2. Women’s political participation in Colombia

2.5.1. Women’s participation in elections for local governments 2020-24

Looking ahead to elections due in 2020, women candidates registered with the electoral authorities were: for governor, 21 out of 176 candidates (11.9%); for mayor, 781 of 5 187 candidates (15%); for departmental assemblies, 1 321 of 3 583 candidates (36.8%); and for municipal councils, 35 855 of 95 487 candidates (37.5%).

As mentioned in this report, until the 2015 local elections, women’s representation in politics at a subnational level in Colombia had an increasing trend. However, recent local elections (2019) results show a decrease in the number of women elected both for major and governor positions compared to the 2015 elections. According to the (Colombian NGO Corporación Sisma Mujer, 2019[14]), the number of women elected as governors in the 2019 local elections is 60% less than those elected in the 2015 local elections, only 2 out of 32 Governors offices are currently led by women governors. At a municipal level, there is a drop of around 3% in the number of women elected as mayors in the 2019 local elections compared to those elected in 2015. An important development has been the election of the first woman mayor in Bogota. In addition, for the first time, an indigenous woman was elected as mayor for the municipality of Silvia, Cauca. According to figures provided by the Office of the Presidential Advisor for Gender Equality, 74 women were elected as deputies for all the 32 Departmental Assemblies in the 2019 while 68 were elected in 2015, showing a slight increase of women´s participation in these institutions. In the 2015 elections 1900 women were elected for Municipal Councils, whereas 2092 were elected to hold this position in the 2019 elections, also indicating an improvement. However, these numbers remain low considering the total number of elected candidates: 12063 for Municipal Councils and 418 for Departmental Assemblies.

2.6.1. Violence against women social leaders in Colombia

Violence against leaders of social movements in Colombia is on the rise, and it affects both men and women. These include threats, attacks and murder by different armed groups. This situation has worsened considerably during the past few years. Since the 2016 peace agreement between the FARC and the national government (as well as a breakdown in dialogue between ELN guerrillas and the government in 2018), new armed groups have taken control of territories previously dominated by the FARC. This helps to explain why the security situation has deteriorated for social leaders, especially for those advocating for land restitution, coca crop substitution and environmental causes (Semana, 2019[17]).

From February 2016 to August 2018, 343 social leaders were killed in Colombia, including 12 in Putumayo and 17 in Chocó (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2018[18]). Electoral campaign periods present a heightened threat to social leaders. In 2018, 40% of the murders of social leaders occurred from May to August, when campaigns and elections took place for Congress, vice president and president of the republic (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2018[18]).

Women are particularly affected: According to the figures shared by the Office of the Presidential Advisor for Gender Equality, until 2019, 6 out of 10 women candidates have been victims of violence. According to the National Ombuds Office, many of the cases took place in the departments of Cauca, Arauca, Antioquia and Norte de Santander, and around 10% in the departments of Putumayo, Caquetá, Nariño, Tolima, Casanare and Boyacá. According to women interviewed by the OECD during the Advisory Sessions in Mocoa (July 2019), this issue is of special concern, as 14 women leaders were killed in Putumayo between January and March 2019.

2.6.2. Stereotypes and other barriers to women’s equality

Gender inequalities – which often stem from deep-rooted and normative gender beliefs, such as women as primary caregivers – are also embedded in political, economic and social structures, the OECD heard during interviews in Colombia. These stereotypes may generate internal barriers for women and members of marginalised groups to participate in political life and top-level decision making, thus reinforcing existing gender roles.

Related barriers include difficult access to affordable care services and limited measures on work-life balance. For example, party meetings and other political events often run until late in the evening, discouraging women with young children from participating. Together, these barriers can reinforce the challenge of balancing work and private life. Sweden offers a good-practice example of a gender-sensitive parliament, while other OECD countries offer practical solutions for increasing women’s engagement and opportunities in political life (Box ‎2.2).

2.6.3. Barriers to women’s equality within political parties

Colombia has seen progress on the issue of funding and promoting women’s political presence: political parties are required to use 15% of their permanent subsidies for the promotion of training and research and the effective inclusion of women, ethnic minorities and young people. However, an absence of legal controls over the use of these funds to promote female leadership has weakened the impact of this measure. The funds have been allocated, for example, for the administration of party offices, the purchase of flowers and the celebration of Mother’s Day (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2016[15]).

