Chapter 5. The European Union’s delivery modalities and partnerships


Peer review indicator: The member has effective partnerships in support of development goals with a range of actors, recognising the different and complementary roles of all actors

The European Union is recognised as a trusted and relevant development co-operation partner at both international and country levels. Partner countries and civil society organisations alike highly appreciate its predictable support and the variety of its instruments and partnership modalities. Co-ordination and harmonisation efforts with its member states, including through joint programming approaches, are also widely appreciated. To maximise their potential, the European Union should continue to pursue plans to further refine these and other partnership approaches and instruments, including those for other multilaterals and the private sector. It can also continue to build on the progress made in making its programme more transparent and untied.

The European Union encourages inclusive approaches to prioritise development needs

During the 2012-2018 review period, the European Union (EU) has developed and strengthened its policy framework as well as partnering and programming approaches with the aim of becoming more responsive, inclusive and fit for purpose. The EU is taking steps to operationalise these policy ambitions by, inter alia:

  • Developing a broader range of support instruments to flexibly and effectively respond to the diversity of global, regional and country development challenges and increasing number of crises. These instruments are currently undergoing a process of consolidation and refinement within the draft Multiannual Financial Framework proposal 2021-27 in response to evaluation findings (European Commission, 2018c, 2017a).1

  • Refining and expanding joint programming processes in 56 partner countries as a preferred mechanism to promote greater co-ordination, harmonisation, alignment and effectiveness of the support given by the EU and its member states. Furthermore, it is continuing to invest in initiatives for global and country level transparency.

  • Setting up and rolling out a comprehensive framework2 for engaging with civil society organisations and local authorities (European Commission, 2017c, 2013, 2012).3 As discussed below, the EU is also adopting more consultative, less government-centred approaches to ownership and accountability. This represents an evolution since the 2012 DAC peer review (OECD DAC, 2012).

  • Attempting to enhance the approach and instruments for partnering with the private sector as a strategic player in partner countries (European Commission, 2014a).4 This is still a work in progress. At the same time, the EU is continuing to untie aid and maintain a significant proportion of support channelled to and through private sector institutions, which, at 10% of all bilateral disbursements in 2016, is triple the DAC average.5

The resulting framework facilitates the EU’s effective engagement in multi-stakeholder policy dialogue and strengthened partnerships with traditional bilateral and multilateral organisations, developing country governments, and non-state actors across the programming cycle.

Strengthened engagement with civil society and local authorities

As discussed in Chapter 2, the EU’s engagement with civil society and local authorities has been strengthened during the review period with the publication of two new Commission Communications, the creation of the EU’s Policy Forum on Development, the signature of 30 framework partnership agreements (25 with civil society and 5 with global and regional association of local authorities) and 107 country roadmaps for engagement with civil society. EU support for programmes and positions that foster an enabling environment for civil society organisations has remained steady throughout the period, including in countries with shrinking civic space.

The partnering approach with local authorities was also stepped up in 2013, with a renewed commitment to decentralisation, in recognising the role of local authorities as key EU partners in development co-operation aimed to achieve better governance and sustainable development (Council of the European Union, 2017; European Commission, 2013). The new partnering approach - linked to an increase in resources for local authorities during the MFF 2014-20 - aims at supporting decentralisation, increasing subnational capacities, addressing the challenge of rapid urbanisation, and engaging with associations of local authorities at all levels. Framework Partnership Agreements with five global and regional Associations of Local Authorities were signed in January 2015.

The share of EU bilateral ODA to and through civil society organisations doubled in response to the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action.6 The EU has maintained this level throughout the review period, with such funding representing 11% of its ODA on average from 2011 to 2016, reaching USD 2 billion in 2016. Nonetheless, consideration should be given to ensure that current partnership modalities are not creating an uneven playing field by concentrating funding on European-based CSOs (Figure 5.1). Measures taken to date to redress the balance for developing country-based CSOs7 - inter alia, ring-fenced funds, eased co-financing requirements and a greater role for delegations - have helped to maintain but not increase funding channelled to and through local CSOs. An approach that encourages CSOs to partner among themselves to apply to the EU for funds will require attention to ensure that EU-funded CSOs and networks also operate in line with the Istanbul Principles of transparency and accountability and that European CSOs pursue equitable partnerships with their local partner CSOs.8

Figure 5.1. EU support to European-based CSOs is increasing
Gross bilateral ODA disbursements to and through CSOs, by type of CSO, 2010-16, EU institutions.

