

---

**World Trade Organization**  
Economic Research and Statistics Division

---

**MARKET ACCESS PROVISIONS ON TRADE IN GOODS  
IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS**

by

Jo-Ann Crawford  
WTO

*Manuscript date: October 2012*

---

**Disclaimer:** This is a working paper, and hence it represents research in progress. This paper contains the opinion of the author, and is the product of professional research. It is not meant to represent the position or opinions of the WTO or its Members, nor the official position of any staff member. Any errors are the fault of the author. Copies of working papers can be requested from the divisional secretariat by writing to: Economic Research and Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, Rue de Lausanne 154, CH 1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland. Please request papers by number and title.

## MARKET ACCESS PROVISIONS ON TRADE IN GOODS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

by Jo-Ann Crawford<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

This paper assembles detailed information on the market access provisions in trade in goods contained in 192 active regional trade agreements (RTAs) notified to the WTO as of November 2010. Although market access provisions in trade in goods in RTAs have been addressed in a number of studies, much of this work has been limited to subsets of RTAs, particularly plurilateral RTAs involving three or more parties. The goal of the current study is to expand beyond the more commonly studied RTAs and to include all RTAs notified to the WTO for which data are available. This task has been facilitated by the recent Transparency Mechanism for RTAs (TM), adopted in 2006, that provides the basis for the systematic provision of detailed tariff and trade data by WTO Members engaged in RTAs. This information has been supplemented by other public sources of data, where available.

A number of trends are evident. While a majority of RTAs result in a reasonably high degree of liberalization overall (with developing countries often liberalizing as much or more than developed countries), liberalization is not uniform across products or RTA parties. In some RTAs the degree of liberalization appears to be a negotiated outcome, depending on the RTA partner. Agricultural goods continue to be subject to lower levels of liberalization, frequent product exclusions and systematic protection in some RTAs, regardless of the RTA partner's comparative advantage. Nonetheless, a lower level of ambition in some RTAs is tempered by a commitment to negotiate further concessions or expand upon the RTA's scope at some future point: more than half the RTAs analysed contain such a commitment. Much has been written about the potential for the multilateralization of commitments undertaken in RTAs. While there may be scope for positive externalities in terms of regulatory convergence particularly with regard to services liberalization undertaken in RTAs, there is less evidence in this study to suggest that increased market access in merchandise goods leads to a more favourable trading environment for third parties.

Continuing constructive engagement by WTO Members in the Transparency Mechanism through the provision of data, timely notifications, and submission of implementation reports will increase the availability of tariff and trade liberalization data, thus facilitating further examination of the topics highlighted in the study as worthy of future research.

**Keywords:** Regional Trade Agreements, market access, liberalization.

**JEL Classifications:** F13, F14, F15, F53

---

<sup>1</sup> Ms Crawford is a Counsellor in the RTA Section of the Trade Policy Review Division of the WTO. Many thanks are due to Richard Eglin for his support in producing this work. The author is also grateful to Rohini Acharya, Maria Donner, Ana Cristina Molina, and Jean Daniel Rey for their valuable comments and to Rowena Cabos and Christelle Renard for statistical assistance. All views expressed are those of the author and cannot be attributed to the WTO Secretariat or WTO Members.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

A.	INTRODUCTION .....	4
	<b>1. Scope of the Study</b> .....	<b>4</b>
	<b>2. Data Sources and Methodology</b> .....	<b>5</b>
B.	PARTICIPATION IN RTAS .....	5
C.	QUANTIFYING PREFERENTIAL TRADE .....	6
D.	TRADE FLOWS .....	9
E.	TRADE AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATION .....	10
	<b>1. Liberalization at the HS 6-digit level</b> .....	<b>10</b>
	<b>2. Liberalization of agricultural products</b> .....	<b>12</b>
F.	PRODUCTS EXCLUDED FROM LIBERALIZATION .....	19
G.	ANALYSIS OF MFN VERSUS REMAINING DUTIABLE PREFERENTIAL RATES .....	22
H.	RELATIVE MARGINS OF PREFERENCE .....	23
I.	TRANSITION PERIOD AND ASYMMETRY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCESSIONS .....	24
J.	MULTILATERALIZATION OF MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS .....	25
	<b>1. MFN-Type Provisions in RTAs</b> .....	<b>25</b>
	<b>2. Accession provisions</b> .....	<b>28</b>
K.	COMMITMENT TO FURTHER LIBERALIZATION .....	29
L.	CONCLUSIONS .....	29

## **A. INTRODUCTION**

The goal of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the market access provisions applicable to trade in goods contained in RTAs notified to the WTO and in force. A previous study conducted by the WTO in 2002 surveyed the market access provisions applicable in merchandise trade for RTAs in force at that time.<sup>2</sup> Since then the number of RTAs has grown considerably. As of November 2010, nearly 200 RTAs containing provisions on trade in goods have been notified to the WTO and are currently in force.<sup>3</sup> Of these, 124 RTAs - more than 60% - were notified to the WTO in the period since 2002.

