3. Ensuring transparency and integrity in Thailand’s public decision making

Inclusive public policies and decision making based on integrity, participation and transparency legitimise and make policies more effective, thereby strengthening citizens' trust in governments (OECD, 2017[1]). However, powerful individuals and interest groups can use their wealth, power or advantages to tip the scale in their favour at the expense of the public interest. When public policy decisions are consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest towards the interests of a specific interest group or persons, policies are captured rendering them unfair and exclusive (OECD, 2017[2]). Public policies that systematically favour narrow interest groups could affect the delivery of public services in the long-term, as well as fair competition, trust in government and the legitimacy of political systems.

The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[3]) states that governments should “encourage transparency and stakeholders’ engagement at all stages of the political process and policy cycle to promote accountability and the public interest”. Indeed, enforcing the right to know through transparency and access to information, and the inclusive and fair participation of stakeholders are key instruments for levelling the playing field and protecting the policy-making process from being dominated by particular interests.

Over the past decades, Thailand has made impressive economic progress: it has joined the rank of upper middle-income economies, poverty has been reduced, and economic growth and well-being indicators have improved steadily (OECD, 2019[4]). However, data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 shows that Thailand seems to be, on average, more vulnerable to undue influence than other countries in Southeast Asia and the OECD, exhibiting lower levels of perceived transparency in government policy making (Figure 3.1). Besides, while according to the Asian Development Bank, Thailand shows the lowest levels of reported bribery solicitations in the continent (9.9% of firms in the country reported experiencing bribery requests), the perception among representatives from business reflects that government officials show favouritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts (IMF, World Economic Outlook Database). Further, country experts from the Varieties of Democracies Project consider that most of Thailand’s social and infrastructure spending systematically favours a specific corporation, sector, or set of constituents, instead of allocating social and infrastructure expenditures for the benefit of society as a whole (V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg).

Promoting integrity and transparency in public policy making is a precondition to building inclusive and fair societies and averting policy capture. An important step in this direction is to implement broader anti-corruption measures, such as the ones in place in Thailand (OECD, 2018[5]). Nonetheless, to ensure that influence on public policies is wielded correctly and to prevent the capture of public policies by private interests, Thailand could increase its efforts to make policy making more accessible, inclusive and accountable to citizens. In particular, this chapter provides recommendations along the following lines of work:

  • Fostering regulations on stakeholder engagement and participation in policy making.

  • Promoting transparency and access to information on decision making.

  • Strengthening enforcement and regulations awareness raising.

Advocacy and interest groups can bring much-needed information to the policy debate. Transparent and fair competition of interests through legal and legitimate channels during decision-making processes lead to public policies that include constituents’ views and concerns, and favour the public interest. However, if there are no effective mechanisms to regulate how private interests influence and interact with policy makers, some interests may have uneven access to decision-making process and capture policies.

Section 77 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand requires the use of good regulatory practices, such as regulatory impact assessment, stakeholder engagement and ex post reviews. It recognises interactions between stakeholders and policy makers during public decision making, and states that the public and stakeholders should be taken into consideration during law-making processes. In addition, implementing requirements under Section 77, the Act on Legislative Drafting and Evaluation of Legislation B.E. 2560 (2019) requires the public to be involved in every drafting process.

Furthermore, the government of Thailand encourages public agencies to promote stakeholders’ participation in decision making through the “Participatory Governance Category” of Public Sector Excellence Awards. The Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) gives this award to government agencies committed to the promotion and development of an effective public administration which meets people’s needs on the basis of accountability and public participation.

Yet, there are no specific regulations on how the private and the public sector should actually interact during legislative drafting or broader policy making. As evidenced during the interviews conducted by the OECD in Thailand, no official mechanisms are in place to regulate or prevent big companies from contacting ministers and policy makers privately during policy-making processes. Indeed, uneven access to policy making was also raised as a concern by Thai Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), pointing out that only a few private actors and businesses have access to direct communications with policy makers to influence legislation, policies or administrative decisions (Nimitmongkol, 2019[6]).

