7. Japan’s fragility, crises and humanitarian assistance

The role of official development assistance (ODA) as a foreign policy tool has been strengthened. Japan describes itself as a peace-loving nation and aims to act as a proactive contributor to peace, a stance that underpins its overall foreign policy (MFA, 2016[1]). Acknowledging rapid changes in the world order, Japan has revised its Development Cooperation Charter to strengthen the role of ODA as a foreign policy tool, with the rationale that building peace through ODA also contributes to Japan’s security and prosperity (MFA, 2015[2]). The revised charter was based on the 2013 National Security Strategy calling for the proactive and strategic use of ODA to respond to development and security challenges (MFA, 2013[3]). In addition, Japan has also actively sought internal reforms in order to increase the role of the Japan Self-Defence Forces in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. These policy trends all support Japan’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which builds on peace and stability as much as on economic prosperity in fostering Japan’s foreign policy ambitions (MFA, 2019[4]).

The various dimensions of fragility are taken into account in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) country analyses, and translated into sound programming. The MOFA has a sectoral policy on peacebuilding assistance that puts the concept of human security at the core of Japan’s engagement in conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction (MFA, 2017[5]). Initiatives include supporting training courses on criminal justice,1 assisting the 2018 general elections in Zimbabwe, and supporting ex-combatant reintegration in the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire (MFA, 2019[6]). These are successful example of Japan’s engagement in strengthening peace. As Japan reinforces its knowledge about challenges and opportunities in fragile states, there is now an opportunity to apply the nexus between humanitarian, development and peace more systematically into its programming and provide appropriate guidance to its staff (Box 7.1).

Building resilient societies is fully embedded in Japan’s development co-operation policy (MFA, 2015[7]). Japan remains a leader in disaster risk reduction and disaster response. It is using its knowledge strategically in multilateral fora, primarily through the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-30 (UNDRR, 2015[8]), and through strong bilateral partnerships. Through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), for example, Japan is sharing its knowledge and technology in disaster-prone countries (JICA, 2017[9]). This is a good practice, in line with the recommendation of the last peer review (Annex A). Since the last review, Japan has also spent between 10% and 14% of its humanitarian ODA on disaster prevention, preparedness, response, rehabilitation and reconstruction the highest share of all Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members and well above the 3% DAC average in 2018 (OECD, 2020[10]).

Japan’s ODA to fragile countries has increased. It does not have a spending target for fragile contexts, which it sees as irrelevant for aid which is based on mutual co-operation and support for self-help efforts in a post-conflict phase. However, Japan now allocates up to 35% of its ODA to fragile countries, representing a steady increase since the last review (Figure 7.1). In 2018, up to 62% of Japan’s ODA in fragile contexts was provided as sovereign loans, a further increase from 56% in 2017 (OECD, 2020[11]). Such a high share of loans in fragile contexts is a particular feature of Japan’s ODA (Chapter 3). It reflects Japan’s consideration for its partners’ economic growth and ability to take loans, aligning with Japan’s vision of self-help and ownership, based on its own post-war reconstruction path and that of other countries such as Cambodia (Annex C).

Japan uses programming modalities for natural disasters and man-made crises. Thanks to long-standing experience, co-ordination and programming across government is swift in response to large-scale natural disasters. Japan has the ability to deploy technical teams and logistics at short notice, and additional funds can be drawn from the supplementary budget. However, Japan also increasingly engages in complex crises. It does so when it sees its intervention can add value and where it aligns with Japan’s foreign policy interests. For these crises, co-ordination across government is put in place and Japan has shown it can combine its diplomatic efforts with targeted development activities, as exemplified in the Philippines (Box 7.1).

Japan is particularly advanced in analysing disaster risk and strengthening the capacity of partner countries to design risk-informed systems and infrastructure. The Cabinet Office manages international co-operation in disaster reduction in close collaboration with MOFA, and has developed specific guidelines for its staff in partner countries for analysing risks and proposing Japanese assistance on disaster risk reduction (Cabinet Secretariat, n.d.[13]). Japan is aware that conflict sensitiveness is critical to manage drivers of conflict. (JICA, 2011[14]). As conflict-affected situations are given increased attention, JICA conducts Peace-building Needs and Impact Assessment in the context of conflict and fragility, the results of which are collectively utilised to infer possible medium- to long-term scenarios that are duly reflected in its operations throughout the operation cycle from planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluation in order to avoid having an adverse effect on the situation and promote the peacebuilding process effectively. The Peace-building Needs and Impact Assessment consolidates both the functions of Conflict Analysis at country programming level as well as at project level, and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment at project-level in order to integrate the conflict prevention lens into JICA’s programs and projects (JICA, 2019[15]). This is an encouraging practice, and Japan is now ready take all dimensions of fragility into account in its programming, and to strengthen the impact assessment of its projects.

