Promoting Active Ageing in Southeast Asia

Promoting active ageing aims to ensure that older people can age healthily and independently and avoid feeling insecure, in particular in terms of income. This could be achieved by putting into action policies that foster the well-being of older people through their participation in the labour market and their engagement in various aspects of life, such as volunteering. Active Ageing is a concept that was popularised by the WHO within a policy framework to develop older people’s potential for well-being, which in turn may facilitate living longer healthy lives.1 The European Commission (DG EMPL) and UNECE have developed the Active Ageing Index (AAI) for European countries as a tool to assess older people’s ability to control their own lives and capacities for participation in both society and the economy.

Drawing from the analyses in the first three chapters of the report, this final chapter identifies the policy implications to promote active ageing among ASEAN countries. These analyses highlighted that:

• Ageing will be very fast in Southeast Asia (Chapter 1). It will have taken 74 years for OECD countries on average, from 1960 to 2034, to move from an old-age to working-age ratio of 15 (people aged 65+ for each 100 people aged between 20 and 64 years) to 40, although it will be much faster in Japan and Korea. In ASEAN countries on average, this will take only 36 years – less than half the OECD period, meaning that ageing will be twice faster according to this metric – from 2027 to 2063 based on current projections. Thailand is ageing extremely fast with 23 years, similar to Korea.

• Most ASEAN countries have a very large share of informal employment (Chapter 1). This is partly due to the high share of agriculture in some countries, but more importantly this relates to deep socio‑economic and cultural reasons. Informal employment is much more widespread in ASEAN countries than in other countries with a similar level of GDP per capita. Large informality generates huge social challenges as the vast majority of informal workers suffer from very limited protection against the risks of income losses related to illness, disability and old age. As a result, many informal workers continue to work in old age to fight vulnerability, with huge costs for individuals and society. These issues are becoming bigger as populations age. Informality also limits public financial resources and distorts competition.

• Employment rates are much lower among women than among men in ASEAN countries, and especially so among older workers, partially due to strong gendered social norms regarding the division of labour in some ASEAN countries (Chapter 2). Some ASEAN countries have large unused health-related work potential, mostly among women: a significant portion of older women is not active even though their health would allow it.

• Contrary to the views that prevailed in the past, economic development alone is not enough to significantly reduce informality: the factors behind such a large informality are deeply engrained in societies. The situation is all the more worrying as old-age safety nets are at very low levels except in Malaysia, exposing older people to high poverty risks and severe vulnerability (Chapter 3). In the absence of significant safety nets and developed pension systems in most ASEAN countries, older people, men in particular, may keep working despite being in bad health (Chapter 2).

• The levels of the key parameters in most public pay-as-you-go pension schemes in ASEAN countries, in Lao PDR and Thailand in particular, must be adjusted to significantly improve financial sustainability (Chapter 3).

• Access to essential health services in all ASEAN countries has significantly improved over the last two decades (Chapter 3). Improved coverage of measures to tackle infectious diseases has strongly contributed to this achievement. Building on these achievements, more needs to be done, for example in terms of access to basic care provision close to home and more generally to more advanced care at affordable cost. While most ASEAN countries provide near-universal coverage of health insurance, they differ a lot in the scope of healthcare services covered.

• Public spending on health is low in ASEAN countries compared to other countries with similar levels of economic development, in particular in Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Singapore (Chapter 3). To meet increasing healthcare costs due to population ageing, the healthcare budget can be increased through expanding the contribution base, raising health-insurance contribution rates, and allocating more resources from general tax revenues.

• Gender discrimination in family and inheritance laws is highly prevalent in most ASEAN countries, and fighting gender inequality is a crucial component of the active ageing strategy (Chapter 3). In most ASEAN countries, gender disparities are pervasive in old age across various aspects of life, including employment, health and poverty. These disparities are heavily influenced by social norms that define gender roles and expectations, creating barriers for women in various dimensions.

• Several ASEAN countries have implemented policies to provide opportunities for older people living in the community to participate in social activities (Chapter 3). Moreover, public transport is a key component of designing age‑friendly environments and of active ageing. Reduced fares are a common initiative to increase older people’s use of public transport services among ASEAN countries.

Consequently, key active ageing policies in the ten ASEAN countries should focus on: tackling labour market informality; reducing gender inequalities in old age and improving care provision; providing inclusive access to healthcare; enhancing social protection in old age; and, promoting the social participation of older people. This chapter discusses the main measures to be taken in these five areas.

Tackling informality is crucial to enhance active ageing in ASEAN countries. This is generally seen as a prerequisite to ensure decent social protection for most older people. Informality hurts the accumulation of pension entitlements financed by contributions on wages and more generally restricts savings over the lifecycle, thereby eroding income security at older ages. Pension entitlements are low because informal workers are rarely covered by contributory schemes. The lack of income at older ages leads to very limited choices on when to exit the labour market, obliges people to work until very old ages and exposes them to high risks of old-age poverty. Beyond directly affecting the well-being of older people, low old-age income also limits their capacity to engage in social activities such as volunteering. Furthermore, informality erodes tax bases and poses substantial challenges for the financing of old-age benefits and activation measures. As population ageing will be particularly rapid in ASEAN countries, these issues will quickly become more severe.

While reducing informality should be a policy priority for most ASEAN countries, this cannot be the only strategy to ensure better social protection in old age. The main reason is that informality has its source in many, deeply engrained factors, which makes this policy issue very complex and means that, even if substantial efforts are put in place, informality will continue to generate serious social and economic concerns in the predictable future. Consequently, one cannot wait for the overall benefits from significant progress made to tackle informality: in the meantime, other measures must be taken to improve social protection in old age. This section deals with ways to reduce informality while section 4 focuses on measures to enhance social protection in old age. Both may be connected as the way social protection is financed can affect the level of informality. Social protection financed by earnings contributions raises the cost of formalisation, which increases informality although the impact varies depending on economical, institutional and historical conditions.

ASEAN countries should substantially strengthen their policies to fight informality as progress towards formalisation is slow. Informality is large in all ASEAN countries, varying from around 3 in 10 workers in Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia to 9 in 10 in Cambodia and Lao PDR (Chapter 1). Among ASEAN countries except for Malaysia, formalisation is lagging productivity growth and informality has not declined as much as one would have expected given high recorded economic growth. Rapid population growth in ASEAN countries may have contributed to sluggish labour formalisation, by sustaining the supply of low-skilled informal workers (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014[1]). On the sectoral level, informal work is common in all sectors, but particularly prevalent in agriculture: across ASEAN countries, 96% of workers in agriculture are informal (Chapter 1). More than 1 in 3 workers work in agriculture in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam. As countries develop economically, more jobs are created in industry and services, creating a push towards formalisation. For example, while most workers in the agricultural sector have traditionally been self-employed in Viet Nam, namely own-account and unpaid family workers, newly created jobs in industry and services are mostly for employees (OECD, 2023[2]).

While fighting informality should be at the top of the policy agenda in most ASEAN countries, the priority level differs a lot across countries. In Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and the Philippines, informality remains very high and shows no clear sign of decline. In Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam, policy efforts seem to have reduced informality significantly recently, although it remains very high; further substantial effort is required. Policy frameworks in Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore have been most effective in formalising employment, even though they still lag behind those in many OECD countries. Specifically for Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, informal employment mainly concerns migrant workers who do not have access to most forms of contributory social security (Olivier, 2018[3]). Singapore has managed to reduce informality among the self-employed by, among others, requiring business registration certificate to make any transaction with government agencies, to open a bank account or to apply for credit. Particularly for mobile street vendors (hawkers), Singapore moved their activity from street into special-purpose buildings in the 1970s; their operation has then been subject to licencing and formal registration. Unregistered hawkers face the risk of substantial fines or even imprisonment (OECD, 2020[4]).

The necessity to fight informality has been increasingly recognised by ASEAN countries over the last decade, but limited concrete outcomes have followed. For example, in 2016, ASEAN Member States adopted the Vientiane Declaration on Transition from Informal Employment to Formal Employment. In 2017, they developed a Regional Action Plan of the Vientiane Declaration (ASEAN, 2017[5]), which aims at enhancing the well-being of workers and their families, making growth more inclusive, and eradicating poverty. The plan includes three areas: strengthening policies, improving data collection and building capacity. Most actions included research and knowledge sharing. However, this has not been translated into clear policy measures. For example, a holistic framework to deal with the informal economy in Indonesia, called the Magna Carta of Workers in the Informal Economy, is still in the pipeline in the parliament after some years of delay.

To reduce the costs of formalisation, governments could lower general labour taxes for low earners. This can be done for example by applying pension contributions only beyond an earnings threshold and by financing flat-rate basic benefits through general taxes.2 Such a measure should not be thought as a long-term solution as it could be gradually eliminated as formalisation reaches acceptable levels, which is likely to take several decades. Bearing the costs of formalisation can indeed be particularly strenuous for low-wage workers, who often have insufficient skills and encounter scarce opportunities elsewhere (OECD, 2024[6]). In some cases, informal work reflects a subsistence strategy in the absence of opportunities for formal employment, while, in others, it reflects a voluntary choice as workers opt out of formality to avoid having to pay social security contributions and taxes (OECD, 2018[7]). Lower labour taxes and social security contributions are costly for the public purse in the short run, while bringing additional revenues from broader tax bases over the longer term. This short-term effect may be an obstacle for policy makers, as lowering general labour taxes would require identifying alternative tax revenues and may require substantial reform of tax systems. Furthermore, to bring domestic workers, often women, into the formal economy, subsidised vouchers to pay for domestic tasks were introduced in Austria, Belgium and France (ELA, 2021[8]), as well as in Romania more recently (Pop, 2022[9]). Introducing such vouchers might be particularly relevant when formal employment prevails, as in Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore among ASEAN countries.

Costs incurred by formalisation can be more easily paid by high earners, who tend to be more productive. Although largely beyond the scope of this report, raising workers’ productivity is therefore an important objective, which requires better skills. One main way to improve skills is increasing participation in formal education and reducing drop-out rates from primary and secondary schools, which is already taking place in ASEAN countries (ASEAN, 2019[10]). Further significant steps are needed in Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar as the share of people without even primary education is expected to remain high in the middle of the 21^st century (Chapter 2). It is important to expand the provision of basic skills for adults, in particular for women and marginalised individuals (UNESCO, 2017[11]). For example, in Colombia, skill upgrading would explain two‑thirds of the reduction in informality from 70% in 2007 to 62% in 2017 (IMF, 2018[12]), with the impact of cutting employers’ contributions coming on top (see references in Box 3.2 in OECD, (2022[13])). Furthermore, governments should improve the recognition of skills acquired through on-the‑job learning, because the lack of official certification makes it difficult for informal workers to prove their skills when they aspire to transition into formal employment.

Measures should also be taken to simplify the regulations faced by firms and reduce formalisation costs. Formalisation incurs direct and short-term costs on firms, making informal work cheaper. Formalisation costs include all bureaucratic procedures related to business registration (highly relevant for the self-employed and small businesses) and compliance with safety regulations, the tax code and social security laws. Moreover, when the system is perceived as corrupt, inefficient or ineffective, workers and companies are less inclined to formalise. To ensure that regulations are not overly costly and complicated, the government should: ease the administrative processes of business registration and reporting; remove legal obstacles to firms’ growth; fight corruption; and, promote a business-friendly environment by encouraging responsible business conduct. For example, by reducing the administrative burden, Indonesia shortened the period required to start a business from 76 days to 10 days between 2013 and 2020 (OECD, 2021[14]). Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand have eased the process of registering informal businesses, by e.g. making it less costly and quicker and by reducing the administrative burden (OECD, 2020[4]). Cambodia and Indonesia have decentralised administration to improve co‑ordination, governance and administrative capacity (Ong and Bista, 2015[15]). Among OECD countries, Chile eased registration and reporting procedures for small firms through implementing a so-called “single window”, which has contributed to the strong reduction of informality (ILO, 2019[16]). Some countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Hungary and Uruguay, have introduced presumptive tax regimes to simplify procedures and lower the cost of formalisation for the self-employed and small companies – presumptive tax regimes levy tax or social security contributions on a presumed tax base that intends to approximate net taxable income by indirect means (Mas-Montserrat, Colin and Brys, 2024[17]); a robust evaluation of the impact of introducing such tax regimes on labour formalisation is missing. Moreover, informal firms in emerging economies tend to remain small, allowing them to stay under the radar of enforcement agencies and minimise the risk of detection. Barriers to firms’ expansion tend to hold down productivity growth as they prevent firms from exploiting economies of scale efficiently and accessing credit (OECD, 2018[7]).

