OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2026 Results

Governments and public administrations across OECD countries face high demands to deliver better policies for better lives in a complex environment. On the one hand, governments are confronting a long list of challenges related to demographic, economic, geopolitical and technological changes. At the same time, governments’ potential actions are limited due to narrowing fiscal space, slow-moving internal processes and considerable difficulties in reaching public and political consensus.

Yet this moment also offers governments important new opportunities to deliver better for people. Governments increasingly realise that ‘business as usual’ is no longer sufficient to meet rising expectations, complexity and resource constraints. The ongoing digital transformation of government, including through the cautious use of emerging technologies like generative artificial intelligence, offers unique opportunities to support transformational reforms in how policies are designed, delivered and implemented (OECD, 2025[1]). High numbers of retiring civil servants, with little budget to replace them, make this transformation even more imperative.

Navigating this moment successfully, and with minimal uncertainty, requires a healthy amount of trust in public institutions. Governments and institutions that are trusted can find it easier to enact reforms and to foster buy-in to policies without having to rely on excessive enforcement efforts.

Trust in institutions is therefore an increasingly important policy concern across the OECD (OECD, 2025[2]), even as some drivers of trust are beyond governments’ direct control: individuals’ early experiences, their personal circumstances and their trust in others can pre-dispose them to lower or higher trust in institutions. Economic and political trends, coupled with individuals’ political leanings, can also colour the way in which people view not only government but also other public institutions.

Yet trust also reflects the extent to which people believe public institutions are reliable, responsive and driven by values like integrity, openness, and fairness (Brezzi et al., 2021[3]). In democracies, trust in institutions fluctuates with time and is, among other factors, an indication of evolving expectations in view of the performance of institutions. This fluctuation incentivizes institutions to constantly improve and adapt, and is a bedrock of open, well-functioning democratic systems.

The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD Trust Survey) forms part of member countries’ extensive efforts to understand how public trust is formed and can be sustained. This report presents the findings from the third wave of the Trust Survey. It showcases evidence on people’s experiences with and expectations of public institutions in 33 OECD and 5 OECD accession candidate countries, and explores how these perceptions have evolved since 2021 (see Box ‎1.1). The survey covers a representative sample of the adult population of each participating country and was carried out in September to November 2025 in most countries.

Recognising that democratic countries all over the world face similar challenges and can benefit from learning from each other, the OECD Public Governance Committee, with approval from the OECD Council, established in 2024 the Global Trust Survey Project. This enabled selected non-OECD member countries to participate in the survey for the first time on an equal footing with OECD countries.

This introductory chapter sets the scene, providing context on the environment that shapes the relationship between people and the state. The chapter then presents current levels of trust in national government and other public institutions, as well as trends over time. Five years post-pandemic, some countries have been able to stabilise or even increase institutional trust, while others have further to go or have seen trust decrease. The chapter also explores the relationship between trust and public perceptions of government competence and values, particularly for national government, local government, and the civil service. By identifying the main drivers of trust, the chapter highlights areas where policy action may help strengthen it.

Building on the background of this chapter, Chapter 2, in turn, illustrates how personal background characteristics such as demographic and socio-economic characteristics affect the likelihood of having high or moderately high trust in the national government. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth view of people’s perceptions of day-to-day interactions with public institutions, and Chapter 4 focuses on assessments of government decision making on complex policy issues. Chapter 5 discusses people’s views on government use of artificial intelligence, and Chapter 6 the potential impacts of and barriers to their political and civic participation. Chapter 7 covers the evolution and the drivers of trust in national legislatures.

Understanding people’s concerns can help governments understand people’s expectations of public institutions. Across the OECD and the participating OECD accession candidate countries, most people in 2025 are worried about economic issues. But in certain countries, internal and national security, essential services, housing, immigration and corruption – which can in themselves be intertwined with economic concerns - are also top of mind.

