2. Trends in development finance for biodiversity, 2011-2020
This chapter analyses development finance for biodiversity over 2011-20, which coincides with the implementation period of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) Strategic Plan on Biodiversity and its Aichi Targets. It describes the methodology developed specifically for this task and then presents detailed analysis for all the main sources of biodiversity-related official development finance (ODF): bilateral ODF (directly provided by a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member to recipient countries); multilateral outflows (resources channelled through and by international financial institutions, multilateral or regional development banks, and UN institutions); ODF flows from non-DAC members that report to the OECD; ODA-like international public funding among developing countries (South-South and triangular co-operation, SSTrC); and private philanthropy. Mobilisation of private flows by public interventions are also assessed. As part of the assessment, it explores whether DAC members have met Aichi Target 20 on development finance.
This chapter provides an overview of trends in biodiversity-related development finance from 2011 to 2020, updating and complementing previous OECD work in this area, notably Biodiversity-related Official Development Assistance 2016. Mainstreaming in the energy and mining, infrastructure, manufacturing and processing, and health sectors (OECD, 2016[1]), Financing for Development in Support of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Drutschinin and Ockenden, 2015[2]) and Biodiversity and development finance: Main trends, 2011-20 (Casado-Asensio, Blaquier and Sedemund, 2022[3]). It is based on a comprehensive methodology developed to identify biodiversity-related activities in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD) databases (Box 2.1).
Development finance for biodiversity can originate from several sources. Official development finance (ODF), which includes official development assitance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF) (see Box 1.3 in Chapter 1), is one of these sources. Development finance can be either bilateral ODF (directly provided by a DAC member to recipient countries) or multilateral outflows (resources channelled through and by international financial institutions, multilateral or regional development banks, and UN institutions). Development finance can also include other sources of ODF: non-DAC members that report to the OECD on their ODF flows; ODA-like international public funding among developing countries (South-South and triangular co-operation, SSTrC); and private flows mobilised by public interventions. Private philanthrophy is also a key source of development finance. This chapter provides estimates of all of these sources of development finance. For further information on how these estimates were produced, see Box 2.1 and Annex A.
The report uses a variety of data sources. The main source is the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which collects data on official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). The report also draws on the total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD) database.
Since 1998, the DAC has monitored development finance targeting the objectives of the Rio Conventions, including the CBD, through four “Rio markers” (biodiversity, desertification, climate change mitigation and adaptation). Countries and institutions reporting their official development finance to the OECD signal flows to biodiversity-related activities using the biodiversity Rio Marker, as well as through two SDG tags – SDG 14 (marine biodiversity) and SDG 15 (terrestrial biodiversity). The two sets of information are generally reported to the CRS in a coherent manner. When discrepancies appeared, the SDG information was manually reviewed against the Rio Marker methodology and included in the analysis.
For DAC members and countries and institutions reporting on the biodiversity marker, biodiversity-related activities should be screened and marked as (i) targeting the objectives of the CBD as either a principal or significant objective; or (ii) not targeting the objective (the activity has no relation to the marker). Activities marked as “principal” must have biodiversity as fundamental in the design of, or the motivation for, the action. Activities marked “significant” have other primary objectives, but have been formulated or adjusted to help meet biodiversity concerns.
The Rio Markers were designed to track the degree to which members are integrating and mainstreaming environmental considerations into their development co-operation activities, and thus apply to the entirety of an activity reported – not just the finance associated with the biodiversity-specific component of that activity. However, when reporting against quantified international finance goals (such as the CBD’s Aichi Target 20), many DAC members only report their official development finance that targets biodiversity as a “significant” objective as a share of the full finance provided, and estimate this by applying coefficients to reflect the share. There is no agreed definition or common approach for this practice, but 40% is the most common coefficient applied to countries’ “significant” flows (Xu and Gualberti, 2022[4]). This is the coefficient used here to calculate progress against Aichi Target 20, together with the full amount for “principal” flows. When it comes to multilateral flows, a 40% coefficient to the flows marked as “significant-like” is also used. For multilateral institutions and non-DAC donors, purpose codes related to biodiversity and a keyword search were also used to gather the information on biodiversity finance.
Figure 2.1 shows the full value of all biodiversity-related development finance flows reported to the OECD over 2011-2020. This shows that biodiversity-related development finance from public sources (DAC members, non-DAC, SSTrC and multilateral providers) increased by 119% over 2011-20, rising from USD 7.8 billion to USD 17.1 billion. This increase was largely driven by DAC members, which made up 72% of the total public flows on average over 2011-20, and is mostly DAC members’ ODA, which accounts for 99% of total bilateral investments (the remaining 1% being OOF). In turn, multilateral institutions provided 28% of the total over this period. Flows from non-DAC and SSTrC providers make up an additional 0.1% of the total and gained importance after 2017, when most started reporting.
