Taxing Wages 2025

Personal income tax (PIT) is a significant part of the tax wedge analysed in Chapter 1 of this Report and a key source of revenues, accounting for 23.6% of total tax revenues on average across the OECD in 2022 (OECD, 2024[1]). At the same time, PIT systems are a channel for income redistribution and contain mechanisms to support households, mitigate possible disincentives to work and encourage specific behaviours, such as saving. While most studies of PIT’s impact on progressivity and post-tax incomes have focused on marginal tax rates, this Special Feature uses the Taxing Wages models to show how tax allowances and credits interact with the tax schedule in OECD countries to affect the average tax rates of different household types and influence the progressivity of labour taxation.

The Special Feature demonstrates that tax allowances and credits (collectively known as tax reliefs) are key elements in determining the tax rates of different household types and amount to a significant share of households’ final post-tax net income in OECD countries. It also shows that they are a channel by which OECD countries reduce the tax liability of specific household types, in particular families with children, and that tax credits tend to contribute more to the progressivity of PIT systems than tax allowances.

It should be noted that not all tax reliefs implemented by OECD countries meet the criteria for inclusion in the Taxing Wages models; only those that are universally available to taxpayers with certain characteristics and are not conditional on their expenditures are included in the calculations shown in this chapter. Further detail on the tax reliefs that exist in each country and whether they are included in the Taxing Wages models is provided in the country chapters found in Part II of this Report.

The results for France for 2024 should be interpreted with caution because the indexation of the tax schedule and income tax parameters to inflation (of 1.8%) could not be incorporated into the Taxing Wages models for this Report. This omission, which was due to the late adoption of the 2025 budget bill, results in higher estimated tax rates in 2024 than those that were effectively in force.

The Special Feature is structured as follows. Section 1 explains how tax reliefs contribute to the variation in the PIT rates of different household types shown in this Report. Section 2 examines the impact of tax credits on selected households’ tax liability while Section 3 analyses the impact of tax allowances on their taxable income. Section 4 investigates the combined impact of credits and allowances on households’ post-tax net income, while Section 5 analyses how these policies jointly affect the structural progressivity of PIT systems in OECD countries. Section 6 concludes.

The average PIT rate is a standard Taxing Wages indicator. It shows the share of gross earnings a household pays in PIT, taking into account any tax reliefs to which they are eligible (provided that the reliefs meet the criteria for inclusion within the Taxing Wages models). To set the scene for the analysis in this chapter, this section explains how variation in PIT rates across household types partly reflects the design of tax reliefs, as well as defining the chapter’s key concepts, scope and methodology.

The chapter focuses on three household types: a single worker earning the average wage, a single parent with two children earning 67% of the average wage (hereafter, ‘low-earning’) and a one-earner married couple with two children where the principal earns the average wage. The single worker is the household type least impacted by tax reliefs across OECD countries, as workers without children mostly benefit from basic or earnings-related reliefs while the two other households are eligible for a broader range of policies, including measures to reduce rates for families with children.

Household types with higher earnings (whether single, married or containing children) also benefit from tax reliefs across OECD countries. However, the impact of tax reliefs on the indicators shown in this chapter for these higher-earning households follows similar dynamics to those shown for the three households specified above (albeit with differences in the exact impact reflecting the higher reference earnings). For reasons of space, the results for higher-earning household types are only included in the final section of this chapter, which focuses on the impact of tax reliefs on the progressivity of PIT systems at earnings between 67% and 300% of the average wage.

PIT rates differ significantly between these household types examined in this chapter (Figure 2.1). On average across the OECD, the PIT rate was highest for a single worker earning the average wage, at 15.4% of gross earnings in 2024. This was 4.7 percentage points (p.p.) higher than for the one-earner married couple with two children (10.7%), while the PIT rate for the low-earning single parent was 6.3%.