People across the OECD remain most preoccupied by economic concerns, above all inflation. When asked about the top three issues facing their country, inflation was cited by a majority (52%) of respondents across the participating 33 OECD countries (Figure ‎1.1). This share is far and above the largest for any of the included questions, and is likewise important in most OECD accession countries which participated in the 2025 survey (Table ‎1.2). Inflation is the most frequently cited concern in 23 OECD countries as well as in Croatia. In a few countries, namely Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark and Peru, one third of the population or less cites inflation, while more than two thirds do in Australia, Croatia, Estonia, Japan and New Zealand.

Other economic concerns are also front of mind for many people. On average across the OECD, 27% cite poverty and social inequality and 23% unemployment and jobs as top-three concerns in their country (Figure ‎1.1). About four in ten people in Estonia, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania are particularly concerned about inequality, while more than two in three in Finland are concerned about unemployment and jobs, the most frequently mentioned topic in the country (Table ‎1.2). As expected, a higher share of individuals living in a household affected by job loss in the past year are likely to cite unemployment as a major concern (33%), compared to 20% in non-affected households.

While people continue to worry about economic concerns, security is increasingly salient in many OECD countries. An average of 28% across the OECD name crime and violence as a top-three issue in their country (Figure ‎1.1). This share is notably high in the Latin American and Caribbean countries covered in the survey, where the share that cite crime and violence exceeds 50% and where it is the most frequently cited topic, with the exception of Colombia. The same is true in Sweden, where it is likewise the most frequently cited topic by 51% (Table ‎1.2). National security is mentioned by a lower share -- 18%. However, in particular in countries in the eastern part of Europe, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, national security is much more frequently mentioned. And in Denmark, a higher share mentions national security than any other issue.

Another issue of high salience in some countries is immigration. On average across the OECD, one in four (25%) name this topic, but again with a broad range. In Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, four to five in ten people name immigration, and it is the second-most-frequently named topic in Austria, Belgium, Chile and Switzerland (Table ‎1.2).

Touching on other issues, 24% on average across the OECD mention healthcare and essential services as an important concern, with slightly lower shares in the participating OECD accession countries. It is the most frequently named topic in Iceland, but also is on the mind of many people in Finland. Housing is mentioned by 20% across the OECD. In Ireland and Luxembourg housing is the most frequently named topic.

Finally, 18% cite corruption among the top three issues facing their country. Shares concerned about corruption are particularly high in Bulgaria, Colombia and Romania, where it is the most frequently cited issue (Table ‎1.2). Likewise, a majority in the other participating OECD accession countries express concerns. Feeling compelled to pay a bribe in the past year – something that very few survey participants indicate happened to them - is associated with a higher likelihood that someone names corruption as a top-three concern. The share in this group who cite it is 30%.1

The timing of surveys can affect the governance issues that people pay attention to, which can influence trust (see Box ‎1.3). Nevertheless, as will be seen later in the chapter, a considerable share of people’s trust in public institutions is shaped by their expectations and perceptions of public governance alongside their personal background.

Governments participate in the OECD Trust Survey to understand better the evolution of the public governance drivers of trust and their impact on trust in different public institutions. The remainder of the chapter illustrates current trust levels in different public institutions as well as their evolution since 2021. The chapter also provides econometric evidence on how trust levels and changes relate to key public governance drivers of trust.

Across the OECD, the number of people who have low or no trust exceeds the number who have high or moderately high trust in the national government.2 An average of 40% have high or moderately high trust in the national government, providing a response from 6 to 10 on a 0-10 scale ranging from “not at all” to “completely” (Figure ‎1.2). This is smaller than the share of 43% who have low or no trust (0 to 4 on the response scale). Finally, 15% provide a neutral answer (5 on the response scale), and 1% indicate that they do not know.

With the exception of Brazil, the share with high or moderately high trust in the national government in the OECD accession countries is substantially lower than the OECD average.

