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**Alain CAIRE**  
**RATP**  
**Paris**  
**France**



# THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RATP

## SUMMARY

1. VANDALISM AND SECURITY IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT: THE RATP AT THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM .....	41
1.1. Vandalism on the RATP's networks: mode-specific characteristics .....	42
1.2. Tags, graffiti, scratches and missile throwing: all part of the wider pattern of "urban violence"?.....	43
2. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO TRANSPORT ENVIRONMENT CONTROL BY CO-PARTNERING SECURITY PROVISION.....	45
2.1. Area and partnership-based urban crime prevention in the context of urban policy.....	47
2.2. Increasing human presence and security in partnership.....	50
2.3. Deploying surveillance and communications technology to control the transport environment and respond swiftly to incidents .....	52
2.4. A specific security issue: the transport operator and the terrorist threat .....	55
3. COSTS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE RATP .....	58
3.1. What are the costs to the RATP of preventing vandalism, terrorism and implementing a security policy? .....	58
3.2. Expectations with respect to local and national policy .....	59

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## **1. VANDALISM AND SECURITY IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT: THE RATP AT THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM**

The term “vandalism”, originally used to describe the wilful destruction of works of art by a race of Germanic invaders, the Vandals, is today used in a much broader sense to mean the defacement or destruction of private or public property. This is also how it is construed in French law.

Vandalism is a specific type of delinquent behaviour that is gratuitous, not acquisitive, in character. Acts of vandalism can be motivated by a number of factors -- sociological, psychological, ethnographic, etc. -- and fall into the category of provocative and aggressive behaviour, the search for an identity or social exclusion.

The RATP and other European transport operators use the term to refer to a range of different types of damage to property. Initial studies carried out for a European project on security on selected transport networks identified three main types of vandalism:

- Graffiti and tags, scratches on windows, experienced by nearly all operators;
- Missile throwing at moving rolling stock, reported by French operators and some UK operators;
- Other damage (equipment breakage other than by missiles, slashing, fires).

The immediate impact of vandalism is its direct financial impact: in the short term, it requires spending money on protecting, repairing and maintaining assets or on guards and surveillance.

However, vandalism also has a major impact in terms of safety.

It has an impact on the actual physical safety of both passengers and staff and affects how safe or unsafe they feel.

Passengers' feelings of insecurity have an impact on most operators -- a short-term impact on factors that affect commercial revenues (patronage and traffic) and a long-term impact on requirements for the development of public transport. A network in decline can neither claim to be providing a quality service nor purport to be attractive to customers and therefore cannot hope to position itself on the market as an alternative mode of travel.

The impact on actual safety, as well as on the feeling of being safe, also has an impact on the transport operator's personnel. On the one hand, the deterioration of their working environment can be a blow to morale and to their confidence in their firm. On the other, such attacks on the tools of their trade and even on their person, can pose a risk to society by undermining the concept of service continuity.

As part of the urban environment, the transport operator is a prime target but is not the sole target.

Since as long ago as 1989, the railways have been the ideal venue for graffiti artists, presenting them with a constant challenge with the added incentive that, because they are in the business of transporting people, they provide an excellent vehicle for communication. Transport operators have also been the favourite targets for missile throwing, which first became a “popular” pastime in the period 1996-97, because they are seen as “state” institutions and the State has failed to live up to the expectations of the population of some suburban areas.

This being the case, transport operators are by no means the only target. Acts of vandalism are also carried out against other urban actors, both private and institutional.

In practice, most solutions are beyond the control of transport operators simply because the problems are caused by external factors.

### **1.1. Vandalism on the RATP’s networks: mode-specific characteristics**

Transport operators need to know precisely what incidents are being reported on their networks. They generally use statistical tools to survey and pinpoint incidents in time and space.

The RATP has an analysis and operations advisory office (*Bureau d’Analyses et de Conseil Opérationnel*) whose job it is to focus on criminal offences involving property or people.

A transport operator can legitimately monitor, process and analyse data on offences relating to its own property. This enables the operator to develop strategies and plans for conducting in-house operations and to communicate with other partners. Observatories of this kind facilitate the monitoring of offences both for performance purposes and to see whether there has been any switch in incidents to other times, areas, targets, etc.

For the purposes of this report, the RATP has elected to exclude incidents involving arson and seat slashing, for example, as these are more to do with individual behaviour (with psychotic overtones) and their impact is more confined. Similarly, defacement and damage following sporting events have also been excluded as they fall under the remit of public safety.

The report concentrates mainly on two forms of vandalism: firstly, tags, graffiti and scratching and, secondly, missile throwing.

The statistics for the year 2000 alone show that each form targets a specific mode: the underground rail network (metro and RER) are the target for 97 per cent of defacement by tags, graffiti and scratches, while the above-ground networks (bus and tram) are the target of 92 per cent of missile throwing.

Historically, *tags and graffiti* were the earliest form of large-scale vandalism. However, the increase in this phenomenon has not been linear. It started with the first wave of defacement by tags and graffiti in 1986, reaching a visually intolerable peak in 1989. In imitation of the “New York model”, the metro then became a symbolic location. Studies conducted at the time show that the metro and RER were prime targets that lent themselves perfectly to the graffiti artists’ philosophy of defiance and communication (social recognition, peer recognition). The movement can thus be seen both as a cultural movement related to the emergence of rap and as the expression of an identity crisis.

After the first policies were put in place, the phenomenon appeared to have been brought under control until 1994-95. A comparative analysis of quantitative trends in both forms of vandalism shows an increase in tagging and graffiti from 1996 onwards and in missile throwing from 1997 onwards.

In the year 2000, the number of incidents of defacement reported was four times as high as in 1995, an exponential increase (over 20 per cent from 1999 to 2000). An average of four such incidents are reported daily (not counting scratches on glass).

A detailed analysis of the incident reports can pinpoint trends and any switch in them.

Effective cleaning procedures for spray-paint graffiti in stations and on trains prompted taggers to change surfaces: from 1998 they began scratching window glass (more than 80 per cent of the fleet has now been defaced), coach side panels, stair nosing or the floors of trains.

Taggers have also come up with a new chemical method for scratching train windows using phosphoric acid to “etch” a tag.

Similarly, the number of tags and graffiti appearing in stations as opposed to on trains is changing. The number of incidents at stations is on the increase: over 40 per cent in 2000 as opposed to 35 per cent in 1999, which would tend to suggest a further switch in targets following the stepping up of protection in stabling yards aimed at limiting vandalism during overhaul periods.

*Missile throwing* at vehicles running on the above-ground network was a much later phenomenon. The number of incidents increased by a factor of 2.5 from 1996 to 2000. The average is also around four incidents a day.

Apart from similar trends in the number of incidents, which are alarming enough for the operator, there are other similarities between the two forms of vandalism.

## **1.2. Tags, graffiti, scratches and missile throwing: all part of the wider pattern of “urban violence”?**

An analysis that considers acts of vandalism in isolation from the overall paradigm of delinquency in urban public passenger transport may well be somewhat contrived. The definition of the term “delinquency” actually warrants broadening it to include more than simply those offences that are punishable by law.

