a risk that lobbyists and/or third parties may abuse this legitimate process by providing unreliable or inaccurate information. For example, lobbyists and/or third parties may highlight selective findings of scientific studies, dismissing any doubts or criticisms in these studies. Likewise, they may support and promote studies that challenge scientific arguments unfavourable to their interests, or highlight the results of studies financed by their own spheres of influence (such as think tanks or industry studies). MPs may not be aware that this input is biased, or may not have the time to assess the credibility of sources (OECD, 2021[4]). In some countries, like the Netherlands, provisions are included in the Code of Conduct to remind public officials of indirect ways in which they may be influenced by special interest groups (see Box ‎3.8).

To further guide MPs in their interactions with lobbyists and third parties, the Commissioner could consider strengthening the additional guidelines for MPs by adding a specific section on engaging with lobbyists and third parties, as is done in the additional guidelines for Ministers. This section could provide additional information and details on the provisions included and to be included in the Code of Ethics on engaging with lobbyists and third parties. For instance, the guidelines could provide information on registering relevant communications in the Transparency Register, by including key concepts such as relevant communication and relevant matter, and the timeframes to do so, based on the final provisions of the Regulation of Lobbying Act. Guidance could also be included on how to assess the reliability of information received from lobbyists/third parties, with examples highlighting the different means lobbyists/third parties could use to provide unreliable or inaccurate information.8

The government of Malta could include provisions on the interactions between Ministers and third parties/lobbyists in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries introduce several provisions on the interactions with lobbyists and third parties, specifically in the sections on “Gifts”, “Retention of official records” and “Attempts at undue influence”. The government of Malta could consider including these provisions in the new Code of Ethics, as they are aligned with international good practice (see Box ‎3.9):

• Ministers are expected not to accept any gift, benefit or hospitality for themselves, members of their families, or any other persons or bodies, if such gift could close them under an inappropriate obligation or compromise their judgement – which is further detailed on the additional guidelines.9

• Ministers are required to avoid associating with individuals who could place them under any obligation or inappropriate influence in the performance of their duties.

• Ministers are required to record all attempts at lobbying in a Transparency Register, and to keep minutes of meetings and communications with lobbyists.

• Ministers are required to hold meetings with persons who have an interest in obtaining permits, authorisations, concessions and other benefits from the state in an official setting in the presence of officials, unless this is impractical on account of justifiable circumstances.

• Ministers are required not to conduct official business through unofficial email accounts.

• Ministers are required to immediately report to the Prime Minister and to the competent authorities any attempt by third parties to influence their conduct as Ministers by means of corruption, pressure or undue influence.

However, the government of Malta could also include a separate section on engaging with lobbyists and third parties. The provision could set out that “lobbying is a legitimate activity as long as it is carried out with transparency and integrity. It is a natural and beneficial part of the democratic process, as it allows different interest groups to inform public policy and decision making, but risks emerge when activities take place without due regard for transparency or integrity.”

The government of Malta could also include provisions that set out how Ministers are expected to engage with lobbyists/third parties. The provisions could specify that:

• Ministers shall treat lobbyists and third parties equally by granting them fair and equitable access.

• Ministers shall check that the lobbyist or third party is registered or intends to register in the Register for Lobbyists within the specified deadlines, and report violations to the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life.

The government of Malta could also include a provision detailing the risk that lobbyists and/or third parties may abuse the lobbying process by providing unreliable or inaccurate information, and requiring Ministers to ensure that information provided by lobbyists/third parties is accurate. Finally, the existing provisions on registration in a Transparency Register, currently under “Attempts at undue influence”, and the provisions on open meeting places and use of official email accounts, currently under “Retention of Official records”, could be included under this new section.

Regarding the additional guidelines, the current proposal includes some provisions on engaging with lobbyists or third parties – i.e. Part 1 on Lobbying and the Transparency Register, and Part 2 on receiving and bestowing gifts, benefits and hospitality. However, the Commissioner could clarify the information included in Part 1 of the additional guidelines in order to ensure coherence with the final Regulation of Lobbying Act. Indeed, the OECD recommended the Commissioner some changes in the proposed framework, including on the definition of “relevant communication” – to include indirect forms of lobbying – and on the definition of “relevant matter” (OECD, 2022[26]). If adopted, such changes should be reflected in the additional guidelines for Ministers to ensure coherence with the Lobbying regulation. Additionally, to further guide Ministers in their interactions with lobbyists and third parties, the Commissioner could consider strengthening the additional guidelines for Ministers by including in Part 1 more detailed information on the assessment of the reliability of information received from lobbyists/third parties – including examples to create awareness about the different means lobbyists/third parties may use to provide unreliable or inaccurate information.

