4. Towards more strategic and effective development finance for biodiversity

As development finance is a minor part of total biodiversity finance, it needs to be used strategically and effectively. In accordance with the provisions of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, development co-operation is increasingly expected to unlock, catalyse and leverage multiple sources of finance, including from the private sector (United Nations, 2015[1]). These expectations are also echoed in CBD assessments (CBD, 2020[2]). The literature reviewed for this report sees a more strategic role for development finance for biodiversity, whereby it contributes to:

  • Helping developing countries reassign expenditures towards biodiversity-related purposes (CBD, 2020[2]) and reduce additional restoration efforts, e.g. by reforming and removing environmentally harmful incentives, including subsidies (e.g. for fossil fuels or in nature-depleting activities) (OECD, 2022[3]); mainstreaming biodiversity into government financial planning processes (Milner-Gulland et al., 2021[4]; Zoi Network, 2022[5]; Dufief et al., 2022[6]), searching for biodiversity-related co-benefits, notably through investments in nature-based solutions; and supporting other mainstreaming approaches across policy frameworks and in specific sector policies, plans and projects (OECD, 2018[7]; Djomo Nana et al., 2022[8]). Generating domestic revenues that promote biodiversity protection (CBD, 2020[2]), e.g. through environmental fiscal reforms and other incentives that promote the sustainable use of biodiversity (OECD, 2021[9]; OECD, 2021[10]; Miller, Agrawal and Roberts, 2013[11]), including well-designed green taxes (Mpofu, 2022[12]). Table 4.1 summarises the finance generated or mobilised by biodiversity-relevant economic incentives.

  • Improving standards and regulations to achieve efficiency, and helping to align incentives among actors (CBD, 2020[2]). In their engagement with partner countries, donors can also support the development of biodiversity mechanisms, such as payments for ecosystem services (Miller, Agrawal and Roberts, 2013[11]; Börner et al., 2020[13]; CIFOR, 2021[14]; Schroeder et al., 2020[15]); biodiversity offsets (OECD, 2016[16]); and corporate social responsibility principles and safeguards (Duchelle et al., 2017[17]).

  • Catalysing additional public and private finance for biodiversity by supporting access to public international development finance and leveraging partnerships by developing countries, e.g. between bilateral and international funding instruments, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF; see Box 4.1), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Land Degradation Neutrality Fund and other environmental financing instruments to mobilise resources for biodiversity (IPBES, 2018[18]).

  • Helping to unlock private finance by lifting market and regulatory barriers and information gaps, promoting the role of the private sector in NBSAPs and Biodiversity Finance Plans, and creating a supportive enabling environment for investment. Creating domestic and international opportunities for private investment in biodiversity can quickly raise finance for conservation (UNEP, 2021[19]).

Developing countries are often leading the way in creating and delivering innovative finance solutions and the UNDP has identified over 150 biodiversity finance solutions (including instruments, tools and strategies) that can be used to finance the preservation and restoration of nature in a country (UNDP-BIOFIN, n.d.[21]), seeking to go beyond mobilising new revenues towards realigning expenditures, reducing future costs and delivery (in line with the strategic role of development finance for biodiversity mentioned in bullets above). An efficient way for donors to use development co-operation finance is to focus on these solutions when deploying their traditional financing modalities. First, donors could continue using grants, notably for capacity development activities such as technical assistance, support for policy design, advocacy, and awareness raising, developing organisational and institutional capacity (e.g. setting up funds and facilities dedicated to conservation); promoting effective governance arrangements; and improving biodiversity, ecosystem services and natural capital data (OECD, 2021[10]). This would enable donors to address immediate priorities, such as ensuring the effective management of protected areas, supporting local communities that depend on ecotourism revenues, or maintaining monitoring and enforcement activities (World Bank Group, 2021[22]); as well as reducing food waste, promoting community-based forest management and forest certification, addressing illegal logging and wildlife trade, improving water quality or promoting sustainable fishing practices (IPBES, 2019[23]).