These different rates reflect variation in how taxable income and tax liabilities are calculated for different household types in Taxing Wages. While part of this variation results from differences in total earnings, it is also determined by tax reliefs that might reduce households’ taxable income or their gross tax liability. Such policies tend to vary between household types according to their income level, marital status and the presence (or otherwise) of children. While many of these measures are well established, some may be timebound, such as those that OECD countries introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic or in response to subsequent increases in living costs.1

In Taxing Wages and for the purposes of this analysis, tax reliefs are limited to those that are automatically available to all taxpayers who satisfy the eligibility conditions. The Taxing Wages models do not include non-standard tax reliefs related to household expenditures such as spending on education or healthcare. While this simplification excludes many reliefs in place across OECD countries,2 it allows for comparable results without making assumptions about households’ consumption patterns.

This chapter focuses on two types of tax relief: allowances and credits. Tax allowances are defined as the amounts deducted from gross earnings to obtain the taxable income, while tax credits are deductions applied to a household’s gross tax liability. Depending on the rules in place, these measures may be universal or means-tested, and they may consist of flat amounts linked to household composition or they may taper above a certain level of earnings.

Zero-rate tax brackets or reduced rates for specific household types are included in the Taxing Wages models but do not fall within the definition of tax reliefs as they are considered to be part of a tax schedule’s structure. Box 2.1 explains the focus of this analysis and provides additional detail on the methodology for obtaining the results discussed in the chapter.

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to acknowledge that the average tax rates on labour shown in the Taxing Wages models are also affected by the social security contributions (SSCs) payable by different household types, while households’ overall liability may be reduced by any cash benefits to which they are eligible. Although SSCs and cash benefits are beyond the scope of this Special Feature, their existence and design are usually intrinsically linked with the design of the PIT system, and they will have an impact on the indicators for post-tax net income and progressivity shown later in the chapter.

Moreover, the chapter does not analyse the effectiveness of tax reliefs in achieving the specific objectives that may influence their design, such as promoting employment or alleviating poverty among low-income earners or households with children. Overall, the chapter should not be construed as providing guidance as to an optimal labour taxation system3 but rather as an examination of specific components within such a system that have traditionally received less attention but may nonetheless have a significant impact on the tax rates of different household types.

For example, the Special Feature on taxation of second earners in Taxing Wages 2024 demonstrated that household-level tax reliefs affect the incentives of second earners to take up employment, even in countries that primarily tax income on an individual basis (OECD, 2024[5]). Moreover, the existence (and importance) of the various tax reliefs examined in this chapter underscores the importance of indexing all components of a PIT system to inflation in order to avoid fiscal drag (OECD, 2023[6]).

To demonstrate the decomposition of effective PIT rates for different households, Figure 2.2 shows how the gross tax liability (including both central and sub-central taxes) is partially offset by tax credits in many OECD countries. The overall PIT rate is the sum of the central and sub-central tax liabilities4 (the dark and light blue bars above the x axis) reduced by the respective tax credits (the dark and light grey bars below the x axis). The black diamond shows the resultant average PIT rate.

As shown in Panel A, the average PIT rate across OECD countries for a single worker earning the average wage was 15.4% of gross earnings in 2024. The rate was highest in Denmark (35.7%) and lowest in Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica (0.0%). In most OECD countries, the central government tax liability was the largest component of this indicator, with the exceptions of Sweden and Switzerland, where local taxes were more significant. In 19 countries, tax credits reduced this household type’s gross tax liabilities, leading to a lower tax rate. This reduction was most notable in Sweden.

Panels B and C show that the average PIT rate was much lower for households with children in 2024. The OECD average PIT rate for a low-earning single parent with two children was 5.5% of gross earnings, while it was 10.4% for a one-earner married couple with two children. The impact of tax reliefs, which are visible both directly and indirectly in the Figure, in reducing these households’ PIT rate is compounded by the lower earnings level for the single parent (Panel B) and by the existence in certain countries of specific tax schedules for these household types (Panels B and C).

Figure 2.2 directly shows that the two household types with children were eligible for additional or more generous tax credits than single earners without children, which reduced the overall average tax rate. These credits were present in more OECD countries for these two household types than for a single earner without children shown in Panel A (25 countries in Panel B; 26 countries in Panel C). In some countries, such as the Slovak Republic, the PIT rate was negative because the value of tax credits exceeded the household’s tax liability and could be refunded as if they were a transfer.5

Meanwhile, tax allowances are indirectly reflected in the Figure due to their impact on the gross tax liability. A comparison of Panels A and C partially demonstrates the effect of tax allowances: the gross tax liability for households with children is lower in some countries even if, at 100% of the average wage, gross earnings are the same because these households receive more generous tax allowances.