The government of Malta could include a comprehensive framework on managing and preventing conflicts of interest in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives introduce a new definition on conflict of interest to guide MPs in identifying, registering, and disclosing conflict-of-interest situations. The definition considers conflict of interest as arising “…where a personal interest may influence the independent performance of the duties and responsibilities of the members. Personal interests include, but are not limited to, any potential benefit or advantage to the members themselves or their family members. A conflict of interest does not exist where members are only concerned as a member of the general public or of a broad class of persons” (Commissioner for Standards in Public Life, 2020[5]). Additionally, the proposed revisions require MPs to declare any conflict “at the first opportunity before a vote is taken”.

The accompanying guidelines provide further guidance on this provision, noting that the conflict-of-interest provisions apply from the first time the House sits after the Member is elected to almost every aspects of the Member’s parliamentary duties. Throughout this period, MPs are required to declare any private interests (i) in the Chamber and in committees; (ii) when tabling any written notice; and (iii) when approaching others.

The guidelines also clarify that the declaration of interests is broader than the registration of interests, covering financial and non-financial interests that do not require registration but meet the “test of relevance”. The “test of relevance” is defined as “whether those interests might influence, or reasonably be perceived by others to influence, their actions or words as members”.

To strengthen the framework on managing conflict of interest in the Code of Ethics, the government of Malta could include additional provisions in the new Code of Ethics. First, the government of Malta could include a new section on incompatibilities in the Code, setting out positions and activities that are incompatible with the role of MPs. Currently, the proposed revisions to the Code contains only one provision on incompatibilities: section 5.2 notes that “Members shall not act as lobbyists, whether paid or otherwise.” While this is a key incompatibility, good practice in OECD countries suggests including a list of incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities in regulation. Such incompatibilities can cover not only lobbying, but secondary employment and voluntary activities, of both the public official and (where necessary) family members.

The current system in Malta, where MPs are engaged in a part-time capacity, presents particular challenges for determining an appropriate range of incompatibilities between public and private activities. Nevertheless, it is possible to adopt a risk-based approach and set clear guidance for MPs on what is acceptable and what is not when balancing their public duties with their private activities. To that end, the government of Malta could include additional incompatibilities, such as:

• Preventing MPs from holding secondary employment in government departments, boards and commissions. As noted in OECD (2022[28]), MPs play a critical accountability role over the actions of the executive. It is their duty to hold the executive accountable for how public monies are spent and public policies determined. The practice of placing elected officials in the executive therefore fundamentally undermines the accountability role of parliament. To that end, the government of Malta could consider amendments to the Constitution so as to prohibit elected officials from obtaining secondary employment in all public functions. A provision could be included in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives to reflect this.

• Preventing MPs from participating in their “private capacity” in any role that would conflict with their duties as a public official. Given the different professions MPs hold, there may be situations where their private employment will conflict with their role as a public official. In such cases, the government of Malta could include in the new Code a clear provision prohibiting MPs from participating in their ‘private capacity’ in any role or any file/project/issue that would conflict with their duties as a Member of Parliament.

Other incompatibilities that could be included are preventing MPs (i) from entering into a contract or employment relationship with their spouse, partner, children, siblings or parents in the exercise of their official duties, (ii) having any form of private interest or partnership in a private corporation that is party to a contract with public sector entity, or (iii) holding any asset whose value may directly or indirectly be affected by government decisions or policy.

Second, the government of Malta could ensure that the new Code provides clear guidance for MPs on when to declare their conflicts of interest, and to whom. In the Commissioner’s proposed revisions, section 8.2 requires MPs to declare a conflict of interest at the first opportunity before a vote is taken, while the additional guidelines include more detail and require MPs to declare interests (a) in the Chamber and in committees, (b) when tabling any written notice, and (c) when approaching others. This difference between this section and the guidelines could present confusion. To that end, the government of Malta could include a provision based on a revision of section 8.2 that states that “Members shall declare private interests to the Commissioner that could lead to an actual or potential conflict (i) upon taking up duty as a Member of the House of Representatives and (ii) at the first opportunity thereafter when they realise there is an actual or potential conflict of interest.”