Given low compliance with labour law and social security regulations, governments should ensure that product market regulations are not too strict, employment protection legislation is flexible enough and the minimum wage is not too high. The combination of non-compliance with labour legislation and strong protective measures for workers and businesses may substantially reduce formal job creation. Furthermore, such an environment likely leads to dual labour markets, where some workers work permanently in better-quality formal jobs, while others are stuck in worse‑quality informal jobs. This results in low mobility rates between informal and formal employment in many emerging economies (OECD, 2018[7]). Dual labour markets are more likely to emerge when employment protection legislation in formal employment is strict (Betcherman, 2014[18]), minimum wages are high and enforcement of labour and social protection regulation is weak. Substantial signs of labour-market duality have been observed, for example, in Indonesia (OECD, 2021[14]). Too strict product market regulation might lead firms to remain informal. Compared with OECD standards, product market regulations, employment protection rules and statutory minimum wages in emerging economies, including most ASEAN countries, tend to be relatively strict, while at the same time leaving large parts of the economy informal, hence unregulated (OECD, 2018[7]). That being said, too lax employment protection legislation and too low minimum wages limit benefits that formalisation brings to workers. Striking the right balance is therefore important but not easy.

Covering all workers by social protection as soon as possible should remain a clear policy objective in all ASEAN countries. Labour and social protection regulations do not cover all workers in ASEAN countries. Exceptions apply, in particular, to those working in small companies, the self‑employed, domestic workers, migrants, part-timers, workers on temporary contracts and seasonal workers (Chapter 2). Companies are also tempted to use service contracts instead of labour contracts to escape regulatory and tax commitments (Arnold et al., 2024[19]). Such exceptions fuel informality. In many OECD countries, including France, Sweden and the United Kingdom, expanding coverage of social security from a few categories – such as civil servants, farmers or sailors – to most workers took decades (SSA, 2019[20]). Among ASEAN countries, Thailand offers the self-employed the option to join social insurance scheme, covering injury, disability and old-age risks, on a voluntary basis but the take‑up rate is rather low. Malaysia introduced a separate employment injury insurance for the self-employed and informal workers in 2017 and expanded it to migrants in 2018. It is generally voluntary but is mandatory for delivery and taxi drivers. The scheme covered only 4.7% of the target group one year after its launch (Nguyen and Cunha, 2019[21]). On pensions, informal workers can join the pension scheme voluntarily; in that case the government tops individual contributions with an additional 15%. In 2022, an additional social security scheme was started to cover housewives against domestic injury and invalidity.

Extending formalisation requires to effectively enforce labour regulations and tax rules. The labour and social protection inspection mechanisms are relatively weak in some ASEAN Member States. Some countries do not ensure regular labour or tax inspections and rarely apply penalties on companies for employing workers informally (Chapter 1). Enhancing compliance with regulations requires an effective judiciary, well-equipped labour inspectorates and a greater involvement of social partners. Detected non-compliance cases should result in adequate penalties on companies. Furthermore, public procurement practices should support formalisation through strictly requiring and checking compliance with the labour code among the contractors and subcontractors of public investments. For example, this is particularly important in Viet Nam where public investments boost construction (OECD, 2023[2]). Finally, policy measures should promote appropriate social norms and responsible business conduct. When social norms strongly condemn informal work, the non-pecuniary costs of informality are higher (Kolm and Larsen, 2002[22]).

Mandating a written and registered labour contract instead of an oral agreement is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition to foster formal employment. For example, Viet Nam introduced the obligation to have labour contracts in writing in 2021 (OECD, 2023[2]). Before, verbal agreements were possible for contracts of less than three‑months, which resulted in no written documents for employees with one‑ to three‑month contracts to prove their employment records for social security. Thailand introduced the obligation to have a written contract for home workers in 2010, with substantial fines if this rule is not respected (ILO, 2021[23]).

Platform work, which is developing, is particularly prone to informality and formalising these jobs calls for specific measures (OECD, 2019[24]; ASEAN, 2023[25]). These measures should include: 1) modernising laws to bring digital labour platform work within the scope of existing labour and social protection regulations; 2) leveraging technologies to formalise workers; 3) encouraging the formalisation of self-employment; 4) ensuring that platforms pay their share of taxes and social security contributions; 5) enforcing regulations to categorise workers as employees where appropriate; and 6) encouraging platforms to exercise social responsibility (OECD, 2023[26]; OECD, 2024[6]).

Social insurance benefits should be adequate, accessible and transparent to make formalisation appealing to workers. Adequacy of contribution-based benefits requires that their level is high enough to convince workers to formalise. Transparent and easy procedures for granting social insurance benefits are particularly important for workers who lack the basic skills needed to deal with more complex administrative procedures. Furthermore, a clear link between contributions and benefits makes advantages of formalisation more straightforward (OECD, 2018[7]). To be consistent, all additional contributions and all additional years of work should lead to higher old-age pension benefits. This is facilitated by a good co‑ordination between contributory pensions and safety-net benefits (OECD, 2015[27]).3

Informing workers about the benefits of formal employment at the individual and collective levels requires substantial communication effort. Over time, labour formalisation improves economic growth and has positive social effects, while only some of them are immediately seen by individuals.4 Advantages of public employment services, unemployment insurance and pensions become visible only in the time of job loss or in retirement. Effective communication requires providing accessible and targeted information. Governments should therefore make sure that information about social benefits is communicated regularly and accurately to individuals, through e.g. social security agencies (OECD, 2022[28]). Public awareness campaigns also help promote appropriate social norms.

Integrating a gender dimension into policies is essential for promoting active ageing in ASEAN countries for both women and men. Gender disparities are pervasive in old age across various aspects of life, and are, among other areas, visible in employment, health and old-age poverty. These disparities are rooted in societal norms that define gender roles and expectations, creating barriers for women to participate in the labour market. As gender imbalances exist in multiple aspects of life, gender inequalities must be addressed broadly.

Effectively tackling gender inequalities in ASEAN countries requires addressing discriminatory norms and practices and incorporating gender perspectives into all policy making. Training and awareness campaigns can shift gendered perceptions, and legal reforms can help address gender discrimination in the labour market and in the private sphere if properly enforced. Beyond gender-specific actions and regulations, incorporating a gender perspective into ageing policies can help ASEAN countries reduce gender inequalities in later life. This involves recognising that women’s caregiving responsibilities limit their access to employment, healthcare and social protection, and developing policies that reduce gender inequalities in family-care provision and mitigate the impact of caregiving on other spheres of life.

As the organisation of care provision plays an important role in shaping gender inequalities, developing formal care policies is key to reduce gender inequalities. In Southeast Asia, traditional gender roles and norms assign the primary caregiving role to women, leading to care systems heavily reliant on unpaid female labour. Discriminatory norms shape caregiving practices and translate into limited formal care services (Chapter 3). The burden of care, closely tied to the gendered division of labour, widens the gender employment and wage gaps (Chapter 2). These gender gaps, stemming from domestic responsibilities, leave women with inadequate social protection and an increased risk of poverty in old age (Chapter 3). Developing formal care policies would reduce women’s unpaid care responsibilities at home and allow them to take up or increase time in paid work. Moreover, it would also reduce gender inequalities in working conditions and access to social protection among workers as care work is among the most female‑dominated occupations in the labour market (OECD, 2023[29]).

Including a gender perspective in designing old-age policies is key to ensure that the challenges faced by older women are not overlooked. Women are more exposed than men to some old-age risks, such as losing one’s spouse or old-age poverty. As disadvantages in old age are often the outcome of the compounding of disadvantages throughout life – for instance, inequalities in the labour market translate into higher financial vulnerability in retirement, while unequal access to healthcare services at younger ages can result in poorer health in old age – tackling gender inequalities in old age requires interventions throughout the life course.

Although ASEAN countries have recognised the need to pay attention to gender issues in ageing policies, limited concrete action has been taken. The 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Active Ageing entails a high-level political commitment among the ASEAN countries to eliminate “maltreatment” of older people on the basis of gender (Box 4.1). While a declaration of intentions is an important first step, they need to be translated into concrete actions to improve the situation for older women in Southeast Asia. The Regional Plan of Action to guide the implementation of the Declaration lists very few objectives, activities or indicators on monitoring or tackling gender inequalities. The attention it actually pays to gender issues is clearly lagging behind. Furthermore, the ASEAN Gender Mainstreaming Strategic Framework (2021‑25) outlines initiatives to promote gender equality and inclusion, but barely considers specific gender issues in old age.

While women’s access to higher education is important to reduce gender inequalities throughout the life course, it is not enough. One very positive achievement is that gender gaps in tertiary education enrolment have largely been eliminated in most ASEAN Member States in recent years. However, women still have less access to higher education compared to men in Cambodia (World Bank, 2024[31]) and Myanmar (Harun and Ibrahim, 2022[32]). In Cambodia, women’s enrolment is 12% lower than men’s, and in Myanmar, female enrolment rates for higher education are almost half those of the total population. Moreover, women in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are much less likely to pursue science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) degrees than men (UNESCO, 2024[33]), and even if they attain such a degree, women are less likely than men to work in STEM fields (Chua, Kline and Lim, 2022[34]), which is also the case in OECD countries (OECD, 2017[35]). Gender-inclusive education policies, such as offering career counselling services specifically geared toward addressing gender disparities in male‑dominated fields, can help reduce the still widespread public perception of higher education as primarily for men. In the Philippines, for instance, the Commission on Higher Education advocates for several actions to make education more gender inclusive. These include avoiding gender-discriminatory language in instruction and course materials, raising awareness of gender discrimination, promoting on-campus harassment prevention and reserving research funding for female researchers in male‑dominated programmes or fields. Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam have implemented similar initiatives in tertiary education. Furthermore, lifelong learning initiatives can help mitigate the effect of historical gender inequalities in access to higher education. While Cambodia still has a way to go to reach gender parity in access to higher education, its Gender Policy and Action (2017‑26) outlines strategies to enhance women’s participation in vocational education and training programmes (Rakhmani et al., 2022[36]). This includes providing financial support for female students, expanding gender-sensitive facilities, and increasing the number of female instructors.

The public sector can lead the way in tackling gender inequalities in the labour market through education and training programmes for civil servants. For instance, the Philippine Civil Service Commission developed a training manual and a course on gender mainstreaming for their human resources system in 2016 (ASEAN, 2021[37]). The materials were designed to help human resources professionals in the civil service see how they can advance gender equality within public institutions. This includes improving these professionals’ awareness and understanding of sex and gender concepts and their workplace implications, of the legal framework on gender and employment in the public sector, and of the role gender plays in talent management. The training also aims to boost knowledge of gender mainstreaming – i.e. the application of a gender perspective in every stage and area of policy making – and of planning gender-responsive interventions. In Malaysia, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development implemented gender mainstreaming training for their health officers. The training seeks to reduce gender inequalities in health, including by raising awareness on how gender norms and inequalities contribute to health issues. By implementing similar gender-responsive trainings across sectors, countries can advance gender equality economy-wide.

Education can also play a role in tackling existing gender inequalities in old age. Improving women’s financial literacy and their understanding of the pension system can help them plan better for old age and reduce their risk of poverty in later life. Given the greater financial risks in older age, financial education programmes tackling these issues should be tailored to encourage women’s participation. This includes offering gender-responsive materials and inclusive learning environments where women feel comfortable participating. New Zealand’s programme called Women in Super educates women on the superannuation system and retirement planning, while Singapore’s Financial Education for Mature Women targets low-income women over age 40 to help them achieve financial independence (OECD, 2021[38]). Both programmes specifically help build networks where women can support one another. Similar programmes were introduced in Indonesia and Malaysia. These programmes empower older women to become financially independent and reduce their financial insecurity.

The benefits of gender equality, including for men, can be highlighted through public information campaigns boosted by collaborating with popular media. Communication campaigns should emphasise that gender equality benefits everyone as gaining men’s support is key to prevent backlash against women’s rights. The #inFAIRness campaign in the Philippines engaged men as advocates for women’s economic empowerment, using digital channels and public transportation to spread key messages (OECD, 2024[39]). In Malaysia, the Society for Equality, Respect, and Trust for All works to dismantle harmful gender norms by engaging men and boys in equal-parenting initiatives, such as the Celebrating Fatherhood campaign, which promotes fathers’ involvement in childcare and a more balanced gender division of care responsibilities. Similar media campaigns can help reach a broader audience and increase public understanding of the benefits of gender equality.