The following sections provide detailed information on the composition and size of tax credits and allowances in OECD countries respectively. Section 4 combines tax allowances and tax credits to show their combined and simultaneous impact on households’ post-tax net income while Section 5 looks at their effect on the progressivity of PIT systems.

This section analyses PIT credits across the OECD countries that implement these policies. As each country adopts specific naming conventions for tax credits, categorising the various policies included under this umbrella can be challenging. In line with the Taxing Wages methodology, this chapter divides central government tax credits between basic tax credits, married or head of family tax credits, child tax credits, earned income tax credits, other tax credits (the latter category contains credits that fall outside the previously mentioned categories, such as tax credits linked to SSCs), and unused wastable tax credits, which include the portion of the wastable tax credits that the household did not use as the value of these credits exceeded the total tax liability.

Tax credits applicable to sub-central taxes are shown as a separate category although they cannot be disaggregated due to a lack of information. Credits on sub-central taxes are marginal across all three household types, with results showing only for Canada, Japan, Spain and the United States.

Figure 2.3 shows the breakdown of the total tax credit received by the three household types between the abovementioned categories for OECD countries that implemented these policies. In the 19 countries where tax credits existed for single workers without children in 2024, these households mostly benefitted from basic tax credits as they were not eligible for other types of credits (Panel A), with an average overall reduction in tax liability equivalent to 1.9% of their gross earnings.6 For this household type, wastable credits were fully utilised as they tend to be low relative to gross earnings.

Meanwhile, single parents earning 67% of the average wage and one-earner couples earning the average wage (Panels B and C, respectively) were eligible for credits linked to the presence of children or a dependent spouse; for single parents, these reduced the tax liability by 7.3% of gross earnings on average while for single-earner married couples the reduction was 4.7% on average.

For both household types, child-related tax credits were larger than basic credits as a share of gross earnings (respectively 3.4% and 1.8% in Panel B, and 2.0% and 1.4% in Panel C), while credits linked to being head of a household only amounted to 0.8% for single parents and 0.4% for the one-earner married couple.

The greater relevance of tax credits for the low-earning single parent is due both to the provision of additional or more generous credits for this household type in some countries and to the lower level of reference earnings. The lower level of earnings means that the value of the credit represents a larger proportion of a household’s gross earnings and that there is less (or no) tapering of the credits (in cases where tapering exists).

Earned income tax credits appear to be more relevant for lower-earning households, amounting to 0.5% of gross earnings in Panels A and C and 1.0% of gross earnings in Panel B. Sweden had the largest earned income tax credit relative to gross earnings for a single worker and one-earner married couple with two children, while this credit was largest for the low-earning single parent with two children in Italy in 2024.

Meanwhile, in Panels B and C, a few countries display unused wastable tax credits. For a low-earning single parent (Panel B), unused credits are present in Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Japan, Poland and Switzerland; for a one-earner married couple (Panel C), they are present in Chile and Costa Rica, where these household types pay no income taxes.

PIT allowances reduce households’ gross tax liability. As such, they have already been taken into account in Figure 2.3, as the gross tax liability in each country is computed by applying the tax schedule to taxable income, which in turn is determined by deducting tax allowances from gross earnings. This section disaggregates PIT allowances into basic tax allowances, married or head-of-family tax allowances, dependent children tax allowances, work-related tax allowances, deductions for SSCs and income taxes, and other standard tax allowances (for the amounts that do not follow within the aforementioned categories).

Figure 2.4 displays the decomposition of tax allowances in OECD countries for the three household types analysed previously. Unlike in the case of tax credits, the Taxing Wages models for almost all OECD countries contain tax allowances for all three household types. Unlike Figure 2.3, this decomposition focuses only on the allowances for central government taxes because the tax base across countries with sub-central taxes is either the same as for central government taxation or is computed on the basis of the central government tax liability.