As in many other countries, female candidates in Colombia often face challenges in receiving equitable financial backing from their political parties. Accurate information is limited about the real level of election expenses and the sources of campaign funding. An information gap on the implementation of regulations limits opportunities for oversight and accountability, and can complicate efforts to level the playing field among candidates. Former senators and political representatives recognise in interviews that investing more and better resources in training emerging female leaders, and making funding available to women during campaigns (initiatives similar to Emily’s List in the United States), could have an important impact on increasing women’s political participation (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2016[15]).

The uneven implementation of the Quota Law, and the fact that sanctions are limited for non-compliance in electoral processes, can also serve as a structural barrier for women’s political participation. There are no mandatory quotas within political parties’ internal structures. Key elements of elections – such as candidate selection procedures, financial support and career progression and promotion, all of which can have a fundamental impact on women’s advancement in public life – are often conducted outside the reach of quota regulations and other government efforts to improve gender equality in politics. Further, the OECD has assessed that there is not always a strong state institutional presence in rural and regional parts of Colombia, which can limit the implementation of policies intended to support equal access to politics and can increase the challenges faced by women in subnational elections.

2.8.1. Quota Law

The Colombian government enacted national affirmative action for gender equality primarily to improve women’s participation in public administration. The Quota Law (Law 581 of 2000) establishes the participation of women in at least 30% of the top decision-making positions in public administration.

Eleven years after the adoption of this legislation, the Electoral Reform Law (Law 1475 of 2011) introduced the Quota Law for candidacies to political bodies (city councils, assemblies and management committees). It established that political party lists for the election of five seats or more should include at least 30% of candidates of each gender. This law also sets out organisational and operational rules for political parties and electoral processes, making it mandatory to present at least 30% of women as candidates to public bodies.

The Electoral Reform Law also provides incentives for the support of women candidates. It grants political parties and movements an additional 5% funding for the election of women candidates, and also requires political parties to invest 15% of the permanent state funding they receive into research and training activities for the inclusion of women, young people and ethnic minorities in the parties’ internal bodies.

While the Quota Law led to an increase in the percentage of women elected in the last national and departmental elections, the political representation of women at all levels continues to fall markedly short of the 30% set out in the law. This points to a gap between the policy set out in the law and its implementation and enforcement in practice. A more targeted and robust commitment would help to deliver gender equality outcomes, accompanied by adequate governance systems and processes.

As for the Electoral Reform Law, if parties do not meet the required 30% of women on candidates list, the list’s inscription is revoked. The law stipulates that the statutes and regulations of political parties must include dispositions guaranteeing women’s right to equality in the inscription and selection of candidates (Article 4). Compliance and follow-up of the law’s implementation is the responsibility of the Department for Public Administration, the Inspector General and the National Ombudsman.

Spain offers an interesting example of legislation to promote gender parity in political parties. Compared to Colombia, Spain mandates a higher percentage of women candidates on party lists and imposes effective sanctions for non-compliance (Box ‎2.5).

Certain barriers prevent full realisation of the objectives of Colombia’s Quota Law. For example, fewer than half of the departments (14 out of 32) are entitled to five seats or more in the National Assembly, which reduces the possibility of reaching 30% in the electoral processes as a whole. An assessment of compliance with the Quota Law, supported by the Spanish Agency for International Co-operation (AECID), highlighted that implementation varies across the public administration. For example, public management positions are not subject to the law (UNDP, 2012[3]).

The National Electoral Council does not appear to have the mandate to exercise systematic control or review how Colombia’s political parties spend the funding received from the state. Further, application of the Quota Law is uneven in sectors that face challenges in complying with its standards at top decision-making levels. Examples include the Department of Housing (women’s representation of 12% in 2015, 18% in 2016, and 11% in 2017) and the Department of Intelligence, which reported zero women’s representation in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (DPA, 2017[8]). The two sectors with greatest women’s representation at top decision-making levels in 2017 were the Department of Public Administration and the Social Inclusion and Reconciliation Sector, while the sector with the highest representation of women at the next level of decision-making was the Sports Sector, with 67% of women’s representation in (Casas-Zamora and Falguera, 2016[24]).

The Department of Public Administration aims to systematically follow up through an annual report on compliance with the Quota Law by the executive, legislative and the judicial branches, and by other national and subnational entities. This should encourage transparency by publicising women’s representation in public office every year, both at a national and a subnational level.

Although the Quota Law does not stipulate a gender quota for party membership, some political parties have voluntarily adopted regulations for an internal gender quota. Parties like MIRA, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Alternative Democratic Pole Party and the U Party have incorporated women’s right to equality in politics into their statutes and regulations. Some, including the Green Alliance Party, the Alternative Democratic Pole Party and the Patriotic Union Party, have voluntarily adopted regulations on a gender quota inside the parties (DPA, 2017[8]).