Reforms in marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws are imperative for reducing gender inequality in the public and family spheres. Several ASEAN countries have developed laws to boost gender equality in these spheres, but further reforms are needed. Lao PDR’s Law on Gender Equality aims to enhance gender equality in areas such as politics, economy, culture, education, healthcare, labour, and justice (OECD, 2024[39]). In addition, the legal marriage age was set at 18 for both men and women and equal rights in all family matters, including joint land titling, divorce and inheritance, were granted in 2019. Singapore has made divorce more accessible for women by enabling married women to apply for divorce without a registration fee since 2022. To build on these reforms, governments and legislators should further amend discriminatory provisions in existing legal frameworks, including in personal status laws, to boost older women’s independence. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar should in particular expand women’s access to divorce and inheritance, and Lao PDR should step up efforts to end child marriage.

Labour regulations with a gender focus can eliminate workplace discrimination and enable women’s continued participation in the labour market. This includes creating a secure, harassment-free environment where women have equal career opportunities and equal pay for equal work. All ASEAN countries, except for Brunei Darussalam, prohibit gender-based discrimination and workplace sexual harassment. Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam have criminalised such harassment (OECD, 2024[39]). Indonesia passed the Anti-Sexual Violence Law in 2022, and a 2023 decree mandates employers to establish an anti-sexual harassment task force. Viet Nam’s Labour Code among others prohibits sex-based discrimination, penalises workplace sexual harassment, and protects women’s employment rights, including paid maternity leave and protection against dismissal during leave. However, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Thailand lack civil remedies, which prevents women from seeking compensation for workplace harassment. Policy makers should broaden the scope of regulations on sexual harassment and equal pay as well as enforce stricter regulations in order to drive systematic changes in workplace practices. For example, in Portugal, harassment is criminalised and public employers are legally obliged to have codes of conduct and disciplinary procedures to prevent it (OECD, 2023[40]). Moreover, formalisation of employment would help protect women in the workplace as labour regulations are difficult to enforce in undeclared work (Section 4.1).

Effectively addressing gender equality requires securing a collective commitment from all government actors, and appointing key leaders within government structures. This approach would help ensure that gender considerations are integrated across all policies (OECD, 2023[41]). In Thailand, the appointment of Chief Gender Equality Officers and Gender Focal Points in every ministry is supposed to ensure gender considerations are integrated into policy planning, budgeting, and public-service provision, creating a unified approach across the government (OECD, 2021[42]). Strengthening independent institutions and advisory bodies to monitor and report on gender equality efforts is also useful for sustained progress. In Cambodia, the National Council for Women monitors compliance with gender-related laws, while the Ministry of Women’s Affairs collaborates with other ministries to support the integration of gender considerations into their policies and initiatives. ASEAN countries can benefit from implementing such strategies to establish accountability and enforcement of regulations.

Policy makers should systematically collect age‑ and gender-disaggregated data to identify the needs of older women and assess their use of current services. National statistics offices can integrate key gender indicators into routine surveys, such as adding modules on economic empowerment to labour force surveys and on health and well-being in household health surveys (OECD, 2024[39]). In 2017, the United Kingdom conducted an audit of data sources to understand inequalities across factors covered by the Equality Act 2010 – including age, sex, race, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, and gender (OECD, 2023[40]). The audit highlighted the need to improve data transparency, coverage, and the inclusiveness of collection and reporting processes. Malaysia has made strides by offering gender statistics courses and establishing priorities for improving gender data (ASEAN, 2021[37]). Similarly, Viet Nam has enhanced its collection of gender-disaggregated data, identifying 78 gender indicators (Gender Equity Unit, 2024[43]). More countries should invest in such data collection to better understand social norms affecting older women and develop targeted strategies.

A key challenge women face in the labour market are caregiving responsibilities. They can be mitigated through maternity and parental leave policies that help women stay in the workforce through involving fathers in care work and facilitating mothers’ return to work. Due to the gendered division of labour, women spend more time on unpaid care and household work than men (Chapter 3). Paid leave supports female employment as it facilitates labour market re‑entry after the end of the leave period. All OECD countries, except for the United States, grant mothers national statutory rights to paid maternity leave (OECD, 2023[40]). While all ASEAN countries mandate paid maternity leave, Cambodia’s 90‑day leave falls about one week short of the 14‑week minimum recommended by the ILO (OECD, 2024[39]). In OECD countries, the average duration of statutory paid maternity leave is 18.5 weeks. Promoting fathers’ involvement in childrearing through parental leave can furthermore help mitigate the gender inequality in unpaid work and enable women to stay in the workforce. OECD countries offer on average around 13 weeks of paid father-specific leave, either through paternity leave or father-specific parental or home care leave. With around one year of leave, Japan and Korea provide the longest paid father-specific leaves in the OECD (OECD, 2024[44]). In Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg and Sweden, close to half of people taking up parental leave benefits are fathers, and rates are also above 40% in Norway and Portugal (OECD, 2022[45]). With the exception of Denmark, all these countries have long periods of leave earmarked for fathers with relatively high replacement rates compared to the OECD average (OECD, 2024[44]). In contrast, virtually no fathers take up leave in Australia, Czechia, New Zealand and Poland. In some countries, including Japan and Korea, the uptake of parental leave by fathers has increased fast over the last decade: the male share of users/recipients increased by more than 20 p.p. in Estonia, Korea, Lithuania and Luxembourg, and by more than 10 p.p. in Italy and Japan (OECD, 2022[45]). Both changes in leave entitlements for father and changes in gender roles can contribute to the higher uptake of parental-leave entitlements by fathers.

Care provision will be a key component to improve the well-being of older people as populations age in ASEAN countries (OECD, 2024[39]). The existing care system for both older adults and children strongly relies on families, in particular women, contributing to persisting gender inequality in ASEAN societies. The current level of formal care provision limits women’s ability to work more hours and further entrenches gender inequality within the family and society. This also affects active ageing, as the caregiving burden often falls on older women, who must balance their own needs with caring for family members, reducing their ability to engage in employment and community life, and maintain independence. Addressing these issues requires a comprehensive approach that improves care provision for children and older people and betters the working conditions of care workers. By developing a formal care sector, ASEAN Member States can enhance the labour force participation of women, improve their employment and income security, and support the active ageing of the older population.

Investment in the formalisation of the care economy in ASEAN countries can reduce the care burden women face and enhance their economic participation. Since childcare and long-term care (LTC) are primarily undertaken by women, the development of a formal care economy would make it possible for more women to enter the labour market and improve the working conditions of those currently providing care in the informal economy. To that end, ASEAN Member States adopted the Comprehensive Framework on Care Economy in 2021 (ASEAN, 2021[46]). Among the strategic priorities of the framework are promoting healthy ageing, ensuring inclusive social protection, reducing the care burden on family members and accelerating the digital transformation of the care economy. Given the increased participation of women in the workforce, the framework also emphasises the formalisation of care work to better address the demands for childcare and LTC.

The formalisation of care work would contribute to reducing both informal employment and gender disparities in employment status, especially as women are currently often engaged in the most vulnerable informal jobs (ILO, 2023[47]). Moreover, while family care will continue to play a significant role in Southeast Asia for a long time, it is important to further promote the advantages of formal care systems. Japan introduced its long-term care insurance system in 2000 as demographic trends and urbanisation increasingly hampered family-care provision, resulting in more and more older people being hospitalised for non-medical reasons (Iwagami and Tamiya, 2019[48]). However, different types of formal LTC services may have a different potential for relieving women from family-care responsibilities. In Japan, care recipients are more likely to use daycare and respite care and less likely to use homecare services if their primary caregiver is a woman compared when it is a man (Tokunaga, Hashimoto and Tamiya, 2015[49]). This could be related to the perception that the use of formal homecare services means that female caregivers resign the responsibilities traditionally assigned to them, whereas daycare and respite care are not perceived as resigning one’s responsibilities but as temporary relief. Spain has successfully reframed childcare from being primarily a family issue to an integral part of its education policy (León, 2007[50]). This shift began in the 1990s, when the education of children under six was included in the national education system. Although it took time, the expansion of pre‑school education in both the public and private sectors has solidified the idea that formal early childhood education is essential. As a result, parents are increasingly relying on these services.

The working conditions of care workers will improve if care work is covered by employment protection legislation. Care workers, particularly domestic workers, are excluded from the national coverage of labour laws in several ASEAN Member States. In Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, domestic workers are either excluded from or only partially covered by labour laws that regulate maximum daily and weekly working hours, establish national minimum wage standards, and provide maternity leave and pay. This exclusion leaves their work only partially formalised and highlights the gendered discrimination inherent in domestic care work (ASEAN, 2023[51]; ILO, 2023[52]). Improving working conditions for informal and domestic workers would directly strengthen their long-term financial stability and overall welfare, especially for many older women who face severe poverty due to low wages in these sectors (Tsao Foundation, 2019[53]). The Philippines implemented a comprehensive set of labour protections for domestic workers under the Kasambahay Act in 2013, establishing minimum standards for wages and hours, rest periods, and leave entitlements (ILO, 2013[54]). The legislation extends the labour rights and protections typically granted to formal employees to domestic workers. Such protection is essential for safeguarding the long-term financial stability of care workers. Yet, they are in themselves not sufficient to compel employers and workers to register the employment contract and sign up for social security (ILO, 2016[55]). A simple registration procedure and incentives to register, such as tax breaks or subsidised social-security contributions, could help formalise employment. This could for instance be done through the creation of a special employment statute for casual or irregular employment. Information campaigns help make employers and employees aware of their rights and responsibilities. And in the case of migrant care work, regularisation of irregular immigrant workers may also contribute to formalisation.

Some countries have taken initiatives to improve access to care specifically for women working in the informal economy. In 2007, Mexico implemented the Programme of Childcare Facilities to Help Working Mothers, which provided subsidised daycare for the children of low-income working parents – an essential resource for informal workers who lacked access to childcare funded by social security (OECD, 2017[56]). The programme offered grants to individuals and organisations to establish nurseries in their own premises, as well as subsidies to parents to make use of childcare services. While the scheme managed to formalise childcare businesses, the childcare assistants employed in these establishments often remained hired informally nonetheless. By 2016, approximately two‑thirds of the childcare facilities had registered as formal enterprises with the government; however, most did not report their childcare assistants. Consequently, despite an estimated 40 000 assistants required for the programme, only about 3 000 were formal workers incorporated into social security. India’s Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), a trade union for female workers in the informal economy, established the Sangini childcare co‑operative. It operates 11 full-time care centres for SEWA members in the city of Ahmedabad (ILO, 2018[57]). SEWA also provides information on the governments’ social security benefits and training programmes to facilitate their entry into the formal labour market. However, limited public financing affects service quality due to low staff-to-child ratios, inadequate wages for childcare workers and insufficient training opportunities. In addition to expanding access to childcare, investing in a comprehensive social protection system is critical to further supporting women’s transition into formal employment.

The provision of training and skill development opportunities would professionalise the care sector, enhance care quality and provide career advancement opportunities for care workers. Designating caregiving as a formal occupation can drive this professionalisation, creating job opportunities and improving the quality of care. The current care sector often requires minimum qualifications and skills, and in a context where most people prefer care from family members, the uptake of institutionalised care services depends on both affordability and quality. Dedicated training programmes can help meet these standards, allowing care workers to develop specific skills or specialise in particular areas of the care sector, such as LTC.

Training can also improve the working conditions of LTC workers, particularly for personal care workers. Better training typically coincides with improved remuneration, but training is also vital to make LTC work less arduous. To maximise this benefit, initial instruction should equip personal care workers with the essential knowledge and skills needed to care for older adults with common physical and mental limitations. In 2023, Australia introduced free vocational training opportunities in LTC to elevate the skills of personal care workers nationwide (OECD, 2023[29]). As care providers increasingly qualify as skilled workers, they may find more opportunities for career progression within the sector, enhancing their job satisfaction and improving the quality of care provision (ILO, 2018[58]). Singapore has taken a step forward by offering care‑provider training courses and providing credits and grants to reduce training costs (Singapore, 2023[59]). Similarly, the Philippines offer caregiving training courses, including basic caregiver skills, advanced nursing techniques, and gerontology, with some programmes specifically designed to fulfil training requirements for care workers in the main destination countries for Filipino migrant care workers (TESDA, n.d.[60]). These training programmes are crucial for promoting the professionalisation of the care sector, improving care quality, and providing career advancement opportunities for care workers. Not only will these training programmes be essential to meet the increase in domestic demand for care workers in the future as ASEAN countries’ populations age: countries will have to finance LTC services to offer working conditions attractive enough to keep a sufficient number of the care workers they train in the country.