Source: OECD (2018). Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No One Behind.

Finally and notwithstanding their broad appreciation for the EU’s commitment to promote human rights abroad and protect human right activists, CSOs in Brussels see a need for the EU to increase its early responsiveness and support to civil society in deteriorating governance circumstances and in fragile settings. The Peer Review Team heard this view from CSOs as well during its field missions in Mali and Bolivia, where domestic actors demanded a more strategic, whole-of-society approach to engaging with CSOs.

The EU champions multilateralism and partners with multilaterals to deliver its programme

The EU is a strong supporter of effective multilateral co-operation and partnerships, as reflected in the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The 2017 European Consensus on Development (the Consensus) commits the EU and its member states to encourage multilateral agencies to align with the 2030 Agenda and to harmonise their efforts, including by promoting deeper UN reform to “Deliver as One”.9 The role of the Commission in convening member states around common positions to redefine the post-2015 development architecture in UN fora and the negotiations around the Paris Agreement stand out as significant achievements in the Commission’s co-ordinating role (Chapter 1).

The EU also partners with multiple multilateral organisations as implementers of its development co-operation programme. Since 2012, approximately one-fourth of EU support (excluding EIB) is implemented through multilaterals, particularly UN agencies (Chapter 3). Decentralised authority in partnering with multilaterals allows the delegations to tap strategically into the technical expertise and comparative advantage of various multilateral agencies when relevant. This was noted in the 2012 DAC peer review of the EU and attested in the Peer Review Team’s two field visits in Mali and Bolivia for this review. That said, and as discussed in Chapter 2, a more strategic approach at global level to partnering with multilateral agencies could help inform partnering choices by EU delegations.

In response to a 2012 peer review recommendation for more targeted and strategic co-operation with international financial institutions (IFIs), DEVCO has stepped up its strategic partnering since 2015. This has resulted in further collaboration and new partnership frameworks with major IFIs during 2018.10

Multi-year funding and flexible instruments have increased responsiveness to less predictable country contexts

Budgeting and programming processes, including the Multiannual Financial Framework, contribute to the EU’s multi-year predictability towards partner countries and other stakeholders.11 The role of partner countries in the preparation of bilateral programmes and providing inputs to the long-term planning of geographic and thematic financing instruments facilitates a shared perception across stakeholders regarding the EU as a trustworthy and reliable partner. However, the impending departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (commonly referred to as “Brexit”), has raised concerns about its potential impact on the predictability of EU development assistance, particularly in the short-term (Olivié and Pérez, 2017). As evidenced in Mali, predictable funding is especially important in fragile or crisis contexts.

In some contexts, the many instruments deployed during the review period have improved the EU’s flexibility to adapt to change, particularly in addressing immediate crises in fragile and post-conflict situations. Still, opportunities for improvement remain:

  • The Mali field visit demonstrated that the EU is making use of all relevant instruments at its disposal (including shorter- and longer-term instruments, as well as development and security programming) and adopting holistic responses in concert with other partners when confronting a challenging crisis. However, new instruments have become add-ons to a more traditional development co-operation system, one based on the European Development Fund, for which management tools and processes were originally developed. Increasing the coherence and visibility of the overall EU programme in Mali was work in progress (Chapter 2).

  • In Bolivia, the government’s request to reprioritise assistance towards urban development challenges could only be partially accommodated (at the annual programming level) because major shifts in sector focus would require a burdensome process to alter the EU’s current long-term strategic direction in the country.

The proposed new Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-27 provides a useful opportunity to review how procedures and systems can better work together in a fast-changing environment while still ensuring alignment with national development priorities.

For joint programming to fully deliver on its promise, close monitoring, adaptation and partner country leadership are needed

Since 2011, the EU and its member states launched joint programming processes in 56 partner countries, with joint strategies already in place in 20 partner countries.12 On average, six EU member states participate in these processes. In half of the processes, non-EU partners have also participated.13 Further policy development and reviews have reaffirmed the value of these joined-up approaches but have also emphasised the need for a voluntary, flexible, and inclusive approach to implementation, tailored to the country context, recognising that in some cases short-term transaction costs are still high (Council of the European Union, 2016). The Council also highlighted the added value of joint programming in terms of reducing transaction costs - including for partner countries.