Transport networks, in France at least, have been experiencing a resurgence of minor disturbances, disorderly behaviour and the like, which -- to borrow Sebastien Roche’s term -- are often lumped under the broad category of “incivilities” and which contribute to the feeling of insecurity experienced by passengers and staff alike.

This approach is now the one taken by law enforcement agencies in studies on urban violence. *Commissaire* Lucienne Bui Trong drew up a scale of severity that includes minor instances of public disorder when the City and Suburbs (“*Ville et Banlieues*”) Unit was first set up.

From a sociological standpoint, acts of vandalism are seen as a process of violence spawned by *the refusal to recognise the legitimate authority* of the State or the institutions that represent it. This refusal to recognise that authority gives young people an excuse that absolves them for their behaviour. The transport operator does not consider them as customers or does not make allowances



for their specific needs as regards mobility, accessibility, fares, transport services, etc., or “dares” to inspect them. In the transport sector, as Lucienne Bui Trong points out, those who pay for their ticket are considered “fools” and young people consider inspections as a slight to their honour by an authority that they do not recognise, and see a uniform not as a sign of legitimate authority but as the “colours” of a rival gang...”.

*The group behaviour aspect of the modus operandi* is characteristic of this rebellion against and defiance of society and the institutions that represent it. Missile throwing, regardless of the reasons behind it (playing, provocation, reprisals for inspections) is generally carried out by gangs or groups (organised or not). Tagging, graffiti and scratching or etching (alone or by a group) also conform to the group mentality, since their goal is recognition by the community of taggers.

Moreover, the perpetrators share some similarities: highly impulsive, irresponsible and with a conception of time that cannot see beyond the immediate present.

The age group of perpetrators is also similar for both types of vandalism. The vast majority of tagging, graffiti and scratching and missile throwing is done by young perpetrators, although there can be some age variation. Missile throwers, for instance, are more likely to be young children (8 to 13 years old, approximately) while taggers can be any age. This type of juvenile delinquency (for which the age bracket stabilizes around 25) poses more serious difficulties for transport operators for a variety of reasons:

- Firstly, it automatically involves -- acutely so for France -- the whole issue of the response of the justice system to minors;
- Secondly, any such response cannot be based solely on repressive measures, which could quite simply be delegated to the police and the courts. As a matter of course, transport operators have to think about, adopt a stance towards and get involved with prevention, either through a commercial approach (such as fare-setting) or through awareness, educational and inclusion approaches.

*“Marking their turf”* is another behaviour that features both types of acts of vandalism to which “suburban culture” has given rise. Missile throwing occurs in an area that perpetrators have already taken over. These areas can be identified on the map and are associated with a particular urban environment: close to disadvantaged housing estates, schools, etc. From there, tags, graffiti and scratching are “exported” to the rest of the urban area, signifying the conquest by the perpetrators of territory beyond their direct sphere of influence.

A tag is a quickly scribbled “logo” standing for a nickname. It aims at perfection in its illegibility and its repetition *ad infinitum*. Like graffiti, it marks a break with the established order, but unlike graffiti it also breaks off any communication with society, to communicate only with the community of taggers. Huge numbers of people pass through the underground transport system, making it an ideal medium, affording maximum visibility, with its rolling stock providing the vehicles of communication.

*Escalation and one-upmanship*, identified as typifying the dynamic of urban violence, are what drives these acts of vandalism.

Missile throwing can, in fact, degenerate into more serious delinquency such as verbal abuse and physical assaults on operating staff. Maps of incidents of delinquency on above-ground networks

show an overlap between sections of line where missile throwing has occurred and sections on which assaults, insults and threats to drivers have been reported.

For taggers, this type of escalation, in which acts of vandalism are just one of the first stages, is motivated by bravado since they have to venture onto territory that is not already theirs in order to provoke. The element of bravado, which is part of the taggers' code of behaviour, explains how this type of delinquency can escalate. The metro is a controlled environment "patrolled by cops", which increases the element of risk. A clampdown by authority is a justification for aggression.

Taken as a whole, these characteristics -- over and above the specific aspects identified -- have led the RATP to consider these acts as part of the process of urban violence and to deal with them as part of an integral approach to handling security. As Lucienne Bui Trong has pointed out, over and above the strict definition of damage to property, vandalism is an "indirect symbolic attack on people". She explains that the costs of vandalism are extremely high in terms of the feeling of insecurity experienced by both passengers, as their environment deteriorates, and by the personnel of institutions. The psychological impact is also lasting: "*while traces remain, the impact of vandalism persists and can even become worse because disorder is interpreted as a sign that the owners of the premises do not care about the environment...*".

## **2. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO TRANSPORT ENVIRONMENT CONTROL BY CO-PARTNERING SECURITY PROVISION**

Security provision, other than through a carefully balanced mix of the transport undertaking's own structures and partnership structures (state, local authority and community), would be impossible, particularly since the legal framework restricts the powers devolved to transport operators and their employees and since public safety remains the responsibility of the State.

### **▲ *Security role of transport operators in the Ile-de-France clarified***

Government clarification of the responsibilities of transport operators with regard to security has led to changes in this field.

- *Clearer transport security goals*
  - Following the Villepinte Symposium in 1997, a ministerial circular set up transport security contracts at local and *département* level. The twin purpose of these contracts is to prevent malicious damage on the transport networks in the Ile-de-France (run by the RATP, the SNCF and numerous private transport operators) and to improve security and the perception of security for both passengers and staff, primarily in order to meet goals for the development of public transport. These contracts are the ideal framework for building partnerships of various kinds at local level.
  - The Round Table on security on public transport of 9 December 1997, chaired by Jean-Claude Gayssot, Minister of Transport, followed up on the Villepinte Symposium and detailed broad measures aimed at the transport field.

- *The link between security and transport development clarified*
  - The State/Region Planning Contract for 2000-2006 gives higher priority to the development of public transport infrastructure. Of a total of FF 60 billion overall, public transport was allocated a budget of FF 26 billion. Development will be mainly in the densely-populated inner suburbs, where demand for suburb-to-suburb travel is rising sharply.
  - In addition, the Urban Travel Plan states that security on public transport is high on the priority list of residents of the Ile-de-France and that improving security is a key factor for the development of public transport. These recommendations form the framework for a security improvement policy that is based on prevention, deterrence through an increasing human presence, sanctions and continued investment in safety.
  - The Government's commitment to promoting the large-scale development of public transport will mean high commercial stakes for transport operators as security and the feeling of security will be key factors in assessing the performance of the services they provide to customers.

### ▲ *Changes in RATP security policy*

In 1989, the RATP made security a priority of its public service mission and the Department of Environment and Safety, set up in 1999, was given responsibility for the security of passengers, staff and property and for improving the environment (concentrating initially on cleanliness and graffiti prevention and later on the wider environmental dimension). As a result, the RATP launched its first prevention operations.

Security is now ensured within a framework of diversified partnerships at all stages of the process of implementing government policies at local level. It is an across-the-board, integrated approach to prevention and security that underpins local security provision by the police. Its aim is to establish control of the transport environment through partnerships between the different agencies, each working in their own areas of competence.