The distribution of trust levels varies across countries, owing to a mixture of different experiences with and expectations and perceptions of public institutions, socio-economic characteristics and cultural factors (Brezzi et al., 2021[3]). A majority express moderate or high trust their national government in only eight countries – Australia, Canada, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland.

After a modest decline in trust between 2021 and 2023, the OECD-wide decrease in trust in the national government seems to have leveled off.3

Across 184 countries with available data, the share of people reporting high or moderately high trust fell by an average of 2 percentage points between 2021 and 2023 (OECD, 2024[8]). Trust levels in many countries appeared buoyed by the COVID crisis, possibly leading to rising trust levels in the 2020-21 period that were often followed by a decline in trust by 2023. Several factors may have shaped this 2021–23 trend, including unusual disruptions post-COVID like spikes in inflation.

In contrast, between 2023 and 2025, no such drop in trust was observed. When considering the countries for which data for all three waves are available, the share with high or moderately high trust almost returned to 2021 values (from 43.2% in 2021 to 40.8% in 2023 and 42.7% in 2025). And for the larger sample of 29 OECD countries that participated in the Trust Survey in both 2023 and 2025, the share with high or moderately high trust (40.0% in 2023 and 40.7% in 2025) and low or no trust (43.3% in 2023 and 43.2% in 2025) remained constant (Figure ‎1.3).

Among countries for which data are available in all three years of the survey, three main patterns are visible.

A first group of countries experienced moderate to large changes between 2021 and 2023 followed by a stabilisation close to the 2023 values. Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia and Sweden are the countries with moderate changes from 2021 to 2023, and Finland in the large category. For these countries, 2021 may have been an outlier, or the 2023-2025 period led to a consolidation from a prior development.

A second group of countries with important changes between 2023 and 2025 had already seen large swings over the prior two-year period.

• Iceland, Norway, Korea, Portugal and the United Kingdom followed up large drops in trust by large increases. In the case of Iceland and Korea, the increase was so large that the 2025 trust level is larger than the 2021 level. And in Portugal and the United Kingdom, the difference in the share with high or moderately high trust was less than two percentage points in 2025 compared to 2021.

• In contrast, in Belgium, an important increase in trust between 2021 and 2023 was partially offset by a decline between 2023 and 2025.

• In France, a more modest increase in trust in the immediate post-Covid period was outweighed by a larger decline in trust between the 2023 and 2025 waves.

Finally, a few countries are outliers in terms of having very stable, consistently improving or consistently declining trust levels over the two periods. In Luxembourg, the share of the population with high or moderately high trust changed by less than one percentage points from 2021 to 2023 and again from 2023 to 2025. In the Netherlands, the share dropped over the two subsequent periods by an equal number of percentage points; and in Australia, a larger increase from 2021 to 2023 was followed by a modest but nonetheless meaningful further increase in 2025.

Among countries for which the data point is available for 2023 and 2025 only, many are showing relatively stable trust levels.

• In Costa Rica, Germany, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia and Switzerland, the share of the adult population with high or moderately high trust in the national government changed by less than two percentage points between 2023 and 2025.

• In contrast, the share with high or moderately high trust in the national government dropped by a larger margin in Chile, Greece, and the Slovak Republic.

• In Spain, the share of the population with high or moderately high trust increased by a larger margin.

The limited number of countries that participated in the 2021 and 2025 Trust Survey waves only saw increases in the share of their populations with high or moderately high trust in the national government. These increases were modest in Austria (3 percentages points (p.p.)) and larger in Japan (22 p.p.).5 Brazil, saw trust levels increase by a substantial 12 p.p. since early 2022.6

The role that (changes in) perceptions of public governance play in (changes in) trust in government are discussed in Sections ‎1.5.1 and ‎1.5.2. But on top of these changes, it also needs to be acknowledged that historical and structural factors can have long-term effects on trust, above and beyond short-term changes linked for example to the political cycle. There is mixed evidence on the relationship between having undergone a transition to democracy a few decades prior and trust in institutions today, with the preponderance leaning towards perceptions of institutional performance today mattering more than historical legacies. By contrast, deep structural crises may trigger declines in trust that take considerable time to reverse (see Box ‎1.2).

