

PART II

Views from Non-OECD Countries

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PART II

Chapter 4

**Overview of Regional Survey Findings
and Policy Implications for Donors**

by

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The regional SSR surveys covered 110 countries across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Baltics, southeast Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent states. The main objective of these surveys was to assess the status of the SSR policy agenda from the contrasting perspectives of these countries, which are being encouraged to reform their security systems, and the international aid community.

While a tremendous amount of activity is underway in these countries which has relevance for SSR, very few of them have comprehensive SSR programmes that conform with the OECD-DAC definition. The survey findings suggest that the SSR concept and terminology is, for the most part, still not familiar to government officials and members of security forces, and that the primary impetus for SSR tends to be external in nature.

Nevertheless, while the SSR concept and policy agenda have thus far had limited “buy-in” by developing and transition countries, the principles which underpin SSR are not alien to them. The individual reform activities currently being undertaken in many countries form essential entry-points and building blocks for more ambitious SSR programmes. Whether or not these reforms develop over time will depend to a large degree on how the SSR concept and policy agenda is adapted to meet their needs.

There are three broad policy challenges for OECD countries:

- First, to widen “buy-in” to the SSR policy agenda by relevant actors across the OECD foreign assistance community and partner countries.
- Second, to develop SSR policies that are well-grounded in an empirical understanding of the political and institutional context in which reforms are being promoted.
- Third, to develop more integrated development and security assistance programmes that are also consistent with the comprehensive principles that underpin the SSR concept.

Introduction

In 2002 the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) commissioned a broad survey of thinking, policies and activities that come under the heading of security system reform (SSR) or similar terms.² The survey consisted of two parts: a *regional* component, which covered 1) Africa; 2) Asia-Pacific; 3) Latin America and the Caribbean; and 4) the Baltics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and southeast Europe; and a *donor* component.³ The main objective was to assess the status of the SSR agenda from the contrasting perspectives of the aid community, which is seeking to promote and support SSR, and the countries being encouraged to reform their security systems.⁴

This part of the publication presents the findings of the regional surveys. While the evolution of the SSR concept owes much to a process of rethinking security concepts underway in developing and transition countries, there is a common perception of SSR as a foreign-driven, often political process, informed primarily by Western experiences of how security institutions should be governed. Understanding the diversity of security reform

challenges non-OECD countries face, as well as how they view the SSR policy agenda, is essential from the stand-point of donor efforts to strengthen the impact and relevance of their assistance programmes in the security domain.

This chapter first examines the origins of the SSR agenda and the OECD-DAC's role in supporting donor policy development efforts in this field. Drawing on the regional survey findings, the chapter then examines three broad challenges donors face in translating the SSR concept into more effective programmes of assistance. The concluding section identifies a number of factors that might lead to wider “buy-in” to the SSR policy agenda by developing and transition countries, as well as several priorities for future research that would build upon the regional surveys. The regional sections in the Annexes discuss in greater detail the regional survey findings.

Background to the Global Survey

Emergence of SSR

In the past decade, security has emerged as a vital concern for national and international policy in conflict-affected societies. The challenge of ensuring the security of states and their populations is both most urgent and most difficult in the context of societies seeking to “rebuild” following war where there is a risk of recreating the conditions that gave rise to violence in the first place. As the limitations of military-based security arrangements become more evident, this underscores the need for new approaches to security that avoid the conflicts of the past between the security interests of states and the security interests of populations.⁵

The process of reconceptualising security has in turn led to a fundamental re-evaluation of international assistance strategies. On the security side, the narrow focus on training and equipping security forces which characterised many past (and some current) assistance programmes is now seen to reinforce militarist, state-centric security paradigms that are not consistent with protecting populations. It is also increasingly recognised that, on the development side, aid strategies which rely on “one-size fits all” approaches and push too rapidly for liberalising economic and political reforms can fuel conflict and undermine security.⁶

These developments have resulted in growing recognition of the need for the international community to address the twin imperatives of security and development through more integrated policies and programmes. This has given rise to a range of new normative developments, policy initiatives, and operational programmes which aim to prevent and resolve violent conflicts, consolidate peace following war, and facilitate reconstruction with a view to avoiding renewed violence.⁷ SSR has its origins within these “peace building” activities and is designed to link the development and security agendas at the policy and programming levels.

The concept of SSR was influenced by the broader “human security” agenda which is based on two key ideas: first, that the protection of individuals is critical to both national and international security; and second, that the security conditions required by people for their development are not limited to traditional matters like national defence and law and order, but rather incorporate broader political, economic and social issues that ensure a life free from risk and concern. Within this wider agenda, SSR focuses on the challenges states face in using the instruments of force in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and supportive of human development goals.

Adoption of a holistic, people-centred approach to security has a number of important implications for how states go about the task of providing security for their populations. First, the concepts and institutional structures that guide security provision need to be “home-grown”, and reflect local needs, priorities and circumstances. Second, security should be seen as a public policy issue, inviting greater input by both the civilian policy sectors and civil society into policy formulation processes. Third, states should move beyond a reliance on the use of force and develop more integrated policy responses to security problems that cut across all sectors of public action. Fourth, reforms should seek to address issues relating both to the operational capacity of security bodies (effectiveness) and how they are governed (accountability).

External actors seeking to encourage or support a holistic, people-centered approach to security can maximise the impact of their assistance in various ways. First, there must be a willingness to countenance a significant degree of local control in determining how security is provided, and the priorities for reform. Second, aid strategies should be based on a comprehensive assessment of the political, institutional and economic factors that influence the security environment and the functioning of the security system. Third, development and security assistance should be provided in an integrated manner that facilitates national strategic reform efforts. Fourth, sound developmental principles and governance expertise should underpin the design and execution of all aspects of SSR programming, including reform of the military.

While the term SSR is being used more frequently within both the development and security policy communities today, definitions still vary. In part this is because the thinking which underpins the DAC policy statement, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*, is relatively new and has not yet been fully integrated into donor country policy and programming. Usage of the term tends to be dictated by the concerns of particular policy communities, and policy and practice often diverge from the concept. At present, OECD assistance strategies remain overwhelmingly focused on the reform (often operational) of traditional security agencies (i.e. the military, police, intelligence services). Efforts to broaden these strategies in line with SSR thinking, by placing greater emphasis on measures that strengthen civil oversight and governance of the overall security system, are still “work-in-progress”.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) approach

Since the late 1990s, the OECD-DAC has worked to promote greater rigour and uniformity in relation to how the SSR concept is used within aid circles by supporting efforts to develop a common definition and a common approach to donor activities in this domain.⁸ In 1999, the DAC commissioned work to develop a conceptual framework⁹ on SSR to guide members’ policy development efforts. The objectives of this work were to assess the case for development actors to become more engaged in SSR, to propose practical ways in which they could begin to do this, and to enhance the coherence of their policies and those of their counterparts in OECD governments, including defence establishments.

The DAC approach to SSR was first laid out in the 2001 DAC Guidelines on *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* and subsequently developed in the DAC policy statement and paper on *Security System Reform and Governance*.¹⁰ This approach embraces the comprehensive principles outlined above. In the policy paper, SSR is defined as “the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent

with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance”.¹¹ The OECD-DAC thus approaches SSR squarely within a development co-operation lens, reflecting the view that it should be supportive of wider efforts to strengthen state capacity, to prevent violent conflict, and to promote human development.

The emphasis placed on SSR as a development co-operation issue in the 2001 Guidelines on *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* was endorsed by OECD development ministers who further acknowledged that achieving “desired policy outcomes” will require OECD countries to develop “more coherent government-wide responses to security problems”. To this end, the global SSR survey findings highlight three broad challenges facing donors:

- First, to build greater consensus on the rationale for and objectives of SSR as a basis for widening “buy-in” to this policy agenda by relevant actors across the OECD foreign assistance community and partner countries.
- Second, to facilitate the development of donor SSR policies and assistance programmes that are well-grounded in an empirical understanding of the political and institutional context in which reforms are being promoted.
- Third, to ensure that OECD development and security assistance programmes are designed and implemented in a coherent manner that is also consistent with the comprehensive principles that underpin the SSR concept.

The dramatic changes in the international environment which followed the events of September 11, 2001 have added a particular sense of urgency to advancing these objectives. There is a real risk that the thinking and policy pronouncements which have accompanied the new “war on terror” may have a negative impact on the way in which the SSR policy agenda is conceived, by down-playing its governance-promotion dimension. Each of the regional studies in this report underscore that there are already grounds for concern that this is happening. Recent developments in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, underscore the need for careful analysis of the way in which the “war on terror” is affecting international efforts to respond in a more integrated manner to security and development problems.

Translating the SSR concept into policy and practice

Widening international “buy-in” to the SSR policy agenda

The regional surveys indicate that a tremendous amount of activity is underway in the 110 countries examined which has relevance for SSR. These activities cut across the nine categories examined by the surveys, including wider political, policy, non-governmental and regional initiatives, as well as traditional security agencies such as the military, intelligence and police, the justice sector, civil oversight and management bodies. There is immense variation – both within and across regions – in the factors driving change in these areas, the objectives being pursued, and the approaches. This varied landscape makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the degree of “buy-in” to the SSR policy agenda, though a number of key points can be made.

First, very few countries have comprehensive SSR programmes that conform with the definition in the OECD-DAC policy statement and paper on security system reform. More often than not, security reform activities remain narrowly focused on traditional security agencies, such as the military and police, and are carried out in an *ad hoc* and piecemeal manner. Reforms are rarely governed by an overarching strategic framework, informed by a wide-ranging and integrating public security concept, or effectively linked to wider

government planning and budgeting processes in ways that help to strengthen governance or ensure state security action is supportive of wider development objectives. While the stated objectives are in some cases to improve governance of the security system, the focus tends to be on strengthening the operational capabilities of security agencies. Indeed, sometimes reform objectives run directly counter to the objective of improving accountability within the security system.

There are nonetheless a range of exceptions: in Africa, for instance, South Africa's post-1994 security reform programme stands out because of the comprehensiveness of reforms undertaken, the highly participatory nature of the process, and the low level of external involvement. There are other instances which could be considered SSR, though these have been limited to countries emerging from conflict where donors have been actively involved such as Sierra Leone and East Timor. In quite a few other countries including Uganda, Mozambique, Serbia, and El Salvador, there have been discrete initiatives focused on one element or another of the security system which have been influenced by SSR principles, but fall short of a fully-fledged SSR programme. In the case of Afghanistan, despite recognition early on in the reconstruction process that a comprehensive SSR programme would be required, the international vision, resources and coordination required have not materialised.¹²

The case of the former Eastern Bloc countries deserves special attention. While there has been an extensive range of activity in the security domain, often referred to as SSR, much of this does not conform with the OECD-DAC definition. Because the primary impetus for reforms has been the desire for integration into the European Union and NATO, reform activities have tended to be shaped by narrower objectives relating to strengthening border security, regional stability and civil-military relations. Furthermore, the primary emphasis often has been on the transfer of Western norms and values about how the security system should be governed, resulting in "cosmetic" reforms, rather than on concrete initiatives to strengthen governance, particularly through the creation of a public and political environment conducive to meaningful SSR.

A second key finding is that the SSR concept and terminology is still not familiar to government officials and members of security forces, or is used differently than by donors. As to be expected, those cases where the term and concept are most used tend to be those countries where donors are heavily engaged. However, the survey of the former Eastern Bloc countries cautions that while political jargon is rich with imported donor phrases such as SSR, it "does not signify genuine local ownership of declared reform programmes". Moreover, there are many cases where "security sector" is part of the vocabulary but has a different meaning. In Uganda, for instance, it is understood to refer to the intelligence and defence bodies.

Third, the surveys indicate that the impetus for SSR programmes tends to be external in nature. This is not to say that there are not internal constituencies or pressures for change, for this is increasingly the case today in many countries. Reform is occurring in response to growing pressures for democratisation and a desire to enhance human rights; the need to develop more effective responses to security problems, including crime; fiscal reforms, intended to either reduce budget deficits or to channel more public resources for development; or as part of power-sharing agreements following the conclusions of war. The key issue, however, is that indigenous responses to security challenges have tended to be formulated in quite different ways than the donor SSR policy agenda.

From the perspective of many aid recipients, SSR has become associated with cuts in security expenditures, efforts to emasculate the security forces, and external meddling in political matters – all of which can create resistance to donor approaches. Furthermore, in some cases, such as South Africa, indigenous concepts and approaches have been devised which, as the Africa survey suggests, may even be more far-reaching than the DAC SSR concept. In most other cases where SSR could be said to be taking place, reforms tend to be much less ambitious than what donors would like to see taking place. This may be due as much to a lack of resources and a weak national vision for reform as it is to the fact that national needs and priorities differ from those of donors.

The more general lesson from the survey, however, is that the way in which countries define and approach security reforms is usually shaped and conditioned by historical experience and national circumstances which determine what is possible at any given time. This underscores that, even though the SSR concept and policy agenda – as defined by donors – has had limited “buy-in” in developing and transition states, the principles which underpin SSR are not alien to these countries. As the Africa survey notes, the individual activities that are currently being undertaken in many countries “form essential entry-points and building blocks for more ambitious SSR programmes”. Whether or not these reforms develop over time will require an enabling *internal* as well as *external* environment.

SSR implies a profound paradigmatic shift in the way in which not only developing and transition states conceptualise security, but the aid community as well. Despite growing usage of the term, many actors within both the development and security assistance communities have simply re-named existing security-related work as SSR without adequate consideration of what is distinctive and new about this agenda from a conceptual and policy perspective. A determining factor in whether non-OECD countries embrace SSR will be the extent to which donor countries and organisations themselves embrace the new security thinking and adopt a more integrated, holistic and principle-based approach to the provision of development and security assistance.

Strengthening the empirical base of SSR policies

The global survey suggests that SSR policies are, in many cases, being formulated by donors without reference to a strong empirical base. Donors often lack adequate understanding of the context in which they are engaging, in particular relating to how countries perceive and define security threats, how security institutions function, and the concerns of reforming governments. The programming rhetoric which permeates many policy documents is often very prescriptive in nature and there should be concern that this may substitute for sound analysis of what is actually happening on the ground. This makes it more difficult for donors to assess what is feasible in a given context or to tailor support appropriately to the needs of developing and transition countries.

There are three key reasons for this gap between research-based evidence and policy making. The first reason has to do with the relatively rapid pace with which the SSR policy agenda has emerged within the aid community over the past five years. Because SSR is a key transition issue in war-affected societies, there has been immense pressure on donors to develop concepts and policy frameworks enabling them to engage in a domain which was extremely sensitive and theretofore unknown to them. Combined with this urgency to act was the fact that there were very few experiences of integrated international assistance

programmes, bringing together development and security actors, that could be used to inform policy or programming.

A second reason stems from the lack of access by donor policy makers to information on SSR issues. Part of the problem stems from a simple dearth of data. The regional surveys show a highly variable picture on information availability: information on security reform matters is most readily available in the former Eastern Bloc countries, least available in the case of Africa, with Asia and Latin America falling somewhere in between. This corresponds roughly with the general ranking of these regions in developmental terms, though perhaps a more telling indicator is the level of strategic engagement by OECD countries in the security domain of countries in these regions. This is naturally higher in the former Eastern Bloc countries for reasons which have to do with concerns about regional political stability and integration into NATO and the European Union. And accordingly, the information available on SSR issues tends to refer to externally-driven reform initiatives.

But another part of the answer lies in the lag between evidence-based research and policy processes, a problem exacerbated by the predominantly academic nature of research generated to date on security issues which has traditionally been of little interest to policy makers. This problem has been recognised by some donors, particularly by the UK which has developed partnerships with researchers in various regions around the world in view of harnessing their expertise for policy development initiatives (this OECD-DAC survey marks another positive step in this direction).¹³ Nevertheless, the primary focus of donor policy efforts to date has been on defining the broad goals of SSR and a set of policy prescriptions. Less emphasis has been placed on understanding the political and economic conditions that facilitate efforts to provide security, or how the interests of national and external actors in security reform programmes may differ.

Third, the SSR policy agenda has been based on a normative Western template of how security systems should operate which has been heavily influenced by theories of democratisation, “human security” thinking, and more technocratic approaches to public sector reform. Strong emphasis is often placed on the desirability of civil control of the armed forces, a clear division between internal and external security functions, and a strong civil society role in the formulation and monitoring of security policy.¹⁴ Accompanying this is a strong preference, particularly within the development community, that resources should be redirected away from the institutions that give rise to militarism, towards the social and economic sectors and other areas of human development.¹⁵

Yet these are “ideal-type” situations that no country, including OECD countries, has fully succeeded in implementing. While the desirability of these institutional arrangements from the point of view of enhancing security sector governance is generally accepted, even in many cases by government officials and members of the security forces in reforming countries, there is legitimate scope for different views on how these objectives can be achieved, and the pace at which change should occur. An over-reliance by donors on a normative framework to design policy may reduce incentives to invest in more basic research along the lines identified above and could result in the application of “one-size-fits-all” approaches to countries facing very dissimilar circumstances.

Outsiders frequently underestimate the complexity and long-term nature of SSR in developing and transition states, in the process attributing the lack of reform to a failure of

political will when other considerations may equally be at play.¹⁶ The obstacles are often structural in nature, and may include: the persistence of authoritarian, militarist approaches to security; the weakness of national vision and capacity to formulate reform programmes; resource constraints; conflicting donor policies in the security domain; and political instability and tensions with neighbouring states. All of these factors serve to reinforce existing military-based security arrangements, particularly in post-conflict societies where SSR is both most needed and most difficult to carry out.

A better understanding of the context in which SSR is being promoted would provide a stronger empirical basis for donor policy development efforts and, crucially, would make the policy agenda more inviting to developing and transition societies.¹⁷ The issue, though, is not simply about the need for more information, but also about who produces it. The surveys suggest that the advent of the Internet as well as deepening processes of political liberalisation have dramatically increased the availability and transparency of security-related information in recent years. As to be expected, however, much of this information comes from international sources, including international publications and web-sites hosted by organisations external to the region in question, and is produced by international consultants.

The issue then is not simply that outsiders may not have the full picture about how things actually work in the security domain, but that national ownership of the very reform processes that donors are trying to support can be undermined because of weak linkages between research and policy-making processes. The generation and exchange of information on security matters by “reformers” themselves is the strongest basis for forging a national vision for reform and creating pro-reform constituencies. Yet many donor assistance programmes fail to explicitly address the fact that the capacity for knowledge generation and assimilation among policy makers and security personnel is often very weak.¹⁸

Developing more integrated international approaches to SSR

From the perspective of developing and transition states, “buy-in” to the SSR agenda by the OECD aid community is itself still weak and has been primarily limited thus far to the development community where this agenda has received most attention. As has been noted, since September 11 prospects for an integrated security and development agenda have been undermined, resulting in a rapid return by numerous OECD countries “... to state-centric conceptions of security with human security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding moving to the back of the international agenda”.¹⁹ From the standpoint of donor efforts to develop more coherent, “whole-of-government” approaches to SSR, the regional surveys suggest that there are a range of closely inter-linked political, policy and programming challenges.

Political challenges

Each of the regional surveys draws attention to the potentially negative impact of the new “war on terror” on the way that “security” is being conceptualized and understood both among donor countries and their partner states. The Africa survey notes, for instance, the risks of “down-playing issues of governance, shifting the emphasis back from “soft” (or “human”) security to traditional (or “hard”) security; reviving cold-war partnerships with dictatorial regimes; suppressing local opposition and undermining legitimate local struggles for group rights by dubbing them as “terrorist”. The growing trend to include a

new anti-terror dimension in more traditional development and security assistance programmes appears to be changing the way in which SSR is approached to some extent.

Reform efforts being promoted by some OECD countries in developing and transition states under the heading of the “war on terrorism” have led to the bolstering of intelligence and internal security capacity of partner states. The short-term emphasis on strengthening operational effectiveness may compromise longer-term goals of improving transparency and accountability in the security system, and has also had some immediate consequences. As has been noted, during 2003 “... international human rights standards continued to be flouted in the name of the ‘war on terror’, by both OECD and non-OECD countries”.²⁰ This underscores the risks of approaching security reforms as a separate activity somehow removed from development of the wider governance environment in a country.²¹

The renewed emphasis on traditional approaches to security is also resulting in changes in the way in which OECD countries prioritise the countries which receive assistance, and the way in which this assistance is provided. This is of concern because, despite the growing internal impetus for SSR in most countries around the world, it is apparent that the receptivity of different societies to the SSR policy agenda is heavily influenced by the external environment and the incentives on offer to facilitate and support reform. In cases where domestic constituencies are weak, and institutional capacity and resources are lacking, the nature of external engagement and the incentives on offer for reform are particularly determining in terms of the nature of progress that can be expected.

The surveys suggest, for instance, that international strategies to promote SSR vary considerably between the four regions examined. In Central/Eastern Europe, for instance, there have been significant Western attempts to promote SSR over the past decade driven by concerns about regional political stability. The prospect of integration into both NATO and the European Union have provided powerful positive inducements for these countries to reform their security system. The provision of significant levels of financial and technical assistance to fulfil the conditions to do so, as well as the narrower cultural gap between this region and the West, may also explain the more rapid progress in terms of building political support for SSR.

The situation of African, Asian and Latin American countries is much less clear-cut. Their lack of strategic significance to the Western countries may explain the relatively limited positive incentives on offer for SSR, and the reliance in many cases by donors on *negative* inducements – or conditionalities – to promote reform. These approaches have not tended to show lasting results. There is also a significant conflict between fiscal and security objectives in many donor-supported SSR programmes, highlighted in particular by the Africa and Latin America surveys. This is the case despite growing recognition within the aid community that a narrow focus on reducing security expenditure can be counter-productive in terms of improving governance in the security system.²²

Furthermore, the focus on spreading Western norms and practices to inform how security institutions should be governed often comes at the expense of a sustained injection of technical and financial support to help these countries address the many barriers to change. Following 9/11, there is a concern that international security assistance programmes may become overly terrorism-driven and result in militaries being encouraged to assume old patterns of behaviour that have been increasingly discredited in

recent years.²³ The reliance on military means to tackle the symptoms of terrorism has in turn reduced the resources available to tackle root causes of the problem, including assistance for education, economic development and governance reforms.

Policy challenges

While political backing for SSR by OECD governments is crucial, aid actors face other challenges in making SSR a policy priority. These stem from weaknesses of institutional capacity, the political sensitivities (for development actors) of working on security issues, and a lack of conviction among many quarters within both the development and security policy communities that the issues encompassed by SSR fall within the agenda which concerns them. Underlying this problem is the fact that the concept of SSR is still used in a loose way within the aid community which reflects a tendency by actors to approach SSR in line with differing institutional mandates, organisational priorities and administrative or political constraints. Differences in approach are as apparent between government departments in the same country, as between countries.

The donor survey indicates that few donor countries have formal co-ordination mechanisms aimed at developing government-wide responses to security-related issues in developing and transition states. Most inter-departmental collaboration is of an *ad hoc* nature and is not grounded in policy frameworks, either explicitly for SSR or integrated into policies for related issues such as conflict prevention. In consequence, opportunities for being strategic about the work OECD countries engage in are missed and there are significant risks that donor government departments will work at cross-purposes.

These factors highlight the need for more thought on how to achieve a synergy both between developmental and security inputs, and between short-term and longer-term assistance, in view of achieving a secure environment for states and their populations.

The surveys suggest, for instance, that there is a need for donor SSR programmes to more effectively accommodate both governance and operational perspectives. This message has come out most clearly in the African context where the authors of the survey report note that a desire for security in its “physical” sense is often more of a priority for local populations than other aspects of the “human security” agenda which is being actively promoted by development actors. This highlights a potential tension, which is particularly difficult to resolve in conflict – affected societies, between the longer-term (structural) objective of building more accountable security institutions and shorter-term measures designed to improve security by strengthening the operational capability of security forces.

In the case of Uganda, for instance, the government has sought for a number of years to significantly increase defence spending in order to more effectively address the threat posed by insurgents of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Donors have generally resisted this increase in defence spending, citing doubts about whether it can be justified in light of the huge needs in the social sectors. There have also been real concerns that additional spending on defence would not achieve the desired objectives given the army’s past record of financial mismanagement.²⁴ The government, for its part, has argued consistently that it cannot afford to invest more resources or attention in carrying out institutional reforms that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the army until the war in the North has been won.²⁵

Programming challenges

While the OECD-DAC approach to SSR emphasises the long-term structural changes required to achieve more efficient and effective security institutions, in practice, as the surveys demonstrate, donor assistance programmes tend to place greatest emphasis on the short-term measures needed to stabilise the security environment. In the post-war context, this may include support for demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, measures to deal with the proliferation of small arms, and training to enhance the operational capacity of the police which tends to be marginalised during conflicts. While all of these measures can lead to improvements in public security which benefit the general population, they do not necessarily help to “reform” security institutions or create a political and institutional environment conducive to more effective management of security policy.

Unless attempts are made to address structural issues (such as power relations) that undermine security-system governance, there is a risk that donors may inadvertently help to recreate the conditions that gave rise to violence and insecurity in the first place. In the post-war context, consideration of the need for new frameworks for state security action that avoid the conflicts of the past between the security interests of political regimes and the security interests of populations is a matter of particular importance. Resolving such conflicts will involve transforming the military-based security arrangements that predominate when wars come to an end into a broader set of institutional arrangements for providing security that functions according to democratic norms and principles.