Ensuring good health among older people is essential for active ageing. The health of older people depends on lifestyle and access to good-quality healthcare, not only in old age as health problems that develop over life are likely to result in poorer health and disability at older ages (OECD, 2017[61]). ASEAN countries have been successful at tackling infectious diseases, but improvements in relation to other aspects of healthcare have been more limited. For instance, improvements regarding non-communicable diseases have been slower and mostly the result of reducing tobacco use. Reforms in three areas are important: increasing public financing of the healthcare system; expanding healthcare coverage, in particular by improving the availability of healthcare services in rural areas; and, strengthening preventive health policies.

Government spending on healthcare will have to increase in ASEAN countries in order to substantially improve older people’s health. Total health expenditure is currently low in ASEAN countries: healthcare spending accounts for 4.7% of GDP in ASEAN countries, half the OECD average (Chapter 3). This is largely driven by low public spending, even compared to other countries with similar levels of economic development. This is the case, in particular, in Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Singapore. While total health expenditure could also be increased through higher private healthcare expenditure, the share of total healthcare expenditure that is paid out of pocket is already high in ASEAN countries, on average roughly double the OECD average.

Two strategies deployed in OECD countries to meet increasing healthcare needs could also be relevant for ASEAN countries (OECD, 2024[62]). First, countries have sought to raise new revenues or reallocate resources from other parts of the state budget. Between 2011 and 2019, the share of total government expenditures going to healthcare increased from 14.5% to 15.4% in the OECD on average, with particularly strong increases in Chile, Iceland, Ireland and the United States. The share of the government budget allocated to healthcare also increased faster in Japan and Korea than in the OECD on average over the same period. In countries with low government expenditure on health, as is the case in all ASEAN countries, this should be the primary strategy to meet increasing healthcare needs driven by ageing. In addition to raising taxes, new revenues can come from increasing the healthcare contribution rate or broadening its contribution base. Taxes on harmful products such as tobacco, alcohol and sugar can also generate some revenues in addition to steering lifestyle choices and reducing the consumption of unhealthy products (OECD, 2024[63]).

Second, efficiency gains can be made by improving preventive care, cutting ineffective and wasteful spending, and investing in new technologies. By increasing the efficiency of current healthcare provision, resources become available to expand the healthcare system. Effective strategies include among others reorganising responsibilities across different care providers, reducing expenditure on pharmaceuticals and implementing new technologies. Organisationally, nurses and pharmacists could be given permission to execute certain tasks previously performed by doctors. It is inefficient for doctors to perform tasks that could safely be executed by nurses or pharmacists, and, in particular in countries facing bigger shortages of doctors than of other medical service providers, the allocation of tasks across healthcare professionals should be reviewed. France, for instance, devolved the responsibility for monitoring patients with certain conditions to pharmacists (Ono, Schoenstein and Buchan, 2014[64]). Thailand similarly moved some responsibilities from doctors to local volunteers: the over one‑million Village Health Volunteers are elected by the community, monitor patients and are pivotal in preventive health campaigns (Dhillon et al., 2023[65]). Expenditure on pharmaceuticals can be reduced through increasing the penetration of generic drugs, as well as through regulating both the pricing and the prescribing of medicines. The implementation of new technologies, especially digital technologies and robotic tools, facilitates telemedicine and allows for making better use of health data to improve the management of care resources. Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have for instance sought to reduce expenditure through reorganising the purchase of medicines, renegotiating prices of certain treatments, improving tendering and procurement procedures, or using primary care as a gatekeeper to other forms of care (Agustina et al., 2019[66]; Department of Health of the Philippines, 2018[67]; Sumriddetchkajorn et al., 2019[68]). Malaysia’s 2023 Health White Paper stresses the importance of implementing electronic health and medical records to improve care co‑ordination and monitoring (Ministry of Health of Malaysia, 2023[69]). Moreover, harmful medical practices should obviously be reduced, for example by tackling the inappropriate use of antimicrobials and by taking measures to reduce medical errors. Prescriptions of antibiotics dropped by about 40% when general practitioners applied rapid diagnostic tests in France, and sales of a specific antibiotic fell by 80% in Canada after the country introduced a reimbursement cap for this medicine (OECD, 2017[70]). On average across the OECD, cutting ineffective or wasteful health spending by half would reduce healthcare spending by 1.2% of GDP per year by 2040. In comparison, policies improving healthy ageing, including the promotion of healthier lifestyles, are estimated to allow for the reduction of spending by 0.4% of GDP (OECD, 2024[62]).

Expanding health-insurance coverage for basic healthcare services to the full population by law is an important first step towards making healthcare services more accessible. This could be supplemented with contributory health insurance (which then applies to formal workers only) providing access to a wider set of healthcare services. Both Indonesia and the Philippines initially made enrolment voluntary for certain groups, but this failed to provide protection to a significant part of the population and undermined the financial sustainability of health insurance as explained in Chapter 3. In response, both countries ultimately abolished the option to enrol voluntarily and passed a law covering the full population by health insurance. Cambodia and Myanmar, in particular, need to step up efforts in this area as the large majority of their populations remain uncovered by public health insurance. A supplementary mandatory health-insurance scheme could give access to a wider set of healthcare services. To limit the risk that low-income workers remain in informality to avoid paying these contributions, the supplementary insurance should give access to a significantly wider or better-quality set of services, and health-insurance contributions should have a progressive structure to mitigate the net income loss for low-income workers (OECD, 2024[71]).

Beyond expanding health-insurance coverage, increasing the availability of healthcare services is important to improve people’s access to healthcare. This requires that countries have sufficient healthcare capacities, and that these capacities are well distributed across local areas so that also people living outside the main urban centres can access them. Cambodia, Lao PDR and, to a lesser extent, Myanmar trail behind other ASEAN Member States in terms of healthcare capacities – the latter refer to the number of healthcare professionals, in particular doctors and nurses, and available infrastructure such as hospital beds; the WHO furthermore includes a number of capacities needed to detect and respond to events threatening public health, such as food safety and laboratory capacity. Boosting healthcare capacities is costly and requires higher public healthcare expenditures to build the necessary infrastructure and to train and retain doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals.

Problems of availability and accessibility of healthcare services are often more pronounced in rural areas. In Indonesia, for instance, the number of doctors relative to the population is much lower in rural areas compared to urban areas. In the Philippines, people in rural areas are much less likely to receive medical treatment despite the entire population in principle being covered by health insurance. There are three broad strategies OECD countries have employed to improve coverage in areas with insufficient medical services (Ono, Schoenstein and Buchan, 2014[64]): countries can seek to increase the total number of healthcare personnel, to distribute the available personnel more equally across the country, or to change medical-service delivery.

A first set of policies focuses on increasing the overall pool of medical staff, which is particularly relevant in countries with a general shortage of medical staff, in particular Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. These three countries fall well below the target of the WHO’s Global Strategy on Human Resources for Health of 44.5 doctors, nurses and midwives per 10 000 population (Boniol et al., 2022[72]; Dhillon et al., 2023[65]). Nationwide shortages allow for medical staff to be more selective in choosing where they want to work and are therefore felt hardest in areas that are generally less attractive for doctors. Southeast Asian countries have faced shortages of health professionals – doctors, nurses and midwives – but the situation has recently improved, with a 30%-increase in health professionals between 2014 and 2020 on average across countries (Dhillon et al., 2023[65]). Through efforts to recruit students into medical programmes, in particular students willing to work in underserved regions or to work longer hours, capacities can be built up over time. For instance, the 2018 Universal Health Care Act in the Philippines expanded the availability of scholarships for medical studies and mandates that people who received such a scholarship work in underserved priority areas for at least three years after graduating (USAID, 2019[73]). While the new requirement did coincide with an expansion of the number of available scholarships, introducing supplementary conditions to existing scholarship programmes can be a risky strategy in countries with general shortages of medical staff as it may reduce a programme’s attractiveness to new students. The Bonded Medical Program in Australia provides a subsidised place to study medicine conditional on committing to work in an eligible rural area for three years after completing the course.5 Japan has a medical school specifically training students to become medical doctors in rural areas. Five years after graduation, graduates of this school are more likely to work in rural areas than graduates who entered medical school on quota and with a scholarship (Matsumoto et al., 2021[74]). The medical school forgives tuition of graduates who work in their home prefecture for nine years.6 Admission quota to medical schools have been increased as well to create places for such regional-quota students. As a result, the number of physicians in the country increased by 13% over the last decade. Some OECD countries also incentivise doing internships in underserved areas. In Norway, for instance, supplementary professional and social support is available for medical students opting to do an internship in some remote areas.

A second set of policies seeks to impact coverage more immediately through incentivising medical professionals to move from areas more saturated with medical service providers to insufficiently covered areas. This is particularly suitable in countries where there are no nationwide shortages, but medical staff is unequally distributed across local areas. Moving medical staff from saturated to underserved areas can be done either through financial incentives or through regulating where doctors can open practices. The majority of OECD countries have some financial incentives in place to improve the geographic distribution of doctors. However, this is an expensive measure as it is difficult to target only doctors who would not work in an underserved area if there was no financial incentive to do so. Many OECD countries provide a one‑off payment for opening a practice in an underserved region, with the level of the financial incentive often depending on an area’s rurality or medical service shortages. The Canadian province of Ontario provides grants to doctors who establish a full-time practice in an underserved area, with bigger grants available to communities scoring higher on a “rurality index” – an index combining population metrics (population count and density) with travel time to basic and advanced medical facilities.7 Several German regions (Länder) provide similar payments, sometimes on the condition of committing to work at least a certain amount of years in the underserved area. Other countries provide wage‑related subsidies or minimum-income guarantees to compensate rural doctors for the smaller number of patients they can see within the same timeframe, or have programmes in place for the retention of doctors already working in underserved areas. The Canadian province of British Colombia provides doctors working in rural areas with a flat-rate payment and an additional supplement for each service provided, of which the levels depend on the size of the shortage and the distance to major medical centres.8 The Danish regions of Northern Jutland and Southern Denmark used to provide bonuses to older doctors to encourage them to continue working.

These incentives for relocation do not necessarily have to be financial: they can also be set through regulatory measures, which generally entail lower direct expenditures than subsidies. Some countries have restricted the choice of practice location for the establishment of new practices, whereas others have sought to tackle rural medical shortages through recruiting medical doctors from abroad. In Germany, there are regional maxima on practice permits for doctors providing services covered by national health insurance, with maxima depending on number of inhabitants and the number of people aged 65+. Doctors who did not manage to secure a permit in the region of their choice can seek a permit in another region. In Australia, doctors with medical degrees from other countries are only free to perform services reimbursed by the universal health insurance scheme anywhere in the country after ten years of working in an area with a shortage of doctors.9 However, the 10‑year period can be reduced by up to five years in case of very remote areas. The policy has drastically reduced the growth rate of general practitioners in urban areas and increased it in remote areas.

A third set of policies aims to change medical service delivery so that the same number of doctors can address the medical needs of a larger group of people. In addition to delegating tasks typically performed by doctors that can safely be performed by other providers (see above), co-location of medical services in rural areas can improve working conditions of doctors. This would make medical services available for a longer period throughout the day without stretching individual doctors’ working hours and reduce the number of hours each doctor is on call. It furthermore limits disruptions in service provision in case of temporary absence of an individual doctor. Moreover, co-location allows for hiring support staff such as a nurse who can take over the monitoring of patients with chronic illnesses or providing preventive care. Telemedicine reduces the need for doctors to frequently travel to remote areas. For this to work effectively, however, people living remotely should have access to the required technology and infrastructure such as a sufficiently strong mobile network.

The development of preventive health policies is key to direct people towards making healthier lifestyle choices. Preventive health policies contribute to maintaining functional ability by reducing unhealthy lifestyles and preventing accidents. Unhealthy lifestyles and accidents are major contributors to illness and disability among older people. Regulation, taxation, public awareness campaigns and health counselling can contribute to healthier lifestyles and help reduce the number of accidents. As health problems tend to accumulate throughout life, preventive health interventions are necessary at all stages of life to improve the health of older people and reduce health inequalities in the long term (OECD, 2017[61]). While on average, spending on preventive health programmes as a share of GDP in ASEAN countries is on par with the level in the OECD, preventive health efforts should be increased in Member States of both organisations. Among ASEAN countries, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand particularly lag behind in terms of spending on preventive health policies. Furthermore, Indonesia and Myanmar trail behind in terms of tackling non-communicable diseases, for which preventive health programmes are key.