Trust in the national government is influenced by a variety of factors. But how people assess government competencies and values in decision making on complex policy issues is a leading factor shaping trust. Empirically, this remains as true in 2025 as it did in 2023. But even theoretically, it stands to reason that how people perceive the processes and outcomes of policy making on issues of national importance will have a strong influence in whether they deem governments trustworthy or not. At the same time, perceptions of day-to-day interactions – above all providing public services in a manner that meets people’s expectations – also plays a role (previewed below and discussed in-depth in Chapter 3).

While one in two (51%) across the OECD finds it likely that institutions would be ready to protect people’s lives in case of a large-scale emergency, other measures of government reliability in complex decisions are seen less positively. In general, about four in ten people find it likely that government would regulate new technologies in a manner that allows businesses and individuals to use them appropriately (42%), would support affected people during an economic crisis (41%), and are confident that their country will reduce GhG emissions in the coming decade (38%) (Figure ‎1.6). While views of emergency preparedness and technology regulation have remained largely constant relative to 2023, with shifts below two percentage points, the proportion of the population that is optimistic with regards to emissions has decreased by three to four percentage points, depending on the country sample. On average across the participating OECD accession candidate countries, confidence is higher that the country can reduce GhG emissions (35%) and regulate new technologies (34%), while emergency preparation (32%) and support during economic crises (29%) are seen less positively.

Beyond the outcomes of policy actions, people also care about how governments arrive at their decisions. They expect policymakers to be open and responsive to feedback from the public and different stakeholders, and yet to withstand pressure from special interests for policies that may run counter to the public interest. On these measures, many OECD countries still have substantial room for improvement: 42% of people find it likely that government takes into account the best available evidence when taking decisions, a share that has remained constant since 2023, and 37% are confident that it cooperates with other stakeholders to solve large-scale policy challenges (Figure ‎1.7). In comparison, fewer than one third find it likely that government would refuse lobbying from a corporation for a policy that could be detrimental to society as a whole (32%) or believe that people like them have a say in what government does (31%). It should however be noted that compared to 2023, slightly more people have a positive view of the ability of government to withstand this policy capture (see Figure 4.8 in Chapter 4).

A majority of people across the OECD are satisfied with administrative services and with the data protection provided by government institutions. Among recent service users, 68% across the OECD and 48% across the participating OECD accession countries are satisfied with these services (Figure ‎1.8). The share satisfied among the overall population has also risen, from 64% in 2021 to 65% in 2023 and 67% in 2025 in the countries where the information is available for all three years. Satisfaction with other essential services is somewhat lower but continues to be on average above 50% across the OECD. Moreover, 52% of people across the OECD and 38% across the participating OECD accession countries find it likely that government institutions would use their data for legitimate purposes only.

Overall, the drivers of trust for national government have remained stable relative to 2023. Across the OECD, people’s perceptions of government decision making on complex policy issues have a strong association with their trust in government, while perceptions of day-to-day interactions play a much smaller role (Figure ‎1.9):

• People who feel their government makes decisions based on the best available evidence, and balances needs of current and future generations, are particularly more likely to have high or moderately high trust in the government. Improvements in the perceptions of having a say in what government does, in government cooperating with other stakeholders to solve problems and in providing support to affected individuals during economic crises are likewise associated with substantially higher trust levels. The newly introduced variables on government’s cooperation with other stakeholders and support during an economic crisis are among the most important drivers identified. These aspects of government reliability and openness on complex decision making are strongly associated with trust in national government. Other governance factors associated with a higher probability of placing trust in the national government are having positive views of government resisting lobbying by companies that could be detrimental to public interest, clearly communicating about the impacts of a major reform, adjusting policies in response to public consultations and majority preferences, and being prepared to protect people’s lives in an emergency. The perceptions of legislatures balancing the needs of different groups and hold government accountable also play a role.

