1. Designing Policies for Efficient, Inclusive and Sustainable Housing

Households in many OECD countries have found it increasingly difficult to access quality, affordable housing. House prices have typically risen faster than average incomes, and households have borrowed more and more to buy their home, so that the burden of mortgage servicing has become heavier for many households despite lower interest rates. Rents have often gone up faster than inflation. Housing costs overall have been on a steep rising trend. Affordability has been particularly challenging for households on low incomes or those that have faced adverse income shocks or job losses, notably as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Increasing awareness of the negative externalities arising from commuting by private automobiles has further put a strain on the capacity of housing markets to deliver affordable housing while reducing environmental and health costs for current and future generations. Housing markets and policies also affect overall economic performance and living standards as they can influence if and when households move, how they use their savings and how they accumulate wealth.

The COVID-19 crisis is exacerbating many of these challenges (see Box 1.1). They will have to be addressed at the same time as an unprecedented effort is required to renew and upgrade the housing stock to improve energy efficiency and facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy. Indeed, the reallocation of resources that will be needed to underpin the recovery post-COVID-19 provides an opportunity to accelerate this transition.

Access to high-quality housing has become increasingly difficult in many OECD countries over the past decades. House prices and rents have risen faster than general inflation across OECD countries undermining housing affordability (Figure 1.1). The reduction in real interest rates has only partly buffeted the impact of higher house prices. The increase in real housing costs has been particularly sharp in urban areas, where the housing stock and undeveloped land is in short supply. In fact, between 2005 and 2015 alone, the share of middle-income households’ (i.e. households earning between 75% and 200% of median incomes) income spent on housing rose by as much as five percentage points on average in OECD countries (Figure 1.2).

Whereas households throughout the income distribution face rising housing costs, the less affluent ones typically spend a higher share of their income on housing (Figure 1.3). The provision of social housing and housing-related benefits can help alleviate the pressure on the most affected social groups. Still, they need to be well designed to ensure that scarce resources reach those in need without hindering their mobility or resulting in residential segregation (OECD, 2020). The COVID-19 crisis, which has created large employment and income losses that are concentrated on the most vulnerable groups,2 exacerbates the difficulties in ensuring access to quality, affordable housing.

There are many reasons why housing costs have increased over the past two decades. Key housing market outcomes, such as house prices and construction, result from the interplay of demand and supply. On the demand side, economic expansion has contributed to household income growth. Demographic developments, such as population ageing and migration are key drivers of the level of demand as more people are looking for homes. At the same time, changes in household structure towards smaller households have not been accompanied by similar changes in the type of housing demanded, since people tend to live in bigger homes as documented by an increase in the average floor area per person in the past decade (IEA, 2020). Mortgage credit became more available and more affordable following financial deregulation during the period of relative macro-economic stability from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, a development further spurred by quantitative easing and ultra-lax monetary policy in the aftermath of the great financial crisis. Many countries also have favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing via mortgage interest deductibility, which further spurs house prices (Chapter 4).

On the supply side, low responsiveness of new housing has exacerbated the price effects of housing demand changes. Supply tends to be more “sticky” than demand, because it takes time to plan and build new structures so that weak supply adjustment allows price pressures to build up. Additionally, rising construction costs have contributed to declining housing affordability in many countries, in part due to increasingly stringent energy efficiency and environmental sustainability regulations (Chapters 4 and 7).

Housing supply responds to changes in demand, such as from income growth, quite differently across countries (Figure 1.4).

