1. Centre of government-led functions and co-ordination capacity in Brazil

Brazil’s new vision for its centre of government reflects the current trend in which CoGs around the world have been evolving from an administrative role to a more strategic one where they support the definition and implementation of strategic policy priorities. CoGs are taking a more active role in aligning multi-department work plans to government actions. This trend is driven by the rise of multidimensional and cross-cutting issues (e.g. environmental sustainability, competitiveness, inequality, trust), which require whole-of-government responses. This calls for the development of sound capacities for co-ordination, planning, prioritisation as well as monitoring and evaluation of policy performance and strategic communication.

The government of Brazil has repeatedly expressed its interest and intention to consolidate the CoG as a strategic player to enable a whole-of-government approach to “emphasize a common strategy instead of allowing each ministry to implement its agenda separately” (Government of Brazil, 2016[1]). However, Brazil has also identified several challenges that hinder its capacity to deliver results to citizens (Government of Brazil/OECD, 2019[2]). These include: a weak co-ordination system within the CoG and between levels of government; fragmentation in the policy cycle; lack of integration between different government plans and budgetary instruments; limited ability for national strategic planning to achieve results and improvements for citizens; lack of coherent prioritisation of the government’s strategic objectives; lack of a solid performance measurement framework to support decision-making; and lack of a policy monitoring and evaluation culture, among others. There is further a need to build a stronger conceptual basis for the CoG and principles for its work to overcome limited structures and routines to drive implementation.

The government of Brazil has requested the OECD’s support for the establishment of an integrated and structured CoG in order to create safer, more reliable and favourable institutional environments for the strategic co-ordination, prioritisation, monitoring, evaluation and communication of public policies in an efficient and effective manner, aimed at delivering results to its citizens. Brazil aims to consolidate its CoG as a strategic player for the efficient and effective management of the whole of government with a focus on results for, and with, citizens. Therefore, the CoG needs to play an end-to-end role in the policy cycle and strengthen its capacity to establish a long-term strategic vision for the whole government that takes into account a cross-cutting approach, both horizontally (inter-ministerial) and with state-level or subnational entities or governments, the private sector, parliament and civil society. The government aims to develop a CoG able to: lead whole-of-government co-ordination across administrative silos; implement cross-cutting priorities; develop capacities for high-level budgetary decisions and evidence-informed policy making; and ensure coherence of the various initiatives proposed by the new government’s strategic priorities as well as those that have been set by previous governments covering multiple years.

The final sections of the review’s chapters also include a case study assessing the CoG's role in developing, coordinating and implementing the business environment reform in Brazil. The case study complements the assessment included in the five chapters of the Centre of Government Review by analysing and exemplifying the CoG’s important role in setting high-level strategic priorities for Brazil.

The chapter first describes the Brazilian CoG’s different functions, mandates and responsibilities. Second, the chapter assesses different instruments to support horizontal and vertical policy co-ordination. A third section analyses the management of transitions between outgoing and incoming governments following elections. The chapter concludes with a series of recommendations on how to establish a more integrated, efficient and strategic CoG in Brazil.

The OECD defines the CoG as the “body or group of bodies that provide direct support and advice to heads of government and the council of ministers, or cabinet” (OECD, 2018[3]). This support is increasingly oriented towards support for translating the government strategic vision into coherent policies and programmes. To this end, the CoG is expected to play a key role in ensuring evidence-based, strategic and consistent policy implementation by governments. It is also seen as critical for organising and supporting the head of government’s decision-making processes to guarantee the delivery of government priorities. The CoG performs certain cross-cutting functions (strategic management, policy co-ordination, monitoring and improving performance, managing the politics of policies, and communications and accountability) (see Figure 1.1) (OECD, 2020[4]). Other common tasks performed primarily by the CoG include taking care of the relations with parliament and communicating government messages within government and to the public (OECD, 2020[4]). While it has been argued in the past that OECD countries do not consider a legal review to be a core responsibility of the centre (OECD, 2004[5]), 78% of surveyed governments indicated in 2021 that activities around legal matters, particularly the review of the quality of legal drafting and legal conformity and the review of regulatory quality (59%) are among the key functions performed by the CoG (OECD, 2021[6]; forthcoming[7]).

However, despite certain well-defined features, the definitions of what encompasses a CoG very much depend on the set of functions that it carries out. Setting up and defining the structure of the centre also very much depends on each country’s history, political system and administrative tradition. While the range of responsibilities carried out by centres of government varies across countries, some functions are common to most such as co-ordinating the preparation of cabinet meetings and policy co-ordination across government. The centre takes almost exclusive responsibility for those functions. Whole-of-government strategic planning (see Chapter 2 for an in-depth analysis) and monitoring the implementation of government policy (see Chapter 4 for more details) are also high on the agenda across OECD countries (Figure 1.1).

The composition of the centre, therefore, also varies considerably across countries. Following an institutional or structural definition of the CoG, some countries have established a CoG comprised of a set of bodies located in a single institution attached to the head of government they serve (OECD, 2018[3]). Other countries follow a more functional approach and include several institutions and units performing core government functions outside the formal structure linked to the head of the executive (e.g. agencies or ministries performing cross-cutting functions) in their definition of the CoG (Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1990[9]).

Currently, Brazil’s centre of government is not formally defined and no policy document exists that describes a set of joint objectives and goals the CoG is supposed to accomplish in order to perform a strategic role for the whole of government. There is no shared CoG vision or narrative in terms of goals, functions and responsibilities. However, the government of Brazil has repeatedly expressed its interest and intention to consolidate the CoG as a strategic player to focus on a whole-of-government approach to “emphasize a common strategy instead of allowing each ministry to implement its agenda separately” (Government of Brazil, 2016[1]).

In Brazil, a broad array of institutions reports directly to the president of the republic (Alessandro, Lafuente and Santiso, 2013[10]). Pursuant to Art. 2 of Law No. 13.844 (from 18 June 2019) (Government of Brazil, 2019[11]) on the basic organisation of the organs of the presidency of the republic and the ministries, Brazil’s presidency comprises six different institutions: the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the President (hereafter “Casa Civil”); the Secretariat of Government; the General Secretariat; the Personal Office of the President of the Republic; the Institutional Security Cabinet; and the National Data Protection Authority (ANDP) (Government of Brazil, 2019[11]). Out of 23 government institutions with the status of ministries, 4 are currently located in the presidency, including Casa Civil, the Secretariat of Government, the General Secretariat and the Institutional Security Cabinet. Law No. 13.844 further lists five advisory bodies to the president of the republic, namely the Government Council, the National Council for Energy Policy, the Council of the Investment Partnership Program of the Presidency of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Union, the Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs and the Special Advisory Office of the President of the Republic. Articles 89-91 of the 1988 Federal Constitution also locate two consultative bodies within the presidency: the Council of the Republic and the National Defence Council.

Responses to the OECD questionnaire and interviews held during two fact-finding missions, however, show that besides the bodies of the presidency, a larger set of institutions is commonly referred to as the CoG in Brazil. Some cross-cutting functions, such as strategic planning, are performed by institutions (e.g. Ministry of Economy) that are functionally attributed to the CoG on the basis of the responsibilities they hold or share with other institutions in the centre. Following such a functional approach to the CoG, Brazil’s CoG includes units outside the formal structure of the Presidency of the Republic. Contrary to countries with a monocephalous structure, where all CoG bodies are brought together under a single institutional roof (e.g. the presidency), Brazil’s CoG includes the following ministries, secretariats and agencies that are most frequently ascribed to the centre of government:

  1. 1. Personal Cabinet of the President (Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente) – as part of the presidency.

  2. 2. Civil Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic (Casa Civil da Presidência da República, Casa Civil) – as part of the presidency.

  3. 3. Secretariat of Government of the Presidency of the Republic (Secretaria de Governo da Presidência da República, SEGOV) – as part of the presidency.

  4. 4. General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic (Secretaria Geral da Presidência da República, SG) – as part of the presidency.

  5. 5. Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (Secretaria Especial de Assuntos Estratégicos, SAE) – as part of the presidency.

  6. 6. Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, GSI) – as part of the presidency.

  7. 7. Office of the Attorney-General (Advocacia-Geral da União) – as part of the presidency.

  8. 8. Office of the Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União, CGU) – outside the presidency.

  9. 9. Ministry of Economy (Ministério da Economia) – outside the presidency.

  10. 10. Special Secretariat for Social Communication (Secretaria Especial de Comunicação Social, SECOM) – outside the presidency, under the Ministry of Communications.

  11. 11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério das Relações Exteriores) – outside the presidency.

A multiplicity of institutions performs core and cross-cutting government functions that the OECD traditionally associates with the CoG. The following institutions perform cross-cutting tasks related to classic CoG responsibilities (see Figure 1.1):

  • The Civil Cabinet of the Presidency (Casa Civil da Presidência da República, Casa Civil) plays a key role in Brazil’s CoG. Located within the presidency, the ministry directly assists the president in carrying out his/her duties, in particular regarding the co-ordination and integration of government actions with all line ministries and other branches of the state. It supports the analysis of “the merit, the opportunity and the compatibility of the [policy] proposals, including the matters under discussion in the National Congress, with government guidelines” and is in charge of the evaluation and monitoring of government action and the management of federal public administration bodies and entities (Government of Brazil, 2019[11]). Moreover, it supports the co-ordination and monitoring of ministries’ activities and the formulation of projects and public policies. The following units from Casa Civil play key CoG functions:

    • The Special Secretariat for Government Relations (Secretaria Especial de Relações Governamentais, SERG) is responsible for advising the minister on co-ordination and dialogue with line ministries and other federal entities. In addition, SERG monitors the activities of line ministries as well as the use of budgetary and financial resources for strategic projects and public policies. SERG is also the executive secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Governance Committee (Comitê Interministerial de Governança, CIG) and advises the minister of state regarding their participation in the committee. Following Article 15 of Decree No. 9.678/2019 (modified by Decree No. 10.205/2020), SERG proposes to the minister of state and the committee the adoption of governance compliance standards in line with best international practices.