Over the last ten years, membership in RTAs has become more geographically diverse and involves a broad cross-section of WTO Members; all but one of the WTO's Members are engaged in RTAs of one type or another. Another major change in the last decade is the increasing participation of Asian countries – previously reliant for the most part on multilateral liberalization – in RTAs both within Asia and further afield. Cross-regional RTAs, as opposed to the more traditional form of regional integration among neighbouring countries, are increasingly the norm. North-South and South-South RTAs feature more prominently among the RTAs in force today than they did a decade ago. All of these factors point to the need to analyse the market access provisions contained in the current generation of RTAs in order to identify trends and determine areas worthy of future study.

### **1. Scope of the Study**

The focus of this study is all RTAs of a reciprocal nature covering trade in goods, notified to the WTO and in force as of November 2010. Unilateral preferences such as those granted under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or under a WTO waiver are not taken into account. A number of issues of relevance to market access in trade in goods are studied. First, an indication of the complexity of WTO Members' preferential trading regimes is provided by calculating for each WTO Member its participation in RTAs and the potential number of bilateral preferential relationships that result. Second, the importance of preferential trade is quantified using as a proxy the share of total imports and exports accounted for in trade with preferential partners.

The scope and depth of trade and tariff liberalization is measured (in selected RTAs) by calculating the percentages of trade and tariffs liberalized at the entry into force and at the end of implementation period. Calculations are performed at the HS 6-digit level (rather than the national tariff-line level) as this provides a uniform measure for comparison across RTAs.<sup>4</sup> Agricultural goods, often shielded from liberalization even in a preferential context, are given special focus. Products excluded from liberalization are analysed by measuring the frequency of exclusion across HS Chapters. The evolution of trade flows over a ten year period between selected RTA partners is also measured. Relative margins of preference are calculated for those RTAs for which detailed tariff liberalization schedules are not available.

The structure and length of the transition period granted by RTA parties to implement tariff concessions provides an insight into the speed of liberalization undertaken and eventual asymmetry in the design of liberalization commitments. Finally, other regulatory aspects which have a bearing on market access are explored. These include rendezvous clauses which commit parties to undertake

---

<sup>2</sup> Coverage, Liberalization Process and Transitional Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/46. In addition, a more recent study conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank, "Market Access in Regional Trade Agreements" by Antoni Estevadeordal, Matthew Shearer and Kati Suominen was published in 2009.

<sup>3</sup> This number includes RTAs notified under Article XXIV.7(a) of GATT and the Enabling Clause. Accessions to existing RTAs are not included in this figure.

<sup>4</sup> Calculations are made for ad valorem duties only.

further liberalization at a future date, and provisions which have the potential to multilateralize commitments taken in RTAs, such as MFN-type provisions on goods and conditions for third party accession to existing RTAs.

## 2. Data Sources and Methodology

The study is based on public sources of information.<sup>5</sup> Varying amounts of information are available on RTAs notified to the WTO; in general, more data are available for RTAs concluded in recent years. The adoption by WTO Members of the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs in December 2006 has increased and standardized statistical data available.<sup>6</sup> The TM requires countries participating in RTAs to submit tariff line and trade data, including a phase-down of tariff concessions granted over the implementation period of the Agreement at the national tariff line level.<sup>7</sup> Under the TM, an in-depth analysis of trade and tariff liberalization is prepared by the Secretariat for individual RTAs; one of the goals in this study is to use such information to provide a horizontal view of market access in trade in goods across RTAs. For RTAs not (or, not yet) subject to the Mechanism, and for which a detailed tariff phase-down was not available, a relative margin of preference is calculated.

### B. PARTICIPATION IN RTAS

The number of RTAs in which a country participates provides an indication of the complexity of its preferential trading relationships (since each RTA has its own regulatory structure with provisions on rules of origin, SPS, TBT, trade remedies etc.), but a more complete picture can be obtained from measuring its bilateral preferential relationships. Plurilateral RTAs involving three or more countries offer less scope for regulatory variance as a single set of rules of origin, SPS and TBT provisions, etc. are generally administered; such RTAs may nonetheless result in a criss-crossing web of preferential tariff concessions (with varying transition periods) for each trading partner involved, thus complicating the administration and implementation of tariff concessions.<sup>8</sup>

Detailed results on the participation in RTAs and maximum number of bilateral preferential trading relationships are provided in Annex Table A1.<sup>9</sup> The average number of RTAs and reciprocal preferential partners are summarized for eleven regions: Africa; Caribbean; Central America; CIS; East Asia; Europe; Middle East; North America; Oceania; South America; and West Asia (Chart 1).<sup>10</sup> Countries in North America, Europe and the CIS participate in the highest average numbers of RTAs. Yet, Africa, the Middle East and Europe are the highest scorers in terms of the number of preferential partners. African and Middle Eastern countries, while participating on average in 2-3 RTAs, have upwards of 17 preferential trading partners, the highest recorded, reflecting the incidence of plurilateral RTAs in these regions. An additional complication arises in some regions - Eastern

---

<sup>5</sup> Trade data was sourced from UN COMTRADE and Eurostat; tariff data from the RTA-IS, IDB, TPRs, and the World Bank's WITS database; the legal text of RTAs can be found in the WTO's database on RTAs, <http://rtais.wto.org>.

