Chapter 8. Third-country nationals’ integration in the European Union

This chapter considers the full set of “Zaragoza indicators” for third-country nationals (TCN) in the European Union, comparing their outcomes with those of host-country nationals and EU nationals. The chapter looks first at the size and composition of third-country national populations (8.1). It then goes on to consider their countries of citizenship and length of residence (8.2), before analysing outcomes in employment and activity (8.3), unemployment (8.4), self-employment (8.5), over-qualification (8.6), levels of education (8.7), income (8.8), poverty (8.9), housing tenure status (8.10), perceived health status (8.11), long-term resident status (8.12), participation in voting (8.13), the acquisition of nationality (8.14), and perceived discrimination (8.15).

    
Box 8.1. The “Zaragoza” indicators: indicators for monitoring integration policy outcomes in the European Union

“Migrants” in the context of the European Union are understood to be non-EU, or third country, nationals who reside legally in the European Union. Their situations often differ markedly from those of EU citizens moving between or living in EU member states other than their own. Although many enjoy equal rights with host-country nationals, not all third-country nationals have access to the labour market and there are greater restrictions on their mobility within the European Union. Their reasons for migrating are also likely to be different from those that prompt EU nationals to move and are more often related to asylum or family reunification.

The Europe 2020 strategy considers better integration of third-country nationals as a factor that will help it meet its first headline target of a 75% employment rate among 20-64 year-olds, given the share of non-EU nationals in its labour force as well as the gap in employment rate with host-country nationals.

Although integration policies are defined and implemented primarily at national or subnational level, they are closely linked to the EU equality framework and to EU provisions that grant migrants residing in the European Union certain rights (e.g. equal working conditions and equal access to goods and services). The European Union indeed has adopted a number of EU non-discrimination laws that are of relevance for the integration of third-country nationals, in particular the Directive 2000/43/EC on racial equality and the employment equality directive (Directive 2000/78/EC). Moreover, since 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states, in Article 79.4, that the European Union may offer support and incentives to member states who take action to promote the integration of legally resident third-country nationals (though that does not include any legal harmonisation).

The European Union has also developed Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy. They were adopted in 2004 and reaffirmed in 2014 as the general framework for EU policy co-operation on integration and for member countries’ assessments of their own efforts. The Common Basic Principles cover the main aspects of integration – employment, education, access to institutions, goods and services, and integration into the society in general. And, most importantly, they define it as a two-way process of mutual accommodation between migrants and host-country nationals.

The so-called “Zaragoza indicators” were introduced at a ministerial conference under the Spanish presidency of the European Union in April 2010. Following the conclusions on integration adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in June 2010, the European Commission worked with member states to draw up those indicators for monitoring the results of integration policies in the four areas of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. These indicators are in line with the Europe 2020 strategy and its related monitoring indicators and targets. A pilot study on the common indicators published its findings in a report, “Using EU Indicators of Immigrant integration”, which was unveiled in 2013. Eurostat updates the indicators annually, drawing on already harmonised data sources, such as the EU Labour Force Survey and the EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions. Moreover, since 2018, Eurostat also started publishing some of these indicators at regional level and by level or urbanisation in order to take into account the sub-national dimension of immigrants' integration.

Key findings

  • In 2017, the EU was home to 21.6 million third-country nationals (TCNs). High numbers of non-EU nationals live in the EU-15 countries and relatively fewer in other member states.

  • TCNs account for 4.2% of the total population in the European Union. Compared to ten years earlier, rises were steepest in Sweden and Slovenia and declines largest in Latvia and Estonia.

  • Almost half of third-country nationals in the EU have lived in their host country for 10 years or longer – 49% EU-wide. Further, only 6% of non-EU nationals were born in their country of residence.

  • EU-wide, 55% of TCNs are in employment compared to nationals’ 68%. Overall, 8.8 million non-EU nationals are employed in the EU, and over 10.5 million economically active.

  • Labour-related gaps between third-country and host-country nationals are wider among women. Non-EU women are less likely to be economically active than their national peers in almost every EU country (save Portugal). EU-wide, 55% are part of the labour market and 45% employed.

  • The highly educated always have a greater chance of being in work, while workers with little education have higher unemployment rates, both irrespective of nationality. Gaps between host- and third-country nationals are, however, wider among the highly than the poorly educated.

  • TCN’s unemployment rate of 16.5% is over double that among nationals (7%), EU-wide. In total, 1.75 million third-country nationals, are unemployed, thus over 9% of all unemployed in the EU are nationals of a non-EU country.

  • About 1 million third-country nationals are self-employed in the EU and over one in four self-employed TCNs has employees.

  • In the 10 years following the economic crisis and in those countries most affects by it (Southern Europe and Ireland) the share of self-employed among non-EU nationals in employment rose, while falling among nationals.

  • EU-wide, 42% of non-EU nationals are over-qualified for the job they do, against 22% of nationals. Over the past decade, the over-qualification gap between third- and host-country nationals has dwindled, as the over-qualification rate fell by 7 percentage points among TCNs and increased by 2 points among nationals.

  • Having a host-country degree halves the over-qualification rates of non-EU nationals in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, compared to their foreign-educated peers. However, even with host-country degree TCNs remain more likely to be overqualified than nationals everywhere except Germany.

  • Of non-EU nationals aged 15 to 64 years old, 19% – 2.6 million individuals – went no further than primary school education. While that share has declined by 2.5 percentage points over the last decade, it remains almost 4 times as high as among nationals. On the other hand, 24% of third-country nationals are highly educated, a share only 5 percentage points lower than among nationals.

  • Non-EU nationals have a lower annual disposable household income than nationals in virtually every EU country. In Benelux, Spain and Sweden, it is less than 60% of nationals’ median income.

  • EU-wide, 5.7 million TCNs live in relative poverty. That number translates into a 39% share, over twice nationals’ 17% and considerably higher than EU mobiles' 24%. In most countries, more than one-third live in poverty, rising to over half in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain.