The RATP's security policy is guided by *the subsidiarity principle*. In other words, every problem must be dealt with at the appropriate level of responsibility. The first such level is operating staff, whose mission is to improve mobility and provide an increased human presence; the second is the transport undertaking's own security services; the third is the authorities in charge of public security -- the police and *gendarmerie* -- who are the sole guardians of law and order.

*By the end of June 2001, a total of 24 850 people were serving the public on the RATP's networks, including: 14 100 drivers, 5 350 stationary ticket sales and after-sales staff and mobile teams of 5 400 giving directions to passengers, carrying out inspections and ensuring security.*

Of these, 23 425 were RATP staff, 825 were on youth employment contracts and 600 were law enforcement officers (in Paris alone).

In order to address factors which contribute either to security or to the feeling of insecurity the RATP is promoting several approaches:

- Developing preventive action in order to change the behaviour of potential perpetrators as part of an urban crime prevention policy that is firmly rooted in urban policy;
- Improving security and passengers' and employees' perceptions of security by a greater human presence and by strengthening institutional partnerships;
- Achieving technical control of the transport environment in order to protect targets and reduce incident response times, thereby contributing to a feeling of security;
- Working in partnership in the highly specific context of the renewed terrorist threat since 11 September 2001.

## **2.1. Area and partnership-based urban crime prevention in the context of urban policy**

Faced with having to carry out its public service obligation in the deteriorating conditions brought about by changes in society that have made urban living tougher over the last ten or so years (incivility, delinquency, violence, etc.), the RATP has embarked on an urban crime prevention policy and has implemented a number of measures.

The goal of this policy is to influence the urban transport environment in order to reduce incivilities, assaults on staff and passengers and their feeling of insecurity, thereby facilitating the operation and routine development of a quality service.

A second goal of this policy is to work alongside government and local authorities *to provide solutions to social issues that no single actor can resolve by itself in order to maintain social cohesion.*

The RATP, one of the city's stakeholders, sees itself as part of a network of urban partners working closely with local and regional authorities.

An area-based urban crime prevention policy means that action can be taken at local level, a prerequisite for intensive work with local stakeholders so that any factors specific to the particular area can be taken into account.

*As the RATP has organised itself into area development agencies at département level, and urban crime prevention is part of this approach, it plays its part in implementing urban policy alongside other public sector stakeholders.*

As well as its core activities as a transport operator, the RATP is an urban stakeholder, an integral part of the life of the city as a partner in urban events, urban management and in sustainable urban development. Implementing an urban crime prevention project thus strengthens the social links that are imperative for developing the initiatives implemented.

It was in this spirit that, on 30 May 2000, the RATP signed an agreement on the implementation of city contracts for 2000/2006 and the local agreements made under them, with the Deputy Minister for the City and the Prefect of the Ile-de-France region.

The RATP is building partnerships at two levels:

- *At central government level, chiefly with state departments within the various ministries*
  - Ministry of the City -- Interministerial Delegation for the City;
  - Ministry of Justice;
  - Ministry of Employment and Solidarity;
  - Ministry of National Education.
  
- *At regional and local government level with:*
  - The Ile-de-France region;
  - *Départements* via the General Councils;
  - *Communes* and groups of *communes*.

It is also taking part in special groups set up for the purpose by all of the partners, i.e. various public interest groups (employment, local development, etc.).

*The role of urban crime prevention is to consolidate all of the initiatives designed and implemented through these partnerships built at local level.*

- Recruitment over the next three years of 6 000 people will be a major opportunity to *diversify recruitment methods, facilitating access to employment for all young residents of the Ile-de-France.*  
In partnership with local missions, townhalls, national employment agencies and public interest groupings as close as possible to grass roots level, the RATP has established direct contacts at area level, to which it has added appropriate professionalisation procedures: pre-training, employment-training contracts, employment solidarity contracts (CES).
  
- *New fare mechanisms to be put in place to respond appropriately to the needs of different users and their economic circumstances. Around 600 000 young people are using the Imagine R travel card, a real response to fraud prevention.*  
Additional initiatives include the *Transition* pass for young people who are taking part in the *Trajet-Accès-Emploi* (TRACE) assisted travel programme, the *Mobilité* cheque for the jobless, the *Equité* pass for those receiving health benefits under the universal health cover system (*Couverture Maladie Universelle*, CMU).
  
- *The RATP's prevention/solidarity initiative centres on three crucial missions:*
  - Its outreach teams (*Recueil Social* and *RATP Assistance*) offer to provide transport to the most appropriate facilities for the social reintegration of anyone sleeping rough on their networks;
  - Through a partnership between the RATP/State/City of Paris, the RATP invested in thirteen integration and solidarity centres (*Espaces Solidarité Insertion* ESI);
  - Through a partnership between the RATP/DASS/City of Paris, the ATLAS plan targeted people at risk: the aim was to direct and transport people to a bed for the night. The plan includes the provision of year-round assistance to the *SAMU Social*, which provides aid and transport for the homeless.

- *The RATP is involved in justice and law centres (Maisons de Justice et du Droit). These are local centres open to anyone for fast, straightforward legal advice or dispute resolution. They bring the legal system into the community with the help of various agencies: magistrates, police, elected representatives, voluntary associations as well as the DASS. They provide an appropriate response to:*
  - petty crime through prevention schemes, particularly for young people, providing alternatives to criminal proceedings: cautions, reparation orders (community service in a bus centre), mediation reparation via the integration/rehabilitation of offenders;
  - minor civil proceedings (non-payment of fare evasion fines) by putting in place fast, amicable and satisfactory solutions.
- *The RATP wants to involve as many of its employees as possible in participatory approaches in the Ile-de-France in order to initiate a dialogue with residents and their representatives at a few experimental sites. This community-wide dialogue ensures that all the participants (RATP employees, residents, passengers, municipal employees) have a better understanding of each other's needs, limitations and expectations, clearing up misunderstandings and leading to practical projects for improving life, particularly on the bus service concerned.*
- *Together with primary and lower and upper secondary schools, the RATP is running various initiatives aimed at teaching pupils about the city and about good citizenship and at improving relations between young people and staff going about their business in the same neighbourhood.*
  - *Mon Territoire, C'est Ma Ville*, a tool shared by the RATP and the national education system, was developed as a teaching aid for these initiatives;
  - Another example is the *Ligne Fictive* operation, support for sports tournaments and debates between young people and staff.

*The RATP has recently subscribed to the "Respect" campaign launched by the Ministry for National Education and is constantly on the look-out for new tools and aids for teaching good citizenship and "respect", and for preventing anti-social behaviour and particularly fraud.*

- *The RATP, in partnership with the Ligue Française de l'Enseignement, is helping to reduce the digital divide. It is providing a cyberbus (buses fitted out with 10 to 12 multimedia computers) in every district for people from disadvantaged areas.*
- *The urban crime prevention policy implemented by the RATP also involves seeking partnerships with associations that design educational and good citizenship projects. Among them are:*
  - the *Sport dans les Transports* operation, providing support for sporting events with the emphasis on observing the rules and the ritual of payment;
  - production of a video by schoolchildren on incivility and bad behaviour on buses and trains;
  - the *Eté banlieue* operation, aimed at giving those young people not going away on vacation, days out in leisure centres in the Ile-de-France.
- *In order to round out and further extend this policy, the RATP Enterprise Foundation for Citizenship was set up under the chairmanship of the company president. The Foundation*

gives the RATP an image that is increasingly, strongly and consistently identified with the social domain.

