The Space Economy at a Glance 2026

The space economy has changed dramatically in the past decade. New market entrants and technological innovations have reduced the cost of access to space, supported by reusable launcher components, miniaturised satellites and commercial rideshare opportunities. Digital advances have also transformed the use of satellite signals and imagery by facilitating data sharing, processing and analysis. At the same time, governments have promoted private-sector participation through commercialisation programmes, procurement models and regulatory measures in selected market segments.

As a result, satellite ownership and orbital activity have expanded rapidly. In 2025 alone, 329 space launches were conducted, carrying around 4 900 objects into space. By the end of the year, more than 14 000 active, operational satellites were circling Earth in low, medium and geostationary orbits (Figure 2.1). In terms of operational satellites, US organisations led by large satellite broadband deployments operated 76% of active satellites by the end of 2025, followed by operators in Western Europe and China. By mid-2026, the number had reached almost 15 000. These developments are both recent and unprecedented, and they have shifted the scale, composition and geography of orbital activity.

The transformation of orbital occupancy has important market implications. It creates opportunities for new commercially-offered services, including satellite broadband, earth observation, direct-to-device communications, mobility services and data-enabled applications. It also increases competition for launch capacity, spectrum, ground infrastructure and orbital resources (see for example OECD (2022[2]; 2023[3]; 2024[4])). These developments have contributed to a space economy that is larger in some segments and increasingly commercially oriented.

Access to space has broadened markedly. In fifteen years, as many countries launched their first satellite as in the previous five decades combined, bringing the total to 109 countries by the end of 2025 (Figure 2.2). This acceleration has been enabled to a large extent by CubeSats, commercial rideshare launches, international training programmes and increasingly available off-the-shelf satellite technologies.1

Recent first satellite missions illustrate the diversity of pathways through which countries are entering space. In Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Botswana have launched small satellites through university-led projects, international training programmes and commercial small-satellite expertise. Similar approaches are visible in Asia and Latin America, where Bhutan, Costa Rica and Guatemala launched early missions focused on technology demonstration, environmental monitoring and natural resource management. These examples show that countries can enter space through academic capacity-building missions, commercial procurement and gradual development of domestic design, manufacturing and operational capabilities.

However, sovereign orbital launch capability remains restricted to a handful of economies. By mid-2026, only 12 countries had demonstrated the ability to place objects in orbit.2 Several countries – including Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom – are developing new commercial or sovereign launch-site projects at varying levels of maturity, but by mid-2026 many had conducted only suborbital activity or unsuccessful orbital attempts. 3

Launch activity is also highly concentrated in practice. In 2025, the United States accounted for 55% of all launches and 87% of launched objects, largely reflecting the high launch cadence of SpaceX, which conducted most US missions (Figure 2.3). China followed with 28% of launches and 8.4% of launched objects. Other active launch actors included Russia, Europe through the Ariane and Vega programmes, Japan, India, Iran and New Zealand, while Israel, the Republic of Korea and North Korea also conducted launches or orbital launch attempts during 2024–2025. The United States and China are furthermore the only economies that have successfully recovered first stage rocket boosters so far. US operator SpaceX first achieved this in 2015 with its Falcon-9 rocket and then with its Starship/Super Heavy booster in 2024. SpaceX had by early 2026 conducted more than 600 Falcon-9 booster recoveries, more than 50 out of which have been reused at least a second time. US firm Blue Origin successfully landed its New Glenn booster in 2025. In 2026, China Rocket, the commercial launch subsidiary of the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, successfully recovered the first stage of a Long March 10B rocket using a sea-based net capture system, marking China's first recovery of an orbital-class launch vehicle booster.

While the global launch market is estimated at USD 12-16 billion in 2025, transparency remains low because most providers do not publish pricing or revenue information and large institutional segments continue to operate as captive markets. Much demand is effectively reserved for domestic launch providers, as governments and institutional customers often require national satellites to be launched on national rockets for strategic, security, or industrial policy reasons.

Over the past decade, more than 30 small-launcher projects have been announced worldwide, including over a dozen in Europe, supported through national programmes, ESA initiatives and private investment. While only a limited number have reached orbit or entered commercial service, many remain in the demonstration, test-flight or early operational phase. In Europe, notable examples include Germany's Isar Aerospace and Rocket Factory Augsburg, Spain's PLD Space, the United Kingdom's Orbex and Skyrora, and France's MaiaSpace and Latitude. Similar developments are underway in Asia, where companies such as China's LandSpace, iSpace and Galactic Energy, Japan's Space One, South Korea's Innospace, and India's Skyroot Aerospace and Agnikul Cosmos, alongside Indian Space Research Organisation's Small Satellite Launch Vehicle, are pursuing dedicated launch solutions for small satellites. This proliferation reflects strong demand for responsive launch services but also raises questions about market consolidation, as not all projects are expected to achieve long-term commercial viability.