The lack of clear stipulations regulating how the private sector is involved in policy making can lead to potential conflicts of interest and may create opportunities for influencing and developing bias in policies. Hence, many OECD countries have either legislative frameworks, rules of procedure or codes of conduct to regulate interactions between stakeholders and public officials and policy makers (Figure 3.2). For example, in Korea, the Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anticorruption and Civil Rights Commission includes a specific code of conduct for public officials that regulates interactions with private stakeholders. In Italy, the Rules of procedure of the Parliament require that everyone who represents an interest, and interacts with policy makers, should register and report their activities, as well as disclose their interests. In France, according to Law No. 2016-1691 on transparency, the fight against corruption and on the modernisation of economic life, the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP) manages a public register through which citizens can access information about the identity of interest representatives who try to influence policies, the activities they perform in order to influence, the expenditure related to these activities, as well as public decisions targeted by them.

Following these examples, Thailand could initiate discussions in order to draft specific rules or guidelines to regulate interactions between different stakeholders and public officials during policy making. To ensure policies are made in the public interest and fair interactions during their design, these rules could for example require the disclosure of stakeholders’ names and the activities they carry out if they intend to influence policies, or could specify that stakeholders who want to influence policies should be registered.

Alternatively, Thailand could include a directive in the Code of Professional Ethics for the Civil Service or provide a set of rules or principles establishing how public officials and policy makers must be contacted or how they should interact with private stakeholders. For instance, the current drafting of the Code of Conduct for Parliamentarians could be an opportunity to include these dispositions, similar to the one in Spain, which defines the notion of “lobbyist” and establishes an obligation for public officials to disclose information on their meetings with lobbyists. The example of the Code of Conduct for Deputies and Senators in Spain is described in Box 3.1.

Public policies in the public interest require the development of regulations to ensure not only fair interactions during policy making, but also fair participation, by granting all stakeholders equal access and proactively promoting their engagement. Meaningful stakeholder engagement safeguards the public interest, enhances the inclusiveness of policies, inspires ownership over policy outcomes and stimulates innovative solutions. By involving people in the policy-making process, governments can collect empirical information for analytical purposes, identify policy alternatives, and measure expectations resulting in valuable information on which to base their policy decisions (OECD, 2018[7]). OECD countries make use of a variety of tools to consult, both with the general public and targeted stakeholders (Figure 3.3).

In Thailand, section 77 of the Constitution of the Kingdom states that prior to the enactment of every law, the State should conduct consultation with stakeholders, analyse any impacts that may occur from the law thoroughly and systematically, and should also disclose the results of the consultation and analysis to the public, and take them into consideration at every stage of the legislative process. Hence, the Act on Legislative Drafting and Evaluation of Legislation B.E. 2560 (2019) includes the requirement for a public consultation before every drafting process begins. Public consultation mechanisms include, among others, meetings, interviews, questionnaires, providing input digitally, or inviting different stakeholders to explain or express their opinions (to learn more about stakeholder engagement see forthcoming OECD Regulatory Reform Review of Thailand).

However, formally requiring stakeholder engagement during policy making is not sufficient to ensure effective implementation: broad and updated information and communication of the processes, as well as the timing and scope of engagement are important considerations. For instance, if engagement procedures do not include all relevant stakeholders, or only engage them after drafts and relevant discussions were developed – that is, in the late stages of policy making – stakeholders are likely to feel de facto excluded from the decision-making process and may abstain from participating in the future.

Additionally, the Rule of the Office of the Prime Minister on Public Consultation B.E. 2548 (2005) states that public consultations are in general optional, and only compulsory if the expected impact on the public is high. This leaves considerable room for discretion to ministries concerning engagement processes. Indeed, a study conducted by the Reform Commission of the Office of the Council of State found that 90% of Thai legislation related to trade was based on a closed government control system, that consultation was uncommon, and that legal initiatives presented vague, broad subjects which did not address focused or specific topics and did not provide evidence or data for support (Ongkittikul and Thongphat, 2016[8]). Accordingly, stakeholders do not have easy and timely access to all information regarding consultations or are not familiar with the many channels and ways used for engagement. Further, evidence from other OECD governance reviews also points to the fact that public consultation– when carried out –is not dynamic and aims at complying with regulations rather than on extracting value from these exercises (forthcoming OECD Open and Connected Review of Thailand). Consultations often appeared to be announced at short notice, and organised without a standardised protocol (forthcoming OECD Regulatory Reform Review of Thailand).