Managing forced displacement is an explicit priority of Japan’s humanitarian policy, which translated into clear commitments during the World Humanitarian Summit (Agenda for Humanity, 2016[19]). While it is strict in receiving refugees in Japan, Japan is generous when supporting refugees worldwide and is one of the largest donors to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2020[20]). It regularly pledges funds as part of its peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts in the Middle East, and in Africa within the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF, 2018[21]). Japan is also mindful of forced displacement due to climate change and natural hazards, and advocates strongly in international policy fora for these new risks to be taken into account (MFA, 2019[22]).

In 2019, Japan published its second action plan on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (MFA, 2019[23]). This defines concrete support for the protection of women and girls during crises, as well as outlining the role of women in peacebuilding activities. Japan implements this plan through JICA, UN Agencies such as UN Women, the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and other international organisations and NGOs with consideration of local needs to advance the women, peace and security agenda and women’s political and economic empowerment. The plan aligns well with Japan’s domestic policy seeking to achieve a “society in which women shine” (Cabinet of the Prime Minister, 2013[24]).

Japan is increasingly sensitive to the link between emergency humanitarian response and long-term solutions. This is reflected in policy and diplomatic documents (MFA, 2019[6]). Because it focuses on the needs of people displaced by conflicts, climate change or natural disasters, Japan is conscious that long-term humanitarian assistance is not in itself adequate to address protracted challenges. As a result, JICA provides holistic assistance to the refugee hosting countries, and supports a range of initiatives to create economic opportunities for refugees while alleviating the burden on receiving countries. These include amongst others allocating fund to the World Bank sub-window for Refugees and Host Communities (World Bank, 2020[25]; World Bank, 2017[26]).2

Japan sees bilateral co-operation as an important diplomatic tool and a way to promote peace and mutual prosperity, even in fragile countries. Japan’s relations with fragile states are founded on political, development and commercial links. In engaging with fragile and post-crisis countries, Japan has learned from its experience in supporting Cambodia’s reconstruction, and later from its engagement in Afghanistan.3 To foster those links, Japan perceives that its national interests are better served through the bilateral partnerships that define its development assistance. While promoting national ownership, Japan also builds its co-operation on diplomatic ties and partnership agreements that can be renewed after a crisis, such as in Iraq (MFA, 2011[27]). Japan also establishes partnerships with other donors through bilateral co-operation agreements, for example with Turkey on Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation (MFA, 2019[28]).

Japan makes use of the multilateral system to implement projects taking into consideration the comparative advantage of its bilateral co-operation. This is particularly important in conflict zones where UN agencies are better able to work – Japanese staff face stringent security measures. However, Japan’s contribution to pooled funds is still irregular. It is the third largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping operations budget (UN, 2019[29]), but its support is decreasing to major funds such as the Peace Building Fund (UNDG, 2020[30]) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (United Nations, 2020[31]). Japan began to contribute modestly to UN country-based pooled funds in 2019 (UNOCHA, 2020[32]). This is an effective way to support the multilateral system in crisis contexts where Japan has no direct engagement, and should be encouraged.

Japan’s 2011 humanitarian policy is still valid given its solid response to natural disasters while acknowledging that crises are more complex and require more diversified ways to meet humanitarian needs (MFA, 2011[33]). This policy gives Japan sufficient leeway to innovate and adapt to recent international commitments such as the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (OECD, 2019[16]) and the Grand Bargain (Agenda for Humanity, 2016[34]). Japan is itself a disaster-prone country (Cabinet Office, 2018[35]);4 this context has shaped the functioning of Japan’s humanitarian assistance. Japan’s role in conflict-affected and fragile contexts is more recent but increasing (Figure 7.1): Japan now allocates most of its humanitarian assistance to man-made crises, and especially focuses its aid on supporting people displaced by conflicts (OECD, 2020[10]).