The responsiveness of supply to price changes triggered by stronger demand indeed has been found to vary a lot across and within countries (Figure 1.5, Figure 1.6). The differences have been empirically related to a range of geographical, historical and policy drivers.3 These factors include: Is the area easily amenable to construction? What is the urban form inherited from the past? How conducive is the policy environment to homebuilding? These factors vary a lot across but also within countries: one manifestation of this variation, together with geographic differences in demand, has been strongly diverging house price changes within many OECD countries (Figure 1.6). Housing supply conditions can further affect the economic incentives to inter-regional migration and, consequently, the spatial allocation of workers within countries (Causa, Abendschein and Cavalleri (2021[3]); Causa, Cavalleri and Luu (2021[4]). A flexible housing supply enhances the responsiveness of internal migration to both local income and employment conditions, and this spatial reallocation can help to absorb adverse local shocks.

The heterogeneity of price developments underscores the importance of spatially aligning demand and supply, meaning construction should occur where it is most demanded. The need for flexible supply responses is even more critical as ongoing megatrends, such as population ageing and digitalisation, as well as the recent COVID-crisis, are weighing on demand patterns (cf. Box 1.1). But, new construction is not the only way to bring supply in line with demand. For instance, the renovation and upgrading of the dwelling stock can help match demand and reduce vacancy rates. Besides, taxing vacant homes encourages greater use of existing housing assets. Making sure that taxation and regulation of short-term rentals are neutral by comparison with hotels or touristic residences can also help to avoid an excessive conversion of dwellings away from long-term residential uses.

Another factor contributing to supply gaps is the decline in government investment in housing development, as well as a drop in the relative size of the social housing stock in most OECD countries. Over the past two decades, public investment in housing construction has dropped by more than one half on average across the OECD. In particular, direct public investment in dwellings has plummeted since the Global Financial Crisis, amounting to less than 0.01% of GDP in 2018 (Figure 1.7). In parallel, relative to the total dwelling stock, the share of social housing has declined in all but six OECD countries since 2010, further reducing the affordable housing supply for low-income households.4

Housing accounts for a sizeable share of output. Construction makes up about 6% of GDP on average across OECD countries. Investment in dwellings alone accounts for about 20% of gross fixed capital accumulation. As a result, fluctuations in housing-related activities and house prices have strong effects on the business cycle (Figure 1.8). Understanding the drivers of these fluctuations is paramount to prevent the propagation and limit the amplification of housing shocks, thereby enhancing economic resilience. Housing and business cycles are indeed related: countries that observed larger corrections in real house prices during the Global Financial Crisis also suffered larger declines in economic activity. The unfolding COVID-19 crisis has had a major impact on construction and other housing-related activity (Box 1.2). Moreover, house price cycles tend to lead economic cycles. Peaks and trough in house prices occur before turning points in the business cycles, making them an important leading indicator of fluctuations in economic activity (Chapter 3).

Financial and mortgage markets play a key role in housing markets since most households finance their home with debt financing (Figure 1.10). Housing finance has changed significantly over the past decades, which has lowered the borrowing cost for housing, leading to an expansion in the supply of mortgage loans. Financial and mortgage market innovations have helped lower-income households to become homeowners, as these changes have made it easier for them to take housing loans. However, excess leverage can pose risks for macroeconomic stability and long-term economic performance if policy changes trigger a significant relaxation in lending standards, a subsequent increase in non-performing loans and credit misallocation.5 Macro-prudential regulations but also housing policies can foster economic resilience by mitigating the build-up of vulnerabilities, reducing the transmission and hence the severity of crises and fostering an economy’s capacity to recover from them.

Several factors influence people’s decision to move. Preferences and needs, including due to changing family circumstances, play an important part, but so do policy choices that may create obstacles to mobility and make it difficult for people to move in search of better jobs. Residential mobility can help overcome interregional inequalities, improve job matching and thereby lift aggregate productivity and social mobility.

Among the key determinants of residential mobility are homeownership and social-housing tenure, since homeowners and social-housing tenants usually are not as mobile as private-market renters (Figure 1.11 and (OECD, 2020[7])). Furthermore, rising housing costs and rising regional differences in housing costs constrain the ability of lower-income individuals to move to areas where there are jobs or better jobs available but where they cannot afford the housing cost, with adverse implications for labour mobility and reallocation.6 Well-designed housing and labour market policies can facilitate residential mobility by improving the matching of workers with jobs across the territory. Removing policy-related obstacles to mobility and ensuring sufficient supply in high-demand areas can speed up the reallocation process in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis and help the labour market to recover.