The challenge is not simply to demilitarise, but also to develop new security concepts, policies and practices that are better suited to the post-war security environment. However, translating new concepts into clear policies endowed with the necessary instruments for security policy to operate effectively is a long-term undertaking. This demands a broader approach than the current emphasis by many donor countries on security agencies devoted to traditional matters such as defence and police. Translating “hard” security capabilities into adequate security for both states and their populations requires a complementary set of “soft” institutional capabilities that enable security policy to be conducted in an accountable, efficient and effective manner. There is a vital role for donors to play here in ensuring that this issue is given the attention and support it merits.

Conclusions

The SSR concept has thus far had limited “buy-in” in developing countries, though the principles which underpin this policy agenda are not alien to them. The regional survey findings suggest they will be most receptive to SSR where it is presented as a framework to structure thinking about how to address their security problems, rather than as a template for donor assistance. In this regard, donors face a number of key challenges in translating the SSR policy concept coherently into operational approaches to security assistance that are responsive to partner countries’ diverse needs, priorities and concerns:

- First, the debate on how donors can support SSR should more actively involve their defence and security counterparts if OECD countries are to develop credible and systematic “whole-of-government” approaches to this policy issue.
- Second, donor SSR policies need to be grounded in a much stronger empirical understanding of the political and institutional factors that shape and constrain security reform processes in developing and transition states.

- Third, donors should seek to develop a principle-based approach to security-related assistance that is consistent with the same principles of transparency and accountability they are encouraging their partner countries, to apply in their own security systems.

The global SSR survey provided a broad “baseline” understanding of the kinds of security reforms currently being undertaken in developing countries. There are a number of priority areas for additional survey work that would provide a stronger empirical base for donor policy development efforts:

- The first priority is to develop a better understanding of how governments in developing and transition societies actually perceive and define their security problems. Assessments of security “problems” and “needs” tend to be highly subjective in nature, and where this is done exclusively through the filter of donor concepts such as “human security” or “SSR”, there is a risk that the peculiarities of local perceptions of security will be downplayed or ignored.
- A second priority is to enhance understanding of how populations respond to security problems where the reach of the state security system is weak, or states themselves are the cause of insecurity. The SSR policy agenda has, to date, focused primarily on the

Box 4.1. Methodology for the regional surveys

The primary objective of the regional surveys was to map out the nature and scope of security-related reforms currently being implemented in developing and transition states, and to compare where possible the approaches being used with the OECD-DAC approach.

The regions surveyed were: 1) Africa; 2) Asia-Pacific; 3) Latin America and the Caribbean; and 4) the Baltics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and southeast Europe. All together, 110 countries across these regions were examined. The survey did not include countries in these regions which are members of the OECD.

As the regional surveys were desk-based studies, the consultants were primarily reliant on information available over the web or through published reports. Because there are few governments in the countries surveyed which think about or organize their security in terms of a cross-cutting “system” or “sector”, information on SSR was not always easy to collect. Information was therefore gathered under nine key headings:

1. Political and policy dialogue and initiatives.
2. Armed forces and intelligence.
3. Justice and internal security apparatus.
4. Non-state security forces.
5. Civil oversight mechanisms.
6. Civil management bodies.
7. Civilian capacity building.
8. Regional initiatives.
9. Initiatives to de-militarise society.

This data was compiled in country tables. The consultants then assessed the extent to which the security reforms were informed by a holistic concept of security, included a governance dimension, and were approached in an integrated manner (i.e. addressing issues relating to both operational capacity and accountability).

challenge of re-centering the state in the security game. More analysis is needed of the incentives which exist for partnerships between state and non-state actors (including the private sector) in the security domain, particularly where state capacity is very weak and seems likely to remain so.

- The third priority, in view of DAC members' recent endorsement of the case for more coherent "government-wide" responses to security problems, is to broaden any future survey work on donor assistance to include the activities of OECD defence and security establishments. At a minimum, this would help to ensure that policies are not working at cross-purposes and would also help to ensure that synergies are tapped in view of maximising the impact of international assistance in crisis situations.²⁶

Dissemination of these survey findings among both donors and their partner countries will provide a valuable opportunity to test the findings, to build consensus on the priorities for SSR work, and to refine the SSR concept and related practice further.

Notes

1. Dylan Hendrickson is a Senior Research Fellow in the Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College London. He was the coordinator of the global survey, and also edited the sections in this report.
2. The term security system reform, which has been adopted by the DAC, has the same meaning as the terms security sector reform (transformation) used by other organisations working in the field.
3. In this section, "donors" refers specifically to development ministries and the multi-lateral development agencies (i.e. IMF, WB, UNDP). "Donor countries" refers to DAC member countries and includes all government ministries that play a role in the provision of security-related assistance.
4. Box 4.1 explains in more detail how the global survey was carried out.
5. For an analysis of the practical considerations which the development of new security approaches entails for societies emerging from war, see Arevalo de Leon, B., "Democratic Security in Guatemala: Reflections on Building a Concept of Security In and For Democracy", in Goucha, M. and Rojas-Aravena, F. (eds.), *Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Santiago; UNESCO/FLACSO-Chile, 2003.
6. Lund, M., "What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of Peacebuilding and Charting Next Steps", IDRC Discussion Paper, Ottawa, Canada, 2002.
7. Tschirgi, N., "Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?", International Peace Academy Studies in Security and Development, New York, 2003.
8. To date, the focus of SSR policy development efforts has been primarily within development ministries and multi-lateral development agencies, though defence and other security establishments in some OECD countries are now taking on board this policy agenda.
9. "Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence", *The DAC Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2001, and its off-print (2002).
10. This policy statement and report were adopted by development ministers in Paris in April 2004. Entitled "Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice", it draws upon a synthesis of the SSR survey findings prepared by Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball. It forms Part I of this publication and is available on the DAC web-site – www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/44/31870339.pdf.
11. *Security System Reform and Governance* – Chapter 2.
12. Bhatia, M., Lanigan, K. and Wilkinson, P., "Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan", report prepared for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, June 2004.
13. *Security System Reform and Governance*, see Chapter 3, Box 3.5 "Good practice: supporting and linking regional networks" that describes the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR).

14. M. Chalmers, "Structural impediments to security-sector reform", Paper presented at the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (IISS-DCAF) Conference on Security-Sector Reform, Geneva, 23 April 2001.
15. See for instance, Richard Jolly, "Military Spending and Development", *Insights Development Research*, June 2004. URL: www.id21.org/insights/insights50/insights-iss50-art00.html.
16. Nathan, Laurie, "Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies", prepared for the Berghof Handbook on Security Sector Reform, 2004.
17. This collection of case studies on security sector transformation in transitional democracies and countries emerging from war conveys the complexity of these processes and the need for area expertise to deal with them: Cawthra, G. and Luckham, R. (eds.) 2003, *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Societies*, London and New York: Zed Books.
18. The Clingendael Institute has developed an institutional assessment framework which provides a framework for dialogue between donors and reforming governments about priorities and requirements for assistance. The document, entitled "Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework" (2003) is available from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
19. Tschirgi, N., "Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?", *International Peace Academy Studies in Security and Development*, New York, 2003.
20. Amnesty International Report, 2004, London.
21. J. 'Kayode Fayemi, "Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia"; in Bryden, A. and Hanggi, H. (2004), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector* (Lit Verlag).
22. See for instance the proceedings from an international symposium sponsored by the UK Department for International Development in June 2000: "Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risks for Donors, High Returns for Development."
23. See for instance articles in the following newspapers: *The Guardian* (www.ngrguardiannews.com) and *This Day* (www.thisdayonline.com) on 27 May 2004 with the same title.
24. "Donors reject Uganda's budget", *Monitor* newspaper, May 14, 2004.
25. In 2002-03 the Government of Uganda carried out a comprehensive Defence Review which was intended to provide a framework for a more rational debate on the country's defence spending requirements.
26. This was the theme of a Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, sponsored by the OECD-DAC, the European Union, the UNDP, and the World Bank (London, January 2005), www.oecd.org/dac/lap.

ANNEX 4.A1

Security System Reform in Africa

by

Eboe Hutchful and J. 'Kayode Fayemi¹

Changing political, economic and security circumstances have obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform that changes the way security institutions operate, are governed, funded, or relate to civilian constituencies. The key questions, though, which the Africa survey examines, are how reform is conducted and how much reform occurs, and whether the “reform” in question can be described as “SSR” in the sense (and terminology) in which the OECD-DAC uses the term.

The survey found that security reforms in African countries are driven by a variety of (sometimes contradictory) trends and considerations. In many cases, SSR has been forced on states by external forces, either as part of the process of rebuilding societies torn by conflict, or as part of a process of fiscal reform (or both). Nevertheless, these reforms are often piecemeal, narrowly-focused and short-term in character and rarely conform to the OECD-DAC definition of SSR.

In addition, the survey found that SSR terminology has yet to become fully familiar to African policy makers and securocrats. Even where new concepts such as SSR and “human security” are entering the security discourse, understanding by governments of how they can actually operationalise these concepts is still very poor. As a consequence, faced with the lack of any clear conceptual and operational alternatives, old military-oriented security paradigms are rarely challenged.

Donors working on SSR in Africa are pursuing many different approaches, not all of which are consistent with the OECD-DAC approach. While some donor approaches are based on comprehensive SSR principles, others stress specific elements consistent with national policy priorities. In particular, the new “war on terror” approaches to security assistance threaten to have a significant impact on how SSR is approached in Africa by downplaying issues of governance, and shifting the emphasis back from “soft” (or “human”) security to traditional (or “hard”) security.

Ensuring that issues of governance and human security continue to receive appropriate emphasis in SSR in Africa is a key priority. A way around the potential conflicts in donor SSR programmes is to make the principles behind reform (and donor assistance) transparent and coherent and to co-ordinate reforms so that they consolidate rather than undermine each other. Donors should also seek to encourage governments to develop a

participatory framework in which the concerns of all stakeholders are fully articulated and addressed.

Introduction

This Annex presents the findings of a survey of security system reform (SSR) in Africa conducted during 2002-03. The survey covered 43 out of 53 African countries across five sub-regions: Central Africa, East Africa and the Horn, North Africa, southern Africa and west Africa.² (Box 4.1 provides further details on how the survey was carried out.)

Changing political, economic and security circumstances have obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform in their security institutions. Nevertheless, there have been few SSR programmes in Africa conforming to the OECD-DAC definition; even SSR terminology has yet to become fully familiar to African policy makers and officials involved in security-related matters. Instances of SSR have been largely limited to countries that are coming out of conflict and are often, though not always, conducted under donor guidance. Although some “reforms” are occurring in the security system of African states, these are often piecemeal, narrowly focused and short term in character. They do, however, form essential entry points and building blocks for more ambitious SSR programmes.

The section is structured as follows:

- First, it assesses the availability of information on SSR issues in Africa.³
- Second, it examines the context for SSR in Africa, highlighting the factors that have put security-related issues on government reform agendas.
- Third, it focuses on how “security” is defined in the region, and contrasts this with the OECD-DAC SSR concept.
- Finally, it assesses the status of SSR in Africa, highlighting key factors that are necessary to understand current trends in this region.

Information availability

The key sources of information for the survey were (in order of importance):

- The findings of research networks, particularly in the southern Africa (SADC) and west Africa (ECOWAS) contexts, in the area of civil-military relations, occasionally policing, and SSR more broadly. These findings are both comparative and case study-based, and are largely in the process of being published. The most important of these have come from the SADC network organized by the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS-Pretoria) under its **African Civil-Military Relations Project**, the project on **Security Sector Reform and Democratisation in Africa** conducted by African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR-Ghana), and the network on **Military Budgeting in Africa: Processes and Mechanisms of Control**, organized jointly by SIPRI and ASDR. Some material was also drawn indirectly from the **African Civil Military Relations** project of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), to which both authors of this annex contributed.
- The works (published as well as unpublished) of individual authors and researchers, which are mainly country studies. These sources are frequently less useful than they might have been, primarily because the work of African (and Africanist) political scientists has largely been within the old coup-driven civil-military relations paradigm (and now tends to be concerned with how the political power of the military might be

curbed or contained). A new generation of research and publications which are more attuned to the needs and concerns of SSR and which address issues of institutional change is only slowly emerging in Africa, and needs to be encouraged.

- Publications that monitor security system developments (such as the *African Security Review*, *Military Balance*, etc.) and specialised reports (such as those by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on francophone countries in 1997 and 1999 (cited in the tables).
- Interviews and questionnaires. The former were occasionally utilized (those with fellow researchers being most useful), but their range was limited by considerations of funding and time. The latter came into play largely in an attempt to cover mainly francophone countries for which information was not available from other sources. These elicited only limited responses, as did interviews attempted (in Ghana) with diplomatic representatives and defence attachés from west African states.
- Official sources and documentation. These were consulted where available. Records of parliamentary debates and the work of parliamentary defence committees (where these could be obtained) were also useful.
- African and foreign newspapers and media (including internet sources and websites). These occasionally carried items of interest about security system developments.⁴

Both the sources and the availability of information differed by region and country. In terms of geographical coverage, southern Africa was probably best served, although there were significant country differences here as elsewhere. South Africa was exceptional in terms of the availability of both official and non-official sources of information, whether print or electronic. North Africa was most problematic. This may well have been because of the traditional security concerns, and concomitant lack of transparency, in that part of the continent. The limited availability of information in that region may also reflect the lack of significant security system developments there. This would be consistent with its limited movement toward political liberalisation.

In general, information also proved difficult to obtain for many (though not all) francophone countries. This is due to several factors: a tradition of “presidentialism”, or executive dominance, in defence and security matters and a concomitant marginalisation of legislatures and civil society; a weak tradition (as in France itself) of civil society analysis and discourse on “security” issues; and traditional defence mechanisms and relationships with France which are actually designed to protect regime security and do not necessarily focus on issues related to transparency.

The challenges of gathering information on SSR show that the task of creating a wide-ranging and integrating concept of security is at a very early stage in Africa. Part of the problem stems from the fact that processes of knowledge generation and assimilation among policy makers and security personnel are very weak. Even where new concepts such as SSR and “human security” are entering the security discourse, an understanding of how governments can actually operationalise these concepts is still very poor. As a consequence, faced with the lack of any clear conceptual and operational alternatives, old military-oriented security paradigms are rarely challenged.

Context for SSR

In recent years, a number of general factors have driven African countries to consider or undertake some degree of reform in respect of their security institutions. This has occurred in a variety of contexts, including one or more of the following:

- Peace agreements which bring an end to conflict.
- Democratisation and dismantling of authoritarian (and often military dominated) political structures. New constitutions sanctioning more democratic governance frameworks for the security system have come into being. The extent to which they are being implemented, however, is very much a matter of debate.
- Fiscal restructuring and public expenditure management reforms.
- Changing strategic environments brought about by the end of the Cold War and associated conflicts (reflecting, in this sense, the fact that defence restructuring has become a global imperative).
- The emergence of regional and sub-regional collective security mechanisms (AU, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD), which are exercising increasing influence in force restructuring and disposition in the member countries.
- The deteriorating security situation in a large number of African states and the possibility that the African state itself is becoming less and less central to the control of violence and management of security. These states face new, and often closely inter-related, forms of violent politics and crime, the proliferation of small arms, and competition from a variety of private and community security organisations. These situations are compounded by the decomposition of the state's own security apparatuses, which is due, in part, to cutbacks in military expenditures and, in part, the scaling-down of external patronage.

Reforms may thus be driven by a variety of trends and considerations which are sometimes contradictory. They are designed to promote or achieve a variety of political, economic and social ends. Just as frequently, however, SSR has been forced on states by external forces. This may occur either as part of the process of rebuilding societies torn by conflict or as part of a process of fiscal reform, or both.

However, a number of distinctive regional scenarios have also emerged in setting the background to SSR:

Southern Africa

The end of the armed conflicts in the region, first in Mozambique and then in South Africa, and the emergence of SADC have transformed the dynamics in the region and facilitated far-reaching measures of demilitarization, security system restructuring, and regional integration.⁵ These processes are likely to deepen with the conclusion of the war in Angola. Already, common terminologies and frameworks are emerging in the sub-region in relation to security. In relation to the police for instance, “community policing” has become the norm, even though the term appears to mean different things in different counties. By contrast, the concept is still rare elsewhere in Africa.

Another common thread lies in the way that “Defence Forces” has become the accepted way of naming national military forces in SADC countries. Dialogues over security and Defence Reviews have become more and more accepted as the norm in the sub-region. Further convergence may become possible once the political rivalries within

SADC have been resolved. On the other hand, new threats, including small arms proliferation, violent/cross border crime, AIDS, drought, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have emerged in the sub-region.

The prevalence of post-liberation regimes in the sub-region defines the particular context of civil-military relations in southern Africa. Specific characteristics include the close relationship between ruling regimes and their militaries, and the executive-centred systems of civil control. Both of these factors have helped to maintain political stability as well as a greater awareness of force structures and dialectics among leaders. In some respects, such as in Zimbabwe, they have acted as a break on the emergence of truly democratic civil-military relations. In spite of the convergence noted above, there is also increasing evidence of certain divergent trajectories among these post-liberation regimes: South Africa, for instance, is moving in the direction of a much more transparent and democratic security system model than is present amongst the rest of its neighbours. At the same time, it is exercising considerable influence as a role model in the sub-region.

West Africa

There have been three major drivers of SSR in the sub-region. The first is the transition from authoritarian (largely military or military-backed) governments. These transitions differ greatly in quality and depth, with several instances of genuine democratisation (Mali, Benin, Senegal, Ghana, Cape Verde), but also a significant number of refurbished military and civilian autocracies. Increasingly, and intriguingly, there are cases of former military rulers returning to power through the electoral process (Kerekou in Benin, Obasanjo in Nigeria, and Toure in Mali).

The second major influence is the internal wars that have ravaged Liberia, Sierra Leone, and now Cote d'Ivoire. In parallel, there has been a concomitant deterioration in internal security in several of the remaining regimes in the sub-region, such as Nigeria. The end of the civil war in Sierra Leone has been followed by a comprehensive, if under-funded, SSR as the core of the peace-building effort. The peace settlement in the Cote d'Ivoire is also likely to be followed by a significant range of reforms and initiatives in the security system, as mandated by the current peace agreement. In Liberia, on the other hand, the failure to initiate any real "post-conflict" SSR following the 1997 peace agreement was directly responsible for the human rights abuses that emanated and the resurgence of civil war, and that showed the inappropriate nature of using the term "post-conflict" in this context. The increased involvement by Liberians themselves in driving the 2003 Accra Agreements may result in greater "demand" for SSR this time round.

A third, prospective influence is the ECOWAS conflict-management system, which is important as a framework for collective security and military co-operation; conflict-management, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention; and norm-setting in the security system. However, as specified below, this has so far had little actual influence on the way that SSR is being conducted in individual west African countries.

East Africa and the Horn

The main contextual factors here include the post-liberation regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the recently concluded Ethiopian-Eritrean war, the long-running conflict in the Sudan, the collapse of the State in Somalia, and the possible remilitarization of the Horn (Djibouti in particular) as a result of the war in Iraq and the war against terror. Ethiopia and Eritrea have launched far-reaching reforms of their security institutions, though these

differ quite substantially in terms of sponsorship, philosophy and focus. The recent change of leadership in Kenya may also open the way for a review of the way security institutions function, particularly as the new government seeks to restore relations with the donor community and international financial institutions that were damaged under the Moi regime.

Central Africa

This has been a volatile region of inter-locking conflicts and extensive military activity, involving a wide range of both official and non-state forces and interests. In addition to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has involved most neighbouring countries, there has been a succession of attempted coups in the Central African Republic, ending with the overthrow of the regime of President Ange Patasse in April 2003, and civil wars involving militias and armed forces in the Congo-Brazzaville. A favourable environment for SSR, therefore, does not exist. Prospects for the peace process in Burundi, which also entails major reforms in the security system, brightened considerably with the handing over of power from the transitional government of President (Major) Buyoya to a new administration headed by a Hutu President. In the event, however, rebels of the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) have refused to lay down their arms and an upsurge in fighting in mid-2003 has dampened any immediate prospects of either a lasting peace settlement or SSR.

Nevertheless, there have been two notable SSR initiatives in the region. In the first case, the conduct of a comprehensive national "Threat Assessment" in Rwanda in 2002 and the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in May 2003 point in the direction of potentially major developments in the security system. Second, the Defence Review in neighbouring Uganda, culminating in 2003, was carried out in a broadly consultative manner and involved an assessment of both military and non-military threats to the security of the State and the population. The Defence Review provides a framework for a longer-term defence transformation programme which the government is currently considering how to undertake.

North Africa

This region has been less affected by political change than other regions of the continent, particularly in terms of political liberalisation, with long-ruling regimes hanging on to power. Security affairs have traditionally been conducted with a relative lack of transparency. The lack of public information makes it difficult to determine what, if any, reform of security apparatuses and governance structures has occurred in recent years.

The main factors structuring the security climate in the sub-region are a) the continuing Middle-east conflict b) the war in the Western Sahara (Saharawi Republic) c) the Algerian conflict d) the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and e) the threat of terrorism, which has materialised in both Tunisia and Morocco.

How security is defined

Concepts of "Human Security" have recently made inroads in African security thinking. This trend has been revealed in documentation and has resulted partly from the influence of the UNDP Human Development Report, and partly from National Poverty Reduction Programmes, which mandate that even security institutions make a

contribution to poverty reduction. Arguably, though, earlier African antecedents of this concept exist in African philosophies and discourses (such those of Nyerere, Nkrumah and Senghor). These argued the primacy of basic human needs and specifically rejected the acquisition of military power as the objective of state policy. The precepts of human security resonate deeply with African cultural heritages. Africans realise intuitively, as well as from bitter experience, that “human security”, as opposed to the security of ruling regimes, is at the basis of any viable social and political order. For a variety of reasons, however, the concept in its present form has come to be viewed as donor-driven. Nevertheless, the indigenous versions of the concept remain and are probably most strikingly used in the South African White Paper on Defence (see Box 4A1.1).

Box 4A1.1. **South African White Paper on Defence**

The White Paper defines security as:

“... an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.”

The objectives of security policy are thus seen to include:

The consolidation of democracy, the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment, and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

The South African approach amply demonstrates the power and possibilities of the concept. It not only redefines the traditional concept of security, but also transforms the very basis and ethics of public policy, in at least three senses. First, it no longer anchors the definition of security on the State, but sees regional, international, as well as sub-state forces as involved in the production of security. Second, within the State itself, it re-conceptualises the institutions involved in security. Responsibility for territorial defence is no longer confused with overall responsibility for security, or with the military as the sole or primary security institution.⁶ Third, it sees “security” and “development” as inextricably linked and “mainstreams” security as both a public policy and a governance issue, therefore encouraging public scrutiny.

Traditional African conceptions of “security” have stressed non-military, existential components, including spiritual and psychological well-being (“peace of mind”), the enjoyment of good health, food security, protection from cyclical stresses like drought as well from crime and violence, and access to essential social and community services.⁷ This has been conducive to expansive definitions of what constitutes “security threats” in popular parlance (the Ugandan Defence Review, for instance, identified fully 134 “security threats”, of which only three were military in character) and has resulted in a diminished emphasis on military/strategic planning.

The lack of elaborated definitions of security does point to the frequent absence of a national security framework in African countries. It suggests, on the one hand, the limited role and capacity of civilians in strategic planning, and, on the other, the weak state of doctrine in African militaries. Not surprisingly, African militaries have traditionally had a

strong, even predominant, internal security role. In particular, democratic governments have brought little conception of strategic planning to their mandate, and only superficial notions of security and civil-military relations. This is not helped by the fact that there has been surprisingly little dialogue to create a common, coherent understanding of what “security” is or should be. Traditional concepts of “hard” security continue to hold sway in African armed forces, largely as a result of training in foreign institutions or a reliance on foreign strategic models in military academies.

While concepts of human security remain, and express, the ideal, many Africans are sceptical of the capacity of their “broken” states to attain the appropriate conditions for their realization of these goals. However, they do continue to insist on the minimum obligation of the State to protect life and property. The latter has become the predominant concern with the growing violence and political disorder in the region. However, the proliferation of private and community security organisations reflects a perception of the need to hedge their bets even at this level.

Assessment of findings

Virtually every African state is involved in some sort of reform that changes the way security institutions operate, are governed, funded, or relate to civilian constituencies. The key questions, though, are how reform is conducted and how much reform occurs, and whether, indeed, the “reform” in question can be described as “SSR” in the sense (and terminology) in which the OECD-DAC uses the term.

The findings of the Africa survey suggest that several criteria need to be used in order to understand African engagement in SSR and distinguish between different types of reform activity:

1. *Contextual factors*: these reflect both institutional (type of security architecture and security system governance mechanisms) and political (nature of regimes and transitions) dynamics. In terms of the latter, we can identify: post-conflict peace-building (Sierra Leone, Mozambique, South Africa, Rwanda); transitions from military rule (Ghana, Mali, Benin) or single-party authoritarian dispensations (Tanzania, The Seychelles, Cape Verde); conquest of the State (Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea); contested transitions (Burundi), and so forth. Further, within each of these scenarios, sub-categories can be identified. SSR is thus taking place in a variety of terrains which confer particular dynamics.