This combination of broader participation, new investments and concentrated strategic capability is central to current market dynamics. More countries and firms can access space-based services and aim to deploy small satellites in particular, but large-scale launch, constellation operation and orbital infrastructure still remain controlled by a limited number of actors. This raises policy questions about access conditions, resilience, interoperability and competitive market development, which become more important as an increasing number of downstream users depend on space-based infrastructure.

Private operators now account for the large majority of active satellites. Their share of satellites launched into orbit increased from 23% in 2010 to 88% in 2025, marking a significant shift from a space environment historically dominated by governments and public agencies towards one increasingly shaped by commercial actors (Figure 2.4).

The nature of private-sector activity has also changed. During the 2010s, in addition to large commercial geostationary satellites providing telecommunication and television broadcasting, many private missions relied on small, standardised and stackable satellites, including CubeSats, which lowered costs and enabled more frequent launches. These satellites increased the number of objects launched, but because they were relatively light, their effect on total launch mass was more limited.

Since 2019, the deployment of large private satellite broadband constellations has become the main driver of launch activity and orbital occupancy. One operator in particular, through the rapid deployment of the Starlink constellation, accounted for around 60% of all active satellites in orbit in 2025, with the constellation continuing to expand rapidly in 2026. This illustrates the growing concentration of orbital occupancy among a small number of large commercial operators.

This shift has important implications for market structure. Commercial operators increasingly control assets that are central to connectivity, orbital infrastructure, data flows and service delivery. At the same time, public agencies often remain key customers, regulators and mission partners. The boundary between public and private activity is therefore evolving, with commercial operators playing a larger operational role while governments continue to shape markets through demand, regulation and public missions.

Telecommunications have become the main driver of recent satellite deployment. International satellite communications were liberalised in the 1980s, with subsequent commercial growth initially driven by direct-to-home television from geostationary orbit. Mobile satellite services emerged in the 1990s, while satellite broadband solutions from geostationary orbit appeared in the early 2000s but faced cost and latency constraints.

Since the mid-2010s, the bulk of orbital activity has shifted from geostationary orbit to low-earth orbit, located roughly between 160 km and 2 000 km altitude. Telecommunications satellites have accounted for a growing share of global satellite launches since 2020, representing 82% of all satellites launched in 2025, compared with 31% over the 2010-19 period (Figure 2.5).

This marked shift is largely driven by the deployment of large-scale satellite broadband constellations and rising demand for space-based connectivity services.

The ongoing and planned deployment of mega-constellations is now a major driver of current launch activity and projected demand for orbital capacity. By mid-2026, more than 12 000 satellites had been launched by 13 constellation operators based in the United States, China and the United Kingdom, with Starlink representing the largest deployed constellation. Announced projects and regulatory filings refer to more than 2 million possible future satellites over the next decade, mainly for satellite broadband, direct-to-device communications, orbital data centres and other connectivity services (Figure 2.6).4 In 2026, several unanticipated filings proposed very large space-based computing infrastructures, including proposals involving up to one million satellites. However, the underlying technologies remain largely unproven at scale, and commercial viability would depend on launch and in-orbit operations costs falling substantially.

International Telecommunication Union satellite filing patterns also point to this shift. Filings for geostationary orbit systems declined between 2015 and 2025, while non-geostationary filings rose sharply and overtook geostationary filings (Figure 2.7). This matters because the ITU plays a central role in co-ordinating the international use of radio-frequency spectrum and orbital resources, helping to avoid harmful interference between satellite systems.

All satellite filings should be interpreted cautiously. Many are non-binding, speculative or unlikely to be implemented in full. Some filings are used to reserve frequencies and orbital resources or to signal commercial ambition. Nevertheless, they provide an indication of the scale of commercial interest in low-earth orbit and the growing pressure on spectrum, launch capacity and orbital management.