  • Poverty hit non-EU nationals harder in the wake of the economic crisis. Their EU-wide poverty rate increased by over 7 percentage points, while remaining the same for nationals.

  • Less than 25% of non-EU national households own the accommodation that they occupy, compared to over 72% among nationals. At the same time, TCNs are equally or less likely than host-country nationals to be low-rent tenants, with the exception of Finland.

  • Across the EU, seven out of ten foreigners – 69% of third-country nationals and 70% of EU nationals – report that they are in good health (shares adjusted by age). The share is slightly above the 67% of nationals.

  • Host-country nationals born in a non-EU country were less likely to vote in national elections than their native-born peers between 2008 and 2016. The respective shares were 73% and 79%, EU-wide. The turnout gap was widest in Ireland, where non-EU-born nationals were 26 percentage points less likely to vote than their native-born peers.

  • Close to one in five third-country nationals EU-wide feel that they belong to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. Almost 40% of non-EU nationals in Greece and more than one-third in Belgium consider that they belong to a group that has been subject to discrimination.

8.1. Size and composition by age

Definition

A third-country national is a foreigner who has the nationality of a non-EU country (see Glossary).

Coverage

Total population in EU countries.

The EU is home to over 21.6 million third-country nationals, who make up more than 4% of the population EU-wide. Nearly one-quarter live in Germany, while Italy accounts for 16%, France 14%, and Spain and the United Kingdom for above 11% each. The populations of Estonia and Latvia boast the largest shares of non-EU nationals relative to their population size: about 14%, predominantly Russian citizens. In most other Central and Eastern European countries, by contrast, with the exception of Slovenia and the Czech Republic, third-country nationals make up less than 1% of the population. In Southern Europe, though, more than 5% of the population are non-EU nationals, and their share is even higher in Germany (6%), Luxembourg (7%) and Austria (8%). Just as third-country nationals outnumber the 17 million EU foreigners living in the European Union, so they outnumber them in most countries. Belgium, however, is home to twice as many EU foreigners as non-EU nationals, Ireland and the Slovak Republic to over three times as many, and Luxembourg to six times more.

EU-wide, 77% of third-country nationals are of working age (between 15 and 64 years old), 7% are over 64, and 16% under 15. As the chances of obtaining host-country nationality increase with length of stay, the younger age brackets account for the bulk of the foreign population. One-third of foreigners – third-country and EU-nationals alike – are aged between 25 and 39. Moreover, while one in five host-country nationals is 65 and over, only 1 in 15 non-EU nationals is. Indeed, EU-wide and in most countries non-EU nationals are in their mid- to late-20s and 30s. Only in the Baltic countries are they much older – older, in fact, than the national population – with more than a quarter aged over 64. At the opposite end of the spectrum, many non-EU nationals in Southern Europe and destinations of recent humanitarian migration are children under the age of 15. In Greece, almost a quarter fall into that age group, while in Croatia and Sweden almost 20% non-EU nationals are children.

Over the last decade, the share of third-country nationals in the EU population increased slightly – by about 0.6 percentage points EU-wide. The rise was below 1 point in most countries, including the longstanding immigration destinations that are home to many non-EU nationals, such as France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. In Sweden and Slovenia, however, it was about 2.5 percentage points and in Italy and Austria a little less than 2 points. As for the Baltic countries, whose non-EU population has been shaped by border changes and is older than in other EU countries, they recorded declines in the third-country shares of their populations. In fact, they were the steepest in the EU. In Latvia, for example, the fall was almost 5 percentage points, due mostly to ageing-related deaths of the third-country population. Altogether, the age structure of the non-EU population is fairly similar to a decade ago.

Figure 8.1. Third-country nationals
Percentages of the total population, 2007 and 2017
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845187

Figure 8.2. Age distribution, by citizenship
Percentages of the third-country, EU and host-country national populations, respectively, 2017
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 StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933844674

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.2. Duration of stay and regions of nationality

Definition

The duration of stay Indicator refers to the length of time that has elapsed since a third-country national’s (TCN’s) year of arrival. Region of nationality denotes five broad regions, namely Asia, Africa, Europe (including Turkey), Latin America and the Caribbean, and Canada-United States-Oceania.

Coverage

TCNs aged between 15 and 64 years old, excluding those whose country of nationality is not reported.

Over one in three third-country nationals of working age EU-wide is citizen of a European non-EU country. Thus, non-EU European countries constitute the top region of nationality among third-country nationals. Next comes Asia – about 30% of non-EU nationals are nationals of an Asian country. One in five has an African nationality, one in seven that of a country from the rest of the world – namely, the Americas and Oceania.

European non-EU citizens make up the largest share of third-country nationals in the populations of most Central and Eastern European countries. In these countries, third-country nationals are chiefly Russian and Ukrainian. In Austria and Germany European non-EU citizens are the largest TCN group, too, with Turks and citizens of former Yugoslavia forming the bulk of non-EU nationals. Asian citizens account for most third-country nationals in Ireland, Hungary and the Nordic countries. Their origins and profiles vary widely, though. Some came to the EU as labour immigrants, like Indians in Ireland and Chinese in Hungary, while others, such as Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians in the Nordic countries, are humanitarian migrants. Historic, cultural and linguistic ties between EU countries and countries outside Europe have shaped immigrant populations. The largest group of third-country nationals in Spain and Portugal, for instance, are nationals of a Latin American country, while the largest group of non-EU citizens in Belgium are nationals of an African country.

Almost half of third-country nationals in the EU have lived in their host country for 10 years or longer – 49% EU-wide. The share is even higher in long-standing immigrant destinations like Austria, France and the Netherlands, as well as in Southern Europe. A number of countries, by contrast, are home to high shares of non-EU nationals who have arrived in the last five years. They include Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, which have seen large inflows of highly educated immigrants and where more than one-third of non-EU nationals – almost a half in Ireland – are recent arrivals. Newcomers account for considerable shares, too, in countries that have taken in significant recent inflows of humanitarian migrants and allow non-EU nationals to naturalise relatively quickly. In Sweden, for instance, 63% of non-EU nationals have arrived over the last five years. Most immigrants from a third country who have settled for 10 years have indeed already acquired the Swedish citizenship.

