Prioritisation can take place at multiple levels within a competition authority. Case prioritisation, which is the focus of this note, concerns decisions on which projects to pursue, as well as which not to. In addition, at the organisational level, competition authorities may signal their high-level priorities. This section explores the definitions of these two levels of priority setting, as well as their differences and interactions.
Case prioritisation and prosecutorial discretion by competition authorities
2. What is case prioritisation and how does it relate to broader priority setting?
Copy link to 2. What is case prioritisation and how does it relate to broader priority setting?2.1. Case prioritisation captures decisions on individual cases
Copy link to 2.1. Case prioritisation captures decisions on individual casesCase prioritisation is important as it allows competition authorities to maximise their impact with limited resources and also effectively guide their work (ICN, 2021[7]). As competition authorities do not have a defined scope of activity like sector regulators, this prioritisation becomes even more important (Jennings, 2015[11]).
Case prioritisation decisions take place at an individual case or action level. This can also include when, and when not, to exercise prosecutorial discretion not to pursue a matter. These decisions revolve around what cases are worth pursuing, continuing, as well as the manner in which they are conducted. Case prioritisation is not an end in itself, but is the process by which an authority ensures it is taking the right cases, in the right way, at the right time.
There are both positive and negative dimensions to case prioritisation. On the positive side, this can involve deciding to launch a case, an ex-officio investigation, for example. On the negative, it could relate to deciding against pursuing one, such as when a complaint is received. As noted above, decisions are also needed beyond enforcement, such as for advocacy, market studies and perhaps to a lesser extent, mergers.
Case prioritisation is not just a one-off decision of whether to pursue a case or not. As cases evolve, a series of explicit or implicit decisions are made, such as it continuing to be worth pursuing. Decisions can also cover how to end cases, for example whether to seek particular remedies or to agree to a proposed settlement. Likewise, not taking up a potential project also reflects a decision. Seen this way, case prioritisation is a dynamic and constant process. As discussed in more detail further below however, for practical reasons decision making often occurs at discrete moments in a case lifecycle rather than constantly.
While case prioritisation decisions typically consider a holistic range of factors, as explored in more detail in Section 4, they are likely to also be subject to several constraints. For example, the amount of resources at team level, such as cartels, may already be set. There may also be political or other factors driving individual case decisions.
2.2. High-level priorities set a context for an authority’s actions
Copy link to 2.2. High-level priorities set a context for an authority’s actionsIn contrast to case prioritisation, organisational high-level priority setting considers what the organisation will focus its resources on going forward. This is usually part of the overall strategy of the authority. High-level priorities are made periodically rather than in relation to specific cases. Some authorities set them annually, whilst others define them for longer periods. These priorities can determine how resources are allocated across an authority, for example the size and structure of tool focussed teams, like mergers or cartels. It can also affect where intelligence resources are directed.
Setting high-level priorities is common amongst competition authorities, and some authorities are under an obligation to do so.1 For example, an OECD survey conducted in 2012 found that only three of the 46 authorities surveyed did not set priorities of some description (OECD, 2013[5]). While such high-level priorities can take various forms, it is common for them to focus on two areas:
Sectors or industries where there is a particular desire to improve competition, for example markets relating to food or healthcare.
Competition tools or types of conduct, for example cartels or exclusionary abuse.
Launching high-level priorities often communicates to government and the public the objectives of the authority, boosting transparency and accountability. Some authorities consult on their high-level priorities in order to obtain input from external stakeholders. 2 Such an exercise can broaden acceptance and legitimacy of the priorities that are adopted. Box 1 provides examples of the high-level priorities published by competition authorities.
High-level priorities can also reflect factors external to a competition authority. For example, they can form part of the dialogue with government on how the agency will seek to align with their priorities. 3 The nature of these discussions will depend on the institutional set-up of the authority. It may also link to a broader question of how governments prioritise their actions across policy areas, which is not the focus of this paper.
Box 1. Examples of high-level organisational priorities
Copy link to Box 1. Examples of high-level organisational prioritiesEnforcement and compliance priority areas in New Zealand
Since 2017/18, the New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC) has publicly released its annual enforcement and compliance priorities, alongside a set of enduring priorities. The annual priorities change year to year, while the enduring priorities have evolved over time and signal areas the NZCC will always regard as priorities due to their significant potential impact on consumers, businesses or markets in New Zealand.
For 2025/2026 the NZCC’s enduring priorities are cartels, anti‑competitive conduct, activities that support market and economic regulation functions, product safety and the protection of vulnerable consumers. NZCC’s specific priorities for 2025/2026 are cartels in the procurement of public services and infrastructure contracts, online sales conduct, breaches in the grocery and telecommunications sectors, motor vehicle sales and finance, and unconscionable conduct.
Korea’s Major Work Plan
The Korean Fair-Trade Commission (KFTC) publishes an annual “Major Work Plan” outlining its core priorities for the coming year. For 2026, the KFTC will focus on four priorities: addressing power imbalances between large firms and small businesses; promoting fair competition in areas closely related to people’s livelihoods; fostering an innovative digital market ecosystem; and strengthening policy effectiveness for large business groups.
Within each priority area, key and supporting measures are identified to support achieving the strategic priorities. Examples of such measures include “creating fair subcontracting conditions that ensure timely payment” or “Strengthening market surveillance against price fixing”.