    • The Undersecretariat for Analysis and Assessment of Government Policies (Subchefia de Análise e Acompanhamento de Políticas Governamentais, SAG) is tasked with co-ordinating the design of government policies to ensure that line ministry policy initiatives are consistent with the government’s overall strategic directions. This applies in particular to the area of infrastructure projects considered a priority by the president. SAG and SERG are jointly in charge of promoting dialogue with government stakeholders to implement the presidency’s priorities (Government of Brazil, 2019[13]). SAG also analyses the merit of all legal proposals and government programmes and projects and ensures that policies are affordable and fit in public sector resource planning. Responses to the OECD questionnaire show that SAG established procedures to verify that adequate costing was carried out and that a proposed item has been subject to an adequate consultation process and is linked to the government’s strategic priorities (OECD, 2021[6]). Contrary to practices in other countries, the SAG does not have the authority to return items to line ministries if the items do not meet specific criteria (OECD, 2021[6]), but it can request the proposing body to carry out an ex ante impact analysis of the proposed normative act. The undersecretariat also submits to the executive secretariat the federal government’s proposed priority legislative agenda and is in charge of monitoring its implementation (Decree No. 10.907/2021).

    • The Undersecretariat for Articulation and Monitoring (Subchefia de Articulação e Moitoramento, SAM) is responsible for monitoring the priority objectives and goals defined by the president of the republic and providing input for the formulation of the government agenda and advice on the management of crises.

  • The Secretariat of Government (SEGOV) is responsible for the relationship with various political actors. Not only is SEGOV in charge of the political negotiations with the line ministries but is also responsible for the executive’s relations with the legislature (both the National Congress and the political parties) and the judiciary. Moreover, SEGOV is the federal government’s interlocutor with subnational governments, namely with the states, the federal district and municipalities. SEGOV also co-ordinates the federal government’s dialogue with international organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs) and monitors the federal government’s partnerships with these organisations.

  • The General Secretariat (SG) is responsible for directly assisting the president in the performance of his duties, in particular with the supervision and execution of administrative duties, the monitoring of governmental action through accounting, financial and budgetary oversight of the presidency (Law No. 13.844 (Government of Brazil, 2019[11]) and Decree No. 9.982/2019). The SG functions as the gatekeeper to the president and prepares all acts to be submitted to the head of government. Consequently, the ministry elaborates messages to the legislature, co-ordinates the sanction process and veto of bills and is also in charge of the publication and preservation of official acts. The SG also assumes responsibilities for state modernisation, in particular by guiding strategic public policies and implementing policies and actions aimed at modernising the state and defining, co-ordinating, monitoring, evaluating and supervising state modernisation programmes.

  • The Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE) was transferred from the SG in February 2020 and merged with the Special Advisory Office of the president to form the new Brazilian Strategy Headquarter” in the presidency. Today, the secretariat is directly attached to the Office of the President (Decree No. 10.374/2020, 10.244/2020, revoked by Decree No. 10.554/2020) and has a twofold mandate. First, it is responsible for supporting the formulation of national strategic planning. As part of long-term national planning, the SAE also co-ordinates with society in drawing up a national development strategy, as well as for drafting projects and initiatives of strategic interest to the country through its Sub-office for Strategic Actions. Besides promoting studies on national challenges and projects, it is responsible for co-ordinating the analysis and research activities required to conceive long-term policies.

  • The Special Secretariat for Social Communication (SECOM) that was transferred in 2020 from SEGOV to the newly recreated Ministry of Communications is in charge of federal government communication and information disclosure policy (according to Provisional Measure 980/2020). Consequently, the secretariat manages the relationship between the government and the regional, national and international press. SECOM also forms the central body of the Government Communication System of the Federal Executive Branch (SICOM), which prepares annual plans and co-ordinates, supervises and develops communication and publicity actions for the executive (Decree No. 6.555/2008).

In several countries, the centre also includes units, sometimes with significant staff, whose functions lie outside the OECD definition, notably intelligence, counter-espionage and other national security-related functions (OECD, 2018[3]). This is also the case in Brazil.

  • The Ministry of Economy does not form part of the presidency and is often not included in narrow definitions of the CoG, but nonetheless performs important CoG duties related to strategic planning as well as monitoring and evaluating policies. In Brazil, the Ministry of Economy is also in charge of promoting administrative simplification and modernisation of the public administration. Following the incorporation of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management and pursuant to Article 31 of Law No. 13.844 (Government of Brazil, 2019[11]), the Ministry of Economy now represents a super-ministry that is responsible (Agência Brasil, 2018[14]), among other competencies, for budgeting (see Chapter 3), formulating national strategic planning and developing input for the formulation of long-term public policies aimed at national development. Strategic planning for the whole of government is considered a key responsibility of the CoG in over half (56%) of the OECD countries surveyed in the 2018 Centre Stage Report (OECD, 2018[3]). Almost half (46%) of OECD respondents consider strategic planning 1 of their top 4 responsibilities. For a detailed assessment of the Ministry of Economy’s role in strategic planning, please consult Chapter 2. In addition to planning, the ministry is in charge of the evaluation of the socio-economic impact of federal policies and programmes as well as the preparation, monitoring and evaluation of the multi-annual investment plan and annual budgets. They also play a key role in the co-ordination and management of the government’s institutional organisation and capacity (i.e. financial and human resources, technology, information management, logistics and administrative organisation) and are in charge of aligning institutional structures, processes and human, technological and logistical resources with government priorities.

  • As in 68% of OECD countries, the responsibility for international co-ordination and international policy issues is shared in Brazil between the centre of government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), with foreign ministries taking the lead (OECD, 2018[3]). Following Law No. 13.844 (2019), the MFA provides direct assistance to the president in matters related to foreign policy making and implementation and co-ordination with other CoG institutions in foreign policy issues. Article 45 of the law stipulates that the MFA is supposed to co-ordinate other international advisory units of CoG. This co-ordination has the purpose of avoiding overlap and gaps in the mandates of CoG units. The ministry is also in charge of institutional communication abroad. The MFA thus plays an active role in the CoG, with a focus on matters related to foreign policy and strategy, while CoG institutions also play a role. Responses to the OECD questionnaire showed that 75% of CoG institutions co-ordinate the national position in international bodies together with the MFA.

  • Pursuant to Article 10 of Law No. 13.844 (2019), the Institutional Security Cabinet “directly assists the president […] in carrying out [her/his] duties, especially with regard to military and security matters”. With the status of a ministry, the cabinet is responsible for risk assessment related to national security, in particular analysing and monitoring subjects with potential risk in order to prevent the occurrence of crises and articulate their management. It also co-ordinates federal intelligence activities, actions related to the development and protection of the Brazilian nuclear programme and the build-up of the Brazilian space programme. Another important task is to plan, co-ordinate and supervise information security activities for the federal government, including cyber security, cyber incident management, security clearance and classified information handling. The cabinet is also in charge of the protection of critical infrastructure and the prevention, inspection and repression of cross-border crimes. Finally, the cabinet is responsible for conducting matters within the competency of the National Defence Council, which is deciding on issues related to defence and national security, especially in the border zone.

  • The Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) carries out core CoG activities such as providing information to the head of government and other ministers through evaluations performed in the scope of internal control activities. These evaluations, selected based on risk analyses and relevant evidence, support government actions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public policies, in addition to improving public management for delivering greater added value to citizens. The concluded evaluations, after a joint search for solutions, are shared with public managers responsible for adopting corrective measures.

In comparison to past compositions of the CoG in Brazil, there are currently no sectoral and thematic secretariats (e.g. on human rights, women’s rights, aquaculture and fisheries, promotion of racial equality) located in the presidency. Nevertheless, the great number of different CoG institutions, including four that have the status of a ministry, require a clear definition of responsibilities and mandates in order to create an agile structure oriented toward performing CoG functions more effectively and efficiently, benefitting the whole of government. This is particularly important since recent changes to ministries and secretariat structures and functions (such as the move of the Special Secretariat for Social Communication) have affected the CoG’s composition and distribution of responsibilities in the centre.

A mapping of the different CoG institutions’ responsibilities (see Table 1.1) shows that certain functions are performed by two or more bodies. Discussions with stakeholders during the OECD fact-finding missions suggested uncertainty regarding the mandates of the multiplicity of entities in the CoG and a perceived lack of overall management of some key processes that led to a reported wasted time and effort. This raises not only the question of effectiveness but also increases opportunity costs from a line ministry perspective. Existing overlaps make it also harder to identify gaps in mandates. A multiplicity of separate institutions thus not only increases the need for co-ordination but also requires a functional review of the different entities forming the loosely defined centre. An analysis of all of the existing institutions can help ensure their mandates are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive – and define the value proposition of each. The result could be a simplified framework for thinking about the CoG’s organisational architecture. Streamlining certain functions and assigning them to single institutions could in addition further help reduce institutional fragmentation both as an end in itself and as a means to identify mandate gaps and reduce mandate overlap/duplication.

While Casa Civil’s improved functioning was positively highlighted during the two fact-finding missions, participants also stressed that even greater levels of integration between the different CoG units and a further strengthened role of Casa Civil are needed to ensure effective co-ordination not only between the CoG and the other ministries but also within the CoG itself. Line ministries recognise Casa Civil’s role and importance, but they also reported having difficulties with identifying the right points of contact to overcome implementation barriers or to solve disputes between line ministries.