EU-wide, only 6% of third-country nationals were born in their country of residence. In Estonia and Latvia, by contrast, shares of host-country-born non-EU nationals are much higher. The reason is that, on independence, neither country automatically granted nationality to the offspring of residents who had immigrated during the Soviet era. As for third-country nationals in Germany, 13.5% were born there, as the country did generally not grant German nationality to native-born children of foreigners. This was changed in a reform in 1999 for children born in or after 2000.

Figure 8.3. Region of citizenship
Composition, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2017
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 StatLink http://doi.org/10.1787/888933844693

Figure 8.4. Third-country nationals by duration of stay
Total = 100, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2015-16
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 StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933844712

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.3. Employment and labour market participation

Definition

The employment rate denotes people in employment as a percentage of the population of working age, aged between 15 and 64 years old. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines an employed person as one who, in the course of the reference week, worked at least one hour or who had a job but was absent from work. The participation rate (or activity rate) denotes the economically active population (employed and unemployed) as a share of the working age population.

Coverage

Working age population, 15 to 64 years old, including those in education, unless indicated otherwise.

Third-country nationals (TCNs) in the EU are less likely to be employed than their host-country peers. Their EU-wide employment rate is 55%, compared to nationals’ 68%. The gap in labour market participation is narrower, however – two-thirds against 73.5%. Overall, 8.8 million third-country workers are employed in the EU, and 10.5 million economically active. In Finland, Sweden, Greece and longstanding immigration countries with high shares of low-educated immigrants, the employment rate among third-country nationals is particularly low. Less than 55% have a job, while their host-country peers are 1.5 times more likely to have one. Among third-country nationals, no country boasts an employment rate of 75% – the Europe 2020 employment target – and only Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden reach it among nationals. As for citizens from other EU countries, they have an employment rate of 73% and labour market participation rate of 79%, thus outperforming nationals. Indeed, eight countries reach the Europe 2020 employment target as far as EU foreigners are concerned.

Employment and labour market participation gaps between third-country and host-country nationals are now higher than ten years earlier. The employment rate fell by 4 percentage points among non-EU nationals and rose by 3 points among nationals. The trend was observable in some two-thirds of countries, and starkest in recent destinations of low-skilled labour migration. In Spain and Greece, where employment rates among host-country nationals declined by 4 and 7 percentage points respectively, they dropped by 15 and 18 points among TCNs. By contrast, in countries where the share of host-country nationals in work increased by over 5 points – such as Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic – third-country nationals are now more likely to have a job than ten years earlier.

Labour-related gaps between third-country and host-country nationals are wider among women and the highly educated. Although male third-country nationals are almost as economically active as their host-country peers, with participation of over 75% in both cases, fewer TCN have jobs – 64% versus 73% of nationals EU-wide. Non-EU women, on the other hand, are less likely to be economically active than female nationals in most EU countries (with the exception of Southern and Central Europe). Across the EU, only 55% are part of the labour market and 45% employed – respectively, 13 and 18 percentage points less than their national peers. And in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland, the shortfall exceeds 25 points for both employment and participation rates. The highly educated always have a greater chance of being in work, irrespective of nationality. However, highly educated non-EU nationals fare worse than their national peers in every EU country, with a 16-point lower employment rate in the union as a whole. Overall employment rates among low-educated third-country workers are closer to those of their host-country peers, with a gap of only 4 points. In one-third of countries, particularly those where foreign workers came to meet low-skilled labour market demand (as in Southern Europe), low-educated third-country nationals tend to be more likely to have a job than their national peers.

Figure 8.5. Employment and labour market participation rates, by citizenship
Percentages, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2017
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 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844731

Figure 8.6. Employment rates of third-country nationals, by level of education
Difference in percentage points with nationals, 15- to 64-year-olds not in education, 2015-16
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 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844750

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.4. Unemployment

Definition

The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines the unemployed as people without, but available for, work, and who have been seeking work in the course of the reference week. The unemployment rate is the percentage of unemployed people in the labour force (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals).

Coverage

The economically active population of working age (15 to 64 years old).

The unemployment rate of third-country nationals across the EU is 16.5%, against 8% among EU foreigners and 7% among host-country nationals. In total, 1.75 million third-country nationals and 765 000 EU foreigners are unemployed. In other words, over 9% of all unemployed in the EU are nationals of a non-EU country. In most EU countries, their jobless rates exceed those of their host-country peers. In Spain and Greece, the two countries with the highest unemployment rates among nationals in the EU, more than one-quarter of non-EU nationals are unemployed. This is also the case in Sweden, where many third-country nationals are recent refugees. At 15 percentage points or more, unemployment rate differences compared with nationals are particularly pronounced in Belgium, France and again Sweden. Indeed, in all Nordic countries and long-standing immigration destinations with large shares of poorly educated immigrants, third-country national unemployment rates are over twice those of nationals. The unemployment gap between nationals from other EU countries and their host-country peers is narrower, however, at less than 3 percentage points in most countries. In most Central European and Baltic countries, EU foreigners are even less affected by unemployment than nationals.

The EU-wide unemployment rates of host-country nationals and EU foreigners are back to their levels prior to the economic crisis. By contrast, the rate among third-country workers is 1.6 percentage points higher than before. In most countries, third- and host-country national unemployment rates evolved in the same direction over the 10 years that followed the crisis. In around one-third of countries, particularly in Southern Europe and Sweden, joblessness among non-EU nationals increased by at least 5 percentage points. Overall unemployment dropped in Germany, however – once again more significantly among third-country nationals. Poland was the only country where it fell markedly among nationals, but remain similar than before the crisis for third-country nationals.

