1. Assessing the situation of youth in Jordan

With around 36%, youth in Jordan constitute more than one third of the population when the age group defined by the Ministry of Youth (12-30 years) is considered. Around six in ten people are under the age of 30 (UNICEF, 2021[1]). Figure 1.1 illustrates the population pyramid for Jordan in 2020 and the projected developments for the next ten years. By 2030, the share of 15-25 year-olds is likely to grow further and may represent the single biggest age group according to projections by the United Nations (UN). As today’s youth cohort will grow older, the demographic transition presents a unique opportunity for Jordan but also the need for renewed efforts and investments into their transition to an autonomous life and participation in economic, social and public life.

Youth in Jordan are growing up in a regional context of political and economic instability with significant spill-over effects into the country and significant impacts on its economic development and social cohesion (United Nations, 2017[2]). Since 2010, Gross Domestic Product (GPD) growth has grown by 2.4% annually on average, down from 6.74% in the decade before (World Bank, 2021[3]). Moreover, fiscal space has tightened in recent years with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reporting risks related to the elevated debt level, fiscal vulnerabilities, and reliance on continued donor financing (IMF, 2019[4]). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Jordan continues to host the highest number of refugees per capita globally with more than 750,000 refugees as of February 2021 (UNHCR, 2021[5]).

The COVID-19 pandemic and its social and economic implications have exacerbated inequalities and the challenges faced by young people, in particular vulnerable groups. School closures, curfews and disrupted access to education have increased inequalities in the access to education. According to the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), around 16% of students in Jordan lacked internet access and one third of 15-year-olds did not have a computer for schoolwork in 2018 (OECD, 2021[6]).Youth unemployment levels reached 50% in the fourth quarter of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, compared to 24.7% among the total population (World Bank, 2021[7]). The COVID-19 crisis has pushed young people further into informal and more precarious jobs with significant impacts on their disposable income and financial independence. It has also put them on a more volatile trajectory in achieving other important milestones of adulthood.

With the closure of youth centres and youth clubs due to sanitary reasons, spaces for social interaction and non-formal learning largely shifted to online platforms. This has raised new concerns about the exclusion of vulnerable groups from online spaces but also the risk of increased exposure to disinformation via social media. In parallel, young people have shown resilience, solidarity with older age cohorts, and agency in mitigating the crisis by supporting vulnerable groups in society, thus fostering social cohesion.

Beyond the impact of COVID-19, other national and global transformations are changing the world in which youth in Jordan are growing up, most notably the fast pace of digitalisation, the future of work, and climate change. In this context, a future-oriented approach to youth policy making and programming is critical to harness new opportunities while mitigating new risks that impact on the wellbeing and resilience of youth.

This chapter sets out the context in which youth in Jordan are coming of age. It will discuss national, regional and global factors shaping young people’s opportunities, analyse key indicators to assess the situation of youth and cover some of trends that are likely to shape the lives of today’s youth and future generations in the years to come.

Improving the situation for youth has long been on the political agenda in Jordan. In 2000, King Abdullah II referred to the young generation as the “greatest asset and hope for the future” and the need to “tap into our young people’s intellectual, creative, and reproductive potential in order for Jordan to keep up with new developments in global scientific, economic and social factors” (OECD, 2018[8]). Subsequent discussion papers issued by King Abdullah II have reiterated the need for empowering youth by developing the state administration and enhancing the rule of law (UNESCO, 2017[9]).

The transformation of the Higher Council for Youth into the Ministry of Youth in 2016 marked an important milestone in elevating youth affairs at the government level. In 2019, Jordan launched the National Strategy for Youth 2019-2025. Coordinated by the Ministry of Youth, the adoption of a cross-sectional strategy dedicated to the concerns of young people makes Jordan one of two countries across the MENA region with an operational strategy in place. Jordan was also the first country in the MENA region to adopt a multi-annual youth strategy for the years 2005-2009 to unify and better coordinate the various initiatives targeting youth.

Despite these notable achievements, young people in Jordan continue to face significant challenges in their transition to an autonomous life. The Arab Barometer data (Figure 1.2) shows that, even prior to the COVID-19 crisis, a large majority of the population sees the economic situation as the country’s biggest challenge (71%), followed by corruption (17%) (Arab Barometer, 2019[10]).