Colombia’s electoral system does not require political parties to alternate men and women candidates on their electoral lists – a practice known as the “zipper system”, or vertical parity. This means that political parties can place women candidates at the bottom of their lists and still fulfil the 30% requirement. Research by UN Women revealed that, in the 2015 elections for departmental assemblies, most of the 1 259 women candidates were positioned at the end (40%) or in the middle (33%) of electoral lists, while 27% were placed higher (UN Women, 2016[12]).

A political and electoral reform debated in the Colombian Congress in 2018 contained measures to increase the chances for women to be elected, including elimination of the Preferential Vote and introduction of the “zipper system”. Unfortunately, according to a document provided by the CNE, this reform failed in the conciliation stage between the two chambers.

However, the Statute of Opposition (Law 1909 of 2018), which establishes the rights of opposition parties, contains dispositions that favour women, such as a gender equality principle and the right of alternation in party management positions. This law also includes an obligation to define protection measures for women candidates.

The 2015 reform of the Constitution implicitly recognises the need to reinforce the gender quota and foster women’s political participation. The reform, carried out under the Balance of Powers Reform Act (Legislative Act No. 2 of 2015), establishes three main principles: parity, requiring that 50% of the members of political participation spaces be women; universality, meaning that the Quota Law must be applied in all government institutions and ministries; and alternation, requiring political parties to list electoral candidates in alternating gender order. The regulation of this act could boost women’s political participation and opportunities for engagement.

There is scope for parliament to strengthen implementation of the parity principle through regulations. The Inspector General’s Office could follow up via better monitoring of compliance with the Quota Law and sanctions for non-compliance. To boost gender-sensitive policy making by parliament, this could potentially be championed by the Legal Commission for Women´s Equality (Comisión Legal para la Equidad de la Mujer).

2.8.2. Sanctions for non-compliance with the Quota Law

Article 4 of the Quota Law concerns compliance with the law’s provisions for women to hold at least 30% of the decision-making positions in public administration. However, the wording of the article is vague. Non-compliance by a public entity is to be sanctioned with a 30-day suspension from office, and removal from office if the conduct persists – but the article does not state precisely who is to be held liable, and this is viewed as a vacuum in the law. Some guidance has been provided by the Constitutional Court, which indicates that the person to be sanctioned is the public officer who made the non-complying appointment (Sentence C-371/2000).

The Department of Public Administration monitors implementation of Article 4, submitting its findings each year to the Inspector General’s Office, which is in charge of reporting and sanctioning non-compliant entities. However, the Quota Law does not specify which entity is to follow up on implementing the other provisions of the law, such as women’s access to professional development. This leaves a gap in terms of oversight and enforcement. There also appear to be limited mechanisms for ensuring compliance with the law in practice. This could generate a sense of impunity and discourage women from participating in politics or aiming for public office.

The High Presidential Council for Women’s Equality has emphasised the role of the Observatory for Women and Political Participation in following up on the Quota Law and informing the public about it (UNDP, 2012[3]). The observatory could benefit from increased resources and legal reinforcement for implementing additional follow-up mechanisms together with the Inspector General’s Office, the OECD was told in December 2017 by the Presidential Advisor for Gender Equality. Promoting compliance with the Quota Law – for example, by establishing active mechanisms like the campaign “More Women, More Democracy” and by encouraging the role of civil society as a systematic monitor – could help to ensure the law’s effective implementation.

2.8.3. Financing for political campaigns

Colombia has taken steps to develop a legal framework that would guarantee equitable electoral conditions, protect the rights of vulnerable populations and control the influence of campaign funding from questionable sources. In general, legal provisions have tried to catch up with changing realities on the ground within Colombia’s political context, including illegally financed campaigns (Casas-Zamora and Falguera, 2016[24]). Yet many challenges remain, especially regarding the implementation of effective sanctions and the oversight of political finance.

A study on Colombia’s upper-management decision makers by the United Nations Development Programme found that a number of ministerial-level officials are members of a “social elite group” (UNDP, 2012[3]). Campaign funding in Colombia can be private or public, and in 2014 elections for Congress, private funds represented 70% of the total cost of the campaigns (Casas-Zamora and Falguera, 2016[24]).