The new code could also make it clear that MPs have an obligation to manage their conflicts of interest. Indeed, the disclosure of a private interest does not in itself resolve a conflict; rather it enables the necessary steps to be taken to determine what measures are needed to resolve or manage the conflict (OECD, 2004[27]). To that end, the government of Malta could include a provision stating that “Members shall take the necessary measure (removal, recusal or restriction, reassignment or resignation) to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest”. Examples of how OECD countries define this obligation are included in Box ‎3.10 and Box ‎3.14 elaborates on these measures.

In line with the proposed changes on managing conflict of interest in the Code, the Commissioner could revise the guidelines to state that Members are required to declare interests upon taking up duties and at the first opportunity thereafter. To further facilitate clarity, the Commissioner could include in the guidelines a non-exhaustive list of examples of situations where MPs could encounter a conflict of interest, for example, when legislation is before the House, when participating in a committee, when tabling a written notice, or in administrative matters, such as ordering office equipment or when recruiting staff or interns. The purpose of providing examples would be to raise MPs’ awareness about the different types of situations that could lead to a potential conflict of interest.

The Commissioner could also include in the guidelines a clarification that conflicts of interest can be real, potential, or perceived. Box ‎3.11 provides examples of the definitions that could be included.

Moreover, the Commissioner could include in Section 3.9 of the guidelines a non-exhaustive list of examples of non-financial interests, including secondary employment, personal affiliations and associations, and family interests (see Box ‎3.12). Other examples include private interest that are developed as the result of political activities, such as when an individual has a strategic role in the MPs campaign, organises political fundraising event(s), co-ordinates the gathering or solicitation of donations, acting as an official campaign spokesperson, etc. Currently, the guidelines focus primarily on financial interests, and leave non-financial interests to the discretion of individual MPs to determine. While the intention may be to cast a wide net, additional guidance would help avoid loopholes and different interpretations. Moreover, it would help MPs understand the different types of non-financial interests that could lead to a potential conflict. It should be clear that the list is not exhaustive but meant to support MPs in thinking more broadly about what private interests could lead to a conflict-of-interest situation.

The Commissioner could also update the guidelines to include guidance on the types of measures available to MPs to prevent and manage conflict-of-interest situations, to align with the code. Measures could include options for eliminating or mitigating the influence of a private interest on the MP, as well as options for limiting the influence of the MP with a conflict on the decision-making process (see Box ‎3.13).

The guidance could also direct MPs to the Commissioner for advice and guidance in case of doubt (see below for further details). Moreover, to keep track that the situation has been resolved or is being managed and allow further monitoring, the Commissioner could keep a record of both declared conflicts of interest and the measures taken in the specific personnel file of the MP kept in the Commissioner’s office.10

The government of Malta could include a comprehensive framework on managing and preventing conflict of interest in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

Section 3 of the Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries on managing and preventing conflicts of interest in the proposed contain a number of strengths, including providing clear parameters for when and to whom Ministers should declare conflicts of interest and clarifying that Ministers are responsible for resolving conflicts of interest when they arise. To that end, the government of Malta could include a comprehensive framework on managing and preventing conflicts of interest in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries informed by Section 3 of the Commissioner’s proposed revisions, with several additional clarifications as laid out below.

The government of Malta could also include a section on incompatibilities in the new Code. The current provisions proposed by the Commissioner prohibit Ministers from continuing their private work, unless under exceptional cases where the national interest so requires. The government of Malta could include additional incompatibilities, such as a prohibition on (i) acting as a lobbyist, paid or otherwise, (ii) entering into a contract or employment relationship with their spouse, partner, children, siblings or parents in the exercise of their official duties, (iii) having any form of private interest or partnership in a private corporation that is party to a contract with public sector entity, or (iv) holding any asset whose value may directly or indirectly be affected by government decisions or policy.