Figure 2.2 applies coefficients to the estimates, which is closer to the approach that many members take when reporting to the CBD on these flows (see Box 2.1 and Annex A for further information). This Figure therefore provides a different scale but similar trends. Public development finance for biodiversity increased by 79% over 2011-20, rising from USD 5.4 billion to USD 9.6 billion. This increase was largely driven by DAC members, which made up 77% of the total public flows on average over 2011-20, with the remaining 23% coming from multilateral institutions. This share increased after 2015, primarily driven by concessional outflows (which represent 61% of total multilateral development finance estimates). Flows from non-DAC and SSTrC providers make up an additional 0.2% of the total.
In both scenarios, private sources of development finance for biodiversity have also increased over time (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Indeed, private philanthropic flows grew from USD 501 million in 2017 to USD 686 million in 2020 – a growth trajectory that also reflects the increased coverage of these actors’ activities in the OECD database since 2016. In turn, private finance flows mobilised by public interventions also increased from USD 94 million in 2016 to reach USD 165 million in 2020 – and represents 21% of all private biodiversity-related development finance in 2020.
Note: The figure shows the full value of all flows reported to the OECD. For details on what is covered under each category see Annex A.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on OECD (2022[5]), OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System Statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1; TOSSD (2022[6]) Total Official Support for Sustainable Development, https://www.tossd.org/.
Note: The figure shows coefficients applied to the information reported to the OECD. For DAC members, this implies taking the full value of flows marked as principal against the Rio marker flows and using a 40% coefficient for flows marked as significant against the Rio marker, as well as flows identified as contributing to SDGs 14 and 15 (see Box 2.1). Multilateral institutions’ activities reflect the full value of their core (principal and “principal-like”) activities and apply a coefficient for activities considered as secondary (significant and “significant-like”). Information from private sources and non-DAC and South-South and triangular co-operation reflect full values, hence they represent the same flows in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. For details see Annex A.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on OECD (2022[5]), OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System Statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1; TOSSD (2022[6]) Total Official Support for Sustainable Development, https://www.tossd.org/.
Table 2.1 provides a breakdown of public biodiversity-related development finance from DAC members and multilateral institutions by type of flow and considering three scenarios. Our analysis shows that over 2011 to 2020, on average, DAC members’ contributions were distributed mainly through ODA, with OOF growing progressively over the decade. Similarly, multilateral institutions’ contributions were mostly provided through concessional outflows.
DAC members are the largest providers of bilateral development finance for biodiversity. DAC members’ biodiversity-related development finance increased from USD 6.2 billion in 2011 to USD 10.1 billion in 2020 (Figure 2.3). This represents an annual average of USD 7.8 billion and 6% of total development finance flows. When accounting for flows based on the use of coefficients, DAC members’ biodiversity-related development finance increased from USD 4.4 billion in 2011 to USD 6.5 billion in 2020, a 49% increase (Figure 2.4). These estimates surpass projections for ODA for biodiversity made at the start of the period (Parker et al., 2012[7]; Miller, Agrawal and Roberts, 2013[8]), and are in line with more recent work (CBD, 2020[9]; OECD, 2020[10]; WWF, 2021[11]).
Despite the overall growth, the portion that is Rio-marked with biodiversity as a principal objective decreased between 2011 and 2020 by 22% (i.e. from USD 3.1 to 2.4 billion). While it increased by 48% over 2011-15, it then decreased by 47% over 2015-20. This pattern can mainly be explained by a significant decrease in the contributions from Japan in 2016 compared to 2015, and thereafter by more gradual decreases in contributions by the EU Institutions, France and the USA – all ranked as top biodiversity-related donors.
Looking ahead, it will be important that ODA funding for biodiversity with a principal objective grows once again as these investments represent core biodiversity spending. Further work will also be needed to address the underlying pressures on biodiversity (e.g. by ensuring the sustainable use of natural resources, and mainstreaming biodiversity across sectors). Such core investments need to remain constant over time to ensure their impacts are sustained.
Note: The figure provides information on DAC member development finance based on estimates with coefficients, reflecting 100% principal Rio-marked flows and applying a 40% coefficient for significant biodiversity Rio-marked finance and for additional finance from activities reported against SDGs 14 and 15.
Other trends emerge from the analysis:
The proportion of total biodiversity ODF targeting other objectives, i.e. activities marked with biodiversity as a significant objective is increasing over time in both scenarios. This slight increase reflects greater awareness of, or interest in, integrating biodiversity-related aspects across development co-operation activities and may reflect growing mainstreaming of biodiversity.