<sup>6</sup> Of the 192 RTAs covering trade in goods covered in this study, 65 were subject to the Transparency Mechanism in the period 2007-2010.

<sup>7</sup> Data requirements under the TM are laid out in the Annex of document WT/L/691.

<sup>8</sup> For instance, in EFTA's RTAs, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland/Liechtenstein (the latter are joined in a customs union and have a common external tariff) each negotiate a tariff liberalization schedule with the RTA partner, while the RTA partner negotiates a separate schedule with each EFTA country, resulting in a total of six schedules. Other configurations are possible. In the South African Development Community (SADC), an RTA involving 13 countries, each non-SACU SADC member of the Protocol negotiated two tariff schedules: one applicable to all SADC members except South Africa; and the other applicable to South Africa. SACU members, in turn, negotiated a single schedule applicable to non-SACU members.


<sup>9</sup> Based on RTAs notified to the WTO and in force as of September 2010. Information on non-WTO members is also included to the extent that such RTAs have been notified to the WTO.

<sup>10</sup> These regions are defined in the WTO's Integrated DataBase.

and Southern Africa, the CIS, East and West Asia - due to overlapping membership in RTAs, which occurs when a country has preferential trading relations with a given partner under two (or more) RTAs.<sup>11</sup>

In Chart 1 and Annex Table A1, EU(27) is counted as one member. If EU Members are counted individually, the average figures for Europe more than double to 21 RTAs per country on average (for 41 European countries in total), and 32 RTA partners.

**Chart 1: Participation in RTAs notified to the WTO, average by region, 2010**



Source: WTO Secretariat.

Note: The figure in parentheses (after the region) indicates the number of countries in the sample.

### C. QUANTIFYING PREFERENTIAL TRADE

Quantifying trade that takes place under reciprocal preferential regimes is fraught with difficulty. Few countries capture preference utilization data (or make it publicly available), thus making it difficult to determine if trade actually takes place under preferential regimes. Studies have shown that exporters do not always take advantage of preferences for reasons which include insufficient knowledge on the part of the exporter, and the need to comply with complicated rules of origin which undermine any advantage conferred by the preference (particularly when preferential margins are low).<sup>12</sup> In addition, trade which takes place at zero MFN rates is not, by definition, preferential. Another complicating factor is that some developing countries may have access to developed markets under non-reciprocal preferential regimes, such as GSP, in addition to access under an RTA.

In the absence of widely available preference utilization data, an indication of the importance of preferential trade can be obtained by measuring for each WTO Member (and non-WTO Member involved in RTAs notified to the WTO) the percentage of imports and exports sourced from or destined to preferential partners, relative to global trading capacity.<sup>13</sup> The reference year is 2008 or

<sup>11</sup> In such cases, the partner is counted only once.

<sup>12</sup> The Asian "Noodle Bowl": Is it Serious for Business?, Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, ADB Institute, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> The figures take account of RTAs notified to the WTO and RTAs under the LAIA framework (not otherwise notified to the WTO).

the last year for which data is available.<sup>14</sup> Only reciprocal preferential relationships are taken into account: preferential relationships resulting from unilateral preferential regimes are not.

The measurement is, however, not an indication of the amount of trade actually conducted under preferential regimes. Bearing in mind that few RTAs liberalize all tariff lines, that liberalization is often implemented over a (lengthy) transition period, that trade which takes place at zero MFN rates is not by nature preferential, and that countries may, when faced with stringent rules of origin, choose to forego the preferential rate on offer in favour of the MFN rate, the figures showing trade conducted with preferential partners will tend to overstate the percentage of trade actually conducted on preferential terms. On the other hand, given the hundred or so RTAs in force but not (or not yet) notified to the WTO, for some countries (particularly developing countries party to such RTAs) the figures presented may understate the amount of trade conducted with preferential partners.<sup>15</sup> Despite these caveats, the figures provide an indication of the importance of preferential trade for WTO Members.

Another element to note is that for some developing countries, a sizable percentage of their exports may qualify for preferential treatment under unilateral preferential regimes granted by developed countries. Thus, it should not be assumed that any developing country exports which are not destined to trading partners under RTAs are subject to MFN rules. Likewise for developed countries which grant unilateral preferences, imports not sourced from trading partners under reciprocal RTAs are not necessarily subject to MFN rules.