A recent European Commission (2017a) evaluation finds that overall, joint programming exercises are adding value to the development co-operation of the EU and its member states by harmonising efforts pragmatically around joint analysis, commonly agreed objectives, a clearer division of labour within sectors, and better collaboration and greater visibility of EU-wide country support. However, the EU and its member states should continue efforts to expand the implementation of joint programming - in a pragmatic way - at the country level. In other words, they need to further refine the modality so as to deliver on the high ambition of making European development co-operation more effective, co-ordinated, efficient, coherent, transparent and predictable, as articulated by the Council (Council of the European Union, 2011). Based on analysis from this peer review and the 2017 European Commission evaluation of joint programming, future progress is likely to require a variety of approaches, including:

  • Ensuring greater partner country leadership and demand for joint programming to address fragmentation among EU and its member states for collective action.

  • Overcoming common issues of partial implementation, limited partner country ownership, and addressing internal constraints that hamper the effectiveness of joint programming, such as how to reconcile different programming cycles, bilateral interests and decision-making processes.

  • Continuing the planned move towards joint results frameworks, ensuring that these are aligned with those of the partner countries and utilising them for mutual accountability and collective results reporting.

  • Using joint strategies as a basis of joint programming and any related division of labour.

  • Considering explicit strategies to avoid unwanted negative effects of EU joint programming on existing co-ordination arrangements with non-EU donors.

As the EU and its member states continue plans to further develop and support flexible joint programming approaches, emphasis should be placed on monitoring their effectiveness. The EU should continue to track whether joint programming is increasing the number of joint political or policy analyses or resulting in better information sharing, closer alignment of budget cycles, and more joined-up or delegated implementation in different partner countries. The effectiveness framework included in Bolivia’s European Joint Strategy sets an example of good practice in this regard.

Finally, and before moving ahead with the current intention to replace individual EU and member states’ country strategies with European joint strategies, the EU and its member states could examine further the benefit of replacing individual country strategies with Joint Programming Documents in different country contexts. This can take place while they continue to consider how the joint strategies fit within broader whole-of-government engagement of the EU and its member states.

To maintain trust and support for European development co-operation, recent gains in transparency could be expanded to all new modalities and instruments

At the global level, current efforts to improve reporting on the EU’s financial contributions and activities in international statistical repositories are paying off (Table 5.1). The EU is also acting in its co-ordinating role by promoting greater visibility of development co-operation by the EU and member states at the global level, including by managing the EU Aid Explorer14 and through active support to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) in collecting data from member states. The EU’s medium-term predictability, the increased reliance on joint programming and good practice in engaging partner countries in project evaluations15 all enhance country-level transparency. The EU’s International Cooperation and Development Results Framework and related annual reports are also enabling greater transparency of results (Chapter 6). Nevertheless, given concerns from the European Parliament and CSOs on the use of trust funds16 and private sector instruments,17 the EU may consider rebalancing the emphasis on communication with other accountability and learning objectives, as well as strengthening the approach to assess and report results of emerging modalities and instruments.

Table 5.1. Transparency of EU development co-operation is improving
Transparency assessments, based on use of information

Retrospective statistics for accountability

OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2018

Information for forecasting

OECD Forward Spending Survey, 2016

Information for aid planning and management

IATI, 2018

Most recent assessment









Note: Each assessment is calculated by weighting some sub-dimensions including timeliness, comprehensiveness, accuracy and forecasting.

Sources: Based on baseline calculations in OECD-UNDP (2016), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2016 Progress Report,; and OECD (2018), Development Co-operation to Leave No One Behind, p. 62,

Progress in untying EU development co-operation should continue

The EU succeeded in 2016 to fully implement the DAC recommendation to untie bilateral aid (OECD DAC, 2014). Following the issuance of new EU financing instruments in 2014, all EU aid to least developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDC, highly indebted poor countries are now 100% untied, jumping from 89.1% in 2011. Untied aid for all countries also grew during the same period to 71.8% in 2016 from 65% in 2011 (OECD DAC, 2018).