As previously discussed, low-income households are spending a larger share of their income on housing: in addition to being more likely to be overburdened by housing costs, they are also more likely to live in poor-quality dwellings (Figure 1.12). They may not be able to afford regular maintenance or improvements to their dwellings, while at the same time finding it too expensive to move to better-quality housing. Lack of access to quality housing are often associated with poor access to health, education, broadband internet and good job opportunities (OECD, 2014[8]). This can have long lasting effects including on the lifelong income of young people who grow up in housing of poor quality or limited access to education or health services. The COVID-19 pandemic renewed concerns among policymakers about overcrowding, because overcrowded conditions make it more difficult for inhabitants to effectively self-isolate, putting people at greater risk of contracting and spreading infectious diseases (OECD, 2020[9]). The COVID-19 crisis has also exacerbated the impact of the digital divide in housing, as households without internet access have greater difficultly in working from home or participating in distance learning.

Rising house prices means that many households are missing out on the benefits of owning a home. Developments in housing markets have repercussions for household consumption and the macroeconomy via wealth effects. Rising house prices also have implications for wealth inequality (Chapter 5). Indeed, housing is an essential part of wealth as it is the single and biggest asset for a majority of households. Changes in house prices translate into changes in household wealth and this can in turn redistribute wealth between different types of households such as renters and homeowners. Given the importance of housing in household balance sheets, especially for the middle class, housing contributes to equalise the net wealth distribution (Figure 1.13). This is because housing seems to be more equally distributed than other assets, such as financial assets.

Housing is energy-intensive. The residential sector (buildings and construction) accounts for 28% of global final energy consumption and 17% of total CO2 emissions. Housing-related emissions are very different across countries (Figure 1.14). These large gaps reflect considerable cross-country differences in the degree to which public policies effectively price CO2 emissions from the residential sector, pointing to ample room for reducing emissions in many countries, although non-policy factors such as temperature patterns are also at play (Figure 1.15).

The use of environmental-friendly materials and improvements in isolation and heating systems have great potential to make housing more energy-efficient and help meeting agreed emission targets. Yet, in 2018, two-thirds of countries still lacked mandatory building energy codes.7 High-performance buildings, such as near-zero energy buildings, still make up less than 5% of new construction. Implementing and enforcing regulation to meet building envelope objectives also means that existing buildings require renovation and maintenance. However, environmental regulation increases construction costs and administrative burdens on the supply of residential structures. Policy simulations show that the carbon transition could put sizeable additional pressure on house prices (Chapter 4). Ensuring both affordability and sustainability is, therefore, an important policy challenge.

In addition to emissions, housing has environmental impacts through land and material use as well as the transportation patterns that urban form generates. These impacts can differ across countries, as in the case of land-use (Figure 1.16). Furthermore, the effects of housing can sometimes be different across environmental objectives: for example, urban sprawl translates into higher transportation needs, greater difficulty in deploying public transport and higher greenhouse gas emissions as well as greater use of rural or natural land. On the other hand, lower density reduces exposure to local air pollutants that are more concentrated in higher density areas. Some environmentally-related policies can put a strain on the near-term affordability of housing. Nonetheless, frontloading the pricing of environmental externalities yields important benefits as it reduces the extent of such externalities, thereby contributing to environmental sustainability and intergenerational justice.

Policy action in multiple areas, ranging from housing policies to government spending and taxation, influences housing outcomes. Reforms can aim at multiple objectives: making the housing market more efficient, more inclusive or more sustainable (Box 1.3). National preferences can considerably vary across these objectives, which can warrant contrasted policy choices across countries. Furthermore, the legacy of past choices strongly shapes today’s needs and possibilities in a sector where path dependency is very strong due to the slow renewal of the housing stock.