As discussed in Box 2.1, some countries have additional policies, such as zero-rate tax brackets or specific tax schedules, that achieve similar objectives to those obtained by allowances. Nevertheless, in this analysis, said policies are considered to be components of a country’s tax schedule as they determine the statutory tax rate. They are therefore not considered in this section of the analysis, which only focuses on those reliefs categorised as allowances within the framework of the Taxing Wages models. Additional details on country-specific reliefs are provided in the country chapters in Part II of this Report.

On average across the OECD, total tax allowances amounted to 15.9% of taxable income for the single worker earning the average wage in 2024 (Panel A). In the same year, the corresponding indicator was 27.7% for the low-earning single parent and 21.7% for the one-earner married couple with two children (Panels B and C respectively). Among the household types shown, tax allowances are especially significant for single parents, amounting to more than 80% of gross earnings in Slovenia.

OECD countries display great variation in their use of this form of tax relief. The only countries without tax allowances for all three household types analysed in this chapter are Australia, Czechia, Ireland, Israel and New Zealand. Australia implements a zero-rate tax bracket whereby the first AUD 18 200 earned by any taxpayer is not subject to income taxes.7 Meanwhile, Czechia, Ireland, Israel and New Zealand provide tax credits that are also available to a single worker without children. In Hungary, tax allowances are linked to the presence of children so a single worker without children is not eligible.

On average, basic allowances and deductions for SSCs made up the majority of deductions across the three household types. Of all the countries with some form of tax allowance in place in 2024, only 11 did not include deductions for SSCs: Colombia, Costa Rica, Hungary, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Meanwhile, allowances for children (for the single parent and the one-earner married couple) were particularly important in Colombia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia and Switzerland.

The countries with the largest shares of “other standard tax allowances” were Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Korea and the Netherlands. In Chile, Colombia and the Netherlands, this category refers to the allowance for non-tax compulsory payments (NTCPs).8 In Costa Rica, it refers to the bonus allowance equal to 30 days of salary. In Denmark and Korea, the “other tax allowance” refers to means-tested allowances linked to earnings from work.

This section compares the contribution of tax allowances and credits to households’ post-tax net income (hereafter shortened to ‘net income’), while the following section does the same with regard to their impact on progressivity. Comparing tax allowances with tax credits is not straightforward: while credits are directly deducted from a household’s tax liability, allowances determine its taxable income, which in turn interacts with the tax schedule to determine the gross tax liability.

In other words, allowances affect the “last taxes” paid on taxable income while the size of a credit is always the same regardless of taxable income (in the absence of means testing).9 A comparison of the net amounts ‘received’ by households through allowances and credits would be biased by the fact that each currency unit of allowance deducted from the tax base is weighted by the marginal tax rate applied. The importance of tax allowances would thus be overestimated.

To overcome this challenge, the following two sections compute the relative impact of allowances and credits on the indicators of interest by comparing two scenarios: a “status quo”, whereby both allowances and credits are considered in the calculations, and a “counterfactual” scenario, whereby the taxpayer is assumed to receive no tax reliefs and their taxable income is thus the same as their gross earnings and their gross tax liability is not reduced by any credits.

This approach allows for a precise comparison of the effects of tax allowances and tax credits by focusing on the “post-tax impact” of both policies on the net income of the households analysed. The impact of tax credits can be identified directly through the amount that is deducted from the tax liability in the “status quo” scenario. For tax allowances, the effect is determined by simply subtracting the effect of the tax credits on the net income from the total effect of tax reliefs computed in the previous step.

Figure 2.5 shows tax allowances and tax credits as a share of net income for the same household types previously examined across all OECD countries, where net income is calculated as the difference between the gross earnings and the sum of the total tax liability and employee SSCs, net of the cash transfers received by the household.

Panel A shows that, for a single worker earning the average wage, tax allowances amounted to more than twice as much as tax credits as a share of net income on average across OECD countries in 2024 (5.4% versus 2.6%). As mentioned previously, tax allowances were also more common across OECD countries for this household type than tax credits, which only existed in 19 countries. Most countries display either a relatively large tax allowance or large tax credits as a share of net income for this household type, except those countries that provide neither.