These estimates could change (potentially correcting the downward trend in activities marked with a principal objective) if all or part of the relevant SDG-tagged information were to be reported against the Rio Marker (SDG-tagged information was captured in this analysis as additional contributions). This calls for more consistent reporting by DAC members in the future.
The overall share of biodiversity-related ODF in total DAC ODF has remained relatively stable over time, at 4% to 6% depending on the methodology applied. However, the analysis also finds that the vast majority of ODF is invested in sectors that are neutral or not related to biodiversity (e.g. government, policies and regulations, disaster risk reduction, health, other economic infrastructure) – and potentially in areas that are not supporting biodiversity. This trend reveals the potential scope for increasing biodiversity-related ODF and for donors to explore the implications of being nature positive in their interventions.
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members have delivered on their Aichi development finance targets
Article 20 of the CBD specifies the role of developed country Parties in providing financial resources to support developing countries, namely to “provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention” (CBD, 2006[12]). This role has been progressively refined (CBD, 2020[13]):
In 2010, Parties to the CBD at COP10 in Japan committed to scaling-up their financing to support the Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and its Aichi Biodiversity Targets by 2020 (CBD, 2010[14]). In particular, Aichi Target 20 on development finance calls for an increase in development finance resources.
In 2012, at COP11 in India, Parties agreed to set a “target on international financial flows” and identified actions to increase mobilisation of financial resources from all sources (CBD, 2012[15]).
COP12 in Korea in 2014 adopted a commitment to double total biodiversity-related international financial resource flows to developing countries by 2015 – especially LDCs and SIDS, as well as countries with economies in transition – using average annual biodiversity funding over 2006-10 as a baseline, and to at least maintain this level until 2020 (CBD, 2014[16]).
At COP13 in Mexico this commitment was extended to CBD Parties, and other governments and donors in a position to do so, through Decision COP XIII/20 (CBD, 2016[17]) and reiterated at COP14 in Egypt (CBD, 2018[18]).
Our analysis shows that collectively the DAC members that are Parties to the CBD (i.e. all except the US) have met the Aichi Biodiversity target on biodiversity-related development finance. In 2015, ODF for biodiversity from this group had doubled compared to the 2006-10 baseline, and then remained above that level over 2016-20 (Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6)1. This finding holds under two scenarios: counting all biodiversity-related development finance from DAC member Parties to the CBD Figure 2.5; and applying a coefficient to those estimates that have been Rio-marked with biodiversity as a significant objective and those marked as targeting SDG 14 and/or 15 Figure 2.6. These conclusions also hold under other scenarios, for example if the United States is included in the analysis, even though it is not a Party to the CBD; or if SDG-marked flows are split into ‘principal’ (when only SDG 14 and/or 15 were tagged in the reporting) and ‘significant’ (when more than one SDG was tagged by a member) activities.
Note: The figure shows the full value of DAC members’ activities reported to the OECD. The analysis covers all DAC members that are Parties to the CBD. It therefore excludes the United States. ODF= official development finance.
Note: The figure shows coefficients applied to the information reported to the OECD. This implies taking the full value of Rio-marked flows reported as having biodiversity as the principal goal, and applying a 40% coefficient to flows reported as having biodiversity as a significant goal, as well as flows marked as targeting SDGs 14 and 15. The analysis covers all DAC members that are Parties to the CBD. It therefore excludes the United States. ODF= official development finance.
Looking beyond these collective trends (Table 2.2), the coefficient approach shows that six DAC members met the commitment to double ODF for biodiversity by 2015 (France, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). An additional seven DAC members reached the target over 2016-20 (Australia, EU, Italy, Korea, New Zealand, Portugal and Switzerland). In addition, four DAC members increased, but did not double, their biodiversity-related ODF in 2016-20 compared to the 2006-10 baseline (Austria, Belgium, Canada and Ireland) – although growth rates vary among the countries in this group (e.g. from 99% growth by Canada to 9% growth by Austria). Other DAC members reduced their bilateral biodiversity-related funding commitment in 2016-20 compared to the 2006-10 baseline. In this group, the most significant decreases were by Greece and Finland (92% and 76% decreases, respectively).
Notwithstanding this trend, it is important to note that the DAC data included here refers to direct bilateral ODF for biodiversity only. Allocations by some DAC members are therefore partially reflected, given that many use the multilateral system, such as the GEF, to engage in biodiversity-type of work. Such core contributions to the multilateral system by DAC members are included within the multilateral institutions total contributions, to avoid double counting.