In furthering its efforts to untie aid across its whole programme that includes technical assistance, the EU could ensure that its framework contracts concluded in Brussels do not result in preferential treatment for EU companies. Opening this mechanism to locally sourced technical assistance would enable procurement from a wider pool and potentially lower costs. Furthermore, the EU could consider how greater authority in the field might provide delegations the flexibility to hire short-term technical assistance in response to specific challenges.

Country-level engagement

Peer review indicator: The member’s engagement in partner countries is consistent with its domestic and international commitments, including those specific to fragile states

The European Union is a proactive advocate of international commitments to engage effectively with partner countries. It makes good use of its large budgets and political influence to support them in a variety of situations over the long-term, including fragile contexts, through general budget support and other instruments. It should now deepen its work to enhance implementation.

Alignment with the principles of country ownership and mutual accountability in spirit and in practice

The EU’s approach to country partnerships is conducive to locally defined prioritisation and inclusive programming. Programming guidelines were simplified and streamlined in 2012 to increase alignment with (or be fully replaced by) national development strategies by default (European Commission, 2012). Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) are being used as the primary tool to identify priority areas, modalities and instruments with partner countries. Consistency, inclusiveness and coherence are promoted through principles and practices that regulate the programming process. The aims include: ensure broader ownership by consulting with CSOs, social partners and the private sector; synchronise MIPs with partner countries’ own cycles; achieve comprehensiveness and coherence with broader policies, strategies and joint programming processes; concentrate in a few sectors (ideally three); ensure flexibility and responsiveness to sudden crises; and consider blending opportunities with other official and private sources (European External Action Service, 2012).

As noted by the Peer Review Team on the field visits, the variety of delivery modalities and the mix of instruments is allowing EU delegations to focus strategically on partner countries’ priorities, needs, and capacities. At the same time, the EU should ensure that combining strategic and programming documents - such as the Joint Programming Documents with other EU bilateral programming documents - continue to cover context diagnosis, strategic prioritisation and results that are currently covered by EU country strategies, which are being phased out since 2014 in countries where the national development plan is deemed to provide a suitable programming basis.

These approaches are translating into tailored programming choices that encourage ownership and inclusiveness, as was demonstrated in Mali and Bolivia where the partner governments and non-state actors alike praised the EU’s partnering approach. Recent estimates indicate that most new individual programmes and projects (73.5%). aim at objectives targeted by partner countries. These interventions tend to be designed to target results indicators also prioritised by partner countries (74.1%). Furthermore, partner governments are actively engaged in jointly assessing the results. This direction is particularly important as countries continue to incorporate SDG results indicators into their country results frameworks (OECD/UNDP, 2016: 154-155).18

Recent surveys of leaders in partner countries confirm that the EU ranks high in terms of helpfulness and influence, which is linked to good country alignment, comprehensiveness of support, and the mix and flexibility of available instruments in EU delegations (Custer et al., 2018). Nonetheless, the EU should continue its on-going effort to review, refine and scale up triangular co-operation. This can be done by adapting its programme to further support partner countries in accessing relevant knowledge and policy advice in particular their weak areas of the SDGs (European Commission, 2018a).

The EU plays a strong and valued leadership role in donor co-ordination mechanisms and through the growing use of programme-based approaches, joint programming and delegated co-operation (Council of the European Union, 2017). It invests in enhancing country-level transparency of European development co-operation, chiefly through greater visibility of joint programming exercises, as well as support to mutual accountability frameworks including open aid management platforms such as IATI (European Commission, 2016).19 While promising, these efforts need to be sustained, scaled up and mainstreamed across countries for significant impact.

To make mutual accountability work on the ground for the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the EU and its member states could strengthen: the development of results frameworks based on SDGs; coherence of joint programming with country-led frameworks; and support to country leadership, inclusiveness and transparency in donor co-ordination arrangements. In particular, where relevant, the EU could also consider working further with countries and emerging Southern providers, including China, in devising more inclusive arrangements.