In order to reform regulations and strengthen stakeholder engagement, the Government of Thailand established the Committee for Revising the Rule of the Office of the Prime Minister on Public Consultation. The draft for the new Public Consultation Act includes some dispositions that are broader than current regulations. For example, it requires State agencies to always disseminate information and consult with affected people whenever a project deals with “quality of environment, health, sanitary condition, the quality of life or any other material interest”. However, the disposition is rather vague and the government of Thailand could use the opportunity to consider including specific and detailed guidelines on the processes, methods and timeframes, which could be applied broadly to the general regulatory processes. Moreover, as included in Section 11 of the Act on Legislative Drafting and Evaluation of Legislation B.E. 2560 (2019), the development of a central database system to provide all stakeholders with open, timely and relevant information, would further encourage the Thai citizens’ engagement in participation processes. The Digital Government Agency plans to establish and manage a centralised web-portal that will host information prepared by the regulators on the underlying principles and rationale for considered legislative measures even before legal drafting has started. This platform could benefit from some experiences in OECD countries (Box 3.2).

Transparency has been proven as a key element in anti-corruption policies. It provides people and civil society organisations with the opportunity to monitor and hold public servants and representatives to account. Moreover, there is a strong correlation between public trust in politicians and transparency in government policy making (OECD, 2017[1]). Granting citizens the right to know, and regulations on access to public information are important tools to curb corruption.

Transparency consists of both active and passive actions on the part of the government. On the one hand, governments need to proactively make information public, allowing individuals to access and use this information (active transparency). This includes the publication of open government data by public sector organisations. As discussed in the OECD Open and Connected Review of Thailand, this could also help in preventing corruption and policy capture. Section 59 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand establishes that the State shall disclose any public data or information in the possession of a State agency, which is not related to the security of the State or government confidentiality, and shall ensure that the public can conveniently access such information.

On the other hand, transparency is also about responding to requests for information by individuals, e.g. through access to information laws (passive transparency). In Thailand, the right to information is granted through the Official Information Act B.E 2540 adopted in 1997, and Section 41 of the National Constitution recognises that: “A person and community shall have the right to be informed and have access to public data or information in possession of a State agency as provided by law” (Box 3.3).

According to the Global Right to Information Index (RTI), the legal quality of Thailand’s Official Information Act –scoring 76 points- is below the OECD average, but slightly above the average score of other South East Asia countries included in the RTI (Figure 3.4).

In addition to the legal framework and as part of the measures to publish government information, Thailand has created the Government Service Center (GovChannel), which allows the public to access some information online, even if not all government information and data are made accessible on the same website, and multiple exemptions to disclosure remain (Figure 3.5). The platform is a first step to increase discoverability by federating the access to public sector information, data and services through one single domain.

Thailand’s Official Information Act B.E 2540 (1997) allows people to request official information from a State agency, while protecting individuals’ privacy rights and the possibility to express their opinions. However, the law does not provide guidance or detailed procedures to request information. For instance, the law is very vague with regard to deadlines and rules on extension, and the institution receiving requests is not obliged to transfer the request in case information cannot be obtained. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior of Thailand has developed a policy that links data from various government agencies to ID cards, which means citizens can use only their ID card to request information, thus reducing in practice the scope of the regulation that currently applies to all natural persons. These elements could obstruct the implementation of the Act and individuals’ actual requests for information, as confirmed by the findings and recommendations on access to information of the forthcoming Open and Connected Government Review of Thailand.

In this regard, Thailand could take advantage of current discussions on the Official Information Act reform to include dispositions that could guide citizens requesting public information. In Mexico, for example, the General Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information states that all proceedings concerning the right of access to information must be substantiated in a simple and expeditious manner. Any person, by themselves or through a representative, can request access to information via the Transparency Unit, the National Platform, at the office or offices designated for this purpose, via email, mail, courier, verbally or by any means approved by the National System (Article 122, Mexico’s General Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information).

On the other hand, concerning the mandate and organisation of the Official Information Commission, it has been noted that it has a very small number of staff and approximately convenes three to four times per year. Furthermore, the Commission does not issue binding decisions and does not have a mandate or authority over other agencies. In addition, the Official Information Commissioner –the head of the Commission, who functions as a chairman for the Board - is appointed by the Prime Minister and dependent on the Prime Minister’s Office, hence he/she changes when the government does. All these elements affect not only the independence but also performance of the Commission turning the outcomes of their studies and decisions into mere declarative statements with no enforcement power.