As in other policy areas, where multiple objectives can be pursued, there is a need to assess possible synergies, trade-offs and unintended consequences that different policy tools may involve. When trade-offs arise, it is also essential to identify the extent to which compensatory measures can alleviate adverse effects induced by specific policy initiatives. Table 1.1 summarises the key policy synergies and trade-offs among housing objectives based on the empirical evidence reported in this Synthesis. Two caveats apply. First, it relates to typically expected effects; different consequences may arise in practice depending on the country-specific environment. Second the table summarises the available empirical evidence regarding impacts on housing objectives, but the policy interventions can also have effects in other areas such as government budgets. The OECD Housing Policy Dashboard (Box 1.4) gathers outcomes and policy indicators drawn from the report and aims to assist policymakers in making informed policy choices when designing national housing strategies.

Several policy initiatives can bring simultaneous progress in inclusiveness, efficiency and sustainability (Table 1.1). They include more provision of social housing, greater reliance on recurring taxes on immovable property and land, and various regulatory changes in land-use (Table 1.1).

Investment in social housing – directly or indirectly through non-profit or reduced-profit associations (Box 1.5) – contributes to increasing housing supply. As such, it not only results in greater affordability for eligible low-income tenants but also for the rest of the housing market. Importantly, eligibility for social housing should be portable across cities and regions to ensure low-income workers' mobility. Removing obstacles for people to follow jobs is an essential aspect of resource reallocation and particularly vital in the post-COVID-19 era (Box 1.2).

Moreover, providing social housing that is developed or refurbished in line with high energy efficiency standards contributes to reducing the housing sector's carbon footprint. It can also contribute to reducing energy poverty among social housing tenants. Doing so can have a demonstration effect, easing the broader deployment of environmentally ambitious building standards and facilitating the transition of the entire economy towards the attainment of agreed emissions objectives. Finally, if social housing investment is well integrated into environmentally and socially ambitious urban strategies, it also contributes to improving the quality of the local environment and to the development of inclusive, socially mixed neighbourhoods.

Unlike the provision of social housing with limited benefit portability, housing allowances do not in principle restrict residential and job mobility (Chapter 6). However, a critical difference between the provision of social housing and housing allowances is that the latter supports demand while the former contributes to expanding supply. Where supply is rigid, an increase in housing allowances may have the unintended consequence of putting upward pressure on house prices and rents.9 This pressure can offset the intended effect of allowances on affordability for beneficiaries while making housing more expensive for households who are not receiving them. Dealing with this trade-off calls for complementary measures (discussed below) to enhance housing supply responsiveness to changes in demand associated with an increase in housing allowances.

Shifting housing taxation away from transaction-based levies towards annual taxes would enhance housing market efficiency. Recurrent taxes on immovable property, as opposed to levies on housing transactions, have the added advantage of not discouraging residential mobility, which is closely linked to job mobility. Recurrent property taxes have also empirically been found to be comparatively supportive of economic growth, by comparison with other taxes, especially transaction-based levies; many countries are raising very litlle revenue from recurring property taxes, a situation that offers scope to make greater use of them.10 In countries where the valuation of the property, for tax purposes, lags well behind the market value, there is also scope to align the valuation for tax purposes with the market value (Chapter 8).

In addition, a rebalancing of the recurring property tax basis towards land, rather than structures, would have the benefit of encouraging more efficient uses of land and therefore greater environmental quality (Chapter 7). By reducing the extent to which recurring housing taxes discourage investment in dwellings, such a shift should also make the supply of housing more responsive to changes in demand. Nevertheless, some caution is warranted, since land-use regulation can limit the benefits that can be reaped through more efficient property taxes (Chapter 8).