Four-year organisational goals in Brazil
Since 2013 Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) has issued strategic plans every four years. For 2025–2028, ten organisational goals were provided, including (but not limited to) promoting a culture of competition, ensuring timely and rigorous control of market structures, and improving the efficiency of investigations and decisions on anti‑competitive conduct.
Each goal has several descriptors and key results that CADE seeks to achieve. Examples of descriptors include: promoting a culture of competition among public officials or delivering timely, consistent and efficient merger reviews. Key results include reducing the average review period of summary mergers to less than 20 days.
Mexico’s Strategic Plans
In 2022, Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), which was at that time the competition authority for Mexico, released its strategic plan for the years 2022-2025. The plan identified four institutional objectives for the period: prevent and correct market structures that hinder, damage or impede competition and free market access; fight and deter anticompetitive practices that affect markets; promote the application of competition principles between public and private actors through actively spreading the benefits of economic competition; and consolidate a robust institutional model that effectively responds to the institutional needs and challenges. Furthermore, as part of the strategic plan, COFECE prioritised several sectors, including food and beverages, transport and logistics, construction and real estate, energy, health, public procurement and digital markets.
Five yearly strategic plans in Türkiye
In 2024, Türkiye’s Competition Authority, the Rekabet Kurumu (RK), released a strategic plan for (2024-2028). The plan identifies six goals and numerous sub-goals. The goals include (but are not limited to) ensuring the effective enforcement of competition law, and encouraging the production and dissemination of knowledge concerning competition law. Sub-goals include the updating of legislation, developing relations with academia and conducting academic studies. To achieve these goals and subgoals, the RK’s strategic plan establishes “target cards” which provide performance indicators, and identifies risks, strategies, and cost estimates, findings and needs to achieve these objectives. For example, to achieve the production and dissemination of competition knowledge objective, RK set a number of desired publications per staff for each year.
Sources: NZCC (2025[12]), Enforcement and compliance priority areas; KFTC (2025[13]), Major Work Plan for 2026;
CADE (2025[14]), CADE Strategic Plan 2025-2028; CADE (2025[15]), Plano Estratégico CADE 2025-2028; COFECE (2022[16]), Strategic Plan 2022-2025; Rekabet Kurumu (2024[17]), Strategic Plan 2024-2028.
2.3. High-level priorities and case prioritisation are different but connected
Copy link to 2.3. High-level priorities and case prioritisation are different but connectedThe two types of priority setting are undertaken for different purposes. Case prioritisation helps ensure the right mix of cases for an authority, while high-level priorities provide direction and transparency on their future intentions as part of implementing the overall goals of the organisation. At the same time, they also share similarities. Both reflect a need for competition authorities to operate efficiently and effectively given their objectives and constraints. Both must interact with authorities’ institutional context.
They are also inter-dependent. Many of the considerations that determine priorities at one level of the organisation will also influence them at others. High-level priorities provide a framework within which case prioritisation decisions are made, both theoretically and operationally. Put simply, to achieve strategic objectives, the cases that authorities take should be consistent with the overarching goals of the organisation (Kovacic, 2018[18]). Ultimately, high-level strategies must be implemented through the choice of activities if they are to have any meaning. High-level priorities can also be influenced by individual case prioritisation decisions, for example if a series of decisions to initiate cases in a sector highlights a need to make it a broader priority.
To support this, the OECD survey conducted alongside this paper reveals that competition authorities believe that their high-level priorities have a significant influence on their case prioritisation decisions. Of the 30 respondents to the survey, 25 indicated that it was at least somewhat likely that a case prioritisation decision would be influenced by the authority’s high-level priorities, with seven stating that this was very likely to be the case. Only one respondent indicated that it was somewhat unlikely that a case prioritisation decision would be influenced by the high-level priorities, and no respondents replied that it would be very unlikely.
The structure of an authority will to some extent reflect its high-level priorities, which will predetermine some parameters of case decisions. For example, if high-level priorities suggest that an organisational focus on a particular area of enforcement, there may be constraints on the ability to pursue cases falling in other areas if staff are committed elsewhere. However, these constraints may not be set in stone, and competition authorities may wish to have some flexibility to alter budgets between teams based on the cases they want to prioritise (ICN, 2021[7]).
In summary, the different prioritises operate at different levels, with high-level priorities being decided first at a macro level, but providing a framework to guide micro level decision making. As explored in Section 4 below, case prioritisation is then likely to be guided and impacted by organisational priorities, alongside other factors. Case prioritisation can also be a method for operationalising the priorities that the organisation sets itself.
Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. For example, the Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014, Section 30, sets out that the Irish Competition Authority must prepare a strategy statement for the three years ahead and submit it to the relevant Minister. See (ISB, 2014[89]).
← 2. See, for example the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority consults on its annual plan (CMA, 2026[90]). See also Spain’s Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia which consulted on its 2021-2026 strategic plan (CNMC, 2021[92]).
← 3. For example, in the UK each Parliament issues a “Strategic Steer” which sets out how the government expects the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to support and contribute to the national priorities. It applies to all aspects of the CMA’s activity over which it has discretion. Similarly, the US government can issue “Executive orders” which encourage the Federal Trade Commission to prioritise certain areas.