Over the past decade, satisfaction with the economic situation has declined significantly. While 55% rated the economic situation as good or very good in 2006, only 23% expressed satisfaction with the state of the economy in 2018. Satisfaction rates have dropped most significantly since 2016 (by 23 percentage points from 46% to 23%) (Figure 1.3). Some of the factors contributing to the sharp decline include the austerity measures adopted by Jordan; the refugee crisis accompanied by the decline in global refugee aid1; and the decline in foreign aid. In turn, a third of the respondents were optimistic that the economic situation will improve in the near future as of 2018 (Arab Barometer, 2019[10]).

Corruption is the second biggest challenge as per the perception of the respondents to the Arab Barometer. 89% say that corruption exists to a “large” or “medium” extent in state institutions and agencies, up by more than 30 percentage points from 66% in 2010 (Figure 3) (Arab Barometer, 2019[10]). According to the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Jordan scored 49 points in 2021, which places it 60th globally out of 180 countries and 5th in the MENA region. Jordan’s performance in the Index has deteriorated between 2005 and 2011 (from a high of 57 points to 45 points) and recovered gradually before effectively stagnating around current levels since 2016 (Figure 1.4) (Economics, 2020[11])2.

Linked to the dissatisfaction of Jordanians with available economic opportunities and perception of corruption, considerations to emigrate from Jordan have increased in recent years. 45% of survey respondents confirmed that they have been thinking about emigrating from Jordan as of 2018, up from 22% in 2016 (Figure 1.5). Considerations to emigrate are particularly pronounced among educated youth who point to economic considerations as the main reason (83%)3. Youth (18-29 years) were significantly more likely to consider emigrating than older age cohorts: Whereas this was considered by 59% of 18-29 year-old, the share drops to 46% for the 30-39 year-old. In contrast, 31% of the 50-59 age cohort and only 16% the respondents aged 60 and older considered emigrating (Arab Barometer, 2019[10]).

This section will discuss the situation of young people in Jordan in the context of the broader social, economic and political context and national and regional developments. It must be noted that youth are not a homogenous group. Although they might face common social, economic and political experiences given the same period in which they transition from childhood to adulthood, their individual backgrounds, experiences and aspirations are highly diverse. It is therefore important to discuss challenges in people’s access to public services and their trust in government not only by age but to complement it with an analysis of other identity factors such as gender and socio-economic background to identify potential vulnerables of specific groups of youth.

Jordan has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the MENA region, in particular among young women. Youth unemployment levels in Jordan were never below 25% in the past three decades (OECD, 2018[8]) and has increased to 50% in the fourth quarter of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, up from an already high share of 37% in 2019 (51% for young women) (World Bank, 2021[7]).

Unemployment among youth is particularly pronounced among well educated youth. For instance, 26% of male holders of a bachelor or higher degree and 77% of female students with a bachelor or higher degree were unemployed in 2018 (Ministry of Education, 2018[12]). Similarly, the rate of young NEET (not in employment, education or training) is significantly higher for young women than young men. In 2019, 44% young women were NEETs in Jordan compared to 29% of young men (Figure 1.6) (World Bank, 2019[13]) (World Bank, 2019[14]).

According to the results of the Arab Barometer (2019), 85% of youth in Jordan are dissatisfied with the performance of government to create employment opportunities (Arab Barometer, 2019[16]). The persistence of high levels of youth unemployment has deep structural roots. Among them, the private sector has not generated enough jobs to absorb young job seekers. Over the past decade, the share of private sector employment relative to employment in the public sector even decreased further (ILO, 2013[17]). Moreover, the public sector is a privileged place to work for many graduates due to the perception of higher job security, shorter working hours, and favourable working conditions (e.g. flexible working hours) despite higher salary prospects in the private sector (USAID, 2015[18]).

There is also a mismatch between the skills tought in school and university and the expertise in demand in the labour market (Arab Barometer, 2019[16]). An assessment by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) flags that private-sector employers often require extensive trainings and work experience and companies are therefore more reluctant to hire graduates (USAID, 2015[18]). According to a study conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), technical know-how, performance under pressure, knowledge and use of new models of machinery, work ethic, and interpersonal skills were among the main challenges raised by private sector representatives (UNDP, 2014[19]). This is acknowledged by self-assessments among students who have been pointing to a “lack of problem-solving, critical thinking and technical skills” (USAID, 2015[18]).