Promoting exercise and active lifestyles can help older adults incorporate physical activity into their daily routines. Exercise has multiple benefits for older people, including lowering the risk of falling and of developing certain medical conditions including heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and certain types of cancer (Lee, Chia and Komar, 2022[75]). Beyond disease prevention, exercise improves physical performance, mental health and the quality of life. All ASEAN countries have physical-activity guidelines and have government agencies responsible for promoting physical activities and healthy ageing for older adults. For instance, in Malaysia, the Youth and Sports Ministry plans to expand the 2024 Exercise Programme for Senior Citizens to 120 locations nationwide to encourage an active lifestyle. Brunei Darussalam published National Physical Activity Guidelines in 2022, recommending regular exercise for older adults. These guidelines and programmes could be enhanced by shifting the focus from merely issuing recommendations to implementing practical, actionable strategies that can be integrated into everyday routines of older adults.

It is essential that responsible ministries not only formulate guidelines on healthy and active lifestyles but also take an active role in their execution, whether by organising initiatives themselves or by providing support to organisations to do so. This can include developing localised, accessible exercise programmes, partnering with community organisations, and utilising digital platforms to promote engagement. Active ageing centres could serve both as a platform to organise activities, and as a hub to bring older people in contact with organisations providing such activities. China’s National Fitness Plan (2021‑25) exemplifies efforts to promote mass fitness among older adults (Liu et al., 2022[76]). It includes creating older-people‑friendly gyms and public sports facilities that older people across the country should be able to reach within 15 minutes, known as “15‑minute fitness circles”. These are easily accessible exercise areas located within a short walking distance from residential areas, equipped with basic workout gear, exercise trails, or open spaces for activities like tai chi (The State Council Information Office, 2024[77]).

Community-wide interventions are effective in educating older adults about preventive health, and in fostering collective engagement. This can include community education on the benefits of exercise to raise awareness as well as information about evidence‑based methods to increase physical activity and make lifestyles healthier (Lee, Chia and Komar, 2022[75]). Peer support can also motivate older adults to engage in such programmes. Active ageing centres are ideal facilities for educating older adults about healthy lifestyles, as for instance happens in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. Malaysia’s Senior Citizen Community Clubs and Viet Nam’s Intergenerational Self-Help Clubs have been actively promoting physical health by raising awareness and educating older adults on the benefits of exercise as well. To raise community awareness, similar structures in other ASEAN Member States can be used to run health promotion campaigns and educational programmes. This localised approach ensures that the programmes are more relevant and accessible, encouraging greater participation and fostering a supportive environment for healthy, active ageing.

Regular health checkups are critical for accelerating preventive health efforts. Although preventive care is gaining attention in ASEAN, fewer than half of older people in the region undergo periodic checkups (ADB, 2024[78]). Indonesia’s posyandu programme monitors the health of people aged 45+ and Singapore’s Healthier SG initiative offers personalised health plans for older adults that include regular checkups, health maintenance, and preventive measures, such as vaccination, all at highly subsidised rates (Japan External Trade Organization, 2023[79]). Including health screenings in universal healthcare coverage programmes, as happens in Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Thailand, can boost the well-being of older people and reduce over time the burden on the healthcare system by detecting potential health conditions in an early stage. Meanwhile, the Philippines has recently started considering free annual medical checkups for older citizens (Quismorio, 2024[80]). Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam have yet to fully implement affordable preventive health screenings for older adults.

Providing older adults with self-monitoring tools can be an effective way to maintain health. These tools include wearable devices such as pedometers that track steps and sitting time, cardiac and blood-pressure monitors, biosensors, and smartwatches. Older adults who use these tools increase their step count, reduce sitting time, and participate more in light physical activity (Izawa, 2024[81]; Lee, Chia and Komar, 2022[75]). A notable example is Seoul’s Wrist Doctor 9988 program, launched in 2021, where 450 000 users adopted digital-health tools to build healthier habits (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2024[82]). Similar digital solutions could be integrated into primary healthcare systems in ASEAN countries to facilitate the screening of non-communicable diseases, early detection, monitoring, and health management. For this approach to be effective, older adults should be familiarised with these technologies. Furthermore, public-health officers could be involved in monitoring the collected health information. Australia’s My Health Record is a national digital health platform that allows individuals, including older adults, to store and monitor health data (Australian Digital Health Agency, 2024[83]). It integrates healthcare providers into the system, allowing them to access and track these data. Educational campaigns and online learning portals have been launched to help older adults navigate the tool. By combining self-monitoring technologies, education, and involvement of healthcare providers, ASEAN countries can improve preventive health routines for older adults. Self-monitoring reduces hospitalisation rates and hospital re‑admissions, although it could increase the use of primary healthcare services (McBain, Shipley and Newman, 2015[84]).

Old-age safety-net levels are very low in most ASEAN countries, which exposes the most vulnerable to high poverty risks. Many older people have not been able to build contributory pension entitlements, in part due to large informality. For them, raising non-contributory benefits is key. For current workers, coverage by contributory pensions needs to be expanded to promote active ageing. The first line of attack is to reduce labour market informality along the lines discussed above, to strengthen the communication about the advantages of contributing to pensions and to strive to enrol most workers into the same schemes. Moreover, substantial reforms are needed to raise employment at older ages in some countries and to improve financial sustainability in those with pay-as-you-go pensions. Some other important parametric reforms are needed to significantly improve future pension income prospects.

With the current high levels of informality in many ASEAN countries, it is key for social protection to ensure a well‑defined set of non-contributory benefits for all retirees, with no distinction between formal and informal workers. Hence, even those that have not made any pension contributions during their careers, and who are therefore currently at great risk of being in poverty, would be reasonably well protected. Indeed, given weak contribution records for most current older people, non-contributory pension payments need to cover many people. Increasing the recipiency levels can be achieved in several ways. A benefit can be paid based solely on age and a residency requirement such as in Brunei Darussalam and Thailand.10 Conversely, a targeted (i.e. means-tested) benefit can be implemented, as is the case in all other ASEAN countries except Cambodia and Lao PDR.

Improving basic social protection in old age can be achieved through either higher flat-rate or higher means-tested benefits. A flat-rate basic pension typically helps every resident above a certain age, but total expenditure will increase as more and more people become eligible with population ageing. With a means-tested benefit, the cost may be better contained over time, especially if more and more employees retire after having built entitlements to an earnings-related pension, thereby reducing their entitlements to non-contributory means-tested benefits.

There are clear trade‑offs between flat-rate and means-tested benefits. For a flat rate benefit, the main decision concerns the level of the benefit. Means testing allows benefits to be targeted to those truly in need, which can either be defined by income level or as a target percentage of the population. Therefore, means testing costs less overall for a given protection for the most vulnerable. Reciprocally, for the same overall spending level, it better protects the more vulnerable. The key parameters for a means-tested social pension on top of the administrative capacity and data availability to effectively means-test the benefits are: the benefit level; the speed at which the benefit is withdrawn as income increases, i.e. the withdrawal rate; whether the benefit applies at the individual or household level; and, the type of income that is means-tested. Beyond the risk of targeting errors especially in less developed countries, one main drawback of means testing is that it raises disincentives to contribute. This is because contributory pensions may make contributors non-eligible to the targeted benefit. Benefits should therefore not be withdrawn fully (corresponding to a withdrawal rate of 100%) once tested income reaches a set threshold. Instead, they should be withdrawn gradually as other income increases. The higher the withdrawal rate, the less costly the scheme is for a given level of maximum benefit but the larger the disincentives. The majority of OECD countries assess at the individual income level, including only other pension income in the calculation. Taking into account the public finance cost, Valdés-Prieto (2009[85]) suggests that it is optimal to opt for a scheme with a relatively low withdrawal rate, around 30%‑50%, as for example in Chile (30%) or Finland (50%). Moreover, administrative costs of means testing may be high compared to universal benefits. This is particularly the case in countries that are less economically developed than OECD countries and where informality is large. Indeed, eligibility needs to be assessed for each claimant and both the income data availability and the administrative capacity can make it difficult to assess eligibility for the benefits.

Many Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries increased social pensions in the early 2000s to help alleviate poverty among the older population. In 1995 around 10% of the population aged 60+ were receiving a social pension on average among the 26 LAC countries. The recipiency rate nearly trebled to 28% by 2014, while spending as a proportion of GDP doubled from 0.28% in 1995 to 0.56% in 2014 (Abramo, Cecchini and Morales, 2019[86]). One of the reforms that took place and that could be adapted to ASEAN countries was in Chile in 2007. This reform, which has since been used as a benchmark for other countries in the region, was designed to provide a level of protection to the poorest pensioners as the funded defined contribution (FDC) pension scheme was not sufficient for people with no or irregular contributions. The reform increased the safety-net benefit level for those without contributions to the FDC scheme while giving an additional top-up benefit for those with contributions. To further incentivise contributing, the withdrawal rate for this top-up benefit against the FDC pension was set at 30% only.11 In 2022, the benefit level was substantially increased and the target population broadened (OECD, 2023[87]). Bolivia provides another example. In 2007, Bolivia introduced a flat‑rate pension covering all Bolivians aged 60+, with a slightly lower flat‑rate amount for those receiving contributory pensions. The impact was very quick as poverty levels among households including an older person fell by 14 percentage points within the first few years (Durán-Valverde and Barbero, 2013[88]). To increase access, payment centres were installed in both military bases and mobile units so that rural populations could be covered.

Cambodia and Lao PDR need to make the introduction of first‑tier pensions a priority. These two countries have never had a first‑tier benefit for retirees. The scheme could be flat rate or means‑tested, but the latter is more appropriate for the long-term as the ultimate aim is to increase pension coverage from earnings‑related schemes, thereby reducing the cost associated with the first‑tier benefit. The initial level of the benefit is entirely dependent on available finances, but it should ideally be a meaningful amount to help older people maintain at least a basic standard of living.

First‑tier pension levels need to be increased in virtually all ASEAN countries, and significantly so in many of them. Beyond Malaysia, at 16% of average earnings, and Brunei Darussalam at 11%, the first‑tier safety‑net benefits are at 7% or below in the other ASEAN countries. By comparison the OECD average is around 21% of average earnings. OECD countries with higher level of economic development tend to offer higher levels of old-age safety-net benefits relative to average earnings (OECD, 2015[27]). Including ASEAN countries in the analysis indicates that, when controlling for economic development level, there is scope to substantially increase old-age benefit levels in Brunei Darussalam, Thailand and Singapore in particular (Figure 4.1). Based on GDP per capita, the benefit levels in Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Thailand could be increased from 11%, 5% and 4% of average earnings to around 20%, 25% and 12%, respectively. In terms of expenditure, only Brunei Darussalam (0.7%) and Thailand (0.4%) spend more than 0.2% of GDP on first‑tier benefits, while even low-income OECD countries such as Chile and Mexico spend 1.0% and 0.6%, respectively (ASPIRE, 2024[89]). By contrast, Denmark, New Zealand and Norway spend around 5% of GDP (ILO, 2022[90]). Raising the basic pension in Thailand, for example, to the poverty line12 would cost around 1.2% of GDP according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2023[91]), which would reduce poverty rates from 6.2% (in 2019) to 3.5%.

All ASEAN countries should put in place indexation mechanisms for their first‑tier benefits to maintain living standards during retirement for the most vulnerable. The absence of suitable indexation mechanisms increases old-age poverty risks. With a legacy of high labour market informality and relatively immature pension systems in many ASEAN countries, current retirees are overwhelmingly dependent on social support. The already very low levels of safety-net benefits are likely to decline over time in real terms as no ASEAN country has any legislated indexation rule. For example, the basic pension in Thailand was THB 500 in 2009, increasing to THB 600 in 2011 and has remained at that level since – benefit was equivalent to 5.8% of average earnings in 2011 but only 3.6% in 2022; the basic pension in Brunei Darussalam has likewise been at BND 250 since 2007. In the Philippines, the social pension was at PHP 500 for many years before doubling in 2022, illustrating how erratic changes can be in the absence of a reliable indexation rule.

Most ASEAN countries should significantly increase the coverage of contributory pensions among workers to improve their future pensions. Myanmar is in a unique position with no pension system for private‑sector workers so introducing one is the priority. Low coverage is not unique to ASEAN countries as similar trends also prevail in other regions of the world. This is especially the case for low- or middle‑income countries where pensions for private‑sector workers were recently introduced and that have to deal with large informal employment. Given the large degree of informality in most ASEAN countries, it is unlikely that coverage is going to reach high levels in the medium term unless deep structural reforms extending well beyond pensions are undertaken.