The EU continues to champion the development effectiveness agenda, but further progress will require substantive policy change

The EU has adopted a co-ordinating and leadership role in promoting the development effectiveness agenda among its member states and at the global level. This is illustrated by a range of factors. Among these are: transitioning the EU’s paradigm from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness;20 adapting the norms of European development policies to be in line with the effectiveness principles;21 representing member states in the governance of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation; strengthening the use of partner countries’ systems and institutions (EU 2016b: 37-45); and implementing effectiveness commitments, including through specific innovative efforts in four partner countries.22 Furthermore, the significant use of budget support (Box 5.1) illustrates its ongoing commitment to implement this agenda, as does the inclusion of relevant indicators as part of the annual reporting to assess the performance of EU delegations.

At the same time, while, as discussed earlier, the EU has made progress since 2010 in untying ODA and in increasing the availability of medium-term expenditure plans, results are mixed in terms of other Busan commitments, such as strengthening country ownership (OECD-UNDP, 2016) (Figure 5.2). For example, no progress is seen in increasing the share of EU funds that are channelled through partner country systems, due to restrictions in EU regulations on their use beyond budget support modalities. Indeed, while still above the DAC average, the EU’s bilateral ODA programmed with partner countries fell to 52% in 2016 from 74% in 2010, with a 65% concentration on project-type interventions. This indicates that these restrictions are greatly reducing the share of total EU bilateral co-operation to be channelled through partner country systems (OECD, 2018: 63). Given the ownership and efficiency that can potentially be enhanced by increasing the use of partner country systems, the EU may consider whether risk assessment and management approaches similar to those used in delivering budget support could be transposed to project-type interventions.

Figure 5.2. Mixed progress towards country ownership of development co-operation

Source: Adapted from OECD (2018). Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces To Leave No One Behind. “EU Institutions” profile.

Box 5.1. EU’s strategic use of budget support in an increasingly risky world

While most DAC members have reduced their use of budget support, the EU’s use of this modality has remained steady during 2012-16, representing on average 12.2% of ODA disbursements, amounting to USD 9.8 billion in 99 partner countries (Figure 5.3). Budget support is one of the modalities that contribute the most to development co-operation effectiveness, given its significant alignment with partner country priorities, efficient delivery through partner countries´ own systems and programme-based approach.

Figure 5.3. The EU has become the largest provider of non-reimbursable budget support in the DAC

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, accessed 17 July 2018.

The EU provides budget support “when relevant and credible policies are put in place and implemented effectively” (European Commission, 2018c) to create positive incentives for maintaining and furthering these public policies. A recent review found that, in general, EU budget support allocations are responsive to positive trends and results in the targeted policy areas, denoting its strategic use to nudge partner governments into continuing effective reforms (European Commission, 2018d).

Acknowledging that policy relevance and credibility may mean different things in various country contexts, the EU offers distinct budget support modalities tailored to different risk settings.1 In Mali, a conflict-afflicted country, the State Building Contracts enabled a context-sensitive design through strengthening the security-development nexus by encouraging policy reforms that contribute to better development, governance and security outcomes. In Bolivia, a middle income country, the combination of budget support and technical co-operation allowed the EU to work on politically sensitive issues by pooling expertise and funding of other providers as well as carrying out monitoring of results through a third party.

The EU supports these context-adapted approaches with thorough guidelines and quality assurance processes that contribute to: sound risk assessment and management frameworks; sector-wide approaches; balanced programme design; and orientation to results (European Commission, 2017b). The EU also emphasises the importance of and continuously support the strengthening of public financial management systems in partner countries (Council of the European Union, 2016: 45-46).

In 2012, the EU set in place a strengthened governance structure for budget support management - including by establishing a Budget Support Steering Committee - which allows: providing strategic guidance to the design and implementation of operations; enhancing political coherence in the dialogue with partner countries; ensuring a consistent policy across countries and regions; increasing the focus on results; and strengthening risk management and mitigation mechanisms. At the same time, albeit comprehensive and clear, current guidelines may not be sufficient to help set the right level of ambition in the actions and intended results related to budget support.2 The EU’s decision to regularly evaluate individual budget support programmes should also generate lessons to help improve current approaches to assess risks, sustainability and results of these programmes.

1. Three different budget support programmes are available for low-risk to high-risk settings: Sustainable Development Goals contracts, which replace general budget support; sector reform performance contracts, focused on service delivery improvements; and state and resilience building contracts, provided in fragile contexts committed to democratic practices and also taking into account the risk of inaction.

