Chapter 1. The ongoing transformation of the global space sector

Institutional funding of space programmes

Public investments represent the bulk of funding in space activities, reaching almost USD 75 billion in 2017 (and still growing in 2018), as compared to an estimated USD 52 billion in 2008. Governments invest in space capabilities to support national security and governance objectives (e.g. being able to map and monitor resources from space), but also broad socio-economic motivations, and scientific capacities’ development (see Chapter 2 on the impacts of space investments). Countries with space programmes have moved from being a very exclusive club relying on their strong defence and aerospace industries, to a much wider group of developed and developing countries, with very diverse capabilities.

In only a decade, the number of countries with a satellite in orbit have increased from 50 in 2008 to 82 in 2018 (Figure 1.1). The satellites considered are of course very different in their specificities and may involve very little national technical expertise, ranging from large multi-ton telecommunication satellites purchased on the international market to very small cubesats built in local universities. But the possibility to have one’s satellite in orbit, registered with one’s own national administration, has never been so affordable (OECD, 2016[1]).

Figure 1.1. More than 80 countries with a registered satellite in orbit

Number of countries with a satellite in orbit (launched via a third party or independently between 1957 and April 2018) and number of countries having launched a rocket successfully

Since the first OECD report on the space economy in 2007, some twenty new countries have also started investing in original space programmes and supporting private endeavours, with distinctive and symbolic projects. They include, for example, the United Arab Emirates’ planned Mars mission, New Zealand’s successful small launcher, Luxembourg’s asteroid mining programme, or Israel’s lunar mission. Most of these programmes are not starting from scratch (i.e. Luxembourg has been a member of the European Space Agency since 2005 and is the home of the second largest commercial satellite communications operator, Société Européenne des Satellites, SES Global), but some of the recently announced programmes have taken the space community by surprise. This includes Luxembourg’s SpaceResources.lu initiative to develop technologies and competencies for the exploration and use of resources found on near earth objects. This has even led to a renewed interest amongst diverse legal expert groups to consider the international implications of space mining. The United Kingdom (UK) has also recently modified its regulatory framework for commercial space activities with the Space Industry Act 2018. It enables small satellite and suborbital activities to launch directly from UK territory. Several spaceport locations across the UK are under consideration (UK Department for Transport, 2017[2]). Rapid developments are also occurring in Africa, where many countries are developing their own space programmes (Box 1.1).

Box 1.1. Space activities in Africa

Space activities in Africa have picked up significantly since 2000. The continent now counts some 14 space agencies or administrations, half of which were established in 2010 or later. Eight countries, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa, have registered satellites into orbit (often procured on the international satellite market), with the majority of satellites launched in the last ten years (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2. Space activities in Africa

As of March 2019

Sources: Based on UNOOSA (2019[3]), Outer Space Objects Index and Space in Africa (2018[4]), https://africanews.space.

In terms of institutional funding, Nigeria and South Africa have the largest space budgets, estimated in 2017 at some USD 29 million for the Nigerian National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) and USD 23 million for the South Africa Space Agency (SANSA).

Africa is also one of the key recipient regions of space-related official development assistance, with more than USD 200 million committed to projects between 2000 and 2016, mainly addressing environmental management, forestry and telecommunications (Figure 1.3) (see also Chapter 2).

Figure 1.3. Official development assistance projects in Africa

Main purpose of projects, as a share of total space-related ODA commitments to the region.

Source: Calculations based on OECD-DAC database (2018).

A recent development was the 2018 launch of the Africa Regional Data Cube, which provides easily accessible earth observation data for five African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tanzania). The data cube was developed by the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) in partnership with several public and private actors.

Global institutional space funding in 2017 reached USD 75 billion, a conservative estimate (i.e. based on 49 selected countries with the larger space programmes). Overall, the institutional funding of the largest space programmes remained stable or increased slightly, while most medium and smaller programmes have increased in real terms, and as a share of GDP.