The Foundation sets up and supports community projects promoting good citizenship, the prevention of exclusion, good relations between the generations, education and health. It supports citizenship and educational initiatives through cultural and sports projects, learning by doing and social integration projects.

The RATP's prevention staff run these projects in the field and act as representatives of the Foundation.

## **2.2. Increasing human presence and security in partnership**

Staff whose job it is to deal with the public help to provide a reassuring human presence and ensure security on the RATP transport network. However, the RATP, like the SNCF, has a special unit dedicated to protecting and ensuring security on transport networks, whose powers and duties have recently been clarified by the Law of 15 November 2001 on internal security.

▲ This unit is the *Groupe de Protection et de Sécurisation des Réseaux (GPSR)*. The GPSR has its own specific organisational structure.

- Its staff have been *geographically decentralised*, with five detachments in Paris and in the northern, southern, eastern and western suburbs of the city, since 1994. Its responsibilities are twofold: to manage security at community level as close as possible to the incidence of suburban crime and to reassure staff affected by the increase in violence.

The decentralised structure was first reinforced in 1993 by the addition of units on the above-ground transport network and this new arrangement was adopted on a wider scale in 2000, as required by a partnership approach to local and regional security at community level. The 23 bus depots in the Ile-de-France now have special units -- security contact points whose teams are made up half of security officers and half of security assistants.

By the end of 2001, the RATP was employing over 1 000 GPSR security staff: around 874 as security officers and 200 as security assistants under the programme to recruit 200 young people to work for the company.

### **2.2.1. Visibility and easy recognition to reassure passengers and staff**

All employees wear a readily identifiable uniform, so that they will not be confused with police patrols, and work in teams of no larger than three to four. The aim, as much as to prevent crime and incivility, is to give passengers a feeling of safety by providing a responsive service.

### **2.2.2. Missions**

As set out in the Law of 15 November 2001, their prevention mission is to “ensure the safety of people and goods, protect the company's employees and property, and ensure smooth operation of the service”.

Special efforts are made on above-ground networks through operational prevention, which involves assisting and reassuring drivers so that they are able to ensure service continuity.

Security officers are permitted to carry firearms and other weapons as well as security gear such as handcuffs and incapacitating sprays, to be used only if they encounter resistance. Security assistants carry a Tonfa baton (defensive weapon).

The RATP's GPSR staff receive special training: 15 weeks of training for security officers and nine weeks for security assistants, covering the legal framework applicable to their work.

Two recent pieces of legislation have extended the requirements for training and communication between the company and the national police force. The implementing decree of 26 November 2000 of the Law of 15 April 1999 requires the operators of public surface transport to apply for accreditation for staff who take identification particulars from passengers who do not have tickets. Under the decree, such staff must receive training and the content and duration of training must be accredited by the *Préfet de Police*. The same training requirement appears in the implementing decree of 26 November 2000 of the Law of 12 July 1983, which authorises RATP and SNCF staff to carry firearms and other defensive weapons.

▲ ***Operational co-ordination with police forces is being stepped up, in line with transport contracts with départements and reforms instituting a local police presence.***

These contracts are especially important in building synergies between transport operators and local police forces. They set out an area-based approach to security, based on complementary jurisdiction. Operational co-ordination has been stepped up between the various police units in the *départements* as well as between transport operators and the various transport police units.

In order to improve police surveillance, as recommended by Jean Claude Gayssot's 1997 Round Table on transport security, the number of dedicated staff on the RATP's networks has been increased as part of the initiative to establish local policing.

In Paris, one of the main reforms concerned the RATP directly. This was the merger of the former *Service de Protection et de Surveillance du Métropolitain* (SPSM) and the Paris Railways Commissariat (criminal investigation department). The new *Service de Protection et de Surveillance des Réseaux Ferrés Parisiens* consists of some 530 police officers and its missions are: to provide a visible presence in the RATP's metro and regional express (RER) networks, proactive crime prevention and conducting investigations relating to its public transport brief.

In some *départements* of the inner suburbs of Paris, transport security contracts have been signed which require the establishment of special public transport security units, particularly for surface networks. These units are assigned to routes which an audit has identified as "problem routes".

The next step was the circular issued by the Ministry of the Interior on 24 February 1998, setting up *operational co-ordination* between police services responsible for security on RATP rail networks, under the authority of the *Préfet de Police* for Paris, the *Préfet* for civil defence in the Paris area. Based on the Contract Plan for 2000, the circular aimed at improving information flow in order to speed up response by the relevant police services and improve the quality of transport from the security standpoint for both passengers and staff. However, these provisions were only for rail transport.



A further stage will involve setting up regional safety co-ordination in public transport throughout the Ile-de-France, under the authority of the *Préfet de Police* for Paris. Four guidelines have been established:

- Operational clarification and legislation to extend the co-ordination mechanism to all partners;
- Clarification of the division of responsibilities of the various actors;
- Putting close regional co-operation on a permanent basis;
- Making modern communications and surveillance technologies the foundation of the human element of the system.

▲ ***Security contracts with the départements are giving a new lease of life to relations with the Prosecution Service***

The commitments of the Public Prosecution Service relate essentially to:

- *improving communication*, chiefly through information and awareness meetings with transport operators or working to simplify procedures in order to provide a better response;
- *greater use of mediation*, which has been developing in conjunction with real-time processing, rather than taking no action on cases, as appearing before the Public Prosecutor for first offences can be a useful deterrent;
- *working in closer partnership* with transport operators on community service. Exact descriptions of the work proposed by transport operators and feedback on these measures would enable public prosecutors to better tailor sentences, without in any way prejudging sentencing.

In the two years that this partnership has been operating, the RATP has been taking on more of those sentenced to community service under agreements with the integration and probation services in the *départements*, provided that the offences were not committed against RATP staff or property. Likewise, under reparation and mediation measures, the RATP also opens its doors to young people in its bus depots and some RER workshops.

The interaction of the human resources working in this co-ordination and support system is dependent on having a technical network capable of ensuring prevention and a swift response by all the security actors concerned.

### **2.3. Deploying surveillance and communications technology to control the transport environment and respond swiftly to incidents**

Selecting the technical options requires attention to consistency in order to ensure that the human and hardware structures are fully compatible.

▲ ***Spatial control of the transport environment*** covers all of those operations of which the main goal is surveillance and intelligence.

These operations are based, partially or totally, on the principles of situational crime prevention. One of the challenges is to reduce the opportunity for crime through the efficient interaction of

security staff and a security equipment network. Apart from the primary aim of reducing crime, situational prevention is aimed at making both passengers and staff feel safer. A statistical analysis tool that can give local or overall data is also needed, to determine the usefulness of the choices made and to refine the human and technical processes involved.