Satellite broadband and emerging direct-to-cell communications are moving from niche activities to growth markets. Satellite connections represented around 0.7% of fixed broadband subscriptions in OECD countries in 2023, but they are growing steadily and play an important role in extending coverage to rural and remote areas where alternative infrastructures may be limited (Figure 2.8) (OECD, 2026[8]; forthcoming[9]). Low-earth orbit constellations are reshaping the market by enabling higher-speed, lower-latency services and by supporting new use cases in mobility, resilience and direct-to-device connectivity.

The pace at which satellite connectivity businesses can scale is illustrated by Starlink, whose revenues reportedly nearly tripled between 2023 and 2025, reaching approximately USD 11.4 billion, driven by an expanding subscriber base and service portfolio (SpaceX, 2026[10]). Further growth is expected as more firms diversify into maritime and aviation connectivity, direct-to-cell capabilities and hybrid satellite-terrestrial services (OECD, forthcoming[11]). These developments may strengthen network resilience and extend coverage, but they also reinforce the importance of monitoring market concentration, interoperability and access conditions.

The rapid expansion of low-earth orbit constellations is also increasing pressure on orbital resources. This chapter treats congestion only as a market-structure and resource-management issue; the broader sustainability and debris implications are addressed in Chapter 4. From a market perspective, the concentration of satellites in attractive orbital bands can affect entry conditions, collision-avoidance costs, spectrum co-ordination and the long-term availability of orbital capacity. This will require national and international co-ordination efforts. The management of spectrum is a case in point, where regulators need to consider both existing and future needs while making room for innovation (OECD, 2022[2]).

Commercial earth observation markets are evolving rapidly. Technological progress, standardisation and miniaturisation on the launcher and satellite hardware side have further lowered the barriers of entry and made commercial products more affordable and performant (OECD, 2024[12]). Benchmarking exercises put start-ups are at the forefront of technological excellence in commercial imagery (Bingen, Gauthier and Chang, 2024[13]). These developments are expanding the range of commercially available observations, including higher-resolution optical imagery, synthetic aperture radar and hyperspectral data.

There has been notable growth in the launch of advanced earth observation technologies, including synthetic aperture radar, hyperspectral sensors and optical imagery with sub-metre resolution (Figure 2.9). These capabilities can improve observational and analytical performance, particularly where time series are sustained and data access conditions support public and commercial use. They can also create new markets for monitoring infrastructure, agriculture, maritime activity, natural resources, insurance, climate risks and security-related applications.

As the cost and complexity of earth observation missions decline, demand is also changing. Some countries increasingly seek technology transfers and domestic control over earth observation systems, rather than relying only on external data providers. In parallel, large utilities, transport operators and infrastructure companies are beginning to assess whether small, dedicated constellations could serve their own monitoring needs, for instance for pipelines, railways, ports, energy assets, land-use impacts or climate-related risks. This broadening of potential users reflects the growing operational relevance of earth observation, but it may also fragment demand across highly specialised use cases.

In their in-depth review of satellite imagery/earth observation technology in official statistics, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe highlighted the need to calibrate earth observation data against other datasets as well as investments in infrastructure to fully support data processing, interpretation and analysis (UNECE, 2019[15]). Private sector actors have expressed similar types of concern about high investment needs with uncertain returns (OECD, 2024[4]). The introduction of AI models could in some cases deepen rather than alleviate distrust in these technologies, as potential users understand even less the underlying technology. Indeed, there seems to be widespread use in the earth observation field of AI methods that are not explainable (Gevaert, 2022[16]).Building new commercial applications also depends on the constant and reliable supply of data. Meanwhile, high-resolution imagery, both in terms of pixel size and temporal revisits, can be subject to government “shutter control”, to avoid revealing sensitive information, e.g. in times of conflict. Commercial GNSS-enabled applications only developed after the US government decided to discontinue its use of “selective ability”, an intentional degradation of public GPS signals in 2000.

This fragmentation creates challenges for commercial earth observation providers. Many markets remain specialised, project-based and characterised by limited repeat demand. Customers often need tailored products, sector-specific analytics, calibration with other data sources and assurance on continuity, quality and latency. As a result, revenue streams can be uneven, and some private operators face bottlenecks in converting technical performance into scalable and recurring commercial revenues (Cerbaro et al., 2020[17]; Burke et al., 2021[18]; CEOS, 2019[19]). This helps explain why government demand remains important, even as commercial offerings become more capable.

