3. Effects of COVID-19 on illicit trade in fakes: What do we know so far?
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a profound psychological shift in world trade, altering human behaviour and interactions. The increase in health risks has led to a marked preference for health-related products. In addition, the closures have encouraged a significant shift towards e-commerce. Border closures and trade disruptions have led to fluctuations in trade patterns, including the trade routes used. Law enforcement authorities, faced with adjusting human resources, have had to recalibrate their priorities and operations to adapt to these rapid changes.
This chapter analyses the key impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on illicit trade in counterfeit goods. The impacts were discussed in structured interviews with enforcement and industry experts,1 as well as during webinars on illicit trade that took place between March 2020 and March 2021 (OECD, 2020[1]), (OECD, 2020[2]) (OECD, 2020[3]), (OECD, 2021[4]) and (OECD, 2021[5]) The findings are complemented with quantitative illustrations drawn from of seizures of counterfeit goods listed in the OECD-EUIPO database (see Box 1.1 in the introductory chapter).
All experts highlighted that the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic surpassed the numerical data and nuances of trade. Notably, it introduced a deep psychological shift in global trading, influencing both human behaviour and their interactions. As the health risks became more prominent, there was a marked preference amongst individuals for authentic health-related products, highlighting concerns over the safety and efficacy of such products. In some countries, this led to a notable reduction in counterfeiting, particularly in the areas of personal and casual trade.
In response to the economic challenges, countries launched new legislative and regulatory measures. However, these measures often led to confusion among citizens, institutions, and industries due to their evolving nature. In the initial phases of the pandemic, addressing counterfeit goods took a backseat, a reflection of the broader societal adaptation to new norms like lockdowns and remote work. Concurrently, many industries experienced disruptions, with some even halting their operations.
Experts noted that the pandemic's effects weren't limited to trade. A significant shift was observed in consumer behaviour. As consumers were spending more time at home, there was a temporary uptick in unauthorised access to digital content and an increased demand for home-centric products. These changes also indicated the kind of products people preferred, and predictably counterfeiters adjusted their strategies to fit the changing preferences.
Furthermore, the pandemic ushered in changes to societal norms. A concerning outcome of this was the rise in crime rates, with small criminal groups targeting individuals possessing branded goods. Additionally, the ease of online shopping led to a decline in brand loyalty among consumers. This behaviour not only posed challenges to genuine businesses, but also offered counterfeiters an avenue to exploit. The diminishing distinction between brand loyalties hinted at a thinning line between legal and illegal trade practices.
Interviewed parties noted that the severity of the crisis cultivated a heightened sense of community and patriotism. Citizens became more vigilant and protective, especially towards the vulnerable sections of society. The gravity of the situation fostered a collective mindset that counterfeiting was not merely a commercial concern but had life-altering implications.
Lastly, experts pointed that the criminal factions involved in counterfeiting displayed remarkable adaptability. Criminals were quick to exploit the increased product demands during the pandemic, with some even venturing into producing fake COVID-19 test kits. This posed new challenges for customs in identifying genuine products. Moreover, the counterfeiters leveraged the booming e-commerce sector, particularly abusing social media platforms like TikTok and Instagram, to sell their counterfeit goods, making their detection more difficult.
The onset of the COVID-19 global lockdowns significantly hampered the movement of goods across economies, particularly in regions with suspended air traffic. As a result, land transportation costs, especially between ports and the interior of economies, surged, complicating the timely delivery of crucial items such as medications and personal protective equipment.
Interviews revealed that while border closures and trade disruptions led to fluctuations in trade patterns, The People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), and Hong Kong (China) remained the primary provenance economies for counterfeits (Box 3.1). Lockdowns led to short-term declines in counterfeiting not because of a fundamental shift in trading practices, but due to constrained transportation of counterfeit products.
Criminals who engage in the trade of counterfeit and pirated products tend to ship infringing products via complex routes, abusing many intermediary points in order to cover their tracks. This poses a challenge in determining whether a given economy produces counterfeit goods or is a point of transit. This challenge resulted in the coining of the term “provenance economy” that was first used in the OECD-EUIPO report (OECD/EUIPO, 2016[6]) following the OECD methodology developed in 2008.