Detailed results showing trade conducted with preferential RTA partners are shown in Annex Table A1. Chart 2 summarizes the results and shows the average percentages of trade with RTA partners (to and from all geographic regions) for RTAs notified to the WTO, broken down into the eleven regions previously defined.<sup>16</sup> Countries in Central America have on average the highest percentage of trade with preferential partners (54% of imports and 76% of exports), followed by those in Africa, North America and Europe. For South America, the addition of the RTAs signed under the LAIA framework (but which have not been notified individually to the WTO), adds on average another 10% of trade from preferential partners. For Europe, only trade for EU(27) with third parties is included.<sup>17</sup>

With an average of less than five RTAs per country and nine preferential trading partners (the low-end of those observed in Chart 1), Central American countries nonetheless have the highest percentage of trade recorded with preferential partners, thus demonstrating the need, when determining the importance of RTAs for a given country, to consider not only the number of RTAs and bilateral trading relationships that result, but whether such RTAs are signed with major trading partners.


---

<sup>14</sup> For the most part, data (sourced from UN COMTRADE) for 2008 were used as they tended to be more complete than data for 2009. In some cases, data for 2009 was used if it was the only option.

<sup>15</sup> In addition, some plurilateral RTAs were not included in the sample, thus understating the amount of preferential trade. Details are in the Annex.

<sup>16</sup> The bracketed figures following the region name indicate the number of countries in each given region for which data was available (and the total number of countries in that region) and thus for which the averages were calculated. Full details can be found in Annex Table A1.

<sup>17</sup> The addition of EU-intra trade would significantly increase percentages for Europe.

**Chart 2: Trade with RTA partners, average by region, 2008\***

\* Data are for the most part for 2008. If a different year is used it is indicated in Annex Table A1.  
 Source: WTO Secretariat based on UN COMTRADE

Notes: EU(27) intra-trade is excluded.  
 RTAs under LAIA (not notified as such to the WTO) are displayed separately for North America and South America.

Table 1 provides the percentage of trade conducted by WTO Members with RTA partners for the outlier countries in each region.<sup>18</sup> In some regions - Africa, East Asia and Oceania - low levels of trade are recorded for some countries from their preferential partners, while for others - Europe and North America in particular - even the low outliers show much higher levels. Unsurprisingly, those countries which are active RTA players – Chile, Mexico, and Singapore – are those that record the highest percentages of trade with preferential partners.

**Table 1: Percentage of Trade conducted by WTO Members with RTA Partners, Outliers by Region, 2008\***

Region (Sample)**	Imports				Exports			
	Lowest	%	Highest	%	Lowest	%	Highest	%
<b>Europe (11/15)</b>	EU (27)	23.2	Switzerland	83.8	EU (27)	27.1	FYROM	96.6
<b>CIS (7/12)</b>	Russian Fed.	13.7	Kyrgyz Rep.	56.2	Russian Fed.	14.9	Kyrgyz Rep.	54.2
<b>Africa (31/45)</b>	Cape Verde	1.1	Botswana	80.6	Guinea Bissau	0.1	Tunisia	85.6
<b>Middle East (9/14)</b>	United Arab Emirates	5.2	Jordan	60.8	United Arab Emirates	7.4	Lebanon	71.7
<b>North America (3/3)</b>	United States	29.8	Mexico	72.4	United States	40.5	Mexico	91.5
<b>Central America (7/7)</b>	Belize	7.0	Honduras	67.9	Panama	12.2	El Salvador	88.5
<b>South America (10/12)</b>	Colombia	6.2	Chile	65.8	Bolivia	7.2	Chile	77.4
<b>Caribbean (8/13)</b>	Trinidad & Tobago	14.5	Dominican Rep.	52.4	Trinidad & Tobago	32.5	St Vincent & Grenadines	93.7
<b>West Asia (7/8)</b>	Maldives	16.7	Nepal	57.1	Bangladesh	7.4	Bhutan	20.9
<b>East Asia (13/17)</b>	Chinese Taipei	0.04	Singapore	65.2	Chinese Taipei	0.14	Singapore	67.6
<b>Oceania (3/6)</b>	Fiji	0.4	New Zealand	47.0	Fiji	11.4	New Zealand	40.3

\* Data are for the most part for 2008. If a different year is used it is indicated in Annex Table A1.

\*\* Shows the number of countries for which data was available out of the total countries in the region.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Note: Excludes EU(27) intra-trade.

<sup>18</sup> Participation in RTAs was measured as of 2010 using trade data from 2008 (for the most part). Since that time a number of new RTAs have been concluded.



#### D. TRADE FLOWS

In order to determine the impact on trade of increased market access between RTA parties trade flows are analysed for a sample of ten countries each of which engage in ten or more notified RTAs (counting EU(27) as one).<sup>19</sup> Percentage shares of global imports and exports sourced from or destined to RTA partners for the period 2000-2009 are shown in Annex Tables A2-A3.<sup>20</sup> Figures in bold indicate trade taking place on or after the RTA's year of entry into force.