Biodiversity-related official development finance (ODF) is primarily driven by five Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members
Building upon the previous discussion, Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 rank the top DAC donors according to their biodiversity-related ODF. The main DAC donors over 2011-20 were Germany, France, EU, United States and Japan, independent of the scenario used, which together accounted for at least 70% of total biodiversity-related ODF. Most DAC member ODF is driven by ODA investments, with OOF being a relevant share of the biodiversity-related investments in Austria and Finland (10% and 9%, respectively). The EU and their DAC member states, taken together, are the major donors for biodiversity worldwide (accounting for 68% of total biodiversity-related ODF), although here too, activities are primarily funded by only a few EU members.
Note: The figure shows coefficients applied to the information reported to the OECD. This implies taking the full value of Rio-marked flows reported as having biodiversity as the principal goal, and applying a 40% coefficient to flows reported as having biodiversity as a significant goal, as well as flows marked as targeting SDGs 14 and 15.
In relative terms, biodiversity is most important in the programmes of Iceland, France and Italy, where estimates show that it represents 10%, 8% and 8% of their ODF activities, respectively, followed by Germany, Norway and Sweden, with 7%. These donors are primarily investing in biodiversity protection, agriculture and fisheries, sustainable use of marine and coastal resources, nature-based solutions, the conservation of forests and sustainable water resource management. Norway, for example, focuses its interventions on the forestry sector through its International Climate and Forest Initiative, and is in fact the largest REDD+ donor, having bilateral agreements with several partner countries, including Brazil (Hoover El Rashidy, 2021[19]), Peru, Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania. Norway also has other joint agreements, such as a partnership with the UK – another big funder of forestry-related activities – to support the Congo Basin Forest Fund; and supports the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, the Forest Investment Program and the Bio Carbon Fund (Angelsen, 2016[20]).
Multilateral providers, such as the multilateral development banks and multilateral funds, are important contributors to biodiversity (see Figure 2.9, and Annex A for a complete list of multilateral institutions considered in this analysis) and their biodiversity-related finance has collectively increased over 2011-20.2 However, reporting on biodiversity-related activities by multilateral institutions is not yet systematic, comprehensive or consistent across years – especially compared to their reporting on climate-related activities (Multilateral Development Banks, 2022[21]).
While some institutions apply the biodiversity Rio Marker, other institutions report against Sustainable Development Goals 14 and 15 to identify their biodiversity-related activities, or provide an indication of these investments through the use of purpose codes related to biodiversity (see Annex A). Some institutions also use a combination of these approaches. However, many institutions that report to the OECD do not signal their biodiversity-related activities through any of these means. This makes the overall volumes of multilateral development finance targeting biodiversity difficult to identify. Given these limitations, a specific methodology was developed for this report to obtain a comprehensive estimate of multilateral institutions’ biodiversity-related outflows. It identifies and disaggregates activities into principal and “principal-like”, as well as significant and “significant-like” objectives (described in Annex A).
Using this methodology, our analysis finds that multilateral outflows for biodiversity-related activities increased over 2011-20, regardless of whether a full value analysis (Figure 2.9) or an analysis applying coefficients was conducted (Figure 2.10). The full analysis estimates that multilateral outflows for biodiversity-related activities increased from USD 1.6 billion in 2011 to USD 7 billion in 2020 (quadrupling over this period and representing, on average, 3% of total multilateral outflows). The second scenario –estimates applying coefficients to the significant and significant-like activities – sees the increase go from USD 1 billion in 2011 to USD 3.1 billion in 2020 (tripling over this period). However, these flows are relatively low, especially when compared to multilateral public finance for climate change, which increased from USD 15.5 billion in 2013 to USD 36.9 billion in 2020 (OECD, 2022[22]).
In the analysis of full flows (Figure 2.10), there are two noticeable spikes in the growth trend, namely over 2015-16 and 2019-20, reflecting a 163% increase (from USD 0.7 to 1.6 billion) and a 60% increase (from USD 1.93 to 3.1 billion), respectively. In 2016 the spike can be explained by the significantly high contributions from two multilateral development banks (representing 47% of total biodiversity-related multilateral outflows), while the spike in 2020 is driven by two other multilateral development banks (representing 45%).
Importantly, and as is the case for other areas of multilateral development finance, the main instruments used are loans (61%) followed by grants (38%) and equity (0.2%). This contrasts with bilateral shares (74% grants, 25% loans, and 1% equity), and underlines the complementary role of multilateral actors in the international development co-operation system (MOPAN, 2021[23]), including for biodiversity.
Note: Estimates for multilateral institutions’ activities reflect 100% of flows for activities with biodiversity as a core (principal and “principal-like”) objective and apply a 40% coefficient to activities for biodiversity considered as having a secondary (significant and “significant-like”) objective. Multilateral flows include principal, ‘principal-like’, significant and ‘significant-like’ data from a variety of sources, including Rio marker data on biodiversity, purpose code data, SDGs 14 and 15 data, and data captured through a targeted keywords search. For more information on the methodology used to obtain and analyse multilateral institutions’ data, please consult Annex A. Commitments that were not classified by aid type or co-operation modalities were not included in this analysis.