For the low-earning single parent with two children (Panel B), both tax reliefs were much higher than shown in Panel A, with tax credits contributing net income more than tax allowances on average (7.4% versus 5.7% respectively) in 2024. This household type is shown to benefit from particularly generous child-related credits, which account for a larger share of their net income than for the other household types as they earn less. The inverse relationship between the two reliefs is still visible in some countries, although there are more countries that display similar shares for both, such as Belgium, Finland, Germany, Korea, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Slovak Republic.

Panel C for the one-earner married couple with two children shows a similar share for tax allowances to that of the single worker without children (5.2%), while tax credits are almost as large as allowances, at 5.4% of net income. Again, the more generous credits can be explained by the presence of children and of a dependent spouse in the household. As for the other households, the inverse relationship between allowances and credits is still visible, while the aforementioned exceptions hold true.

Figure 2.6 examines the same variables as Figure 2.5 (also with reference to 2024) but through a different lens. It displays the net income of the same three household types in all OECD countries as a share of gross earnings in various scenarios: the results as they appear in the Taxing Wages models (hereafter ‘standard’); assuming that the households receive no allowances; assuming they receive no credits, and assuming they receive neither allowances nor credits.

While the shares of gross earnings retained as net income vary significantly across OECD countries, the presence of tax reliefs significantly affects households’ residual after-tax income.

For single workers without children (Panel A), net income decreases from 75.0% to 69.2% of gross earnings when tax allowances and tax credits are excluded, with tax allowances responsible for a larger share of the decrease. The decreases are larger in Panels B and C, where households receive more generous tax reliefs: on average, the net income of a low-earning single parent drops from 97.2% to 84.5% of gross earnings, while it decreases from 85.8% to 76.7% for a one-earner married couple with two children.

As the net incomes shown here include cash transfers for households with children, they can be larger than gross earnings (i.e., above 100% in the figures) in countries with very low taxation at these earnings levels even in the absence of tax reliefs (for example, in Australia, Colombia and New Zealand).

To conclude the analysis in this chapter, this section examines the extent to which tax reliefs affect the progressivity of PIT systems across the OECD. In the absence of data on income distributions in OECD countries, this analysis considers the progressivity implied by the design of the PIT system (structural progressivity) rather than the actual impact of PIT on the income distribution as might be measured, for example, by its effect on the Gini coefficient.10 The progressivity indicator for the PIT rate follows the methodology adopted in the Taxing Wages 2013 report (OECD, 2013[7]).

Figure 2.7 uses this Taxing Wages progressivity indicator to display how excluding either or both tax reliefs affects the progressivity of PIT systems in OECD countries. The progressivity indicator shows the change in the PIT rate as gross earnings increase as a percentage of the average wage over a given income range, and it is computed as follows:

$Progressivity of PIT= \frac{({PIT}_{300\% AW}-{PIT}_{67\% AW})}{(300-67)}$

The indicator should be interpreted as the increase in the PIT rate for an increase in earnings. More precisely: between the earnings levels considered, for each increase of 1 percentage point of the average wage in gross earnings, there is an x% increase in the PIT rate. A higher value means that the PIT rate increases more steeply between the bottom (67% of the average wage) and the top (300% of the average wage) earnings levels considered, implying greater progressivity (OECD, 2013[7]).

Figure 2.7 shows that excluding tax reliefs leads to a reduction in the structural progressivity of PIT among almost all OECD countries for all three household types considered in this chapter. Allowances are particularly important in countries with a flat tax system, such as Estonia and Hungary, where the presence of a means-tested allowance introduces progressivity in the Taxing Wages models.11 Across OECD countries, the reduction in progressivity is larger for households with dependents, in particular for the low-earning single parent.

More precisely, when both allowances and credits are excluded, progressivity decreases from 0.07 to 0.05 for the single worker (Panel A), from 0.08 to 0.05 for the single parent with two children (Panel B) and from 0.09 to 0.05 for the one-earner married couple with two children, on average across OECD countries.