African security institutions have also played very different roles in facilitating, or forestalling, democratic transition in general and SSR in particular. They have permitted, or even collaborated in, regime change in some cases (e.g. Benin, Mali, South Africa), have connived directly or indirectly in regime rearrangement and various degrees of formal constitutionalisation (e.g. Ghana, Burkina, Guinea and Mauritania); have aborted transition processes that were not “going well” (Algeria, Abacha’s Nigeria); or have backed authoritarian rulers who opted to resist popular democratic pressures through repression (Togo, Cameroon and Mobutu’s Zaire). African militaries have also been known to shift ground and reconsider their political stance over the longer term, either in terms of support for, or resistance to, greater democratisation (Nigeria and Ghana in the first instance, Burundi in the second).

A number of striking and idiosyncratic reform scenarios have thus developed. A first scenario is where security institutions have partnered with civilians in transforming security institutions in the context of a genuine or relatively robust democratic transition

(South Africa and, to some degree, Mozambique). Another is where reform of the security system, driven from above by the regime, is occurring with limited public participation and in the context of limited democratisation (Ethiopia, Uganda).⁸ A third (and contrasting) scenario is where democratic change, accompanied by significant improvements in civil-military relations, has yet to result in commensurate change in the internal organisation and governance of the security system (Benin, Ghana, and Mali to a lesser degree).⁹ A fourth is where the security system is undergoing extensive restructuring even though the security institutions themselves are perceived as hostile or beleaguered (Sierra Leone). Further scenarios can doubtless be identified. The conclusion is that the reform of security institutions is not regime-dependent, democratisation is not by itself a guarantee of reform, and illiberal regimes are not necessarily resistant to reform (as they define it).

2. *The political, security or financial imperatives to be addressed.* SSR may be initiated for a variety of reasons. However, peace-building (which may include power-sharing between warring factions, demobilisation, building new integrated armies); fiscal reform and deficit-reduction; improved control of crime; and the desire to enhance civil control, human rights, or the legitimacy of security institutions, seem to be the most common reasons for launching SSR. By contrast, restructuring as a result of changing military technology or strategic environments is relatively rare, although the latter was a powerful factor in shaping the South African programme.

Sometimes, however, SSR has been a by-product of other reforms, such as *public expenditure management reforms*. For instance, the introduction of Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) has been important in mainstreaming African military budgeting, bringing it into line with other state agencies and making them at least somewhat more transparent than previously.¹⁰ *Civil service reforms* may also have exerted some influence. One example of this is the impact of the Civil Service Law of 1993 on the organisation and staffing of the civil wing of Ghana's Ministry of Defence. *Governance Programmes* also seem to be facilitating openings into the security system, as has been the case with the UNDP-sponsored National Police Reform Programme in Ghana. In addition to MTEF, *National Poverty Reduction Strategies* (NPRS) have led to security system – wide planning, usually under the term “Public Safety Sector”, although in many cases the profile of the security system in NPRS is actually quite low. Ghana and Mozambique again are examples of this type of situation.

The problem, of course, is that these objectives may, and often do, conflict, to the detriment of democratic control and human rights in particular. There is also a danger that excessive emphasis on deficit-reduction and fiscal stabilisation may gut security institutions. This has already happened in many African states.

3. *The scope of reform*, which has ranged from the broad, relatively co-ordinated doctrinal and institutional reforms in South Africa to the piecemeal, “fire-fighting” approaches that tend to be characteristic of most African countries. The latter are usually designed to respond to particular exigencies. The most comprehensive SSRs have been attempted in the aftermath of conflict (see below), as part of a peace agreement. Outside of this context, most African regimes are modest and selective in what they attempt to accomplish in the security system.

The result is inherent lopsidedness in the kinds of reforms that are typically attempted. For instance, such reforms tend to focus on a) on practitioner needs (anti-crime capacity building, professional training, peacekeeping training, etc.) rather than the needs

of oversight institutions; b) the military¹¹ rather more than the police (although this is being rectified) and far more on both than on Intelligence; and c) the formal rather than the informal or privatized security actors, such as local militia, vigilantes, community self-policing groups, private security companies, etc. They also tend to be short- rather than long-term in focus (e.g. disarmament and demobilisation rather than proper reintegration and professional development). As Box 4A1.2 suggests, then, a holistic approach to SSR (consistent with the OECD-DAC usage of the term) has been attempted in few cases.

Box 4A1.2. African “SSR”

South Africa and Sierra Leone are among the few examples where SSR in the OECD-DAC sense of the word has been attempted. Indeed, SSR as a co-ordinated, multi-agency reform has yet to establish itself in the official African security discourse. At the moment, “reform” is seen in specific institutional terms (e.g. “police reforms”, “armed forces reforms”, “intelligence reforms”), characterised by few linkages across security institutions,* let alone linkages to oversight institutions or civilian agencies. What this suggests, in short, is that while various forms of SSR (loosely interpreted) may have been attempted or are in progress, few of these currently conform to the OECD-DAC definition. However, there are also several examples of African SSR that go well beyond the specifications and vision of the OECD-DAC. The objectives of ethnic/racial/gender “representivity” and internal democracy that were placed very publicly on the agenda in the Ethiopian and South African reforms are unprecedented and represent new horizons of equity and transparency for this sector.

* An example of this is the concurrent reforms in the Ghana Police (funded by the UNDP) and the Ghana Ministry of Defence and armed forces (funded by DFID). There are no overarching elements in these reforms, even though the two institutions collaborate closely in crime control and (in theory) disaster relief.

4. *The extent to which SSR incorporates, or is governed by, formal principles, such as a strategic framework or fundamental law.* Examples where this is the case are the South African Defence Review and Intelligence Review, the Mozambican Security and Defence Law of 1997, even though the difference is that the Mozambican initiative lacked a proper security review and the same degree of popular participation, and the “Code of Conduct” for the Malian armed forces. This kind of broad legal framework, or fundamental law, to regulate the security system has been popular in east and central Europe, but remains uncommon in Africa where Acts to regulate the individual services seem to be more the norm. In addition, only in the cases of South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda did SSR commence with an actual threat assessment/strategic review. Sierra Leone is in the process of conducting a strategic review.

5. *The processes involved.* In a number of cases, SSR has been preceded by negotiation and dialogue between political parties, civil society organisations, and the target institutions themselves. This was the case, to different degrees, in South Africa, Mali and Tanzania, as well as in the prelude to formal peace agreements in countries such as Mozambique and Sierra Leone. However, such broad and open dialogue is still the exception rather than the rule. By contrast, many African countries and defence establishments, especially those not emerging from conflict, are involved in “stealth reform”, to which they would rather not call attention, and which dispenses as far as possible with public dialogue. As in Latin America and eastern Europe, military self-reform has also emerged as

an important element in the equation. This is not surprising given the fact that, in many countries, the military remains far ahead of newly elected civil dispensations in their knowledge of defence issues, and are thus in a position to retain some initiative.

There may well also be good reasons for conducting reform on the quiet. Military expenditures continue to be a controversial issue in many countries. Relations between security establishments and citizens can be strained, and many newly elected governments are unsure of their ground when dealing with the military. Correspondingly, reforms concerning the security system differ in their degree of transparency, and hence researchability (see Box 4A1.3). “Open” reform is almost always the result of one or both of the following situations: a post-conflict situation where force structures form a key focus of political negotiations; and/or a “political revolution” which aims at broader political transformation (both apply to various degrees in South Africa and Ethiopia).

Box 4A1.3. **How easy is it to conduct research on SSR?**

Information on the South African programme is widely available in print, electronic format and other media both inside and outside the country. Though not as well researched, Mali’s civil-military programme has been accessible to the public, although not to the same degree as far as internal military issues are concerned. As regards Ghana and Benin, for instance, two other countries where significant progress has been made in civil-military relations, information has not been as readily available in the public domain. Even less is available about the majority of African countries with Nigeria being something of a special case. Owing to the contested and controversial nature of military rule in that country, the Obasanjo regime has been fairly public with some of its plans for military restructuring, and has initiated a number of dramatic public actions against the military brass from the previous regime. At the same time, it has been fairly secretive about some of its policy initiatives such as the training agreement with the MPRI. However, the existence of a large and determined body of civilian researchers has meant that information has been relatively available in the public domain. In Uganda, a public information campaign has accompanied the Defence Review.

SSRs may also be distinguished in terms of their *generation*. Current generation SSRs are governed by certain broad normative principles. These include democratic control and accountability, public participation, the latest public expenditure management norms, and a holistic approach. Such principles may be distinguished from earlier reforms of security institutions. Examples are those in Nigeria in the aftermath of the civil war, in South Africa as it prosecuted its war of destabilisation against the ANC and its neighbours, and in Uganda in the aftermath of the NRM victory. Current SSRs in all three countries bear little semblance to these earlier exercises.

6. The *actors or players* involved, in particular the context, form and degree of donor involvement. Unlike the traditional “military assistance programs”, SSR has tended to be much more *development donor*-dominated and multi-agency in character. Donors have been driven by different objectives and have utilized a variety of entry points. In general, the three most important of these have been a) post-conflict reconstruction b) public expenditure reform and c) poverty-reduction programmes, or some combination of the three. Donor interventions have tended to be characterised by lack of co-ordination, even between departments in the same government. However, this problem has increasingly

been recognised. The best example at the country level are the Conflict Prevention Pools in the UK, which has informed a change in approach by the Canadians. A broader inter-donor co-ordination is also emerging in the EU. On the whole, the role of external actors has been much weaker in shaping SSR in Africa than in regions of greater strategic interest to donor countries such as eastern and central Europe in relation to the EU and NATO, and Latin America in relation to the US. Here, SSR has also tended to have greater normative coherence.

The role of donors has been limited in most cases to funding and facilitating disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR), usually co-ordinated by the local UN Mission on the peace-building side or the UNDP and the World Bank on the development side. Direct donor engagement with SSR as such is still relatively rare. The few existing examples include DFID, which has exercised leadership in the development of SSR as concept, in Sierra Leone and now Uganda and, increasingly, Ghana,¹³ and perhaps the role of the UNDP in the development of the Malian Code of Conduct. DFID has also been involved in police reform in several SADC countries. In South Africa, there was extensive donor involvement at several levels in the police reform process. The British were involved through BMATT in military integration and retraining in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and now Sierra Leone (under the IMATT programme). “Traditional” bilateral relations in the military arena continue to flourish as is the case, for example, with extensive links maintained by the US through IMET and other programmes. Much of this focuses on peacekeeping training (ACRI, RECAMP, BMATT again). In a number of cases, donor influence in, or oversight of, SSR has been almost total, directly so in the case of Sierra Leone or indirectly in the case of Guinea-Bissau. In spite of this, donor impact in SSR has been determined very much by the political will and responsiveness of the regime involved. The “good performers” Mozambique and Sierra Leone can here be contrasted with Guinea-Bissau.

There are other types of external involvement worth mentioning, even though these take the form of providing a forum for dialogue and civics lessons rather than direct reform initiatives, and address a regional rather than country context.¹⁴ These include the work of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).¹⁵

In terms of *local actors*, SSRs have tended by their very nature to be driven primarily by the executive branch of governments and donors. With a few exceptions, most prominently South Africa, parliaments have been relatively marginal actors in defence management and oversight, constitutional provisions notwithstanding. However, several regional NGOs such as Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) and GERDES-Afrique have been active in dealing with security issues, as have a number of African civil society networks (including the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), SaferAfrica, and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), which have been active in running their own fora and research networks and advising donors, African governments and military institutions. NGOs enjoyed a particularly high visibility in the South African programme, in part due to the transparency and consultative character of that programme, in part due to the unusual sophistication of local actors in this arena. In much of Africa, however, the role of NGOs/CSOs has been limited by a combination of political constraints and limited capacity and interest. Surprisingly, the role of political parties in SSR in Africa seems to be even more negligible. Participatory spaces for non-state actors are often best enhanced where donors specifically provide for them as a condition of assistance, as DFID has increasingly tried to do.

Some reference should also be made to the role of regional and sub-regional “security complexes”. While these have aimed for mutual confidence-building and norm-setting, their actual influence on SSR at this stage remains debatable, other than perhaps in the area of planning for peacekeeping and possibly crime control. Their establishment has also given rise to new problems of accountability. For instance, many of the interventions conducted under the aegis of ECOWAS and SADC did not involve consultation with or approval by national legislatures or political constituencies. The interventions carried out by these sub-regional bodies have also revealed significant internal cleavages, suggesting that diplomatic and security collaboration still have some way to go.

Assessing overall country performance

While it may still be too soon to judge, African countries appear to have performed unevenly on issues of SSR, ranging from solid progress toward democratic civil-security relations (South Africa, Mali, Benin, Senegal, Ghana) to others (such as Togo, Cameroon, Guinea, and, until recently, Kenya) where the military and security forces are deployed routinely and blatantly against political opponents. In between the two extremes are a large number of more fluid cases where formal institutions have been established, under the constitution, to oversee security, but where such institutions have yet to develop the requisite capacity. Paradoxically, durable civilian regimes seem to have been slowest to transform their civil-security relations in a more fully democratic direction. Such regimes, and here these are taken to include former liberation movements (Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia), liberalising single-party regimes (such as Kenya, and, until recently, Cote d’Ivoire) and quasi-democracies (e.g. Senegal and Botswana) tend to have executive-centred systems of control and weak legislative and civil society oversight. There is some consensus that South Africa’s SSR has set new standards, or “best practices”, in terms of process both in terms of inclusiveness and consultation, the comprehensiveness of its scope, transparency, and ownership, which was primarily, if not entirely, indigenous.

SSR in post-conflict environments

Ironically, overall the most hospitable political environment for “full-bore” SSRs in Africa has been post-conflict situations, which are also the kind of context that, for good or for ill, facilitates relatively unfettered donor interventions. On the other hand, politics apart, these are also the precise contexts that pose the most formidable challenges to SSR, owing to:

- Lack of functioning security institutions as well as the most basic civil institutions capable of undertaking complex tasks of designing and implementing SSR.
- Proliferation of both formal and informal armed formations, requiring complex and demanding DDDR processes.
- The need to eliminate both the embedded legacies of violent conflict, such as militaristic values and a culture of impunity, and the material and economic supports for continued violence, including arms proliferation and illicit resource extraction.
- The need to resettle displaced populations and marginalised youth.
- The need to restore some form of economic normalcy and long-term development.

However, these are not the only reasons why post-conflict SSR has such a mixed record. As an approach to building stable and democratic civil-security relations, the foreign-brokered peace process¹⁶ is fundamentally flawed. To begin with, negotiations

have usually been limited to armed parties with the most direct investment in violence, rather than the forces advocating for peace. Donors have tended to focus on short-term objectives, such as securing an early end to hostilities, followed by demobilisation, rather than the reintegration of ex-combatants, re-professionalisation of the armed forces, and building of institutions of democratic oversight. These latter tasks are all necessarily longer-term, more complex and resource-intensive processes. Since the “demand” for SSR may come predominantly from donors, and is not “owned” by indigenous forces or grounded in local norms or culture, they also tend to be relatively shallow and unsustainable. Finally, though important in forging peace agreements and forcing the initial process of political liberalisation, external influence has been much more limited in shaping election outcomes and virtually irrelevant in determining the nature of the regime emerging from them.

Even so, conflict situations are not without their silver lining. Certainly, one “positive” outcome is the way in which conflict forces even greater attention to issues of SSR. This is manifest in four ways:

- A clearer recognition that settling the question of the composition, disposition and control of force structures is central to any political settlement, and ultimately, to democratisation itself.
- More holistic approaches to dealing with force structures, both formal and informal.
- Leaders who tend to be much more switched on to both political and military issues.
- The fact that conflict has often given rise to new institutions, social and economic relations, and forms of consciousness.

Key constraints to SSR

In spite of the contextual differences, and some significant exceptions, SSR programmes in Africa, where they do exist, tend to be characterised by a number of general shortcomings. They are often:

- Donor-driven and lack local ownership (e.g. Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau). By contrast, there are certain programmes with high levels of local ownership (South Africa, Ethiopia, Mali).
- Under-funded – true of virtually all instances.
- Ill-adjusted to domestic institutional and resource capabilities (Sierra Leone).
- Non-holistic and ad-hoc, lacking co-ordination and the benefit of an overarching national security policy.¹⁷ To date most African countries lack a national security policy and defence policy, although the ongoing work on a new “Common” African policy may provide an enabling framework for such developments at the national level (see Box 4A1.4).
- Fragmented or lop-sided in focus.
- Characterised by lack of political will, weak government leadership and inter-agency collaboration, lack of transparency and participation, and weak, or non-existent, policy and strategic frameworks. This is true of most instances of SSR.
- Lacking adequate linkage with the regional context and emerging collective security mechanisms. Except in the South African case, SSR has remained essentially a national exercise with little regard for the evolution of regional collective security mechanisms, other than in the area of peacekeeping.

Box 4A1.4. Common African Defence and Security Policy

During the inaugural Summit of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, the AU Assembly stressed the need for a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) in compliance with the Constitutive Act of the AU to safeguard against “common threats” to the continent. The objectives and goals of the CADSP are to, *inter alia*, enhance a common vision of defence and security with the expansion of the definition of both to include human security; ensure a collective response to threats to Africa; promote mutual trust and confidence among African States; and to provide a framework for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. A Draft Framework for the CADSP was passed in January 2004. On 28th February 2004 in Sirté, Libya, all Heads of State adopted a Solemn Declaration on a CADSP.*

* See www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/cadspjan04frm.pdf.

Finally, there appear to be significant gaps between formal structures and informal (or real) practices in this arena, often because of underlying power relations. A good example of this is worth quoting from the NDI report on francophone legislatures, where it was found that:

... legislators – despite their interest in the military – appeared to take a minimalist, hands-off approach on military issues and questions of national defence. Although appropriate committees exist for such oversight in the legislatures of the countries visited, parliamentarians seemed to exercise little genuine oversight of the military. None of the legislatures visited possessed in-house expertise on defence issues, nor have they sought outside expertise on such issues when reviewing budgets or defence related bills. Rather, the legislator is expected to vote on bills drafted by the executive branch.¹⁹

This statement has lost none of its force since it was first made (in 1997) and could easily be replicated for most African governments.

Some of these shortcomings spring inevitably from the dynamics of weak states, the lack of capacity of policy and oversight institutions, and the often severely deteriorated character of security establishments. However, they are as much the result of the inherent limitations of the SSR concept itself and the circumstances under which it rose to prominence. OECD-DAC has tried to confer some rigour and uniformity to the concept, stressing for example a governance dimension, a holistic and integrated approach addressing the needs of both security and development, and of security institutions as well as oversight bodies, etc. However, “SSR” in Africa unfortunately appears to have become somewhat of a catch-all phrase, with donors pursuing many different approaches, not all consistent with the objectives set out by the OECD-DAC. While some donor approaches have tried to capture these comprehensive principles, in some if not all contexts, as is the case with the UK’s approach to SSR in Uganda for instance (see Box 4A1.5), others have stressed specific elements consistent with national policy priorities or heritage.

The outcomes of this fragmented approach include:

- Persistent conflicts in most donor-supported SSR programs between fiscal and security imperatives.²⁰ At least until recently, the primary objective of SSR for many donors was to reduce security expenditures, which were deemed counter to “development”.

Box 4A1.5. Uganda's Security Policy Framework

The first phase of Uganda's defence review involved a Strategic Security Assessment that consisted of analysing the security threats of both a military and non-military nature that Uganda could expect to face in the future. Once key threats had been identified, categorised and ranked, then a cross-governmental discussion took place to assess which ministries and agencies had responsibility for addressing which security threats. The outcome of this assessment was a Security Policy Framework (SPF) paper which outlines a new integrated and wide-ranging concept of security for Uganda. The SPF currently has the status of a consultative document. However, it provides a basis for an eventual national security policy if the government decides to further debate and refine the framework. The SPF provided a basis for developing a new defence policy. A number of other security actors, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Internal and External Security Organisations, also reviewed their own policy frameworks in light of the SPF.

- Prevalence of narrow institutional approaches, focusing on, for instance, police to the exclusion of the military or the other way around, or conflict and justice mechanisms but not security institutions. This can result in different donors occupying particular turfs within the same country.
- Cleavage between concepts of “human security”, espoused mainly by international development organisations, and traditional (“hard”) security doctrines, which continue to be articulated by African security establishments and some OECD countries.

In particular, little has been put in place to enhance the capacity of civilians to make an input into strategic planning or oversight processes. Moreover, the intent behind some approaches to SSR seems, consistent with the term “reform”, to be a re-engineering of often decrepit and discredited institutions and a re-centering of the state in the security system, rather than a fundamental rethinking of security, strategic concepts and frameworks, and governance institutions. The donor SSR literature is often suffused with technocratic and apolitical conceptions, often derived from previous, and often unsuccessful, exercises in public sector reform. The central priority in most African countries, however, is to alter the relations of power within the security system and society at large. This is the often case in societies with a history of direct or indirect military dominance, as a necessary prelude to civil control, transformation of institutional culture, etc.

The evolving international environment may also have a significant impact on how SSR may be conceived or rethought. Within a number of OECD countries, the “war on terror” has been accompanied by curbs on due process and traditional civil and other rights. Within Africa and other developing regions with even weaker traditions of protection of human rights, the anti-terror approach may have a major impact on the way “security” is conceived and SSR approached, for example by downplaying issues of governance, shifting the emphasis back from “soft” (or “human”) security to traditional (or “hard”) security; reviving cold-war partnerships with dictatorial regimes; suppressing local opposition and undermining legitimate local struggles for group rights by dubbing them as “terrorist”. This is a game that some African regimes are already playing well.²¹

There is thus a need to ensure that issues of governance and human security continue to receive appropriate emphasis in SSR, and that the necessary short-term trade-offs do

not compromise long-term SSR goals. Broadening the range of local stakeholders in the process is critical to these outcomes.

Conclusions

There is a need to understand the diversity of problems and sensitivities as well as process issues to be addressed as regards SSR in Africa. There is also a need to consider the full range of resources required to address them, which can be substantial, and the potential conflict of objectives that can result. A number of observations from the survey are particularly pertinent and should be reiterated.

The survey suggests that SSR can be undertaken for a wide range of reasons, and the findings allude to the potential conflict of objectives that can result in the process. Examples include those between the need to enhance democratic control and accountability, on the one hand, and operational capacity (effective protection from security threats) on the other. Another tension is between deficit reduction, which has led to often unsustainable cuts in military expenditures in particular, and the need to invest in effective and sustainable security structures as a necessary prerequisite for, *inter alia*, development.

The way around such conflicts is to: a) make the principles behind reform transparent and coherent and b) co-ordinate reforms so that they consolidate rather than undermine each other. Secondly, such conflicts can also be minimised only if there is a participatory framework in which the concerns of all stakeholders are fully articulated and addressed. Participatory spaces for all stakeholders, and particularly for non-state actors, are in turn often best enhanced where donors specifically provide for them as a condition of assistance (as DFID has increasingly tried to do).

A second critical observation is that African SSR has tended to be both piecemeal and characterised by lack of transparency. This is, in part, because of the political sensitivity of such exercises. While this is not ideal, there is perhaps a realistic reason for these piecemeal approaches. “Full-bore” SSR is expensive in terms of resources, institutional capacity, and political will and leadership. Thus programmes deliberately designed to accomplish long-term transformation are the exception rather than the rule. South Africa is perhaps the only country with the capacity to attempt (simultaneous) reforms of such scope. Indeed, given the institutional and resource constraints that characterise African countries, there is a real possibility that the elevated benchmarks often associated with SSR will represent overkill. A set of more modest core goals, such as gradual and monitorable improvements in transparency, in sensitivity to human rights issues, and in the quality of defence and security management, would be more realistic.

Third, the deterioration of the security situation in many African countries, often as an outcrop of democratisation, and, in particular, the explosion of armed robbery and other forms of violent crime, means that both security institutions and publics have tended to place the emphasis on trying to guarantee physical security and may become rather tolerant of possible abuses of legal and human rights. The engagement of the military in crime control, which often reflects greater public confidence in the military than police, is one indication of this. But even more indicative is loss of confidence that the state (to the extent to which it is not itself a “security threat”) can provide any sort of security, and the turn to private and community security mechanisms.

Paradoxically, then, while much effort has gone over the last decade into elaborating “extended” concepts of security such as “human security”, Africans in many cases have become increasingly concerned with “security” in its narrowest and most “primordial” sense, physical security. This is not, however, a rationale for donors to back away from a “governance” or “human rights” perspective on reform. It is, though, an argument to incorporate both operational and governance perspectives into their SSR programmes, thus ensuring effective law enforcement and public order in a context of accountability and good governance of the security system. It is, in particular, also a reason to avoid excessive emphasis on deficit reduction and fiscal stabilisation likely to disable security institutions even further.

Organisational details

African Security Dialogue and Research, Accra Ghana (www.africansecurity.org)

The African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) is an independent, non-governmental institute based in Accra, Ghana, specializing in issues of security and their relationship with democratic consolidation. The core aims of the ASDR are to:

- Foster dialogue and consensus with regard to issues of conflict and security in Africa, focusing in particular on the role and governance of security forces.
- Undertake research, analysis, monitoring, and advocacy on issues relating to civil-military relations and national and regional security in Africa.
- Enhance oversight capabilities of national legislatures and elected representatives by promoting collaboration with defence experts and researchers.
- Strengthen the capabilities and resources of civil society and NGOs in the analysis and discussion of defence and security sector issues.
- Improve overall availability of defence- and security-related information in the public domain through support for new research and development of a database.