The United States remains the largest space power, building on decades of annual multibillion dollar investments in space programmes. Other countries have developed advanced space programmes, with a wide portfolio of activities, also following decades of investment at much lower levels (e.g. France, Germany, Italy, Canada). In parallel to national programmes, the European Space Agency is an excellent example of how European countries have worked together to build up industrial capacity and create regional value chains for their national space industries (Box 1.2). In the past few years, the European Union via the European Commission has also taken a much larger investor role in the European space industry. Already in charge of the Copernicus earth observation programme and the Galileo navigation satellite programmes, the European Commission is taking a leading role in satellite communications, with the EU GovSatcom initiative. Between 2014 and 2020, it should invest over EUR 12 billion in space activities. With over 30 satellites planned in the next 15 years, the European Union is expected to be the largest institutional customer for launch services in Europe (De Concini and Toth, 2019[5]).

Box 1.2. R&D and innovation at the European Space Agency

The European Space Agency is a major success story in international co-operation. Created in 1973 with ten founding members, it now counts 22 members, and with a 2017 budget of EUR 5.8 billion, including third-party programmes (USD 6.5 billion – almost 0.04% of European GDP), it represents one of the most active space agencies in the world, with a portfolio covering a wide range of space activities, from science, research and development (R&D) programmes to supporting space entrepreneurs (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4. ESA’s budget at a glance

Note: Budgets include third-party programmes.

ESA funds R&D at all stages of technological readiness. Early stage R&D is funded through the Basic Technology Research Programme (about EUR 65 million per year), whereas the General Support Technology Programme (GSTP) and ARTES (telecommunications) programmes aim to convert promising concepts into mature products, working with industry. Funding for the five-year GSTP programme for 2013-17 amounted to more than EUR 600 million (Figure 1.5). ESA is also supporting the emergence of start-ups through its active network of business incubation centres (BICs) in 17 member states.

Figure 1.5. ESA’s General Support Technology Programme funding

Source: European Space Agency (2016), GSTP 1993-2017, http://www.esa.int/spaceinimages/Images/2016/11/GSTP_Infographic.

Institutional space budgets fund a large range of activities in space research, development and applications in both civilian and military domains. Budgets are often spread across several government agencies, which makes them difficult to track in national accounts. The estimates provided here should therefore be considered as conservative. Figure 1.6 illustrates trends in institutional funding for a selection of OECD countries and partner economies. Although the past five years have generally been a period of tightening government budgets, space budgets have remained relatively resilient to cuts, with growth taking place both in countries with large, established space programmes and in countries with smaller programmes. In Europe, contributions to the European Union programmes Galileo and Copernicus, account for some of these budget increases, but in some cases they also reflect targeted government strategies. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation has seen significant space budget cuts in recent years, following the fall in commodity prices.

Figure 1.6. Evolution of space budgets for selected countries

Adjusted for inflation with constant national currency and constant 2010 USD, 2008-17

1. Conservative estimate for the United States.

Source: Government budget sources and OECD databases (see Box 1.4).

Still more growth in institutional funding is expected, although at very different scales depending on national situations. The United States is significantly increasing government funding to both civil and military space programmes. As an illustration, the US Air Force could invest some USD 44 billion over five years in space systems (mainly R&D) between 2018 and 2023 (Erwin, 2018[6]). Luxembourg is setting up an ambitious space programme, investing EUR 238 million (USD 263 million) over the 2017-21 period, half of which will be dedicated to public and private research (Luxembourg Ministry of Finance, 2017[7]). Countries with emerging programmes are also investing in space activities, with New Zealand and Australia, which established space agencies in 2017 and 2018, respectively. New Zealand has set aside some NZD 20-30 million (USD 14-21 million) over the next three years for the space agency and a new space technology research centre. The Australian 2018-19 budget announced funding of AUD 26 million (USD 20 million) over four years to the Australian Space Agency, and AUD 15 million (USD 11 million) to an Australian business support scheme.

Increasingly, beyond national or federal governments’ budgets, more regions are also investing in space programmes via different mechanisms. These investments, albeit often small in scale, are occurring in many parts of the world to attract or retain actors from the space industry (e.g. Canada, Italy, United States). In the United States, there are currently ten licensed orbital and suborbital commercial spaceports, several of which have been constructed in anticipation of possible future developments. Spaceports are often strongly supported by regional policy-makers for local industry development (FAA, 2018[8]; OECD, 2016[1]). As an illustration, the space budget of the state of Florida equals that of a medium-sized European country (USD 30 million in 2016) (Space Florida, 2016[9]).