Second, development finance can also be creative in how it uses concessionary, “soft” loans for ecosystem protection or ecosystem-friendly activities. Concessional loans can finance a biodiversity-related activity, or the terms of the loan can be used as a condition to derive biodiversity benefits (e.g. lower interest rates would be the reward for the conservation or sustainable use of natural capital). Increasingly, some donors also resort to results-based or conditional payments to ensure that investments reach their desired outcomes, e.g. (UNDP, 2021[24]). Concessional loans for development are most suitable for investments that have a relatively direct relationship to economic returns. Their use has been suggested e.g. for projects in nascent biodiversity and ecosystem service markets where financial returns are low (Parker et al., 2012[25]). For example, Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI, n.d.[26]) was launched in 2008 pledging up to 3 billion NOK annually to help save the world’s tropical forests while improving local livelihoods. NICFI is well known for its results-based bilateral partnership with key forest partner countries (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Liberia and Peru) disbursing payments for reduced deforestation verified by satellite imagery (Planet, 2023[27]). Beyond using ODA to create payments for results schemes, NICFI also supports capacity development and improving land use and forest governance efforts.

Finally, other development co-operation instruments enable investments in biodiversity conservation by de-risking investments in this area. For example, donors support the development, scaling, and innovative application of financial instruments which blend commercial and concessional finance (Tobin-de la Puente and Mitchell, 2021[34]); support environmental or conservation trust funds (Parker et al., 2012[25]; Berghöfer et al., 2017[35]); co-finance collaborative management partnerships for protected areas, including with private philanthropy and impact investors (World Bank, 2021[36]; Zoi Network, 2022[5]); use a range of other financial instruments such as green, blue, resilience or conservation bonds, credit guarantees or policy insurance and catastrophe bonds (OECD, 2020[37]; Standing, 2021[38]); design sovereign debt restructuring schemes and debt-for-nature swaps that reduce a country’s debt and deliver biodiversity objectives (Box 4.2); as well as facilitate exchanges to promote a deeper understanding on access and benefit-sharing from the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources.

Overall, donor financing remains essential to ensure the effective implementation of biodiversity policies in developing countries (IPBES, 2018[18]). If well designed, donor activities – whether grants, loans or other instruments – can protect biodiversity while simultaneously reducing poverty, helping to tackle climate change (Berghöfer et al., 2017[35]) and supporting actions with multiple benefits for societal goals (Förster, 2022[49]). To achieve this, donors may need to increase their ODF and the range of modalities deployed for biodiversity, and also enhance the effectiveness of their investments (CBD, 2020[50]).

As seen, DAC members individually and collectively have committed to supporting biodiversity through their development co-operation activities. To what extent are these commitments reflected in current DAC member policy frameworks? Table 4.2 provides an overview of DAC member frameworks for biodiversity, noting whether they seek for co-benefits with climate change (see Box 3.1 in Chapter 3), and listing recent development finance pledges and announcements made in support of biodiversity and nature. This overview gives a first, high-level approximation of how DAC members undertake biodiversity-related activities – and provides several preliminary conclusions.

In terms of biodiversity frameworks, the overview shows that although DAC members often mention biodiversity as an overarching strategic direction of their development co-operation, only Canada, the EU, France and the United Kingdom have dedicated biodiversity policies. One good example is the European Union’s Biodiversity for Life initiative, which brings together all EU-funded development co-operation projects and programmes that target biodiversity under the same umbrella framework, with the aim of ensuring better coherence and co-ordination (CBD, 2020[2]). The UK’s International Development Strategy includes a high-level commitment to ensure that its ODA becomes “nature positive”, aligning it with the international goal to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, and with the GBF.

The integration of biodiversity into development co-operation is limited according to (OECD, 2021[51]). Notwithstanding, several DAC members have started looking at how biodiversity and nature can be reconciled and integrated with broader development co-operation efforts, including those linked to climate change. Sweden’s recent experience, for example, shows that additional work was needed even in a country where biodiversity was relatively well mainstreamed. Sweden’s Special Government Assignment on Biodiversity and Ecosystems aims at strengthening and deepening work related to biodiversity and ecosystems throughout Sida’s operations over 2020-23, by seeking coherence and synergies with climate change and other thematic areas (e.g. governance and gender equality); strengthening on-going biodiversity interventions to learn from operations that deliver results, while exploring opportunities for co-financing, notably to support Africa (e.g. through the Africa 100 Initiative); intensifying dialogue with multilateral and European partners and other actors; and mobilising funding, notably through the use of guarantees (Sida, 2021[52]).

