OECD Review on Aligning Finance with Climate Goals 2026

As introduced in the first edition of the OECD Review on Aligning Finance with Climate Goals (OECD, 2024[1]), policymakers use a range of policy tools and approaches both to capture the opportunities from climate transitions, as well as to manage climate risks to their economies and financial systems (Box 2.1). This chapter dives deeper into financial sector policies that integrate climate considerations (Section 2.1) and then provides a snapshot of real-economy policies adopted to drive the climate transition (Section 2.2).

The potential for climate change to generate systemic financial instability, through concurrent, correlated asset devaluations across sectors and geographies, provides a core rationale for public policy intervention in financial markets (Battiston et al., 2017; Bolton et al., 2020; de Bandt et al., 2023). Financial sector policies pursue financial stability, price stability, market integrity and related objectives, depending on the policy area and authority mandate, but they can also influence climate outcomes (OECD, 2024[1]). Such influence can result from existing core financial sector policies or, depending on the mandates of relevant authorities, from financial sector policies that explicitly integrate climate considerations. The core official entities implementing these policies are central banks, supervisory and regulatory authorities, and ministries (finance in particular). The exact mandates of these policymakers differ across jurisdictions.

Financial sector policies that integrate climate considerations are primarily designed to address climate risks (OECD, 2024[1]). Depending on their mandates, policymakers can also encourage the greening of financial markets to seize climate opportunities. While these policies can be categorised in different ways and may, for some, fulfil multiple purposes, they can be grouped in four common policy areas, namely transparency, prudential, monetary and credit allocation policies. The latter are not assessed in this report.

Climate-related financial sector policies have continued to increase over the past years, including a notable increase in prudential policies (Figure 2.2). Policymakers in 111 countries and the EU adopted over 860 climate-related financial sector policies between 2000 and 2025. Of those, 78% were transparency policies and 20% prudential policies. At around 2%, a very limited number of monetary policies integrate climate considerations. At least one climate-related financial sector policy was adopted by 51 advanced economies (AEs) and 60 emerging and developing economies (EMDEs), including 34 out of 38 OECD member countries and all G20 jurisdictions. Between 2023 and 2025, the number of climate-related financial sector policies grew by over 25%, after a peak in 2020 and 2021. This demonstrates continued efforts globally although some countries are revising policy efforts.

While governments and financial supervisors or regulators implemented most of the initial climate‑related financial sector policies, central banks have taken a more active role since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Governments and financial supervisors adopted most policies before the 2015 Paris Agreement, but central banks have taken a more prominent role since. By 2025, central banks adopted 32% of policies, financial supervisors and regulators 28%, governments 28% and securities exchanges or a collaboration of authorities the remainder (Figure 2.3). The share of policies adopted by central banks has been steadily increasing from 24% between 2011 and 2015, 30% between 2016 and 2020, to 35% between 2021 and 2025. Securities exchanges have established disclosure guidance and requirements around 2020 to 2022, but slowed down the adoption of new policies afterwards.

As policymakers have expanded the number and mix of types of climate-related financial sector policies over the years, they have increasingly combined mandatory policies with voluntary tools and updated policies. Before the Paris Agreement, most climate-related financial sector policies were mandatory. Since then, jurisdictions have implemented a wider range of tools, including strategies and guidelines with a lower degree of bindingness. As a result, the share of mandatory policies was significantly lower between 2020 and 2025 than between 2015 and 2020. In addition, around 10% of policies adopted before 2020 have since been updated.

Countries across geographies are adopting a diverse mix of policies that follow different approaches to drive the integration of climate considerations in the financial sector. North America and Europe have adopted a higher share of climate-related prudential policies in their mix of clmimate-related financial sector policies (Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5). In contrast, Africa, Oceania, and parts of Asia still rely more on transparency policies. Some European and Eastern Asian countries have started to integrate climate considerations in monetary policies.

A shared understanding of the effects of climate‑related financial sector policies remains a work in progress, but a growing number of empirical analyses and country case studies help identify patterns of policy effectiveness. Dissecting the effect of individual policies is challenging, as they are often part of policy packages. This attribution challenge is illustrated by evidence showing that growth in climate-related financial policies in G20 countries is associated with lower national emissions (D’Orazio and Dirks, 2021[4]). The adoption of climate-related financial sector policies in those countries went hand in hand with the development of the financial sector and the economy, which are also generally associated with declining emissions. Further, owing to the lack of necessary historic data and the difficulty of isolating the effects of individual policies, limited theoretical and empirical analysis is currently available on the effects of climate‑related financial sector policies on financial and climate policy objectives. Where available, expected effects based on conceptual analysis are not always confirmed by theoretical and empirical research, as explained in more detail in the subsections covering the different policy areas.

Climate-related transparency policies aim to contribute to the identification of climate risks and opportunities, reduce information asymmetries and increase comparability (OECD, 2024[1]). These policies can serve multiple purposes and often provide a foundation for other climate-related financial sector policies and practices. Transparency policies within the financial sector policy domain can also support the efficient functioning of the financial system. This section first provides an overview of their implementation before focusing on three specific policy instruments.

Governments and financial supervisors and regulators are the main policymakers adopting climate-related transparency policies. These two types of actors represent nearly two-thirds of policies adopted by 2025. Central banks adopted around a quarter of policies and have become more active in recent years (Figure 2.7). As different policymakers have different mandates, the purpose of these policies may differ. Some transparency policies set by financial supervisors and central banks also inform market supervision, supporting the stability of the financial system. Broader policies related to prudential supervision are discussed in Section 2.1.2.

The number of climate-related transparency policies have continued to increase significantly over the past years, mainly in the form of principles or guidance (Figure 2.6). By 2025, policymakers in 110 countries and the EU integrated over 670 climate-related transparency policies. This encompasses 51 AEs and 59 EMDEs, including 34 OECD member countries and all G20 jurisdictions. One-fifth of these policies were implemented in the last two years, demonstrating continued efforts globally although some countries are revising policy efforts (Box 2.2). One-third of climate-related transparency policies come in the form of guidelines or principles, followed by just over nearly a quarter as disclosure requirements, 18% as strategy or roadmap policy documents, and 7% as taxonomies.

Mandatory disclosure requirements remain a cornerstone of climate-related transparency policies, increasingly combined with voluntary tools. The latter includes voluntary guidance, frameworks for different financial instruments, and roadmaps or strategies to influence climate-aligned finance. Around 30% of climate-related transparency policies are mandatory. A large share of those are core disclosure measures, taxonomies, or green bond frameworks, which are further discussed in the next few pages.

Climate‑related finance guidelines or principles provide implementation frameworks or recommendations to integrate climate consideration into financial practices (OECD, 2024[1]). Such policies are primarily voluntary and often support the implementation of mandatory transparency or prudential policies. By 2025, 82 countries had adopted at least one such policy. This encompasses 39 AEs and 43 EMDEs, including 27 out of 38 OECD member countries and all G20 jurisdictions. Financial supervisors, central banks, and governments are all nearly equally contributing to these policies. These policies can cover a wide range of topics. One example is the Danish Guidelines on Responsible Investment, set by the Danish Business Authority, which clarify the expectations as to how Danish institutional investors should act in the context of responsible investment.

Many countries adopted roadmaps and strategies after the Paris Agreement, sometimes supported by stocktakes that helped establish a baseline and inform subsequent updates. By 2025, 67 countries had adopted at least one roadmap or strategy to capture sustainable finance opportunities and address climate risks to their financial sector. This encompasses 29 AEs and 38 EMDEs, including 24 OECD member countries and 16 G20 jurisdictions. Governments have been the most prolific issuers of climate roadmaps and strategies, followed by central banks. Examples include the Green Finance Strategy by the UK government or the National Sustainable Finance Roadmap of Azerbaijan by its central bank (UK Government, 2019[5]; Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2023[6]). Climate-related finance stocktakes also emerged after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. These can be understood as diagnostic reviews or inventories of domestic climate-related financial policies, market practices and supervisory developments. Over 20 countries have published such stocktakes. For example, Belgium assessed climate transition plans in Belgian banks in 2025 (Belgian Government, 2025[7]).

ESG scoring policies are an emerging policy area aimed at strengthening the reliability and comparability of ratings, including to address greenwashing concerns. Only a handful such policies had been adopted by 2025, including the Austrian Eco-label (Austrian Government, 2024[8]). Other ESG scoring policies can establish guidelines for external verification and rating providers. Initiatives to regulate or oversee ESG rating providers are under development, for example, in India and the EU.

The full range of climate-related transparency policies has been implemented in Europe and Asia. Europe and Asia-Pacific have the highest share of disclosure requirement policies within their policy mix (Figure 2.8). North America relies more on guidance and principles. Africa and Latin-America have the highest share of transparency frameworks for debt-specific instruments. Taxonomies and ESG scoring policies have not yet been adopted in all regions. Africa and LAC rely more on green bond frameworks. Examples from individual countries in Africa illustrate a highly uneven policy landscape within continents. Countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Morocco and Egypt have more developed frameworks, while many other jurisdictions continue to rely primarily on voluntary measures and face capacity and co-ordination constraints (D’Orazio, 2025[9]).

By reducing information gaps and tightening accountability, transparency policies can indirectly contribute to reducing climate risks and capturing climate opportunities. Growing empirical literature on climate-related disclosure requirements, taxonomies, and green bond frameworks finds that these policies are associated with green innovation, financial benefits and greater inflows into funds labelled as sustainable (Becker, Martin and Walter, 2022[10]; Scherer and Hasaj, 2023[11]). These policies are further discussed in their respective subsections. However, identifying and tracing the impact channels of transparency policies can be challenging. Climate-related finance principles and guidance are often broad in scope, and they may frame, or be adopted alongside, other policies. This makes it difficult to isolate their individual effects on emissions (D’Orazio and Dirks, 2021[4]). The additionality of transparency policies is also difficult to demonstrate, as such policies may respond to investor demand and redirect finance from self‑labelled funds to funds labelled according to the policy. While climate‑related taxonomies and green bond frameworks may increase flows to funds using such labels, there is currently limited evidence on how they contribute to emissions reductions.

Disclosure requirements aim to enhance transparency, support market efficiency and address information asymmetries or risks of greenwashing (OECD, 2024[1]). Existing climate-related disclosure requirements may request information across a range of metrics and information points, including GHG emissions, physical risks, climate-(mis)aligned investments and activities, climate-related engagement, governance, strategy and other areas (see Chapter 4 on Metrics). Such information can help inform the design of other policies (such as prudential policies) and directly support investment decisions, capital allocation and other actions taken by investors. At the international level, this expansion has increasingly been shaped by the transition from TCFD-based approaches towards ISSB-aligned disclosure regimes, alongside efforts to improve interoperability across jurisdiction-level frameworks.

Climate-related disclosure policies have continued to increase significantly, with most active requirements remaining primarily mandatory. By 2025, policymakers in 54 countries and the EU adopted more than 160 climate‑related disclosure policies (Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11). This encompasses 30 AEs and 24 EMDEs. It includes 26 OECD member countries and 18 G20 jurisdictions. Different jurisdictions may require different types of disclosure from corporations, but there are several international initiatives to support interoperability between jurisdiction-level disclosure policies. The number of jurisdiction-level disclosure measures more than doubled since 2020. At the same time, there are some recent indications the pace of new policy adoption may slow down over the coming years as policymakers are updating existing frameworks or revising implementation plans (Box 2.2). Around 85% of active disclosure policies remain mandatory. For financial institutions, disclosures are also increasingly linked to prudential reporting and supervisory frameworks, including to promote more consistent climate-related risk disclosure by internationally active banks (FSB, 2025[16]).

Governments and financial supervisors and regulators are the main policymakers adopting climate-related disclosure policies. By 2025, governments and financial supervisors and regulators had each adopted over one-third of these policies (Figure 2.10 Panel A). Securities exchanges and central banks each accounted for a smaller share of the total stock of disclosure policies.