Japan uses its dwindling and unpredictable humanitarian assistance to respond to crises. Representing an average of 3.6% of its ODA in 2017-18 (Figure 7.1), humanitarian assistance remains well below the DAC average of 12.5%. Japan’s humanitarian assistance decreased further in 2018, and is now almost half of what it was in 2015 (OECD, 2020[36]). Japan uses a limited initial budget to support humanitarian multilateral agencies including with voluntary contributions. In case of crisis and if the initial budget is exhausted, MOFA can access Japan’s supplementary budget. While earmarked for specific “unforeseen needs”, this supplementary budget is in practice also used in protracted crises abroad, making it an unpredictable mechanism used every year for rather predictable needs. While JICA also mobilises development assistance in those contexts, this unpredictability can prevent Japan from delivering aid effectively in protracted crises, which require predictable budgets so as to define programmes that target humanitarian, development and peacebuilding needs together.

The geographical targeting of Japan’s humanitarian assistance remains clearly focused on Asia and the Pacific, rising from 42% of humanitarian assistance in 2009 to 67% in 2018. Japan, however, is a global humanitarian donor and can respond to any crisis in the world, relying on global humanitarian needs assessments and its diplomatic network to determine the severity of crises, as most DAC members do. Outside Asia, the geographical distribution of its humanitarian assistance has changed in recent years despite its overall decrease. The share of aid to the Middle East now exceeds the whole African region as Japan focuses more on large-scale population displacements in middle-income countries (Figure 7.2). These trends have not affected the way Japan programmes its aid, i.e. responding to humanitarian appeals by mainly using multilateral channels to deliver tightly earmarked projects.

Japan values national ownership and builds solid partnerships with those governments who request assistance. It takes into account national mechanisms and actors when engaging in both disaster risk reduction and peacebuilding activities. Supporting local humanitarian actors is more challenging, as for most DAC members whose humanitarian aid is managed centrally. Japan can use a “grassroots grant scheme” only to support very small projects selected by embassies and therefore cannot give strategic support to local humanitarian partners. Many DAC members confronted with the same issue contribute to UN Country Based Pooled Funds or non-government organisation (NGO) based pooled funds,5 which is a practical way to make progress on their Grand Bargain localisation commitment.

Japan has all the necessary tools to respond to natural disasters on its territory and abroad, building an extremely solid expertise that is also available to other countries, and which includes stand-by teams, stocks of relief items, co-ordination mechanisms, and financing modalities. Based on a request from the government of the country affected by a natural or man-made disaster, or from international organisations, the MOFA assesses the relevance of dispatching a Japan Disaster Relief team, and consults with other ministries and agencies to seek support for the deployment. JICA then manages the operational work including the dispatch of a Japan Disaster Relief team. Those teams were deployed twenty two times since 2015, including Nepal in 2015, Mexico in 2017, and Mozambique in 2019. The Japan Self-Defence Forces can be mobilised notably for transportation and heavy logistics. Japan regularly undertakes drills to remain prepared for large-scale disasters (World Bank, 2016[37]). JICA dispatches experts as well as implements rehabilitation and reconstruction projects It also has a Disaster Risk Financing strategy that covers the whole spectrum from disaster risk management to reconstruction, based on public and private funding mechanisms (Juswanto, 2017[38]). Japan also uses innovative funding mechanisms, such as the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (SEADRIF), introduced in 2018 as a regional platform for all Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (SEADRIF, 2020[39]).6 Finally, JICA also provides a Stand-by Loan for Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation to partner countries such as the Philippines, Peru and El Salvador.

Although most partners appreciate Japan’s engagement in crises, relations remain funding-focused rather than on establishing genuine partnerships. The “Japan Platform” is an interesting model for working with civil society. It consists of 43 Japanese NGOs, MOFA and some Japanese businesses willing to provide assistance in response to disasters and conflicts (Japan Platform, 2020[40]). The platform organises funding for NGOs after a rigorous selection process, but administrative requirements remain heavy for recipients, which goes against the spirit of the Grand Bargain. Current efforts to simplify and standardise procedures are positive and offer an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of Japan’s humanitarian assistance. Japan has limited capacity to monitor humanitarian projects and rarely uses third-party monitoring mechanisms. This lack of field capacity explains in part the rigorous and centralised selection and reporting process as well as Japan’s preference for using multilateral channels in crisis contexts. Japan engages with the humanitarian community through participation in high-level meetings but also through strategic collaboration with multilateral agencies, for example on the humanitarian and development nexus. However, Japan still earmarks much of its funding at the country level, and sometimes at the project level, a characteristic already noted in the last peer review. A notable exception is the partnership with the UN Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), with which Japan has created strategic relations around the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (Government of Japan, 2016[41]).