Moreover, the government of Malta could clarify the proposed definition on conflict of interest to strengthen understanding of “private interests”. Currently, the definition included in the Commissioner’s proposals note that a conflict of interest may arise “where a personal interest may influence the independent performance of the duties and responsibilities of Ministers. Personal interests include, but are not limited to, any potential benefit or advantage to the Ministers themselves, their spouses, partners or direct family members” (Commissioner for Standards in Public Life, 2020[5]). It is not clear what would be considered as “any potential benefit or advantage” to the Ministers or their family members, which may limit the different interests that could be considered as leading to a potential or real conflict of interest. The government of Malta could therefore revise the definition to clarify that (a) personal interests may include legitimate private-capacity interests which (b) cover financial interests, personal affiliations and associations, and family interests.

Similar to the recommendations made above to strengthen the guidelines for MPs, the Commissioner could strengthen the guidelines for Ministers to facilitate understanding and implementation of the Code. Specific areas that could be strengthened include (i) clarifying that conflicts of interest can be real, potential or perceived, (ii) including examples of the types of private interests and situations that could lead to a conflict of interest, and (iii) including examples of the types of measures Ministers could take to manage or resolve a conflict of interest.

The government of Malta could expand the scope of assets and interests to be declared and broaden the categories of persons whose data are to be disclosed in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives require MPs to register their financial or other interests in a “Register of Interests”, which will be publicly available. The additional guidelines go into more detail and present both the type of financial and non-financial interests that should be registered and the different moments in which interests should be registered by MPs:

• New MPs are expected to register all their current financial interests with the Commissioner within 28 days of taking their Oath of Allegiance.

• MPs are required to record their financial and non-financial interests in the Register of Interests, by 31 March of every calendar year. Information shall be recorded as of 31 December of the previous year, with respect to the following private interests: (a) work or profession, and if they are employed, the identity of their employer; (b) immovable property;11 (c) shares in companies/business interests; (d) quoted investments, government stocks, treasury bills, deposit certificates and bank balances; (e) bank or other debts; and (f) directorships or other official positions in commercial companies, associations, boards, co-operatives or other groups, even if voluntary associations.

• MPs are required to register in the Register of Interests within 28 days, any change in the registrable interests (b), (c) and (f) of the previous paragraph.

In this sense, the revisions proposed by the Commissioner, along with the additional guidelines, amend a number of previous gaps including the recurrence of the reporting and ensuring that declarations are public and easily accessible. However, the proposals do not address other outstanding issues, including:

• The categories of persons whose data are to be disclosed is not broad enough to detect illicit enrichment.

• The scope of the information reported is limited, with intangible assets (cars, antiques, etc.), outside sources and amounts of income not included. This poses limitations for detecting illicit enrichment and potential conflicts of interest, but also misses an opportunity to strengthen the integrity of public officials. The act of completing a disclosure form should help strengthen the integrity of public officials. When filling out a form as part of a conflict-of-interest management regime, an official has to take stock of his or her interests and the interests of his or her family members, evaluate these interests in light of the duties performed and decide whether any additional steps need to be taken to manage conflict of interest (World Bank, OECD, UNODOC, 2020[33]). This initial self-identification and evaluation process can and should generate requests for assistance to those who provide advice and guidance on managing conflicts of interest.

• There is no guidance on the information to be reported that could help MPs clarify what the different categories of private interests mean and what is the scope of their interpretation.

• Third parties should have access to some of the information declared by MPs in a redacted manner, to allow a balance between privacy and access to information.

To that end, the government of Malta could consider expanding the scope of assets and interests to be declared and the persons whose data are to be disclosed in the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives, as laid out in Chapter 4.

The government of Malta could expand the scope of assets and interests to be declared and broaden the categories of persons whose data are to be disclosed in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

Similarly to MPs, the Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries require Ministers to register their assets and financial and other interests as well as those of their spouses and/or partners and minor children in the “Register of Interests”, which should be open for inspection by the public. Ministers are also expected to record the aforementioned interests upon being appointed to office and submit a copy to the Cabinet Secretary.

The additional guidelines go into more detail and present both the type of assets, financial and other interests that should be registered and the different moments in which interests should be registered by Ministers:

• Newly appointed Ministers are expected to register all their current financial interests within 28 days of taking their Oath of Office.

• Ministers are required to record in the Register of Interests, by 31 March of every calendar year, information pertaining to 31 December of the previous year with respect to: (a) immovable property;12 (b) shares in companies/business interests; (c) quoted investments, government stocks, treasury bills, deposit certificates and bank balances; (d) positions of director or others; (e) total income; and (f) total sums of outstanding loans.