The OECD questionnaire also showed that the different CoG entities do not always co-ordinate among themselves and internally consolidate comments on line ministry policy proposals submitted to the government for decision (OECD, 2021[6]). In the policy- and law-making process, the General Secretariat (SG) plays an important role as it verifies the constitutionality and legality of all legal acts sent to the chief executive. While Casa Civil’s Undersecretariat for Analysis and Assessment of Government Policies (SAG) analyses the merit of all legal proposals and decrees, the SG Department of Legal Affairs (SAJ) works directly with the legal units in line ministries and follows all stages a policy passes to ensure that the quality of legal drafting is satisfactory, the procedures of preparation are respected and legal conformity and compliance with federal laws and regulations of all draft acts is guaranteed. In line with Brazil’s practice, legal units that provide technical advice to the head of government on legal matters exist in most OECD countries, often as part of the CoG. A 2021 CoG survey showed that at least 12 OECD countries have a centralised body tasked with providing legal services to public entities (OECD, 2021[6]). While the legal conformity check was originally located in the Casa Civil Executive Office, the separation of these two important functions into two institutions requires close co-ordination and communication between the SAG and SG that is led by Casa Civil. The separation of the technical from the content review also implies that line ministries need to interface with many different CoG institutions in landing a proposition considered by the head of government, which raises the opportunity costs of time and effort for line ministries.

While the distribution of CoG functions between various institutions allows for greater specialisation, a less centralised structure also constitutes a risk of fragmentation. This is particularly true in Brazil, where governments are formed by coalitions and the different parties that are represented in government politically appoint the heads of institutions.

  • During the OECD’s fact-finding missions, it was reported that the Secretariat of Government (SEGOV)’s central role in the political articulation process has led to disagreement with line ministries in the past. In order to avoid a multiplicity of different government positions, recognition of SEGOV’s central position is important to ensure that the government speaks to Congress, the judiciary, subnational governments, international organisations and CSOs with a single voice. In particular, with regard to the executive’s relations with the legislature, SEGOV’s role as primary interlocutor should be promoted. Even though the SG also elaborates messages to the legislature and co-ordinates the sanction process and veto of bills, SEGOV should be seen as the first contact point in the CoG. Casa Civil, the SG and Ministry of Economy only assume auxiliary functions. The same applies to co-ordination with subnational governments.

The institutional fragmentation of the CoG in Brazil inside and outside the presidency as well as frequent institutional changes within the centre have led to considerable overlap and duplication in the roles and responsibilities of the CoG’s various units.

  • Implementation of priority programmes: Close co-ordination between SAE, SAM and the Undersecretariat for Analysis and Assessment of Government Policies (SAG) is needed for the implementation of the president’s priority programmes. Following an internal report on the CoG provided by the government of Brazil (2019[13]), there are not only three institutions tasked with the co-ordination of the implementation but a great number of entities, including SERG, the SG Department of Legal Affairs (SAJ), the Ministry of Economy, the Office of the Comptroller General and the Secretariat of Government, which are contributing to the process. Moreover, pursuant to Article 12 of Decree No. 9.678/2019 (with the wording given by Decree No. 9.979/2019 and Decree No. 10.372/2020), SAG shall promote the co-ordination of the federal government together with the Undersecretariat for Articulation and Monitoring (SAM). Institutional responsibilities for the co-ordination of the implementation of priority programmes must be clearly defined and communicated. Brazil may therefore consider anchoring the responsibility for the co-ordination of the implementation of priority programmes within a single institutional entity in the presidency to achieve the results set by the head of the executive branch.

  • The OECD finds two significant overlaps between presidency bodies and the Ministry of Economy.

    • Strategic planning: During the OECD fact-finding missions and in response to the questionnaire, several entities pointed to legal overlaps and duplication of competencies in relation to the strategic and long-term planning of government actions, between the Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE) and the Ministry of Economy (see Chapter 2). The SAE is in charge of planning and formulating long-term national policies and strategies, while the Ministry of Economy is also legally responsible for the elaboration of input for the formulation of long-term public policies aimed at national development. Moreover, the existing long-term strategy was produced by Casa Civil, the Ministry of Economy and the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, IPEA). As part of long-term national planning, the SAE is also co-ordinating with the public and CSOs in drawing up a national development strategy, as well as drafting projects and initiatives of strategic interest to the country through its Sub-office for Strategic Actions. Besides promoting studies on national challenges and projects, it is supposed to co-ordinate the analysis and research activities needed in order to conceive long-term policies. In addition, the SAE was put in charge of liaising with international organisations and preparing the president’s meetings and correspondence with foreign authorities. In co-ordination with other agencies, the SAE also participates in the planning, preparation and execution of the president’s international trips and helps process the presidency’s diplomatic proposals and matters. In order to accomplish its mandate, it is necessary to avoid legal overlaps and duplication of competencies in relation to the strategic and long-term planning of government actions with the Ministry of Economy, in particular because the SAE’s main role is to co-ordinate long-term planning activities aimed at bringing the country’s strategic vision to fruition. The SAE will also have to attain effective co-ordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and with other constituent units of the CoG such as Casa Civil, which is responsible for the formulation of the strategic agenda, co-ordination and articulation of government priorities.

    • State modernisation: With regard to the responsibility for actions aimed at modernising the state, close co-operation between the SG and Ministry of Economy is important. While the ministry is in charge of promoting the modernisation of the state, for instance through the work of the System of Organization and Institutional Innovation of the Federal Government (SIORG) and the Special Secretariat for Debureaucratization, Management and Digital Government (Secretaria Especial de Desburocratização, Gestão e Governo Digital do Ministério da Economia, SEDGG/ME), the SG is in charge of regulating the modernisation efforts. The General Secretariat (SG) proposes co-operation models for modernising and strengthening the public sector among entities outside of government, promotes partnerships with non-government entities to facilitate modernisation efforts, manages modernisation plans and programmes, and disseminates modernisation solutions for public management. Even though the activities of the presidency’s bodies are focused on the establishment of general guidelines for co-operation, while the Ministry of Economy is focused on the operationalisation of these general guidelines, the government should assess both institutions’ responsibility for state modernisation to avoid conflicts and duplication of work. Moreover, close co-ordination between the two is essential.

The lack of a proper assessment of functions and responsibilities as well as fragmentation can often lead to mandate overlap and duplication, as identified for strategic planning and state modernisation above, but also in areas such as international relations and relations with stakeholders beyond the executive. The fragmented structure of the CoG thus requires clearer defined mandates with detailed value propositions and a focus on results. Despite the many institutional changes in recent years and the resulting challenges, Brazil has not carried out a functional review of the different institutions in recent years. The government may thus consider conducting a review with a detailed mapping of the current functions of the CoG to identify mandate gaps and reduce mandate overlap and duplication. Following the example of Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (UK), the government could combine this functional review with an assessment of the overall institutional capability of CoG institutions (Brown, Kohli and Mignotte, 2021[16]). Following this review, it is also important to broadly communicate the centre’s structure, mechanisms and activities across the government to raise awareness. Brazil may also consider revising Law No. 13.844/2019 to enshrine the competencies of the different constituent entities of the CoG in primary law to create legal clarity and legitimacy for all institutions.

In addition to the functional review, creating a shared vision and narrative may help create a more strategic CoG in Brazil. To help define the CoG’s purpose as the efficient and effective manager of the whole of government with a focus on results for, and with, citizens, the government should consider establishing a performance framework that describes the set of cross-agency joint goals and priority outcomes the CoG is working to accomplish. The policy document should present how the government seeks to accomplish these objectives and include clear responsibilities for individual institutions. An example of a performance framework in a federal OECD member country is the United States (US) Federal Performance Framework (see Box 1.1) that presents an integrated overview of the government as a whole and could serve as inspiration for a CoG-focused performance framework in Brazil. Another interesting example at the subnational level is the Scottish National Performance Framework. Following these examples, Brazil could publish on line an integrated overview of CoG institutions’ strategic goals and objectives and make information available regarding the progress in achieving these priorities. In order to allow for progressive change, piloting the performance framework first with a smaller sample of institutions could help to find the right approach and generate the necessary support across the CoG.

Setting up performance management processes and working routines to focus on performance delivery and review progress on the CoG’s goals could further help Brazil ensure a focus on managing for results. The government of Brazil could, for instance, consider the following three non-sequential routines (Moynihan and Kroll, 2016[17]):

  • Goal co-ordination: The government could define cross-cutting goals and the respective institutions’ contributions (see Chapter 2 on strategic planning and prioritisation).

  • Goal clarification: A plethora of different goals may further erode clarity and reduce the CoG’s focus. A potential routine to be introduced is the definition of a small number of goals that are backed by high-level political support (see Chapter 2 on strategic planning and prioritisation).

  • Data-driven review: Limited performance review due to the unmanageable amount of data can be overcome by establishing a routine of regular data-driven reviews of performance information, potentially with the involvement of different institutions (see Chapter 4 on monitoring and evaluation).

Evidence collected through the OECD’s questionnaire and during the two fact-finding missions shows that limited capacity, in particular a lack of human resources, is seen as a major challenge for further improving the CoG’s operations (OECD, 2021[6]). Officials’ skillsets for planning, co-ordination and prioritisation are important factors for improving the effectiveness of the CoG and its strategic role. Human resources management should be made a strategic priority. It was further highlighted that the high frequency of staff turnover, especially of staff in key areas, has led to a loss of important knowledge of institutional processes, methods and information.