A partial disconnect can be observed between climate-related disclosure requirements for financial institutions and those for non-financial corporates. Around one-third of climate-related disclosure policies target financial institutions exclusively (Figure 2.10 Panel B). About one-fifth of these financial‑sector-specific policies exclusively target banks and typically relate to prudential supervision practices discussed in Subsection 2.1.2. Other policies apply to insurers, asset managers, pension funds, other financial institutions or a mix of financial actors. Over half of disclosure measures apply to both financial and non-financial corporates simultaneously, of which about over half focus on listed companies. As a result, disclosure measures have limited coverage of unlisted and smaller companies. Only 6% of disclosure measures target non-financial corporates exclusively.

Many jurisdictions have moved towards mandatory disclosure requirements, increasingly aligning domestic frameworks with international standards to improve transparency and comparability. For example, Egypt’s 2021 FRA Resolutions made ESG reporting mandatory for listed companies and large non-bank financial institutions, while requiring the largest firms to provide climate-related financial disclosures aligned with the TCFD framework (SSE, 2021[17]). New Zealand was among the first jurisdictions to mandate climate-related financial reporting for large financial institutions and listed issuers in 2021, with reporting based on TCFD-aligned climate standards, which were expanded in 2023 to include emissions-related elements (New Zealand Government, 2020[18]). Starting in 2026, large, listed companies in South Korea are expected to be required to disclose climate-related and ESG information, aligned with ISSB standards, with the aim to enhance transparency and investor decision-making (Korea Sustainability Standards Board, 2024[19]).

Jurisdiction-level disclosure policy developments increasingly reflect international developments, with some jurisdictions moving from voluntary TCFD recommendations toward mandatory adoption of, or alignment with, ISSB Standards. This shift was reinforced in 2023 when the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) called on its members to consider ways to adopt, apply, or otherwise be informed by the ISSB Standards within their jurisdictions. The TCFD established the widely used four-pillar framework of governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets, which has strongly influenced subsequent national and regional climate disclosure regimes (TCFD, 2017). After the TCFD completed its work, the International Sustainability Standards Board published IFRS S2 in 2023, creating a global baseline for climate-related disclosure that incorporates and builds upon TCFD recommendations (ISSB/IFRS Foundation, 2023).

As the coverage of disclosure requirements has expanded significantly since the Paris Agreement, policymakers have paid increasing attention to the quality, reliability and comparability of disclosures. As further discussed in Chapter 4 on metrics, there remain gaps in the comprehensiveness and reliability of climate disclosure. Several countries are increasing their focus on reliability and comparability as they reflect ISSB standards in domestic disclosure policies. For example, Australia’s 2025 Sustainability Reporting Standard introduced mandatory climate-related disclosures based on IFRS S2, emphasising comparable, verifiable, and timely information (Australian Government, 2025[20]). Brazil’s CVM Resolution 193 similarly moved toward mandatory ISSB-based sustainability reporting for publicly held companies, requiring assurance to improve reliability (Brazilian Government, 2023[21]). Beyond ISSB‑aligned disclosure requirements, policymakers in some jurisdictions are linking disclosures with tracking tools, which can further support data integrity. In the context of Japan’s environmental reporting guidelines, for example, a government-hosted disclosure platform was established to improve environmental data transparency and facilitate stakeholder dialogue.

While climate-related disclosure requirements alone cannot reduce emissions and increase climate resilience, they have been associated with reduced emissions, increased capital allocation towards climate innovation and transition, and capital market benefits for non-financial corporates. Setting and disclosing clear targets can motivate companies to reduce their emissions (ECB, 2021[22]). In the context of transition planning, these can be aligned with broader business strategies and risk management frameworks (NGFS, 2024[23]). Empirical analysis of Chinese firms finds firms with enhanced climate disclosure also have lower GHG emissions (Wang et al., 2024[24]). These effects are stronger when executive environmental experience, investor attention, and government supervision are higher. Better environmental disclosures have also been linked to greater resilience to climate risks (Arian and Sands, 2023[25]). Further, empirical case studies have linked mandatory climate disclosure with increased green innovation outcomes and quality (Bratten, Cheng and Kleppe, 2024[26]; Mbanyele et al., 2022[27]; Gupta, 2025[28]), as well as financial benefits such as a lower cost of capital. Other studies have linked mandatory climate disclosure with improved market valuations and liquidity, and, in some cases, a lower cost of capital (Kreuger et al., 2024[29]; Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2021[30]; Maji and Kalita, 2022[31]; Megeid, 2024[32]).

Corporate climate disclosure requirements are closing information asymmetries and can affect costs of capital differently depending on the risk disclosed. They may raise financing costs when they reveal significant climate transition risks, while physical risks. Disclosure has been found to be positively associated with firm performance and value, but their effect on firm value can turn negative when attention to climate change intensifies for the firm (Vestrelli, Fronzetti Colladon and Pisello, 2024[33]). This is likely because transparency can raise risk premia by revealing transition risk. Higher credit spreads are associated with transition risk disclosure, while physical risk disclosure is associated with lower spreads through uncertainty reduction (Costola and Vozian, 2025[34]; Imerman, Ye and Zhao, 2025[35]). Furthermore, the cost of debt is significantly associated with carbon risk for firms that do not participate in voluntary disclosure initiatives such as the CDP (Carbon Disclosure Project), consistent with the fact that markets penalise opacity in environmental information (Mirza et al., 2024[36]).

Climate-related disclosure requirements influence investor behaviour and enable financial decision makers to capture climate opportunities and redirect finance to climate-aligned activities. Empirical analysis on mandatory disclosure requirements in New Zealand find they reduce information gaps and asymmetries that can otherwise prevent efficient capital reallocation (Gehricke et al., 2025[37]). Other empirical studies find that improved disclosure quality reduces information asymmetry and weakens systemic risk measures, improving resilience for financial institutions (Hu and Borjigin, 2025[38]; Shifa and Khan, 2025[39]). Moreover, some evidence indicates that financial institutions subject to mandatory climate disclosure can redirect capital towards climate-aligned activities. For instance, a case study found that investors lowered fossil fuel-energy financing by 40% after mandatory disclosure requirements (Mésonnier and Nguyen, 2021[40]).

Simplicity and usability of disclosure requirements are crucial for effective implementation. Analysis of the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) finds that it had little effect on mutual fund flows and portfolio sustainability (Allcott et al., 2026[41]). This was in part because the disclosure requirements added little new or clear information beyond what investors could already infer from fund names and mandates. Making the information more intuitive could improve the regulation’s effectiveness. Moreover, this type of data-driven evaluation of policy effectiveness, investor use and coverage should inform future revisions to the scope and design of disclosure policies.

Climate-related disclosure policies provide a foundation for informing other climate-related financial sector policies and improving the effectiveness of broader policy packages. Disclosure policies are frequently adopted alongside other policies or provide the information needed for later policies (Edwards et al., 2020[42]). For example, disclosure requirements may support supervisory expectations or inform asset purchases by central banks (D'Orazio, 2025). Policymakers could invest in shared data and cross-authority evaluation frameworks that assess how transparency measures interact with other policies, how policy sequencing affects outcomes, and where policy packages can be improved over time.

Climate‑related taxonomies classify activities, for example, as green, transition relevant, or supporting adaptation (Tandon, 2021[43]). Taxonomies relate to disclosure requirements when disclosed information is an input to the classification process or when the disclosure of taxonomy alignment is required for labelling financial products (OECD, 2024[1]). Such information and data are often the basis of currently available evidence of finance going to activities that support climate goals, notably bonds (see Chapter 3 on tracking).

Adoption of climate‑related taxonomies rose very rapidly after 2020, especially in EMDEs. The number of taxonomies doubled over the past two years. By 2025, around 50 national sustainable or green taxonomies had been adopted by around 40 countries, including 30 EMDEs and 8 AEs (Figure 2.12). The EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities, which has been a template for others, increased the coverage to 35 AEs. Other regional taxonomies covering a group of countries include the ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance and the AMF-UMOA Taxonomy for the West African regional capital market.

The development and implementation of taxonomies typically involve collaboration between multiple official bodies, led by governments and central banks. Together, they led the development of over two-thirds of taxonomies adopted worldwide. Governments typically involve both finance and environment ministries. Collaboration can also involve international financial institutions, such as the World Bank or Inter-American Development Bank.

Most taxonomies cover multiple environmental objectives, including climate mitigation and often adaptation as well, but mostly remain voluntary. Only about one in five taxonomies is currently mandatory. Still, even where official taxonomies are voluntary, they may have binding effects in practice when linked to disclosure requirements, product labels or green bond standards (European Commission Platform on Sustainable Finance, 2025). About one in five taxonomies do not yet integrate adaptation goals along with mitigation. From the perspective of climate change mitigation, taxonomies typically define climate-aligned activities. More recent taxonomy developments have also placed greater emphasis on transition finance, reflecting the need to classify activities that are not yet fully green but are credibly aligned with decarbonisation pathways (ASEAN Taxonomy Board, 2024). A range of these taxonomies also cover other environmental topics, such as biodiversity, and social challenges.

In many jurisdictions, taxonomies have been co-designed across policy authorities and, in some cases, developed with international organisations or co-ordinated with financial institutions. For example, Panama’s taxonomy was developed by the country’s Superintendency of Banks, the Superintendency of the Securities Market, the Superintendency of Insurance and Reinsurance, and co‑ordinated with the government (UNEP FI, 2024[44]). Discussions were also held with the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. International partners have helped develop taxonomies in countries such as Panama and Uzbekistan. Panama received technical support from UNEP FI and financial support from the EU and Green Climate Fund, while Uzbekistan’s taxonomy guidance was prepared with World Bank support and later taken forward by domestic authorities. In some cases, financial institutions were closely involved in implementation and testing. For example, Kenya’s Green Finance Taxonomy was piloted with commercial banks and developed through close engagement between the central bank, industry, and external technical experts, while Singapore’s Transition Taxonomy was informed by multiple rounds of public consultation with their Green Finance Industry Taskforce.

More empirical analysis is needed to inform updates on the design or scope of taxonomies, while acknowledging that direct emissions-reduction effects of taxonomies are difficult to trace causally. Green taxonomies may encourage inflows into funds using those labels, but their additionality is difficult to demonstrate as such policies may respond to investor demand as well as redirect finance from self-labelled funds. Empirical analysis mostly examined the effects of the EU Taxonomy. Such analysis found that companies with higher taxonomy-aligned revenues benefit from better financing terms, yet this advantage is more pronounced among larger firms, potentially widening the investment gap across different business sizes (Brabec and Macháč, 2025[45]). A key determinant of taxonomy effectiveness is the introduction of clear definitions and unambiguous sector specifications, especially as firms might find it more challenging to comply with new reporting processes (Hummel and Bauernhofer, 2022[46]). If implemented effectively, a taxonomy can nudge corporates into sustainable investments, with a positive effect on climate finance volumes (Lucarelli et al., 2023[47]). To strengthen impact analysis of such transparency tools, policymakers could pair them with tracking tools that can better distinguish new and additional investments from simple relabelling, as well as with dialogue platforms with private investors to understand their needs and motivations.

Green or sustainable bond frameworks can be established independently from taxonomies or build on them or other disclosure requirements (OECD, 2024[1]). Some frameworks focus on bond instruments, but many also cover other debt securities. While green bond frameworks initially focussed on mitigation, nearly all those implemented since 2022 covered both mitigation and adaptation, as well as other sustainability topics. Where green bond frameworks are linked to taxonomies, they can strengthen comparability and reduce ambiguity around eligible activities. In practice, many frameworks continue to operate through process-based disclosure and review requirements rather than strict taxonomy alignment.

National green bond frameworks have become widespread since the adoption of the Paris Agreement across regions and countries, including EMDEs. These policies grew by 21% between 2023 and 2025. By 2025, more than 50 countries had developed over 70 national green bond frameworks, including 22 AEs and 34 EMDEs (Figure 2.13). The EU Green Bond Standards, through its coverage of 27 EU member countries, further increases to number of AEs with a corporate or sovereign green bond framework to 39.