• Ministers are required to register in the Register of Interests within 28 days, any change in the registrable interests (a), (b) and (c) of the previous paragraph.

In this sense, the Commissioner’s proposed revisions and additional guidelines intend to amend previous weakness, including the recurrence of the reporting. However, the proposed revisions do not address other outstanding issues, including:

• The categories of persons whose data are to be disclosed is not broad enough to detect illicit enrichment.

• The scope of the information reported is limited (e.g. intangible assets (cars, antiques, etc.) are not included).

• The scope of information to be declared when changes happen is limited (e.g. Ministers are not expected to record changes to their positions of director or others, their total income nor their outstanding loans should changes occur).

• There is no guidance on the information to be reported that could help Ministers clarify what the different categories of private interests mean and what is the scope of their interpretation.

• Third parties should have access to some of the information declared by MPs in a redacted manner, to allow a balance between privacy and access to information.

To that end, the government of Malta could consider expanding the scope of assets and interests to be declared and the persons whose data are to be disclosed in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, as laid out in Chapter 4.

The government of Malta could include clear provisions on receiving and giving gifts and other benefits in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives introduce provisions on the acceptance and giving of gifts and benefits. These proposals state that MPs are expected not to accept any gifts, benefits or hospitality for themselves, members of their families, or any other persons or bodies. MPs are also expected not to directly or indirectly give any gift to any person or body with a view to influencing that person or body on a matter in which the MPs have an interest. Both provisions indicate that there may be exceptions “in accordance with guidelines set up by the Commissioner”.

The additional guidelines proposed by the Commissioner introduce more details on accepting and bestowing gifts and benefits:

• MPs are expected to register in the Register for Gifts, Benefits and Hospitality those gifts, benefits and hospitality received by them or their family members or bestowed by them or their family members to third parties if these have a value of more than EUR 250 (each or taken together in a calendar year coming or targeted from/to the same source) and are not aimed to influence the recipient.

• MPs are also expected to register all gifts, benefits or hospitality given by a third party to another third party (this, when an MP decides to pass on all or part of the benefit to a third party with the intention of furthering their personal interest) if the threshold for registration is exceeded.

Together, these proposed provisions aim to prevent gifts, benefits and hospitality from becoming means of undue influence. However, the government of Malta could simplify the provisions in the new Code on receiving and giving gifts and other benefits to encourage compliance, facilitate enforcement and allow public scrutiny. For instance, while the Commissioner’s proposed revisions state that MPs are expected not to accept any gifts, benefits or hospitality for themselves, their family members, or any other persons or bodies, unless in accordance with such guidelines as may be set out for this purpose by the Commissioner, the additional guidelines are more straightforward and clarify that MPs are excepted not to accept gifts, benefits or hospitality for themselves, their family members or any other persons or bodies if those “would place them under an obligation in the performance of their duties or may reasonably be seen to do so”.

This lack of alignment may lead to confusion. Moreover, by fairly universal social norm, all gifts create some sort of obligation on the part of the recipient – which may start in a verbal expression of gratitude but could include a more significant expression such as changing a decision to benefit the donor (World Bank, OECD, UNODOC, 2020[33]), meaning that all gifts, benefits or hospitality offered to MPs, if accepted, could be considered as placing them under an obligation. To avoid loopholes and encourage transparency, the government of Malta could include in the new Code a provision which states that “Members are required to register in the Register for Gifts, Benefits and Hospitality all gifts, benefits and hospitality offered to them and their family members – whether they accepted them or not – and given by them and their family members”.

The government of Malta could include a threshold for the value of gifts, benefits and hospitality that can be accepted. This threshold should prevent MPs (and their family members) from accepting gifts and other benefits that might reasonably be seen as attempts to influence them. Indeed, the acceptance of gifts can create a sense of obligation on the part of the recipient, and concerns about the official’s impartiality in current or future decisions. As such, good practice suggests regulating the acceptance of gifts by including limitations on the value of acceptable gifts and/or the disclosure of certain gifts (World Bank, OECD, UNODOC, 2020[33]). Although values for acceptable gifts may differ by country – according to their particular context and risks (see Box ‎3.14), the chosen value should close the door to any concerns of undue influence.