In relative terms, however, the share of biodiversity-related development finance has remained stable over 2011-20. Based on these shares, and compared with bilateral providers, multilateral institutions have scope to increase their biodiversity focus and flows further and to continue mainstreaming biodiversity across activities. This would be in line with the Multilateral Development Banks’ Joint Statement on Nature, People and Planet (adopted during UNFCCC COP26, in Glasgow), which commits the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to mainstream nature into their policies, investments and operations, including through defining and making “nature-positive” investments (Multilateral Development Banks, 2021[24]).
While the portion of principal and “principal-like” flows appears to be stable over time, flows to significant and “significant-like” activities have increased, showing that biodiversity-related concerns are increasingly mainstreamed across activities. Even so, these flows are still low, suggesting there is an opportunity to reap low-hanging fruits and accelerate biodiversity mainstreaming. Given the lack of consistent data on biodiversity spending by multilateral institutions, this report recommends that multilateral institutions enhance their transparency by reporting on their biodiversity-related activities to the OECD CRS, ideally using the Rio Markers, which are currently the most comprehensive source of comparable data on development finance for biodiversity. For institutions already reporting to the OECD on their biodiversity-related activities, there is room to improve the quality of this reporting (e.g. by ensuring that activities reported with a purpose code related to biodiversity are identified with the marker). These recommendations also apply to other policy areas, as noted in the latest OECD Multilateral Development Finance report (OECD, 2022[25]) and are in line with the monitoring framework and resource mobilisation strategy of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (CBD, 2022[26]; CBD, 2022[27]).
Funding from non-DAC providers for biodiversity-related activities amounted to USD 28 million annually on average over 2018-20, the years when most information on these providers is included in the OECD database (Figure 2.12). These trends are driven mainly by:
Saudi Arabia (which provided USD 18.5 million on average over 2018-20, for agricultural and fishing activities)
The United Arab Emirates (USD 3 million on average over 2011-20, peaking in 2018 with a contribution of USD 10.1 million, for wildlife conservation and protection of endangered species)
Kazakhstan (USD 3.5 million on average over 2018-20, for protection of marine environment and contributions to biodiversity-related international organisations).
The contribution of non-DAC EU Member States is also growing over time, mainly driven by Estonia. South-South and triangular co-operation (SSTrC) providers, such as Brazil, Chile and Indonesia, are also reporting on their total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD; see Annex C) with biodiversity-related objectives. Data available for 2019-20 indicate that it increased by 46% in this period. South-South and triangular co-operation has been particularly important in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean, with growing trends and important lessons learnt across the partners engaged, as can be seen from data provided for this report by the Ibero-American General Secretariat (Box 2.2). These modalities help transfer local biodiversity-related solutions within regional contexts, achieve global biodiversity goals across regions, help mainstream biodiversity, and foster strategic biodiversity-related capacity development (OECD, 2019[28]).
Since 2007, the Ibero-American countries (which include countries in the Americas and the Iberian Peninsula where Spanish or Portuguese are predominant languages), together with the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) and the Ibero-American Programme for the Strengthening of South-South Co-operation, have been collecting data on South-South and triangular co-operation initiatives through an online data platform, the Ibero-American Integrated Data System on South-South and triangular co-operation (SIDICSS). This database has information on almost 10 000 co-operation actions, projects and programmes in Ibero-America. Although no specific marker on biodiversity exists in this database, the SEGIB has identified for this report initiatives with a primary biodiversity-related objective and those that consider biodiversity as a secondary objective.
The SEGIB has uncovered 269 initiatives over 2006-20 with a primary focus on biodiversity and 662 with a secondary focus, constituting 2.9% and 7% of the total, respectively. SSTrC initiatives with a focus on biodiversity have been growing steadily since 2013 (Figure 2.11), mainly driven by bilateral South-South co-operation. This accounts for most initiatives and has seen primary biodiversity-related objectives grow from 1.1% in 2010 to 4.1% in 2019 and again in 2020. The fall in 2020 is due to the COVID-19 pandemic, although the total remained stable and close to 5% (SIDICSS, 2022[29]).
Note: The SEGIB developed a methodology to identify primary biodiversity-related activities using the SIDICSS database. The methodology builds upon a keyword search of this database using biodiversity-specific concepts and a list developed by the OECD, adapting this list to the Ibero-American context and searching for keywords in Spanish and Portuguese. These data were drawn from the initiatives under the environmental dimension (Environment and Disaster Management sectors), those aimed at SDGs 14, 15, 7 and 12 (after 2015), as well as other activities identified through the keyword list.