Workers with little education have higher unemployment rates irrespective of their nationality. Among third-country nationals, the unemployment rate of those who are educated only to low levels reaches 23%, a full 10 percentage points higher than the rate of the highly educated. Unemployment hits poorly educated third-country nationals in the labour force particularly hard in Sweden, Spain and Belgium. Gaps between host- and third-country nationals are, however, wider among the highly than the poorly educated. In Belgium, Sweden and in all German-speaking countries, highly-educated third-country nationals are at least four times more likely to be unemployed than their national peers.

Figure 8.7. Unemployment rates, by citizenship and education
Percentages, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2017
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 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844769

Figure 8.8. How unemployment rates have evolved, by citizenship
Changes in percentage points, 15- to 64-year-olds, between 2006-07 and 2017
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 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844788

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.5. Self-employment

Definition

The self-employed are people who work in their own firms or create their own businesses, sometimes hiring employees. Self-employment includes entrepreneurs, the liberal professions, artisans, traders, and many other freelance activities.

Coverage

Population aged between 15 and 64 who are in employment, excluding the agricultural sector.

About 1 million third-country nationals (TCN) and roughly 1.1 million EU foreigners are self-employed in the EU. At 12%, the self-employment rates of third- and host-country nationals are similar, whereas they are 1 percentage point higher among EU foreigners. High proportions of TCN are self-employed in countries where numbers of immigrants are low. In some Central European countries, for example, more than 25% of third-country nationals are self-employed, double the share of nationals. They are, however, less likely to be self-employed than nationals in countries with larger numbers of immigrants, especially in those where many TCN arrived prior to the economic crisis to fill labour market needs. In Italy and Greece, for instance, more than one in five employed nationals are self-employed, but only between one in seven to one in nine third-country nationals.

In the 10 years following the economic crisis, the share of the self-employed among non-EU nationals increased by 3 percentage points, fell by 2 points among their host-country peers, and remained the same among EU foreigners. Variations relative to host-country nationals in the proportions of third-country nationals in self-employment were sharpest in the countries worst hit by the economic crisis. In Southern Europe and Ireland, for example, the share of self-employed workers among non-EU nationals rose, while falling among nationals. Self-employment among immigrants is often a strategy to avoid marginalisation in the labour market, and indeed the observed growth in these countries was partly driven by self-employed with no employees. When self-employment followed the same trend in both groups – increasing in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, for instance, and declining in Sweden, Hungary and Poland – that trend was always more pronounced among non-EU nationals.

EU-wide, over one in four self-employed third-country nationals has employees – slightly less (5 percentage points) than among host-country nationals. Most businesses are small, however, and less than 3% employ more than 10 people, while 6% of those run by nationals do. EU foreigners are the most likely to run one-person businesses, with 78% of self-employed EU foreigners operating as sole traders and only 2% employing more than 10 people. In two countries in five, third-country nationals are more likely to have employees than nationals. In Finland, for instance, almost every second business owned by third-country nationals employs at least another person, while among business owned by nationals the share is roughly one in three. In Austria, most non-EU entrepreneurs provide jobs for at least one person and 10% for more than 10. In Southern Europe, by contrast, self-employed third-country nationals are more likely to have no employees.

Figure 8.9. Self-employed workers, by citizenship
Percentages, excluding the agricultural sector, 15- to 64-year-olds in employment, 2015-16
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 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844807

Figure 8.10. The self-employed, by firm size and citizenship
Total =100, excluding agricultural sector, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2015-16
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844826

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.6. Over-qualification

Definition

The over-qualification rate is the share of the highly educated, i.e. educated to ISCED Levels 5-8 (see Indicator 8.7), who work in a job that is ISCO-classified as low- or medium-skilled, i.e. ISCO Levels 4-9 (see Indicator 3.9).

Coverage

People not in education aged 15 to 64 years old, who are in employment and highly educated (not including military occupations [ISCO 0], where data on skills levels are not referenced).

In all EU countries, highly educated non-EU nationals are more likely than their host-country peers to work in jobs for which they are over-qualified. EU-wide, 42% are over-qualified, against 22% of nationals. In the new destinations of Southern Europe, where many immigrants arrived prior to the economic crisis to do low-skilled work, over-qualification is particularly widespread, affecting at least two-thirds of highly educated third-country nationals. Against this backdrop, the gap between host-country and non-EU nationals is widest in Italy, where over-qualification is 4 times more prevalent among the latter, and in Portugal, where it is 5 times greater. In fact, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom are the only countries where non-EU nationals’ over-qualification rates are less than 10 percentage points above those of nationals.

In most countries, women are more likely than men to work in jobs for which they are over-qualified, irrespective of their nationality. Yet, the over-qualification ratio between third-country female nationals and their host-country peers is similar than that for men, around two to one.

Over the past decade, the over-qualification gap between third- and host-country nationals has dwindled, with third-country over-qualification rates falling by 7 percentage points and those of nationals increasing by 2 points. In Poland, however, as in Portugal, Ireland and the United Kingdom, third-country nationals are now more likely to be over-qualified than a decade ago. In Southern Europe and Luxembourg, by contrast, over-qualification among third-country nationals dropped drastically, while rising among nationals. It also declined among EU foreigners in almost all countries, and by 15 percentage points EU-wide.

Across the EU, third-country nationals who obtained their degree in the host country slot into jobs more in keeping with their level of education than those with foreign credentials. Nevertheless, they remain more likely to be over-qualified than nationals everywhere except Germany. A host-country degree halves the over-qualification rates of non-EU nationals in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, compared to their foreign-educated peers. In Estonia and Latvia, by contrast, where many third-country nationals are native-born Russians, as well as in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where non-EU nationals are particularly highly educated, those trained in the country fare worse than those trained abroad.

Figure 8.11. Over-qualification rates, by citizenship and gender
Percentages of highly educated, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2015-16
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 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844845

Figure 8.12. How over-qualification rates have evolved, by citizenship
Changes in percentage points of highly educated, 15- to 64-year-olds, between 2006-07 and 2015-16
picture

 StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933844864

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.7. Educational attainment

Definition

This section measures educational attainment against the International Standard Classification of Educational Degrees (ISCED). It considers three levels: i) low, no higher than lower secondary education (ISCED Levels 0-2); ii) very low, no higher than completed primary education (ISCED Levels 0-1); iii) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5-8).