Centre for Democracy and Development, Lagos and London (www.cdd.org.uk)

The Centre for Democracy and Development is a non-governmental organisation which aims to promote the values of democracy, peace and human rights in Africa and especially in the west African sub-region.

CDD works through advocacy, training and research in the areas of governance, human rights, peace and security, environment, gender, social and economic development.

Current projects include:

- Promoting Constitutionalism in Africa.
- Promoting Dialogue as a means of conflict resolution, and Building the Capacity of Security Actors, Oversight Bodies and Civil Society.
- Private Military Intervention and Arms Proliferation in Conflicts in Africa.
- Peace and Security Cluster in NEPAD.
- Children in Armed Conflict.
- Stability-Security Monitor (SM).

Notes

1. Dr. Eboe Hutchful is Director of African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), based in Accra, Ghana; Dr. Kayode Fayemi is Director of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), based in Lagos and London. See Organisational details for additional information on these two organisations.
2. Ten countries were omitted from the survey because there were few relevant developments in the security system, or because information about such developments was difficult to obtain. The countries not covered are (in west Africa) Cape Verde, The Gambia, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo; (in southern Africa) Swaziland; (in island Africa) Madagascar and The Comoros.
3. The following page provides a bibliography of selected publications on SSR in Africa.
4. Among the official websites are those of the South African Department of Defence (www.mil.za), the Tanzania Ministry of Defence, the Mauritius Ministry of Defence and Home Affairs, the Nigerian Army (www.Nigerianarmy.net) and the armed forces of Egypt.
5. One product of this has been mutual confidence building and the emergence of a concept of “defensive restructuring” in the sub-region. See Gavin Cawthra and Bjorn Moller (eds) (1997), *Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
6. According to the White Paper, while the SANDF remains an important security instrument of last resort, it is “... no longer the dominant security institution. The responsibility for ensuring the security of South African people is now shared by many government departments and ultimately vests in Parliament” (p. 6).
7. Surveys conducted under the World Bank’s *Voices of the Poor* suggest not only that popular African conceptions of “security” may be quite different from the usage in the strategic (and official) literature, but that the word “security” may sometimes be almost impossible to translate into vernacular languages, in which there are no direct equivalents. See for instance World Bank (1999), *Consultations with the Poor: Ghana Country Synthesis Report*, Washington: World Bank, July, p. 46.
8. Note that the degree of donor involvement in the two SSR programmes differs significantly, high in the case of Uganda, low in the case of Ethiopia (even though the latter is now receiving the attentions of a British Defence Advisory Team).
9. Parenthetically, these examples demonstrate that even the most successful pro-democracy movements have little agenda on the security system in general and the military in particular. Their notion of “reform” seems to be limited to keeping the military out of politics, cutting their budgets (which they have done with some success), and involving them more in peacekeeping and domestic development effort. Beyond this, the military is left alone to its own devices. Militaries, often suffering a severe bout of political marginalisation, have gone along reluctantly with these schemes.
10. This observation is drawn from a study on “Military Budgeting in Africa: the Processes and Mechanisms of Control”, carried out jointly by SIPRI and ASDR.
11. In addition, conversations on the military have tended to focus far more on its perceived development role, and its relationship with the civil population (rather than, say, on improving its obviously critical operational capacity), with the result that “what were previously considered secondary roles for the armed forces may indeed become areas of primary focus” (National Democratic Institute (NDI), *Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central Africa, March 18 to April 10, 1997*, Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, 1997, p. 12).
12. An example of this is the concurrent reforms in the Ghana Police (funded by the UNDP) and the Ghana Ministry of Defence and armed forces (funded by DFID). There are no overarching elements in these reforms, even though the two institutions collaborate closely in crime control and (in theory) disaster relief.
13. Usefully, DFID is also helping to promote “South-South Dialogues on Defence Transformation” in the context of its work in these countries.
14. And hence may not appear in the country tables.
15. The ACSS has run annual Senior Leader Seminars for civilian and military officials (in addition to a variety of sub-regional meetings on topical security issues); the GCA has an annual Africa-wide forum on civil-military relations; and the NDI has focused in particular on the role of parliaments in defence management and oversight.

16. Note that this discussion does not extend to those situations where post-conflict SSR has been driven exclusively or predominantly by indigenous forces, such as in Ethiopia, Eritrea, or South Africa.
17. And often contradictory. A case in point is Ghana, where the current government, like many elected regimes, is facing the paradox of being committed (in theory) to demilitarizing national politics, and yet having to use the military extensively in crime control (with sometimes unpleasant consequences for legality and human rights) as well as expanding its role in development (both apparently popular with the public).
18. See www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/cadspjan04frm.pdf.
19. National Democratic Institute (NDI), Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central Africa, March 18 to April 10, 1997, Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, 1997, p. 20.
20. This has been a big issue in Uganda for instance, with the donors imposing an arbitrary cap of 2% of GDP on military expenditures in the late 1990s, and the Museveni government insisting that much more spending is required in view of the continuing security threats to the country. The Defence Review that was recently completed is intended to establish a baseline upon which security threats and defence spending needs can be more objectively assessed.
21. For example: Ethiopia, which is emerging as one of the “frontline” African states in the “war on terror”, has launched a number of unannounced forays into Somalia on the pretext of suppressing “terrorist” and “fundamentalist” groups (in reality, this likely includes groups with irredentist claims on the Ogaden).

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ANNEX 4.A2

*Security System Reform in Asia-Pacific**by*Dipankar Banerjee and Mallika Joseph¹

The security environment in Asia has undergone a dramatic transformation in the last quarter of a century. Authoritarian dictatorships and one party rule have given way in a large number of countries to multi-party democracy. Yet security system governance remains woefully weak in almost all countries across the region. Old security paradigms still predominate with the result that security reform processes tend to focus narrowly on the military and are not always consistent with improving governance.

The survey found that the concept of SSR, as defined by the OECD-DAC, finds no place in security discourses in the Asia region. This is the case both at a governmental level, and among the academic and policy communities. However, the survey also found that while the term “SSR” may be alien, the concerns are not. Non-traditional security issues such as trafficking in drugs and weapons, refugees, the environment, and governance problems are increasingly coming to be seen as major security issues in their own right that concern the general population.

The key priority for SSR in Asia is to foster an understanding of the need for more integrated and wide-ranging concepts of security that address human development concerns. The survey confirms the impact made by external actors, including multilateral development agencies, donor governments, and non-governmental organisations in getting this issue on government reform agendas. Yet donors themselves still lack a common approach to SSR in the region. This has made it more difficult for partner countries to develop new institutional frameworks that will allow for traditional and non-traditional security concerns to be addressed in a more integrated manner.

The events of September 11, 2001 have had a mixed impact in the region: while they have set in motion some positive changes in countries like Afghanistan, where attempts are being made to reconstruct the state security apparatus, in others the state has assumed more power and fragile civil society voices are being stifled under programmes for countering terrorism. There is a risk that recent progress in developing countries may be reversed in some countries if external engagement is not sustained.

Introduction

This section presents the findings of a survey of security system reform (SSR) in Asia that was conducted during 2002-03. The survey covered 26 countries across four sub-regions of Asia: Central Asia, South Asia, southeast Asia, and Asia-Pacific.² (Box 4.1 provides further detail on how the survey was carried out.)

The Asian countries covered in this study straddle half the globe and include about thirty per cent of the world's population. An enormous diversity is encompassed within this spread of countries: from India, with armed forces numbering about a million and a quarter, to the newly emerged Timor-Leste, with a population of less than half a million and a barely formed military. Against this backdrop no simple categorisation of SSR is possible. While the SSR concept is new to the region, the democratic and developmental principles which underpin this policy agenda are receiving greater attention within the context of wider state reforms. Within the security system, however, old security paradigms still predominate with the result that security reform processes tend to focus narrowly on the military and are not always consistent with improving governance.

This section is structured as follows:

- First, it examines the availability of information on SSR issues in Asia.³
- Second, it examines the context for SSR in Asia, highlighting the factors that have put security on government reform agendas.
- Third, it focuses on how “security” is defined in the region, and contrasts this with the OECD-DAC SSR concept.
- Finally, it assesses the status of SSR in Asia, highlighting key factors that are necessary to understand current trends in this region.

Information availability

Information was gathered from a variety of sources including: the internet, research institutions in the Asia region, participation in regional conferences on security matters, interviews with government officials and members of security establishments, and a range of governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental institutions.⁴ The Delhi Library Network and the collections at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi were particularly useful. The survey also drew upon the country-specific expertise of the team members.

The largest obstacle to data collection was the general lack of quality information on SSR which is a new concept in the Asia region. While there is a wealth of security-related information on issues ranging from more traditional security matters such as defence and policing to wider “human security” challenges that include environmental security, trafficking in humans, HIV/AIDs, etc., there is little systematic analysis of these issues from a governance perspective. This survey was therefore pioneering in its effort to bring together a disparate body of information on the topic in a manner that bridges “hard” and “soft” security issues. In the absence of an established governmental and academic discourse on SSR, the OECD-DAC definition was the point of reference for the research.

In the Central Asian societies, in particular, which have long been closed to outside scrutiny, the data was predominantly collected from external sources. Across Asia in general, care had to be exercised in processing data as few governmental sources offer a critical assessment of security matters. In south Asia, the primary source of information

was news portals and magazines though the annual reports produced by various Indian ministries, including Defence and External Affairs, were useful. In southeast Asia, none of the government portals provided relevant information, with the exception of Cambodia's; and even here the information pertains only to "demilitarization". Another useful source of information on southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands was donor web-sites, though few provided critical assessments of their activities.

In general, across Asia, there appears to be a correlation between the form of government and the availability of information on security issues. Democratic countries tend to be more transparent about their reform activities, while there is generally much less information available in countries with authoritarian regimes, with the exception of what is provided by official sources which is difficult to cross-check and verify. The absence of a common language of "security" across the region further hampers efforts to increase openness and debate.

Context for SSR

Three broad developments have impacted upon the environment for SSR in Asia in recent years. Starting in the 1990s the traditional state-centric realist paradigm of security was challenged by new approaches emphasising human security and cooperative security. Attention increasingly turned to a new range of non-traditional security threats such as environmental degradation, population movements, trafficking in people, drugs and arms, shortages of energy resources, and the harmful impact of globalization on marginalised groups. This has served to broaden the security agenda and focus greater attention both on governance issues and the role of civilians in security policy processes. Human rights and development issues have slowly come to be seen as important security issues in their own right even as the capacity of governments to meet development challenges has been declining.

This trend towards broader, non-military notions of security was strengthened in some ways by the economic downturn that struck the region in the autumn of 1997, affecting southeast Asia in particular. This crisis not only exposed the vulnerabilities facing many segments of Asia's population, but also led to reductions in defence spending in many countries, slowing down new acquisitions as well as exerting pressure on force levels in regional armies. The dependence of many Asian countries on international assistance to bail out their failing economies gave external institutions leverage over national policies and defence expenditures which have long been seen as squeezing out social and economic spending. This, in turn, resulted in increased pressures for accountability and transparency among security institutions, and adherence to human rights norms.

However, the trend towards broader notions of security suffered a major setback after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and the onset of the global "war on terror". In many Asian countries terrorism has now come to be seen as the principal security challenge facing the state and its population. This has adversely affected the climate for SSR as state-centric realist paradigms of security have begun to reassert themselves in security planning. Of particular concern is that the police and armed forces in many countries have been given greater powers for search and arrest under the guise of tackling terrorism. In addition, special laws have also been passed in many cases to restrict civil liberties and civil oversight of security institutions. This has not facilitated efforts to increase accountability.

More recently, China's increasingly assertive regional role as well as North Korea's declaration that it has a nuclear weapon capability have raised concern across the region and may result in some countries developing their own military capabilities to counter the perceived emerging threat. These factors increase the risk of an arms race that may threaten recent developmental gains across the region.

The security challenges facing Asia are nonetheless diverse and need to be understood at a sub-regional and country level.

Central Asia

The five states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) emerged as independent nations just over a decade ago. Under Soviet rule their identity and cohesion was deliberately undermined through the arbitrary demarcation of state boundaries and the forced settlement of Russian and other ethnic minority populations in these Republics. At independence in 1991 the communist governments in each country converted themselves into political parties and assumed political power, which they retain today through tight control of the political process and elections. The current climate of authoritarianism across the region is not conducive to accountability and transparency in the security system.

Legacies of the Soviet era continue to haunt the Republics in dealing with their security problems. The region is afflicted by economic stagnation, rising influence of political Islam, drug-trafficking, and arms smuggling. National security structures are still based on the Soviet model and the Republics remain dependent on Russia for both weapons and training for their security forces. At the same time, because of conflicting interests among the Republics and with Russia, a number of Republics have formed security cooperation arrangements with external powers like the United States and China. With the support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) there have been attempts to co-operatively address a number of security challenges in the region. The focus, however, has largely been on issues relating to regional stability and cross-border security rather than the governance of state security institutions.

In the wake of 9/11, Central Asia's strategic significance to the West has been enhanced dramatically which has resulted in a weakening of external support and pressures for governance-related reforms. The United States government, in particular, has strengthened its military relations with a number of the Republics in view of tackling the crisis in Afghanistan and waging the wider "war on terror".

South Asia

The security discourse in South Asia is dominated by the persistent tensions between India and Pakistan and by their nuclear weapon capabilities. The region is marked by differing forms of violent conflict characterized by religious fundamentalism, insurgency, separatism, terrorism, and caste politics. Gun-running, drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime conglomerates sustain and fuel some of these conflicts. Unfinished agendas of nation building, coupled with the colonial legacy of unsettled borders, have served to sustain and magnify many of these conflicts.

In certain instances such as Afghanistan, decades of devastation wrought by conflict and destabilising external interventions are only now being addressed. The writ of the current government does not extend much beyond the capital, Kabul, and it faces huge

challenges in maintaining security and stability. Local warlords remain dominant in the provinces and maintain independent armed forces. The law and order situation is grim due to the presence of renegade Taliban and *al Qaeda* fighters, ethnic in-fighting within the country and the divided loyalties of state security forces. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is as yet unable to exercise its jurisdiction much beyond Kabul. Millions of unexploded landmines and unexploded ordnance, a thriving small arms market, drug-trafficking and extortion pose additional threats to security and development. While the international community remains the primary guarantor of stability and security in the country, disbursements of foreign assistance are falling far short of what will be required for Afghanistan to rebuild and recover its full sovereignty.

Barring India, democratic institutions across the region are fragile and vulnerable to external pressures and internal fractions. Rampant corruption and misgovernance has given rise to the growing political influence of the military and fundamental forces in many countries. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains ineffective in resolving regional problems and its main agenda to develop greater cooperation in economic and social areas has failed to have an impact on the lives of the citizens of south Asia.

Southeast Asia

Regional organisations like ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) play a stabilising role in the region by facilitating dialogue to address regional problems. However, security reform agendas within southeast Asian nations have advanced much more slowly. The prominence of the military in the political affairs of most countries, which is a consequence of the militant nationalist struggles for independence, has seen most of these countries struggle to assert effective civil control over their armed forces. A complex ethnic mix in most countries, which contributes to political tensions and instability, has in turn served to prolong the role of the military in internal affairs.

Continuing communist rule in the Indochinese states of Vietnam and Laos, and its legacy in the case of Cambodia, has resulted in authoritarian one party rule with a prominent role for the Army. Myanmar has been under military rule for over forty years. In Indonesia, which is a nominal democracy, the military maintains a significant role in all aspects of national life despite much vaunted reforms in several areas. In general, the obstacles to SSR stem from wider governance problems which also affect the security system. Issues of corruption, accountability, capacity building, and the absence of an effective civil society affect wider state-building processes in the region and need to be addressed hand-in-hand with more specific security system-related reforms.

Pacific Islands

The countries surveyed in this region share a number of characteristics including weak governments, economic stagnation, and aid-dependency. Fiji has been unstable due to the difficulties of adjusting to inter-ethnic power sharing within its small population. Over the past few years, the Solomon Islands have experienced a destructive armed conflict between competing militia forces that was only stabilised in mid-2003 following an intervention by regional peace-keeping forces. In Bougainville, a secessionist conflict has also recently come to an end, again with external assistance, and the status of the island is being negotiated. In each of these cases, the security forces have assumed prominent roles

in internal politics that need to be addressed as part of a wider strategy to restore stability and security to these island nations.

How security is defined in Asia

The Asia-Pacific region provides a complex and varied picture of national and popular perceptions of security. Each sub-region and even individual states have different perspectives of what constitutes security. In countries with unsettled borders, security is most often defined as defence of national territories. This realist view of security, which catapults the state and its security to centre stage, prevails in the capitals of most countries, particularly in Central Asia. In south Asia, India-Pakistan relations dominate security thinking and approaches in the region. This is based on the realist approach, emphasizing military preparedness, enhancing military capability through weapons acquisitions, and improving military postures. Major national resources continue to be diverted towards acquiring comprehensive nuclear delivery capabilities and defensive arrangements.

Traditional concepts of security continue to shape security discourse in Asia, though the non-traditional security concerns that make up the SSR agenda are increasingly receiving attention. Other issues such as water resources, trans-border trafficking in drugs and weapons, refugees, the environment, problems of governance, and the adverse effects of globalisation are coming to be seen as major security issues in their own right that concern the general population. In the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, Islamic fundamentalist movements have emerged as a major issue affecting national and regional security. This move towards more comprehensive and cooperative understandings of security has nonetheless been jeopardised in the wake of 9/11.

The concept of SSR as defined by the DAC, which is based on a system-wide approach to meeting the security needs of states and their populations in accordance with democratic norms, has yet to find a place in security discourses across the region. This is the case both at a governmental level, and among the academic and policy communities. While this provides a major challenge to donors seeking to influence the security policies of Asian countries, it cannot be concluded that there is no discourse on the range of issues that make up the SSR agenda. While the term “SSR” might be alien, the concerns are not. The major challenge facing Asian countries, therefore, is to develop new conceptual-institutional frameworks that will allow for both traditional and non-traditional security concerns to be addressed in a more integrated manner.

Assessment of findings

A wide range of security-related reforms are underway across Asia, though the predominant focus is on the military, and in particular on measures to enhance military effectiveness rather than accountability. This is the case in both internally and externally-driven reforms. The impetus for reform tends to be internal in countries that are more developed and hence less dependent on external aid; the opposite is true in the more aid-dependent countries. Countries with vibrant civil societies tend to have more comprehensive reform programmes, though reforms are rarely termed SSR as such. While there are many barriers to reform across Asia, opposition to reform seems to be more common where external actors are driving it. The events of 9/11 have had a mixed impact: while it has set in motion some positive changes in countries like Afghanistan, where

attempts are being made to reconstruct the state security apparatus, in others the state has assumed more power and fragile civil society voices are being stifled under programmes for countering terrorism.

Central Asia

The climate for SSR in Central Asia is weak as a consequence of both the global “war on terror” and the nature of political regimes that prevail across the region. Weak legislatures and judiciaries, emasculated medias and low levels of civil society activity have only reinforced the conservativeness of the Central Asian regimes. A major success in the region a decade ago was the removal of weapons of mass destruction from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with the encouragement of external powers. Since then a range of externally-driven security initiatives have made headway in terms of shoring up regional stability, though mutual suspicion among neighbours is another hindrance to developing a viable collective security system.⁵

On the whole, little progress has been made on the domestic front, particularly with regard to governance reforms. Remnants of Soviet military form the backbone of the security forces in each country with the same legacy of total state control. The volatile political environment in Afghanistan has in many ways served as a barrier to reform in the neighbouring Republics. Political and policy initiatives that address security problems rarely involve the legislature. In the policy arena, civil management bodies and civilian capacity-building initiatives are generally conspicuous by their absence. Kyrgyzstan is notable in that, under its own initiative, attempts have been made to review security legislation and policy within the wider framework of constitutional reforms, but this review has not thus far been translated into new institutional mechanisms that would enhance civil oversight of the security forces.

The Central Asia region was directly affected by the consequences of 9/11, which had a major effect on the nature of external involvement in the region. Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism are now the principle concern of outside actors, particularly the US, whose influence in the region has grown steadily in the past two years. It is still too early to assess the impact of US involvement. However, initial indicators are that the narrow focus on addressing the crisis in Afghanistan and neutralising the threat posed by the remnants of the former Taliban regime and their *al Qaeda* supporters mean that governance-related reforms will take a back-seat to strengthening the operational effectiveness of regional security forces. The case of Uzbekistan illustrates this well (see Box 4A2.1).

South Asia

The new governance-based security thinking which underpins the SSR agenda is not yet reflected in south Asia, where emphasis remains primarily on enhancing military postures and capabilities. The dominance of governments across the sub-region in security debates continues to marginalise civil society and media voices, though this is slowly beginning to change. The persistence of violent struggles across the region suggests that peace-building will be a particularly important component of SSR in the sub-region which donors need to explicitly build into their programming. This is most evident in Afghanistan which provides a particularly unique set of issues for SSR.

Box 4A2.1. Uzbekistan's military doctrine

Uzbekistan, the most populous country in Central Asia, is also the region's largest military power. Uzbekistan's new military doctrine, announced in February 2004, identifies trafficking-related terrorism and religious extremism as two of the most serious threats to national security. Uzbekistan has looked towards both Russia and the United States for help in maintaining and restructuring its military forces. While new security infrastructure is desperately required to initiate and sustain the reform process and inject a greater appreciation of new security concepts into the policy arena, the focus of external assistance has been on military equipment and training. The present reform strategy is based on the idea that "internal opposition and troublesome outside influences can be minimized during the transition period through the heavy-handed but paternal guidance of a dominant central government". Domestically, the Uzbek government has acted vigorously to crush unsanctioned forms of religious expression, resorting to mass arrests and other practices that have drawn international criticism. Human rights experts have said domestic repression is fueling a vicious cycle that serves to increase opposition to the government.

Central governmental authority in Afghanistan currently extends only notionally outside Kabul where local warlords rule supreme, maintain independent armies and collect revenue directly, without any accountability to the central government. A new national army is being created together with the institutional mechanisms required to manage it, although this process is slow and faces various obstacles. In particular, the Taliban and *al Qaeda* continue to enjoy passive support in much of the population which poses a challenge for reconstruction efforts. Continued support from the international community is, therefore, vital to ensuring security in the country and laying the foundations for more substantive reforms.

Constraints in human and financial resources, as well as weak coordination among the ministries of the Transitional Administration in Afghanistan (TAA) are a major hindrance to reforms. Significant aid promised by donor countries to rectify these problems has been slow to materialise. The continuing threats posed by local warlords is in part a consequence of US support provided to these armed groups to help address the threat posed by *al Qaeda* and remnants of the Taliban regime. The emphasis of internationally-driven reforms is therefore on the military. Much less effort has been put in to revitalising the infrastructure for ensuring general law and order, including the judicial system, which received special attention in the Bonn Agreement.⁶

In Bangladesh, which is more stable, the focus of security-related initiatives has to date been on addressing the large quantity of weapons circulating in the country and problems of border insecurity. These initiatives have met with mixed success. Political institutions are weak, preventing long-term strategic planning in the security arena. The rise of fundamentalist parties may also stall any external initiatives to usher in reforms in the security system. The influence of the media, academia and civil society are generally weak. But these groups represent important potential sources of an alternative security reform agenda that might include initiatives to strengthen governance of the security system and demilitarize society, both of which are greater priorities now than narrowly-focused defence reforms.

In India, national defence has traditionally been the sole competence of the military and the higher echelons of the Indian administration. This has begun to change in recent years, especially following the latest round of nuclear tests, which witnessed increased public interest and commentary. The media, however, has not yet fully assumed its role of a “watchdog”, and often uncritically supports measures to increase national military capabilities. The academic and policy communities are yet to initiate a wide-ranging debate on security issues though the issue of defence expenditure has received extensive attention. However, public debate is yet to crystallize into concrete pressures to initiate specific defence reforms, much less in other parts of the state security apparatus. Recent scandals related to defence procurement and the diversion of public resources, by both private and government bodies, have highlighted the necessity for reforms in the defence sector.

There have been relevant developments on a number of fronts in recent years. Arrangements have been made to rationalize defence acquisitions and make these more transparent; higher defence organisations have been streamlined and major reorganisations undertaken in the armed forces at higher levels; the Parliament and its specialized committees, such as the Public Account Committee and Standing Committee on Defence, are more active in monitoring defence activities; the Comptroller and Auditor General, an independent and statutory institution created under the Constitution, submits annual reports to the Parliament on defence related expenditure and make suggestions on effective utilization of funds. These achievements notwithstanding, the Pakistan problem remains the primary focus of Indian security policy, as a consequence of which the non-traditional security problems facing the country do not attain the prominence they might deserve in the national security agenda.

In the past five years, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal has set the framework for security debates and reform efforts. Continuing political instability has hampered Parliament’s ability to discuss vital security issues, while the non-governmental community has until recently focused primarily on economic and environmental issues. Various NGOs involved in developmental activities are nonetheless placing growing pressure on the government (through appeals for more effective governance, changes in security policy and reductions in defence expenditure) to initiate SSR-related reforms.⁷ The donor community has provided some support for this, for instance in the policing and justice sectors, where the UK Department for International Development is active. NGOs have also been urging the government to enter into a sustained dialogue with the Maoists, concerned that a reliance on a military response, made possible by sophisticated weaponry and military training received from the US, UK, China and India, may widen the conflict.