Excluding tax credits contributes to a larger average reduction in the progressivity of PIT rate than excluding tax allowances for all three household types. This suggests that, on average across OECD countries, tax credits tend to be more progressive than tax allowances, which may sometimes even be regressive because they result in a higher tax deduction for higher-earning workers due to the progressivity of tax schedules.

This finding is reinforced by the fact that for Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia, France,12 Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and Türkiye, omitting allowances leads to an increase in the progressivity of PIT. In these countries, allowances tend to increase with earnings either because (i) they mostly consist of deductions for employee SSCs or, where present, NTCPs (in Chile, Colombia, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and Türkiye), or (ii) the main allowance is computed as an uncapped proportion of gross earnings (such as in Costa Rica, where it equals one month’s salary; in France, where there is a work allowance equal to 10% of gross earnings; and in Japan, where there is an employment allowance linked to earnings).

Meanwhile, omitting tax allowances leads to lower progressivity in those countries where they are reduced progressively as earnings increase (such as Estonia or the United Kingdom). This is consistent with the economic literature highlighting the potential regressive impact of certain types of allowance (Avram, 2014[8]; Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2001[9]).

PIT is a key source of revenues for OECD countries and features prominently in the tax wedge on labour for most household types analysed in Taxing Wages. Nonetheless, average PIT rates vary significantly across these household types, reflecting not only different marginal tax rates applied at different levels of earnings but also the tax reliefs to which these households may be eligible.

This Special Feature decomposes PIT rates to understand the nature and impact of these tax reliefs, with a specific focus on tax credits and allowances. While allowances are present in almost every OECD country, the prevalence of tax credits varies by household type; married households or households with children tend to be more likely to receive credits than single workers.

The chapter considers the impact of tax credits with reference to their impact on the tax liability. On average across the OECD in 2024, tax credits reduced the tax liability for a single worker earning the average wage by 1.9% of their gross earnings, while the associated reduction was 4.7% of gross earnings on average for one-earner married couples with two children earning the average wage, and 7.3% for a single parent earning 67% of the average wage.

Tax allowances, meanwhile, are analysed with reference to their impact on a household’s gross income. The chapter shows that total tax allowances amounted to 15.9% of taxable income for the single worker earning the average wage in 2024, 21.7% for the one-earner married couple with two children and 27.7% for the low-earning single parent.

To enable a combined (and thus comparative) analysis of tax credits and allowances, this chapter introduces a new indicator showing the impact of tax reliefs on households’ net income. This indicator shows the relative importance of credits and allowances between household types and across countries.

For a single worker earning the average wage, allowances amounted to a larger share of net income than credits in 2024, while the opposite was the case for the low-earning single parent. For the one-earner married couple, credits and allowances amounted to a similar amount of net income. In many countries and across household types, tax allowances tend to have a greater impact on net incomes where tax credits have a lesser (or no) impact, and vice versa.

The chapter extends this approach to examine the impact of tax credits and allowances on the structural progressivity of PIT systems in OECD countries. It finds that removing tax credits reduces structural progressivity by more than removing tax allowances, in particular for households with children. Indeed, in some countries, tax allowances reduce the progressivity of the PIT.

It is important to note that the analysis in this chapter does not include all the policies OECD countries implement to support households’ net income. Nor does it include reliefs that are embedded in tax schedules, such as specific rates or zero-rate tax brackets.

Nonetheless, it is a unique starting point for deeper analysis on the use of tax reliefs, which could be complemented by an examination of how these have evolved over time and how their impact on tax rates compares with other components of a given labour taxation system, including SSCs and cash benefits. In addition, the results on structural progressivity could be set against income distributions in OECD countries to better understand the incidence and distributional impact of tax reliefs as part of broader studies on tax and inequality.

[8] Avram, S. (2014), “The distributional effects of personal income tax expenditure”, ISER Working Paper Series, Vol. 26, https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/123806.

[10] Kaplow, L. (2024), “Optimal Income Taxation”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 62(2), pp. 637-738, https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221647.

[13] OECD (2025), Income Inequality, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/income-inequality.html.

[2] OECD (2024), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2024 Issue 2, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d8814e8b-en.

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