Chile's leading preferential partners (16 RTAs analysed) are China, the EU and the United States which accounted respectively for 17.6%, 16.7% and 14% of Chile's global trade in 2009. Trade shares with other partners, with the exception of Japan and Korea, are much smaller; half of its RTA partners account individually for less than 1% of Chile's global trade. In terms of the evolution of trade flows, the most striking feature is Chile's changing relationship with China which accounted for 6% of Chile's total imports in 2000 (pre-RTA) and over 12% in 2009, while its share of exports to China quadrupled over the same period from 5% to 23%.

In the case of the EFTA States (21 RTAs analysed), trade with its largest trading partner, the EU, accounts for a growing percentage of trade: 64.7% of global trade in the case of Iceland, 73.4% for Norway and 68.9% for Switzerland and Liechtenstein in 2009.<sup>21</sup> The shares of their global trade with 18 other RTA partners are small, in almost all cases accounting for less than 1%. Declining trade shares over the period are evident with some partners, in particular Israel, Croatia, and Canada, while for others modest increases are recorded.

The EU has the largest sample size (28 RTAs) and the RTAs of longest vintage, though with the exception of trade with Switzerland, Norway and Turkey (which account in 2009 for 7.1%, 4.6% and 3.5% of its global trade, respectively), the shares with other partners are small accounting for 1% or less of its global trade. Over the period analysed, the EU's share of global exports destined for preferential partners increased modestly with most RTA partners (exceptions are Iceland, Andorra, Israel, Mexico, CARIFORUM states and Côte d'Ivoire), while its share of global imports sourced from RTA partners also increased with the majority of its preferential trade partners (except Syria, Faroe Islands, South Africa, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Algeria and Cameroon).

India's trade with its RTA partners is dominated by its membership in APTA and trade with ASEAN countries which account in 2009 for 12.5% and 9.7% of its global trade, respectively. Shares of its global exports increased to all but three of its RTA partners over the period analysed, most strikingly in the case of APTA, Singapore, ASEAN and Korea, where shares are double or nearly so.<sup>22</sup> In terms of share of global imports sourced from RTA partners, those from APTA and Korea increased the most over the period studied, while those from Singapore, SAFTA and Nepal declined.

Japan's trade with ASEAN countries accounts in 2009 for 14% of its global trade, while trade with partners outside the region averages 1% or less. The share of its global imports sourced from RTA partners has declined in six of its 11 RTAs and for exports in four of its RTAs.<sup>23</sup> Japan has bilateral

<sup>19</sup> These are Chile, EFTA, EU, India, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. A total of 149 bilateral trade relationships were analysed. Some overlapping memberships occur: e.g. Japan has an RTA with ASEAN and bilateral RTAs with a number of individual ASEAN members.

<sup>20</sup> In some cases, RTA partners have been grouped, e.g. EFTA, CARIFORUM.

<sup>21</sup> Trade between the EU and Iceland and Norway is conducted bilaterally, while that between the EU and Switzerland/Liechtenstein takes place under a single RTA.

<sup>22</sup> There is some overlap between membership of APTA, SAFTA, and ASEAN and India's bilateral RTAs which results in double counting.

<sup>23</sup> There is some overlap between membership of ASEAN and Japan's bilateral RTAs with some members of ASEAN.

RTAs with seven members of ASEAN: of these, trade shares with Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have declined over the period analysed.

Of the ten countries in the sample, Mexico (12 RTAs) derives the largest share of its global trade with its preferential partners (due to its membership in NAFTA which accounts for 67.8% of Mexico's global trade in 2009). With the exception of its trade with the EU and Japan, its other RTA partners account for less than 1% of Mexico's global trade. Trade shares with Canada and the US have declined over the period studied, while those of its other 11 RTA partners, particularly the EU have increased.

Singapore's preferential trade is dominated by its membership in ASEAN and its RTAs with the US and China which account in 2009 for 27.1%, 9.2%, and 10.2%, respectively, of its global trade. Singapore's trade with the US has declined over the period while that with China has risen. Global trade shares with Japan also decreased over the period studied.

Turkey's trade with the EU accounts for 43.5% of its global trade in 2009, dwarfing trade with its other preferential partners, but in decline over the period analysed. Turkey's 16 other preferential partners, with the exception of EFTA, account for the most part for less than 1% of its global trade.

Ukraine's leading RTA partner is Russia which accounts in 2009 for 25.3% of its global trade, though in decline over the period. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Uzbekistan account for the next largest global shares of Ukraine's preferential trade.

The United States' trade with its NAFTA partners accounts in 2009 for 28.5% of its global trade, while trade with its other RTA partners accounts for the most part for less than 1%. Trade with its NAFTA partners has been in decline over the period, while that of its other ten RTA partners (except Bahrain and Singapore) increased.