There is a balance across countries in the scope of existing green bond frameworks between sovereign and corporate bonds. Frameworks targeting sovereign bonds and corporate bonds each account for 45% of green bond frameworks as of 2025, while the remainder cover both. Within each region’s policy mix, Africa has the highest proportion of frameworks that target corporate and sovereign green bonds simultaneously, Europe, Latin America and Oceania have focussed more on sovereign green bonds, while parts of Asia have focussed more on green corporate bond frameworks.

Sovereign green bond frameworks can be a core dimension of national climate finance strategies and support the development of domestic sustainable finance markets, although green‑labelled sovereign debt issuance has lost momentum globally. For example, Austria’s Green Bond Framework is embedded in its broader Green Finance Agenda (Austrian Treasury, 2022[48]). Fiji’s framework directs a higher share of capital toward adaptation priorities that reflect the country’s high vulnerability to climate change (Fiji's Ministry of Economy, 2019[49]). Sovereign green bond frameworks can also play a market‑development role by signalling policy commitment and helping to establish issuance benchmarks, while corporate frameworks more often structure issuer-level project selection, reporting and external verification practices (OECD, 2025[50]). At the same time, although countries have continued to adopt green bond frameworks, green-labelled sovereign debt issuance has lost momentum, as discussed in Chapter 3 on tracking (Section 3.2.3). Policymakers can send further market signals by issuing new sovereign debt through green- and transition-labelled instruments instead of conventional instruments (also discussed in the Metrics chapter, Section 4.5).

Experiences by several jurisdictions demonstrate that transparent reporting and external verification can strengthen sovereign green bond frameworks. For example, Poland’s updated 2025 framework similarly includes external pre-issuance verification by Sustainalytics, annual allocation and impact reporting, and post-issuance external verification of proceeds. Chile’s Green and Sustainable Bond Frameworks were accompanied by an external review from Vigeo Eiris, while annual reports by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the Environment disclose both allocation and impact information (Chile's Ministry of Finance, 2020[51]). Zambia’s Green Bond Guidelines likewise require issuers to contract an independent reviewer before issuance and report annually on compliance and use of proceeds.

Similar to taxonomies, collaborative government-led efforts across a range of official bodies have driven the development and implementation of green bond frameworks. The development of over half of taxonomies was led by governments, another nearly 30% by financial regulators and supervisors, and the remainder by central banks, securities exchanges or a combination of policy authorities. Among government actors, finance ministries most often lead the development of the frameworks, followed by environmental ministries and treasuries. Sustainable bond frameworks have often been developed through cross-policymaker co-ordination. For example, Poland’s updated sovereign green bond framework relies on an interministerial green finance working group led by the Ministry of Finance. In emerging and smaller markets, international organisations have played a particularly important role. For example, Fiji’s sovereign green bond framework benefited from World Bank and IFC support.

Prudential policies mainly aim to maintain financial stability. This is understood as the capacity of a financial system to absorb severe shocks and maintain the provision of stable financial services (OECD, 2024[1]). Microprudential regulation focusses on the financial health of individual financial institutions, while macroprudential regulation addresses aggregate risks to financial stability arising from the combined effects of financial institutions’ behaviour. Overall, prudential policies seek to ensure that banks, insurers, pension funds, and other financial institutions do not take excessive risks that could cause them to fail and trigger a financial crisis.

Climate-related prudential policies integrate climate risks into existing prudential policy frameworks. Climate change can affect the value of physical and financial assets in ways that may threaten financial stability. At the micro level, climate risks affect individual financial institutions. At the macro level, the impacts of climate change and related policies can affect the overall stability of financial and economic systems. Prudential policies integrating climate considerations can be adopted by a range of policymakers, including central banks, prudential regulators or supervisors, and governments, depending on how jurisdictions have organised their prudential frameworks.

Climate-related supervision practices and stress tests are driving the rise in climate-related prudential policies (Figure 2.14). Climate-related prudential policies include measures that relate to capital, liquidity or large exposures. Capital-related prudential measures specifically can include capital regulations, risk management and supervision tools, and climate-related prudential reporting and disclosure requirements. Within those policy subcategories, capital regulations can include capital requirements, leverage requirements, risk weights and capital buffers, while risk management and supervision tools include climate scenario analysis and stress-testing exercises, supervisory guidance, governance requirements, and ICAAP. As of 2025, climate stress tests or scenario analysis accounted for around one-third of climate-related prudential policies Figure 2.14 Panel A). Over 40% of climate-related prudential policies adopted by 2025 consisted of a range of other risk management and supervision tools, expectations and guidance. 15% of policies relate to prudential transparency measures that were already discussed in Section 2.1.1. By contrast, climate-related capital and leverage requirements, large exposures, and liquidity policies remained largely unexplored.

While all regions have adopted climate-related prudential policies, different regions have prioritised different measures. By 2025, just over 200 climate-related prudential policies had been adopted by prudential policymakers in 57 countries and at European institutional, including 30 AEs and 27 EMDEs (Figure 2.16). This encompasses 27 OECD member countries and 18 G20 jurisdictions. These policies increased by 30% between 2023 and 2025. Around 30 of them were transparency policies discussed in Section 2.1.1. Eastern Asia and Europe have the highest share of climate stress test exercises (Figure 2.15). The Americas and other parts of Asia-Pacific rely more on other risk management and supervision policies. Internationally, recent prudential developments have increasingly been shaped by the Basel Committee’s principles for the effective management and supervision of climate-related financial risks and by subsequent work on the role of climate scenario analysis in supervisory practice (BCBS, 2022; BCBS, 2024).

To better address climate risks, the thematic scope, institutional coverage, and level bindingness of climate-related prudential policies can be expanded. The majority of climate-related prudential policies are adopted by central banks (Figure 2.14, Panel B). Most of these policies apply to banks specifically and only few target insurers and investment funds. Overall, current prudential practice remains bank‑centred, although recent international work has increasingly highlighted the relevance of climate‑related vulnerabilities, transition planning and litigation risks for insurers and for broader financial‑system resilience (FSB, 2025; NGFS, 2023; NGFS, 2024). While about a third of policies are mandatory for the supervised financial institutions, many remain voluntary, providing general guidance or assessments to identify risks without concrete or specific next steps to address them in practice. Moreover, the thematic scope can be broadened, as transition risks are more widely addressed than physical risks.

Nearly all climate-related prudential policies relate to the capital-related pillars under the Basel III framework, which includes stress tests and other risk management practices. Capital-related prudential policies are defined by the Basel III framework as relating to capital and leverage requirements (Pillar 1), risk management and supervision (Pillar 2), and market discipline (Pillar 3) (BIS, n.d.[52]). Climate‑related disclosure policies that fall under Pillar 2 have been discussed under Subsection 2.1.1 as they serve both transparency and prudential purposes. The integration of climate considerations in prudential (Pillar 1 and 2) policies is further discussed in the next three subsections that address policies relating respectively to the level and quality of capital, to risk management and supervision (notably stress tests), and to liquidity and exposure.

Based on existing analyses across conceptual, theoretical, and empirical research, climate‑related prudential policies appear to have mixed effects on financing towards low‑GHG activities, while bringing potential trade‑offs with financial stability (Table 2.1). Conceptual, theoretical, and empirical analyses do not always come to the same conclusions in terms of direction and magnitude of effects. Conceptual research currently expects potential positive effects across policy objectives for climate‑related large exposure policies, as well as for some leverage and risk management and supervision policies, although effects may be small.

Theoretically, climate‑related capital policies adjust minimum capital-related prudential requirements to better reflect financial institutions’ exposure and vulnerability to climate risks. Policy measures can adjust capital adequacy ratios with green supporting factors, which lower capital requirements for exposures considered environmentally sustainable or less exposed to climate-related risks, or brown penalising factors, which increase capital requirements for exposures considered more vulnerable to transition or physical risks (OECD, 2024[1]). They can also adjust capital requirements for specific sectors highly exposed to climate‑related risks or that can benefit from the climate transition, as well as adjust counter‑cyclical and systemic risk buffers, which were originally introduced to mitigate the effects of system‑wide economic and financial shocks.

In practice, by 2025, only a handful of central banks had adopted climate-related policies that adjust minimum capital and leverage requirements. These policies have been put in place by jurisdictions in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. As of 2023, only one country had adopted a capital adequacy requirement with a green supporting factor. Hungary’s central bank introduced green preferential capital requirements in 2020, focusing on projects with energy savings and renewable energy components (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2022[53]). As of 2025, no country has adopted capital adequacy requirements with a brown penalising factor aimed at increasing capital requirements for investments in high‑emitting activities (Krogstrup and Oman, 2019[54]).

Conceptual and theoretical research suggests that adjusting capital adequacy ratios through green supporting or brown penalising factors may involve trade-offs between financial stability and climate policy objectives (Table 2.1):

• Conceptual and theoretical research expects that a capital adequacy ratio with a green supporting factor (GSF) would bring challenges to financial stability, without clear positive effects on limiting climate risks and increasing climate‑related finance volumes. Such a factor lowers the amount of capital banks must hold against loans or assets classified as green. Conceptual and theoretical research highlights that this would make green lending cheaper and encourage banks to finance more climate‑aligned projects. However, the literature suggests that the effects would be modest, especially if the policy is not supported by real‑economy climate policies and would depend on bank business models and the availability of credible green projects (D’Orazio and Dirks, 2021[4]; Oehmke and Opp, 2022[55]; Dankert et al., 2018[56]; Dafermos and Nikolaidi, 2021[57]; Benmir and Roman, 2020[58]; Lamperti et al., 2021[59]; Janke and Weiss, 2024[60]; Carattini, Heutel and Melkadze, 2023[61]). The main concern is that reducing capital requirements without evidence of lower underlying financial risk would weaken banks’ ability to absorb losses, encourage excessive leverage, and create mispricing or green asset bubbles, especially if green classifications are unclear or vulnerable to greenwashing (D’Orazio and Popoyan, 2019[62]). This could, in turn, have a negative effect on financial stability (Castren and Russo, 2024[63]; Noera, 2024[64]). Empirical evidence is also limited, as most studies focus on implementation and calibration rather than proving causal effects (Thomä and Gibhardt, 2019[65]). Overall, a GSF may help support the green transition, but it is not a strong or risk-free policy on its own and requires robust taxonomies, reliable risk evidence, and careful regulatory design (Baer, Campiglio and Deyris, 2021[66]; Berenguer, Cardona and Evain, 2020[67]).

• Conceptual and theoretical research suggests that a capital adequacy ratio with a brown penalising factor (BPF) may be more effective than a GSF at reducing climate-related financial risks and raise fewer prudential concerns when properly calibrated. Such a factor raises the amount of capital banks must hold against loans or assets linked to carbon-intensive activities. Conceptual research highlights that this could make brown lending more expensive, reduce banks’ exposure to high-carbon sectors, and create larger buffers against transition-related losses that may not yet be fully captured in traditional risk models (Noera, 2024[64]; Le Quang and Scialom, 2022[68]; D’Orazio and Popoyan, 2019[62]). Theoretical and emerging empirical studies suggest that a BPF provides a clearer incentive than a GSF to reduce brown exposures and reallocate lending (Punzi, 2024[69]). However, the literature also suggests that the effects depend strongly on calibration and timing. If introduced too suddenly or set too aggressively, a BPF could trigger disorderly portfolio adjustments, reduce credit to carbon-intensive firms, lower aggregate credit, increase defaults, and weaken financial stability in the short term (Thakor and Song, 2023[70]; Oehmke and Opp, 2022[55]; Coelho and Restoy, 2022[71]; Baer, Campiglio and Deyris, 2021[66]; D’Orazio, 2021[72]; Dafermos and Nikolaidi, 2021[57]). Overall, a BPF may be more directly aligned with reducing climate-related financial risks than a GSF, but it is not risk-free and would require gradual implementation, careful calibration, complementary climate policies, and transition-finance instruments to avoid excessive credit contraction and financial instability (Carattini, Heutel and Melkadze, 2023[61]).