Pakistan’s approach to security, like that of India, is heavily influenced by the conflict that pits the two countries against each other, which militates against the adoption of a more comprehensive approach to security. The return of the military to power in Pakistan in effect precludes meaningful civil oversight over defence issues, though this was rarely achieved in any meaningful way even under civilian rule. Active involvement by the military in politics and the economy has helped to ensure its autonomy. The crises facing the country along its borders with both India and Afghanistan, as well as increasing activity by radical Islamic groups internally, are also used to justify exceptional security policy measures that make civil oversight more difficult to achieve. While the media has often been critical of the military’s security policies over the years, this has not led to significant change. Given the nature of the current government and the lack of effective

civil society engagement with security issues, the climate for reform will remain weak for the foreseeable future.

Sri Lanka stands in stark contrast to this. The ending of hostilities between the Government and the Tamil Tigers has opened the way to a broad range of reconstruction efforts, including some SSR-related efforts. The primary focus thus far has been on building a new army to respond to peacetime requirements due to the political sensitivities of defence reform (see Box 4A2.2). Achieving a broader approach will largely depend on the peace being sustained. The media and academia have started to shift their focus from conflict issues to the reform agenda, spotlighting problems such as defence procurement scandals, and calling for greater public participation in defence-related issues. Sections of the media have highlighted the need for more public and political debate on the defence reform agenda. In 2003 the government slashed its defence budget significantly which was an important step in shifting the economy from a war-standing to a position that will be more supportive of the reconstruction effort.

Box 4A2.2. Defence reform as a political process

Defence reform in Sri Lanka commenced in 2002 when the Prime Minister established the Defence Review Committee (DRC) which formulated extensive recommendations that encapsulate force modernization as well as restructuring of command and control in ways that would make the army more responsive to civil control. The first task of the Committee was to assess Higher Defence Organisation, given the decision by the President to relinquish the defence portfolio. When a paper drafted by the Committee was inadvertently made public, concerns were raised that the Committee's recommendations for restructuring Higher Defence Organisation might be constitutionally flawed in relation to the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Sri Lankan armed forces. Although the work of the Committee thereafter proceeded apace, the DRC itself became a political football amidst the growing tension between the President and the Prime Minister. In 2003 the President took the decision to bring an end to the work of the DRC and, instead, assigned the task of SSR to the Joint Operations Headquarters, since when little progress has been evident.

Southeast Asia

SSR in southeast Asia also shows a highly variable picture. Significant reform in security systems is not currently a serious prospect in those countries that require it most, including Cambodia, Indonesia and Myanmar, due to the central roles which their security forces play in the economic and political systems and more wide-ranging problems of governance and development that afflict these societies. Even in countries like Thailand and Philippines, however, where there has been greater political backing for reform, sustaining the change process has proved to be an immense challenge in the face of economic and political crises. Nevertheless, both countries have a vibrant civil society sector that has contributed to keeping reform on the public agenda. More generally, the low level of engagement by civil society actors in the security arena is an important factor in explaining the weak impetus for SSR across the sub-region.

Security-related reforms were initiated in Indonesia due to a combination of external pressure and popular demand following the country's transition to democracy. The over-

riding challenge facing the country post-Soeharto has been to reduce the influence of the military in political and economic life. In one of the first steps, the military was nominally separated from the police, in view of more clearly defining their respective security roles. However, the resurgence of internal security problems has ensured that the military remains actively involved in internal security. There has also been discussion, largely promoted by external actors and civil society actors, about ways to reduce the military's formal involvement in business which has long been officially sanctioned as a means of supplementing the defence budget (see Box 4A2.3). Budgetary constraints nonetheless make it unlikely that withdrawal from business would be financially feasible, nor would it be easy to convince the military to give up its financial autonomy which has long protected it from scrutiny by the civil authorities.

Box 4A2.3. Off-budget military spending

Current defence funding arrangements in Indonesia face real limits. At present, only an estimated 25% of the costs of the military and police are met from the state budget. The remainder of military spending comes from off-budget funds, mainly through the business interests of the foundations under the army's control, many of which are not economically viable. This financial autonomy serves to limit public and government debate over the security role of the army and how it spends its resources. Bringing military spending on budget and involving parliament in determining military policy could enhance professionalism and civil control of the army. However, the government may not be able to meet all of the TNI's spending needs, given competition for an already strained budget. This has dampened the military's enthusiasm for giving up its businesses. At the same time, it also highlights the need for existing defence expenditure – both on-budget and off-budget – to be used as efficiently and effectively as possible.*

* See Hendrickson, D. and Ball, N. (2002), "Off-Budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors", Conflict, Security and Development Group Occasional Paper No. 1, King's College London.

The impetus for military reform in Indonesia slowed dramatically following 9/11 as Indonesia came under increasing international pressure, particularly from the United States, to more actively address terrorist elements within its borders. Indonesia received assistance from the US to upgrade its "anti-terror" capabilities, though this was not provided directly to the military. The escalation of the conflict in Aceh, together with the terrorist bombings in Bali and at the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, further contributed to restoring the military's political influence and traditional role as the primary guarantor of the stability and security of the Indonesia nation, even if it officially remains outside formal politics.

The trend toward re-instating militaries as the primary bulwark against both internal and external threats is also apparent across the wider region. In the Philippines, for instance, the armed forces have received specialist training from the Americans to counter insurgents in the south. Despite a powerful popular movement for political change in the Philippines, the military remains influential. ASEAN has itself passed new resolutions to strengthen regional cooperation to meet the new challenges of international terrorism. It is still too early to determine what the impact of the US-led "war on terror" will be on SSR in the sub-region, but there are grounds to be concerned that short-term measures to

strengthen operational effectiveness of security forces will take precedence over longer-term measures to bolster civil oversight and accountability.

Two countries emerging from war, Cambodia and Timor-Leste, face a different array of challenges. The impetus for SSR in Cambodia has been external, though international support for security-related reforms has generally been *ad hoc*, piece-meal and not guided by an overarching understanding of Cambodia's security needs or how the different elements of the state security apparatus come together. The World Bank-managed demobilisation programme, which was launched in parallel to an Australian-supported Defence Review, was largely conceived as a down-sizing and cost-cutting exercise. Little attempt was made to link the two processes or to address fundamental problems of governance within the military that pose a significant threat to the stability of the country and its development prospects. A range of other security-related projects focusing on light weapons, landmines, and the police have contributed to short-term gains in the security situation. While the need for more structural changes in how Cambodia's security system operates is widely recognised, the climate for reform is still very weak. Civil society initiatives are fast developing and might soon begin to influence SSR.

The most comprehensive SSR programme to date in the sub-region has taken place in Timor-Leste which has been faced with reconstructing its entire security system from scratch following the departure of the occupying Indonesian forces. This task has included the formation of a new national army, demobilisation of former combatants, and the establishment of a fledgling judicial apparatus as well as the establishment of basic civil management bodies such as defence and justice ministries and a national security advisory body. Because SSR was undertaken as part and parcel of the country's transition to independence and the wider reconstruction programme, this increased both the internal political will and international support and resources for rebuilding the country's security apparatus. While the initial gains are promising, Timor-Leste remains particularly vulnerable to future reductions in support from the international community on which it is heavily dependent to meet its core development and security needs.

In extreme contrast to these two war-torn societies are a number of other countries in the sub-region which are highly developed. The governance of security institutions in Singapore is very effective and efficient when compared internationally. The primary concerns do not relate to reform *per se*, but rather to preparing the security agencies to respond more effectively to a new range of non-military security threats such as terrorism, drugs and economic sabotage. Similarly in Brunei there is no impetus for reform, though for different reasons. The economic wealth of the nation, the high standards of living of its population, the lack of any significant security threats, and the stability of its monarchy mean that SSR does not rank as a priority. In Malaysia law and order reforms dominate the agenda as a consequence of both the multi-ethnic nature of its society and the nature of its political system, dominated by one party. Both of these factors have in the past resulted in tensions, raising questions about how the security forces are managed.

The communist countries in the region present a different range of challenges. In both Vietnam and Laos, prospects for SSR are inextricably tied up in processes of political liberalisation that are thus far progressing slowly. While the security forces are effectively under civilian control, the Communist party in both countries retains control over virtually every aspect of governance. The Lao Government has been very hesitant about letting its citizens form voluntary organisations even though the constitution provides for a right of

free association. In practice, it remains virtually impossible to register a voluntary organisation. In Vietnam there has been a much greater degree of liberalisation, primarily in the economic domain, where the armed forces are central actors with the full backing of the Communist Party.

Myanmar is similar in many ways in so far as SSR will not be on the agenda in any meaningful way until there are more fundamental changes in the governance of the country. The current military regime is coming under increasing pressure to democratise, but even then governance of the security system will likely remain under the control of the military. This is a consequence both of the deeply entrenched nature of the military in political and economic life, but also the lack of civilian capacity on security issues. The need for initiatives that enhance and expand civil capacity to manage and monitor the security system as well as to contribute to security policymaking is pressing across the entire sub-region (see Box 4A2.4).⁹

Box 4A2.4. Building civil society capacity

Civil society in Asia has an important role to play in highlighting the need for SSR, helping to develop the agenda for reform, and prodding governments to take action. A key dimension of this work is to assess progress, suggest new approaches and assist in building regional -wide initiatives to support SSR.

This work should include:

- A more concerted effort to redefine security and move the debate from the realist version to a more comprehensive and co-operative approach.
- Assessing and analysing government policies and measures to implement SSR,
- A co-operative and non-official approach to assessing defence expenditure, plans and postures, both nationally and sub-regionally.
- A sub-regional approach as above will introduce a measure of civil society oversight as well as allowing for more co-operation in this vital area.
- Developing regional initiatives aimed at confidence-building.
- An analysis of defence and security policies in the region, focusing in particular on how these affect the perceptions of security policy-makers in each country.

Pacific Islands

Political instability in the island states continues to be the primary barrier to SSR. After several years of negotiation, a final settlement on the status of Bougainville was reached under the Bougainville Peace Agreement. In-built in the agreement were provisions for post-conflict reconstruction, disarmament, and the establishment of autonomous self-government. Core challenges facing the new political authorities include the rehabilitation of ex-combatants, establishment of legal and judicial institutions, and the setting up of a new security apparatus.¹⁰ A constitution that will provide legal backing to these tasks is still at the drafting stage. Delays in clarifying the status of the island and how it will be governed have nonetheless slowed down the demobilisation process. In addition, the task of building security institutions is only one of many challenges the island faces as it seeks to put in place a new administration and address wider development needs, all in the face of extreme resource constraints. This has made the country heavily dependent on external

assistance, particularly from Australia and New Zealand, though the United Nations is also playing a role.

Political uncertainty and Fiji's deep ethnic divide provide a significant barrier to SSR. While pressure from the international community has contributed to stabilising the political situation, any substantive reforms will be dependent on the achievement of new arrangements to govern the relationship between the Indian and ethnic Fijian groups that make up Fiji's population. In addition, the military's role in governance of the country will need to be reviewed given concerns about the impunity it currently enjoys following past abuses.¹¹ The system of political governance is crucial from an SSR perspective as that will determine what kinds of mechanisms can be instituted to more effectively manage the state security bodies. More inter-ethnic civil networking will likely be key both in preparing the political terrain for reform and elaborating the necessary mechanisms to ensure that the various ethnic groups feel secure regardless of who is in power.

Similarly, in the case of the Solomon Islands, resolution of the political crisis is the precondition for the restoration of security as well as more substantial reform. The complete breakdown of law and order in recent years, together with the economic crisis, and large displacements of the population present immense developmental and security challenges. The islands have no standing army, relying instead on police forces which were ill-equipped to manage the inter-provincial rivalry that erupted violently in 1999, eventually affecting most of the populated islands. Despite de-weaponisation programmes, arms availability has increased in the island society in recent years due to endemic corruption and the growing climate of insecurity. Both the Commonwealth and United Nations have emerged in recent years as principal drivers of reforms, carried out under the Framework of the Townsville Peace Agreement. But the final collapse of this process in 2003 and the eruption of violence set the stage for a recent intervention of regional peacekeepers, led by Australia, which are now providing stability to the country.

Conclusions

The security environment in Asia has undergone a dramatic transformation in the last quarter of a century. Authoritarian dictatorships and one party rule have given way in a large number of countries to multi-party democracies. Civil societies have emerged and, in some countries, been empowered enough to make a difference in promoting reform agendas. Yet, a major finding of this survey is that attention to security system governance issues remains woefully weak in almost all countries. Military influence across the region is strong and, even where not in power, militaries are able to divert scarce resources to enhancing military capabilities without adequate analysis by governments of alternative security strategies. While "good governance" is the new mantra in policy arenas, measures to achieve this – particularly in the security arena – are generally weak. Even though the media is generally vibrant and is often independent, in most cases it lacks the ability to contribute to effective oversight of reforms.

At the same time, the survey clearly highlights the impact made by external actors, including multilateral development agencies, donor governments and non-governmental organisations in getting security on government reform agendas. It is clear, moreover, that this initial progress may be reversed in some countries if external engagement promoting governance reform is not sustained due to the weakness of internal reform constituencies. That said, the policies of external actors providing assistance in the security domain also

lack coherence and have made it more difficult for their partner countries to achieve more integrated approaches to security and development. This points to the lack of a shared international understanding of SSR, including both the objectives and the approaches required.

Future priorities for SSR in Asia include:

- Fostering an understanding of the need for more integrated and wide-ranging concepts of security that address human development concerns.
- Strengthening civil democratic control over security structures and making oversight meaningful.
- Independent judicial oversight and national human rights commissions need to be established where they are not functional, and strengthened considerably even where they are in existence.
- Managing defence expenditures more effectively through cooperative threat assessments, transparent processes of defence budgeting and parliamentary control.
- Ensuring that internal security functions are made the responsibility of the civil police rather than the army, and training them to ensure greater civil accountability and adherence to human rights norms.
- Enhancing judicial review mechanisms of military actions.
- Strengthening civil society organisations to allow for more effective oversight of state security activities.

Organisational details

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, India (www.ipcs.org)

The IPCS is a non-governmental research institute on alternate security policy in Asia, established in August 1996. Over the years leading strategic thinkers, academicians, former members of the Civil Services, Foreign Services, Armed Forces, Police Forces, Paramilitary Forces and media persons (print and electronic) have been associated with the Institute in its endeavour to chalk out a comprehensive framework for security studies that caters to the changing demands of national, regional and global security.

While the Institute maintains close liaison with the Indian Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, it seeks to provide alternative approaches to security relevant to India and the World by hosting a wide range of opinion articles on its interactive website. The Institute has also established dialogue processes with leading institutions and think tanks in India and abroad to facilitate the exchange of ideas.

Key programmes of work include:

- Disarmament and arms control.
- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Comprehensive and co-operative security.
- Non-military threats to security.
- Confidence-building measures.
- Terrorism.
- Indo-Pak relations.
- Regional cooperation in south Asia.

- China's security policies.
- Security and governance.
- Human security.

Notes

1. The Asia survey was carried out by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) in New Delhi, India. The team was led by Major General Dipankar Banerjee and included Mallika Joseph, Suba Chandran, Paolienlal Haokip, and N. Manoharan. Maj. Gen. Banerjee and Mallika Joseph are the authors of this report. See Appendix A for additional information on the IPCS.
2. The countries covered were: Asia-Pacific: Bougainville, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands; Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan; South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. A number of countries were omitted from the survey: Japan and South Korea, which are OECD countries; China, North Korea, Mongolia, the Maldives, Bhutan, and most of the Pacific island territories where external involvement in SSR is limited.
3. The bibliography that follows provides a selection of publications on SSR in Asia.
4. These include, for example, the Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo (www.cpalanka.org); the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad; and the Foundation for Research on International Environment, National Development and Security, Rawalpindi (www.friends.org.pk).
5. Among the regional initiatives, the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) with the assistance of NATO, and the CIS annual summits, are noteworthy: see www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm.
6. Bhatia, M., Lanigan, K. and Wilkinson, P., "Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan", report prepared for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, June 2004.
7. HPCR Conflict Prevention Initiative, Nepal. See www.preventconflict.org/portal/nepal/nepal_resources_general_portals.php.
8. See Hendrickson, D. and Ball, N. (2002) "Off-Budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors", Conflict, Security and Development Group Occasional Paper No. 1, King's College London.
9. See Huxley, T. (2001) "Reforming Southeast Asia's Security Sectors", Centre for Defence Studies Working Paper No. 4, King's College London.
10. Gary Brown, Crisis in Papua New Guinea: Military Mutiny and the Threat to Civilian Democratic Rule, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group Information and Research Services, 3 April 2001.
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ANNEX 4.A3

Security System Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean

by

Francisco Rojas Aravena¹

The survey found that a diverse range of SSR-related activities are underway in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, despite the wave of democracy that has swept the region in the past decade, armed forces continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy and influence. Public security systems tend to be weak in many countries, and access to justice remains out of reach of large sections of the population. While there are incipient processes of reform in each of these core security areas, prospects for enduring change are constrained by the wider economic and governance crises affecting the region.

In the absence of an over-arching security concept in the region, in few cases can it really be said that countries are undertaking comprehensive SSR as understood in the OECD-DAC sense of the term. Reform processes tend to be piece-meal and *ad hoc*, reflecting as much constraints in local vision, political will and financial resources as external security assistance policies in the region which have generally not been guided by a wide-ranging concept of security either. As consequence, countries in the region often adopt narrow institutional approaches to reform.

The key challenge for the region is to assert an independent vision of security that responds to its core needs in a rapidly globalizing and interdependent world. While the traditional security agenda still predominates in the thinking of governments across the region, a more multi-dimensional security agenda, encompassing a focus on “citizen” security and a broader array of political, economic, social and environmental concerns, is gaining influence. Implementing this new security agenda will, however, also require new institutional frameworks for managing security. These will need to take into account the diverse needs and priorities of countries in the region, while at the same time promoting collective responses to the growing range of trans-national security issues that affect them.

There is a crucial role for international co-operation to assist in developing approaches that effectively balance traditional security concerns with the “new” security agenda. To date, however, few donors have engaged with security reforms in the region as a long-term evolutionary process requiring constant and carefully targeted support. The SSR concept

and policy agenda offers a potentially valuable framework for closer collaboration between donors and Latin American partners.

Introduction

This section presents the findings of a survey of security system reform in Latin America and the Caribbean.² The survey covered 26 countries across four sub-regions: the Andean countries, Central America, the Caribbean and MERCOSUR (the Common Market of South America). (Box 4.1 explains in further detail how the survey was carried out.)

The survey shows that a diverse range of activities is underway in the region. While the concept of SSR is new, many of the security reforms underway are guided by similar principles. While the traditional military-oriented concept of security no longer meets the region's needs, efforts to develop a new wide-ranging concept are complicated by the different needs and priorities of states in the region. Combined with the lack of a clear common political vision for SSR and serious resource constraints, this has constrained efforts to develop new security concepts and mechanisms at both national and regional levels. International support is key to advancing the SSR agenda, though the central challenge for the region is to assert an independent vision of security that responds to its core needs in a rapidly globalizing and interdependent world.

This section is structured as follows:

- First, it assesses the availability of data on SSR issues in Latin America and the Caribbean.³
- Second, it examines the context for SSR, highlighting the factors that have put security on government reform agendas.
- Third, it focuses on how “security” is defined in the region, and contrasts this with the DAC SSR concept.
- Finally, it assesses the status of SSR in the countries surveyed, highlighting key factors that are necessary to understand current trends.

Information availability

Information was gathered from a variety of sources including the internet, primary sources and academic works; Interviews with academics, civil society and government officials specializing in security issues; and participation in governmental meetings and international seminars on security topics. Internet sources – including the main pages of governmental departments including defence, police and justice – were a particularly valuable source of information on most of the countries in the region.⁴ The FLACSO network, made up of ten Social Science faculties across the region, was the main academic source of information for this survey.⁵

While access to information on security issues in Latin America and the Caribbean is growing, the quality and comprehensiveness of this information is variable. It is difficult to find reliable sources of SSR-related information, which is an obstacle to the conduct of systematic analysis of the issues. The main problem is the absence of a common language of “security” in the region; the concept of SSR is new in Latin America and the Caribbean and there is no comparable indigenous concept that is wide-ranging and brings together “hard” and “soft” security issues. As a consequence, few institutions in the region organise

security-related information in a manner that allows one to gain a sense of the cross-cutting institutional issues that underpin the governance of security.

While transparency on security-related issues in Latin America and the Caribbean is still restricted, this is less the case today than in the past. Rather, institutional capacity to process, organize and disseminate security-related information in regionally-based organisations is still weak which has wider implications for maintaining peace and stability (see Box 4A3.1). This is changing, however, as the internet becomes a more common medium for disseminating information, though at present a significant number of the web-sites are external in origin. This can make it difficult to gain a genuinely local perspective on security matters, for instance relating to the issue of military expenditures.⁶ Notwithstanding these challenges, the trend across Latin America and the Caribbean is towards greater openness and debate on security matters.

Box 4A3.1. **Locally-generated information and confidence building**

Generating statistical data on security issues within the region is important in terms of both ensuring local ownership of data and building co-operation between countries in the region. On the initiative of the Argentinian and Chilean governments, a decision was taken to standardise the reporting of military expenditures in the region in order to ensure comparability. Both countries requested support from the United Nations Commission for Latin America (ECLAC/CEPAL) to develop a common methodology to measure military expenditure. This initiative has come to be seen by other countries within the region as a practical tool for enhancing transparency and building confidence between states. Peru and Chile have subsequently signed an agreement to apply the same methodology to their own military and security expenditures.*

* Standardized Methodology for Comparing Defence Spending and Its Applications in Argentina and Chile. ECLAC. November 2001, Santiago – Chile. See www.cepal.cl.

Context for reform

Latin American and the Caribbean are characterized by a high degree of social, economic and political heterogeneity that contributes to a diverse range of security problems in the region requiring, in turn, different kinds of responses. Huge disparities in developmental terms are evident both between and within countries in the region, including high levels of social polarization. The existence of pockets of extreme poverty in countries with high levels of economic wealth is perhaps most evident in Mexico, an OECD member, and Brazil, which has one of the largest economies in the world. An understanding of the dynamics of security problems, including the developmental factors that generate and sustain them, is thus an essential starting point for outsiders seeking to engage in security-related activities.

Representative democracy has come to be seen as an indispensable condition for stability, peace and development of the State in Latin America and the Caribbean. On 11 September 2001, the same day as the terrorist attack in the USA, the countries in the region signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The Charter recognizes the common values underpinning democracy in the Americas. It states that “the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it”.⁷ The Charter also specifies that, in the event of an unconstitutional change

of government in a regional state, other states can take appropriate measures to bring about a restoration of a democratic regime. The Charter constitutes the fundamental basis for other agreements between American states in different spheres, including security.

Compared with the other regions covered by the global survey of SSR, Latin America and the Caribbean have among the lowest levels of interstate conflict. Military expenditure in the countries surveyed, in terms of both the volume of resources invested and the percentage they represent of the overall expenditures of central government, is generally low. Both of these factors can be partly explained by the important strides that the Latin American and Caribbean countries have made in recent years in establishing confidence-building mechanisms, both at sub-regional and regional levels. Another factor is the declining (formal) influence of the military across the region in recent years which has enabled governments to channel public resources to other priority developmental sectors.

Regional mechanisms for managing security are well-developed and take different forms: region-wide systems to manage security, for instance, have been established within the framework of the Organisation of American States' (OAS) Security commission. The last three meetings of the OAS on security issues which took place in 1995, 1998, and 2003 focused principally on confidence-building mechanisms and inter-state issues, including efforts to combat drug trafficking. The inclusion of HIV/AIDS on the agenda in 2003 is itself indication that the security agenda is broadening though the question of how non-traditional issues should be linked to matters relating to the use of force remains unresolved. The need for more holistic approaches to security was made clear at the last Summit of the Americas where states in the region declared that "among the principal causes of instability in the region are poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, which we must confront comprehensively and urgently".⁸ In addition, security matters are being addressed as part and parcel of regional processes of economic integration which is contributing to more holistic security thinking.

At a sub-regional level a number of complementary mechanisms to address security issues also exist. In the Caribbean region we find the Regional Security System, while in Central America the Democratic Treaty on Central American Security was established. In South America, especially in the Andean region (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia), security issues are dealt with as part of broader institutional mechanisms which relate to economic and political matters, and the same is true among the MERCOSUR countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia).

The progress made in addressing security issues at the regional level contrasts with the national level where many countries in the region are immersed in a deep and often destabilizing crisis of governance that shapes their efforts to deal with security problems. The governance crisis is most accentuated in South American countries: Venezuelan society is polarized and divided over the Chavez administration; Colombia is embroiled in a civil war which has intensified over the past year in response to a new militaristic strategy driven by President Uribe with the renewed support of the United States administration. In Peru, President Toledo's administration is losing popular support and public demonstrations are increasing. Argentina is traversing its most serious economic crisis in a century, which has impacted strongly on a public that is increasingly critical of political elites. Notable exceptions in the region are Costa Rica and Chile.