Phasing out mortgage interest relief can reduce house prices by substantial amounts in countries where supply lacks flexibility (see Chapter 4). The reason is that much of the value of mortgage interest relief gets capitalised into land prices in areas where supply is rigid. Gruber, Jensen and Kleven (2021[13]) find that scaling back mortgage interest rate deduction in Denmark has reduced equilibrium house prices and household indebtedness.11 In the long term, lower house prices make housing markets more inclusive by facilitating homeownership to a more significant share of the population and by driving down rents. In the medium term, before prices adjust, phasing out mortgage interest relief comes at a loss to the households who would otherwise have benefited from the tax advantage. The resulting political economy challenge means that countries that have eliminated or reduced mortgage interest relief have typically done so gradually (France, Netherlands, United Kingdom). This does not raise a pressing distributional issue, however, since mortgage interest relief primarily benefits higher-income groups.12 Furthermore, because mortgage interest relief does not remove primary barriers to first buyers such as downpayments and credit scores, its reform is also likely to have limited effects on homeownership even over the medium term.13 Increasing the effective taxation of residential property through the removal of mortgage interest relief or other advantages offers the additional benefit of contributing to smooth housing cycles (Figure 1.19; Chapter 3). The tax reforms that the Netherlands implemented in the 2010s are an example of a strategy that combined a shift in the burden of property taxation from a transaction-based to recurrent taxes with a reduction in the mortgage relief rate (Box 1.6).

Another avenue for tax reform that can improve both affordability and efficiency is to shift the burden of property taxation from transaction-based to recurrent taxes. Doing so removes an important obstacle to mobility (Chapter 6) and better aligns the tax with the services received (Chapter 8).

Permitting the transfer of vested development rights from environmentally highly valuable areas to other places improves environmental quality while easing supply constraints where housing is in high demand. To the extent that greater supply responsiveness reduces upward pressure on prices, these reforms also have the potential of improving affordability along with improving efficiency in housing markets and contributing to environmental sustainability. Combining these regulatory reforms with stricter energy efficiency standards could improve the environmental impact of housing policies by paving the way for faster progress in the energy transition of the housing stock.

Furthermore, reforming land-use regulations can have broader positive consequences for the economy. Flexible land-use regulation within integrated planning frameworks that incorporate environmental objectives can facilitate the efficient reallocation of labour and capital by allowing housing supply to adjust to the demand for relocation to high-productivity areas: such flexibility boosts investment and aggregate productivity and economic growth.14

One way of doing so is to regularly revisit the geographic boundaries for urban development to accommodate city growth while ensuring forms of expansion compatible with environmental objectives (Chapter 7). Moreover, land-use governance arrangements that avoid overlap in the allocation of housing policy functions across the different levels of administration and favour planning at the metropolitan level rather than lower levels of government (Figure 1.20) can facilitate the matching of supply and demand within broader catchment areas. This can potentially increase the responsiveness of supply to evolving demand, mitigating upward pressure on prices and making housing more affordable (Chapter 4).15

The subsidisation of energy-efficient renovation of old buildings, which may be underutilised as a result of poor building standards, can expand the use of housing stock and its energy performance while easing the near-term pressure on affordability from the cost of energy-efficiency upgrading. Over time, the affordability benefits of such subsidies are likely to diminish, however, as the value of the upgrading gets capitalised into house prices.16

Making rental market regulations such as rent control and tenure security (Figure 1.21) more flexible, in combination with reforms to allow more responsive supply, have the potential to make housing markets more efficient and affordable in the long term. Still, they could undermine affordability for some households in the short term, especially for incumbents, as stringent rent controls reduce the rates of return on real estate investment. The related uncertainty discourages developers and lenders from investing in real estate, making the supply of housing considerably less responsive to changes in demand (Chapter 4). At the same time, tight rental contract restrictions could also affect vulnerable renters adversely, which poses obstacles for residential and labour mobility (Chapter 6). Indeed, excessive protection of tenants often implies that renters with uncertain labour market prospects, such as low-wage or non-standard workers, find it difficult to sign a lease, because landlords, who anticipate a difficult eviction in case of non-payment, require evidence about the stability of tenants’ income. There nonetheless remains a case for providing tenants with reasonable security over tenure and rent levels: a compromise can be a system of rent stabilisation, whereby rents can be varied for new contracts and renewals but regulated in line with market developments during the duration of the contract.