Tackling the high levels of labour market informality and enforcing enrolment rules are the priorities to significantly raise the pension coverage of workers. There are many measures that can foster the formalisation of labour, as outlined in Section 4.1. As more workers become formal, pension coverage will automatically increase. However, this will happen only if enrolment rules are effectively enforced. In theory, penalties for non-compliance need to be introduced and rigorously applied. These sanctions should be accompanied by technical assistance to help workers and firms navigate administrative processes. In practice in many ASEAN countries, a large number of informal workers face income constraints, which make contributing to social security very difficult for them. As a result, the introduction of a flat-rate basic pension financed by general taxes may be the best option. An alternative could be to subsidise contributions up to an earnings threshold. In both cases, funding from general tax revenues will be required depending on the fiscal space to offset the loss of contribution revenues.

Informal workers need to see the value of contributing. This means that the non-contributory benefits should not be fully withdrawn against contributory pensions, otherwise the incentives to contribute are very weak. As explained above, a good compromise is to set withdrawal rates around 30%‑50%. Also, contributing additional years needs to be rewarded by generating higher pension benefits in order to provide effective incentives to contribute (see more on this below). In addition, trust in the management of the pension system is key to encourage contributing.

Informal workers can be incentivised to enrol in the same social security scheme covering formal workers. While a separate scheme can be designed for informal workers to account for the volatile nature of their employment, it risks limiting the portability of entitlements and creating barriers for labour mobility, as many workers move in and out of formal employment during their careers. Therefore, having one system covering both formal and informal workers eliminates this issue. However, as highlighted above, given that informal workers are often reluctant to participate, countries have tried to offer incentives to encourage participation. Many governments in Asia have introduced voluntary programmes for informal workers by introducing FDC schemes with no contribution floor or no requirement for regular payments thereby accounting for the volatility of their income (ADB, 2024[78]). Directly matching contributions up to a limit provides an immediate and easily understandable value proposition to prospective entrants to the system (Hinz et al., 2012[92]), while limiting the advantages for high earners and their cost. For example, India launched a scheme in 2010 (NPS-Swavalamban) with a matching contribution of INR 1 000 every year if the worker managed to contribute INR 1 000 to their National Pension System accounts. The matching contribution was given for three years. The scheme was replaced in 2015 by Atal Pension Yojana (APY) which included a minimum pension component but retained the matching contribution. There are currently around 62 million members of APY (Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services, 2024[93]), representing just over 10% of the labour force. Among ASEAN countries, Malaysia’s i-Saraan programme provides state matching contributions to the private‑sector pension scheme (Employees Provident Fund, EPF) for informal workers and the self-employed up to a maximum of MYR 500 per year with a lifetime limit of MYR 5 000. The matching contribution rate is currently 15% and will increase to 20% according to the 2025 budget.

The self-employed should be covered by the same pension schemes as private‑sector workers. Self‑employed workers are mandatorily covered in only Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines (Chapter 3), while contributing voluntarily is possible in the other countries. Voluntary schemes can have negative effects as they may create perverse incentives for employers not to cover workers. For example, if employers have no obligation to make payments, then they benefit from the informality of their employees. The self-employed can be included within the same rules as applied to private‑sector workers or they can have a separate scheme as long as it is mandatory. Among OECD countries, the United States, for example, includes the self‑employed in the general Social Security scheme, while France and Spain have separate schemes for different categories of self-employed workers.

Migrant workers should be mandatorily covered by the pension system even if they are only temporary. For all the defined benefit (DB) schemes in ASEAN countries, nationality or residency status is not considered. This means that coverage is mandatory for migrant workers in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. From 2025 in Malaysia, foreign workers will be mandatorily covered within the EPF scheme, potentially benefitting over 2 million workers (KWSP, 2024[94]). Migrant workers are covered by the DC scheme in Indonesia once they have been working for six months, but migrants cannot join the DC schemes in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. There is, however, a separate Supplementary Retirement Scheme (SRS) in Singapore that is voluntary for all workers and has a much higher contribution ceiling for migrant workers than for citizens or permanent residents (35% vs. 15% of earnings) to compensate for the former’s ineligibility to the main DC scheme. Upon leaving their host country, migrant workers should ideally be able to transfer their pension funds to their new resident country, with assets remaining ringfenced for retirement. Portability of social security benefits for migrant workers is an ongoing topic of discussion for ASEAN countries with the recent release of the “Declaration on Portability of Social Security Benefits for Migrant Workers in ASEAN” (ASEAN, 2022[95]) and the January 2024 workshop to discuss guidelines. Brunei Darussalam and Singapore should therefore make coverage of migrant workers mandatory and in the same scheme as for citizens and permanent residents.

Policy efforts should focus on developing effective information campaigns about income protection provided by pension systems as one gets older. Policy makers, as well as regulators and supervisors of private pension funds, need to ensure that all workers are informed about being able to contribute towards a pension and about the benefits it could bring. Communication campaigns should be part of an overall national strategy for financial education aimed at improving the financial awareness and literacy of the population (OECD, 2012[96]). If the pension is flat rate or has a means-tested safety net, then this needs to be publicised so that everyone who may be eligible claims it. Advertising on television, radio or newspapers or billboard campaigns in areas of high informal employment greatly help. For earnings-related schemes, enhancing the financial literacy of younger workers is critical to prepare them for old age (ADB, 2024[78]). Calculators and dashboards are good digital tools to engage people on their pensions and help them visualise the effects of different decisions. Pension statements can then be used to show the value of the contributions made, but they should be designed in a way that provides clear information and engages people to take action (OECD, 2022[28]).

Given technological advancements and assuming improved publicity, mobile phones can now easily be used to make voluntary contributions towards retirement savings. As mobile phones are commonplace everywhere the opportunities for making payments, even very small ones, has significantly increased. Those without access to a bank can use microfinance institutions for saving (ADB, 2024[78]). Many low-income informal workers are willing to make contributions towards pensions when they are able, but as their income levels are volatile, they are not always able to do so on a regular basis. By providing alternative savings mechanisms, some countries are trying to overcome this obstacle. For example, in India, both the NPS-Swavalamban system and its replacement APY permit many more institutions or organisations to collect the contributions (PFRDA, 2011[97]). In Rwanda, informal workers represent over 90% of the entire labour force (ILO, 2018[98]). The government therefore established a voluntary savings mechanism (EjoHeza) for informal workers in 2018. Joining the scheme takes only a few minutes and can be done entirely with a mobile phone and the scheme allows for irregular payments with matching contributions from the government for the lowest earners. The latest annual report indicates that about 30% of the workforce were active savers representing at the end of 2022, with 0.3% of GDP of assets under management.

When formality eventually progresses, the cost of providing non-contributory means‑tested benefits could gradually be reduced. If policies are successful in significantly reducing informality, then more workers will acquire some contributory pension entitlements, lowering their eligibility to means‑tested benefits. The cost of these means‑tested benefits may therefore decrease over time; alternatively, the level of the benefits for the most vulnerable could be increased if the spending level is maintained. For flat‑rate benefits as in Brunei Darussalam and Thailand, the cost of the scheme is unaffected by increased coverage as there is no reduction in non-contributory benefit levels with greater contributory pensions.

Minimum contributory pensions should be pro-rated for short careers to encourage participation. Minimum contributory pension schemes that only grant a benefit after 15 or 20 years of contribution do not encourage workers to contribute if they believe they are unlikely to contribute regularly. Rather the minimum contributory pension should be available even with a very short contribution history, say one year, pro-rated based on the duration of contributions. This would then show the merit of each year of contribution even if only a few years are ultimately possible. Only Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam currently have minimum contributory pensions, but they require, 15, 10 and 20 years of contributions, respectively. A pro-rated scheme could be applied instead in these countries and introduced in Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand within their DB schemes. In Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore within their FDC schemes, pension benefits are determined by financial returns on paid contributions, so the question of disincentives to contribute is very limited.13

Raising retirement ages is needed to boost pension benefits in Malaysia and Thailand in particular. In Malaysia and Thailand, earnings-related pensions can be accessed in full at the age of only 55 years. In general, retirement ages are low in many ASEAN countries relative to OECD standards, in particular future ones. Indonesia and Singapore are the exceptions as both have a future retirement age of 65 years, while in Singapore, in addition, employers have to offer their employees contracts until five years beyond the retirement age. In the other ASEAN countries, the relatively low retirement age better reflects low life expectancy (see below). In a few ASEAN countries, raising the retirement age would need to be accompanied by improved labour market protection to prevent companies from terminating employment contracts based on age. For example, employment protection ceases at the age 60 in Malaysia and Thailand, while workers can be dismissed at age 65 in the Philippines and firms in Indonesia are able to set retirement ages based on collective agreements (Chapter 2). Over time to deal with longevity trends and ease the political process, retirement ages should be linked to improvements in life expectancy. Implementing such a link is one major pension policy innovation over the last decades and one‑quarter of OECD countries have legislated this type of automatic adjustment mechanism (OECD, 2023[87]).

Defined contribution pension schemes need to provide a regular income throughout retirement through annuities, at least after a certain age. Flexibility can be provided by allowing for partial or deferred lifetime income combined with programmed withdrawals (OECD, 2021[99]). Full lump sums should be discouraged, except for low account balances. While half of ASEAN countries have at least some FDC within their pension design, only Brunei Darussalam and Singapore mandate that a lifetime annuity be taken at retirement. Full lump sums are possible in Indonesia and Malaysia while the Philippines has a regular payment for only 15 years, hence failing to insure against longevity risks. These three countries should transition to annuitising the majority of the pension pot from a given age, to guarantee regular income at older ages and protect against longevity risk. Furthermore, the contribution rates in Brunei Darussalam (8.5% – 10.5%) should be increased to provide a higher level of retirement income.

Lifetime earnings should be used as the reference wage for calculating pensions based on DB or points schemes as a matter of equity. The large majority of OECD countries take into account wages throughout the whole career for calculating pension benefits. Recently, the Czech Republic, Greece and Norway joined this group. Exceptions are Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the United States (OECD, 2023[87]). Using only part of the career to calculate pension entitlements generates inequities as people with the same lifetime earnings and the same total contributions might have very different pensions (OECD, 2022[28]). While taking into account only the best years is the most favourable to pensioners all other things equal, it also generates perverse, regressive effects by favouring workers experiencing large wage improvements who tend to be high earners as low-wage periods are ignored (Aubert and Duc, 2011[100]). For people with low earnings throughout the career, using part of or the whole career as the reference wage does not make a big difference. But all other things are not equal: for a given level of total pension spending, using lifetime earnings as the reference wage thus tends to increase pension of low earners and decreases that of high earners, thereby improving equity. For countries using only part of the career, moving to lifetime earnings in a budget-neutral way means raising accrual rates at the same time. Among the ASEAN countries, Cambodia, Indonesia and Viet Nam use lifetime earnings, while the Philippines and Thailand use the last five years. Lao PDR uses the average covered earnings of all insured persons in the calendar year before retirement. All ASEAN countries with separate public‑sector pension schemes use final salary as the base for civil servants – the Philippines actually uses the highest salary.

Contribution ceilings need to be set at appropriate levels and should increase over time in line with average‑wage growth. Due to socio‑economic differences in life expectancy, contribution ceilings that prevent building up pension entitlements at very high earnings levels in public pensions or in private pensions with annuities markets limit inequality in pension income: without these ceiling, the regressive effect from people who have shorter lives (and tend to have low income) to those with longer lives (and high income) is compounded as high pensions are paid for long periods to the detriment of people receiving low pensions and dying at relatively young ages. Across the OECD, most pension systems have an earnings ceiling for contributions, which is typically around twice average earnings and often substantially above. Some ASEAN pension schemes have high ceilings – such as Indonesia and Viet Nam at 3.4 and 8.0 times the average earnings, respectively – but there are exceptions. In Singapore, the wage ceiling to contributions is only around 1.3 times average earnings, and there is on top a cap to the amount that can be placed in the retirement account at retirement age. The ceiling should be linked to wage growth and the cap eliminated as the earnings ceiling is sufficient. The biggest issue is in Thailand where the contribution ceiling is relatively low, at THB 15 000 per month or 0.9 times average earnings; it has been flat in nominal terms for over 20 years.