Despite the wave of democracy that has swept the region in the past decade, armed forces in many countries continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy even though they no

longer play formal political roles. In a context of persisting political instability, this leaves the door open to continuing military influence on the political process and may bode poorly for security-related reforms designed to increase civil control. Judicial systems tend to be weak, and access to justice is a long and expensive process that remains out of reach of large sections of the population. Police forces face an array of problems ranging from poor leadership to weak organisational structures and severe resource deficiencies, all of which undermine efficiency and increase corruption. While there are incipient processes of reform in each of these core security areas, prospects for enduring change will be shaped by the success of efforts to deal with wider economic and political problems.

This is particularly the case in relation to defence modernization which is constrained, on the one hand, by the entrenched autonomy of the armed forces across the region and, on the other, by competing demands on government attention and resources. In many countries, government focus has shifted to the public security agenda, including justice, in response to both popular and elite perceptions of a growing crisis of personal safety. In this context, space has also been increasing for consideration of a range of so-called “new” security threats that include organised crime, terrorism, environmental issues, AIDS, and migration. Recognition of the ways in which these threats impact upon human development and state stability is contributing to a more nuanced understanding of security. Yet, inclusion of these new threats in state security agendas also runs the risk of overloading the reform agenda in countries where the institutional mechanisms required to implement the new security thinking have not yet been developed.

This crisis of governance in Latin America and the Caribbean is accentuated by the problems facing regional economies which have fared consistently poorly since the Asian financial crisis struck in 1997. With the prospect of another half decade of growth lost, the image of the “lost eighties” has once again come back to haunt governments. The economic problems in the region are directly associated with the volatility of financial markets. External debt continues to be an important problem for most Latin American and Caribbean countries, as is corruption, which further hampers efforts to manage competing demands on scarce public resources. Only two Latin American countries come in the upper third of the international ranking on corruption according to Transparency International:⁹ Chile, which is ranked 20, and Uruguay, ranked 33. This is coupled with a more deep-seated crisis of confidence in national institutions (see Box 4A3.2) which poses a further obstacle to reform efforts.

Recent increases in poverty across the region, associated both with poor economic performance and unequal distribution of income in societies, also need to be taken into account. In 1999, 43.8% of Latin Americans lived in poverty, which is roughly equivalent to the level in 1997. Since 1990, however, the overall number of poor people in the region has increased from 200.2 million to 211.4 million. This situation is worsened by the unequal distribution of income: 10% of households at the top of the scale take 30% of income, while 40% of the households at the bottom of the scale only earn between 9 and 15% of domestic income. High levels of poverty exacerbate the crisis of governance, particularly in the domestic security arena where social tensions, criminality and household violence pose particular challenges for governments in the region.¹⁰

At the sub-regional level, the security challenges vary quite extensively in line with differing historical, political and geographic circumstances.

Box 4A3.2. Crisis of public confidence in national institutions

While the church (71%), education and media rank highest, parliaments (23%) and political parties (14%) in general are seen as the least reliable institutions. Armed forces fall somewhere in the middle (38%), with some important national variations. In Venezuela, for example, (54%) of the public have confidence in the army; in Uruguay and Bolivia (32%), in Peru (36%) and Argentina, it decreases to 36 and 34%, respectively.¹ These relatively low figures can be explained by the perceived negative impact of the military governments in the region and the failure of efforts to date to extend meaningful civil oversight over the armed forces. Generally speaking, neither the police nor justice fare well either. Public support for the two institutions in 2002 was 33% and 25% respectively. Confidence in Parliament is 23% and in political parties just 14% which is perhaps most worrying since they might be considered key drivers of reform.²

1. Latinobarometro, 2002. See www.latinobarometro.org.

2. Latinobarometro, 2002. See www.latinobarometro.org.

Central America

Central America faces a unique mix of security challenges that have their roots in the cold-war era conflicts that gripped much of the sub-region. While the wars have formally come to an end, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua are still struggling to build a durable peace in the face of persisting social and political divisions and the destructive economic legacy of war. In this light, ensuring citizen security is one of the most important security challenges facing the sub-region. Increases in violent criminality, fueled in part by the many arms in society left over from the war, are a key security issue. Weak judicial systems are struggling to cope with the new types of legal problems flourishing in the post-war environment, including delinquency linked with drug issues.

At the sub-regional level, Central American countries have sought through the elaboration of a new *Democratic Security Treaty* to construct a more holistic concept of security that balances both traditional security threats and the newer threats.¹¹

Caribbean

In the Caribbean, the key security challenges are a product of the unique economic, geographic and social make-up of small island states. The security challenges include: addressing the impact of natural disasters such as hurricanes which can, in a single incident, undermine the stability of state institutions and destroy the tourist infrastructure upon which Caribbean countries are heavily reliant; managing their precarious economic status in the face of rapid globalization – countries dependent on one export crop like bananas are particularly vulnerable to economic factors outside their control; curbing the problem of drug trafficking which has gripped the region due to the reliance of criminals on sea-borne vessels for transporting drugs; managing health problems linked with AIDS which can risk having devastating effect on the small population base of the island economies.¹²

The Caribbean countries co-operate in addressing these issues through their regional security mechanism (the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) which enables them to articulate their special needs at both a regional and international level. The close proximity of Caribbean states to the US and the shared interest they have with the

Americans in dealing with certain problems like drugs trafficking also defines how the Caribbean countries address their core security needs (see Box 4A3.3).

Box 4A3.3. Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS)

The member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) – Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines – are often referred to as the “Eastern Caribbean”. Information about US security assistance they receive is usually reported jointly. While the vast majority of US military and police assistance is oriented towards combating drugs-trafficking, there is a new focus on preventing terrorism, alien smuggling and preventing financial crimes. Funding from the various programs is directed to bolstering the region’s national security forces along with the role of the RSS in helping these agencies to deal with these threats as well as those presented by terrorism, drug trafficking, financial crime, illegal trafficking in arms, alien smuggling, natural disasters, and external threats.

Andean countries

Violent conflict is the most visible security challenge facing the Andean region as a consequence of the war in Colombia and the resulting spillover in neighbouring Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru. Though the economic, political and social roots of the conflict are complex, it has an important drugs-related dimension that has, as in the case of the Caribbean, shaped the nature of US interest and engagement in the security affairs of the sub-region. The US focus on eradicating the raw material used to produce cocaine has, however, had contradictory effects in the sub-region, leading to a decline in production in some areas and a corresponding increase in others, including within Colombia itself. The US is currently supporting the Government’s aggressive militaristic response to the insurgency which risks widening the conflict beyond Colombia’s borders.

The Colombian war has also had an important impact on the humanitarian situation in the sub-region, resulting in significant forced displacement of populations and the creation of a climate of insecurity that is impeding economic and social life both in Colombia and its neighboring countries. While the Andean community has developed a range of confidence-building measures (such as Presidential Summits between Colombo and Venezuela, or joint supervision of borders by Colombia and Ecuador) to manage the build-up of state forces along the sub-region’s national frontiers, activity by both insurgents and paramilitary forces in the border regions is more difficult to control. Recent political instability in both Venezuela and Peru frustrates efforts to develop a coherent sub-regional security mechanism in the Andean region.

MERCOSUR countries

The MERCOSUR countries have, through different various agreements and confidence building measures, resolved the traditional security problems linked with border issues and the build-up of national armed forces that have threatened inter-state relations in the past. While these countries are today looking to improve their cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, in part a response to international pressure, the primary security problems affecting their populations are internal in nature. The key security challenges today relate to managing the fall-out of the economic and political crises in the

sub-region, and in particular addressing citizen security needs which are moving up the public and political agendas. The inequitable distribution of resources in MERCOSUR societies and the growing vulnerability of populations to the fluctuating economic fortunes of the region is one of the most important barriers to development and a key ingredient in recent social unrest in countries like Bolivia.

Factors shaping SSR

In light of these broad trends, there are three key factors that will affect prospects for SSR in Latin America and the Caribbean in coming years. The first factor will be the success of efforts to enhance regional cooperation on security matters. While significant progress has been made, there are many outstanding security issues that relate to disputes over maritime and territorial borders. Resolution of these differences is essential to enhance trust and cooperation to address other transnational security issues, including organised crime. Latin American and Caribbean governments are learning that globalization transforms domestic security issues into regional and international matters, and vice-versa. Moreover, current security policies and mechanisms are in many ways ill-adapted to the new security challenges facing the region: the burgeoning array of non-traditional security issues that Governments now need to address require the development of new conceptual frameworks and a corresponding set of policy frameworks and institutional mechanisms to implement them.

Second, strengthening democratic governance and revitalizing regional economies, both of which are key to state stability and human security, will require a greater focus on structural reforms. Achieving this will, in turn, require more integrated approaches to addressing the closely interlinked economic, political and security challenges facing the region. During the 1980s and early 1990s, government reform agendas (strongly influenced by the international financial institutions) focused primarily on macroeconomic reforms. A second generation of “good governance” reforms emerged during the 1990s, though this agenda has only been partially taken on board. Despite good intentions, progress has been constrained by the lack of a clear vision for reform, weak political will, and resource constraints. This has been most evident with regard to state security institutions where a holistic transformation concept has been missing.

A third factor has to do with the role of the United States in the region. The United States can be considered simultaneously as an “external” and a “domestic” actor. For many countries, the United States is the primary guarantor of security, both providing vital security equipment and influencing the organisation of security. The US, furthermore, influences the strategic position of the region *vis-à-vis* other parts of the world by shaping the nature of their security cooperation arrangements with European or other nations, including in the area of arms purchases. Through extensive military assistance to the region, the US has a powerful influence on how countries address security threats (examined below) which does not always coincide with other perceptions of regional priorities. While there is a common understanding between the US and most countries on the security challenges facing the region, the proposed responses often differ in line with other policy objectives, definitions of security, and perceptions of priorities.

How security is defined

In Latin America and the Caribbean the traditional security agenda is military focused, revolving around the protection of the state and borders, though it has also included non-military elements associated primarily with economic development. While this traditional agenda still predominates in the thinking of governments across the region, a more multi-dimensional security agenda encompassing a focus on “citizen” security and a broader array of political, economic, social and environmental concerns is gaining greater prominence.

While development of a single integrating concept of security that effectively links the use of force with non-military concerns is a priority, this remains difficult given the different circumstances facing countries across the region. Differences in priorities are most evident with regard to the Caribbean countries which strongly emphasize the need for an approach that addresses the specific problems facing small island states. Most of these can be categorised under the security agenda that includes issues such as the illicit trafficking of drugs, persons, arms and chemicals; transportation security; and natural disasters. This agenda also includes health (AIDS) and environmental issues. These security issues are of particular concern due to the strong reliance of many Caribbean countries on tourism as a major source of revenue. While many of these issues are also relevant to the larger countries, they continue to place priority on the more traditional security issues.

The key challenge in articulating a multidimensional approach to security is simultaneously addressing within a single framework international security demands, state necessities, and human or citizen security. The largest countries in the region make a conceptual and legal difference between defense and military issues, on the one hand, and domestic and police issues, on the other, and are reluctant to address them together. Conversely, in the Caribbean and to an extent in Central America, the police problem and the defense issue are perceived as one and the same. In the first case, security is defined more narrowly, while in the latter case it is increasingly defined in a broad manner.

A shared understanding of security issues in the countries across the region is yet to emerge. Mexico’s 2001 decision to denounce the 1947 Rio Treaty, which institutionalized the concept of security as “protection from external threats”, has nonetheless opened the way to more discussion about the limits of traditional collective security mechanisms in the region. Changes in the international system, in turn, which are leading to a greater emphasis on the human dimensions of security have further underscored the urgency of elaborating a new concept of security that fits in with the emerging democratic dispensation across the region. This was the focus of the Special Conference on Security, held in October 2003 in Mexico, under the sponsorship of the Organization of American States, where governments made a formal political declaration about the need for a more integrated concept of security (see Box 4A3.4).

Efforts to develop a region-wide concept of security are further complicated by the special role of the United States in the region which is indirectly shaping how countries respond to security problems. This is most evident with the security threats arising from organized crime and trafficking in drugs where the US has generally favoured militarized responses. One practical consequence of the US approach has been the further militarization of domestic security as the army in a number of countries has been encouraged to take on a greater role in addressing problems that might otherwise be

Box 4A3.4. Declaration of Nuevo Leon, México 2003

“The security threats, concerns, and other challenges in the hemispheric context are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, and the traditional concept and approach must be expanded to encompass new and non-traditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects.”

“In our Hemisphere, as democratic states committed to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the OAS, we reaffirm that the basis and purpose of security is the protection of human beings. Security is strengthened when we deepen its human dimension. Conditions for human security are improved through full respect for people’s dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, as well as the promotion of social and economic development, social inclusion, and education and the fight against poverty, disease, and hunger.”

“The Heads of State and Government of the Americas, in the Special Summit in the city of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico, reiterate the commitment to the objectives and purposes contained in the Declaration on Security in the Americas, approved at the Special Conference on Security, held in Mexico City in October 2003, based on, *inter alia*, the multidimensional concept of security as well the principle that the basis and purpose of security is the protection of human beings.”

considered to fall within the mandate of the police or other policy actors. This has had consequences for regional security and stability. This contrasts with the views held in many Latin American and Caribbean countries that attribute these problems to structural weaknesses in their economies, hence favouring more of a developmental response.

In contrast to the militarised approach associated by many with the US, a number of multilateral development agencies including the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) are supporting development programmes that aim to promote security under its widest sense. The UNDP, for instance, is actively supporting institutional reforms aimed at modernization of judicial systems, police services and in a few cases, the defence sector. The IADB has been an active supporter of programmes to address domestic violence. Governments in the Latin American and Caribbean region are therefore being confronted with an array of external perspectives on security that challenge existing conceptual frameworks and institutional mechanisms in the security domain. This is no more evident than with regard to the recent “war on terror”, led by the United States, which has affected Latin America in different ways (see Box 4A3.5).

The process of developing the security frameworks to engage with new global security concerns is still underway and has important implications for the success of security-related reforms. The issues at stake are broader than SSR as defined by the DAC, and include the development of new political alliances and collective security mechanisms which will allow the region to assert its authority on security matters and address the structural roots of the economic and political crisis that give rise to insecurity.

Box 4A3.5. Impact of the “war on terror”

Latin American countries have been strongly encouraged to play an active role in addressing this threat despite a lukewarm response from many governments in the region. After Sept. 11 there has also been a tendency for the US to lump together a range of security issues – including drugs, money laundering and terrorism – which might otherwise be considered to be distinct, and require different responses. This has forced some governments in the region to prioritise security-related activities which might not otherwise top their own agendas. The expulsion of illegal immigrants or other imprisoned people back to their home countries following the domestic crack-down on terrorism in the US has posed an additional burden on policing capacity in certain Latin American countries. While governments in Latin America have generally been split down the middle in terms of their support for the war on terrorism, there is recognition that the region’s security thinking must also accommodate the new global security concerns.*

* Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Security on the American Continent: Challenges, Perceptions, and Concepts”, available from FESCOL, Columbia (www.fescol.org.co), 2004.

Assessment of findings

The survey indicates that a tremendous number of reform activities are taking place across the security domain in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Activities can be found under all nine of the reform categories examined though, as to be expected, the emphasis varies from country to country and from sub-region to sub-region. There is a greater emphasis on military and defence issues in the Southern Cone, while public security issues tend to receive more attention in Central America and the Caribbean. These differences in emphasis can be understood with reference both to local political dynamics and external policy priorities in the region, including those of both the US and other donors.

The trajectory of SSR processes in the region has also been shaped not only by the difficulties of achieving new concepts of security but also by the wider economic and governance crises affecting the region. In the absence of an over-arching security concept in the region, in few cases can it really be said that countries are undertaking a comprehensive reform of the security-system as understood in the sense of the OECD-DAC concept. Reform processes tend to be piece-meal and *ad hoc*, reflecting as much constraints in local vision, political will and financial resources as external security assistance policies in the region which have generally not been guided by a wide-ranging and integrated concept of security either. As consequence, countries often adopt narrow institutional approaches to reform.

One example would be a focus on police training with insufficient attention to the linkages with judicial reform or the question of how reform processes can be sustained in the absence of strong political leadership and financial resources. While many reforms have been driven by democratization – for instance, the withdrawal of the military from formal political roles – reform processes have often stopped short of actually redefining the roles and missions of the military and developing both the new policy frameworks and legislation required to implement these new roles. In most cases, the modernization processes of armed forces has been self-generated, that is, driven by armed forces themselves. This is in large part a consequence of weak civilian leadership, though the weakness of civil management bodies – including defence and interior ministries – where

the civilian expertise required both at the technical and policy levels is often absent, should be noted.

A weak framework for reforms

During the 1990s the narrow focus on economic liberalisation gave way to an expanded good governance reform agenda that sought to tackle the institutional constraints to effective economic management and growth in the region. This agenda also opened the way to wider state reforms which did include justice and penal systems, public security and defence. While this “good governance” reform agenda paralleled emerging thinking within Latin American societies on the need for greater democracy, a clear vision was lacking among both the local and external proponents of reform regarding the institutional architecture for the new security systems.

The different waves of reform in Latin America generated by the inputs of international organisations, or led by the governments, have failed to develop a clear vision about state modernity in the 20th century. After 15 years of reform in Latin America, there is still no clear consensus on how to build a modern, efficient state that can effectively harness the benefits of globalization while minimising its negative effects. In the 13th Ibero-American Summit, the Heads of Government recognized that structural economic reforms that have been carried out with great sacrifices by Latin American towns and governments have, in many cases, not produced adequate results in terms of reducing social inequalities and exclusion, and even in some cases, have made the situation worse.¹³

Weak popular participation

In general, reform processes in Latin America and the Caribbean have been driven by either governments or inter-governmental institutions. Involvement by civil society in reform processes in terms of either debating government plans or contributing to policy development is very limited across the region. In an increasing number of cases, in the more open governments, processes are being organized to increase the participation of civil society. This is often as part and parcel of internationally-supported reform programmes, however. In the economic and judicial arenas, reform processes have been driven by both international and regional institutions including the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Resource constraints

The second-generation reforms being undertaken in the region, including those within the security system, are facing a basic constraint: the lack of resources available for governance-related reforms. As is increasingly apparent, it is extremely expensive to create the institutional frameworks to ensure that judicial systems, police services, armed forces and other components of the security system to function effectively and in line with democratic norms. SSR is thus in most countries competing for limited public resources with other priority sectors more obviously related to poverty reduction. Without wider state reforms, including efforts to tackle corruption, as well as more sustained economic growth, it will be difficult to resolve this dilemma. While this is forcing national governments to seek international support, this also comes tied with certain conditions – including support for the “war on terrorism” – which certain Latin American and Caribbean countries have been reluctant to accept.

Mixed international engagement

The international record of support for security-related assistance in the region is mixed. While the recent shift in US policy towards waging the “war on terror” has raised concern, the United States has traditionally played a privileged role in the region through its active support for a large number of security-related programs across the region. The most notable area of intervention has been in support of the development of measures of mutual trust and security, particularly in Latin America. Support for the preparation of defense white papers (books) is another important area where the US has been active. Perhaps the most important consequence of the US focus on global terror and on Iraq, however, has been a decline in the importance of Latin America on the US foreign policy agenda.

More generally, donor agendas in the region tend to be short-termist. This reflects both the natural programming cycles of donor agencies and a failure to engage with SSR as a long-term evolutionary and integrated process requiring constant and carefully targeted support. There has also been a tendency to compartmentalize reform efforts between different international agencies, overlooking key linkages between activities. Underpinning the problem is the lack of a clear framework for evaluating the security environment on the ground or a transparent and coherent system of benchmarks and guidelines for deciding when to encourage countries to undertake certain kinds of reforms.

In this regard, the OECD/DAC SSR concept offers a potentially valuable framework for debate between donors and Latin American partners though there is a danger of it being perceived as an external tool unless the terminology, approaches and objectives are more responsive to local needs, and priorities. Given the sensitivities at a governmental level surrounding security-related reforms, it may also be necessary to introduce SSR as part of second-track security initiatives that engage civil society. There are additional entry points at the inter-governmental level where debate on new security frameworks has become acceptable. Given suspicions in the region regarding the motives of external actors, introducing new security thinking through the framework of multi-lateral organisations such as the United Nations or the OECD may also facilitate debate.

Lack of a long-term political vision

The main issue in Latin America is the consolidation of its democracy, which will require that citizens regain a basic trust in their political institutions. The prestige level of armed forces is low and the lack of interest in politics has increased. Governance in the region is, therefore, a central issue. To date, the security arena has generally not been considered a priority sector in the face of other competing demands more evidently linked both to institutional reform and poverty reduction. Fundamental in shaping the evolution of public debate on security in coming years will therefore be political processes, in particular the path adopted by the crop of new Presidents that is emerging in the region following recent elections.

The best case in point is Colombia, where President Alvaro Uribe is opting for a military solution to the country’s long-running Marxist insurgency. This represents a complete turn around from the strategy of negotiation that characterized the approach of his predecessor, President Pastrana. Even though the incidence of homicides and kidnappings has diminished considerably in Colombia since Uribe’s administration assumed power, public perceptions of insecurity remain high. In Brazil, new President José

Ignacio Da Silva, who assumed power in January of 2003, has taken a contrasting approach. Da Silva has made poverty reduction his priority, in particular ensuring that the 40 million poorest people in the country are adequately fed.

How the wider crisis of governance in Latin America and the Caribbean is addressed will shape the success of SSR efforts. Since the end of the Cold War, the region's security forces have not been key players in changes of governments. This is significant in a region which experienced a long sequence of military coup d'etats in the 1970s and 1980s. The political crises gripping Latin American states have their roots in intractable problems that stem from the weak legitimacy of ruling parties or more deep-seated economic problems that have spawned powerful social movements with the ability to bring about changes in government.

Conclusions

Security-related reforms in Latin America have begun and are an ongoing process. Recent events show that it will be necessary for countries in the region to approach this challenge in a global perspective. In brief, the four main challenges for the region are:

- To develop new institutional frameworks for managing security that take into account the diverse needs and priorities of countries in the region, while at the same time promoting collective responses to the growing range of trans-national security issues that affect them. There is a crucial role for international co-operation to assist security actors in the region in developing approaches that effectively balance traditional security concerns with the “new” security agenda.
- To develop civilian leadership in strategic defense and other security matters. As a consequence of the Cold War, the political leadership in Latin America and the Caribbean is largely disinterested in defense and security issues. For this reason, SSR has not been viewed as an essential part of wider state-building and reform processes. Ensuring the final and irreversible disengagement of the military from politics will be key to developing the civilian and constitutional leadership required in defense and broader security affairs.
- Enhancing professionalism of the armed forces and police will be essential to achieving their disengagement from politics. To this end, constructive engagement is required with both armed and public security forces. A clearer understanding will be required of their respective roles and missions in light of new security challenges facing the region. A key challenge is to avoid further militarization of domestic security, either through the transformation of armed forces into policing units, or the granting of excessive powers and military capabilities to public security forces.
- Without transparency it is impossible to increase trust, and without trust the security dilemmas that have led to inter-state tensions in the region in the past may return. It is particularly important to develop a regional process to increase the transparency of military expenditures and arms acquisitions. In view of increasing co-operation between the security establishments of the region, there is much scope for joint programmes to train the police and other security forces.

Organisational Details

FLACSO (Latin American Faculty of Social Science), www.flacso.org

FLACSO is an international academic institution of a regional and autonomous nature created in 1957 by the governments of countries across Latin America and the Caribbean. Today, FLACSO has academic sites in ten countries in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. The Secretariat-General of the institution is based in San Jose, Costa Rica.

For more than 40 years, FLACSO-Chile has been a vital and important center for research and learning in the field of social sciences, both in Chile and throughout the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean.

FLACSO-Chile has a well-developed program on international relations and security studies. It also produces a well-known publication called *Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* (Armed Forces and Society) which is dedicated to research and studies on governance, integration, conflict and co-operation in the Western Hemisphere. One important focus is the relationship between the United States and the Latin American countries.

FLACSO's research also has a policy-relevant focus which aims to generate practical recommendations for different actors, including states, civil society, and international organisations, seeking to strengthen peace and co-operation in the region.

Notes

1. Dr. Francisco Rojas Aravena is Director of the Chile branch of the Latin American Faculty of Social Science (FLACSO). See above for further details on the activities of FLACSO.
2. The following countries were covered: Among MERCOSUR countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and the two associate countries of Bolivia and Chile; Among Andean countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; in Central America: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama; in the Caribbean: Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago. Excluded from the survey were Mexico, which is an OECD country, Surinam, a former Dutch colony, French Guiana, an overseas Department of France, and several smaller Caribbean island states.
3. The bibliography which follows provides a selected bibliography of publications on SSR in Latin America and the Caribbean.
4. See, for instance, the following sites: Organisation of American States (www.oas.org), The World Factbook – Inter-American Development Bank (www.iadb.org), International Information Programs (www.usinfo.state.gov), Center for International Policy (www.ciponline.org), Data Base on Security and Defense (www.ser2000.org.ar), Regional Co-ordinator of Social and Economic Investigations (www.cries.org), Transparency International (www.transparency.org).
5. See www.flacso.org for additional information. Another useful source of security-related information on the region is RESDAL (www.resdal.org).
6. For example, there does not exist a regional source of information on military spending. Military spending data for the region comes from specialized institutions such as SIPRI, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (which produces the *Military Balance*) or the United States Arms Control Agency (ACA), in the Department of State.
7. Inter-American Democratic Charter. See www.oas.org.
8. Declaration of Nuevo Leon. Special Summit of the Americas. Monterrey, Mexico January 2004. See www.oas.org.
9. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003. See www.transparency.org.
10. Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 Report. See www.cepal.cl.
11. Adopted at the Special Conference on Security held in Mexico City on October 27 and 28, 2003.