In order to ensure an effective implementation of the legislative framework, the government of Thailand may strengthen and further promote the independence of Thailand’s Information Commissioner. Effective oversight bodies should be independent from the government, have their own budget and appoint their members based on specific appointing requirements and criteria. In this context, and also as part of the reform of the Official Information Law, Thailand could consider the case of the Information Commission in Indonesia. Commissioners are experts, nominated by the president, but appointed by the Parliament (Articles 30 and 31 of the Public Information Disclosure Act). Further, the Commission’s decisions are binding (Articles 39 and 46), it is assigned its own budget and it is able to request additional budget from the Parliament if necessary (Article 29).

During the last decade, in parallel with the global decline of trust in governments, an increasing number of countries have introduced tools and regulations to enhance the transparency and integrity of the public decision-making process, for example the disclosure of “legislative footprints” (Figure 3.6). A legislative footprint is a document that details the time, identity and subject of a legislator’s contact with a stakeholder (Berg and Freund, 2015[9]). It enables public scrutiny of the entire legislative process. As a way to strengthen transparency, many OECD countries have made public the names of organisations and people who policy makers have met with and consulted while drafting legislation, or those to whom they have disclosed discussions and interventions held within committees and parliamentary bodies (Box 3.4).

In Thailand, according to Section 77 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, the State should ensure that the public has proper access to laws and is able to understand them easily. This is echoed by section 5 of the Act on Legislative Drafting and Evaluation of Legislation B.E. 2560 (2019), which states that the government shall provide the public easy access to legislation so they can understand and comply with the law correctly. However, the main objective of these dispositions is to underline the responsibility of citizens to comply with legislation by ensuring comprehensibility, rather than to foster transparency in decision making. In this sense, though the public can have access to legislation, they cannot access information on the decision-making processes.

In order to foster citizens’ trust in government through transparency, Thailand could therefore provide complete information on different legislative stages and gear the information provided towards promoting transparency in decision-making processes. To this end, the Office of the Council of State is planning to develop a new website and have it ready by the end of 2020. This platform is being designed to support various regulatory policy tools and become the country’s central legal database. Meanwhile, as an initial step, the website of the National Assembly could be updated in order to systematise all the available information. In particular, it should be ensured that all links are functioning properly and that all information is presented in a user-friendly way, grouping data by topic, status, etc. Additionally, the Secretariat of the House of Representatives could consider the inclusion of a disposition within legislative regulations making available to the public additional information on the legislative process, similar to the majority of OECD countries. For example, this could include information on discussions in Commissions or Assembly, or meetings with experts and stakeholders.

Opening policy makers’ agendas could allow individuals and organisations to know which interest representatives or groups have had access to policy makers, and when they have been approached. This could increase transparency with regards to how policy-making processes are influenced by various interests, beyond the legislative processes or safeguards that may already be in place. Further, it could strengthen enforcement of regulations, complementing specific dispositions to promote integrity and avert the capture of decision-making processes.

Indeed, many OECD countries require that public officials that are involved in regulatory processes make their agendas available to the public. In Spain, for example, all members of Government are required to disclose their professional agendas, detailing all their daily meetings. The agendas can be accessed online through the webpages of the entities or through the Official Transparency Platform. In Chile, the Council for Transparency manages an online website, where all the information on public officials’ meetings is made public (Box 3.5).

However, in Thailand there are no regulations or guidelines that require or suggest that public officials involved in regulatory processes make their agendas available to the public. In this regard, and taking the opportunity of current discussions on amending the Official Information Act B.E 2540 (1997), the Thai Government could consider including such a disposition in the new draft. Additionally, a similar requirement could be discussed in the Ethics Committee of the House of Representatives and included in the rules of procedure or the future code of conduct for parliamentarians.

Many governments establish and use advisory groups, such as committees, boards, or commissions, to inform public decision making through the provision of specific advice, expertise and recommendations. These groups are made up of public and/or private sector members and/or representatives from civil society, and may be created by the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government or government subdivisions.

Despite their relevance in decision making, there are not many regulations on these advisory bodies in OECD countries. Most OECD countries make members of advisory bodies public (Figure 3.7), but there are only a few countries that establish specific requirements for their composition, or that require members to disclose their interests. For instance, only 20% of lobbyists state that they have to disclose their interests and activities if they are part of an advisory board (2020 OECD Survey on Lobbying). In fact, the capture of these advisory groups by private interests to exert influence has been identified as an emerging risk to the integrity of policy making. When, for example, corporate executives advise governments as members of an advisory group, they act not as external lobbyists or stakeholders, but as part of the policy-making process with direct access to decision makers (OECD, 2014[10]).