• People whose satisfaction with administrative services is above average, those who find it likely that government agencies use personal data for legitimate purposes, and those who believe their application for government benefits and services would be treated fairly are also slightly more likely to place high or moderately high trust in the national government.

In the participating OECD accession candidate countries, the observed relationships are similar (see Table A.4, column (4), Annex A). People’s perceptions about whether decisions are informed by the best available evidence is the driver by far most strongly associated with trust in the national government, followed – at a distance – by people’s perceptions of whether government is able to balance well between the interests of current and future generations. People’s perceptions in other areas of decision making on complex policy issues, such as political voice, the legislature’s role in holding government accountable and tending to the needs of different groups, the preparation for large-scale emergencies, the appropriate regulation of new technologies, and the clear explanation of major reforms likewise play a role. As is true in OECD countries, perceptions on daily interactions have a less pronounced influence, with satisfaction with administrative services and the availability of information about these services being the only two drivers with a statistically significant relationship with trust in the national government.

The respective findings for OECD and OECD accession candidate countries thus reaffirm a result from the first OECD Trust Survey in Latin America and the Caribbean (OECD, 2025[13]): while there are differences in how people across the OECD and in non-OECD countries perceive different public governance drivers, on average, the relationship between these perceptions and trust in public institutions is relatively similar. This implies that lessons on potential policy actions to enhance trust may apply across different democratic countries. However, at the country level, results of course vary.

A decomposition analysis of the survey data – carried out within each country – helps explain how changes in trust levels relate to shifts in perceptions of public governance.

This analysis (Figure ‎1.10), which was run separately for each country, is illustrated for countries where trust levels changed by at least four percentage points between 2023 and 2025. The findings show that in all concerned countries except Norway and Spain (not shown in Figure ‎1.107), changes in public governance perceptions account for at least forty percent of the observed change in the share of people with high or moderately high trust in the national government. Accordingly, other factors that are not measured and included in this model account for the remainder of the trust level changes. Interestingly, in the United Kingdom, the change in the share with high or moderately high trust is smaller than the changes in the underlying trust drivers would predict8 – in other words, based on changes in perceptions of public governance, trust may have been expected to be higher.

While the changes in public governance perceptions that contribute the most to the change in trust naturally differs from country to country,9 there are a few patterns that stand out:

• First, changes in the levels of trust are far more strongly associated with changes in average perceptions of decision making on complex policy issues than day-to-day interactions.

• Second, on average across countries, changes in the perceptions of the responsiveness and reliability of government institutions related to complex decisions on average account for slightly higher shares of changes in trust than do changes in the perceptions of the fairness, integrity and openness of institutions around complex decisions.

• Third, among the different perceptions of how well governmental institutions act with integrity, openness and fairness when taking complex decisions, it is mostly changes in perceptions of fairness that contribute to changes in overall trust levels.

Together, these findings suggest that there are certain public governance perceptions – in particular related to how reliable and responsive, but also how fair, institutions are seen to be in addressing complex and long-term policy issues – that can ‘move the needle’ of trust in the national government relatively rapidly. This confirms the analysis of the drivers of trust carried out over the years. Improving trust takes time, but investing in these areas might enable faster improvements for the national government. For local government and other institutions, it is likely that changes are determined by other factors as developed in the next sections.

Evidence from the OECD Trust Survey over time suggests that across democratic countries, people tend to trust institutions responsible for upholding security and the law the most. Conversely, they trust political institutions the least, especially political parties. The institutions with which individuals are more prone to interact with on a day-to-day basis, including the local government and the civil service, fall in the middle (Figure ‎1.11). Far from a failure of democratic governance, this pattern is expected and can be a sign of ‘skeptical trust’ whereby citizens of democratic countries critically assess whether public institutions meet their expectations and where institutions tasked with maintaining essential services, as well as law and order, are seen to meet these expectations more consistently than institutions in which political debates occur.