Control of the transport environment therefore requires the installation of equipment that serves to protect both people and property.

▲ ***Protecting property and preventing vandalism*** keeps facilities in good condition and protects assets. It also makes passengers feel safer. The response may be either preventive or corrective.

*The preventive response* covers a range of operations aimed at protecting likely targets. There are three principles for securing sites: deterring and delaying intrusion, detection and prevention using electronic surveillance and confirmation and evaluation of the severity of the alarm via remote surveillance. Protection of metro and RER stabling sidings and bus depots began in 1990 and will be completed in 2006 at a total cost of € 15.24 million. Surveillance is also provided by guard-dog patrols by security companies.

Several substantial operations have been conducted to protect rolling stock and fixed equipment: starting in 1990, stations, depots and trains were renovated and protected with a laminate coating that enables graffiti to be removed in under 24 hours. This produced results, but also had an adverse effect inasmuch as taggers then switched their tactics to scratching windows, side panels, etc. In response, another operation to cover windows on rolling stock and in stations with protective film started in 1999 and is more than 90 per cent complete.

Despite the improved removal methods, the results are still not satisfactory and the RATP is looking into other procedures.

Again with a view to protecting people and property, the response to missiles thrown at buses has been to install protective film on drivers' side-windows on all 4 000 buses in the RATP fleet.

*Remedial responses* are aimed at facilitating property maintenance procedures to ensure customer satisfaction. They include cleaning off graffiti and tags, restoring and repairing glass or windshields, repairing seats, station furniture, relaminating, etc.

▲ ***Protecting people by providing a secure transport environment***

The security of the transport environment is ensured by monitoring, deterrence and response. The general principle is based on a three-tier structure.

The first tier consists of 2 000 cameras and callpoints in metro, train and bus stations connected to tiers 2 and 3, handled by the operator for areas within the operator's competence.

The second tier is information filtering, with a filtering system optimised by telesurveillance equipment. It includes 29 liaison centres for the metro (five already optimised), six RER surveillance centres (three already optimised) and one bus centre. It receives any requests not handled at operating level. If these require a response by the security forces -- GPSR and police -- they are relayed to the command post -- PC 2000 -- comprising one RATP room and one police room. The PC 2000 command post is the third tier.

The ongoing telesurveillance operations are aimed at fine-tuning the existing systems to the risks identified and at improving incident response.

Likewise, following the 1995 and 1996 bomb attacks, it was decided to introduce videosurveillance on platforms in 17 RER stations, a practical application of situational prevention that combines prevention, deterrent and investigative objectives. CCTV systems film all passenger access ways to the platforms of 17 busy stations. The monitoring and replay systems are housed in the RATP Command Post.

On the bus network, the rapid increase in incivilities and delinquency prompted the RATP to supplement existing systems (anti-assault cabs, alarm pedals, etc.) with on-board CCTV to improve passenger and driver security on buses.

The recording system, which can be triggered by the driver, enables the identification of anyone abusing the driver, passengers or equipment. One thousand buses have already been fitted with the equipment on the most vulnerable routes, which are to be part of the backbone network under the Urban Travel Plan. Further phases are being planned.

A strategic project to optimise and extend CCTV monitoring on the three RATP networks is underway and will be put in place over five years.

Investment in all of these systems will be subsidised by the *Syndicat des Transports d'Ile-de-France*, the regional transport authority.

All of these surveillance systems help to provide a reassuring atmosphere for passengers and to streamline the intervention of all staff dealing with the public -- operating staff, security staff and police -- providing better information on security-related incidents and enabling each player to respond to incidents within their own scope of responsibility in keeping with the subsidiarity principle.

### ▲ *Managing response times*

Immediate response to an incident reassures passengers and staff and deters offenders. The immediacy of the response is a result of increasing the human presence on the networks through the deployment of more staff dealing with the public. An efficient human presence requires real-time response by all of the security players on the RATP network in order to reduce response times when an incident occurs.

To facilitate real-time response, information and communications systems must be shared so as to ensure the deployment of whatever human resources are most appropriate as the incident develops. Current arrangements extend those already implemented, such as PC 2000. This command post enables real-time handling of incidents affecting the security of passengers, staff and goods and optimum use of RATP and police operational teams, using the AIGLE system (*Aide à l'Intervention Globale sur les Lignes en Exploitation*).

The latest operations to extend existing systems have been undertaken in order to meet these challenges.

The radiopositioning systems for security foot patrols in the RER's airport terminals has just been completed, bringing this operation to a close.

The bus radiopositioning system was also completed in the course of 2001. If a driver triggers an alarm, the exact position of the bus in distress is displayed on a detailed map, thus substantially reducing response time by security teams. The aim of the system is partly to make drivers more secure, thus ensuring continuity of service to problem areas and night services, partly to reassure passengers and give them a greater feeling of security.

The provision of local security in the underground network means that policing staff have a greater need for communications equipment that meets compatibility requirements.

A large-scale operation is in progress: it involves extending the ACROPOL (*Automatisation des Communications Radiotéléphoniques Opérationnelles de la Police Nationale*) **radio network** to underground RATP locations.

The extension of ACROPOL to the underground network will ensure the continuity of communications to local police, thus providing a technical link that is essential for co-ordinating above-ground and underground missions. In addition, from the technical angle, the digital cellular network ensures that police communications remain confidential. This operation -- scheduled for completion in 2003 -- is essential for establishing overall security co-ordination for public transport in the Ile-de-France.

#### **2.4. A specific security issue: the transport operator and the terrorist threat**

All of these prevention and personal security measures become particularly important in the event of a terrorist threat because they provide transport operators and their partners with a responsive human and technical structure that reduces some of the additional measures that would otherwise have to be implemented in a crisis situation.

While a political analysis of the terrorist threat is the sole responsibility of government, transport companies cannot pretend that this risk does not concern them. Past and recent incidents show that they are a prime target for terrorist organisations, primarily because of the media interest that such incidents attract.

The two attacks on 26 July 1995 at Saint Michel and 3 December at Port Royal were timed for 18.00 so that they would make the television news headlines.

Since public security was made part of its public service mission in 1989, the RATP has considered the risk of terrorism in its policy discussions and procedures.

The Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo metro in 1995 introduced a new dimension, as the release of chemicals can do damage over a wider area and for a longer period of time than an explosion. This prompted the RATP to consider the wider issue of incident response in a contaminated environment.

As a result, special training exercises were designed for staff. For example, regular training exercises organised by the Paris Fire Brigade are conducted on RATP networks -- around ten or so exercises are organised each year under simulated disaster conditions: explosion, fire, crashes, with evacuation of casualties.

Special training exercises were also arranged for a team of staff equipped for incident response in contaminated zones. This team is also qualified to operate all technical facilities in the field under the command of the Emergency Operations Commander.

The RATP also has specific response procedures for chemical gas attacks, with instructions on a set of emergency response cards.

Since the 11 September attacks in the United States, procedures have been implemented to protect the transport operator from security threats.