In Thailand, various advisory bodies are established within the executive to support, advise and inform ministries and governmental agencies. They vary in objective, scope and functioning. There are institutionalised, long-term bodies, such as the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee (composed of senior public officials responsible for economic affairs, and private representatives, such as the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, and Thai Bankers Association), and other more informal and ad-hoc entities, such as the sub-committees within the National Research Council. The members of these advisory bodies are generally appointed by the government.

Additionally, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have the power to establish ‘ad hoc committees’ when they deem it reasonable and necessary to address parliamentary affairs that are not under the scope of any particular standing committee, or overlap with the powers and duties of multiple standing committees. Concerning appointments to these committees, the National Constitution (Section 128) states that if a bill concerns certain social groups (children, youth, women, elderly, disabled or handicapped), one third of the committee must comprise either people belonging to the social group concerned by the bill, or representatives from private organisations who deal with this social group. Similarly, if a bill is introduced through a petition, the appointment rules of ad hoc committees stipulate a quota requiring one third of the committee to consist of representatives of people who signed the petition.

Despite their varied relevance and duration in the Thai institutional framework, these advisory bodies in the executive and legislative branches are key in decision making, and should therefore be subject to high standards of transparency and integrity. However, the OECD fact-finding mission to Thailand found that the information pertaining to members of these different committees is not available to the public, and neither are the reports on assessment evaluations, minutes of meetings, or transcripts of discussions that were held. These elements may impact on the performance of the advisory bodies, undermining their expertise and advice, affecting the transparency of decision-making processes, and increasing capture risks.

Hence, the government of Thailand could develop strict and clear regulations regarding its advisory bodies and establish transparency criteria for their composition and advice provided to policy makers. For instance, these rules could extend the scope of some related dispositions of the National Constitution in order to make it applicable to all government committees within the Executive branch. Section 129 of the National Constitution requires the Legislative branch to include in its Rules of Procedure that ad-hoc committees should disclose minutes of sittings or committees’ reports, findings and studies. Therefore, and similar to most OECD countries (Figure 3.7 above), information on members of committees, as well as all relevant documents, minutes or agendas, should be made available to the public. This could strengthen transparency in decision making, promote accountability of advisory groups, and diminish capture risks.

Additional measures could include the requirement to balance the composition of advisory boards in terms of private stakeholders’ participation, by including representatives from different sectors, organisations, etc. For example, only representatives from big and well-known chambers or associations are invited to participate in the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee at the national level. However, even if advisory boards include local experts or local-level representatives, there is no guarantee that a plurality of interests are represented in discussions. Another example of a measure Thailand could consider is an outright ban on industry payments to committee members, a proposal currently being discussed in Switzerland.

In order to make a stronger impact and achieve real outcomes, a comprehensive legislative framework to promote transparency and integrity in public decision making needs to be complemented by measures to raise awareness about the available information and the existing engagement mechanisms. In addition, the framework needs to be enforced to ensure that public officials respect these mechanisms, and that rules and regulations are implemented and complied with.

The Public Consultation Advisory Committee in Thailand, which includes government representatives and qualified persons appointed by the Council of Ministers, monitors and provides feedback on public consultations held in the country. According to the Act on Legislative Drafting and Evaluation of Legislation B.E. 2560 (2019), once a public consultation has been held, the State agency in charge of the process has to consider the inputs for further drafting and has to enumerate at least the general topics and opinions including the reasoning provided by each participant of the public consultation. Further, the State agency has to provide, publish and present an impact assessment report. The Office of the Council of State can require the stakeholder engagement to be conducted again if needed, or inform the relevant government agency to do so.

As mentioned above, the Council of State is currently developing a single platform that will centralise and organise all information related to different public consultations. However, until now this information is still being disaggregated by State agencies, and hence there are no overall statistics or data on public consultations held in the country. The lack of centralised and co-ordinated data may undermine the best practice principle on performance assessment (OECD, 2014[11]) as well as hinder access to this information by the general public.