Trust in different public institutions within the same country tends to move in tandem, but often with stronger movements for trust in the national government than in other institutions.

The following section will show the current trust levels in law-and-order institutions on the one hand and the civil service and local government on the other hand. It will also discuss the drivers of trust in the national civil service and local government. The levels and drivers of trust in national legislatures – parliaments and congresses – will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 7. Table ‎1.3 provides an overview of the population share with high or moderately high trust in the different public institutions by country.

People across the OECD have consistently shown substantial trust in the police. The share with high and moderately high trust is equal to 63% across the OECD (Figure ‎1.12). This share has remained relatively constant since 2021 and 2023. This is true whether the analysis over time applies to the sample of 20 countries included in both waves, or the 29 included in the 2023 and 2025 waves. In the participating OECD accession countries, an average of 42% trust the police, which remains substantially above the share who trust national government.

On average, two thirds (66%) of people across the OECD have high or moderately high trust in the armed forces (Figure ‎1.12), an institution for which trust levels are measured for the first time in the current Trust Survey wave. The lowest population shares that trust the armed forces in the OECD and among accession countries are in the Slovak Republic (47%) and Bulgaria (36%). Elsewhere, at least one in two adults place trust in the armed forces. And in Finland, their share even reaches nine out of ten (91%).

Trust in the courts and judicial system is substantially lower, albeit higher than other public institutions, and displays a higher variability across countries. On average, 54% across the OECD have high or moderately high trust in the courts (Figure ‎1.12). In Denmark (77%) and Norway (76%), more than three in four individuals trust the courts, while in Chile, fewer than one in four (24%) do. Trust in the judicial system is relatively constant over time, rising by one percentage point between each survey wave for stable groups of countries. Across the participating OECD accession countries, 31% have high or moderately high trust in the courts.

On average across the OECD, 46% of people have high or moderately high trust in their local government, a share that is six percentage points above the trust in the national government (Figure ‎1.13). In a few countries, trust in the two institutions is almost equal, namely in Canada, Costa Rica, Ireland and Slovenia. In Iceland, Mexico, Korea, and Norway more people have high or moderately high trust in the national government than in local government. But in all other countries, including the surveyed OECD accession candidate countries, local government is more trusted than the national government. This gap can be substantial -- in France, for example, trust in local government is thirty percentage points higher than trust in the national government.

Average trust in local government has remained stable for the 29 countries that participated in the 2023 and 2025 surveys (Figure ‎1.14), but increased slightly for the 20 countries that participated in the Trust Survey since 2021. Increases that exceed two percentage points were observed in Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Korea, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom as well as Brazil (in 2022). In Japan, relative to 2021, trust in local government increased by twelve percentage points. Decreases of more than two percentage points are observed in Belgium, Canada, Chile, France, Greece, Norway, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.

In two thirds of the countries that were part of the survey in both 2023 and 2025, the change in trust levels in local government was very similar or smaller than the change in trust in national government. In Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland and Switzerland, the share of the population with high or moderately high trust in the local government increased while the share that trusts the national government was relatively stable or declined slightly. In Canada, Greece, and Slovenia, declines in trust in the local government stood in opposition to stable or less strongly declining trust in the national government. And in Norway, trust in the national government increased substantially while trust in local government declined slightly.

The public governance drivers associated with a higher probability of trusting the local government are a mix of perceptions associated with day-to-day interactions and decision making on complex policy issues, but with openness to people’s inputs on day-to-day interactions being far and above the most important driver (Figure ‎1.15):

• People who find it more likely that they are able to voice their opinion on policy decisions affecting their own community are six percentage points more likely to trust local government.

• Positive perceptions of fair treatment when applying for public benefits or services and of legitimate use of personal data, as well as satisfaction with administrative services and with the ability to access information about them, are likewise highly correlated with trust in local government.