12. Griffith, I., *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*. Ian Randle Publisher, Jamaica, 2004.
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ANNEX 4.A4

*Security System Reform in the Baltics,
the Commonwealth of Independent States,
and Southeast Europe*

by

Tanja Petovar¹

The main SSR challenge facing the post-communist states is to limit the influence of the old military and secret police cadre and to restore democratic control over the use of force by state institutions. This challenge encompasses not just internal military and police reforms but also the establishment of impartial judiciaries, the strengthening of legislatures, and the empowerment of civil society. A number of states have made great strides in democratising their societies and security systems, but most continue to face significant challenges in strengthening democratic governance of their security systems.

The primary impetus for SSR in the regions surveyed is the desire for integration into the EU Stabilisation and Association process and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This has given the military a new-found legitimacy in many countries due to their central importance in the accession processes. Yet an attitude where national security systems are viewed as being above the rule of law still dominates in the majority of the observed societies. A key SSR challenge is therefore to prevent the corruption of the newly-born democratic institutions by the old interpretation of governance.

Most of the countries surveyed are currently in the process of developing new national security concepts and defense doctrines that are better adapted to the post-Cold War security environment. The security challenges facing the post-communist states today extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditional military and police, requiring a broader approach that involves building basic political consensus on how to create a functioning state and healthy civil society. These processes have been heavily influenced by Western donors and defence establishments.

Yet the survey found that while political jargon in the surveyed regions is rich with phrases that reflect the impact of the international community on policy documents and political declarations about security, it does not, however, signify genuine local ownership of declared reform programmes or new concepts of security such as SSR. The term SSR – though widely used in the former Yugoslavia, for example – often has a different meaning

than the OECD-DAC sense of the word. Few people in the region, including policy makers and members of security establishments, view security in a holistic sense.

Much international assistance for SSR in SEE and CIS countries continues to focus on bilateral training and technical assistance, with much less emphasis placed by donors on structural reform or cultural change in the security system. This underscores the importance of linking donor engagements to reform-oriented outcomes and providing assistance in ways that serve as a stimulus to changes in the governance climate within the security system.

Introduction

This section presents the findings of a survey of security system reform which covered 18 post-communist countries in three sub-regions: the Baltics, southeast Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).² (Box 4.1 provides further detail on how the survey was carried out.)

The main SSR challenge facing the post-communist states is to limit the influence of the old military and secret police cadre and to restore democratic control over the use of force by state institutions. This challenge encompasses not just internal military and police reforms but also the establishment of impartial judiciaries, the strengthening of legislatures, and the empowerment of civil society. The Baltic States and Slovenia, in particular, have made great strides in democratising their societies and security systems, as recognised by their accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. The other countries continue to face significant challenges in strengthening democratic governance of their security systems. With the benefit of substantial international assistance, progress has, nonetheless, been relatively steady and visible even if uneven and far from complete.

This section is structured as follows:

- First, it assesses the challenges of gathering information on security issues in the post-communist countries.³
- Second, it examines the context for SSR in this region, highlighting the factors that have put security on government reform agendas.
- Third, it focuses on how “security” is defined in the post-communist states, and contrasts this with the DAC SSR concept.
- Finally, assesses the status of SSR in the three sub-regions, highlighting key factors that are necessary to understand current trends.

Information availability

Information for this survey was gathered from a variety of sources including interviews with civil society and government officials in the region, the Internet, and documents produced by think tanks in the regions. Due to the political relevance of SSR, information in this subject area is increasingly available, though the focus is mainly on individual components of state security systems rather than on the system as a whole, as emphasised by the OECD/DAC. Furthermore, much of the data and analysis on SSR in these regions is produced by outside organisations such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the OSCE Mission to this country has been very active in providing advice to governmental bodies, such as the

legislature, on security-related topics. There are, nonetheless, a number of specialised institutions that deal with SSR emerging in the Baltic States.

The post-communist states are heavily reliant on external organisations for data and expertise on SSR which is problematic for various reasons. When conducting research, external organisations often turn to their contacts in the legislative branch of governments in post-communist states, whose members may not be well informed about security-related issues. A similar problem emerges when outsiders work through liaison officers from the national defence and interior ministries, or even from the secret services. These officers often have little influence over (or specialist knowledge of) their security agencies. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for them to be closely monitored by counter-intelligence elements of the secret services (the surviving bastion of the old communist guard) and, therefore, may not be able to provide outsiders with a true picture of how the state security apparatus functions.

Despite the long shadow of the communist past which hangs over governments in the countries surveyed, most are now developing new national security concepts. However, while there are new and useful policy documents that indicate official thinking on SSR, in practice these documents are often simply a reworking of the old communist party documents, albeit somewhat “modernised” by the introduction of new democratic concepts and terminology (see Box 4A4.1). Having local experts with insider knowledge would help to clarify the situation, though their numbers are limited. As a consequence, much current analysis reflects an external, often superficial perspective on the institutional culture within post-communist security establishments.

Box 4A4.1. Understanding the communist legacy

In Serbia the national legislature passed a law in 2002 to reform the old state security service (renamed the Security Information Agency, or BIA), but a quick glance at the law’s text clearly shows the heavy influence of old communist thinking on security matters. The structure of the secret service was changed only cosmetically, and the only true element of civil control added was the formation of a National Security Council, headed by the Prime Minister. The individuals who make up that Council, however, have been accused of using the secret service as an instrument to maintain their positions of political power, rather than to tackle the serious threats to national security. There is little useful and knowledgeable analysis available on these matters within the body of SSR literature that is being produced for the international community.

Context for reform

The primary impetus for SSR in the regions surveyed is the desire for integration into the EU Stabilisation and Association process and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Countries aspiring to NATO Alliance membership⁴ have joined the Membership Action Plan (MAP).⁵ The Baltic States and Slovenia, which were welcomed into NATO on 29 March 2004 and into the EU in May 2004 and, have gone much further than the SEE and CIS countries in developing their democracies and incorporating EU standards and regulations into their domestic legislation. Romania and Bulgaria will be likely to join the EU in 2007, having become members of NATO also in March 2004.

The CIS countries have not been invited to apply for a myriad of different reasons. Many political forces in both the European Union and the United States consider the value of including these countries in the Euro-Atlantic fold negligible compared to the potential harm it may cause to the West's relations with Russia. The CIS countries generally suffer from rampant crime and corruption, as well as having depressed economies that would need large financial injections from the West to ready them for EU/NATO membership. These factors, combined with the Russian Federation's openly stated concern over possible NATO encroachment on its western borders, have led many in the West to view the CIS countries as a convenient "buffer zone" between themselves and the Russians.⁶

Progress on SSR in all three sub-regions will likely be closely tied to progress on wider economic and political reforms. The UNDP Human Development indicators give a sense of the vast differences among countries in the regions: Slovenia is ranked highest (29), Estonia (42), Croatia (48), Lithuania (49), Latvia (53), Ukraine (80), Georgia (81), Azerbaijan (88), with Albania (92) lowest in the ranking. Notwithstanding these economic differences and their diverse historical and cultural traditions, these countries do share in common the legacy of a communist past which has heavily shaped the direction of SSR in this region.

In the Balkans, the fragile peace and a semblance of law and order in conflict-torn societies are today being sustained by the heavy presence of international military forces and international agencies. NATO forces (SFOR) have played this role in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and will be replaced by an EU contingent from the end of 2004, accompanying the ongoing EU police mission. NATO troops are also present as KFOR in Kosovo. NATO then EU forces were deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the UN forces were, for a time, present in Croatia. A continuing challenge to peace and stability in these countries is the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of war crimes. In most cases the perpetrators are former members of armed forces or are still active in them, and this impedes efforts to establish democratic controls over the security system (see Box 4A4.2). Other security challenges in both SEE and CIS countries are economically-motivated ethnic conflicts, the presence of old Soviet cadres in governing regimes, drugs trafficking, terrorism and unstable borders.

Box 4A4.2. The role of "shadow" security systems

Western security experts have had difficulty understanding the so-called "parallel" or "shadow" security systems that operate in the Balkans behind the scenes of the formal state security establishments. Accused war criminals such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, for instance, who are wanted by international authorities in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been able to successfully evade arrest for several years. This is likely because they have had access to official state intelligence along with well-organised logistical support provided by former or serving members of the security establishments. This has enabled them to consistently evade arrest in areas with large contingents of foreign troops. These "shadow" security structures co-exist alongside – and in various ways interact with – official security bodies, yet are by their very nature above the law and, therefore, immune from any civil control.

One of the key challenges of SSR in the surveyed regions is preventing the corruption of newly-born democratic institutions through the transfer of the "old spirit" of governance

into the new political institutions. An attitude where national security systems are viewed as being above the rule of law still dominates in the majority of the societies in question,⁷ as clearly seen after the March 12, 2003 assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. The assassins were all active or retired special “police” officers belonging to the state security service, or their criminal cohorts from organised crime circles. The government declared a state of emergency, during which the security forces (many of them closely associated with the accused assassins) were given *carte blanche* powers.

Over 10 000 Serbian citizens were arrested during the state of emergency, even though most had nothing to do with the murder. The media was placed under government censorship, journalists were arrested for publishing articles not in keeping with government propaganda, and all civil liberties were suspended. The security forces and government were placed above the law by the state of emergency decree, which led to widespread abuses of power. Though seen in the beginning as a necessary and even desirable action against rampant organised crime, the state of emergency soon lost nearly all of its popular support as the abuses and selectivity of the state’s action became evident. This also contributed to the backlash by voters against the government at early parliamentary elections held on December 28, 2003.

Despite these challenges, SSR is occurring. The internal impetus is popular and there is political recognition of the urgent need for democratic change in broader society. The problem is that the reasons behind such impetus are often of concern. Civil society, in the Western sense of the word, is generally weak, while its effect on shaping and implementing SSR is negligible for a variety of reasons. Civil society in these countries is mostly composed of those who have a strong, built-in aversion to security forces, in general, and almost no understanding or knowledge of their internal functioning and wider purpose. This leads to civil society often adopting a confrontational approach with governments when it comes to SSR. This complicated nature of the internal drive for reform is in turn reinforced by external pressure and support emanating from the EU, NATO, the OSCE, international financial institutions, and the Council of Europe, including the Stability Pact in SEE.⁸

The pace of change varies enormously from the Baltic States and Slovenia, where it has been very rapid, to the gradual processes of nation-state building in the Western Balkans and post-Soviet states in the CIS region. All countries, except Belarus, are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, the countries differ substantially as far as their legal structures, accountability mechanisms, surveillance powers, and controls are concerned. Political and administrative culture, media freedom, public opinion and democratic values are factors that make these differences even bigger. Due to the authoritarian traditions that still prevail in the CIS and Western Balkans, a new political class still exercises power through prerogatives and ordinances, rather than through democratically elected institutions and legal mechanisms. At the same time, most of the new constitutions in the surveyed regions provide for elected parliaments with instruments to control crucial decisions affecting national defence and security (budgets, the declaration of war, etc.).

Politically-binding international agreements such as the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security⁹ and other ethical codes have been set up along with Council of Europe standards, which form a basis for further harmonisation of national laws with the EU standards.

Baltic states and Slovenia

The Baltic states have rapidly moved towards integration with the EU and NATO. They have also built close political and economic ties with the Nordic countries. Slovenia, which is located at the geopolitical border of south and central Europe, has also successfully joined numerous regional political, military and economic associations of the Central European nations (Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), as well as the Stability Pact for southeast Europe.

The Baltic states' new constitutions provide for a range of fundamental rights. Most laws relating to governance of the military and police have been drafted together with international experts.¹⁰ New provisions for legislative oversight provide a framework for accountability and transparency of the organisational, planning, budgeting, administrative and operational functions of the military and police, their services and agencies. National parliaments have gradually established effective control over these institutions. In their national security concepts, SSR is viewed in the context of wider economic and social reforms (see for example the case of Latvia – see Box 4A4.3).

Box 4A4.3. The National Security Concept of Latvia (Unofficial translation)

This Law was adopted by the Saeima on 16 February 1995.

National Interests of the Republic of Latvia

"The national security of the Republic of Latvia is the ability of the state and its society to protect and ensure the national interests and basic values. They are: the maintenance of the state independence, territorial integrity and democratic system of the Republic of Latvia, determined by the Satversme (Constitution), as well as ensuring the internal security of the state by guaranteeing compliance with the human rights, security and protection of the people.

The national interests also include ensuring of the preconditions necessary for a long-term development of the state and society: ensuring the economic growth and welfare of the population, preservation of language and cultural identity, maintenance of defence system, preservation and development of scientific and technical potential, ensuring sustainable development of the environment, ensuring and developing state infrastructure and telecommunications, including information technologies, the maintenance of internal political stability, which is based on overall awareness of the democratic development of the Republic of Latvia, and the development of unified civil society, which on the turn is based on the principle of equality of rights for all individuals.

The ability of Latvia to ensure realisation of its national interests also depends on such external conditions as general environment of international relations and co-operation in the world and the region, international economic situation, global environmental quality."

In Slovenia, "civilian control over the armed forces and, consequently, over the whole security system was one of the basic ideas about how to form an independent state".¹¹ By reforming its security forces, Slovenia has paved a way out of the system that was dominated by the Federal Army (of the former Yugoslavia) and its secret police. As the most developed republic of the former federal state, Slovenia has successfully undertaken a range of structural and economic reforms, achieving today the level of a developed European state.

During the early 1990s, the three Baltic states struggled through a difficult process of “re-establishing the basics of nationhood and dismantling the Soviet system”.¹² Fortunately, none of the Baltic states inherited the armed forces from the Soviet period. Consequently, the creation of national security and defence structures, including armed forces, border guard services, and new law enforcement mechanisms, were considered as one of the top priorities on the new governments’ agendas. It was perceived as a prerequisite for sustaining the independence gained after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The official applications of these countries for NATO membership in 1994 marked the beginning of a new stage of socio-political reforms, which included the adoption of laws related to national defence and the security system.¹³

Security in the Baltic region is understood to go beyond the traditional interpretation of concept. Trans-national organised crime is seen as one of the greatest threats to the integrity of governments and the rule of law. Links between organised crime and terrorist networks are of the highest concern, especially the fear that Russian organised crime networks might help terrorist groups obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or their precursors. In respect of Russian political interest in and influence on events in the Baltic region, this has become marginal.

Southeast Europe

EU enlargement has highlighted the gap between the SEE countries and Baltic Group Plus. The transition to democracy is underway in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, though it lags behind in most of the Western Balkans and Moldova where economic and cultural obstacles are intensified by contested borders. This is true for Serbia and Montenegro, where the survival of a common state is permanently challenged and the status of Kosovo is also far from being resolved. Serbia’s new constitution was still in negotiation in mid-2003 and the aforementioned “joint state” was officially created in the spring of 2003 amidst wide-spread chaos in its member state of Serbia, following the assassination of Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic. There is still latent unrest among the ethnic Albanian minority in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which led to the outbreak of armed hostilities in 2001.

Bosnian Serbs and Croats in post-Dayton Bosnia are still restive and a vast majority of them remain true to the idea of one day reuniting with their homelands (Serbia and Croatia respectively), while the Bosniaks are dissatisfied with what they consider the lack of centralisation in the country and want to concentrate more power in the capital, Sarajevo. Integration into the European Union and membership of NATO as part of the enlargement process that is now underway in both institutions provides an important incentive for reform. This reform however is, as mentioned earlier, not motivated by a genuine understanding of the inherent need for such changes. The resultant inflated and unrealistic demands by the populace, therefore, complicate the process.

In the Western Balkans, many commanders in the armed forces, the secret police and paramilitary units have been involved in war crimes and are still linked to illegal trafficking of drugs, cigarettes and people. For this reason, in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, there is resistance to full co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and to attempts to place the military under civilian control, to extradite war criminals to the Hague tribunal and to try local “mafia” in domestic courts. The police

and judiciary are still poorly trained and equipped, which, combined with old mindsets, prevent them from effectively tackling crime.

One of the most worrying issues is the tightly woven network of organised crime that also involves politicians, police and the judiciary. These criminal networks are deliberately obstructing the emergence of a stronger rule of law, in particular increased transparency and accountability of the military and police, as well as a healthy market economy.¹⁴

Albania, one of the least developed countries of the Western Balkans region, has gone through a period of serious conflict and destabilisation which was, in part, due to the Yugoslav wars and the impact of the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. An unusually radical reform and restructuring process in the economy, the military, and the police have accompanied Albania's transition. Organised crime, human and drug trafficking, and black market arms trade are chronic problems, which need to be tackled. Albania is a part of the EU Stabilisation and Association Process, the Partnership for Peace and Stability Pact and other security-related regional initiatives. Negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU started on February 15, 2003 and are expected to take some time. According to the European Commission¹⁵ Albania is still a rather unstable democracy, which has made only limited progress in addressing the main challenges it faces.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a war-torn society that is under a UN protectorate administered by the Office of High Representative. The Dayton Agreement (1995) retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and created a joint multi-ethnic and democratic government. This national government was charged with conducting foreign, economic, and fiscal policy. A second tier of government was also recognised, comprised of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation and RS governments were charged with overseeing internal functions. The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR), whose mission is to deter renewed hostilities, remains in place, with a declining number of troops, and will be replaced by an EU contingent by the end of 2004. As evidenced by the last parliamentary elections, deep ethnic divisions remain. The same three nationalist parties that led the country to war regained power.

Bulgaria has experienced positive economic growth rates since a major economic downturn in 1996. The current government, elected in 2001, has also pledged to continue political reforms, including the military and wider security system. The democratisation process kept Bulgaria on a path towards membership of NATO on 29 March 2004, with accession to the EU expected in 2007.

Although Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, it took four years to resolve the conflicts resulting from the collapse of the Yugoslav federation. Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia was, after Slovenia, the most prosperous and industrialised area, with a per capita output approximately one-third above the Yugoslav average. After the death of President Tudjman, his nationalistic government was voted out of power in January 2000. In the post-Tudjman era the country undertook some gradual reforms, particularly in the security system. Co-operation with the ICTY in the Hague and the repatriation of refugees are among the key political issues to be resolved prior to integration into EU. In the fall of 2003, new parliamentary elections returned the late Tudjman's HDZ nationalists to power, though there is some indication that the positions of extreme nationalist elements in the security systems and other segments of society are weakening.

After a decade of oppression under Milosevic, Kosovo came under UN administration (pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244) in 1999. In May 2001 international officials and local political parties (but no Serbian parties which refused to participate) agreed to a new Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo. This established a new parliament, which elected a new president, and laid the groundwork for a new local governmental structure. However, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) still has authority to govern the province and to disarm paramilitary units. Kosovo's still unresolved status hinders the development of clear policy and strategy with regard to the Stabilisation and Association process. KFOR, UNMIK Police and the Kosovo Police Service share in law enforcement and are under UN supervision. Their efforts to strengthen the rule of law are undermined by corruption and organised crime among the local political leadership, the guerrilla-military leadership, and militant diaspora.

In the winter of 2003, dialogue began between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, under international supervision, in Vienna. UNMIK also introduced a list of standards that the provisional authorities would have to meet before any talks on the province's final status could begin. And, while most international organisations in the province insisted the status of ethnic minorities was steadily improving, a wave of violent attacks by ethnic Albanians against minority Serbs in mid-March 2004 shattered all illusions about a multi-ethnic Kosovo society being "just around the corner". This only reinforced demands by the newly elected Vojislav Kostunica government in Belgrade that the province be cantonised, with Serbs there gaining special autonomy rights.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is one of the former federal units of Yugoslavia populated by Slav Macedonians and Albanians. The new state was spared from the Balkans' wars by the deployment of the UN preventive peacekeeping mission in 1992. The outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict between Slav Macedonians and Albanians in the spring of 2001 put to the test all segments of the new Macedonian society, as well as the international community. The conflict was resolved through the efforts of the EU and NATO diplomacy in the fall of 2001 and formalised by the Ohrid Agreement.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia faces many of the problems common to states where the democratic transition has been stalled and the society torn by war. These include criminalised and oversized armed forces, uncontrolled paramilitary units, and corrupt political elites. The presence of the NATO/EU forces preserves a fragile peace. The commitment of international organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UNDP and many other institutions has played an important role in preventing the dissolution of Macedonia into Slav and Albanian parts. While the Macedonian government has been very actively involved in a range of regional security initiatives, the strong influence of former Albanian National Liberation Army (UÇK) guerrillas in the country's economic and political life raises concerns about the trajectory of SSR, particularly since these same individuals are often tied to organised crime.

Since Moldova obtained its independence from the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991, the country has remained divided, with the Transnistrian region along the Ukrainian border controlled by separatist forces. The new communist government that came to power in the February 2001 elections has shown increased determination to resolve the ongoing conflict over the status of that region. Recent progress by Russia to destroy the weapons and munitions of the Organised Group of Russian Forces stationed in Transnistria has raised hopes for peaceful resolution of the conflict. Like many other former Soviet

republics, Moldova is experiencing severe economic difficulties. During 2001 Moldova joined the WTO and the Southeast Europe Stability Pact. It is a member of the Council of Europe and has signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. Politically the Communist Party government is committed to dealing with social issues including individual security, health and education.

In Romania, there is a widely shared belief among political parties on the desirability of rapid integration with NATO and the European Union (of which Romania is a candidate country). Although invited to join NATO at the summit in Prague 2002 with accession following in March 2004, concerns remain, in part, because democratic control of the armed forces is so weak. Structural reforms are slow due to an extremely heavy and cumbersome bureaucracy and excessive regulations and administrative control. That partly explains the high incidence of corruption and very slow and cosmetic military and security-related reforms to date. The judiciary and parliament are still too weak to control the executive branch of government in any meaningful way.

The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000 finally allowed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (since March 2003 called Serbia and Montenegro – SaM)¹⁶ to embark on a much-delayed process of political and economic reforms. The cumbersome, 18-party Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition government took power and immediately started a successful return to membership of international institutions. However, achievements on the domestic front were not matched in the foreign policy arena. The major problem SaM faces is sustaining the alliance of the two states, reforming the former Yugoslav Army, and the unresolved status of Kosovo. A not less complicated problem is how to establish the rule of law and an impartial judiciary, not to mention placing the executive power under democratic control after decades of authoritarianism and corruption. Most of the Serbian “oligarchs” in the security institutions successfully survived the soft political transition that occurred in October 2000.

The weak minority government that came to power after the 2003 assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic rules with the support of the former Milosevic party. Early indicators show that “soldier/businessman oligarchs” retain huge influence over the security system, or possess their own “parallel” security structures, making genuine SSR next to impossible. These secret police forces are behind most of the criminal activities in the country and, in this context, the question of whether there is enough “civil control” over the “official” services is a moot point.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The diversity of cultures, ethnicities and religion in the region are fundamental to understanding the conflicts and instability that have prevailed in the CIS states during the last decade. These conflicts, however, were in large part the result of policy choices of the new political classes in the CIS, classes that mainly consist of converts from the old Soviet “nomenclature”.

The three states of the South Caucasus face many of the developmental and security problems that plague other former Soviet republics, including weak transparency, rule of law, and democratic institutions. In Georgia, problems with separatism persist in the regions of Abkhazia, Adjara, and Javakhetia, each of which could potentially re-ignite civil war. One of the most serious obstacles to Georgia’s acceptance into NATO is the absence of government control over the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan only share basic diplomatic relations, a result of their war over Nagorno-Karabakh during the early 1990s. Despite a nine-year cease-fire, no final peace deal has been reached. A volatile mix of regional conflicts is intensified by the presence of Russian military bases in both countries. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was also exacerbated by Russia's attempt to keep a balancing role in the region.

The situation in the Russian Federation is even more complex. The country has only achieved a slight recovery after the economic crisis that struck in 1998 which hampers the broader political reform agenda.¹⁷ Serious problems persist, including widespread corruption, lack of a strong legal system and independent judiciary. Russia inherited a bulky military sector and an extensive network of secret police forces. The per capita size of the Russian military force today is in fact higher than that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Russia has kept some 80 per cent of the Soviet military machine, while inheriting only 50 per cent of the Soviet Union's resources, population and natural wealth. Russia is a top producer and exporter of military and police equipment. The war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s caused the radicalisation of Russian military as well as the Chechen guerrillas. Chechnya continues to be a haven for mafia groups and international terrorists. The war in Iraq and incidences of a more open and flexible foreign policy under President Putin have nonetheless allowed closer ties with the USA and some or all of the EU and created a window of opportunity for broader domestic reforms.

The expansion of NATO in March 2004 to include the former Eastern Bloc states of Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania caused fierce reactions in Moscow, coming as a surprise to Alliance officials after the Russians had previously been lukewarm in their response to NATO encroaching closer on their borders. The Russian legislature (State Duma) denounced the expansion, calling for President Putin to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, while top government officials, including the defence minister and deputy army chief of staff, warned of an "adequate response" and "reformulating" their country's nuclear arms doctrine to counter the NATO move. The Russian "sabre-rattling" came at a time when President Putin was ordering some of the most dramatic reforms of so-called "power agencies" (government bodies that report directly to him), including the foreign affairs, defence, interior, justice and emergency situations ministries and security and intelligence services, in an attempt to downsize these clumsy bureaucracies and bring them under tighter control. Notwithstanding these moves, serious obstacles remain to SSR in Russia as understood in the OECD DAC sense of the term. These include resistance within the security systems themselves and possible rogue elements among the 20 000 former KGB officers now privately engaged in security-related fields, some of whom are purported to have ties to "black-market" arms dealers and terrorist groups.