Coverage

People not in education aged 15 to 64 years old.

Across the EU, third-country nationals have lower levels of educational attainment than nationals. About 6.4 million non-EU nationals are educated to a low level. That number translates into a share of 45%, almost twice that of nationals, of whom 23% went no further than lower secondary school. On the other hand, 24% of third-country nationals are highly educated – about 3.3 million individuals – a share only 5 percentage points lower than among nationals. In countries of longstanding immigration, in recent Southern European destinations, and in Latvia and Estonia, third-country nationals’ levels of educational attainment are low. Fewer than half in Italy, Spain, Greece and France have gone any further than lower-secondary school. Over half, by contrast, in Ireland and the United Kingdom have at least completed short-cycle higher education programmes, about 1.5 times as many as nationals. The poorly educated account for a four times higher share of third- than host-country nationals in Germany. In Poland and the Slovak Republic, by contrast, non-EU nationals are almost twice as likely to be highly educated than host-country nationals. As for EU foreigners, they are overrepresented at both ends of the educational attainment scale: 26% of them lie towards the bottom and 32% at the top. They are thus more often both poorly and highly educated than nationals.

As for nationals, educational attainment among third-country nationals has improved across the EU. The share of those who are highly educated has risen by 6.4 percentage points over pre-crisis levels, while that of the poorly educated has dropped 2.7 points. However, the growth in the proportion of individuals with higher education credentials was greater among third- than host-country nationals in only a third of countries. In the United Kingdom, the share of highly educated non-EU nationals almost doubled. At the other end of the scale, the poorly educated shares of non-EU populations fell most steeply, by 13 and 16 percentage points, in Slovenia and Portugal. Third-country nationals further caught up in Denmark, Germany and Slovenia, as their poorly educated shares declined more significantly than among nationals. This was also the case in Austria, albeit at the same time there was less of an increase among the highly educated non-EU nationals. In one-third of countries, by contrast, chiefly in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, the educational attainment of non-EU nationals fell further behind those of host-country nationals.

Of non-EU nationals aged 15 to 64 years old, 19% – 2.6 million individuals – are considered to have very low levels of education. In other words, they went no further than primary school. While that share has declined by 2.5 percentage points over the last decade, it remains almost 4 times as high as among nationals. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Spain, over 25% of non-EU nationals are educated to very low levels. In Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, less than 2% of third-country nationals have very low levels of education. Over the last decade, the largest falls in shares of very-low-educated third-country nationals have come in Portugal, France and Belgium, with drops as steep as 8 percentage points or more.

Figure 8.13. Low- and highly educated, by citizenship
Percentages, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2015-16
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844883

Figure 8.14. How shares of highly educated have evolved, by citizenship
Changes in percentage points, 15- to 64-year-olds, between 2006-07 and 2015-16
picture

 StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933844902

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.8. Household income

Definition

A household’s annual equivalised disposable income is the income per capita adjusted by the square root of household size. Income is expressed in euros (EUR) at constant prices (2010=100) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) for 2014. It includes earnings from labour and capital. The median income divides households into two halves: one-half receives less and the other more than the median income. One-tenth of the population has an income lower than the first decile (D1) and one-tenth higher than the ninth decile (D9).

Coverage

People aged 16 years old and over who live in ordinary housing. The household's annual equivalised income is attributed to each individual member.

Non-EU nationals have a lower annual disposable household income than nationals in virtually every EU country. EU-wide, their median income is EUR 10 500, compared to host-country nationals’ EUR 13 700 and EU foreigners’ EUR 13 800. In Benelux, Spain and Sweden, it is less than 60% of nationals’ median income. In absolute terms, it is highest in Malta and the United Kingdom at around EUR 14 500, very similar to the income of nationals in these countries.

With regard to income distribution, third-country nationals (TCN) are strongly overrepresented in the lowest household income decile. A full 24% live in such households EU-wide, while less than 4% live in a household in the highest income decile. Only in four countries are third-country nationals overrepresented in the highest income decile: the United Kingdom, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Further, only in the latter two are third-country nationals more often represented in the highest income decile than in the lowest.

In the vast majority of countries, the household top income decile is about 3 to 6 times the amount of the lowest decile, and this ratio is broadly similar among nationals and non-EU nationals. However, in Sweden, the Netherlands and Lithuania third-country nationals in the top income decile boast a household income that is at least ten times as high as the lowest income decile of their peers. This is not the case among nationals, where the respective ratios for these countries are between three and six.

Over the last decade, the median household income of third-country nationals has declined, while increasing among nationals. Across the EU, it is equivalent to about 77% of nationals’ income, compared to close to 88% prior to the economic crisis. While EU-wide the income in the top and the lowest income decile declined among TCNs, it increased among nationals, thus poor and rich TCNs tended to get poorer while poor and rich nationals got richer. However, there are considerable differences between countries. Non-EU median income levels have fallen most sharply in Southern Europe and Luxembourg but increased in some Eastern European countries. Third-country nationals are almost equally under-represented in the top income decile compared to before the economic downturn. By contrast, their over-representation in the poorest income bracket is a further 5 percentage points higher than at the onset of the crisis.

Figure 8.15. Income deciles of third-country nationals
Percentages, aged 16 and above, 2016
picture

 StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933844921

Figure 8.16. Median income, by citizenship
EUR in constant prices (based on 2014 PPP), aged 16 and above, 2016
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844940

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.9. Relative poverty

Definition

The poverty rate is the proportion of individuals living below the poverty threshold. The Eurostat definition of the poverty threshold used here is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country.

Coverage

All people aged 16 years old and over living in ordinary housing. The annual equivalised household income is attributed to each individual.

A large number of third-country nationals – 5.7 million – live in relative poverty. That number translates into a 39% share, over twice nationals’ 17% and considerably higher than EU foreigners’ 24%. In most countries, more than one-third live in poverty, rising to over half in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain. Fewer than a quarter are affected in four countries only, namely the United Kingdom and Malta, both destination countries for the highly educated, as well as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.