• People who find it more likely that government decisions are informed by evidence and cooperations with other stakeholders, that people like them have a political voice, and that institutions are ready to protect people’s lives in case of a large-scale emergency are also more prone to place high or moderately high trust in local government.

Broadly, the same relationships can be found when analysing the drivers of trust in local government across the participating OECD accession countries. However, availability of information on administrative services is more strongly related to high or moderately high trust; while perceptions of the responsiveness of public services are not significantly related to trust in local government in these countries (see Table A.5, column (10), Annex A).

The share of the OECD population that trust the national civil service is comparable to the share that trust local government (Figure ‎1.13): 45% have high or moderately high trust in this institution, 18% provide a neutral reply, and 34% have no or low trust. The share that trusts is substantially lower in the OECD accession countries. People are most likely to trust the civil service in Finland and Iceland, where 68% of the adult population does, and trust in the national civil service also is equal to or above 60% in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland.

In the countries where respondents were surveyed about the regional or local civil service, the share that trust the regional or local civil service is usually within one or two percentage points of the share that trust the national civil service. Exceptions are Canada, where more people trust the national civil service; and Costa Rica, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland, where more people trust the regional civil service. But even in these cases, the differences are usually in the order of 3-4 percentage points. Only in Finland and New Zealand there are 16 and 12 percentage point gaps favouring the national civil service.

Countries’ trends in trust in the national civil service between 2023 and 2025 usually mirror those for trends in trust in the national government, though the changes in trust in the civil service are usually smaller. However, in France, this difference is very pronounced. Regardless of whether the sample refers to the 20 countries that participated continuously from 2021 through 2025 or the 29 countries that participated in 2023 and 2025, the shares with high or moderately high trust or with low or no trust in the national civil service have remained fairly constant.

As is true for trust in local government, trust in the civil service is equally affected by people’s perceptions of their day-to-day interactions with public institutions as it is by government decision making on complex policy issues (Figure ‎1.16):

• People who have a particularly positive view of the quality of administrative services, and who find it more likely than average that data are used for legitimate purposes only, that applications for government benefits or services are treated fairly, that innovative ideas that could improve public services are adopted, and that information about administrative services are easily available are more likely to place high or moderately high trust in the national civil service.

• People who find it more likely that a civil servant grants people a ‘right to error’ is only very marginally positively related to trust in the civil service. A person who finds this outcome particularly likely is only 1.0 percentage points more likely to have high or moderately high trust in the national civil service.

• As was the case in 2023, people who find it likely that government decisions are informed by the best available evidence, that institutions are prepared to protect people’s lives in large-scale emergencies, and that they hold each other accountable are also more likely to place trust in the national civil service. Positive perceptions of government cooperating with other stakeholders to solve problems and of services adapting to changing societal needs are likewise associated with placing trust in the civil service.

In comparison to the drivers of trust in other institutions, there are more distinct findings on drivers of trust in the civil service in the surveyed OECD accession countries compared to the OECD (see Table A.5, column (6), Annex A). The increase in the likelihood of having high or moderately high trust in the civil service is more pronounced with positive perceptions of innovation potential in public services, with emergency preparation, with information on administrative services being available, and with having a say in what government does in OECD accession than in OECD countries. In contrast, satisfaction with administrative services and with data being used for legitimate purposes are less predictive of high or moderately high trust in these countries.

Depending on the country and its constellation of public governance perceptions, different policy actions are going to offer the biggest potential for enhancing trust in public institutions. The subsequent chapters provide more detailed policy recommendations that could contribute to improving perceptions of the day-to-day interactions with public institutions and of government decision making on complex policy issues. The following general lessons can apply regardless of country and institutional specificities:

• Focus on high-impact drivers with the greatest room to improve trust in specific institutions. Improving day-to-day service delivery will have more impact on trust in the civil service and local government) while improving perceptions about long-term policymaking will have more impact on trust in the national government and the legislatures.