As regards biodiversity-climate links, biodiversity objectives are part of all DAC members’ climate change and environment strategies or action plans, in one way or another. For instance, the UK’s International Development Strategy prioritises work on climate change and nature, putting it at the heart of its international development offer. The UK 2030 Strategic Framework on International Climate and Nature Action will further define the UK Government’s vision and long-term role on these issues (UK Government, 2022[65]). Canada also recognises that urgent action is needed to address the interconnected crises of climate change and biodiversity loss, which disproportionally affect the poorest and most vulnerable, and intends to increase supporting nature-based solutions to climate change and to support sustainable development objectives more broadly (OECD, 2021[51]). Norway has also been integrating biodiversity as a key component of its REDD+ programme from the start in 2008, becoming one of the three overall goals in the revised strategy of 2019. At the same time, the growing interest among donors has yet to be matched with concrete action, practical tools or training, including in mobilising resources at scale through nature-based solutions. Moreover, caution will be needed to ensure that the increasing interest in nature-based solutions does not end up “climatising” the biodiversity agenda (see Box 3.1 in Chapter 3), thus diverting attention away from broader biodiversity values (Parrotta et al., 2022[91]).

Finally, 10 DAC members (e.g. Canada, Denmark, EU, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom) have put forward biodiversity-related development finance pledges to support developing countries in their action on biodiversity and in the implementation of the GBF Table 4.2, in line with CBD Article 20 on Financial Resources (CBD, 2006[92]), as well as previous UNFCCC COP26 announcements made to implement the Paris Agreement on climate change (COP26 Presidency, 2021[64]) including USD 1.7 billion, from 2021 to 2025, to secure forest tenure rights and the role as guardians of nature of IPLC’s and other forest dependent communities (COP26 Presidency, 2021[93]) In addition, four DAC members have announced synergistic pledges for climate and biodiversity, notably emphasising the role of nature-based solutions (e.g. Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom).

Furthermore, at CBD COP15, 14 DAC members issued a Joint Donor Statement on International Finance for Biodiversity and Nature (Joint Donor Statement, 2022[89]). The Statement notes these members’ intention to continue to collectively increase international biodiversity finance (and includes a number of pledges as in Table 4.2, as well as contributions to the GEF) and align relevant international development flows, commensurate with the ambition of the GBF. The Statement is in part a response to the 10 Point Plan for Financing Biodiversity, an initiative launched by Ecuador, Gabon, the Maldives and the UK to provide a blueprint for bridging the current biodiversity financing gap (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2022[94]) and which also specifies the role donor finance must play and has also been endorsed by 10 DAC members.

Further work would be needed to understand how DAC members use safeguards or Strategic Environmental Assessments in their work, and how they mainstream biodiversity across their portfolios, as well as to review how DAC members are structured to deliver on these frameworks and their commitments, including the Joint Donor Statement and the DAC Declaration, more generally. While there are indications that members with large impacts on biodiversity tended to have high positive contributions to conservation through funding, there is room for members to be more ambitious and to improve their budget allocation processes based on their negative impacts on biodiversity (Tomoi et al., 2022[95]). Moreover, as DAC members seek to mainstream biodiversity into their development co-operation strategies, additional attention should be taken to assess whether further mainstreaming can be positively derived from and linked to more funding.

Beyond the DAC, other donors and South-South and triangular co-operation providers also have a role to consider biodiversity in their development activities as well as how to align such co-operation with the recently adopted GBF. Since the CBD was agreed in 1992, 11 countries moved from a low- or middle-income group to a high-income group, according to the World Bank classification. While this classification includes DAC members such as Greece, Portugal, Poland or Korea – it also includes other providers such as Chile, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates. Further, another 24 countries moved from a low-income group to a middle-income group over that same period, including China, Peru or Turkey, all of which have development or South-South Co-operation programmes. While national capabilities need to be considered, halting biodiversity loss will require the contribution from these other countries (Tomoi et al., 2022[95]), which could use the OECD database to report or enhance their reporting (e.g. using the Rio markers).