Source: SIDICSS (2022[29]), Sistema Integrado de Datos de Iberoamérica sobre cooperación Sur-Sur y Triangular, https://www.sidicss.org/sidicss/.
The percentage of initiatives with a primary focus on biodiversity is higher for both the triangular and regional South-South co-operation modalities (over 5%), while the bilateral modality was used for most initiatives (64%). A third of the biodiversity initiatives in all three modalities of co-operation focus on protected areas, while another fifth target forest protection. However, many also touch upon other issues, such as marine or mountain ecosystems, threatened species, controlling illegal fishing, genetic diversity, and protecting coral reefs.
Among the activities with a secondary biodiversity-related objective, countries aim at improving general environmental protection (e.g. planning and management, data, evaluation and control, education and research); reducing pollution (e.g. water, soil, air, hazardous pollutants, waste); integrated management of watersheds and water resources; the sustainable use of natural resources and sustainable production (e.g. agriculture, industry, aquaculture); as well as issues related to indigenous peoples. The initiatives that are included in these themes are also frequent in the Triangular and regional South-South modalities.
Behind these numbers are many examples of strengthened capacities (SIDICSS, 2022[29]):
Since 2016 a triangular co-operation project has seen Brazil and Germany support the development of Ecuador’s National Biodiversity Institute (INABIO). The objective is to strengthen INABIO's capacities in knowledge management in science, technology and innovation, and thus improve decision making. Among other things, work is being done on a biological database that systematises information on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and enables data modelling.
A bilateral South-South co-operation project under the Mexico-Chile Mixed Fund over 2017-21 aimed to transfer of knowledge for institutional strengthening in the context of climate change and in the framework of the creation of Chile’s Service of Biodiversity and Protected Areas. This sought to improve the application of biodiversity conservation policies in both countries, and to reduce the vulnerability of ecosystems and their services in a context of climate change and sustainable development. Among its results are the consolidation of the Biodiversity Information and Monitoring System and the creation of a "Biodiversity Conservation Barometer".
The “Development of capacities in management and comprehensive conservation of biodiversity in the Central American Commission region” is a regional South-South co-operation project in existence since 2019. It is carried out by the Executive Secretariat of the Central American Commission for the Environment and Development and foresees the construction of a regional information platform for the comprehensive management and conservation of biodiversity, along with learning through pilot projects, and the preparation of proposals for implementing regional and national policies, as well as developing capacity and human resources.
Note: Non-DAC countries include Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, Republic of Türkiye, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, Latvia, Cyprus3 and Kuwait. These flows are recorded in the CRS. South-South and triangular co-operation countries (SSTrC) include Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Indonesia, whose flows were reported through the total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD) framework.
Source: OECD (2022[5]), OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System Statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1; TOSSD (2022[6]) Total Official Support for Sustainable Development, https://www.tossd.org/.
The report recommends that more countries that provide development finance report to the OECD on their biodiversity-related ODF, and that they also report their biodiversity-related South-South and triangular co-operation through the TOSSD database. The OECD is supporting these economies with statistical capacity development to improve their reporting, including on the use of the Rio Markers. A recent example is the support provided to Qatar, which is increasingly engaging in biodiversity-related work and that, by reporting on these flows to the OECD, could help provide visibility to the country’s efforts, as well as enhance the global picture of biodiversity-related development finance (Box 2.3).
Combatting climate change, protecting the environment, and supporting sustainable development are at the forefront of Qatar’s priorities. Striking the balance between development and the protection of the natural environment is a key pillar of Qatar’s National Vision 2030. Qatar has created a dedicated Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, and conserving, restoring, and protecting biodiversity for healthy and resilient natural ecosystems is one of five key priorities of its National Environment and Climate Change Strategy. As per 2022, protected land and marine ecosystems cover 29.8% of Qatar’s territory. Qatar is a Party to the CBD and the Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols. Qatar was also a driving force behind the creation of the Global Dryland Alliance and is a member of the Group of Friends on Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought; it is a founding member of the Global Green Growth Institute which supports Qatar also in meeting its biodiversity targets.
Numerous good practice examples exist on how Qatar contributes to biodiversity, for instance in the field of sustaining and preserving marine ecosystems. These include a comprehensive coral management program with artificial reef deployment and coral farming with over 10,000 corals produced and out-planted so far, a hawksbill turtle conservation initiative that released over 30,000 baby turtles over the past five years, or measures to protect mangrove coastal areas, whale sharks, and dugongs. Over the past three years, Qatar increased the areas of mangroves along its shores from 9 km to 14 km. Qatar also has taken steps to protect and create wildlife habitats for the over 300 types of migratory birds flocking over the country.