In line with Principle 12 of the OECD Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability (PSLC) (OECD, 2019[20]), Brazil could adjust the conditions for intra-CoG workforce mobility and adaptability, by enabling and encouraging short- and medium-term assignments of staff in different CoG institutions. These assignments could foster learning and exchange of information, promote co-ordination between different CoG entities and occasionally meet short-term labour demands. However, the design of the career system acts as a strong barrier to promoting mobility. Careers are often siloed and prevent people from applying to other public entities or institutions, moving temporarily to new assignments and posts or even moving internally within the entity. An additional factor impeding mobility is the lack of transversal job requirements in the majority of careers, making the identification of suitable opportunities difficult. In line with the OECD Public Service Leadership and Capability Review of Brazil (forthcoming[21]), Brazil may consider exploring options to create more transversal careers including provisions on mobility and allowing for more permeability across careers overall. An example of a workforce mobility programme is the White House Leadership Development Program (Box 1.2), which rotates 15-20 high-performing line ministry officials into the White House to work on cross-cutting issues and provide leadership development training. Similarly, the UK Civil Service Fast Stream programme could serve as inspiration for designing an entry position workforce mobility programme in Brazil.

Perhaps one of the most critical roles of the CoG is its work in the co-ordination of government processes. Experiences in OECD countries have shown that the process of increasing co-ordination and strategic capacities across government is a long-term endeavour. Moreover, it is confronted with certain challenges, notably the resistance of line ministries in aligning their own programmes and initiatives with high-level government priorities if this means modifying or delaying decision-making on issues falling under their purview (OECD, 2018[24]). In addition to a lack of whole-of-government consensus, personal incentives for individual ministers may also prove to be an obstacle to horizontal co-ordination. Nevertheless, co-ordination between the CoG and line ministries and other institutions is imperative and driven by functionality to establish more effective co-ordination for better policy design and planning, and for better engagement with stakeholders to implement and evaluate complex strategies. One can distinguish between co-ordination across CoG units, for instance effective planning (see Chapter 2 on planning and prioritisation) or integrating budget and strategy effectively (see Chapter 3 on budgetary governance), and co-ordination between the CoG and line ministries as well as other public entities, for instance for the design, implementation and evaluation of a whole-of-government strategy. The OECD identifies eight different dimensions of co-ordination that are linked to typical functions of CoGs in OECD countries (OECD, 2004[25]):

  1. 1. Co-ordination of organisational arrangements for the cabinet and ministerial committees.

  2. 2. Co-ordination of the policy content of proposals for the cabinet.

  3. 3. Co-ordination of legal conformity.

  4. 4. Co-ordination of the preparation of government programmes and priorities, and their linkage to the budget.

  5. 5. Co-ordination of communications.

  6. 6. Co-ordination of the monitoring of government performance.

  7. 7. Co-ordination of relations with the parliament.

  8. 8. Co-ordination of specific horizontal strategic priorities.

The existence of numerous CoG institutions in Brazil and their exercise of shared responsibilities require functional co-ordination instruments for high-level policy discussion and decision-making, for instance for effective planning or integrating budget and strategy effectively. Improved co-ordination between the CoG’s units can also help to avoid overlapping activities between institutions and allows the CoG to speak with one voice. Governments have developed different co-ordination approaches to ensure effective horizontal co-ordination between the CoG and different line ministries and agencies. They have a range of instruments at their disposal for improving co-ordination. They include cabinet meetings, cross-departmental meetings, permanent or temporary working groups and committees of both ministers and public officials. Each of these mechanisms may involve exchanges between two institutions or a greater number of actors within the government. These instruments may help governments improve co-ordination across institutional boundaries; however, their establishment is no guarantee for more co-ordinated policy and law-making. The simple creation of co-ordination mechanisms is unlikely to solve the issue of limited co-ordination but may in fact compound it. Instead, the need for co-ordination, indeed the imperative requiring greater co-ordination, should be driven by functionality. Co-ordination is not an end in itself; instead, it is a necessary condition for better policy design, improved planning, better engagement with stakeholders to implement and evaluate complex strategies.

Figure 1.3 presents the various institutional mechanisms used by CoG institutions in Brazil to ensure policy co-ordination with line ministries and agencies. Cabinet meetings are one of the two most common co-ordination instruments used by CoG institutions. A large majority (88% of questionnaire respondents) reported the use of cabinet meetings for co-ordination. Across the OECD, regular cabinet meetings are also the main institutional instruments used by the CoG to ensure policy co-ordination (OECD, 2018[3]).

In most OECD countries, more or less regular cabinet meetings are the principal forum for policy deliberation and decision-making (OECD, 2018[3]). In presidential systems, bilateral meetings with key ministers or advisors tend to be more common. Most systems also involve committees of ministers, state secretaries and advisors to prepare and transmit advice to the cabinet or the head of government. The centre plays an important role in preparing these meetings to verify the quality of advice and supporting information, help resolve disputes and ensure that any required procedures (for example consultation, regulatory impact analysis, articulation of financial and legal implications) are followed.

Permanent inter-ministerial committees or councils are an equally important co-ordination instrument by CoG institutions in Brazil. As Figure 1.3 shows, 88% of the questionnaire respondents report the use of this instrument for co-ordination. Inter-ministerial committees may not focus on a broad policy area (economic, social, environmental) but rather on a specific issue or problem. These committees or councils are often facilitated by CoG staff to co-ordinate across policy areas and institutional boundaries.

The frequent use of this instrument is in line with OECD practice. The 2017 Survey on the Organisation and Functions of the Centre of Government (OECD, 2018[3]) found that the CoG in OECD countries is also highly involved in organising cross-government policy co-ordination committees, including at the ministerial level. More than three-quarters (78%) of respondents reported organising meetings of ministers, confirming the CoG’s close proximity to and involvement with the wider executive.

The establishment of permanent committees or councils does not of course guarantee seamless co-ordination, in particular for policy issues that pertain to the area of competency of more than one ministry, and always depends on the active support of the participants. However, their use as an instrument for horizontal co-ordination can help resolve differences at the technical levels and reduce the number of arbitration instances between institutions by the head of government.

In Brazil, two different levels of inter-ministerial committees were first established by President Cardoso (Costa Cavalcante and de Ávila Gomide, 2018[26]). Conflicts between different line ministries not resolved by lower technical level committees were passed to higher inter-ministerial committees and councils, comprised of ministers and co-ordinated by the Head of Casa Civil (a position that can be compared to a chief of staff to the president) (Costa Cavalcante and de Ávila Gomide, 2018[26]). In the case that differences between departments were not resolved by the ministers, the president is expected to arbitrate (Gaetani, 2011[27]). Such a system allows for the effective resolution of conflicts, while it also limits situations of groupthink, where high-level involvement may lead to consensus decisions without critical consideration of diverging opinions (Janis, 1972[28]).

Three permanent committees play a particularly important role in whole-of-government co-ordination: the Government Council, the Interministerial Governance Committee and the Budget Execution Board. The activities of all three are facilitated by CoG staff. This is in line with the approach taken by OECD countries, for instance Costa Rica and Spain.

  • The Government Council (Conselho de Governo) has great importance for whole-of-government co-ordination. As an advisory body to the president (Law No. 13.844/2019) for the formulation of guidelines for government action, it is chaired by the president of the republic or by a replacement and is composed of the vice-president as well as all CoG and line ministry ministers. Even though the council gathers less frequently than in the past (previously weekly), meetings are held on a regular basis once per month. Following the approach of two-level co-ordination, the council is complemented by different sectoral chambers, which are created with the purpose of formulating sectoral policies whose scope exceeds the competency of more than one ministry. While the success of the council and the subordinated chambers always depend on political will and support, they can function as important fora for the definition of priorities and co-ordinated policy making. They should therefore meet with some frequency to discuss relevant themes and necessary measures.

  • The Inter-ministerial Governance Committee (Comite Interministerial de Governança, CIG), established by Decree No. 9.203/2017 (amended by Decree No. 9.901/2019), is responsible for advising the president on matters of public governance. Under the co-ordination of Casa Civil with the Special Secretariat for Government Relations (SERG) as the committee’s executive secretariat, CIG brings together the ministers or executive secretaries of the Ministry of Economy and the Office of the Comptroller General. Representatives of other bodies and entities of the federal public administration may be invited to participate in CIG meetings, without the right to vote. Following its quarterly meetings, CIG proposes organisational measures, mechanisms and practices to comply with principles and guidelines of public governance set out in Decree No. 9.203/2017 and approves recommendations to other bodies to ensure coherence and co-ordination of specific governance programmes and policies. The committee also approves manuals and guides on public governance for the entire administration and promotes and monitors the application of best practices. For planning purposes, CIG also represents the link between the Ministry of Economy and Casa Civil, however, the identification and monitoring of priorities remain ambiguous (see Chapter 4).

  • The Budget Execution Board (Junta de Execução Orçamentária, JEO) (see Chapter 3 for more information) was established in 2019 as a direct advisory body to the president for the conduct of the country’s fiscal policy (Decree No. 9.884/2019). The Ministry of Economy assumes the function of the executive secretariat of the board. As shown in Chapter 3, co-ordination between the CoG and the Ministry of Economy becomes particularly relevant for budgetary and financial management. The board serves as a forum for co-ordination between the Ministry of Economy and Casa Civil for the allocation of public resources. During its meetings, Casa Civil represents the interests of line ministries. The board is supported by the subordinate Technical Committee for Budget and Financial Management composed of the Federal Budget Secretary of the Special Secretariat of Finance of the Ministry of Economy, the Secretary of the National Treasury of the Special Secretariat of Finance of the Ministry of Economy, the Secretary of Economic Policy of the Special Secretariat of Finance of the Ministry of Economy, the Special Secretary of the Federal Revenue of Brazil, the Deputy Head of Government Action of Casa Civil; the Deputy Head of Co-ordination of Monitoring of Casa Civil, the Executive Secretary of Casa Civil, the Executive Secretary of the Government Secretariat and the Special Secretary for Government Relations of Casa Civil.