In the absence of decent jobs, a significant share of youth is employed in the informal sector. Young jobseekers often accept informal jobs that do not match their qualification and generate low income, which delays their path to an autonomous life and to achieving what are considered important milestones of adulthood, such as marriage (USAID, 2015[18]). In 2015, 38% of young workers (below 30 years old) were employed in the informal sector, half of whom had higher qualifications than their current occupation. Moreover, 60% in this category received below-average wages (OECD, 2018[8]).

High youth unemployment rates are also linked to the prevalence of Wasta in the Jordanian society4. An assessment by USAID finds that 94% of youth in Jordan believe that connections and networks play a more important role in securing employment and getting a job than education and academic performance (Arab Barometer, 2019[16]) (USAID, 2015[18]).

Jordan has made significant progress in providing access to education. For instance, literacy rates among youth (aged 15-24 years) reached 99% (Statista, 2021[20]), outnumbering the average of 90% across the MENA region in 2019 (UNESCO, 2021[21]) (World Bank, 2019[22]). Jordan also made considerable progress in achieving gender parity in education as illustrated by equal literacy rates and enrolment rates for primary education among young men and women (Statista, 2021[20]). As of 2018, 81% of youth (82% of young men and 80% of young women) were enrolled in primary education, up from 78% in 2011 (World Bank, 2020[23]). Moreover, 87% of young men and 90% of young women were enrolled in secondary education (World Bank, 2020[23]).

However, enrollment rates for primary education of 81% figure below the average of MENA region (94%) and OECD countries (97%). Enrollment rates in secondary education decreased from 77% in 2011 to 63% in 2018 (75% in MENA), similarly, they decreased from 37% in 2011 to 34% in tertiary education (41% in MENA) over the same period (World Bank, n.d.[24]). Challenges in the education sector also relate to the shortage of education staff. In the 2018 edition of the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) , school principals reported having one of the largest shortage of education staff among countries participating in the assessment.

In line with patterns across OECD countries, social and economic inequalities contribute to unequal access to schools and learning opportunities in Jordan, which results in unequal learning outcomes and performance. For instance, the shortage of education staff is more pronounced in disadvantaged schools5. 47% of students enrolled in a disadvantaged school (compared to 34% in OECD countries) and 30% of students enrolled in an advantaged school (compared to 18% in OECD countries) attend a school whose principal reported that the capacity of the school to provide instructions is hindered at least to “some extent” by a lack of teaching staff (OECD, 2018[25]). The findings also demonstrate that students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds hold lower ambitions related to their academic achievements than more advantaged students even when the high-achievers in both groups are considered.6

To address the mismatch of skills in the labour market, Jordan’s Education Strategic Plan (2018-2022) stresses the importance of developing an advanced system of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) to better meet the needs of the labour market. However, TVET continues to be perceived negatively by students and families as it is considered a “second-class route for low performing students” (Ministry of Education, 2018[12]). In response, the Ministry of Education intends to make this sector more attractive for students by providing Vocational Education to secondary schools (grades 11-12)7 in areas such as industry, agriculture, hotel and tourism, and household production. While around 43% of Vocational Education (VE) students are women, data shows that gender biases and stereotypes persist. For instance, whereas the majority of young men are enrolled in the industrial, hotel, tourism and agricultural sectors, almost 98% of all students enrolled in household production are young women. VE trainings in industry, agriculture, hotel and tourism sector often take place in boys’ schools, which exclude or discourage female students from attending the same classes. Social norms continue to exert a strong influence on students’ choices as many females consider home-based activities “appropriate” while acknowledging that such activities do not prepare them adequately for the job market (USAID, 2015[18]).

Child labour, caused by poverty and adult unemployment, further restricts young people’s access to education. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), around 70,000 children, aged 5-17, were exposed to child labour in 2018, 62,500 of which are boys and 7,500 are girls (Ministry of Education, 2018[12]). Data from the Ministry of Labour in 2010 shows that 40% of the fathers of children exposed to child labour are unemployed and 70% live in families that are living below the extreme poverty line (UNICEF, 2014[26]). More recent data suggests that child poverty is on the rise, reaching 20% in 2018 (The Jordan Times, 2018[27]).