2. A common tension in budget support programmes is over mitigating the incentives for adjusting results reporting that arise from pressure to disburse successive tranches of the programme. In setting the right level of ambition in the design of budget support programme, a recent EU review (European Commission, 2018d) offers recommendations on how to balance tensions between depth of triggers and staff/partner country pressure to disburse successive variable tranches. The EU produced some guidance on how to involve third parties in policy dialogue and budget support management in 2014 (see Linking results reporting to third party monitoring creates incentives for actual performance, as evidenced in the EU-funded programme in Bolivia to combat illegal drug trafficking.


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← 1. The proposal addresses some of the recommendations to enhance the strategic coherence, financial sufficiency and responsiveness of the current instruments emanating from the mid-term evaluation.

← 2. For an overview of the EU’s strategic priorities and approach to promoting civil society, see Additionally, as of June 2018, the Commission and member states have elaborated 105 Roadmaps for engagement with civil society. For more information on Roadmaps, see

← 3. The references describes the EU’s progress in setting up country roadmaps for CSO engagement, as part of the operationalisation of its more inclusive and strategic partnering approach for the period.

← 4. The 2014 Commission communication, which provided a renewed guiding framework, drew on lessons from a 2013 evaluation and subsequent public consultations. The 2013 evaluation is at

← 5. Data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (accessed 16 July 2018).

← 6. The source is the OECD Creditor Reporting System database (accessed 16 July 2018).

← 7. For a comparative analysis of instruments, see

← 8. The Principles were agreed at the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness. See

← 9. See paragraph 90 of the new European Consensus on Development at

← 10. The 2018 management plan report for DG, DEVCO noted that since 2015 it is strengthening “its strategic policy dialogue and cooperation with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) including the strategic participation of the Commission and promotion of EU objectives in fora and Trust Funds with IFIs”. See For 2018, DEVCO has targeted launching structured consultations and joint analyses with the World Bank, establishing a strategic partnership framework with the IMF, participating in the Annual Meetings’ dialogues, establishing an open dialogue with other regional development banks, and promoting EU objectives and participation in IFI-led fora and trust funds.

← 11. In 2016, three-year forward spending plans for the EU covered 84.6% of the forecasting needs of 81 partner countries participating in the Global Partnership monitoring round, a sharp improvement from 69.4% in 2014 (OECD/UNDP, 2016).

← 12. At the moment, there are 25 Joint Programming Documents (joint strategies) of which 3 are in the process of approval and 2 have expired (Namibia and Myanmar).

← 13. This estimate is as of July 2018. See the Joint Programming Tracker for updated information at Four non-EU partners also have participated in joint programming: Switzerland (22 countries), Norway (9), Canada (2) and the United States (1).

← 14. For information on the EU Aid Explorer, see

← 15. Overall, 94.1% of the 223 EU programmes and projects approved in 2015 planned to engage partner countries in defining the scope of the final evaluation and/or in implementing it. For further information, see page 155 of

← 16. The European Parliament and external stakeholders have pointed out that flexibility and speed of instruments such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa should be coupled with greater transparency on the use and results of these instruments. See, for example,

← 17. See, for example,

← 18. The results are reported by 64 partner countries in liaison with EU Delegations on EU practices in designing, monitoring and evaluating 223 new interventions that are valued at USD 3.19 billion, and were approved in 2015.

← 19. Illustrative examples of EU-supported efforts at country level include Myanmar’s aid information management system, Laos’ joint programming and Afghanistan’s mutual accountability framework. For more details, see

← 20. This transition is exemplified by the EU’s current approach to engage with non-state stakeholders in programming and policy dialogue, the support offered towards an enabling environment for private sector and civil society in partner countries, the renewed emphasis and support to partner countries’ efforts in domestic revenue mobilisation, and the adoption of integrated approaches to development finance (beyond aid).

← 21. The EU and member states played a fundamental role in reflecting the effectiveness agenda as a core element of the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda (para 58), the 2016 Nairobi Outcome document and the 2017 European Consensus on Development (section 4.3).

← 22. For more information, see GPEDC (2018), “Enhancing Effective Co-operation at Country Level: Ten Pilot Countries”:

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