Earnings-related benefits during retirement should be indexed based on a clear rule. There are trade‑offs between the two main options of indexing pensions during retirement to either price inflation or wage growth. Indexing to prices maintains purchasing power, while indexing to wages ensures stable relative benefit levels. Wage indexation typically generates a higher progression over time due to productivity gains translating in positive real-wage growth. For different components of the pension system, different indexation policies are often followed, with price indexation being more common among OECD countries for earnings-related pensions and wage indexation for the (means‑tested or flat‑rate) first‑tier components. Choosing a particular index is a political choice. For the same (discounted) spending levels over time, indexing to price inflation results in higher initial benefits, but their relative value declines over the retirement period, while wage indexation generates constant benefits in relative terms but with lower levels in the years immediately after retirement. Hence, by generating initially higher benefit levels, price indexation compared with wage indexation benefit those with a lower life expectancy. Without any indexation, benefits gradually lose their purchasing power during retirement; moreover, discretionary and irregular indexation generates uncertainty and increases inequality between generations. Therefore, both Cambodia and Thailand that have no pension indexation rule for their DB schemes need to adopt one, either in line with CPI (as in Indonesia and the Philippines) or average wages (as in Lao PDR and Viet Nam), or a combination of both.

Additional schemes may be introduced to diversify the pension system and increase retirement savings. The benefits of mixing DB and FDC schemes, PAYG and funded schemes stem from diversifying the nature of risks, those driven mainly by the political process and financial markets, respectively. In the majority of OECD countries, these complementary schemes are FDC. Indonesia and the Philippines already have dual systems with mandatory DB and FDC components. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam, the other countries with only PAYG DB schemes, may benefit from diversification by adding an FDC component.14 However, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand need to first reform their DB schemes to ensure long-term financial sustainability (see below). Hence, only Viet Nam is currently in a position to consider introducing a supplementary FDC scheme.

Several OECD countries have introduced supplementary FDC schemes in the last couple of decades, many giving incentives to try and encourage participation. For example, when New Zealand started the auto‑enrolment KiwiSaver scheme in July 2007 the government provided NZD 1 000 as a kick-starter whenever an account was created. This policy remained in place until May 2015, by which point there were 2.3 million accounts in place (TAAO, 2022[101]). The design of financial incentives should reflect the retirement saving needs and capabilities of different population subgroups as well as the government’s fiscal space. In particular, low earners in Viet Nam may be responsive to matching contributions and fixed nominal subsidies.

Pensions must be financially sustainable to build confidence in the system and, beyond, to ensure macroeconomic stability. When pension parameters are not set at adequate levels to ensure sound finances, in particular in the ageing context, they are or are expected to be frequently revised. Such an unstable framework hurts confidence that individuals could count on predictable retirement income. Moreover, given the growing share of older people, pensions will account for an increasing share of social spending. As a result, financially unsustainable pensions can threaten macroeconomic balances, with potentially dire consequences for the economy as a whole and for the most vulnerable in particular.

Profound reforms are needed to improve the financial sustainability of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions – defined benefit (DB) or points schemes – in ASEAN countries. For the pension provider, defined contribution (DC) schemes are financially immune to changes in longevity, at least to well-predicted ones in case of annuitisation, i.e. when total pension assets at retirement are transformed into a stream of monthly pension payments. More generally, FDC schemes are funded individually and avoid that demographic changes, such as fertility trends, generate financial sustainability issues (for pension providers). The situation is very different for PAYG pension systems.15 DB PAYG pensions based on annual accrual rates and points systems based on the accumulated number of points over the career provide a set monthly pension; the benefit level is not explicitly linked to the expected duration of retirement or, more generally, to the ageing structure of the population. Of course, ultimately demographics influence the benefit levels that PAYG pensions can finance in a sustainable way. Yet, regardless of population ageing, Chapter 3 shows that, by comparing the promised (or implicit) returns with the internal returns of PAYG pensions, PAYG parameters in ASEAN countries are not set in a financially sustainable way. Moreover, the difficulties will be compounded by population ageing as no country provides automatic adjustments of pension parameters to demographic changes.

At 55 years, the retirement age is too low in Thailand. In Malaysia, as discussed above, the low retirement age of also 55 years lowers pension benefits, but it does not raise financial sustainability issues as the scheme is FDC. In Thailand, by contrast, the low retirement age significantly contributes to the large gap between the implicit and the internal rate of return on paid DB contributions as was highlighted in Chapter 3. As a result of such a low retirement age, the projected remaining life expectancy at the normal retirement age for the 2000 birth cohort reaches 28 years or more in Malaysia and Thailand for men, against an average of 21.8 and 21.7 years among ASEAN and OECD countries, respectively (Figure 4.2).16 While Cambodia, Lao PDR and the Philippines have a retirement age of 60 years that is low in OECD comparison, their future remaining life expectancy at retirement age is also low in international comparison due to relatively low longevity. However, even in Thailand, raising the retirement age will not be enough to make the pension system financially sustainable, and other significant parametric measures are needed.

Some ASEAN countries need to reduce benefit accrual rates or increase contribution rates to address the imbalances between contribution rates and pension promises in their PAYG pension systems. The difference between the implicit and the internal rate of return is extremely large in Lao PDR and Thailand, very large in Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines and significant in Viet Nam (Chapter 3). In Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand, contribution rates are clearly too low, while on top the accrual rate is too high in Lao PDR, and in Thailand as well, although to a lesser extent (Box 4.2). The Philippines also has a large accrual rate. To overly simplify (in particular because demographics and retirement ages come into play) based on OECD comparison, accrual rates may have to be divided by at least 3 in Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand (and even 7 in Lao PDR) or contribution rates be multiplied by at least 3 (and even 7 in Lao PDR) or a mix of both.

The uprating of past wages to calculate the reference wage for pension purposes should be based on average wage growth. This should at least apply to new pension entitlements. Uprating past wages based on prices instead of wages makes the management of pension finances complicated and adds a large and unneeded uncertainty. The reason is that pension revenues are based on contributions: they tend to grow in line with wages. If uprating is based on prices, then pension spending does not grow in line with wages, with the gap between revenues and spending, i.e. the financial balance, being heavily dependent on real-wage growth (the difference between wage growth and price inflation), which is closely related to labour productivity growth, a variable that is very difficult to predict. When the value of pension parameters (contribution rate, accrual rate, retirement age, etc.) are decided such as to ensure financial sustainability based on given productivity-growth assumptions, pension finances then become sensitive to actual productivity-growth trends. For example, if productivity growth is less than initially expected, revenues are lower than projected while spending is not affected, thereby deteriorating pension finances. And vice versa if productivity growth is larger than expected. Hence, for a given spending target, the uprating of past wages should be done based on wage growth, and the shift from price to wage uprating should be accompanied by lower nominal accrual rates in order to maintain the same projected effective accrual rate and therefore the same replacement rates. Countries should refrain from moving from wage to price uprating to generate savings, because this generates this undesirable sensitivity of pension finances to productivity growth; if generating savings is the pursued policy objective, accrual rates should instead be cut, also improving transparency. Cambodia, Indonesia and Viet Nam are the most affected by this serious issue as they uprate lifetime earnings based on prices.

Once pension parameters have been set at levels that ensure sound finances, automatic adjustment mechanisms (AAMs) can be put in place to accompany ageing prospects. This will help ensure long-term financial sustainability. In the face of demographic, economic or financial trends, policy makers can choose not to act and accept the negative consequences these trends might have for financial sustainability (OECD, 2021[102]). Alternatively, they can adjust pension parameters. These adjustments can be discretionary, by undertaking regular legislative action as circumstances change or they can occur automatically by setting rules about how pension parameters should be adjusted. These automatic rules are one way to better include future generations who have neither a vote nor a voice today. AAMs refer to predefined rules that automatically change pension parameters or pension benefits based on the evolution of a demographic, economic or financial indicator. Automatic adjustments can protect pensions from uncertainties by, for example, making benefit levels or contribution rates based on demographic or economic changes and by linking retirement ages to life expectancy.

Linking retirement ages to old-age life expectancy is one main way to deal with increasing longevity. After the standard indexation of pensions to prices or wages, this type of link is the AAM that is becoming increasingly implemented in the OECD. Nine OECD countries, including Italy and Sweden, now have such a link in place (OECD, 2023[87]). The automatic change in the retirement age varies by country, with some choosing a one‑to‑one link and others changing retirement ages by two‑thirds of the changes in old-age life expectancy. Putting in place such a link may be an attractive option especially in the countries where the retirement age is at 60 years – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and the Philippines – beyond the discretionary changes that are needed regardless in Malaysia and Thailand.

Public- and private‑sector workers should be covered under the same pension scheme. Among ASEAN countries, only Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Viet Nam have the same schemes for public- and private‑sector workers. Malaysia plans to enrol new civil servants into the private‑sector EPF from 2024 (Chapter 3). In the other ASEAN countries public‑sector workers have either entirely different schemes or at least one component is different. In all cases, the resulting pension benefits are much higher than what would result from the private‑sector scheme. Only 4 of 38 OECD countries still maintain entirely separate pension schemes for their public‑sector workers with around one‑third of countries having aligned the systems over the last two decades (OECD, 2016[103]). Having public-sector workers under the private‑sector scheme would increase equity, remove any obstacles for portability or labour mobility, reduce administrative costs and improve public finances.

Beyond pensions, demographic changes will affect all components of age‑related expenditure, including healthcare and long-term care. For example, according to World Bank (2021[104]), public expenditure on healthcare in Thailand is projected to increase from 3.2% of GDP in 2022 to 5.5% in 2060. On the pension side, pension expenditure from the civil-service scheme would increase from 1.6% to 2.9% of GDP over the period, while the social security funds would be depleted in the 2050s. This illustrates that Thailand will face strong fiscal pressure related to ageing.

The number of people aged 65+ is projected to more than double in most ASEAN countries between 2025 and 2050. Limitations in the social participation of older people will thus affect an increasing number of people at a fast pace. While it is difficult to increase social participation directly through policies, policy makers can shape the conditions in which it is easier for older people to remain an active member of the community. Promoting social participation can help reduce social exclusion, which is a risk factor for depression and lower self-esteem in older people (Marquet et al., 2018[105]) and can result in disadvantages in other spheres of life as social contact is a resource for people to find help when they need it (OECD, 2017[61]). To counteract these effects, policies can facilitate older adults to remain integrated in society. It is never too late to start something new or make new friends. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Ageing, adopted by all ASEAN Member States, recommends promoting a positive image of older persons though the recognition of their rights and contributions to society as well as conducting research on age discrimination in ASEAN Member States. Policy makers can further facilitate the social participation of older people through creating age‑friendly spaces in which older people can meet each other and younger generations, and through providing accessible public transport.

Inclusive urban planning can strengthen the social inclusion and active ageing of older adults. Age‑inclusive physical environments are essential for older residents to move around in their own neighbourhoods. This includes removing barriers such as making high or uneven pavements accessible, improving traffic safety in particular at crossings, and providing benches at regular intervals for people to rest (WHO, 2007[106]; Van Hoof et al., 2018[107]). One study in metropolitan areas in Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam found that, except in Viet Nam, most older people did not consider their neighbourhood to be accessible (Tiraphat et al., 2020[108]). Older people’s assessment of accessibility of their neighbourhood was particularly negative in Myanmar. Singapore in contrast is a good example for creating an age‑inclusive urban environment, for instance through Silver Zones making residential neighbourhoods safer for older people to go around in (Box 4.3). Indonesia and the Philippines have made some high-level commitments to move towards more age‑friendly environments (Irwansyah and Febrina Ernungtyas, 2023[109]; Parial, 2024[110]), and Malaysia is the only ASEAN country in addition to Singapore that is represented in the WHO’s Global Network for Age‑friendly Cities and Communities. While intentions are important, realising age‑inclusive environments ultimately depends on implementing very concrete changes to the physical environment. For instance, despite several expressions of intent from the local government around 2013, the Indonesian city of Depok had made little progress towards becoming more age‑friendly five years later (Fatmah, Dewi and Priotomo, 2019[111]).

As older people are more reliant on public transport, affordable and well-designed public transport networks with accessible vehicles, stops and stations are important to help older people move around. With the exception of Lao PDR and Myanmar, all ASEAN Member States provide public transport fare reductions to older adults. Less is known about the state of the accessibility of public transportation in ASEAN countries, although the ASEAN Secretariat assesses access to public transport as “poor” for most older people (ASEAN, 2023[30]). Singapore, in contrast, invested heavily in making public transport more accessible (Chapter 3). Several OECD countries, such as Germany and Spain, mandate public-transport providers to provide barrier-free transportation as well (OECD/ITF, 2017[112]).