#### 2.4.1. *Threefold approach to security measures*

- *Staff.* Staff training and education is aimed at avoiding an ineffective response, or a response that would make the situation worse, particularly in the case of a chemical or bacteriological attack.
- *Passengers.* The first approach is to convince passengers that the public authorities take their security seriously, which means providing a physical presence as well as a number of technical measures but which in no case should be taken to guarantee safety. The second is communication (visual and audio) aimed at securing the full co-operation of passengers in watching out for everyone's safety, including their own.
- *Partners.* Providing for more responsive incident co-ordination by the partners concerned -- faster response by the police in setting up a safety cordon, by the fire brigade or by the police laboratories.

At any rate, emergency management measures and organisational structures are in place for catastrophes of any type (natural, accidental, terrorist, etc.). The RATP has made every effort to put in place standard procedural rules for all types of emergency.

In addition to the preventive and corrective measures used to ensure the day-to-day security of people and goods (transmission, CCTV and ventilation control, etc.) special procedures are also in place:

- The Government's *Plan Vigipirate*, operational in all buildings open to the public, has a direct impact on the RATP and SNCF network, since it requires extra security staffing by the police, *gendarmerie* and army;
- In this situation, the police can carry out random baggage checks. RATP security staff can also check luggage, but only with the consent of passengers;
- Special procedures are in place for dealing with *suspicious packages* and there are written orders for establishing security cordons and calling the appropriate authorities (police bomb disposal squad, forensic laboratory, etc.);
- On the practical front, the RATP has sealed all waste disposal bins on its networks.

These are, of course, the readily visible precautions; other preventive measures must remain confidential.

- *As regards communications:* since the Port Royal attack, the "*Attentifs ensemble*" campaign has been maintained, encouraging the public to be alert and using wording that reflects positive values for everyone.

#### 2.4.2. *Emergency management procedures in the event of an attack call for:*

- An immediate meeting of the pre-designated emergency unit, comprising the chairman, general management and managers of the departments concerned, as well as the communications manager for the purposes of taking important decisions and press relations management;
- In the field, all of the procedures are pre-planned. As soon as information is received by the central command posts (security, operations, etc.), the fire brigade and police headquarters are informed. The *Plan Rouge* is set in motion by the fire brigade and the *Plan Blanc* by the ambulance service;
- The RATP activates additional emergency procedures for casualties or their families: a free-phone number and reception centres for victims and families are set up immediately in conjunction with INAVEM. The RATP, together with other partners, also set up the *Institut d'Accompagnement Psychologique Post-Traumatique, de Prévention et de Recherche*, whose primary aim is to provide psychological support for disaster victims.

For the transport operator, as one link in the chain of co-partners committed to ensuring security, the management of this type of risk requires a heavy investment in terms of human resources.

It should also be said that managing emergency periods has major implications for operation in terms of traffic and disruptions to services while traffic is suspended for investigation by the police and for forensic analysis of “suspicious packages”.

To give some examples:

- From 26 July 1995 to the end of 1995: 657 bomb scares, as a result of suspicious packages or telephone calls, accounted for 156 hours of suspended services;
- In 1996: there were 351 bomb scares, accounting for a total of 64 hours and 20 minutes of suspended services on various lines;
- From 11 September to 10 October 2001: 120 scares, as a result of suspicious packages or telephone calls, resulted in services being suspended for almost forty hours.

### 3. COSTS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE RATP

#### 3.1. What are the costs to the RATP of preventing vandalism, terrorism and implementing a security policy?

The direct costs of vandalism in terms of repairs and preventive security amount to approximately €30.5 million per year.

The indirect costs of vandalism on the feeling of insecurity are low and estimated at a 1 per cent loss in traffic, or the equivalent of €15.24 million in direct revenue. In actual fact, fluctuations in traffic seem to be much more directly related to the economic environment.

Investment covers both crime prevention and incident response. So far, €0.17 billion have already been invested, and the same amount will be required to complete all of the operations planned.

In evaluating the vandalism prevention and security policies implemented, one question has to be asked: which indicators should we use to measure what?

To assess the effectiveness of the vandalism prevention and security policy currently being implemented, it becomes apparent that the range of different indicators needed reflect the range of different objectives and the multidisciplinary responses to them. The transport operator is continually confronted with a management paradox: reconciling the objectives of a public service provider with profitability objectives.

Of necessity, its responses will be an interactive mix: targeted responses to incidents of vandalism and broader responses aimed at overall prevention, making the network safe and controlling the transport environment. The measures implemented use a combination of human presence and technology. The mix includes targeted commercial responses (fares for the young, etc.) and broader responses in an urban policy context. These responses may have either a direct or an indirect impact and may be in-house or partnership initiatives.

Evaluating the effectiveness of a given measure or policy is therefore a complex exercise, since the type of indicator and the balance between quantitative and qualitative indicators have to take several parameters into account: the results, which have to include both objective and subjective impacts relating to security and the feeling of security, the position of the operator in the urban environment and its responsibility in successfully meeting the challenge of developing public transport.

As well as this, security is a joint sphere, involving both in-house and external partners, which further complicates the interpretation of results that depend on integrated, across-the-board, multipartnership security.

Moreover, the *contractual arrangement* between the RATP and the *Syndicat des Transports d'Ile-de-France* reflects this paradoxical position with regard to security, since part of the funding is provided under the contract while part is covered in a separate supplement. The contractual elements mainly relate to supply, defined in terms of both quantity and quality of service. In this respect, the transport operator takes the risks.

For example, the service quality commitment is based on regularity indicators, but also on customer care and cleanliness -- the standard of which can affect the bonus/penalty system. The cleanliness indicator is partly relevant to the topic here since vandalism, especially graffiti, tags and scratches on windows, is likely to be seriously penalising. For this reason, the final indicator stipulated in the contract was the number of graffiti per passenger journey, which takes the customer's perspective into account to a certain extent.

This type of evaluation has commercial overtones, as is only natural given the transport operator's commitment to satisfy customers' expectations of a quality transport service and to make that service as attractive as necessary in order to win market share. In the same way, expenditure on security engineering (including equipment to prevent vandalism and personal protection) and on the environment are included in the contract.

Conversely, the areas of security that the RATP has taken over at the request of the Government, through a form of delegation of some of its sovereign powers (specially trained dedicated staff for personal security, in-house and external youth employment in areas relating to prevention and security), are covered in a supplement. Related expenditure is refundable. Any increase in the numbers employed at the government's request will open the relevant additional clause to negotiation.

Does this then mean that the transport operator should look for indicators that reflect the results of security control measures or should it look to establish the part played by security in improving overall indicators for its transport activities, such as increased traffic or market share?

▲ *What indicators should be used to gauge the measures taken to protect passengers, staff and equipment?:*

- Evaluating the scale of the measures to be taken to ensure the continuity of supply of services to sensitive areas and neighbourhoods?
- Asking what effort needs to be made to ensure the same services to different urban areas, given the specific characteristics of each of them?

### **3.2. Expectations with respect to local and national policy**

Urban public transport is a field where major social changes are playing out.