While these permanent committees or councils may contribute to the clarification of responsibilities and help administrative barriers, the OECD’s fact-finding missions revealed that representatives from different ministries sometimes do not have a shared understanding of priorities, joint projects are rare and the alignment of policies with the budget could be improved. Moreover, due to the number of co-ordination instruments, civil servants may lose track of their ministry’s involvement. The simple establishment of new co-ordination instruments will not automatically lead to improved levels of co-ordination. The government of Brazil should also ensure that permanent councils and committees are equipped with the necessary political support to fulfil their functions.

Interviews held during the OECD’s fact-finding missions showed that not all CoG constituent bodies are fully aware of Inter-ministerial Governance Committee (CIG) functions and responsibilities. To further foster the three constituent institutions’ co-ordination on matters of public governance and overcome reported challenges, Brazil could consider convening CIG on a more frequent basis or allow staff at the technical level to meet in preparation of the more high-level CIG meetings. With the aim of supporting CIG in the fulfilment of its functions, two subordinate working groups on infrastructure and CoG were created in 2019 and 2020. The Centre of Government Working Group that is comprised of representatives of Casa Civil, the Ministry of Economy and the Office of the Comptroller General assist CIG with identifying measures necessary to improve the governance of the CoG and contribute to the assessment of the CoG’s functioning and decision-making, in order to guarantee an integrated and structured action. The government should regularly assess the need for additional working groups to support CIG’s work in other thematic areas.

Another often used co-ordination instrument of CoG institutions is working groups. A total of 63% of the CoG respondents to the OECD questionnaire resort to working groups to deal with policy co-ordination with line ministries and agencies (Figure 1.3). Working groups are most commonly established by different institutions through laws, decrees or other normative acts to focus on particular issues or problems, sometimes with concrete deadlines for the development of studies or solutions to challenges. They are usually comprised of several different ministries and institutions. To facilitate their work, task forces often establish protocols and procedures to exchange information and documents. Often, a lead person or institution, responsible for oversight and facilitating operations, chairs the working group or task force. The chair regularly prepares the agenda, ensures cohesion among the different participating units/institutions and is in charge of implementing the working group’s decisions. The appointed chair should also be involved in the planning and implementation of the budget and multi-annual financial plan within the scope of the working group’s entrusted tasks. Despite, its composition and mandate, the success of the chairperson and the working group is in practice also subject to the political support they receive. It is thus crucial that they have political backing and enjoy respective decision-making authority within their respective scope of tasks. Moreover, working groups need to be provided with adequate financial resources, personnel, expertise and technical support to co-ordinate policy making. It is therefore important that the head or chair of the working group communicate their human and financial needs. They could further be involved in the planning of the budget and multi-annual financial plan within the scope of their entrusted tasks.

In order to systematically assess the use and effectiveness of the great number of existing councils, committees and working groups, the current government has initiated a review process. This effort resulted in the dissolution of several working groups and committees not created by and detailed in primary legislation that was found to be superfluous (Decree No. 9.759/2019). Through the same decree, the government further established new guidelines for the creation and functioning of councils, working groups and committees. While around 700 different bodies were affected by the decree, those bodies established by decree or other inferior norms were continued if the public authority in charge was able to justify their existence to Casa Civil. At the moment of publication, it was unclear how many bodies were dissolved as the government has not published a detailed list. A register of councils, committees and working groups each public institution presides over, co-ordinates or is participating in is scheduled to be published on the respective institution’s website in the future. This list is supposed to be updated on a monthly basis to decide which committees work well, which have overlap and where bottlenecks exist.

Decree No. 9.759 faces several challenges (OECD, forthcoming[29]). The decree was sanctioned by the Federal Supreme Tribunal (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF), citing that the executive cannot close instances created by the legislative and that is based on the constitution (Agência Brasil, 2019[30]). STF judges also criticised too vague a list of bodies to be dissolved, which can create a legal vacuum. This legal uncertainty pushed public institutions to issue new norms, contributing to the proliferation of legislation and supporting fragmentation. Several stakeholders from academia and civil society also raised concerns, highlighting that the decree further limits the possibilities for participation, in particular regarding the national policy councils (Teixeira, de Paiva Bezerra and Kunrath Silva, 2019[31]). Research presented in the OECD Open Government Review of Brazil (forthcoming[29]) has shown that Decree No. 9.7559 also affected the quality of participation in the councils, committees and working groups, both in terms of representation and inclusion. The extinction of spaces for participation without the creation of other mechanisms for stakeholders to be involved in policy making reduces the space for dialogue, decreases transparency and accountability and can affect trust and confidence in public decision-making (OECD, forthcoming[29]).

In line with the recommendation of the forthcoming Open Government Review of Brazil (forthcoming[29]), the government may consider adopting a consultation-based approach to reviewing councils, committees and working groups and update Decree No. 9.759 in a way to ensure that all remaining bodies are efficient, representative and inclusive (OECD, forthcoming[29]). At the time of publication, Brazil had not yet published the entire list of bodies affected by Decree No. 9.759. Besides the overview provided on individual institutions’ websites, a register of all existing co-ordination bodies is not accessible to the public. To enhance transparency and facilitate stakeholder information, the government could thus consider publishing the entire register of on a single government website. In addition to the composition and legal basis of each body, the register should also list the goals and objectives of all councils, committees and working groups.

In addition to working groups, 63% of the surveyed CoG institutions also reported the use of cross-departmental co-ordination meetings (between the secretaries or political advisors of ministers). While most co-ordination mechanisms depend upon a certain degree of formality and regularity, the interaction of senior officials or technical staff is often not directly perceived as a co-ordination mechanism due to its informal character and the minimal transaction costs that it generates. However, in particular to discuss technical details and resolve technical issues between a small number of institutions, the adoption of such informal arrangements can also positively affect co-ordination. Nevertheless, the prospects for forging co-ordination through informal cross-departmental meetings can be expected to vary according to the involved individuals and might consequently depend on participants’ personalities, knowledge and interpersonal relations.

While cabinet meetings, standing committees, working groups and cross-departmental co-ordination meetings were considered the main institutional instrument used by the CoG for ensuring policy co-ordination, responses to the OECD questionnaire confirmed that ad hoc meetings of public officials are also an important institutional venue for co-ordination and for working through differences or conflicts in substance or territory. One-third of respondents (38%) said they use ad hoc meetings to ensure horizontal policy co-ordination with line ministries and agencies. These meetings offer an opportunity for officials to develop a shared understanding of each other’s work and the issue at hand.

The transversal nature of policy co-ordination and need to involve different stakeholders necessitates institutional arrangements. OECD member country experience shows that an adequate institutional architecture can facilitate effective and efficient horizontal and vertical co-ordination. To ensure that the responsibilities of different government institutions for intra-governmental co-ordination are clear, governments across the OECD have started to establish formal mandates. Often, the roles, tasks and duties for co-ordination are enshrined in legal mandates to provide institutions with the necessary power to focus on co-ordination across administrative units and policy sectors. Having the responsibility for co-ordination codified in a decree or legislation creates legal certainty and legitimacy in relation to other actors and may raise awareness of the importance of co-ordination. Providing public officials with a strong mandate can thus help ensure effective co-ordination. Against this background, the OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development calls for the establishment of clear mandates to ensure whole-of-government co-ordination for sustainable development in order to “identify and mitigate divergences between sectoral priorities and policies, and promote mutually supporting actions across sectors and institutions” (OECD, 2019[32]).

While a formal mandate based on decrees or laws can help to establish responsibilities for co-ordination, policy documents including written guidance can raise awareness of the importance of horizontal co-ordination and may offer advice to public officials that are tasked with co-ordination. They can provide guidance and clarity, highlight good practices and objectives that a particular institution seeks to meet. Examples of such policy documents with guidance include written rules, instruction manuals or guidelines on procedures. While guidance can be enshrined in separate policy documents, it can also be incorporated into strategic plans. Reference to co-ordination in development strategies can help to raise public officials’ awareness of the benefits of co-ordination as a catalyst to implement the CoG unit’s strategic policy objectives.

Only 38% of the responding CoG institutions use written guidance as an instrument to improve horizontal co-ordination in Brazil. Figure 1.4 shows that Brazil’s CoG units currently provide guidance on the drafting of legal acts and legal conformity (83%). The existence of guidance on the conduct of public consultations and the evaluation of policy proposals was also reported by a majority of the surveyed CoG entities. However, only half of the surveyed institutions report the existence of guidance on the co-ordination across different sectors and administrative units. For those units and institutions using written guidance, it is important that they constantly review the use of their documents to assess the extent to which they are working.

Managing relations with constituent governments to co-ordinate policy is of great importance for the CoG in federal states, where sovereignty is shared between the federal level and subnational governments (OECD, 2018[3]). In federal systems, the state-level subnational governments are autonomous in certain policy areas but often share competencies with the federal government. In particular, for areas of shared competency, vertical co-ordination between the federal and subnational governments is important. Co-ordination led by the federal government in policy areas that are constitutionally the responsibility of the states is based on voluntary participation by the states – and is usually the subject of federal incentives like the promise of federal money. It is therefore not a surprise that in almost half of OECD countries (49%), the CoG has a co-ordinating role across levels of government. In Australia and Hungary, this role is reported to be one of the CoG’s top four functions (OECD, 2018[3]).

Brazil’s 3-tier federal system is composed of 26 states, a federal district and 5 570 municipalities (Government of Brazil, 1988[33]). Brazil represents an exceptional case among federal countries, due to the prominent role played by municipalities, the high degree of local autonomy and no hierarchical relationship between state governments and municipalities (OECD, 2020[34]).

Policy-making and service delivery require effective co-ordination arrangements to ensure that strategies and priorities at both the national and subnational levels are aligned. The government of Brazil, like all federal governments, relies on subnational counterparts for the actual implementation of many of its policy objectives. Co-ordination among levels of government is particularly important when it comes to shared and overlapping responsibilities, as is often the case in federal countries. Co-ordination can help to align priorities and objectives and to overcome challenges posed by unclear assignment of responsibilities or by a series of information, financing and capacity gaps that impede the efficient use of resources. Effective multi-level governance can facilitate well-managed and co-ordinated public policies in decentralised policy areas and generate substantial savings. It is therefore important to develop co-ordination mechanisms between and across each level.