ODF can be used to support developing countries in aligning incentives and finance towards biodiversity-related goals and objectives. Moreover, development finance providers can support partner countries to scale up the use and ambition of economic instruments (i.e. positive incentives) that promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. These instruments (including biodiversity-relevant taxes, fees and charges, tradable permits, biodiversity offsets, payments for ecosystem services, with environmental and social safeguards (CBD, 2022[96])) serve to reflect the true value of biodiversity in economic decision making, provide continuous incentives for more environmentally-sustainable patterns and are able to generate revenue or mobilise finance for biodiversity (OECD, 2021[97]). Failure to address biodiversity from a systemic, whole-of-government perspective could significantly undermine developing countries’ efforts to implement their biodiversity objectives, as well as sustainable development at national and global levels.

It is of high priority to identify and reform potentially environmentally harmful support across a range of sectors, including development co-operation for energy, agriculture and fisheries, averting the most detrimental and market distorting types of support, so that government-funded actions to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity are not undermined by government incentives that lead to environmentally harmful activities. Global government support that is potentially harmful to biodiversity is estimated to be at least USD 800 billion annually, including fossil fuels (OECD, 2021[10]).

Momentum is building for further multilateral action on biodiversity in the future. Collectively, multilateral development banks issued a joint statement at COP26 on Nature, People and Planet (Box 4.3). As noted, a core commitment of the Statement is to create institutional strategies to mainstream nature and biodiversity across MDB investments, operations, and advisory services. Some MDBs have taken steps to flesh out nature-based solutions in their operations (Finance for Biodiversity Initiative, 2021[98]). For example, the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) has developed internal guidance as part of a larger, systematic and operational commitment to scaling up nature-based solutions (Matthews and Ocampo Dela Cruz, 2022[99]). It is rolling out these solutions within its disaster risk and climate adaptation investment programmes in the water, urban infrastructure and transport sectors. Other multilaterals are reviewing their policies to ensure they are aligned with nature. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank mainstreams nature and biodiversity considerations into its Country Strategies, which help define development and investment priorities for four-to-five year periods (IDB, n.d.[100]); while the Bank creates an institution-wide plan to mainstream natural capital and biodiversity. The African Development Bank has also published a report that explores ways to mobilise finance for African countries effectively, while advancing climate and nature goals to support Africa’s “nature-positive development agenda” (AfDB, 2022[101]). Finally, MDBs are setting targets on biodiversity and nature (WWF and The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2021[102]; Multilateral Development Banks, 2021[103]). For example, the Inter-American Development Bank has set a 40% target for climate and green finance for 2025 (IDB, 2022[104]); and the EBRD a green finance target ratio of 50% by 2025 (EBRD, 2020[105]; EBRD, 2020[106]).

Multilateral institutions are also assessing the extent to which their finance has been promoting biodiversity objectives. For instance, IFAD has conducted a stocktake of recent projects to understand the impact on biodiversity of its funding. Out of 66 projects surveyed, one-third were directly relevant to biodiversity, while another 40% had at least some activities linked to biodiversity (IFAD, 2021[107]).

All multilateral institutions also have safeguards to ensure no harm is done to biodiversity through their operations. Institutions such as the World Bank, the EBRD and the GCF have adopted International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards, or else developed their own standards based on them (Rode et al., 2019[112]). These standards provide detailed guidance on avoiding or reducing adverse impacts on biodiversity and living natural resources. Yet, while that IFC Performance Standards sets the global standard, there is limited evidence on how institutions implement it. For example, research has shown that safeguards often take the form of a checklist to prevent detrimental actions, rather than to help uncover nature-related risks in institutions’ portfolios, including impacts and dependencies on nature (WWF and The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2021[102]). Moreover, they do not systematically collect information on the implementation of required offsets. Reviews also conclude that institutions could make greater use of strategic environmental assessments and apply integrated spatial planning (CBD, 2020[50]).