According to International IDEA and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, electoral candidates in Colombia enjoy fundraising opportunities if they have the support of a political group or the advantages of incumbency. Emerging female leaders can thus face more complex financial limitations than women already on the inside lane of Colombian politics (Guzmán Rodríguez and Prieto Dávil, 2014[25]).

OECD interviews and research in Colombia indicate that candidates at a subnational level, especially those on open lists, rarely find campaign funding support from their parties, partly because the parties’ financial structure is weaker in the regions (Casas-Zamora and Falguera, 2016[24]). Furthermore, OECD interviews indicate that while there are indications that political parties allocate resources according to the perceived electoral viability of individual candidates, information on the allocation of funds within political parties is limited.

Law 1475 of 2011 requires that 5% of state funding for political parties be distributed as an incentive for those that gain seats for women candidates. However, the law does not say how these resources should be spent. Furthermore, as there is a voting threshold that parties must reach in order to obtain seats and maintain their legal status (Personería Jurídica), Law 1475 of 2011 also contains incentives for parties that have gained seats in the previous election (to Congress, departmental assemblies and municipal councils).

These incentives are considerably higher than those for having women elected. For instance, parties that won more that 3% of the seats in the previous election to Congress receive 15% of state funding for the next election. This means that parties may find it more advantageous to focus on obtaining seats and votes than on guaranteeing that women are effectively elected.

This law also requires every party and political movement to allocate at least 15% of the state funding they receive to training activities for increasing political participation among women, ethnic groups and young people. However, stakeholders indicate that the parties often have difficulties distributing this percentage in fair proportions among those groups. Additionally, as parties are not required to report on the training activities, it can be challenging to oversee the use of this funding and whether it actually increases inclusiveness and gender equality. The sanction framework for non-compliance with this requirement also needs to be clarified.

Regarding the oversight of financial dispositions, only a handful of investigations were initiated by the National Electoral Council (CNE) after the 2014 legislative elections, despite low levels of compliance with campaign finance regulations by parties and candidates. This is possibly due to structural and internal barriers, which will be further discussed below.

2.8.4. Regulations on media access

Colombia’s regulations on access to the media appear to be comprehensive, granting candidates and parties access to both state-owned and private-sector media channels on radio and television during the three-month official campaign period. Moreover, media slots are allocated by ballot to secure impartiality. Yet while the law is rigorous, stakeholders reported in interviews that practices appear to be more lax in this regard, especially at the local level.

As for media access for opposition parties, the Statute of Opposition (Law 1909 of 2018) sets out their rights, such as 30 minutes each month on national and regional television and radio, and a national television slot after every presidential speech.

Law 1475 of 2011 establishes sanctions for parties that do not comply with the requirements on media access, from loss of public funding and loss of access to state-owned media to a prohibition on registering candidates. In practice, however, private media conglomerates can lower their advertising rates for specific candidates or parties, creating inequalities during campaigns.

In Colombia’s electoral system, as in many other countries, individual access to media is as important for electoral success as access to money and networks. Presidential candidates are entitled during the campaign to two minutes per day per television broadcaster (private and state-owned) and four minutes per day per radio broadcaster (private and state-owned). Additionally, candidates, parties and significant groups of citizens are entitled to free advertising on state-owned and private media for two months prior to the election (Law 1475 of 2011, Article 35).

Despite these regulations, stakeholders reported in interviews that political parties and candidates often look for private media options. The financial resources required make this option unavailable to some candidates, which can create unequal access to media for women and other underrepresented groups. There appear to be no estimates about the use of paid electoral advertising by women candidates. Research carried out by a local NGO, the Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación Electora), in the wake of the 2014 congressional and presidential elections found that women were underrepresented in the news coverage (Casas-Zamora and Falguera, 2016[24]). Paradoxically, the proportion of coverage allocated to women, including coverage of gender issues, decreased in 2014 despite implementation of Quota Law.

Colombia might benefit from strengthening implementation and monitoring measures for media regulations on political campaigning. Sweden offers a useful example in this regard. According to a Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) analysis, all candidates and all parties in Sweden “have equal opportunity of access to the national media and other means of communication.” It adds that equality among political candidates in terms of their access to media is to a large extent safeguarded by the public service rules of Swedish public television and radio (SGI, 2017[26]).