Firstly, the dynamics of urbanisation, following on economic and cultural changes, are revolutionising urban mobility policies and giving rise to new travel needs to which public transport must adapt.

Secondly, the series of crises that have hit cities -- unemployment, poverty and exclusion -- have culminated in some areas and at some periods in the violence and vandalism that are directly undermining public services.

Conversely, to reverse the process of segregation, public transport seems to be a decisive factor in social cohesion and the quality of urban living.



- ▲ ***At stake is the chance this gives public transport to play a multi-faceted social role:*** in social accessibility, mobility, land-use planning, urban policy, economic and technical development and lifestyle.

When urban society is in trouble, so is public transport. When a city is running well, the transport network is running well.

The fact that the RATP has signed over 100 local security contracts and seven transport contracts with *départements* is evidence of its involvement as a partner in plans for co-partnering security at local or national level. Its expectations are founded on these official partnerships and centre around several issues.

- ▲ ***For instance, the question of co-ordinating all preventive and educational measures.*** Today, between the National Education Service, teachers, various child protection agencies, transport operators, voluntary organisations, etc., upwards of twelve representatives of different agencies can be involved with a young person in difficulty, either at the same time or one after the other, without any overall co-ordination. The young person knows the weak points of this piecemeal system and takes advantage of them, cancelling out much of the desired impact.

Furthermore, recent research on juvenile delinquency shows that there are certain links that have not been addressed: many studies have established a link between truancy and juvenile delinquency -- from vandalism to more serious cases -- but no structure is specifically responsible for following up on truant children or teenagers.

- ▲ Another issue is ***the recognition of urban quality facilitation as a profession in its own right***, necessary to the proper function of urban space: if they are to survive, these new urban jobs must be recognised as providing a public service within the framework of a caring economy combining public and private approaches.
- ▲ ***From the deterrence standpoint, the issue of immunity from prosecution for minors is being raised in France and at European level.*** This goes beyond just vandalism and has a major impact on personal security on transport networks, particularly as concerns pickpocketing, but also given the overwhelming numbers of minors committing certain offences.

The most sensitive issue is still the response that should be made to crimes committed by minors. The Order of 2 February 1994, the reference for legislation on minors, propounds the principle of the primacy of educational measures over criminal sanctions. Juvenile courts scrupulously apply this principle.

The provisions on criminal proceedings are moreover very restrictive since custody is possible only as of the age of 13 and detention on remand from the age of 16, under certain conditions. Minors also benefit from more lenient sentences and custodial sentences can only be passed as a last resort.

Furthermore, there may be a long time between commission of the offence and sentencing.

Recently, the introduction of community service has given minors over 16 years of age other alternatives. Mediation and reparation procedures, on the initiative of a public prosecutor, have also been encouraged.

Commendable as the motives for recent measures declaring the principle of primacy of educational measures may be, it has to be said that they are increasingly out of touch with the change in attitudes of the sectors of the population concerned and with new forms of delinquency. Those responsible for theft and vandalism in particular, for whom educational measures prove ineffective most of the time, see themselves as immune from punishment, which encourages them to keep on offending. The security forces on transport networks often have no alternative but to escort them above ground.

This was the conclusion of the Interministerial Mission on preventing and dealing with juvenile delinquency in April 1998, which proposed 135 corrective measures, some of which directly concern the types of delinquency with which the RATP is confronted.

Among the measures, some of those which directly concern the types of delinquency with which the RATP is confronted are as follows:

- Sanctions for inciting or aiding and abetting a minor to commit offences;
- Fining parents who fail to respond to summonses;
- Requiring all parents to take out family civil liability insurance;
- Prosecution of parents suspected of receiving stolen goods;
- Education and training for police personnel;
- Suspended sentences to replace discontinuance of proceedings;
- Response to all delinquency offences reported to the public prosecutor.

However, most of the recommendations of the Interministerial Mission have remained a dead letter and the resources available to the administrations concerned fall very far short of what they need. The measures taken have proved to be not enough and the initial conclusion is largely still valid today.

The fact remains that, for a transport undertaking, for which service quality is a major issue, keen to ensure its passengers' security and responsible for its development, the situation is still alarming given the increasing scale of such phenomena.

Despite the efforts expended on a human and technical level and despite the RATP's involvement in partnerships, the feeling is that these phenomena are out of control, which is demoralising for staff and makes passengers feel unsafe. This is difficult to live with:

- for the security forces who encounter the same delinquents they just stopped the day before;
- for transport security staff who feel powerless when faced with the cockiness of juveniles who know they can offend with impunity;
- and for passengers who blame the transport operator for the dereliction they see.

The issue is how to strike a balance between personal liberties and security. Offending with impunity is a problem in Europe and delinquency is on the increase worldwide. How can we prevent delinquency and provide adequate resources?

If punishment becomes the exception, the chain is missing a link and we need to rethink the issue and find solutions that do not infringe liberties but restore real exemplary sanctions.

### ▲ *The issue of balancing public service and economic imperatives*

For public authorities, transport networks are of strategic importance. Along with land-use planning, they enable governments to play a structuring role and are clearly seen as providing a service to the public.

The role given to transport at European level in the law itself (French Law of June 1999 on sustainable regional development) faithfully reflects the new relevance of these imperatives for public transport development: a new public service accessibility dimension, catering for the growing need for suburb-to-suburb travel, ensuring the integrated development of regions and residential areas. It must also respond to the demands of residents in the Ile-de-France and businesses in terms of services and not just facilities.

Transport undertakings tasked with a public service obligation are faced both with running a traditional transport business while doing the utmost to meet the needs of the public in a given sector.

Now, those needs are also expressed in terms of quality, security and a feeling of safety. Meeting them will determine whether the operators' market shares will increase.

Thus, the transport authority has two alternatives in selecting the requirements to impose on transport operators:

- Either the transport operator operates on a strictly commercial basis and the contractual service obligation is confined solely to improving service quality. The measures taken will be satisfactory network coverage by operating and commercial staff along with technical measures geared to cleanliness and surveillance. The security dimension is considered as strictly the government's responsibility.
- Alternatively, the transport operator is required to provide a public service involving a participatory and partnership dimension. In this case, the commercial and security dimensions become inseparable and integral to the success of accessible public transport. The transport undertaking then addresses security in all senses of the word: i.e. not only tackling feelings of insecurity, but also security itself, by employing a group of staffing and technology measures designed to eliminate or limit crime.

At this point, the question of the division of funding again arises: what should be financed by the undertaking and what by public funding?