While non-EU nationals are 2.3 times more likely to live in poverty than their host-country peers across the EU, the widest in-country differences come in Luxembourg where non-EU nationals are over 4 times more likely than nationals to be poor. Gaps are also high in longstanding destinations like the Netherlands, Belgium and France as well as in Sweden. In Central Europe and the United Kingdom, discrepancies are narrower between host- and third-country nationals, with the latter less likely than the former to be poor only in Bulgaria.

Poverty hit non-EU nationals harder in the wake of the economic crisis. Their EU-wide poverty rate increased by over 7 percentage points, while remaining the same among nationals. In Portugal, they were over twice as likely to live in poverty 10 years after the crisis as before it. In about one-third of countries, by contrast, non-EU national poverty rates declined, most steeply in the Czech Republic, where it halved.

As for EU foreigners, their situation worsened in the 10 years after the onset of the crisis, with their EU-wide poverty rate rising 5 percentage points. Increases were steep in the Southern European countries of Spain, Greece, and Italy at over 10 percentage points. The steepest of all, however, came in Austria, where the 18-point rise doubled the share of those in poverty among EU nationals.

Figure 8.17. Relative poverty rates, by citizenship
Percentages, aged 16 and above, 2016
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844959

Figure 8.18. How relative poverty rates have evolved, by citizenship
Changes in percentage points, aged 16 and above, between 2007 and 2016
picture

 StatLink http://doi.org/10.1787/888933844978

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.10. Housing tenure

Definition

There are three main types of housing tenure: owner occupancy, tenancy, and free occupancy. In most EU member states, tenants pay rents at market rates or occupy low-rent accommodation, i.e. public social housing, employer-funded social housing, or housing where rents are capped by law.

Coverage

Households with individuals living in an ordinary residence where at least one principal occupant is aged over 15 years old.

Across the EU, less than 25% of non-EU national households own the accommodation that they occupy, compared to over 72% among nationals. As for EU nationals’, owner occupancy is at 37% and thus more widespread than among third-country nationals, and just over half the rate of nationals. In fact, the majority of nationals in every country own the property in which they live, while the opposite is true of third-country nationals in most countries. While large shares own their homes in some Central and Eastern European countries, less than a quarter do so in longstanding immigration destinations and Southern Europe. The lowest shares come in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Sweden with less than one-fifth.

In some two-thirds of countries, non-EU national households are less likely to own their homes than ten years ago. How home ownership by citizenship has evolved is attributable partly to a change in the make-up of the foreign population. In countries with large recent intakes of migrants, many may not yet have been able to save enough to buy their own homes. Accordingly, 4 percentage points fewer non-EU nationals own their homes than before the crisis EU-wide, while nationals’ home ownership rates have shown a slight increase of 2 points. The fall is very steep among immigrant households in Sweden, – 19 percentage points. Among EU foreigners, owner-occupancy rates are down 7 points on pre-crisis levels, with the largest drop of 17.5 points coming in the United Kingdom.

As the incomes of third-country nationals are generally lower than nationals’, it may be expected that they are more likely to occupy low-rent housing. In fact, the opposite is true. While 24% of host-country nationals are low-rent tenants EU-wide, only 13% of third-country nationals are. They are more likely to be so in Finland alone, while in about a quarter of countries they are just as likely as nationals. They are markedly less likely to live in low-rent accommodation in countries like Malta, Ireland and the United Kingdom, with recent high intakes of highly educated third-country nationals.

Several factors affect the lower access to housing of third-country nationals, such as their lower income and their lack of knowledge of the housing market. They may also be prone to discrimination from property owners. According to the second wave of the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II), 7% of the third-country nationals in the largest ethnic minorities stated that they had experienced discrimination in the last 12 months because of skin colour/ethnic origin or religion when trying to rent or buy housing. Perceptions of discrimination were most widespread among nationals from Africa, especially in Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg and Italy.

Figure 8.19. Rates of home ownership, by citizenship
Percentages of all households, 2016
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933844997

Figure 8.20. How home ownership rates have evolved, by citizenship
Changes in percentage points, between 2007 and 2016
picture

 StatLink http://doi.org/10.1787/888933845016

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.11. Self-reported health status

Definition

Self-reported health status denotes how people perceive their physiological and psychological health. The share of those in good health is the share of individuals who rate their health as “good” or better. As health status is strongly age-dependent, and immigrants tend to be younger in most countries, that share in immigrant populations is adjusted to estimate what outcomes would be if immigrants had the same age structure as the native-born.

Coverage

People aged 16 years and over.

Across the EU, seven out of ten foreigners – 69% of third-country nationals and 70% of EU nationals – report that they are in good health. The share is slightly above the 67% of nationals. Differences between countries are wider than between nationals and foreigners within countries. Third-country nationals feel particularly healthy in Sweden, destinations with intakes of recent highly educated immigrants (like Ireland and the United Kingdom), and in the Southern European countries. At the other end of the scale lies Germany, where less than one in two third-country nationals (and host-country nationals) claim good health.

Ten years after the crisis, fewer third-country nationals reported good health than before, albeit only by a single percentage point EU-wide. The trend was much the same among nationals. EU nationals, by contrast, felt slightly healthier – they were 2 percentage points more likely than before the crisis to rate their own health as good or better. Third-country nationals reported better health in nearly half of countries, with a particular improvement in Austria. As for the biggest drops in self-reported good health, they came in Germany and Sweden. In two-third of countries the same trend was observed among third- and host-country nationals. Not in Sweden and Luxembourg, however, where nationals reported much better health status and non-EU nationals much worse.

Differences in the self-reported health status of third- and host-country nationals may also be attributable to a number of factors not included in the analysis – e.g. gender, lifestyle or other social and economic circumstances. They may also indicate different degrees of satisfaction with health and social security systems.