2.8.5. National gender strategies and public policies

2.9.1. Putumayo’s policy on gender equality

The Department of Putumayo’s gender policy was adopted in late 2017. It is officially titled “Public Policy on Gender Equity and Equality for Women of Putumayo: Dignity, Recognition and Territory 2017-27” (herein referred to as the Putumayo Gender Policy). Its purpose is to complement the National Policy for Gender Equality with a regional perspective (Government of Putumayo, 2017[29]). The policy describes the multiple causes of women’s low political participation and explains that they are due to a range of personal, social, political and economic factors, as well as the rules of the electoral system and the internal functioning of the political parties themselves. It defines guidelines, strategies and goals that the department should follow in order to guarantee rights for all women in Putumayo.

The Putumayo Gender Policy has eight objectives, one of which, Objective 4, relates specifically to women’s political participation. Objective 4 calls for designing initiatives that favour the training and political empowerment of women in their territories to enhance their participation in decision making and high-level positions. These initiatives should further the implementation of gender-sensitive strategic agendas and interests. Section 3.6, on women’s empowerment, outlines a strategy for “institutional strengthening, women’s empowerment and capacity building for active participation and access to power” (Government of Putumayo, 2017[29]).

The Putumayo Gender Policy serves as a development and evaluation tool for public policy and includes cross-sectoral strategies, work areas and lines of action, such as Line of Action 1: “Prevention, care and punishment of all forms of violence against women and girls.” It encourages the department to reduce gaps between men and women in an effort to overcome historical inequalities and gender stereotypes.

At the time of drafting this assessment, Putumayo was governed by a woman, and the OECD fact-finding mission in December 2017 was told that this seems to have helped foster the introduction of gender-related public policy at the departmental level, in line with the mandate of the National Development Plan. For instance, the launch of participatory budgets includes a budget line for rural women and actions for the political participation of women.

On-the-ground interviews in Mocoa suggested that the gender-balanced composition of the Putumayo Assembly also contributed to the inclusion of gender equality issues in its agenda.

Moving forward, incorporating Putumayo Gender Policy into the department’s Territorial Development Plan and allocating it with a specific budget could help to ensure its sustainability and continued prioritisation and the establishment of a robust institutional structure. To ensure a holistic response to gender-equality needs, this could be complemented by promoting spaces for dialogue and capacity building, in collaboration with women’s associations, to promote and highlight women’s inclusion and participation in the Department’s political life.

2.9.2. Chocó’s policy on gender equality

The Public Policy on Gender Equality for Women of Chocó, adopted in 2018, aims to complement the National Policy for Gender Equality with a regional perspective. Its main goal is to guarantee the rights of women in the department, acknowledging their particularities (e.g. ethnic and cultural factors), with the purpose of contributing to the elimination of inequality, discrimination, and exclusion.

Chocó’s Gender Policy has seven core topics, one related to women’s political participation and another to violence against women. For each topic there is a diagnosis of the current situation. There is no specific timeline for the policy. It is implemented by T topics a ten-year Action Plan that serves as a development and evaluation tool for public policy on gender, with guidelines, strategies, goals and timelines. It depends on the will of the governor in office effectively comply with the policy.

The objective related to violence against women proposes actions, such as workshops, to disseminate prevention measures; train and sensitises public officers in order to improve women’s’ access to justice; create shelters for women victims of violence; and design, strengthen and disseminate other pathways for women victims of violence.

Local women’s civil organisations and leaders play an important role in raising awareness about the main barriers to women’s political participation and the need for action. The direct intervention of women’s organisations in the design of public policies in Chocó is evidenced in Ordinance 013 of 2011, through which an Inter-institutional Committee to design and implement the gender policy was created (Government of Chocó, 2018[11]).

Follow-up and monitoring of implementation of Chocó’s gender policy (the Action Plan) is to be carried out by the gender mechanism within the Secretary of Integration and by the Secretary of Planning and Ethnic Development in the Governor’s Office (Government of Chocó, 2018[11]).2

2.11.1. Electoral management and oversight bodies

2.11.2. National Civil Registry

The National Civil Registry is responsible for organising and processing vote tallies and election results, and for identifying all Colombian voters by regulating the distribution of identity documentation for each citizen. Women represent 24% of the registry’s officials but hold none of the top level (DPA, 2017[8]).

To ensure that vulnerable and displaced populations, and communities at risk, are able to register, the Colombian government has run a civil registration programme over the last eight years through the National Civil Registry’s Unit for Vulnerable Populations (Opción Legal, 2013[34]).

However, the difficulty of obtaining identity documents due to the civil conflict remains an important obstacle for women’s participation in political and social movements. This is particularly the case of women from Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities and women living in rural areas, especially those affected by the armed conflict (Opción Legal, 2013[34]).