Japan Self-Defence Force Unit, one of five types of the Japan Disaster Relief teams, is regularly dispatched after an international disaster, and co-ordination mechanisms are well established and aligned with humanitarian principles. For example in Djibouti a part of the Self-Defence Force unit originally deployed for anti-piracy operations also provided relief assistance after the 2019 floods (MFA, 2019[42]). Following a change in legislation in 2015 (Government of Japan, 2016[43]), Japan was able to send a contribution of personnel to the UN mission in South Sudan, where civil-military co-ordination follows the UN rules and leadership. In pursuit of its vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan also engages in building defence capacity in some of its partner countries (Ministry of Defense, 2016[44]). Some of these activities relate to disaster relief, and through MOFA’s Development Project Accountability Committee, Japan pays attention to the development objective and the ODA eligibility of those defence capacity-building activities.


[19] Agenda for Humanity (2016), Individual and Joint Commitments by Core Responsibility, Agenda for Humanity, https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/explore-commitments/indv-commitments/?combine=Austria#search (accessed on 26 July 2019).

[34] Agenda for Humanity (2016), The Grand Bargain - A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need, 2016, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/grand_bargain_final_22_may_final-2_0.pdf (accessed on 28 February 2018).

[24] Cabinet of the Prime Minister (2013), Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, at The Sixty-Eighth Session of The General Assembly of The United Nations (Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister), Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html (accessed on 14 February 2020).

[35] Cabinet Office (2018), White Paper on Disaster Risk Management 2018, Cabinet Office, Tokyo, http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/pdf/H30_hakusho_english.pdf.

[13] Cabinet Secretariat (n.d.), Guide to Disaster Management Measures, http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/catalog/pdf/Guide_to_Japanese_tech_EN.pdf.

[21] CRRF (2018), JICA’s support to the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees in Uganda, Global Compact on Refugees, UNHCR, http://www.globalcrrf.org/crrf_good_practices/jicas-support-to-the-implementation-of-the-global-compact-on-refugees-in-uganda/ (accessed on 11 February 2020).

[41] Government of Japan (2016), Disaster Risk Reduction: Japan and the UNISDR, https://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/publicity/book/hlj/html/201612/201612_06_en.html (accessed on 15 February 2020).

[43] Government of Japan (2016), Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security Government of Japan Seamless Responses for Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community, Government of Japan, Tokyo, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000143304.pdf.

[40] Japan Platform (2020), NGO Japan Platform - Emergency humanitation aid organization, https://www.japanplatform.org/E/ (accessed on 4 February 2020).

[15] JICA (2019), JICA Annual Evaluation Report 2018, Japan International Cooperation Agency, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/reports/2018/c8h0vm0000f4nmle-att/full_2018_a4.pdf.

[9] JICA (2017), Disaster Resilient Society for All, Japan International Cooperation Agency, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/brochures/c8h0vm0000avs7w2-att/disaster_en.pdf (accessed on 4 February 2020).

[18] JICA (2016), Case Study on Mindanao. The Philippines. Women’s Participation and Leadership in Peace-building., Japan International Cooperation Agency, https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/booksandreports/l75nbg00000697z9-att/JICA_MindanaoLO.pdf.

[14] JICA (2011), Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding, Japan International Cooperation Agency, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/peace/pdf/guideline.pdf.

[38] Juswanto, W. (2017), “OECD-ADBI Insurance and Retirement Saving and Disaster Risk Financing: Roundtable and Seminar Promoting Disaster Risk Financing in Asia and the Pacific”, ADB Institute Policy Brief, Vol. No. 2017-1, pp. 2017-2018, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227516/adbi-pb2017-1.pdf (accessed on 15 February 2020).

[6] MFA (2019), Diplomatic Bluebook. Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2018, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000527154.pdf.

[42] MFA (2019), Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Team (Japan Self-Defense Force Units) in Response to the Heavy Rain and Flood Disaster in Djibouti | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002709.html (accessed on 4 February 2020).

[4] MFA (2019), Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page25e_000278.html (accessed on 4 February 2020).

[22] MFA (2019), International Conference on Climate Change and Fragility in the Asia-Pacific Region 2019 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ch/page24e_000259.html (accessed on 17 February 2020).

[23] MFA (2019), National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, http://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/basic_plans/4th/pdf/yougo.pdf (accessed on 14 February 2020).

[28] MFA (2019), The 1st Annual Meeting on Japan-Turkey Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002731.html.