Commercial earth observation is also increasingly shaped by the interaction between public missions and private provision. Governments have opened access to public satellite catalogues while also supporting private providers through deregulation, procurement and service buys. This dual role has expanded the availability of satellite data while creating demand for commercial services. The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has been purchasing commercial radio occultation data since 2016 for integration into the agency’s numerical weather prediction models (NOAA, 2023[20]).. NASA has been using the Commercial Smallsat Data Acquisition programme since 2017 to augment and complement its own data or that of other partners (NASA, 2023[21]). In 2022, the National Reconnaissance Office made its largest commercial contracts yet to three data providers, worth several USD billion until 2032, as part of its Electro-Optical Commercial Layer (EOCL) programme (NRO, 2022[22]). Other countries and organisations followed suit. Eumetsat launched a commercial radio occultation third-party pilot data service in 2022 (Eumetsat, 2022[23])

In the case of weather information, seven-day weather forecasts today are about as accurate as five-day forecasts were around 2000, reflecting major advances in modelling and, above all, the rapid expansion of earth observation systems. More than 90% of the observations assimilated into modern weather forecasting systems comes from satellites, making space infrastructure the foundation of both traditional and new AI-based forecasting. Traditional numerical weather prediction (NWP) combines these observations with previous forecasts through data assimilation before solving the physical equations governing the atmosphere, while AI models learn atmospheric behaviour from decades of reanalysis data and can generate forecasts in minutes. The two approaches are increasingly complementary, with operational centres such as the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) already using both in parallel. However, neither AI nor NWP can compensate for missing observations. Continued investment in public meteorological satellite programmes (e.g. NOAA, EUMETSAT and JAXA), alongside the growing ecosystem of commercial weather data providers (e.g. Spire Global, Tomorrow.io and PlanetiQ) remain essential to further improve forecast accuracy.

Open public earth observation data are therefore a major source of public value and a foundation for commercial innovation. Data from government missions are increasingly openly available. The Committee on Earth Observation Satellites reports that some 70% of data from active missions (and 55% from decommissioned missions) are open access, if including those requiring registration (Figure 2.10). The Landsat and Copernicus programmes provide free and open access to long time series of earth observation data, supporting science, public policy and private-sector applications. These datasets provide de facto standards for geometric, spectral and radiometric calibration, enabling reliable detection of change across time and locations. They also provide training data and reference datasets for digitally enabled analysis, including machine-learning applications and geospatial foundation models.

Open public earth observation data and commercial markets are closely interconnected. Open datasets can lower barriers to entry, support value-added analytics, enable benchmarking and strengthen user confidence in commercial products. At the same time, governments need to balance the benefits of open access with conditions that allow commercial providers to develop sustainable business models.

Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals are among the most widely diffused space-enabled inputs in the economy. Since GNSS chips were first introduced in mobile phones, wearables and cars in the early 2000s, satellite positioning, navigation and timing services have become embedded in a broad range of digital devices, platforms and services. Unlike upstream space activities, much of this value is generated downstream, where satellite signals are combined with software, maps, sensors, connectivity, data analytics and user-facing applications.5

This makes GNSS a useful example of how space infrastructure supports commercial value creation beyond the space sector itself. Location-based services now underpin consumer navigation, personal and asset tracking, emergency applications, health and fitness services, mapping, logistics, tourism, agriculture, construction and other digital markets. In many of these applications, the space component is largely invisible to end users, but it remains an essential enabling input.

These developments point to expanding commercial opportunities, although market development remains uneven. The European Union Agency for the Space Programme forecasts accumulated revenues of around EUR 2.8 trillion over 2024-34 for GNSS-enabled consumer solutions, tourism and health applications (EUSPA, 2026[25]). These estimates, although covering data markets beyond the core space economy, point to new potential commercial opportunities associated with satellite signals, particularly as GNSS capabilities are integrated into smartphones, vehicles, wearables, connected devices and sector-specific digital services.

For policy makers, GNSS-enabled markets illustrate why the economic value of space cannot be assessed only through launch, satellite manufacturing or satellite operations. Much of the value emerges through broader applications, business models and user adoption. This reinforces the importance of reliable and resilient positioning, navigation and timing signals, as well as interoperability, standards, cybersecurity and user capabilities across the wider digital economy.

Despite the increasing number of commercial actors and activities, profitability remains uneven across space economy segments. This is particularly true in space manufacturing and launch, where firms often face high capital expenditure, high R&D costs, long development cycles and regulatory barriers (OECD, 2024[12]).

Despite being leaders in different space market segments, several recent entrants that went public around 2021 have yet to achieve sustained profitability.6 For selected listed space manufacturers, combined R&D and capital expenditure represented a large share of revenues, sometimes exceeding 60% of revenues, over the 2021-25 period. This reflects the challenges of developing, manufacturing and launching space systems, as well as the reaching the scale needed to become profitable in such capital-intensive industries (Figure 2.11).