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Mr. David BAYLISS  
37 Ledborough Lane  
GB-BEACONSFIELD HP9 2DB  
Buckinghamshire  
United Kingdom

**Chairman**

Monsieur Alain CAIRE  
Directeur  
Département Environnement et Sécurité  
RATP  
54 quai de la Rapée  
F-75599 PARIS CEDEX 12  
France

**Rapporteur**

Mrs Stefania DI SERIO  
ATAC  
Public Transport Agency  
Via Sondrio 18  
I-00176 ROMA  
Italy

**Rapporteur**

Prof.Dr. Thomas FELTES  
Rektor  
Hochschule für Polizei  
Fachhochschule Villingen-Schwenningen  
Sturmbühlstr. 250  
D-78054 VILLINGEN-SCHWENNINGEN  
Germany

**Rapporteur**

Ms Julia STAFFORD  
Director  
CRIME CONCERN  
1st Floor (Front)  
36 Victoria Street  
GB-BRISTOL BS1 6BY  
United Kingdom

**Rapporteur**

Mr. Paul ABBOTT  
Special Operations Manager  
RAILTRACK  
Railtrack House DPI  
Euston Square  
GB-LONDON NW1 2EE  
United Kingdom

Erster Polizeihauptkommissar Peter DAUBE  
Polizeidirektion 3  
Referat Öffentliche Sicherheit  
Kruppstr. 2  
D-10557 BERLIN  
Germany

Drs. John DIETZ  
Project Manager, Public Security Team  
NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen  
Programmabureau Sociale Veiligheid  
Postbus 2025  
NL-3500 HA UTRECHT  
The Netherlands

Mr. Adrian DWYER  
Force Counter Terrorism Adviser  
British Transport Police Force Headquarters  
P.O. Box 260  
GB-LONDON WC1H 9SJ  
United Kingdom

Mrs Ann FRYE  
Head of Mobility and Inclusion Unit  
Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions  
Zone 1/18  
Great Minster House  
76 Marsham Street  
GB-LONDON SW1P 4DR  
United Kingdom

Mrs. Nandia GEROLYMATOU  
International Affairs Division  
Ministry of Transport and Communications  
Anastaseos Str. 2  
GR-10191 ATHENS  
Greece

Mr. Kjell HULTMAN  
Head Security Officer  
AB Storstockholms Lokaltrafik  
Business, Department of Contracts  
Globen Arenavagen 27  
SE-120 80 STOCKHOLM  
Sweden

Mr. Alan KIEPPER  
Management Consultant  
41 Daffodil Hill Road  
Garrison, NY 10524  
USA

Mrs Olga KRISTOFIKOVA  
Ministry of Transport and Communications  
Transport Policy, International Relations  
and Environmental Department  
P.O. Box 9  
CZ-110 15 PRAHA 1  
Czech Republic

M Pierre LACONTE  
Président  
Foundation for the Urban Environment  
Abdijdreef 19  
B-3070 KORTENBERG  
Belgique

Mr. Gianluca LUCISANO  
Director of Security  
ATAC SpA  
Via Volturmo 65  
I-00185 ROME  
Italy

Dr. Rosario MACARIO  
TIS.PT  
Av. 5 Outubro 75-7  
P-1050-049 LISBONNE  
Portugal

Dott. Massimo MARCIANI  
General Manager  
Fit Consulting  
via Primo Acciaresi 8  
I-00176 ROME  
Italy

Mr. Mohamed MEZGHANI  
Director – Programmes and Studies Department  
UITP  
6 rue Sainte Marie  
B-1080 BRUXELLES  
Belgium

Mr. Stefan ODEVALL  
Institut SOCIALDATA i Servige AB  
Kungsgatan 47A  
S-75321 UPPSALA  
Sweden

Ms. Geraldine PETTERSSON  
Researcher, Crime Concern  
Flat E, 93 Highbury Hill  
GB-LONDON N5 1SX  
United Kingdom

Mr. Christopher PRICE  
University of Plymouth  
Institute of Marine Studies  
Drake Circus  
GB-PLYMOUTH PL4 8AA  
United Kingdom

Mrs. Belén RODRIGUEZ  
Responsable Unitat Operación i Control de Metro  
Ferrocarril Metropolità de Barcelona, S.A.  
Calle 60, Nos. 21-23, Sector A  
E-08040 BARCELONA  
Spain

Monsieur Manuel RODRIGUEZ SIMONS  
Gerente Area Operativa  
RENFE  
Avda. Pio XII 110  
E-28036 MADRID  
Spain

Mr. Carlos ROMAN CRESPO  
Director Corporativo de Seguridad  
RENFE  
Avda. Pio XII 110  
E-28036 MADRID  
Spain

Prof. Austin W. SMYTH  
Napier University  
School of the Built Environment  
Transport Research Institute  
Redwood House  
66 Spylaw Road  
GB-EDINBURGH, EH10 5BR  
United Kingdom

Mrs. Ingunn STANGEBY  
Head of Department  
Institute of Transport Economics (TØI)  
Box 6110 Etterstad  
N-0602 OSLO  
Norway

Mr. Damiano TOSELLI  
Director of Security & Colpofer Chairman  
Ferrovie dello Stato SpA  
Piazza della Croce Rossa 1  
I-00161 ROME  
Italy

Monsieur Jean-Pierre VAN KEYMEULEN  
Responsable Intégration Réseau  
Société des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles (STIB)  
Avenue de la Toison d'Or 15  
B-1050 BRUXELLES  
Belgium



## **ECMT SECRETARIAT**

Monsieur Alain RATHERY, Deputy Secretary General

### **ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND STATISTICS**

Mr. Andreas KOPP, Principal Administrator

Dr. Michel VIOLLAND, Administrator

Mrs. Julie PAILLIEZ, Assistant

Mlle Françoise ROULLET, Assistant

### **TRANSPORT POLICY**

Mrs. Mary CRASS, Administrator

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTORY REPORTS

<b>Report by T. FELTES (Germany)</b> .....	5
1. Public safety and public spaces: The citizen's fear of strangers.....	9
2. Public security, vandalism and graffiti: Connections and assumptions .....	16
3. Security in public transport: Results of a survey.....	19
4. Potential for crime prevention and proposed measures: A public transport system that meets customers' requirements and provides a service .....	24
5. Terrorism as a threat in public transport?.....	29
6. Conclusions.....	29
<b>Report by A. CAIRE (France)</b> .....	37
The experience of the RATP	
1. Vandalism and security in public transport: The RATP at the heart of the problem.....	41
2. An integrated approach to transport environment control by co-partnering security provision .....	45
3. Costs and expectations of the RATP .....	58
<b>Report by S. DI SERIO (Italy)</b> .....	63
1. Introduction.....	67
2. Vandalism and security in public passenger transport .....	68
3. System security approach to public passenger transport.....	69
4. The state of the art .....	71
5. Available statistics on vandalism and security.....	77
6. The current emergency: Terrorist attack .....	81
7. Rome's experience and its findings .....	83
8. Conclusion .....	87
<b>Report by J. STAFFORD (United Kingdom)</b> .....	99
1. Introduction.....	103
2. Vandalism and its impact on perceptions of security.....	104
3. The scale and impact of the problem.....	105
4. Patterns of offending .....	109
5. The causes of graffiti and vandalism.....	110

6. Reducing vandalism and graffiti on public transport .....	112
7. Features of effective practice.....	116


## **OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS**

<b>DWYER, A. (United Kingdom):</b> "Prudent pessimism" - The management of terrorist threats against the railways in England, Scotland and Wales .....	125
--	-----

## **SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS**

(Round Table debate on reports).....	135
--------------------------------------	-----

<b>LIST OF PARTICIPANTS</b> .....	151
-----------------------------------	-----



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