Limited research indicates that other climate-related prudential instruments related to the capital requirements and macroprudential buffers may also imply trade-offs between policy objectives (Table 2.1):

• Conceptual and theoretical research suggests that sectoral capital requirements may undermine financial stability if applied too broadly. Sectoral capital requirements require banks to hold extra capital when they lend to certain sectors, such as fossil fuels or energy-intensive industries. Conceptual and theoretical work shows that this can help protect banks from transition risks, particularly when paired with real-economy climate policies (D’Orazio, 2021[72]; Coelho and Restoy, 2022[71]). However, this policy measure may not contribute to decreasing emissions and may increase financial instability by depressing credit and investment when there is no carbon pricing policy (García-Villegas and Martorell, 2024[73]). Moreover, it may be difficult to apply in practice and could have unintended consequences as energy-intensive sectors need capital to transition.

• Conceptual research on countercyclical risk buffers suggests that they can help banks become more resilient to climate-related financial risks but highlights that they are difficult to design and could create new instability if implemented poorly. Countercyclical risk buffers build resilience during periods of carbon-intensive credit build-up or other climate-vulnerable exposures (D’Orazio and Popoyan, 2019[62]; Coelho and Restoy, 2022[71]). However, varying risk buffers are especially difficult to calibrate and may lead to more disruptions than other instruments when suddenly introduced (Coelho and Restoy, 2022[71]). In a conceptual macroprudential framework focused on carbon-intensive credit booms, a countercyclical risk buffer is argued to contain ex ante growth in carbon-intensive exposures and to build buffers to absorb ex post stranded asset shocks, thereby smoothing the green transition (D’Orazio and Popoyan, 2019[62]).

• Conceptual research identifies the potential of systemic risk buffers to reduce climate‑related financial risks. A climate-related systemic risk buffer applies a structural macroprudential buffer to address systemic losses from climate transition and physical risks. It can be adjusted individually to reflect geographic and sectoral differences in exposure (Monnin, 2021[74]; Grunewald, 2023[75]; Busies et al., 2024[76]). Dedicated capital buffers could build resilience against unexpected and unaccounted-for systemic climate losses (ECB/ESRB, 2023[77]). However, the such tools should be gradual, targeted and scalable, because broad or poorly calibrated buffers could restrict credit, including to high-emitting firms that need financing for transition investment. Granular definitions of risk exposures, including sectoral, geographic and forward-looking transition information are, therefore, important to improve efficiency and limit unintended consequences on transition and adaptation finance.

Risk management and supervision policies aim to ensure that financial institutions manage risks effectively to avoid excessive risk‑taking that could threaten their own soundness or the stability of the financial system (OECD, 2024[1]). Climate‑related risk management and supervision measures focus on the identification, assessment, management and monitoring of climate‑related risks. Where supervisors identify material unmanaged risks, these measures may inform further prudential responses, including capital add-ons, lending restrictions or enhanced supervisory scrutiny.

Climate-related risk management and supervision measures are most often adopted by central banks followed by prudential supervisors. As of 2025, about 60% of these measures were adopted by central banks with prudential supervision mandates and mainly targeted credit institutions. About one-third were adopted by prudential supervisors and regulators, which include insurance supervisors, financial market authorities, and banking regulators. This, in part, reflects that the responsibility for financial system risk management and supervision differ across jurisdictions globally.

A range of climate-related risk management and supervision measures are being adopted, but there is a particular focus on climate stress tests and scenario analysis. By 2025, around 160 climate-related risk management and supervision policies (including climate stress tests) were adopted by policymakers in over 55 countries and at the EU institutional level. This includes 29 AEs and 26 EMDEs and encompasses 19 OECD member countries and 18 G20 jurisdictions. As of 2025, climate stress tests and scenarios analyses accounted for around 45% of adopted measures (Figure 2.14). Other adopted measures include risk management guidance and supervisory expectations (around one-fifth), supervisory reviews, governance and internal control requirements.

Prudential supervisors have often shaped climate risk management through guidance and supervisory expectations rather than binding prudential rules. Two examples from Switzerland and Zimbabwe illustrate that such guidance builds on international standards. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority adopted guidance on the management of climate risks, which sets out supervisory expectations for banks and insurers on how to identify, manage and monitor climate-related physical and transition risks (FINMA, 2023[78]). Although non-binding, the guidance influences institutions through the supervisory review process and encourages alignment with international standards from bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. In Zimbabwe, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe issued in 2023 a bank supervision guideline as a voluntary climate-risk management tool to help regulated institutions strengthen their resilience to physical and transition climate risks. Definitions used for climate terminology closely follow those developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the NGFS.

Policies requiring banks to integrate climate considerations into asset-quality assessments have been adopted in several countries. An early example is Indonesia’s regulation on asset quality rating for commercial banks, which required commercial banks to consider a debtor’s environmental conservation efforts when assessing asset quality and business prospects (Bank Indonesia, 2005[79]). The rule aimed to reduce transition-related credit risks by embedding environmental factors into credit assessment for lending, interbank exposures and assets linked to securities. While legally binding, implementation allowed some flexibility for small businesses and regions targeted for local economic development. As one of Indonesia’s first climate-related financial-sector policies, it marked an important shift toward environmental risk management in banking operations.

Climate scenario analysis and stress tests assess the vulnerability of financial institutions and financial systems to climate change transition and/or physical risks. Climate transition related assessments rely on different scenarios with different temperature outcomes and assumptions about the speed and depth of the transition in different sectors. Assessments relating to climate-related physical risks also rely on a range of scenarios modelling the expected scale of climate impacts across geographies and sectors. The results of these assessments can inform other prudential policies. Climate scenario analysis provides the broader forward-looking framework, while supervisory stress testing is one application of that framework used to assess resilience at the firm or system level (NGFS, 2025; BCBS, 2022).

Jurisdiction-level climate‑related stress testing took off after 2020, but as of 2025, many countries had still not assessed climate risks to their financial system. The number of climate stress tests has doubled since 2022. By 2025, 37 countries conducted national climate stress tests or scenario analyses, as well as all 27 EU member states under the European climate stress tests or scenario analyses exercises (Figure 2.17), with more on the way. However, only 14 EMDEs have conducted a stress test. While more AEs than EMDEs have conducted climate stress tests, uptake remains uneven, as nearly half of OECD countries have yet to undertake a first one.

Climate stress tests and scenario analyses remain primarily non-binding supervisory exercises, while only a few jurisdictions have implemented both micro- and macro-level approaches. Less than one-fifth of climate stress tests were mandatory. Climate stress tests have so far been used primarily to assess exposures, strengthen data and modelling capabilities, and inform supervisory dialogue, rather than to mechanically determine capital requirements (ECB, 2022). Over half of climate stress tests and scenario analyses followed a top-down approach. Less than 15 countries have done both a top-down and bottom-up assessment. Both are needed to assess climate risks to the financial system. Bottom-up approaches focus on detailed financial exposure and vulnerability, while top-down approaches provide macro-level insights into systemic risk (NGFS, 2025[80]).

Climate stress tests by insurance supervisors and dedicated assessments of physical risks remain limited across jurisdictions, especially compared to those ran by central banks for lending institutions. Climate stress tests and scenario analysis are mainly developed by central banks, but also financial supervisors and in some cases governments. They typically target credit institutions, but such assessments can also cover other types of financial institutions. Only eight countries so far have included insurance companies in their stress tests. As banks, insurers, and other financial institutions face different risk channels, climate stress testing should eventually move beyond banks and cover insurers, pension funds, asset managers, and other parts of the financial system.

A phased approach has helped scale and deepen scenario analysis in several jurisdictions, regularly supported by collaboration between supervisors and financial institutions. Several jurisdictions moved gradually from narrower exercises to broader and more sophisticated assessments. Australia began with banks and later expanded to insurers and the wider financial system (APRA, 2022[81]). The ECB moved from broad top-down exercises to more refined tests incorporating new models, short-term risks, and cross-sector financial linkages (ECB, 2022[82]; Abbondanza et al., 2025[83]; EBA, EIOPA, ESMA & ECB, 2024[84]). Canadian supervisors conducted an exploratory climate transition scenario analysis covering Canada’s largest banks and insurers in 2021 (BoC-OSFI, 2022[85]). Building on this pilot, Canada’s Superintendent of Financial Institutions rolled out a standardised supervisory climate scenario analysis in 2023-24, in collaboration with Quebec’s Autorité des Marchés financiers (AMF), to build sector‑wide capacity to assess both physical and transition risks (OSFI, 2025[86]). These experiences illustrate that policymakers do not need to wait for perfect data or modelling capacity to begin. They can start with exploratory exercises, then develop methodologies and data over time.

Climate stress-testing experiences in several jurisdictions demonstrate that they can serve as important capacity-building tools for both supervisors and financial institutions. In Australia, APRA’s exercises improved risk awareness among participating banks and insurers and encouraged institutions to reassess their risk appetites in light of potentially higher climate-related lending losses (APRA, 2022[81]). Similarly, Canada’s pilot scenario analysis helped banks and insurers identify data gaps and strengthen internal climate-risk assessment capabilities (BoC-OSFI, 2022[85]). Colombia’s stress test created a foundation for more detailed future climate-risk assessments by improving transparency and encouraging dialogue between public authorities and private financial institutions (World Bank, 2021[87]). In South Africa, the climate-risk stress test allowed the South African Reserve Bank to assess banks’ internal climate-risk management frameworks and stress-testing capabilities, while also highlighting areas where further collaboration and data improvements are needed (SARB, 2025[88]). Together, these examples show that stress tests are valuable not only for estimating potential losses, but also for developing institutional expertise, improving data practices, and embedding climate risks into financial supervision and risk management.

Although many climate stress tests are still exploratory and not yet strongly linked to regulatory consequences, they help translate climate-risk data into information that supervisors and financial institutions can act upon. Conceptual analyses emphasise that stress tests provide a bridge between information and action. For example, indicators used to assess system-wide financial risks can help shape stress-test scenarios, while the results of stress tests can show how climate risks may affect banks’ capital and liquidity positions (Coelho and Restoy, 2022[71]; D’Orazio, 2021[72]). These findings can then inform the calibration of capital buffers and other prudential tools, making stress tests a key input for embedding climate considerations into supervision measures (Baer, Campiglio and Deyris, 2021[66]). However, the benefits of climate stress testing are not yet fully realised, partly because many exercises remain exploratory and lack a strong link to supervisory impacts (DeMenno, 2022[89]).

Evidence on the real-world effects of climate stress tests is still limited, but early findings suggest they influence bank behaviour and how they allocate lending. Interview-based and anecdotal evidence suggests that climate stress tests can improve internal co-ordination of risk and raise management attention, although they currently play a limited role in financing the transition (Calipel and Fidel, 2023[90]). An empirical study using the French climate pilot exercise finds that participating banks increased lending volumes to high-carbon emitters by 38% while simultaneously charging higher spreads as compensation (Fuchs et al., 2023[91]). The banks also became more likely to provide green loans to those emitters. This pattern may reflect a combination of risk repricing, transition-finance support and portfolio rebalancing triggered by supervisory scrutiny.

Policies that adjust liquidity requirements to better reflect climate-related risks to asset liquidity, funding stability and financial institutions’ resilience are not yet used. Liquidity‑related policies are designed to ensure that financial institutions maintain sufficient liquid assets to meet their short‑term obligations and continue operating during periods of stress (OECD, 2024[1]). A climate-related liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) modifies short-term liquidity requirements to reflect transition risk-driven liquidity stress and to discourage holdings of assets that may become illiquid under abrupt policy or market shifts. Analogously, a climate-related net stable funding ratio (NSFR) modifies structural funding requirements to account for the relative funding stability of green versus brown assets in the short-term. No such policies were identified as of 2025.