By potentially resulting in supply-demand mismatches, overly tight rental market regulations may also exacerbate speculative housing bubbles and excess accumulation of household debt, undermining economic resilience. Indeed, tight rental market regulations are associated with a higher probability of incidence of financial crises and more severe cyclical downturns in economic activity (Chapter 3). The unintended consequences associated with a tightening of rental market regulations can be mitigated at least in part through greater reliance on social housing and household allowances, which can be targeted to vulnerable renters, as well as by relaxing overly restrictive land-use regulations that inhibit supply responses where housing is in high demand.

The measures taken by several countries to shield renters from the hardships associated with the COVID-19 crisis are a case in point (Box 1.7). For example, rental market restrictions were introduced in many countries at the onset of confinement to help vulnerable households in the short term and provide a degree of income protection for existing renters. However, the obstacles imposed by tight landlord-tenant obligations to residential and consequently labour mobility can over time become particularly unwelcome in post-COVID-19 economies, given the need to adjust and facilitate the reallocation of labour and capital towards sectors and activities with promising economic prospects.

Macro-prudential measures to limit borrowers’ exposure to housing indebtedness also involve trade-offs, especially as regards access to housing finance by specific social groups. Tightening macro-prudential policy settings helps to curb housing market excesses (Box 1.8) and protect macroeconomic stability (Chapter 3). However, interventions such as limits on mortgage amounts relative to the value of the property (loan-to-value LTV caps) make dwelling purchases more difficult for young households with limited savings. Where appropriate, this trade-off can be mitigated at least in part by targeting support to first-time home-buyers through tax-favoured savings plans that help them accumulate their upfront payment. Another option is for macro-prudential policy to rely more on debt-service-to-income caps, which also mitigate risk without requiring the accumulation of a downpayment in the same way as LTV caps do.

The costs arising from compliance with stricter energy efficiency and other regulations that can improve the environmental sustainability of buildings and structures can undermine affordability. Of course, these costs may not be passed on in full to house prices, especially where construction and home improvements may be subsidised, at least in part. Also, efforts to increase the energy efficiency of dwellings may result in lower energy costs to be borne by homeowners or renters. These improvements can also lower borrowing costs or improve credit terms for mortgage-holders to the extent that lower utility bills and better long-term valuation prospects for high-efficiency homes reduce credit risk (Box 1.9). However, upward pressure on house prices may be substantial where sizeable investments are needed to replace or upgrade the housing stock: illustrative simulations with stylised assumptions suggest that the attendant house price increase could be equivalent to more than half a year of disposable income in many OECD countries (Figure 1.23).

Several policies to improve the environmental performance of cities can have adverse implications for housing supply and affordability. Government acquisition of land to prevent development, as in the case of green belts around urban areas, directly limits supply. More indirectly, policies to restrict car access to city centres, price urban roads or increase car park fares have also been empirically found to raise house prices in cities by reshaping housing demand towards city centres, where house prices are typically higher (Chapter 7). There is also evidence that expanding public transport networks typically results in higher house prices, although doing so enhances labour-market and broader social inclusion by facilitating commuting and exchanges within urban areas. The potential negative effects of higher house prices on affordability and inclusiveness can be countered by policies to provide social housing and make land available for construction in the areas for which these policies are boosting housing demand.

Increases in motor fuel taxes, which reduce pollution in cities and beyond, potentially have the same upward effect on house prices over the medium term. However, this adverse impact subsides over time as the car fleet gradually becomes more fuel-efficient in response to higher fuel taxes (Chapter 7).