This section shows trade flows over a decade for ten countries with ten or more RTA partners. Most of the countries in the sample have one or two dominant preferential trade partners with the rest accounting for a negligible share, suggesting that motivations other than a desire to increase market access may determine the choice of RTA partner. Rising trade flows may be the result of increased market access while preference erosion may account for declining shares of trade. Other factors such as exchange rate volatility, commodity booms and bust, and the global financial crisis may also play a role.

## E. TRADE AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATION

### 1. Liberalization at the HS 6-digit level

In this section we analyse the percentages of trade and tariff lines liberalized under 65 RTAs which have been subject to the TM and for which a complete tariff phasedown and detailed import data are available.<sup>24</sup> Given the wide variance in WTO Members' tariff structures,<sup>25</sup> tariff schedules are harmonized at the HS 6-digit level in order to provide a uniform basis for comparison across agreements.<sup>26</sup> Results based on calculation at the HS 6-digit level may differ from those at the

---

<sup>24</sup> Only ad valorem duties are taken into account.


<sup>25</sup> For instance, Turkey's national tariff schedule is defined at the 12 digit level and is composed of over 19,000 lines while Norway's is defined at the 8 digit level and has just over 7,000 tariff lines.

<sup>26</sup> For the purpose of this study, an HS 6-digit line is only considered liberalized if all its sub-lines are completely liberalized, the strictest measure that can be applied. Other methods of summing at the six digit level, e.g. averaging, or considering an HS 6-digit line liberalized if half or more of its sub-lines are liberalized would yield different results.

national tariff-line level depending on the structure of a country's tariff schedule and the tariff concessions granted.<sup>27</sup>


Charts 3-8 show liberalization measured by the share of tariff lines and intra-RTA imports (based on the three year average preceding the RTA's year of entry into force) at the entry into force and end of implementation for the 65 RTAs (comprising 162 tariff schedules) included in the sample. As can be seen in Chart 3, some RTAs provide for full liberalization of tariffs on entry into force of the RTA, while others start with a lower level of liberalization.<sup>28</sup> By the end of the implementation period, a dense cluster in the top right corner of the Chart indicates liberalization of 85% or higher of tariffs and trade, though a few outliers liberalize substantially less (Chart 4).

**Chart 3: All products, entry into force**



Source: WTO Secretariat.

**Chart 4: All products, end of liberalization**



Source: WTO Secretariat.

The picture is more nuanced, however, if the liberalization of agricultural and non-agricultural goods is considered separately. Charts 5 and 6 show a breakdown of the share of tariff lines and intra-RTA imports liberalized at entry into force and at the end of the implementation period for non-agricultural products (WTO definition). By the end of the implementation period most RTAs in the sample liberalize more than 90% of tariffs and trade, as shown by the clustering effect at the top right hand corner of Chart 6.

<sup>27</sup> The FTA between Japan and Mexico shown in Table 2 is used to illustrate this point. In this example, Japan's liberalization under the FTA is higher when calculated at the HS-6 digit level, whereas for Mexico calculation at the national tariff line level yields a higher result.


**Table 2: Comparison of the Tariff line and HS 6-digit calculation methods for Japan-Mexico FTA**

Importer	Calculation Method	Percentage share of duty-free lines at end of the liberalization period		
		Total lines	Agriculture	Non-Agriculture
Japan	National tariff line level	87.1	42.1	97.5
Japan	HS 6-digit level	91.1	46.0	97.9
Mexico	National tariff line level	94.1	53.1	98.6
Mexico	HS 6-digit level	90.9	46.3	97.9

Source: WTO Secretariat.


<sup>28</sup> The sample includes countries such as Singapore with a high share of MFN duty-free tariff lines.

**Chart 5: Non-ag products, entry into force**



Source: WTO Secretariat


**Chart 6: Non-ag products, end of liberalization**



Source: WTO Secretariat


In the case of agricultural goods, however, a broader range of liberalization strategies is evident. On entry into force of the RTAs surveyed, considerably less liberalization takes place (Chart 7), and by the end of the implementation period a lower outcome is evident (Chart 8). This confirms the long-standing observation that greater sensitivities in agriculture impede liberalization under RTAs with outcomes falling considerably short of that achieved for industrial products.

**Chart 7: Agricultural products, entry into force**



Source: WTO Secretariat

**Chart 8: Agricultural products, end of liberalization**



Source: WTO Secretariat

## 2. Liberalization of agricultural products

In order to explore further the liberalization of tariffs on agricultural products, we analyse the individual tariff concessions granted in the same 65 RTAs (162 tariff schedules in total), by calculating the percentages of MFN duty free lines, tariff lines liberalized at entry into force and at the end of the implementation period, and lines excluded from liberalization.<sup>29</sup> Results are shown in Charts 9-12 for each bilateral relationship grouped by geographical region - Africa and the Middle East, Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe and the CIS countries.<sup>30</sup> For example, in Chart 9, Egypt-Switzerland shows the liberalization of agricultural lines offered by Egypt to its partner Switzerland (under the EFTA-Egypt FTA). The corresponding concessions offered by Switzerland to Egypt (Switzerland-Egypt) are shown in Chart 12, Europe and CIS.