Scarce conceptual literature on liquidity-related instruments expects positive to neutral effects on financial stability, mixed or uncertain effects on the reduction of climate-related risks and increases in climate‑related financial flows. Conceptual literature emphasises that such adjustments could be implemented without major changes to existing frameworks, but that effective application requires a clear taxonomy, a credible mapping from climate risk to liquidity characteristics, and time variation to reflect evolving transition dynamics (D’Orazio and Dirks, 2021[4]). A related conceptual paper highlights that LCRs and NSFRs are short- and medium-term tools that improve banks’ liquidity risk profiles, but that the management of long-term climate risks may require other policy frameworks (Baranović et al., 2021[92]).

Climate-related large exposure policies aim to limit financial institutions’ concentration of exposure to counterparties, sectors or assets that are particularly vulnerable to climate risks. Generally, large exposure measures aim to reduce concentration risk by preventing financial institutions from becoming excessively exposed to a single counterparty or group of connected counterparties (OECD, 2024[1]). Related climate-relevant exposure-control tools can include lending limits, or credit ceilings, as well as concentration charges. Climate-related lending limits and credit ceilings place quantitative constraints on banks’ exposures to climate-vulnerable or carbon-intensive sectors. A climate-related concentration charge applies additional prudential costs when banks’ exposures to climate-relevant sectors exceed thresholds, aiming to discourage correlated concentrations that amplify systemic stress.

No bank prudential large exposure rules have yet been adopted but some countries have applied climate-relevant exclusion criteria to reduce excessive exposure to counterparties and sectors with high climate risk. For example, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance published guidelines for the exclusion of certain companies, including companies with high GHG emissions, from the Government Pension Fund Global (Government of Norway, 2014[93]). Such norm-based exclusion frameworks can indirectly limit climate-related exposures. This policy has been periodically recalibrated and was temporarily paused at the end of 2025 for a review of the guidelines to ensure a balanced investment approach (Norges Bank, 2025[94]).

Conceptual analysis on climate-related considerations for large exposure policies currently suggests positive effects across policy objectives, depending on their design and sequencing with other macroprudential policies. Lending limits and concentration charges restrict financial institutions from holding large exposures to specifically defined sectors and thus limit their exposure to risks in those sectors. However, their restrictive nature means that narrow targeting, robust reporting, and careful sequencing are essential to avoid unintended macro-financial consequences.

• Conceptual studies suggest that lending limits on carbon-intensive firms can help reduce banks’ exposure to large potential losses but could limit transition financing if not designed and sequenced correctly. By restricting how much banks can lend to highly polluting or climate-vulnerable counterparties, these measures can complement risk-based capital requirements and other supervisory tools (D’Orazio, 2021[72]; Baranović et al., 2021[92]; Miller and Dikau, 2022[95]; Schoenmaker and Van Tilburg, 2016[96]). They may also help smooth adjustment during a sudden low-carbon transition shock. At the same time, these measures are more restrictive than tools that influence lending through prices or capital costs and directly limit banks’ allocation of credit (Hiebert, 2024[97]). If applied too broadly or too early, they could limit firms’ ability to finance their transition, encourage similar portfolio shifts across banks, and reduce overall economic activity (Coelho and Restoy, 2022[71]; Baer, Campiglio and Deyris, 2021[66]; Le Quang and Scialom, 2022[68]).

• Conceptual analysis expects that concentration charges can directly limit banks’ exposure to climate risks without necessarily increasing overall capital requirements. When they are part of a broader prudential toolkit, they help contain aggregate and concentration risks, and protect against transition risk by limiting correlated losses (Hiebert, 2024[97]; Le Quang and Scialom, 2022[68]). However, the policy design must balance prudential benefits with impacts on credit availability (Le Quang and Scialom, 2022[68]). Moreover, they require detailed reporting and can be complex in operational and legal terms (Baranović et al., 2021[92]). At the same time, if poorly calibrated, these measures could restrict transition finance for carbon-intensive firms and amplify shocks through common portfolio adjustments, implying that narrow targeting and careful sequencing are important for systemic-risk reduction (Coelho and Restoy, 2022[71]).

The primary policy objective of monetary policy is usually to maintain price stability, although some central banks also have broader economic stability mandates. It is usually the realm of central banks, sometimes of specific monetary authorities, and involves the use of tools such as interest rates and central bank asset holdings. The individual interpretations of stability differ, and several central banks also have additional aims in their policy objective, such as exchange rate stability, economic growth, and job creation (Dikau and Volz, 2021[98]).

Climate-related monetary policies primarily aim to integrate climate-related risks and considerations into monetary policy operations, where consistent with central bank mandates (OECD, 2024[1]). They integrate climate risks into monetary policy operations to preserve price stability, support effective transmission of monetary policy, and manage risks to central-bank balance sheets. While most climate-related monetary policies have a risk management perspective, depending on central bank mandates, some may also support an orderly climate transition and resilience. Monetary policies include both asset-side adjustments, linked to credit operations, collateral framework, and asset purchases, as well as liability-side measures related to liquidity management (NGFS, 2026[99]). The use of monetary instruments reflects complex trade-offs and national contexts.

Climate-related monetary policies remain limited and have not yet spread across all regions. By 2025, only around 10 countries and the EU had adopted such policies, mainly on the European continent, but also in LAC and Asia (Figure 2.18). A first such policy was adopted in 2010 by the central bank of Lebanon, but most have been established after 2020.

Research on the existing or potential effects of climate-related monetary policies remains scarce and points to mixed effects on price stability objectives. As only a small number of policies have been adopted, evidence remains limited and relies largely on theoretical research and scenario analysis. Conceptual and some theoretical research identifies potential trade-offs between climate and price stability goals. Across monetary policy measures, research generally expects positive effects on climate-related finance volumes and climate-related risk reduction, but effects on price stability are more mixed and depend on the policy measure and design. Expanded and more systematic scenario and policy analysis can help understand potential effects and inform their design.

Central bank approaches to integrate climate considerations into monetary policy operations are still emerging, but asset purchase measures were the most common by 2025. Relevant monetary policy instruments include central banks’ credit operations, collateral frameworks, asset purchases, and liquidity management (NGFS, 2024[100]; NGFS, 2026[99]). The latter includes reserve requirement policies. Few had explored adjusting collateral policies and integrating climate considerations into reserve requirements for banks.

Climate-related considerations in asset purchases may involve increasing exposure to green bonds or other securities that finance projects relevant to the climate transition and resilience, while reducing exposure to assets exposed to climate risks (OECD, 2024[1]). Asset purchases and holdings may involve central banks purchasing or holding public- or private-sector securities, typically to influence money-market conditions, longer-term interest rates, spreads or market liquidity. There are two general approaches to integrating climate considerations into asset purchase tilting or screening (NGFS, 2021[101]).

Less than 10 central banks, mainly in Europe, have integrated climate considerations into asset purchases, through green tilting and screening. Green tilting adjusts the composition of asset portfolios toward lower-carbon issuers or green securities. In 2021, the Bank of England and Swedish central bank published information on how they intended to integrate environmental considerations in their corporate bond purchase schemes. The Bank of England introduced climate-related eligibility criteria, climate tilting and a 2025 portfolio-emissions target (BoE, 2025[102]). The Swedish central bank applied norm-based negative screening to corporate-bond purchases (Sveriges Riksbank, 2021[103]). As of October 2022, the ECB adopted a policy to adjust corporate bond holdings in the Eurosystem under its Corporate Sector Purchase Programme by tilting them towards issuers with better climate performance, based on emissions, climate targets, and disclosure practices. Key choices of climate metrics to inform climate-adjusted asset purchases include emissions intensity, climate scores, or a green taxonomy.

Existing research on the effects of climate-adjusted asset purchases suggests that they may have limited effects on monetary policy effectiveness, while potentially helping to reduce climate-related risks and increase finance for activities relevant to climate mitigation. Such research remains mostly conceptual and theoretical:

• Research on green tilting suggests that it could reduce climate risks, increase green finance volumes, and be designed in a way that it does not impair monetary policy effectiveness. Some conceptual analysis suggests that it would not impede other monetary policy objectives (Tamez, Weenink and Yoshinaga, 2024[104]; Vestergaard, 2024[105]), while others suggest that it could undermine price stability to some degree (Baer, Campiglio and Deyris, 2021[66]). In contrast, modelling exercises find green tilting can be designed so as not to materially impair monetary transmission (Nakov and Thomas, 2023[106]; Papoutsi, Piazzesi and Schneider, 2022[107]; Diluiso et al., 2021[108]). Some findings suggest that this may depend on complementary macroprudential policy (Benmir and Roman, 2020[58]). While green tilting may reduce climate risks and support the growth of green finance, effects on emissions are difficult to identify, and its effectiveness depends on programme design and broader policy co-ordination (Aloui et al., 2023[109]; Ferrari and Landi, 2023[110]). Some theoretical research suggests that green quantitative easing reduces the cost of capital for low-carbon firms, incentivising firm investment in green technologies and green asset issuance (Bacchiocchi, Ille and Giombini, 2024[111]; Papoutsi, Piazzesi and Schneider, 2022[107]; Schoenmaker, 2021[112]). However, these effects are very modest compared to those of a carbon tax (Abiry et al., 2022[113]), and hence cannot replace the absence of real-economy climate policies (see Section 2.2 below). Analysis of the Bank of England’s green tilting found that it increased the probability of a bond being purchased if it had a higher climate score, but it did not influence its market prices (BoE, 2025[102]).

• Evidence on negative screening remains very limited. While there are some concerns about its consistency with price stability objectives, existing literature suggests it could help mitigate climate risks, improve green asset liquidity, and support the growth of green and climate finance (Le Quang and Scialom, 2022[68]; NGFS, 2021[101]).

Explicit integration of climate-related considerations into central bank credit operations remains very limited across jurisdictions. Credit operations are central banks’ lending activities or refinancing operations to financial institutions, usually through loans or liquidity provisions, that provide liquidity to eligible counterparties and help implement the monetary-policy stance (NGFS, 2021[101]). Depending on their design and mandates, climate-adjusted credit operations can link the pricing, amount or eligibility of central-bank lending to counterparties’ climate-related lending, the climate characteristics of pledged collateral, or counterparties’ climate profiles and transition plans (NGFS, 2021[101]). Examples include the Bank of Japan’s climate-response fund-supplying operations, Hungary’s Green Home Programme, Malaysia’s Low Carbon Transition Facility, and the People’s Bank of China’s Carbon Emission Reduction Facility.

Existing research on the effects of climate-related credit operations points to potential trade-offs between monetary and climate policy objectives, and to the importance of robust climate-related definitions of eligible activities. Conceptual and theoretical research currently mostly focuses on pricing adjustments and eligibility criteria:

• Most conceptual work expects that well-designed pricing adjustments would not undermine price or financial stability (NGFS, 2021[101]; Monnet and van ’t Klooster, 2023[114]; Vestergaard, 2024[105]). However, this conclusion is conditional on robust taxonomies, operational simplicity and legal feasibility, as differentiated refinancing or preferential funding schemes can create tensions with monetary transmission, balance-sheet risk management and perceptions of mandate overreach (NGFS, 2021[101]; NGFS, 2026[99]). Moreover, theoretical analysis suggests that dual or differentiated interest rate policies involve trade-offs with inflation and financial stability (Chan, Punzi and Zhao, 2024[115]; Tan, Tsomocos and Wang, 2025[116]). Existing studies find that such measures could reduce climate-related financial risks, stimulate green credit and reallocate lending away from carbon-intensive sectors (Jourdan et al., 2024[117]; Senni, Pagliari and van ‘t Klooster, 2024[118]; Vestergaard, 2024[105]; Kedward, Gabor and Ryan-Collins, 2022[119]; Böser and Colesanti Senni, 2023[120]; Lamperti et al., 2021[59]). Some explorations of climate-related credit operation policies point to the importance of robust definitions and classifications of eligible ‘green activities’ to make such policies effective (NGFS, 2024[100]).

• Conceptual analysis expects that adjusting counterparty eligibility has a negative impact on maintaining price stability and positive impacts on directly climate-related finance flows as well as mitigating climate risks (NGFS, 2021[101]; Lane, 2024[121]). Similarly, theoretical work expects that while there are costs in terms of maintaining price stability and welfare, such policies improve environmental outcomes in terms of both risk management and financial flows (Lamperti et al., 2021[59]).