Finally, considering that the acceptance of gifts, benefits and hospitality by a public official can create concern about that official’s impartiality (World Bank, OECD, UNODOC, 2020[33]), it may be necessary to further regulate the acceptance of gifts by empowering an independent third party to verify whether the gifts, benefits and hospitality accepted by MPs and their family members may be seen to compromise their personal judgment or integrity. To that end, the government of Malta could include a provision in the Standards Act that assigns responsibility to the Commissioner for reviewing gifts, benefits and hospitality accepted by MPs and their family members and having a final say on whether they should be donated or kept. To do so, the Commissioner could use the information registered by MPs in the Register for Gifts, Benefits and Hospitality.

The government of Malta could include clear provisions on receiving and giving gifts and other benefits in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries introduce provisions on the acceptance and giving of gifts and benefits. These provisions state that Ministers are expected not to accept any gifts, benefits or hospitality for themselves, their family members or any other persons or body if this would place them under an inappropriate obligation or compromise their judgement, or if it may reasonably be seen as doing so. Ministers are also prohibited from giving any gifts, benefits or hospitality to any person or body with the aim of influencing them on a matter in which they have an interest.

The proposed additional guidelines introduce more details on accepting and bestowing gifts and benefits:

• Ministers are expected to record in the Register for Gifts, Benefits and Hospitality those gifts, benefits and hospitality received by them or their family members or bestowed by them or their family members to third parties if these have a value of more than EUR 250 (each or taken together in a calendar year coming or targeted from/to the same source) and are not aimed to influence the recipient.

• Ministers are expected to register all gifts, benefits or hospitality bestowed by a third party to another third party (this, when a Minister decides to pass on all or part of the benefit to a third party with the intention of furthering their personal interest).

The set of provisions proposed by the Commissioner aim to prevent potential and actual conflicts of interest from arising. However, the government of Malta could simplify the provisions on receiving and bestowing gifts and other benefits to encourage compliance, facilitate enforcement and allow public scrutiny. To do so and further encourage transparency, the government of Malta could include a provision that states that “Ministers are required to register in the Register for Gifts, Benefits and Hospitality all gifts, benefits and hospitality offered to them and their family members – whether they accepted them or not – and bestowed by them and their family members”.

Additionally, as for MPs, the government of Malta could set a threshold for the value of acceptable gifts to prevent Ministers (and their family members) from accepting gifts that might reasonably be seen as aimed to influence them. Finally, an amendment to the Standards Act could assign responsibility to the Commissioner for reviewing gifts, benefits and hospitality accepted by Ministers and their family members and having a final say on whether they should be donated or kept.

The government of Malta could include post-public employment restrictions for MPs in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives

The fact that MPs in Malta are part-time, with many retaining secondary employment while serving in office, presents a particular challenge for post-public employment measures. Nevertheless, provisions could be introduced in the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives to address potential conflict-of-interest situations emerging from post-public employment. First, as noted in the section on proper use of information, the government of Malta could include a provision in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives prohibiting MPs from using or disclosing confidential information after leaving office, as the first step to mitigate post-public employment risks of undue influence.

Second, in the specific case of lobbying, the Commissioner’s proposals on lobbying include a one-year ban on MP’s for carrying out lobbying activities after their term ends. To ensure coherence with other integrity standards that apply to MPs, the government of Malta could include this provision in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives. The provision could state that “Members are not permitted to carry out lobbying activities for a period of one year after they cease to hold office”. Such a restriction is aligned with international good practice that regulates movement between the public and private sectors by establishing cooling-off period for elected officials in at-risk positions, such as MPs – for instance, Canada, Israel, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the United States have implemented cooling-off period for members of their legislative bodies (see Table ‎3.4).

The government of Malta could include an obligation for Ministers to inform the Commissioner about their post-public employment plans and receive his clearance in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries introduces some restrictions on activities after departure from office and cooling-off periods. In particular, the following provisions are proposed:

• For a period of up to three years following their resignation or the termination of their appointment, Ministers must not have a relationship of profit with any private enterprise or non-government body with which they would have dealt while serving as Ministers during the period of five years immediately preceding their resignation or the termination of their appointment (section 3.10).

• For a period of three years following their resignation or the termination of their appointment, lobby Government (section 3.11).