Given the importance of the state governments in achieving the ambitions of the federal government, the vertical relationships must work and the CoG clearly plays a role in making them efficient and effective. All countries need to manage the interface with lower tiers of government and a diverse range of delivery patterns. Vertical co-ordination is therefore crucial. It can help limit the growth of inequalities and ensure coherent policies in federal countries. Through enhanced dialogue and exchange of information, well-managed co-ordination can also reinforce trust among the different levels of government and lead to more effective policy implementation.

In line with the OECD’s guidelines on decentralisation (see Box 1.3), co-ordination mechanisms across levels also need to be strengthened by the CoG which has the capacity to steer policy development and implementation through a supporting and advisory role for subnational governments and non-governmental stakeholders. Effective policy co-ordination in fact calls for a whole-of-government approach, where the CoG shares with other government actors some key responsibilities, such as supporting effective decision-making, overseeing the quality of the policy process, facilitating policy co-ordination, communicating relevant policy messages and monitoring and evaluating outcomes (OECD, 2018[3]). Multi-level co-ordination can also enable better adjustment of policies to the needs of different localities. When decisions are taken in silos, resources are more likely to be assigned to policies that do not necessarily respond effectively to local needs. It is through joint actions that policies and service delivery may target the proper scale, internalising positive or negative spill-overs and implementing the complementary measures needed to make the most of the interventions. Multi-year programming and policies can further support a co-ordinated approach and enable better forecasting and alignment of objectives across levels of government.

During the OECD’s fact-finding missions, a lack of alignment between the federal government and the states and municipalities was reported by several participants. Also, with regard to the joint work of all three levels of government in solving problems and developing policies and programmes that assess the impact of policy on practices, limited progress was reported during the OECD’s interviews. Processes in place to communicate and co-ordinate with subnational governments were described to be hampered by limited engagement and consensus on clear priorities and the specificity of clear results. Recognising the legislative boundaries of the federal government and the role of the CoG in taking a system approach to results is important. The CoG may thus wish to review the extent to which priority programmes are built bottom-up and top-down with other tiers of government.

Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show the CoG’s engagement and co-ordination with subnational governments in the decision-making process. Half of the surveyed CoG institutions (50%) in Brazil report the use of formal consultations with state government representatives led by the CoG. Following Decree No. 10.591/2019, the Secretariat of Government’s Special Secretariat for Federative Affairs (SEAF/SEGOV) supports the CoG’s dialogue with subnational governments, which was described as being limited during OECD fact-finding missions. A consultation practice that is worth highlighting is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ dialogue with municipal representatives. The ministry provides institutional support with issues related to foreign policy through a network of regional offices (Decree No. 9.683/2019).

The thematic configurations of the Federative Articulation Committee (CAF) represented sectoral committees where state government and municipal representatives participate in the policy-making process. While they were revoked by Decree No. 9.784/2019, these thematic configurations had an advisory function and aimed at promoting the formulation of strategies and the implementation of co-ordinated and co-operative actions between the CoG, the states and the federal district and municipalities. CAF was chaired by the Head of the Government Secretariat and composed of the chief of staff of the presidency (Casa Civil), the Minister of the SG, the Minister of the Institutional Security Office, the Minister of the Comptroller General, the Minister of Economy as well as of representatives of the state governments, the Brazilian Association of Municipalities, the National Confederation of Municipalities and the National Front of Mayors.

Another example of a committee facilitating vertical co-ordination was the National Commission for Sustainable Development Objectives (CNODS) created for the joint implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Before it was revoked in 2019 (Decree No. 9.759), the commission led as an advisory body the process of articulation, mobilisation and dialogue on SDGs with federal entities and civil society. Following Decree No. 8.892/2016, the Head of the Secretariat of Government (SEGOV) chaired the commission that brought together representatives of the federal, state, district and municipal governments and civil society. The Special Secretariat for National Articulation (SEAS/SEGOV) served as the commission’s executive secretariat. The National Confederation of Municipalities (CNM) and the Brazilian Association of Municipalities (ABM) represented the municipal level.

In several inter-ministerial committees, states, municipalities or other entities can be invited to ensure co-ordination across levels of government. Two examples are the Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance and the Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defence of the Government Council. Law No. 13.684/2018 establishes the Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance, a deliberative organ, presided by the Head of the Casa Civil with ten other ministers as members. Representatives of organs and entities of the union, states, federal district, municipalities, CSOs, international organisations and private entities can be invited to collaborate within the scope of its activities. To facilitate the formulation, implementation and monitoring of policies in the area of foreign affairs and national defence that go beyond the scope of responsibility of one ministry, Decree No. 9.819/2019 created the Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defence of the Government Council. Albeit an advisory body composed of different ministries, representatives of other organs and entities of the federal, state, district and municipal public administration and private institutions, including non-governmental organisations, may be invited to participate in meetings to support the decision-making process, though without the right to vote.

Comparing the level of the CoG’s engagement with different subnational governments, it becomes apparent that consultations with municipalities occur less frequently than those with state governments. While the two tiers’ different competencies and the number of representatives may offer an explanation for the differences in dialogue, the prominent role played by municipalities in Brazil calls for reinforced co-ordination.

Government transitions are both a cornerstone and a particularly sensitive period in the democratic process (Partnership for Public Service, 2018[36]). The regular transfer of power between political groups is understood as a crucial mechanism for stability within democratic systems as it decreases the “stakes” of holding power and promotes buy-in from all stakeholders in the political arena (Ruiz-Rufino and Birch, 2020[37]). Alternation in power also functions as a mechanism for accountability in democracies and respect for the outcome reflects public trust in institutions (Lundell, 2011[38]). Lastly, the process of transition itself requires co-operation across the political spectrum. Successful transitions can also result in less uncertainty and fear of change by minimising public costs and economic losses during the transitional period, while strengthening democracy and reducing polarisation. Despite these benefits, transfers of power entail a number of risks (Table 1.2).

The experience of transferring or preparing to transfer power after an election, especially if that transfer occurs between a longstanding party or leader to an opposition candidate or coalition, requires significant focus on mechanisms that support sustainable, democratic governance. Effective transitions provide an opportunity to showcase the ways that democratic processes can ensure continuity and sustainability in governance despite shifts in leadership.

According to OECD data, the vast majority of CoGs take complete or shared responsibility for transition management (Figure 1.7), although only half of the surveyed countries had written guidelines codifying government transitions (OECD, 2018[3]). The three tasks most commonly carried out by the CoG in the context of a transition are (OECD, 2018[3]):

  • Providing policy advice to the incoming government.

  • Ensuring that written records are transmitted to the incoming government.

  • Co-ordinating reports, guides or manuals for incoming governments.

In Brazil, planning and managing the transfer of power is crucial as transitions are characterised by a high degree of staff and leadership turnover. The head of the CoG is replaced when there is a change of government and over 50% of the senior staff changes with each new government (OECD, 2017[8]). For context, 86% of surveyed OECD countries indicated that less than 50% of their senior management was replaced during a government transition (OECD, 2018[3]).

The case of Brazil represents one of the most streamlined frameworks for government transitions in Latin America. Brazil enshrined legal requirements for transition planning and management. The established process provides very clear directions regarding the principles to follow, the integration of the transition team as well as the form of briefings. The transition process is also accordingly funded and sanctions for non-compliance exist. The transition process is based on the following legal bases:

  • Law No. 10.609/2002 provides for the institution of a transition team by the candidate elected for the office of president of the republic, creates commission positions and other measures.

  • Decree No. 4.199/2002 provides for the provision of institutional information relating to the federal public administration to political parties, coalitions and candidates for the Presidency of the Republic until the date of official disclosure of the final result of the election.

  • Decree No. 7.221/2010 provides the principles for the performance of agencies and entities of the federal public administration during the governmental transition process, namely: i) collaboration between the current government and the elected one; ii) transparency in public management; iii) planning of government action; iv) continuity of services provided to society; v) supremacy of the public interest; and vi) good faith in the performance of administrative acts.

Brazil has legal guidelines in place, which outline the responsibilities for the transition, the establishment of transition teams, their composition and the budget allocated to them. According to Law No. 10.609/2002, the elected candidate is entitled to establish a transition team of up to 50 people that are freely selected. The purpose of the transition team is to learn about the functioning of the bodies and entities that make up the federal public administration and to prepare the policy programme for the new presidency. The successful candidate can nominate members of their transition team and appoint a transition co-ordinator on the second business day following the election results. The co-ordinator is responsible for requesting information from the federal public administration bodies and entities on behalf of the team as a whole, while the bodies and entities of the federal public administration are obliged to provide the information requested by the transition team co-ordinator. While the elected candidate nominates the members of the transition team, Casa Civil is responsible for appointing these members to up to 50 commissioned positions called Special Transition Governmental Positions (CETG) and provides this transition team with infrastructure and administrative support necessary for the performance of their activities.

Guidelines concerning briefing information and data shared by the incumbent government with candidates and newly elected officials prior to and following the election are regulated by Decree No. 4.199 and Decree No. 7.221 respectively. Prior to the election, the registered candidate’s party or coalition are entitled to request information from the Casa Civil executive secretariat, which may then order the appropriate entity to provide the information in writing within 15 days. Information and data in the public domain are to be made available at any time, while information concerning state secrets, bank secrecy, taxes or justice cannot be communicated. Similarly, following the election, the minister of Casa Civil is tasked with co-ordinating the work related to the governmental transition process. The transition team nominated by the newly elected candidate may have access to information contained in records, documents, archives of the federal administration on the following topics:

  • The activities carried out by the bodies and entities, including those related to their policy, organisation and services.