Climate-related considerations in collateral frameworks can be integrated by adjusting the eligibility or valuation of collateral based on the climate-related characteristics of underlying assets (OECD, 2024[1]). Collateral frameworks (or collateral policies) define the range of assets that commercial banks can pledge to secure central bank credit operations, as well as the risk control measures that apply to them. Collateral frameworks can consider climate through four potential adjustments: (1) adjusting collateral haircuts or valuation margins, (2) adapting eligibility criteria with negative screening to exclude certain assets, (3) adopting eligibility criteria with positive screening to favour certain assets, (4) aligning collateral pools of counterparties with climate-related objectives (NGFS, 2021[101]).

The policy area of climate-related adjustments in collateral frameworks is in its infancy. Only three central banks have adopted such a policy so far. A notable example is the preferential haircut policy for green securities in the collateral management system of the central bank of Hungary, introduced in 2021. In 2025, the ECB published plans to adapt its collateral framework to address climate related risks by including a "climate factor" when assessing eligible assets pledged as collateral.

Existing research on the potential effects of climate-adjusted collateral frameworks suggests potentially limited trade-offs between monetary and climate policy objectives, but more economic theoretical analysis is needed. Most existing research has focussed on haircut adjustments, and analysis on screening and aligning collateral pools is scarce:

• Analysis on haircut adjustments suggests positive or limited effects across policy objectives. Conceptual and theoretical studies find that green-tilted collateral policies can mitigate climate change, reduce central bank exposure to climate-related risks, and reallocate investment away from carbon-intensive activities, without undermining monetary policy objectives (Vestergaard, 2024[105]; Lane, 2024[121]; Giovanardi et al., 2023[122]; McConnell, Yanovski and Lessmann, 2021[123]; Schoenmaker, 2021[112]). However, outcomes are sensitive to model calibration, and overly aggressive green credit expansion may raise leverage and default risks (Giovanardi et al., 2023[122]).

• Conceptual studies suggest that collateral-based positive and negative screening can be effective green monetary policy tools that support welfare objectives, improve transition-risk management, and reallocate financial flows, though concerns remain regarding definitions and cliff effects (Tamez, Weenink and Yoshinaga, 2024[104]; Vestergaard, 2024[105]; Monnet and van ’t Klooster, 2023[114]; NGFS, 2021[101]).

Climate-related considerations in reserve requirements may involve reducing or exempting reserve requirements for deposits or funding linked to eligible green assets, or differentiating the remuneration of reserves according to banks’ green lending or deposit activity. Reserve requirements are liability-side monetary-policy instruments through which central banks require banks to hold a share of selected liabilities as reserves at the central bank, directly influencing the money supply (NGFS, 2026[99]). Depending on the monetary framework in jurisdictions, they are used to manage system-wide liquidity, absorbing excess reserves, and support monetary-policy transmission and financial stability. Increasing reserve requirements generally absorbs liquidity, while lowering them can increase liquidity and lending capacity. The degree to which climate considerations can be integrated into reserve requirements depends on central banks’ mandates.

As of 2025, two central banks have reduced reserve requirements to encourage lending that supports climate transition and resilience. In Lebanon, the central bank allows banks to reduce mandatory reserve requirements by an amount equivalent to between 100% and 150% of the qualifying loan value when financing energy projects under the National Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Action (NEEREA) scheme, or non-energy projects relating to sectors such as pollution abatement and recycling (Lebanese Ministry of Environment, 2024[124]). In the Philippines, the central bank similarly lowered reserve requirements for sustainable bonds issued by banks and separately increased the Single Borrower’s Limit for loans, credit, and guarantees (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 2023[125]). These measures can encourage banks to expand sustainable finance, but their design needs to remain consistent with central-bank mandates and avoid disrupting monetary-policy effectiveness or weakening banks’ liquidity resilience (NGFS, 2026[99]). Differentiated reserve requirement policies remain particularly uncommon and experimental, as their consistency with monetary policy transmission depends heavily on domestic banking-system structure, reserve regimes and implementation design (NGFS, 2026). As a result, this review did not identify conceptual, theoretical, or empirical research on the potential or observed effects of climate-related reserve requirements.

Governments use a range of real-economy climate policies to incentivise, enable or require climate‑aligned actions by the private sector. These policies can influence the climate alignment of real‑economy investments by companies and households, as well as the financing that supports them, by changing incentives, expected returns, costs and risks. As discussed in Section 2.1, climate-related financial sector policies primarily serve financial policy objectives. Real-economy climate policies more directly aim to influence climate outcomes in the real economy. Depending on the policy measure and their design, these policies can also pursue other policy objectives, such as industrial development, competitiveness, energy security, affordability or distributional goals.

The adoption of climate mitigation policies, as tracked for 50 OECD, G20 and OECD accession countries, plateaued since 2021, after a decade of rapid growth. Policy tracking based on the OECD Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework (CAPMF) highlights that climate policy action across market-based, non-market based on other policies (see Box 2.1), only increased by 1% to 2% annually between 2022 and 2024. The average annual increase between 2010 and 2021 was 10%. The trend in the level of stringency of implemented policies is similar, with a recent stabilisation after a period of significant growth (Figure 2.19). While the level of climate policy action varies widely between different countries, this plateauing can be observed across both OECD member and non-member countries (OECD, 2025[126]). Such slowdown may be an indication of widening implementation gaps but can also reflect recalibrations of policy mixes towards increased effectiveness. The effectiveness of climate policy depends not only on the number and stringency of adopted measures, but also on their design, sequencing and interaction within broader policy packages (OECD, 2025[127]; OECD, 2025[128]). On the other hand, climate policy uncertainty, due to recalibrations of policies or other reasons, is associated with decreases in investments, including in pollution-intensive sectors most exposed to climate policies, and among capital‑intensive companies (Berestycki et al., 2022[129]).

Data for 38 countries indicate a high share of tax instruments in climate mitigation policy mixes across sectors, alongside a notable role of subsidies and trading schemes for energy and of performance standards for buildings. Different policy approaches target different sectors but the development of a comprehensive global database of climate policies remains work in progress. In the current scope of the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA) database, which covers validated data for 38 countries, taxes are the most widespread policy measure group overall, representing more than a third of all adopted approaches across sectors, and over two thirds for agriculture, manufacturing and waste (Figure 2.20). In the buildings sector, however, performance standards are most common. In the energy sector, which is central to the decarbonisation of other sectors, subsidies and trading schemes each represent over 20% of policies adopted, while the transport sector is characterised by the most diverse policy mix. This diversity of policy approaches is consistent with evidence that different market failures and sectoral barriers require different combinations of carbon pricing, standards, subsidies, public investment and enabling regulations (IMF, 2023[131]).

Effective real-economy climate policies, especially fiscal and financial incentives, remain fundamental levers for incentivising climate-aligned investments. Within the mix of policies influencing investment decisions, instruments resulting in fiscal and financial incentives directly impact net present value and internal rate of return calculations. Mobilising and aligning finance with climate goals requires enabling policy frameworks conducive to investment in general (OECD, 2015[132]), as well as specific policies for low-carbon investments (OECD, 2015[133]) and climate-resilient investments (OECD, 2024[134]). Policy instruments that positively or negatively affect expected cash-flows over the lifespan of an investment have a direct impact on the calculations and metrics that inform investment decisions of companies, households and financial institutions. This is notably the case of tax incentives and of financial incentives (grants, subsidies, loans), which respectively 97% and 86% of OECD member countries rely on to attract investors in specific sectors (OECD, 2024[135]).

Feed-in tariffs providing subsidies to produce energy from renewable sources have largely been phased out as many investments in solar and wind became profitable without direct support. Feed‑in tariffs provide a guaranteed fixed rate per unit of energy produced for a defined period, thereby ensuring price stability and reducing investment risk. They have been instrumental for the deployment of renewable energy power production capacities across regions and underlying rise of underlying real‑economy investments (see Chapter 3 on tracking). Their progressive phasing out reflects the maturation and improved cost‑competitiveness of these technologies and underlines the need for adaptive policy mixes to advance the climate transition across sectors (OECD, 2025[136]).

Environmental taxes represent decreasing shares of GDP and total tax revenues, but fiscal incentives remain critical to accelerate investments in climate innovation and solutions. Environmentally related taxes can be a cost-effective instrument to achieve environmental goals. However, in 2023, they accounted for only 4.3% of total tax revenue on average across OECD member countries, down from 5.4% in 2015 and 5.9% in 2000. Their share of GDP-equivalent also decreased over the period (OECD, 2025[136]). These trends tend to limit the effectiveness of fiscal policy in addressing environmental externalities, including in incentivising investments for activities contributing to the climate transition.

Fiscal support and subsidies for fossil fuels have decreased since a 2022 peak, yet they continue to provide strong incentives for investments and financing in GHG-intensive. The OECD-IEA combined estimates covering 82 countries show that the global cost of support measures for fossil fuels fell from about USD 1 trillion in 2023 to around USD 0.9 trillion in 2024, following a USD 1.6 trillion peak in 2022 that resulted from support measures to offset high energy prices (OECD, 2025[137]). However, many measures that support the production and consumption of fossil fuels remain in place, which contribute to explain stable related investments (see Chapter 3 on tracking).

Fiscal and financial incentives can also help align finance with climate resilience goals but improved tracking of the implementation of adaptation policies would provide stronger evidence. While countries are increasingly defining adaptation objectives, measuring progress remains challenging as policy objectives often lack timeframes, baselines and specificity (OECD, 2024[138]; Noels et al., 2024[139]). Exposure and vulnerability to climate change as well as corresponding policy responses are context specific, which explains the lack of global and comprehensive data on adaptation policies. However, available evidence highlights the relevance of fiscal incentives to trigger investment in adaptation, for instance in the retrofitting of existing assets to improve their resilience to climate hazards (OECD, 2025[140]).

Climate-related financial sector policies cannot substitute fiscal, industrial and infrastructure policy but can act as amplifiers. The effectiveness of climate-related financial sector policies, therefore, depends in part on the credibility, consistency and effectiveness of the broader policy environment. However, empirical evidence on the interaction between real-economy climate policies and climate-related financial sector policies remains limited. Further analysis on their interactions, including at the country level, is needed to understand the effectiveness of climate-related policy playbooks of both real-economy and financial sector policies across geographies.

[83] Abbondanza, A. et al. (2025), Integrating climate risk into the 2025 EU-wide stress test: the effects of climate risks for firms, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/macroprudential-bulletin/html/ecb.mpbu202511_04.en.html.

[113] Abiry, R. et al. (2022), Green QE and carbon pricing: looking at potential tools to fight climate change, ECB, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/research-publications/resbull/2022/html/ecb.rb220928~f2ce0ac394.en.html.

[41] Allcott, H. et al. (2026), The Effects of Regulating Greenwashing: Evidence from Europe’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, https://doi.org/10.3386/w34624.

[109] Aloui, D. et al. (2023), “The European Central Bank and green finance: How would the green quantitative easing affect the investors’ behavior during times of crisis?”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 85, p. 102464, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102464.

[81] APRA (2022), Climate Vulnerability Assessment Results, https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-11/Information%20Paper%20-%20Climate%20Vulnerability%20Assessment%20Results.pdf.

[25] Arian, A. and J. Sands (2023), “Corporate climate risk disclosure: assessing materiality and stakeholder expectations for sustainable value creation”, Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, Vol. 15/2, pp. 457-481, https://doi.org/10.1108/sampj-04-2023-0236.

[20] Australian Government (2025), Australian Sustainability Reporting Standard, https://standards.aasb.gov.au/aasb-s2-sep-2024.

[8] Austrian Government (2024), Nachhaltige Finanzprodukte Version 6.0, https://www.umweltzeichen.at/file/Richtlinie/UZ%2049/Long/UZ49%20Nachhaltige%20Finanzprodukte%202024.pdf.