• Recognise that some perceptions of the capacity of governments to make the right decisions on long term and complex policy challenges can shift quickly. In countries with sizeable changes in trust in the national government in the past two years, citizens’ perceptions of the competence and fairness of decision making on complex matters have been the key variable. Continuing to invest in public services will help maintain trust levels but investments in both the how (engagement of people and stakeholders, transparency, evidence based, communication) and the what (fairness) of decisions on complex policy areas will be help increase trust levels in national government and the legislature.

• Embrace the use of new technologies in government with care to ensure public sector principles and attention to communication. While the level of confidence of government use of personal data is relatively high, with 52% finding it likely that their personal data will be used only for legitimate purposes, investments in communicating on the value added of the use of AI in government and addressing concerns about the risks will have to be made.

• Invest in renewed democratic governance. The drivers of trust for national governments and legislatures show growing public expectations for transparency, accountability, and fairness in policy making. Most importantly, there is a sizeable and persistently large group of people who do not feel they are being heard. The institutionalisation of engagement mechanisms beyond traditional representative processes in many countries should help in this regard, but investments are necessary to ensure these mechanisms are efficient and effective in driving meaningful results on policy decisions.

This introductory chapter provided an overview of the current levels of trust in the national government and other public institutions and their evolution over time. Moreover, it presented the identified drivers of trust in the national government, civil service and local government.

To learn more about variations in trust in individual countries and the underlying perceptions of the public governance drivers of trust, the rest of the report is structured as follows:

• Chapter 2 covers differences in trust in the national government across different population groups;

• Chapter 3 analyses perceptions in the participating OECD and OECD accession candidate countries regarding day-to-day interactions with public institutions, including an in-depth view on how the assessment of different quality factors relate to overall satisfaction with administrative services;

• Chapter 4 focuses on the perceptions of government decision making on complex policy issues, assessing how people view the likelihood of institutions achieving certain long-term and difficult policy objectives in a manner that is receptive to public preferences and interests;

• Chapter 5 explores people’s assessment of the potential implications of the use of artificial intelligence by government institutions;

• Chapter 6 discusses findings related to the perceived impacts of and barriers to political and civic participation, in order to provide insights into potential mechanisms for altering the widespread scepticism that the political system allows people to have a say in what government does;

• Chapter 7 – for the first time since the inaugural wave of the Trust Survey – explores in depth how trust in the national legislature is evolving over time and across population groups, and which public governance perceptions are most associated with trust levels in parliaments and congresses.

[3] Brezzi, M. et al. (2021), “An updated OECD framework on drivers of trust in public institutions to meet current and future challenges”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 48, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6c5478c-en.

[12] OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.

[11] OECD (2026), “Implementing budgetary reforms in Greece: Performance budgeting, spending reviews and green budgeting”, OECD Papers on Budgeting, No. 2026/04, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/75348f67-en.

[1] OECD (2025), Governing with Artificial Intelligence: The State of Play and Way Forward in Core Government Functions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/795de142-en.

[2] OECD (2025), Government at a Glance 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en.

[13] OECD (2025), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean 2025 Results, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ea3385cf-en.

[9] OECD (2024), OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a35a56b6-en.

[8] OECD (2024), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

[7] OECD (2021), Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Finland, Building Trust in Public Institutions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/52600c9e-en.

[5] OECD (2017), OECD Guidelines on Measuring Trust, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264278219-en.

[4] OECD (2017), Trust and Public Policy: How Better Governance Can Help Rebuild Public Trust, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264268920-en.

[6] OECD/KDI (2018), Understanding the Drivers of Trust in Government Institutions in Korea, Building Trust in Public Institutions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264308992-en.

[10] Tufis, C., L. Ghica and B. Radu (2024), Long-Term trends of Political Trust Dynamics (1980-2023), Harvard Dataverse, V1, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/7ETG2Q.