The term provenance economy refers to both those economies of origin where the actual production of infringing goods is taking place, as well as those economies that are abused as ports of transit through which infringing goods pass on route to the destination economy.
The pandemic's early impacts were most evident in disrupted global supply chains (OECD, 2022[7]). For example, Finland, which is favourably positioned geographically as a transit point for cargo traffic between the European Union and China, experienced a sharp decline in air cargo, a prominent medium for trafficking counterfeits, due to suspensions in Chinese airspace.
Experts noted that the pandemic did not significantly alter traffickers' favoured supply chains or routes. Established routes retained their efficiency and cost-effectiveness, but customs and enforcement agencies were unable to effectively combat counterfeiting due to continuous challenges related to the pandemic.
The year 2020 marked a lull in counterfeiting cases. The downward trend in the number of seizures of counterfeit goods persisted into the following years in the European Union, raising questions about the causes for this. Experts attributed the significant downturn in 2020 seizures to diminished air traffic, a direct consequence of China's lockdown. When China subsequently reopened, air traffic resumed on a regular basis. However, the financial strains associated with the pandemic led companies to reduce counterfeiting enforcement. It is also important to make the distinction between the number of seizures and their value. Indeed, the downward trend in the number of seizures was not accompanied by a decrease in the seized value.
Customs data from DG TAXUD shows that the number of seizures dropped in 2020 and slightly increased in 2021 (Figure 3.1), while data from the US customs show a strong increase in the number of seizures in 2021 following the decline experienced in 2020 (Figure 3.2).
Source: OECD/EUIPO global customs seizures.
Source: OECD/EUIPO global customs seizures.
Experts noted that in the initial months of the pandemic, there was a decrease in both the volume and range of counterfeit goods intercepted by customs. As global attention shifted to prioritising health, the counterfeit market followed suit, emphasising masks, gloves, and antibacterial apparel. This adaptability underscores the responsive nature of counterfeit markets to changing scenarios.
Lockdowns, with their variable stringency across nations, generated in some cases alterations in counterfeit entry points. While some regions observed decreases in counterfeit consignments due to supply chain interruptions, the established entry points for counterfeit goods remained largely predictable.
In the industrial sector, conventional counterfeit production hubs such as China underwent disturbances, prompting counterfeiters to expand their operations to, for example, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Peru, Mexico, and Guatemala. It is evident that criminals consistently adapt their activities and methods, along with modifying their trade routes.
This ability to adapt is reflected in seizures data. An analysis of the trade routes of seized counterfeit products clearly shows the decline of China (-10 percentage points) and Hong Kong (China) (-3 percentage points) during the Covid period (2020-21) compared to the 2017-2019 period. They also show the growing role of certain Asian and South American economies as suppliers of counterfeit goods, such as the Philippines, Viet Nam, Colombia, and Mexico (Figure 3.3).
Source: OECD-EUIPO global customs seizures.
Criminals seized the opportunity to profit from the pandemic by flooding the market with illicit COVID-19-related products. Enforcement authorities observed a considerable uptick in seizures of counterfeit and subpar medicines, test kits, personal protective equipment (PPE), and other related medical products. For instance, a US Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) cited 668 seizures related to COVID-19, including imitation masks, fake COVID-19 tests, and dubious pharmaceuticals purported to treat the virus. This trend is not limited to the United States; the World Customs Organization documented around 200 seizures of similar COVID-related products in other economies.
Public health and safety were jeopardised by the proliferation of counterfeit health products. Fake masks, which falsely sold as medical grade, became widespread, endangering both medical professionals and the general populace. Likewise, counterfeit test kits and bogus vaccination cards were discovered, underscoring the need for increased vigilance. Counterfeit items included products which violated trademarks, as well as those that were substandard or unlisted.
The types of counterfeit goods in circulation underwent a noticeable transformation during the pandemic. Counterfeit health products, including masks, gloves, and sanitation attire, rose in prominence. Many consumers turned to digital platforms to buy these products due to shortages in traditional outlets. Concurrently, there was a surge in demand for vitamins, notably vitamin C, spurred by the perception of its immunity-enhancing properties. This change in consumer behaviour offered counterfeiters new avenues to exploit.