Important health indicators have improved in Jordan over recent decades while important challenges prevail. For instance, infant mortality rate declined from 18 per 1000 births in 2010 to 14 in 2018, which is below the average of 18 in the MENA region (World Bank Data, 2019[28]). With 8% of GDP, Jordan allocated a higher share of its GDP to public health expenditures than the MENA region (5.7%) but less than OECD countries (12.6%) in 2017 (World Bank Data, 2020[29]).In 2019, 63% of survey respondents to the Arab Barometer from Jordan expressed satisfaction with the healthcare system. This presents a significant decline from a share of 86% in 2016 (Arab Barometer, 2019[10]). At the policy level, Jordan Vision 2025 acknowledges the importance of establishing youth-friendly health care centres to treat mental health issues and drug abuse among the young generation (UNESCO and OECD, 2020[30]).

Health risks among young people in Jordan are linked to high-risk behaviour, such as the prevalence of smoking, unhealty nutrition, and reckless traffic behaviour. As indicated by the 2019 annual report on traffic accidences of the Jordanian Public Security Directorate, young drivers (below 33 years) have the highest rates of road traffic accidents, compared to older age groups (Public Security Directorate, 2019[31]). Likewise, the rate of smoking among adolescents (aged 13-15) increased up to 24% in 2014 (34% among young men and 14% among young women). This also concerns the consumption of Argileh among youth, which, at odds with scientific evidence, is often considered less harmful and addictive by adolescents8.12% of young persons aged 15-18 is obese (OECD, 2018[8]). According to a study conducted by World Health Organization (WHO) in the Governorate of Irbid, obesity among adolescents aged 13-16 years was significantly higher among female students, students who lived in urban areas and those with working parents (WHO, 2010[32]). In addition, as reported by the Ministry of Health in 2011, diabetes represents a major health problem. In 2016, more than a third of the adult population (18 years and above) was affected by it (Jordan Times, 2019[33]).

Young women, youth in rural areas, and youth with disabilities face specific challenges in their access to health services and health facilities (OECD, 2018[8]). For instance, sexual and reproductive health awareness is limited among youth in Jordan, especially among young women. According to a study conducted by WHO on contraceptive methods, there is still a high use of traditional contraceptive methods, which increases the risk of an undesired pregnancy (WHO, 2018[34]).

Over the past decade, Jordan has undertaken important reform efforts to strengthen more open, participatory and inclusive policymaking. In 2012, Jordan was the first Arab country to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and, by 2018, it launched its 4th National Action Plan for 2018-20 (Open Government Partnership, 2019[35]). The current Action Plan is the first to acknowledge that youth institutions shall be included in the national dialogue (Chapter 4). Moreover, Jordan’s National Youth Strategy 2019-25 highlights the need to “promote youth work and the development of young people in an educational, skilful and valuable way, enabling them to innovate, create, produce and participate in political life and public affairs” (Ministry of Youth in Jordan, 2019[36]) (Chapter 2). Internationally, led by Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah, Jordan has been one of the driving countries to adopt UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, which recognises the role of youth in promoting and maintaining international peace (UNESCO, 2017[9]).

At national level, Jordan has engaged in decentralisation reform with the aim to reduce territorial disparities and provide new opportunities for citizens to participate in the identification of local needs and priorities. In 2017, the Ministry of Youth provided youth directors, who oversee youth-related programmes and the work of youth centres across the governorates, with greater administrative and financial autonomy and facilitated approval procedures (Chapter 3). However, access of youth from remote areas to government services and programmes remains unequal and demonstrates the need for continuous efforts to build administrative capacity, especially at the subnational level (OECD, 2017[37]). Other important changes to encourage (young people’s) participation in political life concern the Election Law in 2016, among others (Chapter 4).

Despite these initiatives, structural barriers for young people to participate in public and political life remain to be addressed. Youth participation in national and subnational elections remains low. Voters under 30 years of age represented 38% of the people who participated in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Jordan (Rased, 2020[38]). In 2016, 35% of those who voted were below the age of 30. 41% of surveyed people aged 18-29 reported having voted in the 2016 parliamentary election, while 55% of people aged above 30 did so (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2016[39]). Moreover, trust among youth in political institutions and leaders is low, especially in parliament (23%) and political parties (12%) (OECD, 2018[8]). As Chapter 4 will discuss in detail, young people’s dissatisfaction in political institutions has been on the rise since 2010 (Arab Barometer, 2019[10]). Less than 3% of youth in Jordan are members of a charitable society and organised in a youth, cultural or sports organisation as of 2013 (OECD, 2018[40]). To address this challenge, Jordan Vision 2025 acknowledges the importance of encouraging young people to volunteer and to create a National Coordinating Volunteer Council (UNESCO, 2017[9]).