One of the most useful indicators to measure and compare space funding intensity is the ratio of space budget to the national gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 1.7). In 2017, the budget of the United States accounted conservatively for some 0.24% of national GDP, followed by the Russian Federation at 0.17%, France at 0.1%, The People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”) at about 0.08% and Japan at 0.07%. The calculations for the United States, China and Israel are based on conservative estimates. The majority of space budgets constitute less than 0.05% of GDP in 2017 (including civil and military space activities where data are available). Evolutions in a space budget’s share in GDP may be affected not only by changes in funding levels but also by rapidly contracting or expanding GDP.

Figure 1.7. Selected government space budget estimates

OECD countries and partner economies, share of GDP in 2017 (%)

1. Conservative estimates.

Sources: Government budget sources and OECD databases (see Box 1.4).

Government budget allocations for research and development (GBARD, previously known as GBAORD) is another indicator which provides interesting insights about the long-term orientations and volumes of government-funded R&D. Data collection for this indicator has been carried out in many economies since the early 1980s. Governments’ R&D activities are classified according to 14 different socio-economic objectives, one of which is ‘the exploration and exploitation of space’. This category includes both fundamental and applied R&D activities and space-related infrastructure (laboratories, launch systems, etc.). But the data have some limitations, since civil space GBARD excludes all defence-related activities and potentially some of the R&D dedicated to earth observation, meteorology and environment monitoring (categorised under ‘exploration and exploitation of earth’). Despite this caveat, GBARD gives an indication of how some space-related R&D budget allocations have evolved, as compared to other national priority areas and over time.

In 2016, civil space R&D (space GBARD) for the OECD members accounted for some 0.4% of GDP and 8% of total government allocations to civil R&D (OECD, 2018[10]), as is shown in Figure 1.8. In the United States, government budget allocations in 2017 for civil space R&D accounted for some 0.07% of GDP and almost 18% of total civil GBARD; followed by Italy (0.05% and 9.3%, respectively), Belgium (0.05% and 8.4%, respectively) and Japan (0.04% and 8%, respectively). In the European Union (EU28), civil space R&D programmes accounted for about 0.03% of GDP and 5% of total civil GBARD (OECD, 2018[10]).

Figure 1.8. Civil space GBARD as a share of GDP and total government civil R&D allocations

2017 or latest available year, selected countries

Note: Data from 2016: Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, OECD and EU28. Data from 2015: Canada, Chile, Switzerland.

Source: OECD (2018[10]), OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00182-en.

When studying the long-term trends of space GBARD (Figure 1.9) over the last three decades, several observations can be made. First, high-spending countries, such as France and the United States, dedicate a decreasing share of their GDP to government civil space R&D compared to the early 1990s, when the share was double what it is today. Second, an increasing number of countries engage in space activities and carry out space R&D. Finally, several countries which dedicate a small or medium share of their GDP to space GBARD have seen a positive growth in the last decade (e.g. United Kingdom, Norway). As a result, space GBARD’s share of GDP is converging across the OECD, with ratios stabilising between 0.02 and 0.07%.

Figure 1.9. Long-term trends for civil space GBARD

1981-2017 or earliest and latest available years, selected countries

Note: Data from 2016: Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, OECD and EU28. Data from 2015: Canada, Chile, Switzerland.

Source: OECD (2018[10]), OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00182-en.

Private funding of space activities

Private sources of investment for space projects are challenging to track; however, current evidence shows unprecedented investments from angel and venture capital funds in space start-ups and recently established firms, although the amounts still pale compared to public funding.

Commercial satellite telecommunications have paved the way for private financing, as the high profitability of satellite services over the past 15 years has allowed operators to benefit from classic financial schemes (e.g. equity financing, bond issuance) to develop their activities, buy satellites and fund innovation, especially in their distribution networks. Most satellite operators in OECD countries have become publicly traded corporations, and this is also now happening in China, where state-owned enterprises are being restructured (e.g. the operator China Satellite Communications Corp. is due to open its capital; it is a subsidiary of the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp., which designs and manufactures many of China’s satellites). Operators have also resorted to project financing, with syndicates of banks providing loans. This successful trend in financing satellite telecommunications has led to similar, if limited, experiences in other domains of space activities. For example, in the past ten years, several companies have launched initial public offerings of stocks, using the proceeds to build their next generation of earth observation satellites (e.g. Digital Globe in the early 2010s).