In Africa and the Middle East (a total of 15 bilateral tariff schedules, plus the SACU customs union), the level of MFN duty-free tariffs on agricultural products is quite varied. For the SACU countries,


<sup>29</sup> Again for the sake of harmonization, analysis is performed at the HS 6-digit level.

<sup>30</sup> Again, in these charts the WTO definition of agricultural products is used. The percentages of MFN duty-free lines for a given country may vary depending on the year of entry into force of the RTA.

more than 40% of agricultural tariff lines are duty-free on an MFN basis, more than double that of most other countries in the sample, such as Egypt (13%), Tunisia (5%) and Morocco (0%). By the end of the implementation period, significant liberalization is evident in four of the 16 tariff schedules analysed (Egypt-EU, Morocco-US, SACU and Jordan-Singapore). Liberalization is low, however, in the case of Egypt's and Tunisia's RTAs with EFTA partners and with Turkey where less than 15% of tariff lines on agricultural products are liberalized by the end of the implementation period in the bilateral tariff concessions analysed (Chart 9).

Also evident is the disparity of liberalization granted by some countries. Morocco, for example, liberalizes less than 20% of agricultural tariff lines at the end of the implementation period in its RTA with Turkey, but more than 90% in its RTA with the United States. Likewise, Egypt liberalizes 13% of agricultural tariffs with the EFTA States but more than 90% in its RTA with the EU.

**Chart 9: Africa and Middle East - Liberalization of tariff lines (agricultural goods)**




Source: WTO Secretariat.

In the Americas (44 bilateral tariff schedules analysed), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras have no agricultural tariff lines duty-free on an MFN basis (Chart 10). For others, the percentage of MFN duty-free lines ranges from 2% (Mexico) to 49% (Canada). By the end of the transition period, liberalization of agricultural products is, on the whole, quite high, with the exception of a few outliers: more than 80% of agricultural tariff lines are liberalized in more than 75% of the schedules analysed for this region. Disparities in liberalization commitments are again evident for certain countries. For instance, Canada has a higher ambition in its RTA with Peru where more than 90% of agricultural tariff lines are liberalized at the end of the liberalization period, compared to its RTA with EFTA where it liberalizes less than 60% with Switzerland and Norway and 80% with Iceland. Chile's RTAs (for which the sample size is greatest) show even greater disparities in liberalization: in its RTA with India, no agricultural tariff lines are liberalized, with the EFTA countries it liberalizes on average 25%, whereas with Australia, Brunei, China, Colombia, New Zealand, Panama, and Singapore it liberalizes more than 97%. Likewise, Mexico liberalizes more than 80% of its agricultural tariff lines in five of its six RTAs, but less than 50% in its RTA with Japan.

Another observation is that countries which start out with high percentages of MFN-duty free lines do not necessarily achieve a higher outcome by the end of the RTA's implementation period. Canada, with the highest percentage of MFN duty-free lines in the Americas, achieves a lower outcome on average than most developing countries in the sample which have lower percentages of MFN duty-free lines and therefore liberalized considerably more. In the case of the United States, although the percentage of duty-free lines in its RTAs is high at the end-point, it is less than that achieved by some developing countries such as Peru and Chile in some of their RTAs.

**Chart 10: Americas - Liberalization of tariff lines (agricultural goods)**




Source: WTO Secretariat.

In Asia and Oceania (for which the sample size is greatest with 54 tariff schedules), again there is a mixed picture regarding MFN duty-free lines: Brunei and Singapore (with no agricultural sector to

speak of) have a high percentage of MFN duty-free tariff lines, compared for example to China, India, Korea, Pakistan and Thailand where protection on an MFN basis is much more evident (Chart 11). Again, a distinct pattern emerges. In more than half the schedules analysed, 80% or more of agricultural tariff lines are liberalized by the end of the implementation period. In other cases, liberalization is consistently low: India liberalizes less than 10% of lines in its RTAs with Chile and Singapore. For Japan, liberalization falls consistently between 60% and 70% except in its RTA with the Philippines where it liberalizes marginally more and with Mexico where it liberalizes less than 50%. For Korea, too, liberalization of agricultural tariff lines is below average for the region. Disparities are again evident. China liberalizes 90% or more of its agricultural tariff lines with Chile, New Zealand and Peru, but less than 20% in its RTA with Pakistan. Korea liberalizes less with its EFTA partners than with Chile and Singapore.