As an example, there was an influx of counterfeit health products into Italy, including masks, gloves, and antibacterial gels. Originating from economies such as China, Hong Kong (China), and Indonesia, these items often breached trademarks and were of inferior quality. In some instances, imported medications and vitamins were suspected to be counterfeit, although conclusive evidence was lacking.
Enforcement activities involving COVID-related products revealed that the overwhelming global demand for items such as masks meant that counterfeiters did not always need to rely on fake branding or infringed intellectual property. Many chose to manufacture substandard masks devoid of any branding, thus capitalising on the unprecedented demand.
The European Union's Anti-Fraud Office OLAF initiated an investigation in March 2020, concentrating on the medical supplies used for COVID-19. The inquiry encompassed a range of fraudulent activities, including counterfeits, scams, and falsified medicines. The investigation found that products seized often did not meet EU standards and were commonly accompanied by counterfeit certificates of authenticity. In 2021, OLAF’s investigations led to the identification of suspicious operators and seizures of over 100 million COVID-related products. These included consignments of hand sanitisers containing a high volume of methanol, substandard face masks, and fake testing kits.
The investigation found further that Chinese traditional medicines purported to cure COVID-19 were being trafficked, despite lacking proven efficacy. These questionable products were smuggled into the European Union in significant volumes.
The pandemic also led to restrictions on medical supplies, either imposed by local authorities or resulting from reduced air traffic. With over 60 countries enacting export restrictions, enforcement bodies raised alarms about potential illicit activities in specific markets, such as cancer treatments, which were experiencing local shortages.
To address this global issue, OLAF collaborated with nearly every custom and enforcement authority in Europe and around the world, in addition to partnering with Europol, Interpol, and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). This collaborative effort resulted in the detection of more than 1 250 suspicious companies operating as intermediaries or traders involved in the production of counterfeit or substandard products related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
To exploit the situation, fraudsters established artificially lengthy chains of intermediary shell companies. Numerous opportunistic businesses sought to enter a lucrative new market without any prior operational history in the field and lacked control over their supply chain.
OLAF placed a high priority on identifying and preventing these fraudulent activities. Through its investigations, OLAF uncovered various fraud schemes, sharing the gathered information with both EU Member States and non-EU countries. OLAF also pinpointed 270 companies employing forged or invalid EU declarations of conformity, disseminating pertinent information to EU Member States. The diligent work of OLAF's investigators and analysts empowered Member States to halt the distribution of over 100 million counterfeit or substandard medical supplies in 2021.
Both the customs data seizures from DG TAXUD and US CBP-ICE show sharp rises in the shares of counterfeit masks (in their HS category) from the second quarter of 2020. This was transitory and was followed by a sharp decline, with the share of these products returning to pre-pandemic levels by the third quarter of 2021.
Source: OECD/EUIPO global customs seizures.
Source: OECD/EUIPO global customs seizures.
While there is a perception that counterfeiting during the pandemic focused on masks and personal protective equipment (PPE), organised crime broadened their operations. The transition in consumer behaviour towards online purchasing was exploited, encompassing a range of products such as cosmetics, toys, sportswear, accessories, and even food and beverages.
Data on customs seizures show that during the pandemic items such as leather goods, clothing and jewellery in particular were increasingly counterfeited. Indeed, they were seized more frequently than during the pre-COVID-19 period (Figure 3.6). The shares of customs seizures related to these product categories were higher in 2020-21 than in 2017-19.
Significantly, the pharmaceutical industry came under threat due to the escalating demand for anti-COVID-19 products that often could not be satisfied. Markets were inundated with fraudulent treatments, test kits, and medical supplies. The pandemic also prompted temporary regulatory adjustments, such as the suspension of serialisation requirements for critical drugs by Luxembourg and French authorities. The lockdown, though essential for health reasons, may have further escalated economic and social tensions. Experts noted that concerns are mounting in regions like sub-Saharan Africa, which relies heavily on imported medical supplies, about the repercussions on diseases like malaria and AIDS (OECD, 2021[8]).