Figure 8.21. Good self-reported health status, by citizenship
Percentages, aged 16 and above, 2016
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845035

Figure 8.22. How the shares of individuals in good health have evolved, by citizenship
Changes in percentage points, aged 16 and above, between 2007 and 2016
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845054

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.12. Long-term residents

Definition

A long-term resident is a third-country national who has been granted long-term residence status in accordance with Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003. The status may be granted to all non-EU citizens if they have resided legally and continuously for five years in an EU member state, have health insurance coverage, and enjoy sufficient financial resources not to have to rely on social assistance. Some countries may also have additional requirements, such as proficiency in the host-country language. Long-term residents enjoy the same rights of residence as EU nationals, particularly that of residing in an EU country other than the one where they were awarded long-term residence.

This indicator relates to the share of long-term residents among third-country nationals who live legally in the European Union. EU member countries may deliver permanent residence permits that confer more advantageous conditions than foreseen in the Directive. The collection of data on long-term residence permits includes countries’ permanent residence permits, even if they do not entitle residents to live in other EU countries.

Coverage

All third-country nationals with a valid residence permit.

An average of four TCNs in ten benefit from long-term residence status in the EU (both EU long-term resident status and national permanent status included). From country to country, however, that share varies greatly. More than 85% of third-country nationals are long-term residents in Latvia and Estonia, countries where the non-EU population was largely shaped by border changes and includes national minorities. In Sweden and France, about 75% of non-EU nationals enjoy long-term residence status. Fewer than one in two do, however, in two-thirds of countries, and only about 1 in 50 in Portugal and Finland.

The permanent residence permits granted by some countries before Directive 2003/109/EC came into effect may be more advantageous than the long-term status conferred by the directive. In countries that grant permanent residence entitlements, it is not in third-country nationals’ interest to apply for a long-term EU residence permit unless they wish to settle later on in another member state. The long-term residence data generally collected include the permanent residence permits granted by certain countries. For instance in France, Germany, Belgium and Spain, where more than half of third-country nationals enjoy long-term residence status, it is mainly under national permanent residence permits, while the share of those having EU long-term residence status is lower than 3%.

The proportion of third-country nationals with long-term residence status has increased in most countries over the past decade. However, because countries have taken different lengths of time to implement Directive 2003/109/EC and because data collection does not always include the permanent permits granted by certain countries, cross-country comparisons over time may not be meaningful.

Figure 8.23. Proportions of third-country nationals with long-term residence status
Percentages, EU long-term resident status and national permanent status included, 2016
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845073

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.13. Voter participation

Definition

Voter participation is the share of voters who report that they cast a ballot in the most recent national parliamentary election in the country of residence.

Coverage

All nationals of the country of residence aged 18 and above who are eligible to vote in national elections.

EU-wide, host-country nationals born in a third country were less likely to vote in national elections than their native-born peers between 2008 and 2016. The respective shares were 73% and 79%. Host-country nationals born in other EU countries came in between, with 76% voting in the most recent national election.

Non-EU-born voter turnout was lower not only EU-wide, but in most countries, too. The turnout gap was widest in Ireland, where non-EU-born with host-country citizenship were 26 points less likely to cast a vote than their native-born peers. In the Nordic countries, Southern Europe, Germany and the Netherlands, gaps were wide, too, at over 10 percentage points. In about half of countries, however, including most of Eastern Europe and some longstanding destinations like Austria, France and the United Kingdom, differences in non-EU-born and native-born voter participation were not significant.

As for host-country nationals born in other EU countries, though less likely to vote than their native-born peers EU-wide, there is no significant difference in turnout in half of countries. In virtually all countries, however, they are more likely to vote than non-EU-born nationals. In fact, only in Belgium and the United Kingdom do nationals born in other EU countries vote in lower proportions than non-EU-born nationals. Commonwealth citizenship may have something to do with the relatively high turnout of non-EU-born nationals in the United Kingdom. As immigrants with a nationality from the Commonwealth can take part in national elections when residing in the United Kingdom, they may be familiar with the voting system and more likely to cast their vote, including after naturalisation.

Figure 8.24. Self-reported participation in most recent election by place of birth
Percentages of population with the country’s nationality, aged 18 and above, 2008-16
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845092

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.14. Acquisition of nationality

Definition

The acquisition of nationality is the process through which immigrants become citizens of the host country in which they reside. Immigrants must have lived for a certain time in the host country before they can apply for nationality. Required durations vary according to the host country and the immigrant group. On average, most immigrants are eligible for citizenship after 10 years of residence. This section uses the term “acquisition rate” to denote the share of immigrants who have resided in the host country for at least 10 years and hold its nationality. This rate is based on EU-LFS and not administrative headcount data.

Coverage

Immigrants aged 15 years and above who have resided in the host country for at least 10 years (settled immigrants). Immigrants who acquire the nationality of the host country at birth (e.g. expatriates) are also included since they cannot be separately identified.

A majority of non-EU born – 60% EU-wide – who resided in the EU in 2015-16 have taken their host-country’s nationality after 10 years of residence. Among EU migrants, the share is lower, at 46%. Over 90% of settled non-EU migrants in Croatia, Lithuania, Sweden and the Slovak Republic became host-country citizens, while less than half did so in about one-third of countries. Rates are particularly low in Latvia, Estonia, Italy and Greece, where no more than 36% of settled non-EU born take up nationality.

In most countries, EU migrants are less likely to take up host-country nationality than non-EU migrants – partly because they already enjoy the benefits of EU citizenship. Immigrants born in another EU country are much more likely to have naturalised in member states that joined the EU and its free movement area more recently – particularly in the Czech Republic and, to a lesser extent, in Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia. This is partly linked to border changes. By contrast, no more than one in three settled EU-migrants has acquired nationality in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain or Luxembourg.

The EU-wide nationality acquisition rate has fallen substantially over the last 10 years. In three countries in five actually, immigrants from a third country were less likely to be host-country nationals 10 years after the economic crisis than at its onset. The decline was close to 9 percentage points among non-EU migrants and 13 points among those from other EU countries. By contrast, there were significant rises among both non-EU and EU migrants in Luxembourg and Portugal. In almost all countries, the rates of non-EU and EU migrants acquiring nationality followed the same trend. The only exceptions were Greece, Spain and Finland, where immigrants from other EU-28 countries became less likely to take up host-country nationality, while those from outside the EU became more likely to do so.