Both the three-year ban to lobby government after Ministers’ resignation or the termination of their appointment and the three-year ban to have a relationship of profit with a private enterprise or non-government body with which Ministers had a relationship while in office aligns with good practices that aim to regulate movement between the public and private sectors. Indeed, several OECD countries prohibit Ministers from engaging in lobbying activities for between 1 to 5 years after they cease to hold office, while Spain offers an example of a two-year ban on Ministers to provide services in private entities that have been affected by decisions in which they participated (see Box ‎3.15). To that end, the government of Malta could include these two provisions in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.

Moreover, the additional guidelines include a provision that serving or former Ministers may request a ruling from the Commissioner to determine whether entering into a particular relationship of profit after departure from office would constitute a breach of the Code. However, to effectively implement cooling-off periods and facilitate monitoring, some countries require public officials to disclose future employment plans and seek approval from the dedicated advisory body before taking new jobs (see Box ‎3.16). To that end, the government of Malta could include a provision stating that “Ministers shall inform the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life about their post-public employment plans and receive clearance prior to taking up any post-public employment activity”. Such a provision will support awareness raising about potential conflicts of interest as well as to facilitate monitoring and enforcement.

Additionally, to alleviate the burden that post-public employment restrictions may have on Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, the Ministry for Justice could introduce a provision in the new Code of Ethics that requires Ministers to be provided a stipend –– a proportionate arrangement such as indemnities, allowances or compensations involving all or part of the former salary – for a proportion of the three-year cooling-off period introduced in the proposed Code of Ethics. Indeed, in cases where public officials who choose to seek private employment face a period of inactivity as a result of the cooling-off restrictions, some OECD countries provide proportionate arrangements to public officials. For instance, in France, members of the government receive an allowance for three months after termination of their public functions; the allowance is equivalent to their former monthly salary if they filed their end-of-function asset declaration to the relevant authority (OECD, 2021[4]).

To implement the post-public employment measures, the Commissioner could communicate post-public employment restrictions to all affected parties and the government of Malta could include relevant sanctions for breaches of the measures in the Standards Act

To facilitate implementation of cooling-off periods, public officials and prospective employers need to understand and follow the post-public employment rules (World Bank, OECD, UNODOC, 2020[33]). In Malta, efforts to strengthen the post-public employment system could be further enhanced by implementing communication actions and strengthening the enforcement system.

The Commissioner could develop and deliver training on post-public employment restrictions for MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. The training material could clarify what the post-public framework entails (e.g. what the rules are, to whom they apply and for how long, and sanctions for breaches), and why post-public employment measures are a key tool for preventing conflict of interest and corruption. Australia’s Public Service Commission has prepared guidance on post-separation employment to support employees who are leaving the public service in understanding what their obligations are to prevent conflict-of-interest risks associated with post-public employment (Australian Public Service Comission, 2018[29]).

Moreover, to support the private sector in understanding and upholding the rules on post-public employment, the Commissioner could develop a guidance document based on the training that explains the post-public employment framework, consequences for private sector employers for breaching the rules, and why such rules uphold the public interest. The guidance could be shared with relevant chambers of commerce and industry associations.

While awareness raising and capacity building help facilitate observance of the rules, specific sanctions for breaches are needed to strengthen deterrence and support enforcement of the rules. Under the current system, the Commissioner is empowered to investigate and recommend sanctions to the Committee for Standards in cases of breaches of the Code of Ethics, including of post-public employment restrictions. However, the government of Malta could further strengthen this enforcement function by including additional sanctions in the Standards Act in cases of breaches of post-public employment restrictions. Potential sanctions for violating post-public employment restrictions could include reduction on the public pension of public officials breaching post-public employment restrictions and/or blacklisting the private sector employer from government contracts for a specific period of time.

The government of Malta could clarify in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives the applicable enforcement mechanisms in case of breaches of the code

The Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries clarifies the enforcement mechanisms in place. Indeed, Section 1.4 states that the Commissioner is responsible for investigating cases of breaches of the Code, and that the Committee for Standards in Public Life is responsible for deciding on them as provided for in the Standards Act, without prejudice to the powers and prerogatives of the Prime Minister in respect of Cabinet. The government of Malta could include this proposed revision in the new Code of Ethics for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.