The COVID-19 pandemic further accentuated the challenges faced by high-risk industries such as tobacco, alcohol and food. Criminal entities driving illicit trade networks capitalized on the pandemic, exploiting systemic vulnerabilities and rapidly changing conditions. Factors like border closures, reshaped supplier structures and disrupted supply chain relationships; evolving enforcement priorities contributed to the illicit upsurge. Enforcement agencies in Europe have uncovered numerous instances where criminals have penetrated legitimate supply chains with counterfeit or substandard products. Examples include the reintroduction of degraded milk and dairy products into the market, fraudulent seed oils masked as extra virgin olive oil and illicit horse meat. All these products, when inferior in quality, can pose serious health risks (OECD, 2020[9]; OECD, 2020[10]; OECD, 2021[11]; OECD, 2022[12]).
Source: OECD/EUIPO global customs seizures.
Similarly, there has been a noticeable spike in illicit tobacco trade, with significant recent seizures across EU countries. The economic aftermath of the pandemic such as the decline in consumers’ purchasing power have prompted them to buy cheaper tobacco products. Criminal groups are gearing up to cater to this demand (OECD, 2020[9]; OECD, 2020[10]).
Lastly, illicit trade in alcohol has grown significantly, e.g. in counterfeit wines. Even if the demand for alcohol has remained stable, supply chains for legitimate products have been disrupted. This demand-supply imbalance is exploited by criminals producing substandard and hazardous alcoholic beverages. Reports from countries such as the Dominican Republic and India have confirmed hundreds of deaths due to the consumption of such illicit alcohol, emphasising the gravity of the situation (OECD, 2022[12]; OECD, 2021[11]).
The COVID-19 pandemic dramatically reshaped global e-commerce. As the world grappled with the crisis, the online environment witnessed a heightened risk of cybercrime. Authorities reported that as remote work grew, cybercriminals exploited the less secure infrastructure of home networks. Law enforcement agencies across the European Union found e-commerce platforms being extensively used for distributing fraudulent COVID-19 related products. Such malpractices were not restricted to the European Union. The United States faced challenges in ensuring secure and lawful e-commerce; a rise in the use of small packages by counterfeiters that required only minimal data, made it difficult to track illicit activities.
With lockdowns forcing the closure of physical markets, consumers pivoted to online shopping, leading to a proliferation of e-commerce ventures. As a result, e-commerce giants such as Amazon, Alibaba, and AliExpress experienced exponential growth. Improved responsiveness and customer service became a hallmark of this era, further enhancing online shopping experiences.
The surge in online shopping was not a temporary phenomenon. Even after restrictions eased, consumers continued to show a preference for online platforms. For instance, the United Kingdom reported a 47% surge in online sales in the first half of the pandemic, which persisted, leading to a 41% rise in retail trade from 2019. This shift in consumer behaviour was echoed globally and consumer confidence in e-commerce platforms grew.
Experts noted that the pandemic's influence was not just limited to consumer behaviour. There was an explosive growth in domain registrations related to COVID-19 for selling medical items. Additionally, the Dark Net saw an uptick in the distribution of counterfeit medicines, leveraging COVID-19 as a major key word.
Another consequence of the e-commerce boom was the strain on postal and courier services. With the rising volume of packages, declaring and inspecting shipments became increasingly difficult. For enforcement services monitoring these shipments became an enormous task due to the sheer volume. Additionally, the pandemic led many brands to prioritise tasks other than brand protection, inadvertently allowing counterfeit activities to flourish.
The onset of the pandemic brought unprecedented challenges to enforcement authorities. A significant hurdle arose with fluctuations in trade volumes due to pandemic-induced lockdowns and restrictions. Experts noted that contrary to some assumptions, the dips in counterfeit goods seizures were primarily a result of these trade volume changes rather than a lapse in enforcement.
Customs officers responsible for inspecting containers faced the dilemma of adapting to a rapidly changing landscape. Unlike many professions that transitioned to remote work, customs inspections necessitated on-site presence. Officers navigated through staffing and operational adjustments to maintain operations during the pandemic.
An alarming surge in counterfeit and substandard products, including masks and other health equipment, intensified the challenge. Inaccurate health claims and fraudulent certification added layers of complexity to a fraught situation. For example, enforcement officers in the European Union grappled with the discrepancies in international standards. On occasion, substandard products entered the EU market due to pressing demand and stretched resources.
