Executive summary
In recent years, the risks of foreign interference in France have become a major issue, making top headlines. Although France already has a robust legal and institutional framework in place to tackle these risks, notably through its intelligence services and the agencies that support them, it is necessary to complement the existing mechanisms with public governance tools designed to strengthen the transparency and integrity of public life. This report looks into establishing a transparency framework for the interests of natural or legal persons operating in the public sphere and conducting lobbying and influence activities on behalf of foreign state interests, as well as into strengthening the monitoring of movements of certain public officials and civil servants between the public and private sectors.
France has developed numerous public policy tools to tackle the risk of foreign interference from a variety of angles, notably through its criminal law system for repressing violations of the fundamental interests of the Nation, regulatory tools dedicated to political financing, the supervision of lobbying activities (defined as “interest representation” in the French legal system), the fight against corruption, influence peddling and illegal interest-taking, as well as administrative systems for foreign investment screening or combating foreign digital interference. However, these measures remain incomplete, as highlighted in various parliamentary reports, which identify transparency and integrity in public life as priority areas for action to strengthen France's resilience in the face of the growing risk of interference in its democratic processes.
For example, , France has had a framework for lobbying in place since the adoption of the Sapin II Act in 2016. Foreign companies are obliged to register on the Register of interest representatives and declare their interest representation activities, as well as the resources allocated to these activities, in the same way as domestic companies. Since October 2023 and the entry into force of the new guidelines by the French High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique, HATVP), third-party states must now also be declared as clients of consultancy firms, where applicable. However, the Sapin II Act was not specifically designed to target foreign influence activities and has several limitations, notably in its scope. For example, the influence of public opinion as an indirect means of influencing public decisions and democratic processes is not covered, whereas a growing proportion of foreign influence activities target public opinion directly to influence the course of public decisions. Nor does it seem sufficiently clear whether certain foreign-government related entities acting in accordance with the directions or instructions of a foreign government, whether acting as beneficiaries or intermediaries of lobbying and influence activities, are included in the scope of application.
In addition to transparency of foreign influence, tackling foreign interference means taking this risk into account in policies related to the integrity of public officials and civil servants. Since its creation, the HATVP monitors the professional mobility of former ministers, presidents of local executives and members of independent administrative authorities. The 2019 Civil Service Transformation Act also gave the HATVP new responsibilities for monitoring the mobility of certain civil servants. However, when it comes to the mobility of former public officials and civil servants in foreign entities, the French system currently does not enable any monitoring beyond three years, and does not include any specific provisions on the representation of foreign interests. While new provisions have strengthened post-public employment obligations for former military personnel, this is not yet the case for other public officials and civil servants.
Following the example of existing systems in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, France could adopt a specific framework to regulate lobbying and influence activities carried out on behalf of foreign state interests. Such a scheme could enhance the transparency of foreign influence activities, enabling citizens and public decision-makers to be fully informed and understand who is really behind attempts to influence democratic processes. It could also contribute to France's strategic objectives in combatting foreign interference and the protection of the fundamental interests of the Nation, by making it possible to detect and sanction undeclared activities. Such a system should include the following key elements:
Provide for broad coverage of the interests benefiting from the activities, as well as of entities conducting foreign lobbying and influence activities subject to transparency obligations, including actors who act de facto in the interest or under the control of foreign powers or entities linked to them.
Include influence on decision-making processes and activities seeking to influence public debate in the scope of the scheme.
Include a list of legitimate exemptions to guarantee fundamental freedoms and facilitate state-to-state relations. For example, it is essential to exclude diplomatic, consular and similar activities, as well as legal advice.
Require the disclosure of precise and regular information, enabling key details of lobbying and influence activities to be highlighted, including the objectives pursued.
Provide for a graduated system of sanctions in the event of non-compliance with obligations, including administrative and criminal penalties, with the primary aim of deterring undeclared influence activities.
Design a balanced and effective institutional framework in charge of administering the system, verifying disclosures and applying sanctions. Among the various scenarios envisaged, the introduction of a new register dedicated to foreign influence, administered by the HATVP in parallel with the existing Register of interest representatives (for which the HATVP is already responsible) has reached consensus among the stakeholders.
Beyond the transparency of foreign influence activities, combating the risks of interference also requires strengthening public integrity. To this end, France could:
Reinforce ethical obligations, both for those involved in foreign lobbying and influence activities and who are subject to disclosure obligations, and for public officials and civil servants.
Strengthen the HATVP's powers of control over the new professional careers of certain former public officials and civil servants within entities linked to foreign powers. This control could be extended beyond three years for lobbying and influence activities, or more broadly influence activities, carried out on behalf of foreign interests.