The enactment of the Defence Law to enforce the COVID-19 lockdown measures prompted a debate about a balanced approach to protecting public health while ensuring civic rights and liberties to create an enabling environment for youth to participate in public life (Freedom House, 2020[41]) (Chapter 4).

The report is divided into four thematic chapters to assess the capacities of the government of Jordan to deliver policies and services that are responsive to the needs of youth.

This Chapter will analyse the governance arrangements put in place to design, steer, coordinate and track progress in the implementation of Jordan’s National Youth Strategy (NYS) 2019-25. For this purpose, it will benchmark the arrangements in place against the eight principles of good governance as set out in the OECD Assessment Framework of National Youth Strategies to identify strengths and opportunities to build up further administrative capacity and partnerships.

It will provide comparative evidence from across MENA and OECD countries to translate the commitments of national integrated youth strategies into tangible improvements in the lives of youth.

This Chapter examines the formal organisation of youth affairs in Jordan with a focus on the administrative capacity within the Ministry of Youth, with a focus on human and financial resources. It will analyse the coordination mechanisms established horizontally (across ministerial departments) and vertically (across the different levels of government) to translate its strategic objectives into programmes and activities across Jordan’s 12 governorates and explore the tools used to mainstram youth’s concerns in programming.

It will complement the analysis with good practice examples from across MENA and OECD countries to build administrative capacity in the lead government entity in charge of youth affairs.

This chapter discusses how the government of Jordan can strengthen youth participation and representation in public life. Youth trust in public institutions and representation in decision-making remain limited in Jordan, with the risk of young people disassociating from public and political life. Governance arrangements, laws, policies and institutions can be leveraged to promote a stronger relationship between youth and public institutions.

Based on an assessment of the current situation, ongoing reform initiatives and good practices from MENA and OECD countries, this chapter provides policy recommendations to empower youth in public life.

This chapter addresses to what extent key legal frameworks are responsive to young people’s needs and provide opportunities for them to participate in public and political life. It analyses minimum age criteria set up to vote and run in elections and those that determine access to employment, education, health, justice and other services that are critical for the transition of youth to an autonomous life.

The Chapter will benchmark the current criteria in place against the thresholds set across MENA and OECD countries in a constant effort of balancing concerns about protecting and empowering young men and women.


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[16] Arab Barometer (2019), Youth Report, Public Opinion Middle East and North Africa,, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Youth_Report_Public-Opinion_Middle-East-North-Africa_2019-1.pdf.

[11] Economics, T. (2020), Jordan Corruption Index, https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/corruption-index.

[39] European Union Election Observation Mission (2016), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Parliamentary Election 20 September 2016, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/212604/Jordan_parliamentary-elections_20-September-2016_EU-EOM-report.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2021).

[41] Freedom House (2020), , https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2046522.html.

[17] ILO (2013), Decent work country profile: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---integration/documents/publication/wcms_232764.pdf.

[4] IMF (2019), IMF Jordan Country Report No. 19/127, http://file:///C:/Users/Hosny_M/Downloads/1JOREA2019001%20(1).pdf.

[33] Jordan Times (2019), ’Obesity in Jordan rises by 300,000 in four years’, https://jordantimes.com/news/local/obesity-jordan-rises-300000-four-years.

[12] Ministry of Education, J. (2018), Education Strategic Plan, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Amman/pdf/ESP_English.pdf.

[36] Ministry of Youth in Jordan (2019), National Youth Strategy 2019-2025, http://moy.gov.jo/sites/default/files/jordan_national_youth_strategy_2019-2025_english_compressed_1.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2021).

[6] OECD (2021), PISA, https://www.oecd.org/pisa/.

[25] OECD (2018), The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results for Jordan,, https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_CN_JOR.pdf.

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[8] OECD (2018), Youth Well-being Policy Review in Jordan, https://www.oecd.org/dev/inclusivesocietiesanddevelopment/Youth_well_being_policy_review_Jordan.pdf.

[37] OECD (2017), OECD Open Government Review in Jordan, https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/Jordan-Highlights-2017.pdf.

[35] Open Government Partnership (2019), Jordan Action Plan 2018-2020, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/jordan-action-plan-2018-2020/.

[31] Public Security Directorate, J. (2019), 2019 Annual Report on Traffic Accidences in Jordan, https://www.psd.gov.jo/images/docs/TrafficRep2019.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1ZvII_waPNv5edbwsw1Xn9aaRCSJbr8hKZMV6lRUS7Ph4wddQ-PtfiKZY.