Experts noted that during the COVID-19 pandemic enforcement officers, faced with limited resources and a wide range of responsibilities, had to recalibrate their priorities. Prior to the pandemic, enforcement officers juggled diverse tasks from combating counterfeit goods to narcotics interdiction. However, the gravity of COVID-19 demanded a renewed focus on health and safety-related materials, particularly for COVID-19 related products, such as Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and test kits.2 As the pandemic's grip loosened and health concerns eased, there was a reduction in the priority of health products. Many countries reverted to pre-pandemic customs procedures, with ad hoc health measures relaxed or lifted.
In terms of processes, according to interviewed enforcement experts, despite the challenges there were no significant shifts in customs procedures during the pandemic. Meanwhile, the boom in online shopping underscored the challenges of managing cross-border counterfeit trafficking, especially when small packages were involved. The persisting issues concerning small packages in counterfeit trafficking suggest that procedural changes might be needed in the future.
Information sharing between enforcement officers and rights holders emerged as another bottleneck. For example, a pilot programme introduced by US CBP allowing importers to abandon suspected counterfeit shipments was challenged due to insufficient communication with rights holders. Economic strains played a role as well. With numerous companies grappling with financial constraints, the focus shifted away from IPR enforcement.
Internationally, enforcement authorities in OECD countries rallied against the changes in illicit trade propelled by the pandemic. The US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) initiated Operation Stolen Promise, addressing global trade and cybercrime. The European Union launched several initiatives in response. DG TAXUD set up a customs risk management alert for COVID-19, DG Trade instituted pre-export authorisation for PPEs, and DG GROW issued guidelines to ensure the supply and safety of medical equipment. Simultaneously, OLAF focused on preventing the entry of illicit goods into the European Union through intelligence sharing and updating risk profiles.
The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic presented an array of challenges in the realm of counterfeiting. These difficulties underscored the need for an integrated, collaborative response at both the international and national levels.
3.7.1. Collaborative endeavours
To combat the escalating counterfeiting issue, international collaboration emerged as a pivotal strategy. The United States actively engaged in real-time intelligence sharing with many partners in Latin America. Such collaboration significantly augmented the capacity to identify and interdict counterfeit and substandard products. Nationally, enhanced co-operation was manifested through the collaboration between customs and market surveillance authorities (e.g. food safety), particularly evident in addressing issues like contaminated sanitisers.
Despite these efforts, the surge in e-commerce during the pandemic provided fertile ground for counterfeit activities. Addressing the voluminous small parcels typical in e-commerce continues to be a challenge.
3.7.2. Overcoming challenges: Innovation and lessons
Countries took several measures in response to the pandemic's challenges. For example, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency faced persistent issues of limited resources and evolving priorities. Their adaptive response included creating rapid response teams that partnered with businesses importing vital goods. This proactive measure ensured the swift import of crucial supplies to medical establishments. The CBP also developed ties with the e-commerce ecosystem, encompassing platforms and carriers. Such alliances facilitated enhanced communication and collective action against counterfeit activities online.
Another example is the adoption by Finnish customs of remote working practices to safeguard field officers. This shift led to increased virtual training sessions.
In the United Kingdom, the government's strategy to respond to challenges included the establishment of an Office for Product Safety and Standards, which held sellers accountable for product safety compliance. This strategy, however, had limited efficacy against international counterfeiters. The proposal of an online safety bill aimed to further address online counterfeiting was considered, but its scope was limited as it did not address intellectual property issues.
A notable achievement during these tumultuous times was the co-operative spirit evident in vaccine distribution. There was unparalleled collaboration between enforcement agencies, the medical supply sector, and other private actors. This cohesion effectively prevented the influx of counterfeit vaccines on the market.
3.7.3. Future directions
To combat counterfeiting holistically, there is an emerging consensus on the need for integrated strategies that encompass the public and private sectors. Such strategies should encapsulate not just law enforcement, but entities from the financial, e-commerce, and telecommunications communities. Harnessing the insights and resources from these parties can provide a comprehensive understanding of counterfeiting challenges.