[48] Austrian Treasury (2022), Publication Green Bond Framework and SPO, https://www.oebfa.at/en/presse/presseuebersicht/2022/green-bond-framework.html.

[111] Bacchiocchi, A., S. Ille and G. Giombini (2024), “The effects of a green monetary policy on firms financing cost”, Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Vol. 19/4, pp. 727-757, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00400-0.

[66] Baer, M., E. Campiglio and J. Deyris (2021), “It takes two to dance: Institutional dynamics and climate-related financial policies”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 190, p. 107210, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107210.

[125] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2023), Circular No. 1185, https://www.bsp.gov.ph/Regulations/Issuances/2023/1185.pdf.

[79] Bank Indonesia (2005), Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 7/2/PBI/2005, https://www.bi.go.id/en/archive/arsip-peraturan/Documents/c8eb2fa834b4425cb71a1f94724b15dapbi7205_eng_rev.pdf.

[92] Baranović, I. et al. (2021), The challenge of capturing climate risks in the banking regulatory framework: is there a need for a macroprudential response?, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/macroprudential-bulletin/html/ecb.mpbu202110_1~5323a5baa8.en.html.

[10] Becker, M., F. Martin and A. Walter (2022), “The power of ESG transparency: The effect of the new SFDR sustainability labels on mutual funds and individual investors”, Finance Research Letters, Vol. 47, p. 102708, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2022.102708.

[7] Belgian Government (2025), Belgian Banks Climate Transition Plans: A 2024 Stocktake, https://climat.be/doc/2024-stocktake-belgian-banks.pdf.

[58] Benmir, G. and J. Roman (2020), Policy interactions and the transition to clean technology, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/working-paper-337-Benmir-Roman-Jul21.pdf.

[67] Berenguer, M., M. Cardona and J. Evain (2020), Integrating Climate-related Risks into Banks’ Capital Requirements, https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/IntegratingClimate_EtudeVA.pdf.

[129] Berestycki, C. et al. (2022), “Measuring and assessing the effects of climate policy uncertainty”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1724, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/34483d83-en.

[52] BIS (n.d.), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reforms – Basel III, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3_bank_sup_reforms.pdf.

[85] BoC-OSFI (2022), Using Scenario Analysis to Assess Climate Transition Risk: Final Report of the BoC-OSFI Climate Scenario Analysis Pilot, https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/BoC-OSFI-Using-Scenario-Analysis-to-Assess-Climate-Transition-Risk.pdf.

[102] BoE (2025), Greening our Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/greening-the-corporate-bond-purchase-scheme (accessed on 15 April 2026).

[120] Böser, F. and C. Colesanti Senni (2023), Caros: Climate Risk-Adjusted Refinancing Operations, Elsevier BV, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4649962.

[45] Brabec, J. and J. Macháč (2025), “Impacts of the EU Taxonomy implementation: a systematic literature review”, Climate Policy, Vol. 26/4, pp. 688-700, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2025.2526683.

[26] Bratten, B., S. Cheng and T. Kleppe (2024), “Mandatory Disclosure and Corporate Green Innovation”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4840459.

[21] Brazilian Government (2023), CVM RESOLUTION Nº 193, 20 OCTOBER 2023, https://www.gov.br/cvm/en/foreign-investors/regulation-files/ResolutionCVM193.pdf.

[76] Busies, I. et al. (2024), “Designing a Macroprudential Capital Buffer for Climate-Related Risks”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4844507.

[90] Calipel, C. and L. Fidel (2023), Climate stress tests: what co-benefits can we expect for transition financing, I4CE, https://www.i4ce.org/en/publication/climate-stress-tests-what-co-benefits-can-we-expect-for-transition-financing/.

[14] Canada CSA (2025), CSA updates market on approach to climate-related and diversity-related disclosure projects, https://www.securities-administrators.ca/news/csa-updates-market-on-approach-to-climate-related-and-diversity-related-disclosure-projects/.

[61] Carattini, S., G. Heutel and G. Melkadze (2023), “Climate policy, financial frictions, and transition risk”, Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 51, pp. 778-794, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2023.08.003.

[63] Castren, O. and R. Russo (2024), Green-supporting factors, brown-penalising factors and the prudential framework, https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-08/f8a17406-92dd-4ec4-9675-c251a8f8b9a4/Staff%20paper_Green-supporting%20factors%20brown-penalising%20factors%20and%20the%20prudential%20framework.pdf.

[6] Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2023), Sustainable Finance Roadmap, https://uploads.cbar.az/assets/Sustainable%20Finance%20Roadmap_230223.pdf.

[115] Chan, Y., M. Punzi and H. Zhao (2024), “Green transition and financial stability: The role of green monetary and macroprudential policies and vouchers”, Energy Economics, Vol. 132, p. 107449, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107449.

[51] Chile’s Ministry of Finance (2020), Sustainable Bonds, https://www.hacienda.cl/english/work-areas/international-finance/public-debt-office/esg-bonds/sustainable-bonds (accessed on 17 April 2026).

[30] Christensen, H., L. Hail and C. Leuz (2021), “Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review”, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 26/3, pp. 1176-1248, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5.

[71] Coelho, R. and F. Restoy (2022), The regulatory response to climate risks: some challenges, Bank for International Settlements, https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs16.pdf.

[34] Costola, M. and K. Vozian (2025), “Pricing climate transition risk: Evidence from European corporate CDS”, Energy Economics, Vol. 143, p. 108248, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108248.

[72] D’Orazio, P. (2021), “Towards a post-pandemic policy framework to manage climate-related financial risks and resilience”, Climate Policy, Vol. 21/10, pp. 1368-1382, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.1975623.

[4] D’Orazio, P. and M. Dirks (2021), “Exploring the effects of climate-related financial policies on carbon emissions in G20 countries: a panel quantile regression approach”, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, Vol. 29/5, pp. 7678-7702, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-15655-y.

[62] D’Orazio, P. and L. Popoyan (2019), “Fostering green investments and tackling climate-related financial risks: Which role for macroprudential policies?”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 160, pp. 25-37, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.01.029.

[57] Dafermos, Y. and M. Nikolaidi (2021), “How can green differentiated capital requirements affect climate risks? A dynamic macrofinancial analysis”, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 54, p. 100871, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100871.

[56] Dankert, J. et al. (2018), A Green Supporting Factor — The Right Policy?, https://www.suerf.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/f_99be9f83741d1275639df2c1e4d0072f_3473_suerf.pdf.

[89] DeMenno, M. (2022), “Environmental sustainability and financial stability: can macroprudential stress testing measure and mitigate climate-related systemic financial risk?”, Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 24/4, pp. 445-473, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-022-00207-2.

[98] Dikau, S. and U. Volz (2021), “Central bank mandates, sustainability objectives and the promotion of green finance”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 184, p. 107022, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107022.

[108] Diluiso, F. et al. (2021), “Climate actions and macro-financial stability: The role of central banks”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 110, p. 102548, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102548.

[9] D’Orazio, P. (2025), “Financial regulation for climate resilience: a comparative analysis across African economies”, Climate Policy, pp. 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2025.2598683.

[3] D’Orazio, P. (2023), “Dataset for the climate-related financial policy index (CRFPI)”, Data in Brief, Vol. 48, p. 109044, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2023.109044.

[84] EBA, EIOPA, ESMA & ECB (2024), Fit-for-55 climate scenario analysis, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.report_fit-for-55_stress_test_exercise~7fec18f3a8.en.pdf.

[82] ECB (2022), 2022 climate risk stress test, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.climate_stress_test_report.20220708~2e3cc0999f.en.pdf.

[22] ECB (2021), Climate-related risk and financial stability, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.climateriskfinancialstability202107~87822fae81.en.pdf.

[77] ECB/ESRB (2023), Towards macroprudential frameworks for managing climate risk, https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb.report202312~d7881028b8.en.pdf.

[42] Edwards, I. et al. (2020), “Climate-related financial disclosures in the public sector”, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 10/7, pp. 588-591, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0785-1.

[12] EU Parliament (2025), Simplified sustainability reporting and due diligence rules for businesses, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20251211IPR32164/simplified-sustainability-reporting-and-due-diligence-rules-for-businesses.

[110] Ferrari, A. and V. Landi (2023), Toward a green economy: the role of central bank’s asset purchases, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2779~a4eca2101a.en.pdf.

[49] Fiji’s Ministry of Economy (2019), The Fiji Sovereign Green Bond: 2019 update, https://www.rbf.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Fiji-Sovereign-Green-Bond-Impact-Report-2019.pdf.

[78] FINMA (2023), FINMA Guidance 01/2023: Developments with regard to the management of climate risks, https://www.finma.ch/en/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/4dokumentation/finma-aufsichtsmitteilungen/20230124-finma-aufsichtsmitteilung-01-2023.pdf?sc_lang=en&hash=AE5AC34C3A564F4CF9FBD08557A3D124.

[16] FSB (2025), Global Monitoring Report on Nonbank Financial Intermediation 2025, https://www.fsb.org/2025/12/global-monitoring-report-on-nonbank-financial-intermediation-2025/.

[91] Fuchs, L. et al. (2023), “Climate Stress Tests, Bank Lending, and the Transition to the Carbon-Neutral Economy”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4427729.

[73] García-Villegas, S. and E. Martorell (2024), Climate transition risk and the role of bank capital requirements, Banco de España, Madrid, https://doi.org/10.53479/36292.

[37] Gehricke, S. et al. (2025), To Disclose, or Not to Disclose: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Mandatory Climate-Related Disclosure, Elsevier BV, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5246456.

[122] Giovanardi, F. et al. (2023), The effectiveness of green collateral policy as an instrument of climate policy, https://www.bundesbank.de/en/publications/research/research-brief/2023-57-green-collateral-policy-805516.

[93] Government of Norway (2014), Guidelines for observation and exclusion from the Government Pension Fund Global, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/7c9a364d2d1c474f8220965065695a4a/guidelines_observation_exclusion2016.pdf.

[75] Grunewald, S. (2023), “Macroprudential policies and climate risks”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4327142.

[28] Gupta, P. (2025), “Mandatory TCFD Disclosure and Corporate Financial Performance: Evidence From UK Non‐Financial Firms”, Business Strategy and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.70374.

[97] Hiebert, P. (2024), A macroprudential approach to managing climate risk, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/macroprudential-approach-managing-climate-risk.

[46] Hummel, K. and K. Bauernhofer (2022), “Early Evidence on Stakeholders’ Perceptions of the EU Green Taxonomy Regulation”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4175157.

[38] Hu, Z. and S. Borjigin (2025), “Climate information disclosure quality and systemic risk in the U.S. banking industry”, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 79, p. 101420, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101420.

[35] Imerman, M., X. Ye and R. Zhao (2025), “Voluntary disclosures and climate change uncertainty: Evidence from CDS premiums”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 94, p. 102831, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102831.

[131] IMF (2023), Fiscal Monitor: Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fm/issues/2023/10/10/fiscal-monitor-october-2023.

[60] Janke, O. and G. Weiss (2024), “Green Capital Requirements, ESG Rating Uncertainty, and Greenwashing”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4466282.

[117] Jourdan, S. et al. (2024), A green interest rate for the Eurozone: evaluating the design choices, https://sustainablefinancelab.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/334/2024/09/A-green-interest-rate-for-Europe.pdf.

[119] Kedward, K., D. Gabor and J. Ryan-Collins (2022), Aligning finance with the green transition: From a risk-based to an allocative green credit policy regime, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/sites/bartlett/files/kedward_gabor_ryan-collins_aligning_finance_with_the_green_transition_from_a_risk-based_to_allocative_green_credit_policy_regime.pdf.

[19] Korea Sustainability Standards Board (2024), KSSB published the Exposure Draft of the Sustainability Disclosure Standards, https://eng.kasb.or.kr/en/front/board/engAnnouncementsView.do?seq=206&searchfield=ALL&searchword=&s_date_start=&s_date_end= (accessed on 9 March 2026).