Figure 8.25. Acquisition of nationality, by place of birth
Percentages of settled immigrants who became host-country nationals, aged 15 and above, 2015-16
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845111

Figure 8.26. How the acquisition of nationality rate has evolved, by place of birth
Changes in percentage points, aged 15 and above, between 2006-07 and 2015-16
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845130

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

8.15. Perceived discrimination

Definition

This section considers shares of immigrants who report having experienced discrimination. In the EU, perceived discrimination among immigrants is the sentiment of belonging to a group that is discriminated against on grounds of ethnicity, nationality, or race. In Australia and Canada, perceived discrimination relates to reported personal experience of discrimination. In the United States, only work-related discrimination is covered, people who feel they have been discriminated against with regard to work over the past five years (2016 data).

Coverage

Foreigners aged 15 to 64 years old.

Close to one in five third-country nationals EU-wide feel that they belong to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. The sentiment varies widely from country to country, however. Almost 40% of non-EU nationals in Greece and more than one-third in Belgium consider that they belong to a group that has been subject to discrimination. Shares are lower in the Nordic countries, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

The sentiment is much less prevalent among EU foreigners, only 10% of whom feel part of a group that is singled out for discrimination. The incidence is particularly low in Belgium, where less than 7% of EU foreigners share that perception. By contrast, EU foreigners in Sweden and the United Kingdom feel similarly or even more discriminated against than non-EU nationals.

Fewer third-country nationals EU-wide feel discriminated against today than a decade ago. Between 2010 and 2016, a 5-point lower share than between 2002 and 2008 reported discrimination on the grounds of belonging to a particular group. Although the sense of discrimination lessened among third-country nationals in Austria and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands and Ireland, it rose to double pre-crisis levels in Belgium. As for EU foreigners, the reported incidence of discrimination remained much the same EU-wide. It rose however by about 5 percentage points in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, while declining particularly steeply in Austria and to a lesser extent in Germany.

While shares of male and female EU nationals report to be part of a discriminated group in similar proportions, non-EU national men were much more likely to do so than non-EU national women. Foreigners from North and Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia perceive greater discrimination than those born in other parts of the world – i.e. Europe, Oceania and the Americas. Discrimination seems to single out foreigners of working age (between the ages of 25 and 54), particularly those who are unemployed and regardless of whether they are EU or third-country nationals. Language, however, appears to be less of a factor in perceptions of discrimination among third-country nationals, who report broadly the same shares irrespective of whether or not their first language is the host-country’s. By contrast, EU nationals whose first language is not the one spoken in the host-country are twice as likely to feel that they belong to a group that is discriminated against as those who share a first language with host-country nationals.

Figure 8.27. Self-reported discrimination, by citizenship
Percentages, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2008-16
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845149

Figure 8.28. Self-reported discrimination, by several characteristics and citizenship
Percentages, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2012-16
picture

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845168

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

Notes and sources

Notes on Cyprus

  1. 1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

  2. 2. Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Note on Israel

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Notes on figures and tables

EU totals factor in rates that cannot be published individually because sample sizes are too small.

EU totals in figures on evolutions from Indicator 8.3 to 8.11 and 8.14 exclude Latvia.

In the EU-LFS data for Malta it is not possible to distinguish EU nationals from third-country nationals. As a result, all figure EU totals for third-country nationals based on EU-LFS data exclude Malta.

Figure 8.1: EU total (25) excludes data for Croatia, Romania and Malta for 2007 and 2017. The figure displays EU-25 4.4% (2017) and 3.8% (2007). The EU-28 share for 2017 is 4.2%.

Figure 8.3: For Spain, the region of citizenship United States, Canada and Oceania only includes data for the United States.

Figure 8.15 and Figure 8.16: Purchasing power parities (PPP) in national currencies per euro (EU=1.00), 2014.

Figure 8.21 and Figure 8.22: Adjusted rates refer to the hypothetical situation if third-country nationals had the same age distribution as nationals.

For further detailed data, see Annex A.

Table 8.1. Sources by indicator

8.1 Size and composition by age and gender

8.2 Duration of stay and regions of nationality

8.3, 8.4 Employment and labour market participation, unemployment

8.5 Self-employment

8.6, 8.7 Over-qualification, Educational attainment

8.8 – 8.11

Household income, relative poverty, housing tenure, reported health status

8.12 Long-term residents

8.13 Voter participation

8.14 Acquisition of nationality

8.15 Perceived discrimination

EU countries

Austria

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Belgium

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Bulgaria

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Croatia

Eurostat Database 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2017

EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-SILC 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Cyprus1,2

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Czech Republic

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Denmark

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Estonia

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Finland

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

AHM 2014

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS AHM 2014

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

France

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Germany

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & Mikrozensus 2016

EU-LFS 2006-07 & Mikrozensus 2016

G-SOEP 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

..

ESS 2008-16

Greece

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Hungary

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Ireland

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Italy

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Latvia

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Lithuania

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007& 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Luxembourg

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Malta

Eurostat Database 2017

Eurostat Database 2017

..

..

..

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

..

ESS 2008-16

Netherlands

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Poland

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

..

ESS 2008-16

Portugal

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Romania

Eurostat Database 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Slovak Republic

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Slovenia

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Spain

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Sweden

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

United Kingdom

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2017

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007 & 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

Non-EU countries

Iceland

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007& 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

..

..

Norway

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007& 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

..

..

Switzerland

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

Eurostat Database 2017 & EU-LFS 2015-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

EU-SILC 2007& 2016

Eurostat Database 2016

ESS 2008-16

EU-LFS 2006-07 & 2015-16

ESS 2008-16

..

..

Turkey

Eurostat Database 2007 & 2017

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

 StatLink https://doi.org/10.1787/888933845206

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