Additionally, experts highlighted the need for countries to treat counterfeiting as a significant economic crime, warranting attention and resources. By integrating counterfeiting within broader economic crime paradigms, a more cohesive, effective, and efficient approach to its mitigation can be achieved. In this context, it is worth noting the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT),3 an EU policy cycle, embodies an integrated approach to EU internal security. This comprehensive strategy encompasses a spectrum of measures, including external border controls, collaboration among police, customs, and judicial entities, information management, innovation, training, prevention, and addressing the external dimension of internal security. Additionally, EMPACT recognises the importance of fostering public-private partnerships where applicable and has a clear methodology to develop, implement and evaluate priorities in the fight against organised and serious international crime. It aims to tackle the most important threats posed to the European Union in a coherent and methodological way by improving and strengthening co-operation between the relevant services of the Member States, EU institutions and EU agencies, as well as third-party economies and organisations, including the private sector where relevant. Some illicit activities are included in the list of the European Union’s priorities in the fight against serious and organised crime.
References
[12] OECD (2022), Illicit trade in high-risk sectors: Implications of illicit alcohol for public health and criminal networks, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1334c634-en.
[7] OECD (2022), International trade during the COVID-19 pandemic: Big shifts and uncertainty, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/international-trade-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-big-shifts-and-uncertainty-d1131663/.
[8] OECD (2021), Chair’s Summary of the webinar “COVID-19 vaccine and the threat of illicit trade” organised by the OECD TF-CIT on 21 December 2020, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2021)2/en.
[11] OECD (2021), Chair’s Summary of the webinar “Crisis policy, illicit alcohol and lessons learned from lockdown” organised by the OECD TF-CIT on 12 January 2021., https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2021)4/en.
[4] OECD (2021), COVID-19 vaccine and the threat of illicit trade“, Chair’s summary of a webinar held on 21 December 2020, OECD, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2021)2/en.
[5] OECD (2021), Crisis policy, illicit alcohol and lessons learned from lockdown“, Chair’s summary of a webinar held on 12 January 2021, OECD, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2021)4/en.
[9] OECD (2020), Chair’s Summary of the webinar “High Risk Sectors in COVID-19 recovery” organised by the OECD TF-CIT on 16 June 2020, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2020)6/en.
[10] OECD (2020), Chair’s Summary of the webinar “Illicit trade in a time of crisis” organised by the OECD TF-CIT on 23 April 2020., https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2020)3/en.
[3] OECD (2020), High Risk Sectors in COVID-19 recovery“, Chair’s summary of a webinar held on 16 September 2020, OECD, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2020)6/en.
[1] OECD (2020), Illicit Trade in a time of crisis, Chair’s summary of a webinar held on 23 April 2020, OECD, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2020)3/en.
[2] OECD (2020), Trade in fake medicines at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic“, Chair’s summary of a webinar held on 10 June 2020, OECD, https://one.oecd.org/official-document/GOV/PGC/HLRF/TFCIT(2020)4/en.
[6] OECD/EUIPO (2016), Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact,, OECD Publishing, Paris,, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252653-en.
Have there been new priorities in the relevant legal/regulatory frameworks during the pandemic? If yes, what are their impacts on the results (nature/volume of seizures)?
How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the volume and nature of goods seized by customs? For example, how to explain the drop in the number of seizures in the first half of 2020 (drop in trave volumes / shortages of enforcement officers?)
More generally, have there been any challenges or obstacles faced by customs during the COVID-19 period?
Have there been any specific changes in the types of counterfeit or illegal goods being seized during the pandemic?
What were the most frequently seized COVID-related products? And non-COVID products? Did you note the appearance of any new/unusual products?
Have you noted some longer-term changes in the structure of import in general after pandemic?
How has the pandemic influenced the resources, staffing, and training? Impacts on seizures.
Have there been any changes in the methods, risk profiling or technologies used by customs to detect counterfeit goods during the pandemic?
Have any (temporal) changes in the customs’ procedures been introduced during the pandemics?
Given the crisis, have any preferences for medical supply shipments been introduced (for instance in terms of less restrictive controls on borders)?
Notes
← 1. A list of questions discussed during the interviews can be found in the Annex 3.B.
← 2. See Annex 3.A for a full list.
← 3. For more information, refer to the EMPACT website, https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-statistics/empact.