Moving forward, the CNE and the National Civil Registry could strengthen their information systems by systematically collecting, using and disseminating gender-disaggregated data. The CNE and the registry should be encouraged to record cases of violence against women candidates and others (social leaders and candidates). The National Commission for the Co-ordination and Follow-Up of Elections could report these cases through its Unit for Immediate Reception to Guarantee Electoral Transparency. The government and the CNE could consider additional oversight mechanisms, that provide field data, to complement and substantiate the results obtained through the Cuentas Claras mechanism.

2.11.3. High Presidential Council for Women’s Equality

The national institution in charge of gender policies in Colombia is the High Presidential Council for Women’s Equality (Consejeria Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer). This is a special unit located in the Office of the Presidency. The High Presidential Council for Women’s Equality promotes strategies for the advancement of equality between men and women, including:

• promoting the incorporation of a gender perspective in the formulation, management and monitoring of policies, plans and programmes in national and territorial public entities

• establishing follow-up mechanisms to comply with domestic legislation and international treaties and conventions related to women’s’ equity and gender mainstreaming.

• promoting the regulation of laws aimed at achieving equity for women.

A challenge faced by the council concerns amount of states presence at subnational levels and whether regulations at the central level can compel local levels to adopt national policies and comply with restrictions. There is scope to strengthen the structure and budget of the High Presidential Council for Women’s Equality in order to boost policy and programme delivery. While the council’s links to the Office of the Presidency gives it a solid mandate, having its own budget and strengthened human resources could increase its impact at the local level.

2.11.4. Civil society organisations working on gender equality

At the departmental level, civil society organisations (CSOs) working on gender equality and women’s’ empowerment in Putumayo and Chocó provide important support for women in public office and in popularly elected bodies. These women’s social organisations are fundamental in shining a spotlight on the social problems related to gender equality in the departments. Historically, these groups have worked mainly on political participation, human rights, development and environment. The growing dialogue between local authorities and CSOs to meet the needs of the territories is a notable achievement.

Civil grassroots organisations open the possibility of diversifying traditional political methods. One example is the Women Weavers of Life (Alianza de Mujeres Tejedoras de Vida), which, as noted above, helped to forge Putumayo’s public gender policy. AA leading social organisation of women in Putumayo, the alliance brings together more than 30 organisations throughout the department, with more than 3 000 women leaders (Alianza de Mujeres Tejedoras de Vida, n.d.[35]). By creating a strong and collective voice and opportunities for collaboration, it has become an important platform for promoting women’s rights and preventing gender-based violence. The alliance works to train local women and women’s organisations, and to bring crimes committed against women into public discussion. Its strong communication links with subnational institutions facilitate institutional responses, according to representatives of civil society interviewed by the OECD in Mocoa in December 2017.

Likewise, two major civil organisations advocating for women’s’ rights in Chocó created and developed an initiative called “Schools for Political Training” that aims to facilitate and promote women’s political participation. These organisations - the Chocó Women’s Network (Red Departamental de Mujeres Chocoanas) and the Women’s Peace Route (Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres) - have worked with the community and political parties to reinforce this initiative, according to representatives of civil society interviewed by the OECD in Quibdó in June 2019.

Community Action Boards (JACs) are strive to be the representative institutions of each community in Colombia. They are composed of residents of a determined area of the municipality who volunteer to work for the interests of the community. As non-profit social organisations, with legal capacity and independent budgets, the JACs are open to all citizens. They are therefore important in terms of women’s political participation. Although there is no information regarding the proportion of women in JACs in Mocoa or in Putumayo as a whole, the community recognises this space as educational and politically inclusive. Community Action Boards in Mocoa communicate regularly with the local authorities (i.e. Justice House) in order to meet the needs of the community.

Community Action Boards could consider taking affirmative action to motivate women’s’ participation. Strengthening the links between civil society, local governments and international institutions could help to develop a holistic regional strategy for the strengthening and legal empowerment of women’s’ associations and the implementation of gender policy.

Local governments and international organisations could also play a key role in building bridges and highlighting opportunities for partnership among the existing civil organisations. Local governments could promote the creation of interterritorial networks at a departmental level focusing on the challenge of women’s low participation in politics. Such networks would allow the exchange of experiences and good practices and the identification of priority actions, which could feed into the “More Women More Democracy” strategy. Relevant CSOs could also work on the design of proposals for changing the traditional method for funding political campaigns.

2.12.1. Public policy frameworks

2.12.2. Institutional frameworks