Many OECD countries compile and analyse information regarding stakeholder engagement processes. They collect information and produce statistics on participants of consultations (that is the case in Canada, France, Greece, among others), publish reports on the performance of consultation practices related to draft regulations (such as in Estonia, Switzerland or the United Kingdom), or even develop indicators on the functioning of consultations (in Japan, Slovenia or Mexico, among others) (OECD, 2018[7]).

In this sense, the Thai government’s initiative to systematise all information concerning public consultations and make it available to the public should be continued and could be furthered by the development, compilation and analysis of statistical data. Some OECD countries’ websites provide suitable examples (Box 3.6). This would allow for the identification of trends, weaknesses and comparative analysis regarding issues, agencies and mechanisms. It could even allow the government and many stakeholders to assess the impact of their engagement on different regulations and foster trust in government.

In addition to engaging stakeholders during decision-making processes and allowing citizens to provide their inputs on different initiatives, governments sometimes grant their citizens the right to propose initiatives and hence to proactively engage in shaping the public agenda. This is the case in the majority of OECD countries, which provide citizens with the possibility to present draft initiatives of legislative bills (2020 OECD Survey on Lobbying).

In Thailand, since 1997, a number of eligible voters have been granted the right to introduce bills directly to the National Assembly. The proposed bill must be related to the rights and liberties of people, or fundamental State policies, and requires the support of at least 10 000 citizens.

However, during the OECD fact-finding mission, the Office of the Council highlighted that after more than ten years of implementation, bills initiated by the electorate have proven to be impractical as a method of introducing draft laws, since they rarely pass the National Assembly due to a lack of technical and political support from the government. Public officials mentioned that only ten draft bills have been presented by citizens’ initiatives. None of these have ever been successful though, for various reasons, including for example technical problems regarding the fact that bills must be related to and do not contradict any other pre-existing laws.

In this regard, the government of Thailand could consider implementing awareness-raising and communication efforts in order to make citizens more mindful of the requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to introduce legislation, and develop their capabilities to proactively engage in policy making. This could serve the purpose of both educating people on the role of Parliament, as well as encouraging them to participate in legislative processes. Current programs and campaigns carried out in some OECD member and non-member countries could be used as guidance (Box 3.7).

Additionally, the Thai government may consider developing an initiative that provides direct incentives for citizens to proactively engage in public life, similar to the European Citizens Initiative in the EU (Box 3.8).


[9] Berg, J. and D. Freund (2015), EU LEGISLATIVE FOOTPRINT: What´s the real influence of lobbying?, Transparency International-EU Office, Brussels, https://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Transparency-05-small-text-web-1.pdf.

[6] Nimitmongkol, M. (2019), Why is corruption not reduced?, ACT, Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand, http://www.anticorruption.in.th/2016/en/detail/1427/1/%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%B3%E0%B9%84%E0%B8%A1%E0%B8%84%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%A3%E0%B9%8C%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%8A%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%99%E0%B9%84%E0%B8%A1%E0%B9%88%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%94%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%87%20? (accessed on 12 August 2020).

[4] OECD (2019), Multi-dimensional Review of Thailand: Volume 3: From Analysis to Action, OECD Development Pathways, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/7ef9363b-en.

[5] OECD (2018), OECD Integrity Review of Thailand: Towards Coherent and Effective Integrity Policies, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264291928-en.

[7] OECD (2018), OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264303072-en.

[3] OECD (2017), OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/OECD-Recommendation-Public-Integrity.pdf.

[2] OECD (2017), Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264065239-en.

[1] OECD (2017), Trust and Public Policy: How Better Governance Can Help Rebuild Public Trust,, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264268920-en.

[10] OECD (2014), Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3: Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264214224-en.

[11] OECD (2014), The Governance of Regulators, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209015-en.

[8] Ongkittikul, S. and N. Thongphat (2016), “Regulatory Coherence: The Case of Thailand”, in Gill, D. and P. Intal (eds.), The Development of Regulatory Management Systems in East Asia: Country Studies- ERIA Research Project Report 2014-5, ERIA, Jakarta.

[12] ParlAmericas (n.d.), Toolkit: Citizen Participation in the Legislative Process, http://parlamericas.org/uploads/documents/Toolkit_Citizen%20Participation%20in%20the%20Legislative%20Process.pdf.

Metadata, Legal and Rights

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Extracts from publications may be subject to additional disclaimers, which are set out in the complete version of the publication, available at the link provided.

© OECD 2021

The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at http://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.