[38] Rased (2020), Final Report on the Outcomes of Observing the Jordanian Parliamentary Elections 2020, https://www.rasedjo.com/ar/publications (accessed on 6 May 2021).

[20] Statista (2021), Jordan: Literacy Rate from 2007 to 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/572748/literacy-rate-in-jordan/.

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[19] UNDP (2014), Labour Market: The Case of Vocational Training in Jordan,, https://www.knowledge4all.com/en/210/Publications/Labour-Market--The-Case-of-Vocational-Training-in-Jordan.

[21] UNESCO (2021), Sustainable Development Goals, http://data.uis.unesco.org/.

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[30] UNESCO and OECD (2020), Assessing the broader youth environment in Jordan, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Amman/pdf/Assessing_broader_youth_environment_JOR.pdf.

[5] UNHCR (2021), Jordan, https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Jordan%20country%20factsheet%20-%20February%202021.pdf.

[1] UNICEF (2021), Youth, https://www.unicef.org/jordan/youth.

[26] UNICEF (2014), Jordan, Country Report on Out of School Children, https://www.unicef.org/mena/sites/unicef.org.mena/files/2019-11/Jordan%20Country%20Report%20on%20OOSC_EN.pdf.

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[32] WHO (2010), Prevalence of overweight and obesity among adolescents in Irbid governorate, Jordan,, http://www.emro.who.int/emhj-volume-16-2010/volume-16-issue-6/article-13.html.

[3] World Bank (2021), GDP growth (annual %) - Jordan, Middle East & North Africa, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=JO-ZQ.

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[23] World Bank (2020), School enrollment, primary, male (% net) - Jordan, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR.MA?locations=JO.

[22] World Bank (2019), Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24) - Middle East & North Africa, Jordan, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS?locations=ZQ-JO.

[14] World Bank (2019), Share of youth not in education, employment or training, female (% of female youth population), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.NEET.FE.ZS.

[13] World Bank (2019), Share of youth not in education, employment or training, male (% of male youth population), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.NEET.MA.ZS.

[15] World Bank (2019), Share of youth not in education, employment or training, total (% of youth population) - Jordan, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.NEET.ZS?locations=JO.

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← 1. According to UNHCR, Jordan continues to host the highest number of refugees per capita globally with 753,282 refugees in February 2021, including 664,414 Syrian refugees, almost 50 percent of whom are adolescents and children (UNHCR, 2021[5]). https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/unhcr-jordan-factsheet-october-2018; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-jordan-s-austerity-protests/

← 2. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/corruption-index

← 3. More than four in five Jordanians who consider emigrating highlight economic reasons (83 percent), compared to 17 percent for other reasons such as: educational opportunities (4 percent), corruption (2 percent), family reunion (1 percent), and others (9 percent), https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Jordan_Report_Public-Opinion-2019.pdf

← 4. Wasta is the practice of favoritism based on family and tribal relations and not on the person’s qualifications or expertise.

← 5. Socio-economically disadvantaged schools are schools in the bottom  25% of the national distribution of the school-level ESCS index, which is calculated as the average ESCS index among students in a school. Socio-economically advantaged schools are schools in the top 25% of the national distribution of the school-level ESCS index. https://www.educacionyfp.gob.es/dam/jcr:1f3a39fe-505f-44f7-99c8-a676edd42d0d/equity%20in%20education.pdf

← 6. Socio-economically disadvantaged students as those whose value on the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS) is among the bottom 25% of students within their country or economy. Socio-economically advantaged students as those whose ESCS is among the top 25% of students within their country or economy. https://www.educacionyfp.gob.es/dam/jcr:1f3a39fe-505f-44f7-99c8-a676edd42d0d/equity%20in%20education.pdf

← 7. In Jordan, the VE enrolment last for two years (grades 11 and 12). After successfully finishing the tenth grade and taking the General Secondary School Certificate Examination, students can be enrolled in VE. http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Amman/pdf/ESP_English.pdf

← 8. Due to the public misconceptions about tobacco products, many young people do not realise that one hour of argileh consumption equals smoking 100 cigarettes. http://jo.one.un.org/en/press-releases/the-ministry-of-health-and-the-united-nations-in-jordan-call-upon-everyone-to-unite-to-end-tobacco-use/102

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