In addition, Qatar supports global efforts to promote sustainability through its development co-operation. For example, during the Climate Action Summit in 2019, His Highness the Emir of Qatar announced a contribution of USD 100 million to support SIDS and LDCs to address climate change and environmental challenges. The pledge is being implemented by the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) and support is being provided to multilateral climate change funds to projects that foster, inter alia, ecosystem-based approaches.
Qatar has been a Participant in the DAC since 2016. Since 2019, the QFFD, acting on behalf of Qatar, has reported the state’s ODA to the OECD and, since 2020, it is also reporting on TOSSD. Several initiatives have been organised with the OECD to start capturing Qatar’s efforts in the field of biodiversity, notably by reporting through the Rio Markers.
Philanthropic flows are still modest in volume compared to total biodiversity-related ODF, but in key sectors such as general environment protection, agriculture and fisheries, they are significant. Private philanthropic institutions are investing more and more in biodiversity-related areas, providing USD 501.4 million in 2017 and USD 685.6 million in 2020 (an increase of 37%) (Figure 2.13).
The sources of philanthropic contributions for biodiversity are highly concentrated. Of the 36 foundations included in the OECD database that reported on biodiversity-related activities, the Bezos Earth Fund, the Dutch Postcode Lottery, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation were the most significant donors, providing 45% of the total biodiversity-related philanthropic giving during 2017-20, while 78% was provided by only 10 foundations (Figure 2.14). Aside from these private providers, the Arcadia Fund, Arcus Foundation and MAVA Foundation show a strong focus on biodiversity, allocating more than one-third of their annual grant making to conservation of nature and related aspects. Moreover, based on its first commitments in 2020, the Bezos Earth Fund is likely to continue having a key role in the future too. Box 2.4 provides examples of the evolving participation of private philanthropies in the biodiversity-related area through innovative financial mechanisms and partnerships.
Note: Out of the 45 foundations that reported to the OECD, 36 did so for biodiversity-related activities.
Source: OECD (2022[5]), OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System Statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1.
Philanthropists favour investing in middle-income economies (75% of the total), such as Indonesia, Brazil, India, Peru and Kenya (together accounting for 14% of the total). The remaining 25% of the country-allocable funding targeted LDCs. In addition, almost all philanthropic contributions (74%) were implemented through NGOs and civil society (such as WWF, Climate Works Foundation, The Nature Conservancy, or Fauna and Flora International), followed by academia or research institutes (17%).
Note: Finance provided by Bezos Earth Fund was based on 2020 due to data availability.
Source: OECD (2022[5]), OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System Statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1.
The Giving to Amplify Earth Action (GAEA) is a recently initiative launched by WEF supported by more than 45 philanthropic (e.g. Bezos Earth Fund, IKEA Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, Open Society Foundations), public (e.g. Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, Ocean14, Stanford University Center for Ocean Solutions, UNEP-WCMC) and private sector partners (WEF, 2023[30]). GAEA aims to fund new and existing public, private and philanthropic partnerships (PPPPs) to help unlock USD 3 trillion annually to reach net zero, reduce nature loss and restore biodiversity by 2050. This initiative aims to be a platform to convene stakeholders, including companies, family offices, individuals and philanthropists, and amplify action at scale for climate and nature conservation by building and replicating existing successful approaches (e.g. Seychelles’ USD 13 million blue bond and USD 22 million debt-to-nature swap for funding the creation of 13 marine protected areas).
In particular, the Government of Seychelles’ initiative is the world’s first ocean debt conversion, resulting in a payment of a foreign debt in exchange for in-country financing for long-term conservation and commitment to reach its goal to protect 30 percent of its ocean (The Nature Conservancy, 2020[31]). The ground-breaking debt conversion deal was co-designed with The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and the financial transaction was facilitated with the support of private foundations (e.g. the China Global Conservation Fund of TNC, Oak Foundation, Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation and Waitt Foundation) as well as public government collaborators (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, South Africa, and the United Kingdom) and multilateral institutions (e.g. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Global Island Partnership). Moreover, the creation of Seychelles’ Marine Spatial Plan [SMSP (Seymsp, n.d.[32])] was critical to the success of the initiative, with planning, science and facilitation provided by the TNC in partnership with the Government of Seychelles-UNDP-GEF Programme Coordinating Unit and Seychelles Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust (SeyCCAT). The SMSP is designed to protect marine biodiversity and support the blue economy, with the aim to support thriving ecosystems, economic growth and resilient communities.
Mobilising private sector finance is essential to deliver on biodiversity targets (CBD, 2020[13]). According to the latest data (OECD, 2022[33]), private finance mobilised by official providers grew by 11% in 2020, up from USD 46.4 billion in 2019 to USD 51.3 billion in 2020. Multilateral organisations are the largest contributors to the mobilisation of private finance (Table 2.3), accounting for 75% of the total.