[17] MFA (2019), White Paper on Japan’s Development Cooperation 2018, Ministry of Foreign Affais, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000554934.pdf.

[5] MFA (2017), Peacebuilding Assistance: Japan’s Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/sector/conflict/action.html (accessed on 6 February 2020).

[1] MFA (2016), Japan’s orientation as a peace loving country, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/p_pd/pds/page22e_000691.html (accessed on 30 January 2020).

[2] MFA (2015), Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067701.pdf (accessed on 4 February 2020).

[7] MFA (2015), Sendai Cooperation Initiative for Disaster Risk Reduction, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000070664.pdf (accessed on 4 February 2020).

[3] MFA (2013), National Security Strategy, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf (accessed on 30 January 2020).

[33] MFA (2011), Humanitarian Aid Policy of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/emergency/pdfs/aid_policy_japan.pdf.

[27] MFA (2011), MOFA: Joint Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq -Towards a New Stage of the Japan-Iraq Comprehensive Partnership-, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/pm1111/joint_state1111.html (accessed on 12 February 2020).

[44] Ministry of Defense (2016), “Japan’s Defense Capacity Building Assistance”, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000146830.pdf (accessed on 4 February 2020).

[10] OECD (2020), Creditor Reporting System (database), https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1.

[11] OECD (2020), OECD Fragility framework, http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/overview/0/.

[12] OECD (2020), States of fragility, OECD, Paris, http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/overview/0/.

[36] OECD (2020), Workbook: OECD DAC Aid at a glance by donor, https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1 (accessed on 6 February 2020).

[16] OECD (2019), DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, OECD Legal Instruments, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019 (accessed on 10 April 2019).

[39] SEADRIF (2020), SEADRIF, https://www.seadrif.org/ (accessed on 15 February 2020).

[29] UN (2019), How are we financed?, https://peacekeeping.un.org/fr/how-we-are-funded.

[30] UNDG (2020), Contributor/Partner Factsheet - JAPAN, Government of, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/donor/00141 (accessed on 12 February 2020).

[8] UNDRR (2015), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - 2030, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, https://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf (accessed on 10 April 2019).

[20] UNHCR (2020), Donor profiles | Global Focus, http://reporting.unhcr.org/donor-profiles?year=2019&donor=GJPN (accessed on 11 February 2020).

[31] United Nations (2020), Contributions | OCHA CERF, http://www.unocha.org/cerf/donors/donorspage (accessed on 1 March 2018).

[32] UNOCHA (2020), Welcome to CBPF BI Homepage, https://pfbi.unocha.org/ (accessed on 12 February 2020).

[25] World Bank (2020), IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities, World Bank, Washington DC, http://ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18replenishments/ida18-regional-sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities (accessed on 12 February 2020).

[26] World Bank (2017), Contributions to the Eighteenth Replenishment, World Bank, Washington DC, http://ida.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ida18-donor-contributions.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2020).

[37] World Bank (2016), LEARNING FROM DISASTER SIMULATION DRILLS IN JAPAN, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/419601484285362538/011717-drmhubtokyo-Learning-From-Disaster-Simulation-Drills-in-Japan.pdf (accessed on 18 February 2020).


← 1. Since 2014, Japan has been implementing training courses on “Criminal Justice for French Speaking African Countries” in Côte d'lvoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mauritania. The course covers various fields of criminal investigations, prosecution, administration of justice and counter-terrorism in the target countries.

← 2. Japan is the third highest contributor to the World Bank’s International Development Association 18 replenishment.

← 3. Japan has pledged a total of USD 2 billion in assistance to Afghanistan where it has been engaged in political processes, security, human resource development and economic infrastructure. In 2002, Japan hosted the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan marking the beginning of the country’s reconstruction process.

← 4. Twenty percent of the earthquakes above 6 on the Richter Scale have been recorded in Japan. Source: www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/pdf/H30_hakusho_english.pdf.

← 5. Notably, the START Fund is owned and managed by Start Network’s NGO members, and supported by the governments of the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Jersey and the IKEA Foundation. Source: https://startnetwork.org/start-fund.

← 6. SEADRIF is a regional platform providing ASEAN countries with financial solutions and technical advice to increase their financial resilience to climate and disaster risks. The initiative was developed in partnership with the World Bank. Source: www.seadrif.org/.

Metadata, Legal and Rights

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Extracts from publications may be subject to additional disclaimers, which are set out in the complete version of the publication, available at the link provided.

© OECD 2020

The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at http://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.