  • The federal government’s public accounts.

  • The organisational structure of the public administration.

  • The implementation, monitoring and results of programmes, projects and actions of public bodies and entities, as well as proposed targets and indicators.

  • Matters that require the adoption of measures, actions or decisions by the administration in the first four months of the new government.

During the transition, all requests for access to information must be made by the transition co-ordinator to the Executive Secretary of Casa Civil, which in turn requests the information from the relevant bodies within the administration. Additionally, the Executive Secretary of Casa Civil is authorised to request information from the executive secretaries of the ministries and equivalent authorities on the following: programmes carried out and in execution relating to the president of the republic’s term of office; agenda of commitments with a timetable defined by legal, contractual and other requirements; projects to be implemented or that have been suspended; and a glossary of projects, technical terms and acronyms used by the public administration. In addition to these legal processes, Brazil has developed a number of tools to facilitate transition management (Box 1.4).

Some OECD countries establish an adequately equipped temporary unit, chaired by a senior employee of the CoG, which is responsible for co-ordinating the transition between the outgoing and the incoming government. Such designated teams can advise ministries on the preparation for a potential transition and support information requests and the preparation of briefing material in case of a change of government. An example of such a unit is the White House Transition Coordinating Council (Box 1.5). In addition, some countries designate individual senior civil servants in each CoG institution and line ministry as transition points of contact to oversee transition activities.

The OECD identifies a number of challenges to be addressed by the CoG in order to prevent risks and provide more certainty and trust in the transition process in Brazil.

Actively promoting stronger planning of the transition and of the first days of government during the pre-election phase could have a positive impact. Experience shows that better-prepared teams and candidates, with solid public policy plans, are in a better position to “hit the ground running” when assuming office. In Brazil, the outgoing government provides information to all recognised presidential candidates and their teams when requested during the electoral process. Given the importance of planning ahead, the government of Brazil could actively prepare and distribute essential information, for instance regarding the organisation of government and the respective organisation charts, institutions’ budget or staff composition, before the presidential election. In the case of a change of government, more detailed briefing material prepared with the help of all line ministries in the weeks before the election may further facilitate a smooth transition.

Limits to policy action are controversial. While mandates usually contain clear end-dates, the legitimacy to make policy decisions may not. Many of the risks identified for government transitions processes such as “midnight regulations” and “burrowing in” take place during the so-called “lame-duck period”. To prevent them, many countries put in place policy action restrictions that aim to protect the country from unilateral policy decisions that might limit or diminish the room for manoeuvre of the newly elected government. While those decisions may be legal, they may lack legitimacy by being contrary to what people or parliament expressed in an election or vote of confidence.

Three main types of restrictions can be identified in different countries: limitation to financial or budget compromising actions; limitation to compromising public credit or signing of new public contracts; and limitations in the appointment of permanent human resources or international representatives. However, these restrictions are expressed in different ways.

In Spain, for example, there are few but very clear codified limitations on what an acting government may not do. Australia is contemplating similar restrictions as an acting government in the caretaker period avoids: making major policy decisions that are likely to commit an incoming government; making significant appointments; and entering major contracts or undertakings. These previsions are presented in the cabinet office guidelines (Tiernan, 2007[40]).

In the UK, no restrictions are codified. However, it is customary for ministers to observe discretion in initiating any new action of a continuing long-term character. This means the deferral of activity such as: taking or announcing major policy decisions; entering into large/contentious procurement contracts or significant long-term commitments; and making some senior public appointments and approving senior civil service appointments, provided that such postponement would not be detrimental to the national interest or wasteful of public money. If decisions cannot wait, they may be handled by temporary arrangements or following relevant consultation with the opposition (UK Government, 2010[41]).

Another example is seen in New Zealand. As set out in the Cabinet Manual (Government of New Zealand, 2017[42]), it is clear that the incumbent government is still the lawful executive authority with all of the powers and responsibilities the office is provided with. However, once there is clarity regarding the new government, the outgoing administration is constrained from undertaking any new policy initiatives but should act on the advice of the incoming government on any matters of constitutional, economic or other significance that cannot be delayed until the new government takes office, even if the two disagree over the course of action to take.

Similar to Australia and New Zealand, the government of Brazil could thus consider introducing clear guidance on policy action for policy makers of the outgoing government to prevent and disincentivise burrowing in, midnight regulations, the compromising of future finance and credit or other unilateral policy decisions that limit or diminish the room for manoeuvre of the newly elected government after the election is held and before the formal government handover. While it is customary in Brazil that a departing administration will not take bold policy decisions when it is about to leave office, it is worth noting that Law No. 101/2000 on fiscal responsibility established a series of restrictions related to expenditure that limit the outgoing government.

As identified above, government changes in Brazil usually imply a major change in senior management personnel in the CoG. This could represent a challenge to the continuity of certain programmes and public policies and may also lead to a prolonged training period for new personnel to learn the circuits of power and administration. As of 2017, Brazil is among the countries where senior management in the CoG changes the most with a change of government. In a large majority of OECD countries (27), only a small proportion of the senior management of the CoG (0-25%) changes with a change in government (OECD, 2018[3]). Equipping the CoG with a higher share of permanent staff that remains in charge of delivering policy between governments (as in other federal countries such as in Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland) could result in greater stability and policy continuity.

One of Brazil’s cross-cutting, high-level goals is the transformation of the business environment to simplify the setting up and operation of businesses and attract investments while improving its position in international business environment rankings. In 2019, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Bolsonaro committed to working towards building a new business environment with the aim of transforming Brazil into one of the top 50 economies doing business in the world. The business environment reform has three primary objectives (OECD, 2021[6]):

  • Modernise the business environment as a strategy for post-pandemic economic recovery.

  • Contribute to the improvement of Brazil’s position in the World Bank Doing Business index, which has gained wide visibility and acceptance and was considered to be an important tool for promoting Brazil’s economy and attracting investments.

  • Attract foreign direct investment through a better institutional environment.

In the context of this priority, Brazil has enacted a new Business Environment Law (14.195/2021), developed numerous memoranda of understanding that set out plans to modernise the business environment and implemented various policy initiatives towards the objective of promoting the modernisation of the business environment in Brazil and consequently improving Brazil’s position in the World Bank Doing Business ranking.

The Special Secretariat for State Modernization (Secretaria Especial de Modernização do Estado, SEME) co-ordinates state modernisation and follows and monitors modernisation processes included in the National State Modernization Policy’s five different thematic axes: i) prosperous business environment; ii) capacities of the modern state; iii) evolution of public services; iv) co-operation and articulation between public and private agents; and v) government and digital society. In the prosperous business environment axis, the SEME follows up and monitors actions and projects that may have an impact on the different areas of the Doing Business ranking and articulates with federal, state and municipal public agencies and entities representing civil society with a focus on improving the processes that make up the business environment.

The roles of the different institutions working on the reform of the business environment are clearly defined and contributed to better co-ordination between the different CoG actors as reported by all participants in the OECD’s fact-finding mission. Within the CoG, the General Secretariat (SG) is responsible for state modernisation, while the Ministry of Economy’s System of Organization and Innovation Institutional of the Federal Government (SIORG) and Special Secretariat for Debureaucratization, Management and Digital Government also play a role. In 2019, the SEME took over the responsibilities of the previously existing Bem Mais Simples programme that had the objective to simplify and expedite the access of citizens, companies and entities to public services and information, cut red tape for the provision of public services and modernise the internal management of the public administration between 2015 and 2018.

Following Decree No. 9.982/2019, the SEME is in charge of guiding strategic public policies and implementing policies and actions aimed at modernising the state and defining, co-ordination, monitoring, evaluating and supervising state modernisation programmes. It co-ordinates the preparation of the planning and formulation of the National State Modernization Policy and, in particular, supports other public administration bodies and entities in defining, evaluating and supervising the actions of the state modernisation programme. The important tasks of co-ordinating the elaboration of the business environment project as well as its implementation and monitoring are consequently also led by the SG’s SEME. The secretariat is also responsible for the identification, agreement and support of projects, measures and action plans for state modernisation with federal, state and municipal governments and public entities, with a focus on improving the processes that make up the business environment. The Secretariat for Competition and Competitiveness Advocacy of the Ministry of Economy (SEAE/ME) is the second lead institution for the government’s priority of reforming the business sector. As digitalisation falls within the SEME’s regulatory competency and the secretariat has the responsibility for the co-ordination, elaboration and implementation of Brazil’s Digital Government Strategy, no additional institution was involved to support work on this cross-cutting issue of the business environment reform programme. Besides digitalisation, no other cross-cutting issues (such as gender, social equality, youth or environment) were integrated into the reform programme.

Despite the Secretariat of Government’s (SEGOV) responsibility for the political negotiations with line ministries and the executive’s relations with the legislature, subnational governments and non-governmental actors, SEGOV was not directly involved in the development of the reform programme and was only consulted prior to the submission of legislative proposals to the National Congress. For policy issues related to the responsibility of different ministries, the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency (Casa Civil) decided about the involvement and leadership of the respective entities. Many of the policies included in the business environment reform already existed before the launch of the priority and have already been co-ordinated in the framework of the PPA or by other actors in Casa Civil. However, despite the late involvement of SEGOV, the relatively low number of newly proposed legal norms that were not approved show overall functioning co-ordination inside the CoG. The clear and well-defined line of command at the CoG pertaining to this reform programme has enabled efforts to be well co-ordinated: action plans did not overlap, relevant actors were made aware of the various initiatives, objectives were complementary and fed into each other, and the line of accountability was clear to all actors involved.