Despite increasing, figures are relatively small for biodiversity: private finance mobilised by DAC members’ ODF averaged only USD 37.2 million over 2017-20, increasing from USD 14.7 million in 2017 to USD 148.7 million in 2020, an increase of 502%. In addition, the GEF also mobilised USD 109.4 million over a similar period (2016-20), ranging from USD 94.4 million to USD 76.7 million, in 2016 and 2020, respectively – which reflects its mandate and connection to the World Bank, which allows it to benefit from the Bank’s expertise in financial engineering (Landry et al., 2022[34]).
Coverage of the dataset is still improving and the estimates here may be an underestimate of actual figures. In fact, the multilateral dataset only captures data for 2016-20 – there is little data on biodiversity for years prior to that, mainly due to the evolving methodology and quality of data reporting. It is possible that the limited amounts mobilised for biodiversity also reflect the fact that projects are still at an early stage and thus are not yet reported in the statistics. Another reason for low mobilisation amounts may be the fact that some projects are identified differently under climate change or a particular sector (e.g. water and sanitation) – and biodiversity-related co-benefits are not mentioned. Finally, and given the commercial nature of activities captured here, low mobilisation amounts may also reflect low project numbers because it is more difficult to attract a broader range of investors and to scale up due to lack of investor confidence in this area as well as successful reference cases to rely on. However, multiple biodiversity-related mobilisation approaches are evolving (Box 2.5) spanning across multiple stakeholders (private, public and philanthropic) as well as financial instruments and mechanisms.
Each year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (MFA) measures and reports the mobilisation of private climate and biodiversity finance for developing countries by Dutch public interventions (Warmerdam, Pham Van and Walstra, 2022[35]). The reporting uses the OECD-DAC methodology [see Annex B, (OECD, 2021[36])] to calculate MFA’s mobilisation of private finance, distinguishing between different financial instruments (e.g. guarantees, syndicated loans, co-financing arrangements) and using the Rio Markers to determine activities’ objectives. In 2021, MFA mobilised EUR 369 million private finance, of which EUR 17 million corresponded to private biodiversity finance across Dutch and multi-donor programmes and funds. In particular, the 2SCALE and AGRI3 programmes mobilised the greatest value of private biodiversity finance (EUR 6 million and EUR 5.32 million, respectively). However, it is important to note that some programmes are not reported as mobilising private finance due to their indirect catalytic effects, supporting interventions that are not included in the OECD’s methodology (e.g. Water Sector Fund and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility - which mainly provided technical assistance).
In particular, the AGRI3 Fund is an initiative created by a public private-partnership composed of the UN Environment, Rabobank, the Dutch Development bank (FMO) and the IDH Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) that aims to mobilise USD 1 billion to reduce deforestation and encourage sustainable agricultural practices, while also improving rural livelihoods in low and middle-income countries (Agri3 Fund, n.d.[37]). By providing guarantees, subordinated loans and other de-risking investment solutions (e.g. pari passu risk participation, tenor extension, first loss risk participations) the Fund aims to mobilise capital and provide sustainable land use at scale. In addition, MFA acts as an investor within AGRI3 Fund’s financial structure, and has provided USD 40 million as a reimbursable grant (UNEP, 2020[38]), classified as providing ‘guarantee/insurance’ according to OECD’s leveraging mechanisms. However, the Netherlands’ contributions are not reflected within the OECD data on mobilisation biodiversity-related efforts yet, calling for an update of how DAC members report this data to the OECD.
While some of these limits could be solved through greater transparency on private finance mobilisation and more granularity in reporting to the OECD, especially from multilateral development banks, further attention will also be needed to ensure appropriate government policies, regulations and incentives are in place in partner countries to unleash the potential of private capital (Deutz et al., 2020[39]). One approach would be to integrate such action through the resource mobilisation strategies of NBSAP processes (Pisupati and Prip, 2015[40]; UNCCD, 2022[41]) or into Biodiversity Finance Plans (UNDP, 2016[42]). The on-going work by the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures may also support greater transparency on mobilisation in the future (Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures, n.d.[43]).
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Notes
← 1. While the CBD agreement on the Aichi target on development finance does not specify whether commitments should be assessed against nominal or real values, this report has analysed trends by adjusting for inflation and using as a reference 2020 constant prices.
← 2. Previous work had already found that multilateral organisations are key providers of biodiversity-related ODF – and that multilateral flows could grow to twice the level of bilateral flows over time (Miller, Agrawal and Roberts, 2013[44]).
← 3. Note by Türkiye
The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Türkiye recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Türkiye shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union
The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Türkiye. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.