The governance of housing-related policies, from social housing to land-use to taxation, tends to be fragmented across government levels and sometimes across ministries or government agencies. This situation can complicate reforms, if public bodies with responsibility over one area, for instance land-use regulation, do not have authority in other areas, such as taxation or social housing that would allow them to design integrated reform packages. Difficulties of this nature can be tackled by reviewing the assignment of responsibilities and ensuring proper coordination across government layers and functions (Chapter 8). Integrated governance is important to provide urban policy making that is nimble and aware of linkages so that it can respond well to the lasting changes that are likely to arise in the future (see Box 1.1).


[5] Bétin, M. and V. Ziemann (2019), “How responsive are housing markets in the OECD? Regional level estimates”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1590, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/1342258c-en.

[21] Billio, M. et al. (2020), Final Report on Correlation Analysis Between Energy Efficiency and Risk, https://eedapp.energyefficientmortgages.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/EeDaPP_D57_27Aug20-1.pdf.

[10] Brys, B. et al. (2021), Effective Taxation of Residential Property, forthcoming.

[3] Causa, O., M. Abendschein and M. Cavalleri (2021), The laws of attraction: economic drivers of inter-regional migration,housing costs and the role of policies, OECD, Economics Department Working Papers, forthcoming.

[4] Causa, O., M. Cavalleri and N. Luu (2021), Migration, housing and regional disparities: a gravity model of inter-regional migration with an application to selected OECD countries, OECD, Economics Department Working Papers, forthcoming.

[2] Cavalleri, M., B. Cournède and V. Ziemann (2019), “Housing markets and macroeconomic risks”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1555, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/737133d8-en.

[20] Cournède, B., F. De Pace and V. Ziemann (2020), The Future of Housing: Policy Scenarios.

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[13] Gruber, J., A. Jensen and H. Kleven (2021), “Do People Respond to the Mortgage Interest Deduction? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Denmark”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2021, Vol. 13/2, pp. 273-303, https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170366.

[11] OECD (2020), Affordable Housing Database, http://oe.cd/ahd.

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[9] OECD (2020), OECD Employment Outlook 2020: Worker Security and the COVID-19 Crisis, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/1686c758-en.

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[12] OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: Austria 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/22f8383a-en.

[17] OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/c510039b-en.

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← 1. See for instance OECD (2018[93]).

← 2. (OECD, 2020[9]).

← 3. (Bétin and Ziemann, 2019[5]; Cavalleri, Cournède and Özsöğüt, 2019[29]).

← 4. (OECD, 2020[28]).

← 5. See Chapter 3 for impacts on resilience and Cournède, Denk and Hoeller (2015[210]) for effects on long-term economic performance.

← 6. (Bayoumi and Barkema, 2019[211]; Causa et al., 2021[222]).

← 7. Source : https://www.iea.org/reports/building-envelopes.

← 8. User name : delegate. Password : OECDHorizontalProject.

← 9. (Fack, 2006[214]; Grislain-Letrémy and Trevien, 2014[215]; Susin, 2002[216]).

← 10. See Akgun, Cournède and Fournier (2017[206]) and Arnold et al. (2011[220]).

← 11. Similarly, a recent study by Sommer and Sullivan (2018[51]) shows that eliminating mortgage interest relief reduces house prices and increases homeownership in the Unites States.

← 12. (Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007[207]; Jahoda and Godarovo, 2014[208]; Figari et al., 2017[209]; Justo et al., 2019[213]).

← 13. (Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007[207]; Jahoda and Godarovo, 2014[208]; Figari et al., 2017[209]; Justo et al., 2019[213]).

← 14. (Herkenhoff, Ohanian and Prescott, 2018[192]; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019[217]).

← 15. (Bétin and Ziemann, 2019[5]; Cavalleri, Cournède and Özsöğüt, 2019[29]).

← 16. (Taruttis and Weber, 2020[130]).


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