[29] Kreuger, P. et al. (2024), “The Effects of Mandatory ESG Disclosure Around the World”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 62/5, pp. 1795-1847, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12548.

[54] Krogstrup, S. and W. Oman (2019), Macroeconomic and Financial Policies for Climate Change Mitigation: A Review of the Literature, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/09/04/Macroeconomic-and-Financial-Policies-for-Climate-Change-Mitigation-A-Review-of-the-Literature-48612.

[59] Lamperti, F. et al. (2021), “Three green financial policies to address climate risks”, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 54, p. 100875, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100875.

[121] Lane, T. (2024), Monetary policy and climate change: Distinguishinh between a protective and a proactive agenda, https://www.cepweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Lane-2024.-Monetary-Policy-and-Climate-Change.pdf.

[68] Le Quang, G. and L. Scialom (2022), “Better safe than sorry: Macroprudential policy, Covid 19 and climate change”, International Economics, Vol. 172, pp. 403-413, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inteco.2021.07.002.

[124] Lebanese Ministry of Environment (2024), Climate finance loan schemes: Existing and planned loan schemes in Lebanon, https://climatechange.moe.gov.lb/viewfile.aspx?id=216.

[47] Lucarelli, C. et al. (2023), “THE IMPACT OF EU TAXONOMY ON CORPORATE INVESTMENTS”, Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Vol. 11/01, https://doi.org/10.1142/s2282717x23500044.

[53] Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2022), Monetary policy for sustainability, https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/zold-jegybanki-eszkoztar-strategia-tanulmanykotet-eng-0209.pdf.

[31] Maji, S. and N. Kalita (2022), “Climate change financial disclosure and firm performance: empirical evidence from Indian energy sector based on TCFD recommendations”, Society and Business Review, Vol. 17/4, pp. 594-612, https://doi.org/10.1108/sbr-10-2021-0208.

[27] Mbanyele, W. et al. (2022), “Corporate social responsibility and green innovation: Evidence from mandatory CSR disclosure laws”, Economics Letters, Vol. 212, p. 110322, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110322.

[123] McConnell, A., B. Yanovski and K. Lessmann (2021), “Central bank collateral as a green monetary policy instrument”, Climate Policy, Vol. 22/3, pp. 339-355, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.2012112.

[32] Megeid, N. (2024), “The impact of climate risk disclosure on financial performance, financial reporting and risk management: evidence from Egypt”, Future Business Journal, Vol. 10/1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s43093-024-00309-5.

[40] Mésonnier, J. and B. Nguyen (2021), Showing off cleaner hands: mandatory climate-related disclosure by financial institutions and the financing of fossil energy, Working papers 800, Banque de France, https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/wp800.pdf.

[95] Miller, H. and S. Dikau (2022), Preventing a ‘climate Minsky moment’: environmental financial risks and prudential exposure limits, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/preventing-a-climate-minsky-moment/.

[36] Mirza, N. et al. (2024), “Effects of climate change and technological capex on credit risk cycles in the European Union”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 204, p. 123448, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2024.123448.

[114] Monnet, E. and J. van ’t Klooster (2023), Using green credit policy to bring down inflation: what central bankers can learn from history, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/INSPIRE-Sustainable-Central-Banking-Toolbox_13.pdf.

[74] Monnin, P. (2021), Systemic Risk Buffers – The Missing Piece in the Prudential Response to Climate Risks, https://www.cepweb.org/systemic-risk-buffers-the-missing-piece-in-the-prudential-response-to-climate-risks/.

[130] Nachtigall, D. et al. (2022), “The climate actions and policies measurement framework: A structured and harmonised climate policy database to monitor countries’ mitigation action”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 203, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2caa60ce-en.

[106] Nakov, A. and C. Thomas (2023), “Climate-conscious monetary policy”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4639789.

[18] New Zealand Government (2020), New Zealand first in the world to require climate risk reporting, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-first-world-require-climate-risk-reporting (accessed on 9 March 2026).

[99] NGFS (2026), Greening Monetary Policy Operations: Exploring Additional Options, https://www.ngfs.net/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/greening-monetary-policy-operations-exploring-additional-options.

[80] NGFS (2025), Leveraging physical climate risk data, https://www.ngfs.net/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/leveraging-physical-climate-risk-data.

[100] NGFS (2024), Adapting central bank operations to a hotter world: current progress and insights from practical examples, https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_adapting_central_bank_operations_to_a_hotter_world_final.pdf.

[23] NGFS (2024), NGFS: Transition Plan Package, https://www.ngfs.net/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/ngfs-transition-plan-package.

[101] NGFS (2021), Adapting central bank operations to a hotter world: Reviewing some options, https://www.ngfs.net/en/adapting-central-bank-operations-hotter-world-reviewing-some-options.

[139] Noels, J. et al. (2024), “Towards assessing the alignment of finance with climate resilience goals: Exploring options, methodologies, data and metrics”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 251, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9446d65e-en.

[64] Noera, M. (2024), Climate risk and banks’capital requirements: a lever for the transition?, https://eccoclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Climate-risks-and-banks-capital-requirements_techinical-report.pdf.

[94] Norges Bank (2025), Observation and exclusion of companies, https://www.nbim.no/en/responsible-investment/exclusion-of-companies/.

[136] OECD (2025), Environment at a Glance Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac4b8b89-en.

[137] OECD (2025), OECD Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels 2025: Policy Trends, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6fff0cb7-en.

[127] OECD (2025), “Packaging and sequencing policies for more effective climate action”, OECD Net Zero+ Policy Papers, No. 10, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fced4e28-en.

[140] OECD (2025), Scaling finance and investment for climate adaptation: Input paper for the G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/eeec8b52-en.

[50] OECD (2025), Sustainable Bonds: Trends and Policy Recommendations, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/26726c68-en.

[126] OECD (2025), The Climate Action Monitor 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1819c631-en.

[128] OECD (2025), The effects of climate policies on emissions: Evidence from a comprehensive and systematic review of the ex-post empirical literature, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/05/the-effects-of-climate-policies-on-emissions_e8c0a91b/ec1f7f0d-en.pdf.

[134] OECD (2024), Climate Adaptation Investment Framework, Green Finance and Investment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8686fc27-en.

[138] OECD (2024), Measuring Progress in Adapting to a Changing Climate: Insights from OECD countries, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8cfe45af-en.

[1] OECD (2024), OECD Review on Aligning Finance with Climate Goals: Assessing Progress to Net Zero and Preventing Greenwashing, Green Finance and Investment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b9b7ce49-en.

[2] OECD (2024), “The IFCMA’s Climate Policy Database: Policy instruments typology and data structure”, Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches Papers, No. 5, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/68529f35-en.

[135] OECD (2024), The Role of Incentives in Investment Promotion: Trends and Practices in OECD Member Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e3338264-en.

[133] OECD (2015), Aligning Policies for a Low-carbon Economy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264233294-en.

[132] OECD (2015), Policy Framework for Investment, 2015 Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264208667-en.

[55] Oehmke, M. and M. Opp (2022), Green Capital Requirements, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4040098.

[86] OSFI (2025), Strengthening Climate Risk Financial Resilience: Insights from the Standardized Climate Scenario Exercise, https://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/en/about-osfi/reports-publications/strengthening-climate-risk-financial-resilience-insights-standardized-climate-scenario-exercise.

[107] Papoutsi, M., M. Piazzesi and M. Schneider (2022), How unconventional is green monetary policy?, https://web.stanford.edu/~piazzesi/How_unconventional_is_green_monetary_policy.pdf.

[69] Punzi, M. (2024), “The role of macroprudential policies under carbon pricing”, International Review of Economics & Finance, Vol. 93, pp. 858-875, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2024.03.044.

[88] SARB (2025), 2024 Climate Risk Stress Test (CRST): Technical Report, https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/reviews/finstab-review/2025/financial-stability-review/2024%20CRST%20Technical%20Report_.pdf.

[11] Scherer, B. and M. Hasaj (2023), “Greenlabelling: How valuable is the SFDR Art 9 label?”, Journal of Asset Management, Vol. 24/7, pp. 541-546, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41260-023-00319-y.

[112] Schoenmaker, D. (2021), “Greening monetary policy”, Climate Policy, Vol. 21/4, pp. 581-592, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1868392.

[96] Schoenmaker, D. and R. Van Tilburg (2016), “What Role for Financial Supervisors in Addressing Environmental Risks?”, Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 58/3, pp. 317-334, https://doi.org/10.1057/ces.2016.11.

[118] Senni, C., M. Pagliari and J. van ‘t Klooster (2024), Central banks’ targeted refinancing operations and the climate transition, SUERF Policy Brief, No 793, https://www.suerf.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SUERF-Policy-Brief-793_Colesanti-Senni-et-al.pdf.

[39] Shifa, S. and R. Khan (2025), “Disclosing the Climate Within: How Risk Transparency Shapes Financial Stability in Banks”, The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies, Vol. 3/3, pp. 634-642, https://doi.org/10.59075/we1fn084.

[13] Singapore ACRA (2025), Extended Timelines for Most Climate Reporting Requirements to Support Companies, https://www.acra.gov.sg/news-events/news-details/id/887.

[17] SSE (2021), Egyptian FRA: Mandatory ESG and Climate Disclosure Regulation, https://sseinitiative.org/all-news/egyptian-fra-issued-mandatory-esg-and-climate-disclosure (accessed on 9 March 2026).

[141] Stechemesser, A. et al. (2024), “Climate policies that achieved major emission reductions: Global evidence from two decades”, Science, Vol. 385/6711, pp. 884-892, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adl6547.

[103] Sveriges Riksbank (2021), Riksbank takes sustainability into account when purchasing corporate bonds, https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-published/notices-and-press-releases/notices/2021/riksbank-takes-sustainability-into-account-when-purchasing-corporate-bonds/ (accessed on 15 April 2026).

[104] Tamez, M., H. Weenink and A. Yoshinaga (2024), “Central Banks and Climate Change: Key Legal Issues”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 2024/192, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400288395.001.

[43] Tandon, A. (2021), “Transition finance: Investigating the state of play: A stocktake of emerging approaches and financial instruments”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 179, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/68becf35-en.

[116] Tan, Y., D. Tsomocos and X. Wang (2025), Climate change, monetary policy and price stability in South Africa, South African Reserve Bank Working Paper Series WP/25/15, https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/working-papers/2025/climate-change-monetary-policy-and-price-stability-in-south-africa.pdf.

[70] Thakor, A. and F. Song (2023), “Banks, Markets, and the Color of Finance”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4581551.

[65] Thomä, J. and K. Gibhardt (2019), “Quantifying the potential impact of a green supporting factor or brown penalty on European banks and lending”, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 27/3, pp. 380-394, https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-03-2018-0038.

[15] UK Government (2025), The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-uks-modern-industrial-strategy-2025.

[5] UK Government (2019), Transforming finance for a greener future: 2019 green finance strategy, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/green-finance-strategy/transforming-finance-for-a-greener-future-2019-green-finance-strategy.

[44] UNEP FI (2024), La Taxonomía de Finanzas Sostenibles de Panamá, https://www.unepfi.org/publications/la-taxonomia-de-finanzas-sostenibles-de-panama/.

[105] Vestergaard, J. (2024), “Green central banking: reorienting finance through a recalibration of monetary policy”, Climate Policy, Vol. 24/7, pp. 924-933, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2024.2353118.

[33] Vestrelli, R., A. Fronzetti Colladon and A. Pisello (2024), “When attention to climate change matters: The impact of climate risk disclosure on firm market value”, Energy Policy, Vol. 185, p. 113938, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113938.

[24] Wang, Z. et al. (2024), “Exploring the carbon emission reduction effects of corporate climate risk disclosure: Empirical evidence based on Chinese A-share listed enterprises”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 92, p. 103072, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103072.

[87] World Bank (2021), Not-so-magical realism: A climate stress test of the Colombian banking system, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/957831635911537578/pdf/Not-So-Magical-Realism-A-Climate-Stress-Test-of-the-Colombian-Banking-System.pdf.