In Europe for example, commercial activity and investment are expanding rapidly across the space economy, but profitability remains uneven as many firms continue to balance strong growth ambitions against high R&D, manufacturing and capital expenditure requirements. According to the European industry association Eurospace, the sector's overall financial performance weakened significantly between 2019 and 2024, with aggregate operating margins declining from a small profit (+2% of sales) to a sizeable loss (-16%). However, this deterioration was largely driven by substantial losses incurred by a limited number of companies. Profitability challenges remained concentrated among a few large actors rather than affecting the industry as a whole (Eurospace, 2026[26]).

Downstream segments linked to the delivery and exploitation of satellite data and signals show more heterogeneous performance than upstream activities. Satellite operators face periodic spikes in capital expenditure, for example when procuring and launching satellites, but their R&D intensity tends to be lower than in manufacturing and launch. For listed operators such as Iridium and Viasat, R&D expenditure averaged around 3.4% of revenues over 2021-25 (Stock Analysis, 2026[27]). Closer to end-user markets, space-related activities increasingly follow broader digital economy trends, where value derives from data, software, devices and integrated services.

Market composition is also changing. Satellite broadcasting, once the dominant privately generated space economy segment in some countries, is declining as streaming services gain traction: its share in value added in the United States fell from 40% in 2016 to 25% in 2023, as recorded in the US space economy thematic account, with further decreases observed more recently (Georgi and Surfield, 2025[6]). By contrast, the manufacturing of consumer equipment linked to global navigation satellite systems has become a major industry segment, reflecting the growing integration of satellite-based data into everyday digital applications.

Against this backdrop, horizontal consolidation and vertical integration are becoming increasingly important business strategies in the space sector. Proposed consolidation among European space-systems manufacturers and digital space services providers, including Airbus, Leonardo and Thales, alongside the recent SES-Intelsat and Eutelsat-OneWeb mergers in satellite communications, reflect efforts to build scale across space services. Some companies are as well expanding beyond their core activities to control a larger share of the value chain, combining infrastructure, manufacturing and services under a single business model. Such strategies may improve profitability by securing demand, reducing transaction costs, capturing revenues across multiple segments and providing greater control over critical technologies and supply chains. Similar trends have been observed in the wider aerospace and defence industries, where major incumbents such as Boeing, Airbus and Lockheed Martin have often integrated upstream and downstream activities to improve margins, reduce dependence on external suppliers and strengthen resilience.

Recent developments suggest that this trend is accelerating. Beyond SpaceX's combination of launch services, satellite manufacturing and communications through Starlink, several firms expanded their activities in 2025-26. In 2026, Rocket Lab announced the acquisition of satellite communications operator Iridium, extending its activities from launch and spacecraft manufacturing into satellite network operations and connectivity services. MDA Space expanded into both manufacturing and analytics through the acquisitions of spacecraft manufacturer Blue Canyon Technologies and a majority stake in earth observation analytics company CLS. York Space acquired satcom terminal provider All.Space, while Mitsubishi Electric acquired ground-segment company Infostellar. While these strategies may increase efficiency and support investment at scale, they could also reinforce market concentration and raise barriers to entry for smaller firms.These patterns show that commercialisation does not automatically translate into profitability across all space economy segments. Some activities may remain dependent on public demand, anchor contracts or patient capital, while others may scale through consumer, enterprise or mobility markets. For policy makers, this underlines the importance of distinguishing between market growth, strategic capability and sustainable business models when designing support measures and procurement strategies.

This chapter has shown that the space economy is becoming more commercial, more constellation-driven and more concentrated. Access to orbit has broadened, with more countries and firms able to deploy satellites, but launch capability, orbital infrastructure and large-scale satellite operations remain concentrated among a small number of actors. Telecommunications and low-earth orbit constellations are now major drivers of launch activity and demand for orbital resources, while satellite broadband, direct-to-cell services and commercial earth observation are creating new market opportunities.

These developments are reshaping the conditions for competition and value creation. Public procurement continues to play an important role in forming markets, particularly in earth observation, while profitability remains uneven across space economy segments. For policy makers, the challenge is to support commercial growth and innovation while monitoring concentration, access conditions, interoperability and the sustainability of orbital resources. The broader public value, resilience and environmental implications of these trends are addressed in Chapter 4.

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