Despite the progress outlined in this report, there are growing calls for multilateral institutions to review their mandates, capitalisation and governance so they can protect nature further, fulfil their core purpose of sustainable development (Finance for Biodiversity Initiative, 2021[98]), and align with the goals of the CBD (CBD, 2020[50]; Finance Watch, 2019[113]). Multilateral institutions could look at further mainstreaming biodiversity into their overall strategies, by “embedding nature into their analysis, policy dialogue and operations”, as recommended by the G7 (G7 2030 Nature Compact, 2021[114]). Implementing such changes needs to build upon the added value of multilateral donors – yet progress is partially hampered by the limited information on multilateral donor biodiversity-related ODF volumes, trends and priorities. Multilateral institutions could also do more to mobilise private finance for biodiversity. For example, they could boost the pipeline of investment opportunities for nature in credit market segments in which commercial banks are not fully engaged, as well as mainstreaming biodiversity into risk assessments of private sector actors (CBD, 2020[50]). In this regard, the World Bank Group’s Mobilizing Private Finance for Nature report notes how MDBs are in a position to create new mechanisms for biodiversity finance, promote blended finance solutions for biodiversity and develop accountability and reporting standards for biodiversity (World Bank Group, 2020[115]).

The resource mobilisation strategy for the GBF calls for a reform of multilateral development banks and international finance institutions, including investment banks, to make them fit for purpose in supporting implementation of the Framework (CBD, 2022[33]). In that sense, the strategy also calls for these organisations to identify and report investments in their portfolio that contribute to achieving the objectives of the Convention, and the goals and targets of the GBF, taking into account relevant international guidance and good international practice, among other elements (i.e. aligning their portfolios and flows with the GBF, simplifying access to finance, increasing biodiversity-related funding).

The international community aims to increase the mobilisation of private finance through official interventions (CBD, 2020[2]; Berghöfer et al., 2017[35]) – although such approaches may also have limits (Finance Watch, 2019[113]) and there are concerns about the ‘financialisation’ or ‘commodification’ of the biodiversity agenda (Rode et al., 2019[112]).

Through the use of the approaches described in Chapter 1 (“The private sector could become a vital source”), blending public and private finance can be used, for example, to finance small-scale conservation or restoration projects that may not be readily profitable, as well as larger or more bankable projects that need to be scaled up. For example, the recently created Land Degradation Fund was initiated by the UNCCD and Mirova, a management company that offers sustainable investment solutions to its clients, to invest in sustainable agriculture, forestry, infrastructure and ecotourism (UNCCD, 2022[116]). Mirova’s Sustainable Ocean Fund includes EIB, IADB and USAID, and uses a public guarantee to secure substantial commitments of private capital for biodiversity conservation. Another example is the Collaborative Management Partnerships approach (Box 4.4), as well as the Global Fund for Coral Reefs (GFCR, n.d.[117]), the Global Fund for Coral Reefs Investment Window (GCF, n.d.[118]) and the Coalition of Private Investment in Conservation (CPIC, 2023[119]).

However, significant challenges to scaling up private finance remain. Attracting private capital into biodiversity requires breaking down investment barriers and originating bankable projects that create sustainable and inclusive opportunities for investors, both private and public (World Bank Group, 2020[115]; Rode et al., 2019[112]). These challenges have to do with the lack of understanding of the value of biodiversity (which leads to it being under priced) and the basic public good nature of biodiversity; in addition, they relate to the small scale and localised nature of biodiversity-related projects; lack of data, measurement, and reporting standards; the fact that these projects often involve no, or limited, cashflow; financial returns that tend to be below market terms (which means that pipelines of investment-grade projects and programmes are limited); as well as the lack of enforceable collateral in conservation projects (Rode et al., 2019[112]; Finance Watch, 2019[113]; FAO, 2022[120]). Not surprisingly, private capital has invested the least in SDGs 14 and 15 (Finance Watch, 2019[113]). A better understanding of the role of the private sector is needed so that it can contribute at scale, building on progress observed in other areas, such as climate change (Berghöfer et al., 2017[35]).

The focus on resource mobilisation for biodiversity, including from ODF, is occurring against a backdrop of rapid loss of biodiversity. Consequently, the pressure on biodiversity may also put pressure on ODF budgets, as a constant and growing flow of spending is needed to counterbalance biodiversity loss or to finance REDD+ schemes (Carrilho et al., 2022[121]; Parrotta et al., 2022[91]). This begs the question of whether and how to ensure that existing policy interventions, including those supported by ODF, are effective at ensuring the necessary protection of biodiversity, so that future ODF can help alleviate the pressure placed on biodiversity elsewhere. Yet, there is a lack of shared learning on the effectiveness of biodiversity approaches that also limits the sustainability of efforts (Santy et al., 2022[122]).