However, the Commissioner’s proposed revisions to the Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives does not include an equivalent provision clarifying the enforcement mechanisms that would apply in case of a breach. Although the Standards Act clearly states that the Commissioner is responsible for investigating cases of breaches of the Code (Article 13(1) (b)) while the Committee for Standards in Public Life decides on them and on the corresponding sanction (Articles 27(3) and 28), having these provisions in one place can help public officials understand the consequences of breaching the Code, encouraging transparency as well as compliance with public integrity rules. To that end, the government of Malta could clarify the applicable enforcement mechanisms in the case of breaches in the new Code of Ethics for Members of the House of Representatives. This could be done by including a short and clear subsection “Enforcement” within the introductory section that clarifies the responsibilities of the Commissioner and the Committee for Standards in Public Life in terms of investigating and deciding on potential breaches to the Code.

The Commissioner could consider developing and implementing systematic awareness-raising measures for MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries

To further strengthen awareness raising and capacity building, the Commissioner could develop and systematically implement integrity awareness-raising measures for MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. This may include sending MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries a copy of their corresponding code of ethics and presenting the Codes content upon assuming the exercise of their duties, as well as asking them to sign, upon entry, a statement that they have read, understood and agree to adhere to their code of ethics. Moreover, the Commissioner could also consider approaches inspired by behavioural insights to promote ideas and discussions on integrity, such as e-mail reminders or references to core public values in the workplace (see Box ‎3.17).

The Commissioner could consider developing and implementing a series of trainings for MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, which could focus on the core values and standards of conduct outlined in their respective codes of ethics

In Malta, discussions with key stakeholders highlighted the need to continue strengthening integrity awareness and building capacities amongst those covered by the Standards Act. Indeed, stakeholders agreed on the lack of consensus on the core integrity values and standards in Malta and the difficulties to translate such standards into day-to-day actions. These challenges demonstrate the need to develop a more proactive role of the Commissioner and his office, including developing and implementing integrity trainings that help building awareness and capacities on public integrity.

The Commissioner could consider providing MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries induction training on the standards of conduct established by their respective Code of Ethics. Induction training provides an opportunity to set the tone regarding integrity from the beginning of the working relationship, and familiarise public officials with the specific conduct and behaviour that is expected from them in their day-to-day activities (OECD, 2018[3]). For instance, after the 2019 General Election, the UK Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards organised workshops to introduce the values, the Code of Conduct and the Guide to the Rules of the Parliament and invited each of the new 140 MPs to an individual briefing to advise them on, amongst others, the Code of Conduct (UK House of Commons, 2020[40]).

Additionally, for sustainable capacity building, training needs to be repeated over time, and may be adjusted to the needs of specific target groups such as at-risk positions or management (OECD, 2018[9]). Although ethical training may include lectures, online courses, coaching and mentoring, research shows that interactive components where participants are confronted with realistic situations are more likely to generate a personal mental commitment to integrity than mere presentations by trainers (OECD, 2018[9]). In this sense, the Commissioner could consider developing and implementing ‘ethical dilemma’ training, whereby participants are presented with practical situations in which they face an ethical choice with no clear path to resolving the situation, and discuss in small groups what actions they would take to resolve those dilemmas. Examples can be found in other jurisdictions, where ethical dilemma training has been used to support delivery of integrity training to public officials (see Box ‎3.18).

The Commissioner could strengthen proactive guidance for MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries on implementing the standards of the Codes of Ethics

To date, the Commissioner has focused on giving recommendations on whether an action or conduct is prohibited by the applicable Code of Ethics or by any other particular statutory if a person subject to the Act requests such an opinion (‘negative clearance’ role). However, the Commissioner could also provide proactive guidance to support those covered by the Standards Act, particularly – but not exclusively – if a new version of the codes of ethics for MPs, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries is approved.

Indeed, although integrity is ultimately the responsibility of all public officials, having a dedicated integrity body in place to support public officials in understanding the rules and ethical principles and providing advice on solving ethical dilemmas is fundamental for shaping integrity (OECD, 2020[1]). To that end, the Commissioner could prepare guidance on the values and behaviours expected by elected and appointed officials regarding the following key integrity issues:

• on conflict-of-interest management measures;

• on receiving and bestowing gifts;

• on post-public employment; and

• on any other key integrity issue as it comes up.

Moreover, the Commissioner and his office could provide regular communications and guidelines drawn from advice requested by public officials over a period of time (‘negative clearance’) or from recurring systemic or sector-specific issues (e.g. parliamentary ethics, proper use of publicly provided resources, etc.). Such regular communications and guidelines should always be done respecting confidentiality of the exchanges between the Commissioner and those requesting advice.