After seven decades as a constituent republic of the USSR, Belarus attained its independence in 1991. The country is led by Europe's last dictator, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and has retained close political and economic ties with Russia. The two countries signed a treaty in 1999 envisioning greater political and economic integration. Belarus has seen little structural reform since 1995. The country inherited a large military industrial complex from the former USSR. Between 1996 and 2000, Belarus ranked tenth in major arms exports in the world. Lukashenka's command economy has precluded sustained recovery of the kind now experienced by neighbouring Ukraine and Russia. Belarus also has the highest inflation rate in the CIS. The country remains in self-imposed isolation from the West.

The Republic of Ukraine, which used to be the Soviet Union's wheat basket and produced up to a third of Soviet armaments, has long experienced a split between its Russian-speaking East and the more nationalistic West. Industrialised eastern Ukraine, which suffered the most from the Soviet collapse, tends to be more in favour of integration with Russia. Western Ukraine, which has been a part of Austro-Hungary and Poland is dominated by nationalists who want closer ties with Europe and NATO. However, the country is still under the strong influence of Moscow since many of the former Soviet political cadres remain entrenched, stalling efforts at economic reform, privatisation, and civil liberties. In part due to problems of corruption, Ukraine was not invited to sign a Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002.

How security is defined

The notion that the quality of governance in general, and of the security system in particular, are relevant for internal peace and prosperity is gradually gaining political legitimacy in most of the countries surveyed.¹⁸ Political accountability and transparency have become an important benchmark which some governments have started to consider in SSR and wider socio-economic reforms. Some governments now also place structural security threats such as crime, corruption, and ethnic conflict at the apex of security policy, as in the case of Latvia, Georgia, and Russia.

Most of the countries surveyed are revising or writing new national security concepts and defence doctrines. The security challenges differ from the early 1990s because most countries now perceive internal conflicts as the major challenges to their security. These new concerns, which extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditional military and police, require a broader approach that involves building basic political consensus on how to create a functioning state and healthy civil society.

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (NSC), signed by President Putin on 10 January 2000, proceeds from the assessment that the main threats now and in the foreseeable future do not have a external military orientation but are predominantly internal in nature and arise from political, economic, social, environmental, and technological issues. It emphasises that the critical state of the economy, the deterioration in inter-ethnic relations, and the social polarisation of Russian society create a direct threat to the country's national security.

Some of these new notions of security that are emerging in the Baltic states, SEE and CIS at an official level do have some relevance to the DAC definitions. The particular emphasis on corruption, organised crime, and terrorism relates to the issues of operational effectiveness. Throughout all three regions, corruption is recognised as a key security-related issue. It is perceived as posing a real threat to new states by eroding the rule of law and undermining the trust and confidence of citizens in the fairness and impartiality of the new democratic institutions.

While political jargon in the surveyed regions is rich with phrases that reflect the impact of the international community on policy documents and political declarations about security, it does not, however, signify genuine local ownership of declared reform programmes or the adoption of new concepts of security as set out in the SSR work conducted in the OECD/DAC. The term "security-sector reform" – though widely used in the former Yugoslavia, for example – often has a different meaning for those using it. Few people in the region, including policy makers and members of security establishments,

view security in a holistic sense. The general public probably knows a significant amount about the way their security services work, but this knowledge is firmly rooted in the old communist model of security systems existing for the sole purpose of defending the ruling elite.

Assessment of findings

In the period since 1989, civil-security relations in the Baltics, SEE states, and the CIS have undergone – and continue to undergo – profound changes. These changes, which are common to most observed countries, encompass the following:

- Adoption of new constitutions and laws that give power to legislators and establish civil control of the military.
- Setting up a dividing line between political and military leaders.
- Restructuring and downsizing of armed forces.
- Increasing transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes.
- Reforming judiciaries and training of judges.
- Reforming police services.

While the nature of these changes differs substantially between countries and regions, several common themes are observable, and clear patterns in the development of civil-security relations are emerging. These common themes are changes in the military's role in governance, demilitarisation of areas of society that were militarised under communism, reduction of military influence, and changes of attitudes and perceptions of the role of security forces in society. The military enjoys a new-found legitimacy in many countries that is linked to their central importance in the accession of countries to NATO and, by implication, to other Western regional institutions. Internally, the legitimacy of the reformed military has been reinforced by their role in – or potential for – aid to the civil authority in times of crisis.

Governments of the Baltic countries and Slovenia have been the most successful thus far in building a broad-based concept of security, which they see as key to fostering economic growth, social stability, and respect for law and order. The new concepts emerged in the 1990s in the face of resistance from the “old guard”. However, backed by the success of rapid economic reforms and integration into the EU and NATO, democratic parties have managed to achieve consensus about the strategic priorities of national security.

Compared with the Baltics and Slovenia, the process in SEE and CIS countries has been slower and more politically controversial due to the generally slower pace of economic and political reforms. A potential obstacle to further change is a resurgence of the influence of old communist party officials who resist economic liberalisation and attempts to re-allocate the national wealth. This has resulted in the creation of informal power centres within new political parties. Affiliation with the “right” political party is still the key to a successful political career. Another key to success can also be links with former secret police and military intelligence. Paramilitary and internal security forces as well as intelligence services, police and border guards remain outside of any meaningful civil control in many SEE and CIS states, particularly those emerging from conflict (see Box 4A4.4).

Box 4A4.4. The enduring influence of the KGB

The Soviet Union's Committee for State Security (KGB) was dissolved along with the state it served in late 1991, following an aborted coup attempt by hard-line KGB and other Soviet leaders. However, most activities and assets of the KGB continued to function as separate intelligence, counterintelligence, presidential secret service, and telecommunications agencies of the Russian Federation, with the Russian president and government initially resisting attempts by the legislature to reunify the country's security system. The rise to power of former KGB officer Vladimir Putin and his election to president, after the 1998 economic downturn, drastically affected the entire course of Russian reforms, including those relating to the security system. Most analysts point to the increasingly predominant influence of so-called "siloviki" ("strongmen" – former KGB, defense and interior ministry officers now engaged by the government in many top posts) in Russian politics and economy over the last four years of Putin's presidency.

Mechanisms of accountability in governments are either weak or non-existent. Corruption in the public service, the weakness of civil society, and dysfunctional parliaments slow down the process of SSR. In CIS countries, control of the state security apparatus is typically in the hands of one man – the president – who has reproduced the role of the old Party Secretary-General. Such presidential control is, however, undermined by the "Oligarchs", a mixture of the old and the new interest groups, which are independent and uncontrollable. This dichotomy further weakens already weak state institutions.

Flagging economies, poor infrastructure, and low birth-rates are seen by many analysts as additional obstacles to broader reform. The new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation recognizes all of these challenges, emphasizing the importance of establishing a functioning central government able to create "... favourable conditions for the development of the individual and society, including upholding the constitution, law and order, and maintaining a friendly international environment".¹⁹

New national security concepts and other political and legal documents are full of terms and phrases such as "accountability and transparency", "good governance", "legitimacy through democratic participation", "respect for human rights and the rule of law", "parliamentary and civil control of the military", etc. While westernization of political jargon is an important step in creating a new political culture, it is hard to assess how many of those who use the new political jargon believe in its substance. A significant number of training initiatives, seminars, exchange programmes and other activities have been organized for parliamentarians, state administrative personnel, young politicians and party members. The country data gathered during the survey shows a number of activities focused on strengthening institutional and political culture.

Attempts have been made to give elected Parliaments across the region a measure of control over crucial decisions affecting national defence and security, such as approval of budgets, the declaration of war and peace, passage of security-related laws, monitoring of weapons procurement, ratification of international agreements, and authorisation of the deployment of troops for internal emergency situations and abroad (for example, Art. 92 of the Constitution of Slovenia). In most countries, however, these mechanisms do not function yet and are often perceived as a "favour" to the donor community. With the

exception of Slovenia, and to an extent the Baltic countries, parliamentary and other civil oversight bodies need significantly more experience and management skills.

Weak points in SSR processes relate to the development of a longer-term strategic vision for change, particularly in the military domain. This has partly been compensated for by the process of integration into the EU and NATO which has become both a new political mantra and provided a blueprint for reforms. The external vision has had an enormous impact in all SEE countries, and in most CIS states. One significant concrete benefit has been the closing of specialized military tribunals in almost all countries. Yet, as Box 4A4.5 suggests, one needs to be cautious about over-stating the degree to which SSR goals have been achieved. Current international efforts to support SSR have to date focused primarily on spreading Western norms and practices to inform how the security sector should operate.

Box 4A4.5. Separating “profound” from “cosmetic” reforms

The key to assessing the success of SSR across the Baltics, SEE and CIS states lies in separating “profound” SSR, that leads to open and transparent democratic governance, from cosmetic reforms undertaken to please international donors, NATO, the EU and other international actors. A typical example of superficial reforms is the restructuring and downsizing of the armed forces, and modernization of police structures and border guards, without strengthening parliamentary and other forms of civil oversight mechanisms. This underscores the need to create a public and political environment that is supportive of genuine democratic reform. This task can only be achieved with, on the one hand, the support of military and police leaders and, on the other, the creation of a class of well-educated, effective and highly professional public servants.

Enhancing public oversight of state security bodies by means of political parties, NGOs, independent media, specialized think tanks and academic institutions should be very high on the reform agenda. Until recently, there has been little or no co-operation between these kinds of organisations and national parliaments, while the military and intelligence were perceived as being above public control. Today, national defence planning and budgeting processes are becoming more transparent. National security concepts, though still vague and often ambiguous in many cases, are increasingly the subject of public debate.

Another significant SSR challenge is ensuring that the radical economic and monetary reforms introduced by the international financial institutions in the transition countries do not undermine the social and economic welfare of populations, including general law and order. None of the governments have successfully reconciled these competing goals, nor have they addressed these challenges in their national security concepts.

In summary, the key SSR priorities facing the Baltic, SEE and CIS states are those set out below. It should also be noted that the work of the OECD/DAC in this area has underlined the fundamental need to address these issues in an integrated and co-ordinated manner and to take a whole-of-government approach when promoting SSR.

Military reform remains an overwhelming priority for assistance by NATO and other international institutions because of the weakness of internal democratic control of armed forces and the persisting influence of the old pillars of the former totalitarian states – the

army and secret police. Key issues include the demobilization and reintegration of military personnel, the restructuring of the military secret police, and the strengthening of civil oversight over all aspects of the state security apparatus, including military industry and the arms trade.

The reform of **intelligence services** seems to be the weakest point in this process, and it remains the only sector not addressed by international assistance. The global “war on terror”, together with organised crime, drugs and human trafficking have been used as alibis to exclude executive power from democratic control, and even to justify secret police control over legislators and judiciaries. For example, the governments of Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia have at best only partial control over the intelligence services, because neither parliaments nor judiciaries have subpoena power over them.

There are, nonetheless, indications that the international community has decided to be more actively involved in this field. Recently, the UN High Representative in Bosnia has made an effort to merge all ethnic intelligence agencies into a single state-wide service. After September 11 2001, the US has become more active in Republika Srpska and Serbia. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, intelligence services in Serbia and Montenegro have been under investigation for their alleged links to organised crime.

All countries in the surveyed regions are attempting to **reform the police**. In SEE, for example, almost ten per cent of registered projects in the Stability Pact data base relate to police reform, with many more activities still to be registered. These projects address issues such as transparency and accountability within individual police forces, restructuring of the police to create more specialized units, creation of community policing, the establishment of multi-ethnic policing, and the de-militarisation of police forces that have been used in ethnic conflicts.

There are three main areas where unreformed police forces have a serious detrimental impact on development and pose a threat to stability across the regions surveyed, though particularly the CIS countries:

- First, police forces and the justice system are not effective in countering serious criminal and terrorist threats. Although in some instances the police have done valuable work, a combination of high-level corruption, lack of professionalism, lack of co-operation with the general public, and serious resource limitations or misdirection of funds has allowed these threats to flourish.
- Secondly, police forces are largely seen as the coercive branch of government rather than a neutral, service-oriented force that ensures law and order for all. They are involved in widespread human rights abuses that have estranged them from the public they are supposed to serve. Abuses by the police, including torture, have fuelled support for extremist groups and enhanced the risk the region faces from terrorism.
- Thirdly, security forces are acting as a brake on economic progress. Security is a key concern for domestic business and international investors but too often the police are not seen as defenders of business from criminals. Instead they are often involved in extortion rackets, costing business significant profits, or are directly involved in organised crime.

Much has also been achieved in **reforming the judiciary** mainly due to international assistance, though these efforts are also constrained by the challenges of police reform noted above. There are a great number of actors in this field and co-ordination is poor. Due

to the presence of both Anglo-Saxon and continental European legal experts, there is also an overlap between the two legal systems (for example in Albania or Georgia). However, in all countries, except Slovenia, the judicial sector remains one of the weakest links in the entire security system. Many legal reforms end at the point where legislation is adopted, while very weak enforcement mechanisms fail to ensure that legislation is actually implemented. The reasons are corrupt and incompetent judiciaries, inefficient public administrations and weak civil society capacity to monitor these reforms.

Civil society has undergone remarkable development in recent years, particularly with regard to the protection of human rights and media freedoms. Nevertheless, active civil society engagement in SSR remains limited, particularly in terms of contributing to the development of policy in the security arena.

The **return of displaced persons and refugees**, particularly minorities, is an important security issue in all post-conflict societies in the regions surveyed, though not an SSR issue *per se*. This is a very slow process, often politically controversial, and its progress is directly linked to the success of security reforms (*i.e.* ensuring the safety of returnees). Weak economies make the re-integration of refugees into society even more difficult.

In the area of **arms control and non-proliferation** international actors are the driving force. They are involved at various levels in regional arms control and confidence building activities. There is some overlap between the work of the SEESAC (SEE Clearing House for the control of small arms and light weapons), OSCE, NATO and other institutions that are active in all three regions. However, progress towards the destruction of landmine stockpiles is well advanced, particularly in Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Anti-corruption activities form a part of good governance and transparency initiatives. Strengthening “freedom of information” legislation is a significant challenge in efforts to combat corruption, yet such activities have not received adequate emphasis in SSR programmes. Domestic Transparency International (TI) branches in the region (notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) have been founded only recently. In Albania – which has one of the region’s most serious corruption problems – no TI chapter exists.

The fight against **organized crime** is directly linked to other activities in the area of police and border-guards reform, or reform of judiciaries. Money laundering is a significant problem in this field. There are many programmes in this area, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, Albania and Russia. Across the SEE states, the factors that make organised crime a problem are the same: their strategic location on Europe’s border with Asia, weak and fractured political and legal systems in which organised crime exploits a “single criminal space” unlimited by economic, political, ethnic or geographical boundaries, and the damaging legacy of early 1990s conflicts.

Like their counterparts in other countries, Russia’s organized crime groups focus on drug trafficking, racketeering, prostitution, smuggling, theft, money laundering, contract killing, and the like. The difference in Russia is the deep penetration of organized crime into normally licit activities of government and business. This increases the possibility of the involvement of organised crime in the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, or even influencing state policy in ways that threaten the security of other countries. International multi- and bilateral co-operation is crucial in preventing organised crime from penetrating into politics, the civil service and local administrations.

Terrorism, terrorist organisations and extremist groups are not characteristic of the Baltic states, Slovenia and most of the SEE countries. However, terrorism is a potentially destabilising factor in Russia and some of the other CIS countries. Efforts to combat this problem are only now receiving greater attention and will require a strong legal framework and effective international partnerships.

Conclusions

To address the wide array of problems identified by this survey, SSR must incorporate a strong developmental emphasis. So far, the international focus has been on post-conflict situations, but SSR is also a highly important tool for conflict prevention and peace-building across all of the regions surveyed.

Much international assistance for SSR in SEE and CIS countries continues to focus on bilateral training and technical assistance, with little attention to structural and other governance reforms or cultural change in the security domain. Most technical assistance actually goes for high-tech solutions, largely determined by donor preferences, which are often ineffective and ill-suited to needs of beneficiaries. Ideally, all technical assistance should be linked to reform-oriented outcomes and serve as a stimulus to changes of political culture.

The obstacles to SSR should not be underestimated. Interior ministries, for instance, are politically powerful in many of the former communist states, particularly the CIS. In many cases, they have little incentive to change if that means undermining their personal political and financial power bases. Many have experienced previous reforms that have done little except to introduce new security concepts that are not locally owned. Reforms have to take into account this internal opposition.

One of the most important goals must be to develop an understanding and appreciation among security forces of the long-term benefits of reforms. Without that, there is little hope for substantial reform. To this end, SSR must entail the strengthening of political parties (i.e. a real democratic opposition) that can encourage and facilitate dialogues that will lead to a national consensus about the minimum standards for governance of the security system.

Notes

1. Tanja Petovar has worked for many years, in various capacities, on institution-building programmes in southeast Europe: as director of Civil Link in Slovenia, as a Senior Executive of International IDEA, Sweden, and as a private consultant to governmental and non-governmental institutions in the region. Through her work facilitating the SEEDS Network (South-Eastern Europe Democracy Support), she has become closely involved with leading research agencies and think tanks in the Balkans.
2. The three Baltic states are: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; the nine SEE countries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo), and Slovenia; and the six CIS states are: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The survey did not cover the Central and Eastern European countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all of which are members of the OECD.
3. The bibliography that follows provides a select bibliography of publications on SSR in the post-communist countries.
4. Other nations that have applied to join NATO are: Albania, Croatia and Macedonia.

5. The NATO Washington Summit in April 1999 unveiled the Membership Action Plan (MAP) concept that has four essential components: a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) that identifies key targets spanning the political/economic, defence/military, resources, security, and legal dimensions of Alliance membership; a feedback mechanism by which NATO members and the partner can jointly assess progress; a clearinghouse for co-ordinating security assistance from NATO members to the partner; enhanced defence planning at the country level that establishes and reviews agreed planning targets.
6. On April 2, 2004 NATO expanded to include seven new members: Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. During the lengthy ratification process, NATO countries sought to appease Russian fears about expansion in different ways. But when four Belgian F-16s touched down at a former Soviet military base in Lithuania, Russian officials responded with outrage. President Putin later took advantage of German Chancellor Schröder's one-day visit to Moscow to assure the West that Russia does not fear NATO's expansion to the East.
7. The introduction of new "anti-terror" legislation in parts of Europe and in the US, which has undermined civil rights, has been used as a pretext by certain post-communist states to enact new policies that undermine human rights and democratic values in the name of ensuring security.
8. NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme has "ensuring democratic control of defence forces" as one of its five objectives. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) for aspiring NATO members has included detailed requirements under the PfP programmes. The European Union's PHARE and TACIT Democracy Programmes include projects to promote reform of judiciary, oversight by legislatures of the military sphere, education of police and border guards, etc. The OSCE and the Council of Europe have co-operated to support police reform and access to justice programmes, strengthen democratic oversight of reforms, and establish a code of police ethics such as the Council of Europe Code of Police Ethics.
9. In 1994, the OSCE adopted the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. While reaffirming the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the sovereign right of states, the Code contains a number of innovative positions on the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security.
10. For instance, the Legal-Political Assistance Group (LPAG) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and the US Bar Association.
11. Prof. Dr. Ljubica Jelusic, "Security Sector Reform in Slovenia: Waging Success and Failure Before the End of Transition", DCAF Conference Paper, Geneva, August 2002, p. 13-14.
12. Robert Sapronas, "Security Sector Reform in Lithuania: Theory and Practice," DCAF Conference Paper, Geneva, August 2002.
13. The National Defense Law (1996), Lithuania National Defence Service Law (1998, amended 2000), Lithuania Law of Fundamentals of National Security Concept (1996).
14. In Serbia, for example, Zoran Janjusevic, a security adviser of the assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and a member of his National Security Council, the body put in place for civil oversight of Serbian state security, was a trusted member of Radovan Karadzic's secret police at the height of the Bosnia war. After the war in Bosnia, Janusevic became one of the main suppliers of telecommunications equipment to Milosevic's interior ministry. He was earlier accused of criminal activities in his home country of Bosnia. The so-called "Janjusevic-Kolesar affair" brought down the Serbian government and raises concerns about the authenticity of Serbian reforms.
15. See the EC 2003 "Stabilisation and Association Report" published in March 2003.
16. Under strong pressure from the European Union, the parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro and consequently the Yugoslav parliament adopted the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on February 5, 2003, putting an end to the Yugoslav Federation and opening negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. In April 2003, Serbia and Montenegro was admitted into the Council of Europe, which was also seen as an act of encouragement to continue and intensify co-operation with the ICTY, the fight against organised crime and work on economic and political reform.
17. See the discussion in Aleksei G. Arbatov's "The National Idea and National Security", *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 5 (May) 1998: p. 5-21, and 6 (April) 1998: p.5-19.
18. See Heiner Hanggi's paper "Good Governance of the Security Sector: Its Relevance for Confidence Building" presented at the Seminar "Practical Confidence-Building Measures: Does Good

Governance of the Security Sector Matter?” held in New York, October 2002, sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security.

19. See: Andrei Tsygankov, “From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia”, *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 2 (November 1997).

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Table of Contents

Part I

Policy and Good Practice

Policy Statement	11
Chapter 1. Introduction	15
Background	16
Challenges and approaches	17
Notes	18
Chapter 2. Integrating Security Work into Development: Whole-of-Government Frameworks	19
Definitions and actors	20
Working principles for effective security system reform	22
Improve reporting	24
Mainstream security as a public policy issue and take a whole-of-government approach	24
Develop programming strategies	28
Promote an effective division of labour amongst development actors	29
Notes	29
Chapter 3. Continuing Donor Commitment to Facilitating Developing Country-led Reform Efforts: Programming Approaches	33
Enhance domestic ownership of reform processes and strengthen institutional frameworks	34
Develop country and context-specific SSR approaches	45
Encourage governments to develop workable multi-sectoral strategies	46
Help to create conditions that will generate local demand for change	47
Identify entry-points and develop methods of working through local actors	47
Adopt a regional perspective	50
Notes	52

Part II

Views from Non-OECD Countries


Chapter 4. Overview of Regional Survey Findings and Policy Implications for Donors	55
Introduction	56
Background to the Global Survey	57
Translating the SSR concept into policy and practice	59
Conclusions	66
Notes	68
Annex 4.A1. Security System Reform in Africa	71
Annex 4.A2. Security System Reform in Asia-Pacific	91
Annex 4.A3. Security System Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean	109
Annex 4.A4. Security System Reform in the Baltics, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Southeast Europe	125

List of boxes

1.1.	Women, peace and security	18
2.1.	Definition of transitional justice	21
2.2.	The United Kingdom's support for reform in Sierra Leone	25
2.3.	Good practice: Promoting policy coherence through funding mechanisms ..	26
2.4.	Good practice: Policy-driven funding mechanisms.	27
2.5.	Good practice: Partnership for governance reform in Indonesia	30
3.1.	Categories of SSR-related activities	35
3.2.	Good practice: Enhancing democratic governance of the security sector: An institutional assessment framework.	36
3.3.	Good practice: South Africa's Defence Review process	37
3.4.	Good practice: Managing risks: Integrating the defence sector into public expenditure work	38
3.5.	Good practice: Supporting and linking regional networks.	40
3.6.	Good practice: Capacity building of the South African police service	41
3.7.	Weapons for development: A comprehensive, community-based approach in Cambodia	42
3.8.	Good practice: Linking small arms and SSR	43
3.9.	Assistance for DDR in Afghanistan: Comprehensive approaches to SSR	44
3.10.	Good practice: UNDP support for dialogue on defence issues.	45
3.11.	SSR in Sierra Leone.	46
3.12.	Good practice: Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). ...	47
3.13.	Good practice: Using an entry point for SSR – Uganda's Strategic Security Assessment	48
3.14.	Good practice: South-South dialogues on security system governance and transformation	49
3.15.	Good practice: Participatory frameworks for SSR	49
3.16.	Regional comprehensive development assistance to Afghanistan: "The Ogata Initiative"	51
4.1.	Methodology for the regional surveys.	67
4A1.1.	South African White Paper on Defence.	77
4A1.2.	African "SSR"	80
4A1.3.	How easy is it to conduct research on SSR?	81
4A1.4.	Common African Defence and Security Policy	85
4A1.5.	Uganda's Security Policy Framework	86
4A2.1.	Uzbekistan's military doctrine	98
4A2.2.	Defence reform as a political process	100
4A2.3.	Off-budget military spending	101
4A2.4.	Building civil society capacity.	103
4A3.1.	Locally-generated information and confidence building	111
4A3.2.	Crisis of public confidence in national institutions	114
4A3.3.	Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS).	115
4A3.4.	Declaration of Nuevo Leon, México 2003.	118
4A3.5.	Impact of the "war on terror"	119
4A4.1.	Understanding the communist legacy	127
4A4.2.	The role of "shadow" security systems.	128
4A4.3.	The National Security Concept of Latvia (Unofficial translation)	130
4A4.4.	The enduring influence of the KGB	138
4A4.5.	Separating "profound" from "cosmetic" reforms.	139

List of figures

2.1.	Security system reform and other related activities.	20
3.1.	Framework for developing a security system governance strategy	36



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