The main sources of funding for new firms are usually the founder’s own funds, with investments from family circles, bank loans, equity capital (including from business angels and venture capitalists) and government support. A relatively new source of private capital comes from large aerospace and defence firms, which have all set up their own venture capital funds in the past five years, to invest in start-ups involved in software development, artificial intelligence, augmented reality, sensors and autonomous vehicles in particular. Some of the most active actors include for example Boeing’s HorizonX Ventures, Lockheed Martin Ventures, Airbus Ventures, Thales Corporate Ventures, and the Dassault System Venture Fund.

In the space sector, start-up equity investments represented some USD 3 to 3.25 billion in 2018 (Space Angels, 2019[15]; Seraphim Capital, 2019[16]). The number of investment transactions also grew globally, from 200 investment deals in 2011 to over 1 400 in 2017. Space Angels estimates that the 2018 total represented around 16% of all the equity capital invested in space companies since 2009. In China, almost 100 space start-ups have been launched since 2015, following a new national policy to foster space commercialisation (see country profile of China). In 2018, some 30 start-ups involved in rockets, satellite manufacturing and applications raised approximately USD 310 million in venture capital. When including publicly-listed space companies, total private investment amounted to USD 530 million in China (FutureAerospace, 2019[17]). Although these amounts are far from negligible, as a comparison, more than USD 50 billion was invested in artificial intelligence start-ups during the period 2011 through to mid-2018, with some USD 17 billion in 2017 alone (OECD, 2018[18]).

Investments from billionaires in numerous space ventures have also increased in the past five years (Table 1.1). Most of the recent space companies are privately funded (e.g. Space X, Blue Origin) and not publicly traded. Although there are few public data available, their capitalisation is considered important in view of their ongoing large projects (launchers, space exploration modules) and commercial contracts particularly with the US government.

As a final indication of changes in private financing, new exchange-traded funds, which usually contain various types of investment instruments, are increasingly including stocks from space-related companies. Stocks in aerospace and defence companies have for many years formed attractive portfolios in investment funds, but the specific focus on space is relatively recent. Further interest from the investment community may come if the capital formation of some of the more successful space companies from Table 1.1 eventually moves into the public market.

Despite positive trends, sustained access to finance will remain a challenge for a majority of established and new players in the space sector. Hardened international competition between incumbents, the acceleration of the rollout of new technological solutions, and the apparition of ever-more newcomers with yet unproven business models continue to affect the investment landscape.

Actual returns on investments are still to come for most space ventures that have received capital in the past five years. Long lead times represent an inherent issue for most space activities, as manufacturing processes and launch to orbit take time. These constraints may be increasingly alleviated thanks to major impacts of digitalisation on manufacturing and production processes (impacting satellites, rockets, ground systems) (see Chapter 4). But these are changes still very much in the making. Also the enthusiasm surrounding new space activities may have created possible ‘economic bubbles’. Consolidation and buy-outs are expected in the next two years for many competing space start-ups, especially in the small launcher segment where several dozens of actors are currently being financed. The hype concerning the space economy is discussed in the next section.

Government space programmes supporting the space economy

Three overarching thrusts are driving commercial revenue generation in the space sector in all its segments, and will probably continue to do so over the next decade: national security goals; the pursuit of scientific objectives and human space exploration; and the expansion of downstream space applications (OECD, 2016[1]).

The pre-eminence of government objectives, from defence to space exploration, remains a key driver in most space programmes today and will remain for the foreseeable future. Institutional budgets are funding, via procurement schemes and grant mechanisms, a majority of commercial space activities around the world. In addition, in many countries, public administrations play a major role in not only administrating and coordinating space activities, but also in pursuing research and development. Historically, and still today, national agencies, research centres, universities and laboratories (such as test facilities) perform fundamental research, applied research and experimental development in the space sector (see country profiles for illustrations). These research capacities under governmental control have important impacts on employment and public innovation capabilities for the space sector (see Chapter 3 about employment).

This is not a situation unique to the space sector, as major infrastructure and transport activities rely directly and indirectly on sustained public investments (OECD, 2017[25]). But many of these funding schemes in the space sector aim to sustain governmental captive markets, reserved in priority for national industries. This is particularly true for military space programmes, even if recent mergers and acquisitions in North America and Europe have allowed companies to bid for large governmental contracts across the Atlantic.