The development process of the reform programme saw the creation of ten thematic action groups (Grupos Temáticos de Ação, GTA), formed by experts in their respective fields, who provided an assessment and presented proposals for measures and actions to be included under the new reform programme. The participants of the individual action groups were selected and invited by the SEME. Participants included not only line ministries and agencies at the federal level but also representatives from subnational governments (e.g. from Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), from the judiciary, academia and the private sector. Despite this broad array of stakeholders, CSOs were not invited to participate in the action groups for the elaboration of the Business Environment Modernization Plan and the development of individual legislation acts.

Each action group was presided by a co-ordinator, who was tasked with facilitating the discussions and exchange. The individual meetings of the action groups were arranged by the SEME with a focus on the different dynamics and schedules of meetings for each action group. The SEME kept in regular contact with the 10 co-ordinators through fixed regular meetings at the working level called to convene by the SEME every 15 days and higher-level encounters of an internal steering group with the participation of the minister of state every 3 months. Through SEPEC, the Ministry of Economy was represented in all co-ordination meetings. While this flexible approach helped to avoid having formal co-ordination mechanisms for the sake of formality, formal co-ordination arrangements can also help ensure accountability. The SEME and SEPEC took two approaches to ensure accountability. First, the SEME set up a project management system where all individual projects, phases and meetings were registered. Minutes of all meetings were made available to all action group participants through a repository for the reach project. Second, SEPEC, which is institutionally and jointly responsible for Brazil’s transformation of the business environment, closely accompanied all projects and presented issues and possible solutions where necessary.

Following action group discussions, the proposed goals and performance indicators were eventually consolidated into a Business Environment Modernization Plan (Plano de Modernização do Ambiente de Negócios, PMA) and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) were agreed upon with different relevant institutions at the federal level. MoUs were signed in the period from February to August 2020 and were intended to record the commitment to promoting the modernisation of the business environment, through the use of all efforts necessary by the signatories to increase Brazil’s Doing Business ranking. The documents defined the shared responsibility of federal entities for the themes evaluated in the PMA, for defining goals and configuring the monitoring of actions and activities necessary for the project’s success.

As a next step, goals were defined for each action group in the form of action plans to monitor the modernisation plan’s implementation. As the government target was defined as a position in an international ranking that also includes constant developments in other countries, the target was difficult to attain (see Chapter 4 on monitoring and evaluation). The SEME and SEPEC thus resorted to an approach where all thematic groups had their goals defined by points – a simpler metric to plan and control. A simulation tool in the form of an Excel spreadsheet was developed that was accessible to all action group co-ordinators. Based on statistical data from the World Bank Doing Business ranking, this tool allowed the SEME team and bodies involved to carry out a prospective assessment of the necessary points in each of the ten themes to monitor the implementation and progress in the different dimensions of the reform programme.

Despite the implementation of practices and tools to foster co-ordination, participants in the action groups reported the need for additional time for consultations and discussion of the great number of different issues each group was responsible for. Since only a total of 155 days were calculated for the planning phase of the reform programme, some discussions were reported to have been cut short due to the submission of policies to Congress.

While the planning for the transformation of the business environment reform is tailored to the government’s priority, it appears to be disconnected from the broader CoG management and planning system. Neither PMA nor MoUs are embedded in a broader national performance framework. This separation may point to the shortcomings of the existing planning and management tools the CoG currently has in place. Ideally, this reform programme would be managed through the CoG performance management system and be considered a cross-sectoral programme.

Beyond the formally defined presidency, Brazil’s CoG encompasses a larger set of institutions that perform functions traditionally attributed to the CoG in OECD countries. Currently, no policy documents exist that describe a set of joint objectives and goals the centre aims to accomplish to perform a strategic role for the whole of government. Institutional fragmentation, uncertain mandates, overlaps of different entities’ functions as well as limited capacity currently limit the CoG’s performance as an efficient and effective manager of the whole of government with a focus on results for and with citizens, and increase the need for more effective co-ordination.


[30] Agência Brasil (2019), “STF: maioria vota por limitar decreto que extingue conselhos federais”, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2019-06/stf-maioria-vota-por-limitar-decreto-que-extingue-conselhos-federais.

[14] Agência Brasil (2018), “Bolsonaro plans to create super Economy Ministry after merger”.

[10] Alessandro, M., M. Lafuente and C. Santiso (2013), “The role of the center of government: A literature review”, Institutions for Development Technical Note, https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/5988 (accessed on 11 September 2020).

[16] Brown, D., K. Kohli and S. Mignotte (2021), Tools at the Centre of Government - Research and Practitioners’ Insight.

[39] Center for Presidential Transition (2020), Presidential Transition Act.

[26] Costa Cavalcante, P. and A. de Ávila Gomide (2018), O Presidente e seu núcleo de governo: a coordenação do Poder Executivo, IPEA Institute for Applied Economic Research.

[27] Gaetani, F. (2011), “La dinámica de la coordinación en el ámbito del ejecutivo – una reflexión a partir de las variaciones y contrastes en los dieciséis años de Cardoso y Lula”, in Grau, N. and J. Toro (eds.), Fortalecimiento del alto gobierno – aproximaciones conceptuales.

[12] Government of Brazil (2020), Estrutura da Presidência, https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/estrutura-da-presidencia.

[11] Government of Brazil (2019), Law 13.844 on the Basic Organization of the Presidency of the Republic Bodies and Ministries, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2019/lei/L13844.htm (accessed on 6 June 2021).

[13] Government of Brazil (2019), Relatório sobre a oficina sobre o centro de governo.

[1] Government of Brazil (2016), Referencial para Avaliação da Governança do Centro de Governo, Portal TCU, Tribunal de Contas da União, https://portal.tcu.gov.br/biblioteca-digital/referencial-para-avaliacao-da-governanca-do-centro-de-governo.htm (accessed on 6 June 2021).

[33] Government of Brazil (1988), Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil.

[2] Government of Brazil/OECD (2019), Terms of Reference of the “Toward an Integrated and Structured Centre of Government within the Federal Government of Brazil” Project.

[42] Government of New Zealand (2017), The Cabinet Manual.

[23] Government of the United Kingdom (n.d.), UK Civil Service Fast Stream Programme, https://www.faststream.gov.uk/.

[28] Janis, I. (1972), Victims of Groupthink, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, MA.

[38] Lundell, K. (2011), “Accountability and patterns of alternation in pluralitarian, majoritarian and consensus democracies”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 46/2, pp. 145-167.

[17] Moynihan, D. and A. Kroll (2016), “Performance management routines that work? An early assessment of the GPRA Modernization Act”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 76/2, https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12434.

[6] OECD (2021), “Building a resilient response: The role of the Centre of Government in the management of the COVID-19 crisis and future recovery efforts”, Centre of Government Survey, OECD, Paris.

[15] OECD (2021), Centre of Government Questionnaire of Brazil (unpublished).

[34] OECD (2020), Auditing Decentralised Policies in Brazil: Collaborative and Evidence-Based Approaches for Better Outcomes, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/30023307-en.

[4] OECD (2020), Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2020, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/13130fbb-en.

[35] OECD (2019), Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy-Makers, OECD Multi-level Governance Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en.

[32] OECD (2019), Recommendation of the Council on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0381.

[20] OECD (2019), Recommendation of the Council on Public Service Leadership and Capability, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/pem/recommendation-on-public-service-leadership-and-capability-en.pdf.

[3] OECD (2018), Centre Stage 2 - The Organisation and Functions of the Centre of Government in OECD Countries, OECD, Paris.

[24] OECD (2018), OECD Public Governance Reviews: Paraguay: Pursuing National Development through Integrated Public Governance, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301856-en.

[8] OECD (2017), “Survey on the organisation and functions of the centre of government”, OECD, Paris.

[25] OECD (2004), “A comparative analysis of government offices in OECD countries”, OECD, Paris.

[5] OECD (2004), “Co-ordination at the Centre of Government: The Functions and Organisation of the Government Office Comparative; Analysis of OECD Countries, CEECs and Western Balkan Countries”, SIGMA Papers, No. 35, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5kml60v4x2f6-en.

[29] OECD (forthcoming), Open Government Review of Brazil, OECD Publishing, Paris.

[21] OECD (forthcoming), Public Service Leadership and Capability Review of Brazil, OECD Publishing, Paris.

[7] OECD (forthcoming), Review and Support of Portugal’s State Legal Competency Centre (JurisAPP), OECD, Paris.

[36] Partnership for Public Service (2018), Presidential Transition Guide, https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Presidential-Transition-Guide-2018.pdf.

[9] Rhodes, R. and P. Dunleavy (1990), “Core executive studies in Britain”, Public Administration, Vol. 68, pp. 3-28.

[37] Ruiz-Rufino, R. and S. Birch (2020), “The effect of alternation in power on electoral”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 57/1, pp. 126-139, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319885171.

[18] Scottish Government (n.d.), National Performance Framework.

[31] Teixeira, A., C. de Paiva Bezerra and M. Kunrath Silva (2019), “Participação e democracia: o Brasil precisa de conselhos”, Nexo Jornal, https://www.nexojornal.com.br/ensaio/2019/Participa%C3%A7%C3%A3o-e-democracia-o-Brasil-precisa-de-conselhos.

[40] Tiernan, A. (2007), Caretaker Conventions in Australasia: Minding the Shop for Government, Australian National University Press, Canberra.

[41] UK Government (2010), The Cabinet Manual.

[19] US Government (n.d.), Performance.gov, General Services Administration/Office of Management and Budget, https://www.performance.gov/.

[22] US Government (n.d.), White House Leadership Development Program, https://www.pic.gov/whldp/ (accessed on 18 October 2021).

Metadata, Legal and Rights

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Extracts from publications may be subject to additional disclaimers, which are set out in the complete version of the publication, available at the link provided.

© OECD 2022

The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at https://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.