In addition to shaping the physical environment, governments can play a key role in establishing or supporting initiatives that bring people together. While older people’s participation in social gatherings other than religious services is limited in ASEAN countries (ASEAN, 2023[30]), peer social gatherings can reduce loneliness and increase social engagement (Cattan et al., 2005_[116]). Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam have community centres for older people that often combine providing social activities with some care‑related functions (Chapter 3). While such centres can help older people to remain healthy, active and socially engaged, a comprehensive evaluation of their impact on older people’s well-being is often lacking. In Thailand, some clubs do serve as successful models for community development, while others face challenges in effectiveness due to inadequate funding and poor management (Torut and Pongquan, 2012[116]). In Viet Nam, key factors contributing to the success of social clubs for older adults include dedicated management committees, regular activities, support from local authorities, and external financial backing (HelpAge International, 2023[117]). Strengthening these elements enables these social hubs to better facilitate community engagement and provide meaningful opportunities for older adults to stay connected.

Intergenerational contact can improve the well-being of older people. Intergenerational programmes are associated with lower social isolation, better self-rated health and a sense of purpose in older people, especially when it concerns community-service programmes such as volunteering (Giraudeau and Bailly, 2019[118]; Peters et al., 2021[119]; Zhong et al., 2020[120]). To foster intergenerational contact, Japan has reinforced a community-based inclusive society for older adults by amending the Social Welfare Act in 2020 (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2021[121]). Under the new act, municipalities must establish an integrated support system that meets the needs of all age groups. To achieve this, the government encourages intergenerational exchanges to strengthen mutual understanding and reliance among residents across generations.

Intergenerational interactions can help ease negative perceptions of ageing and older people. Alongside Africa, Southeast Asia is the region with the highest prevalence of moderately or highly ageist attitudes according to the WHO (WHO, 2021[122]). All ASEAN countries except for Brunei Darussalam have implemented national action plans to safeguard the rights of older persons. The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have enacted specific laws prohibiting age‑based discrimination in employment in order to ensure more equal opportunities for older workers. Beyond prohibiting discrimination, activities facilitating positive intergenerational contact can reduce ageism (Marques et al., 2020[123]; WHO, 2021[122]). Interventions that combine educational elements with intergenerational contact can effectively reduce negative attitudes toward ageing (Burnes et al., 2019[124]). Intergenerational programmes that create positive shared experiences can accelerate mutual respect between different generations and combat age stereotypes. These programmes can take the form of mentorships, of shared activities such as gardening and arts and crafts, or of community volunteering (WHO, 2023[125]). Meeting regularly and pairing older adults with younger people based on interests and needs can significantly enhance the benefits of intergenerational programmes (Lou and Dai, 2017[126]). The outcomes can further be boosted by providing participants with some training at the start of the programme to equip them with the knowledge and skills needed to effectively interact with other generations, including with people with dementia. Singapore’s Council for Third Age for instance launched the Intergenerational Learning Programme in 2011, introducing a classroom-based model where older learners are paired with young teachers.

The regional and local level play an important role in creating the settings in which positive intergenerational contact can take place. Local intergenerational programmes can address the specific needs of a community and speak to the interests of older people in the area. The Kampung Admiralty project in Singapore provides a good example of facilitating positive intergenerational contact in an urban environment. It combines childcare and long-term care facilities to strengthen intergenerational relationships within the neighbourhood. Different generations engage together in arts and music programmes, volunteer services, and exercise activities. Arts can also bring people together across generations, as exemplified by two projects in Australia listed in the WHO’s Age‑Friendly Practices Database. In the City of Maroondah, located in the Melbourne area, the Intergenerational Musical Memories Project connected older adults in care facilities with youths through music, helping them build meaningful relationships and overcome generational barriers. The Young and Gold Intergenerational Urban Art Project in Rockingham, near Perth, brought together young people and older people to create a mural, transforming a blank wall into vibrant art. These initiatives highlight how intentional design and intergenerational activities can promote active ageing and build more age‑inclusive communities.

Recognising older volunteers and building the capabilities to effectively engage them – from training and development to appreciation – will encourage older adults to engage with society. Volunteering in activities like visiting people, mentoring youth and assisting nonprofit organisations with fundraising and community services positively impacts older adults’ quality of life by enhancing their sense of social support and connections (Ang and Malhotra, 2024[127]). The Philippines’ Senior Citizens Volunteer Resource Project has organised public campaigns informing older people of opportunities for volunteering, linked older people with volunteering opportunities in particular in community social welfare and development programmes, and has provided training to older volunteers to equip them with the knowledge and skills to perform their tasks (Quieta, 2005[128]). Singapore’s Silver Volunteer Fund assists community organisations in recruiting and developing older volunteers, empowering older adults to contribute their skills and experience to local initiatives. While Singapore does not have formal compensation schemes for older volunteers, its micro-job programmes at active ageing centres allow older adults to earn small allowances for tasks such as food delivery and organising community activities (Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, 2024[129]). Korea’s Senior Employment and Social Activity Support Program provides public service opportunities for older adults, including support for vulnerable groups and volunteering at public facilities (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2023[130]). In Japan, the municipality-led volunteer point system rewards older adults for their community service participation, enabling them to exchange earned points for cash and coupons (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, 2021[131]). Japan’s Silver Human Resource Centres furthermore provide opportunities for older people across the country to perform paid work or to volunteer in their local communities. These centres primarily aim to provide older people with a sense of purpose in life.19 These programmes in Japan and Korea offer training courses for older volunteers and involve a third party to match volunteers with hosting organisations. Investing in capacity building to implement programmes that support older volunteers can improve their well-being by creating opportunities for social connections.

The following recommendations are based on the analysis in the respective sections above.

• Lower the cost of formalisation for low-income workers by limiting general labour taxes on their earnings. This can be done for example by applying mandatory pension contributions only beyond an earnings threshold and by financing flat-rate basic benefits through other taxes. Depending on the fiscal space, finding alternative general tax revenues will be needed to compensate for the loss of contribution revenues.

• Ensure adequate levels of contribution-based benefits so that formal work provides substantial advantages to individuals in a transparent way.

• Enhance compliance with labour and social security regulations through an effective judiciary, well-equipped labour and tax inspectorates, large enough penalties for non-compliance, strong involvement of social partners and strict requirements for contractors of public procurement to employ workers formally.

• Ensure that labour and social protection regulations cover all workers, including migrants and those in small businesses and platform-based jobs.

• Ensure that product market regulations are not too strict, employment protection legislation is flexible enough and the minimum wage is adequate but at a level that does not create substantial barriers to formalisation.

• Ease administrative processes of business registration and reporting, remove legal obstacles to firms’ growth, fight corruption and encourage a responsible business conduct to promote a business-friendly environment.

• Expand the provision of learning opportunities for adults and develop systems for certifying skills acquired in both formal and informal employment.

• Inform workers about individual and social advantages of formal work through consistent and regular communication by social security institutions and through ad hoc public awareness campaigns.

• Follow up with concrete action on the commitment in principle to gender equality in old age by ASEAN countries.

• Systematically include a gender perspective in designing policies for all stages of life to mitigate compounding inequalities. This can be achieved by: appointing key leaders within government structures responsible for integrating gender considerations into planning, budgeting and implementing policies; strengthening independent institutions and advisory bodies that monitor and report on gender equality; and, improving data collection to monitor and report on gender equality efforts.

• Raise awareness about gender inequalities in education and training and how to address them. Public information campaigns highlighting the benefits of gender equality and of programmes that help women plan financially for retirement would improve women’s income security in old age. The public sector can lead the way by implementing training on gender inequalities in career development and talent management.

• Develop gender-inclusive education policies, such as offering career counselling services specifically geared towards addressing gender disparities in male‑dominated fields. Cambodia and Myanmar should implement such policies to reduce gender inequalities in enrolment in tertiary education, while other countries, including Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, should do so to reduce gender inequalities in enrolment in STEM degrees.

• Reform legal frameworks to reduce gender discrimination in public and private life and in the workplace. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar have laws, often personal status laws, that currently still cement gender inequalities in the family as these laws grant men and women different entitlements to marriage, divorce and inheritance. Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Thailand need to step up efforts to tackle gender discrimination and harassment in the workplace.

• Strengthen women’s labour market attachment through maternity and parental leave policies as well as formal childcare and long-term care policies. Providing training to care workers will increase service quality and boost people’s confidence in using these services. As the care sector is largely female‑dominated, formalisation of care work would also significantly increase income security for women both in the labour market and in old age.

• Allocate more public financial resources to the healthcare sector, in particular in Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Singapore.

• Improve efficiency in the way healthcare resources are spent by: cutting ineffective and wasteful spending, for instance through increasing penetration of generic drugs, regulating both pricing and prescribing medicines; strengthening preventive health policies; and, investing in new technologies such as digital health records.

• Establish in law that the full population is covered by health insurance for basic healthcare and use contributory health insurance to provide access to a wider set of healthcare services. In particular, Cambodia and Myanmar need to step up efforts to expand coverage as the large majority of their respective populations remain uncovered by public health insurance, resulting in very high out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure.

• Improve access to healthcare in rural areas. Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar should increase the total number of healthcare personnel through increasing efforts to recruit students into medical programmes. This could be done through scholarships conditional on working in underserved areas after graduating to recruit students willing to work in rural areas. In countries where there is no overall shortage of healthcare personnel, providing financial incentives for healthcare personnel to work in underserved areas, or granting limited licenses for establishing a practice in overserved areas can help improve access to healthcare in rural areas. Access to healthcare in rural areas can also be improved by changing healthcare service delivery, for instance through telemedicine or through delegating some tasks typically performed by doctors to other providers.

• Promote the incorporation of physical exercise and active lifestyles in older people’s daily routines. Ministries should play an active role through locally embedded public organisations such as active ageing centres to educate communities on the benefits of physical exercise and healthy lifestyles, to bring older people in contact with organisations providing such activities or to directly organise physical activities.

• Provide regular health checkups and self-monitoring tools to older adults to detect and treat health issues early on. In particular, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam should implement affordable preventive health screenings for older adults.

• Increase first‑tier benefit levels in all ASEAN countries, significantly so in many, to ensure adequate support for current pensioners. This particularly applies to Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Thailand.

• Clearly highlight the benefits of contributing to pensions and develop communication campaigns. The latter should be part of an overall national strategy for financial education related to pensions, aimed at improving financial awareness and financial literacy.

• Remove contribution floors to voluntary pensions and give informal workers incentives to contribute to the pension system through matching contributions up to a ceiling.

• Mandatorily enrol self‑employed workers in the same social security scheme that covers private‑sector workers as in Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines. Likewise, mandatorily enrol migrant workers in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore in the same schemes as for citizens and permanent residents.

• Raise the retirement age in Malaysia and Thailand. Once this discretionary adjustment is legislated, introduce an automatic link between the retirement age and life expectancy in both countries, as well as in other ASEAN countries.

• Increase contribution rates in the defined contribution pension scheme in Brunei Darussalam.

• Significantly reform pay-as-you-go pension schemes so that contributions are sufficient to finance current promises by either increasing contributions or reducing accrual rates or a combination of both. More precisely, at the minimum, accrual rates should be lowered in Lao PDR and the Philippines and PAYG contribution rates increased in Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand, while a better balance should be found in Cambodia.

• Enrol public‑sector workers into the same pension scheme that applies to private‑sector workers.

• Regularly index all earnings-related pensions paid during retirement based on a clear rule.

• Use lifetime earnings as the reference wage for calculating pay-as-you-go pensions and uprate past earnings with wage growth.

• Increase contribution ceilings over time in line with average‑wage growth in all countries, substantially increase the ceiling level in Thailand and remove the retirement-account cap in Singapore.

• Annuitise pension assets in defined contribution schemes to provide a regular income throughout retirement, at least after a certain age, and limit lump-sum withdrawals to small accounts only.

• Redesign neighbourhoods to make it easier and safer for older people to go outside. This includes removing obstacles such as high pavements, improving traffic safety, particularly close to crossings and installing benches for older people to rest. Singapore provides some good practices on how to make environments more age friendly.

• Increase accessibility of public transportation by making it safer and easier for people to reach the platform on foot and to get from the platform on the bus or train. Policy makers could prescribe accessibility requirements to public transport providers.

• Create social opportunities for older people to meet on a regular basis. For example, locally embedded social clubs bring older people together in Thailand and Viet Nam.

• Create opportunities for older and younger people to meet. Positive intergenerational contact can improve older people’s well-being and is a good antidote against ageism. Local governments can play a key role in establishing or supporting initiatives that bring people together across generations.

• Promote volunteering of older people. Successful programmes to promote volunteering of older people have included: public information campaigns to make older people aware of the possibilities; a system to match older volunteers with organisations; and, some training to equip the volunteers with the skills needed to execute the tasks they are assigned to.

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