The growth in institutional demand has so far compensated the downturn in commercial satellite telecommunications markets (see Chapter 6), the traditional leading segment for the European space manufacturing industry. Government programmes represented 59% of European industry’s sales in 2017 (EUR 5.1 billion, out of a total of EUR 8.76 billion), with critical procurement from ESA and national space agencies (ASD - Eurospace, 2018[26]). Even when examining exports, a fourth of the European industry sales respond to demand from public agencies, whether civilian or military. In the United States, manufacturers and space launch providers are also benefitting from significant programmes from the US Department of Defense (recent USD 7.8 billion contract for the upgrade of the GPS constellation awarded to Lockheed Martin), while in China the space industry benefits from large scale investments by the Chinese authorities. In the United Kingdom, much of the recent growth in the UK space economy was also driven by recent public investments in launch vehicles and subsystems (London Economics, 2019[27]).

The role of initial and sustained government funding will be essential when looking ahead to further developing the possible “cislunar space economy”. This would include commercial human spaceflight in orbit and beyond, the expansion of the human presence in space, or the development of new space missions that may have long-term commercial implications (e.g. space mining). At the core of these missions that are all becoming possible thanks to technological advances, commercial actors will certainly play a determining factor, but with institutional funding support (see also Chapter 5).

Putting different markets in perspective

At a first glance, the space sector seems relatively small and easy to value. Some segments, like space manufacturing, are indeed rather well known, thanks to regular industry surveys that have been conducted for decades (e.g. the Eurospace survey on European space manufacturing). The knowledge base continues to grow internationally and many national and industry associations’ efforts are to be commended with annual and bi-annual surveys to map activities and build up datasets to support policy-making (see Box 1.6). However, extensive and comparable microdata to quantify in detail the different segments of the space economy in different countries are still lacking.

In the past five years, much attention has been given to the growth potential of downstream space activities. Downstream activities are very diverse, but they all directly rely on the provision of satellite technology, signals or data to function. Many applications are by definition reliant on space infrastructure set up by public and/or private actors. They include services and products for consumers using satellite capacity, such as communications, satellite television services, geospatial products, meteorology and location-based services (e.g. a navigation device using satellite positioning signals from publicly funded space infrastructure, like the US GPS, the European Galileo or the Chinese Beidou systems). The actual value creation and revenue generation are often far removed from the initial investments.

Commercial satellite telecommunications were indeed first to link with a wide range of businesses with no previous connections to the space community, in order to commercialise satellite capacity mainly for television broadcast. Telecommunications markets are currently facing uncertainties, as space and ground technologies, as well as customer behaviours, are evolving rapidly. There is a current downturn in satellite video, which is starting to impact satellite operators as well as manufacturers. Incumbents and future satellite constellation operators increasingly have to navigate complex telecom ecosystems (more in Chapter 6). Other important downstream actors include the suppliers of devices and equipment supporting consumer markets.

When examining the company Bryce’s 2019 State of the Space Industry report (commissioned by the US Satellite Industry Association), around 87.8% of the estimated USD 277 billion in revenues are generated by activities based on satellite capacity (signals, data), sometimes by actors that are building on investments made by others, much higher in the value chains.

• The bulk of the space economy revenues are considered to come from commercial satellite services with USD 126.5 billion, i.e. 45.6% of the total revenues (with satellite fixed services representing USD 17.9 billion, mobile satellite services USD 4 billion; satellite radio USD 5.8 billion; satellite broadband USD 2.4 billion; commercial remote sensing USD 2.1 billion; and satellite television services representing USD 94.2 billion) (Bryce Space and Technology, 2019[29]) (see Chapter 6 on satellite telecommunications).

• The second largest share of revenues (USD 125.2 billion, 45% of the estimated space economy) consists of devices and chipsets to receive positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) signals (USD 93.3 billion), consumer equipment such as satellite television dishes (USD 18.1), and other network equipment, such as very small aperture terminals and gateways (13.8 billion). Overall these sectors are dominated by consumer electronics companies.