Effectiveness assessments measure the extent to which a development co-operation activity achieves (or is likely to achieve) its objectives. As in other areas of development co-operation, assessing the effectiveness of biodiversity ODF is faced with several methodological and practical challenges (Drutschinin et al., 2015[123]). Currently, as with most interventions targeting environmental change, the link between ODF and changes in the status of biodiversity are difficult to establish, mainly given by the complex functioning of ecosystems, the many factors influencing its status, the time lag before changes in biodiversity are observed and measurable, the small proportion of ODF relative to other financial flows that impact upon biodiversity (Richerzhagen, Rodríguez and Stepping, 2016[124]), as well as effectiveness being measured at broader levels of ODA committed (e.g. effect measured at project/programme level instead of by objective). In addition, ODF financial inputs would need to be related to indicators that measure biodiversity aspects at a country level in a consistent and comparative way – yet these are difficult to obtain or, at best, partial (Richerzhagen, Rodríguez and Stepping, 2016[124]).

As a result, the literature has not yet reached conclusions on what constitutes effective development co-operation in biodiversity (Law, 2016[125]; Stepping and Meijer, 2018[126]). While (Bare, Kauffman and Miller, 2015[127]) find higher rates of forest loss correlated with aid, others such as (Waldron et al., 2017[128]) find that biodiversity-related funding ODA reduces biodiversity loss by 29% on average. Other studies also find positive outcomes linked to biodiversity-related ODF (Lee et al., 2022[129]; IFAD, 2021[107]), although the long-term impact of ODF on conservation, as well as the socio-economic impacts of this financing, is not well understood (Drutschinin and Ockenden, 2015[130]; Drutschinin et al., 2015[123]; Dufief et al., 2022[6]; OECD, 2019[131]; Erbaugh, 2022[132]). Biodiversity-related ODF may have positive impacts at a project level (Dublin, Volonte and Brann, 2004[133]), but this impact may get lost when one measures overall country-level biodiversity trends (Morrison-Métois and Lundgren, 2016[134]), especially when mediating factors, such as governance and institutional capacity, are deficient or missing (Bare, Kauffman and Miller, 2015[135]; Moreira-Dantas and Söder, 2022[136]). In addition, many activities are not designed with sufficient time scales to have an impact: some suggest that 5 to 20 years are needed for finance to have an impact (Richerzhagen, Rodríguez and Stepping, 2016[124]). Austria’s engagement in Moldova is a good example of effective long-term donor engagement for biodiversity (Box 4.5), as well as Norway’s EAF-Nansen programme supporting the application of ecosystem approaches to fisheries management while considering climate change and environmental pollution (FAO, 2018[137]) and Norway’s ongoing REDD+ programme to strengthen global forest governance while reduce illegality in the forest sector (Norad, n.d.[138]).

Above these biodiversity-specific factors, the principles of effective development co-operation are also relevant to the biodiversity field and should guide DAC donors’ development co-operation practice. These principles include country ownership, a focus on results, inclusive partnerships and transparency and mutual accountability (GPEDC, n.d.[141]). For example, donor contributions in a given partner country ought to be co-ordinated, in as far as possible, to ensure that international development finance intended for biodiversity is targeted strategically, seeking to achieve complementary synergies across donor contributions to achieve biodiversity-positive outcomes (CBD, 2020[50]). However, research shows that (as in other areas of development co-operation) biodiversity-related action tends to be uncoordinated, or at best is country-specific or occurs through bilateral meetings among donors (Hoover El Rashidy, 2021[142]), which limits ownership and thus impacts on the success of these activities to address biodiversity loss (Berghöfer et al., 2017[35]; Milner-Gulland et al., 2021[4]). Research also shows that the engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in biodiversity-related action also tends to be overlooked (Milner-Gulland et al., 2021[4]), again with impacts on the long-term effectiveness of biodiversity-related ODF.


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