• In comparison, space systems’ manufacturing revenues are valued at USD 19.5 billion, i.e. 7% of the total revenues, while the commercial launch industry represents USD 6.2 billion (i.e. 2.2% of the total). These two activities are the foundations for all the others, and are being strongly affected by digitalisation and growing competition from newcomers (see Chapter 4).

When comparing these results with time series and a previous 2014 report, the revenues totalled at that time some USD 246 billion (USD 203 billion in 2014 dollars in the original report). Taking into account discrepancies, the main increase in revenues from 2014 to 2019 comes from the then-strong development of consumer ground equipment, pushed particularly by positioning and navigation equipment (Tauri Group, 2015[30]). A study conducted every two years by the European GNSS Agency, with the estimates usually reused in many other industry report, confirms these trends (European GNSS Agency, 2017[31]). It forecasts that satellite navigation, position and timing devices and related augmentation services could grow by more than 6% annually between 2015 and 2020 before gradually decelerating over the following years. In the United Kingdom, the downstream segment – which has represented the largest segment of the UK space economy via the satellite television direct-to-home and telecommunication markets – has grown since 2014 at a rather slow rate of 1.1% per year (London Economics, 2019[27]).

Box 1.7. Trade in selected space products

Imports and exports are useful indicators in today’s interconnected world. Still, many commercial space activities are not covered by official statistics, and beyond this limitation, many space products and services are considered strategic in nature and not freely traded. To convene a partial overview of existing trade in the space sector, some conservative data are provided, covering the commodity code “spacecraft (including satellites) and spacecraft launch vehicles” (code 7925) in the International Trade in Commodity Statistics (ITCS) database.

Based on this commodity code, OECD countries are heavy exporters of space products (Figure 1.10). The value of exports almost tripled in fifteen years, amounting to around USD 3.4 billion in 2018. The aggregate for the European-28 region showed a slower growth pace between 2002 and 2018. Exports from BRICS countries experienced growth, booming to USD 1.1 billion in 2018. This suggests a catching-up process in commercial markets, as many Chinese and Indian satellite products are now exported.

Figure 1.10. Exports of selected space products by region

Constant USD million

Note: The figures refer to trade of the product code 880260 of the Harmonised System (HS) for commodity classification. Code 880260 includes: spacecraft, including satellites, and suborbital and spacecraft launch vehicles. The latest available year for Israel was 2017, while the 2009 statistics is reported instead of 2010 for the United States.

Source: Calculations based on UN COMTRADE database and ITC statistics, 2018.

Although they can show only a partial view, snapshots of global exports in 2018 for the code 7925 reveal that France was the leading exporter in 2018 (27.6% of the total exported value), followed by China (22.3%) and the United States (20%). Other actors include Japan (8.1%), Germany (7.9%) and Israel (5.7%).

There is much hype about the space sector and its commercial potential, driving activities in consumer electronics, far beyond space manufacturing and space launchers, with some reason, as it has never attracted so much investment from both public and private actors. Many recent estimates and forecasts from leading consulting firms and investment banks have provided different estimates. This is a challenging exercise, as the space economy encompasses various activities and different value chains (from hardware to digital products far removed from initial space investments). A 2018 report by the investment firm Goldman Sachs predicted that the space economy would reach USD 1 trillion in the 2040s, while a different study by Morgan Stanley projected a USD 1.1 trillion space economy in the 2040s. A third study by Bank of America Merrill Lynch has the most optimistic outlook, seeing the market growing to USD 2.7 trillion within the same timeframe (Table 1.2). As a comparison, revenues from the well-established global commercial airlines amounted to USD 821 billion in 2018 with net profits of around USD 32.3 billion (IATA, 2018[32]).

However, one should remain prudent in forecasts, as downturns may occur in selected downstream markets, notably satellite telecommunications and satellite navigation, position and timing markets, because of strong competition from new terrestrial systems coming online (see Chapter 6). In addition, possible accidents in the space infrastructure need to be taken into account in different scenarios (e.g. satellites remain fragile because of space debris, jamming of signals, etc. see Chapter 5).

As more countries conduct industry surveys to collect relevant micro-data on their space sector’s value chains, with the support of national statistical offices or consulting firms, often linking with industry associations, more evidence should become available on the different segments of the space economy. The OECD is already working with many actors to support this effort.