In Europe and the CIS countries (49 tariff schedules analysed), liberalization of agricultural goods is lower on the whole than that in other regions (Chart 12). By the end of the implementation period, only about a third of the schedules analysed show liberalization of more than 80%. Switzerland liberalizes less than 40% of its agricultural tariff lines in all seven RTAs analysed and Norway only slightly more. Turkey has liberalized less than 20% of agricultural tariff lines in six of its seven RTAs, and less than 40% in its RTA with Georgia. Again, disparities are evident. Ukraine has liberalized more than 90% of its agricultural tariff lines in all its RTAs except that with FYROM in which it has liberalized less than 20%. Albania has liberalized more than 70% of its agricultural tariff lines with the EU, but less than 20% in its RTA with Turkey. Likewise, Serbia has liberalized more than 80% of its agricultural tariff lines with the EU, but less than 5% in its RTA with Turkey.


**Chart 11: Asia and Oceania - Liberalization of tariff lines (agricultural goods)**



Source: WTO Secretariat.



**Chart 12: Europe and CIS - Liberalization of tariff lines (agricultural goods)**



Source: WTO Secretariat.

Charts 9-12 demonstrate the variance of liberalization strategies applied to agricultural products in RTAs across the regions for the sample analysed (which is about a third of all RTAs in goods notified to the WTO). Obviously a larger sample size would enable clearer patterns to be drawn as some countries, though active RTA players, are underrepresented in the sample. This analysis could be complemented as more RTAs are subject to the WTO's Transparency Mechanism.

The degree of liberalization in agricultural products does not seem to be determined by a country's status as either developed or developing; in some North-South RTAs, developing countries liberalize

considerably more agricultural tariff lines than developed countries, despite having a lower percentage of duty-free MFN lines initially.<sup>31</sup> Some countries appear to engage in the systematic protection of the agricultural sector regardless of their trading partner's comparative advantage. This seems to be the case for the EFTA countries, Japan, Korea and Turkey which might - potentially - limit their future RTA partners to countries which are not major agricultural producers or those willing to accept a lower level of market access in agricultural products. Alternatively, these countries may be required to liberalize more in order to strike a deal with some partners.<sup>32</sup> For others, such as Chile and Mexico, the picture is more nuanced, with high level outcomes achieved when negotiating with some trading partners and lower levels in others, indicating that a low level of ambition may be a negotiated (and reciprocated) outcome, depending on the negotiating interests of the RTA parties involved.

Nor is it evident that ambition is determined by the legal cover used by WTO Members to notify their RTAs. RTAs covering trade in goods among developed countries or between a developed and developing country fall under GATT Article XXIV, while those among developing countries can be notified under either GATT Article XXIV or the Enabling Clause. Indeed, many developing countries, particularly in Latin America and Asia have opted to notify their RTAs under the more stringent conditions of GATT Article XXIV rather than use the Enabling Clause. Those RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause are identified by an asterisk in Charts 9-12. Although the sample size is small (4 RTAs and eight bilateral tariff schedules), the outcomes are clearly different. In two RTAs (Chile-India and Egypt-Turkey), the ambition to liberalize is clearly absent: Turkey liberalizes 0.6% of its agricultural tariff lines, while Chile, India, and Egypt liberalize none. In the other two RTAs (Pakistan-Malaysia and Pakistan-Sri Lanka) the objective is clearly more ambitious: by the end of the implementation period, liberalization of agricultural tariff lines ranges from 66% to 96.1%, above that achieved under a number of RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV.<sup>33</sup>

Nor is there evidence in the sample to suggest that complementarities in agriculture are being exploited, i.e. that RTA partners with different growing seasons are accorded greater market access than partners located in the same hemisphere. For instance, Japan accords no greater market access in agricultural products to Chile than to its other RTA partners, nor do the EFTA countries accord greater market access to Chile or SACU than to other RTA partners. Obviously with a larger sample size this observation could be explored in more detail.

The focus in this section has been on tariff lines fully liberalized under an RTA. It should be noted, however, that other forms of market access liberalization such as duty reduction (as opposed to elimination), and tariff rate quotas may provide increased market access opportunities.<sup>34</sup>

Tariff-rate quotas are used in a number of RTAs, in general in addition to those offered by a WTO Member in the WTO. Sensitive agricultural products such as beef, chicken, pork, vegetables, fruits, sugar and dairy products are frequently the target, though some industrial products such as iron and steel, wool and certain textile products are subject to TRQs. The design of TRQs varies considerably; some are clearly more trade liberalizing than others. For instance, the in-quota quantity may be fixed, progressively increase, or be subject to review or consultations at a later stage, while the in-quota duty may be zero or set at a fixed or declining percentage of the MFN rate. The out-of-quota duty may be set as the MFN rate or a declining percentage thereof. In many RTAs, TRQs are phased out and removed by the end of the transition period; in others, they remain in place. Table 3 provides an overview of the various liberalization modalities seen in RTAs. A case-by-case study would be necessary in order to measure their degree of trade liberalization or restrictiveness.

---

<sup>31</sup> For example, Japan's RTAs with Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam.

<sup>32</sup> For instance Korea liberalizes 96.6% of agricultural tariff lines in its recent RTA with the EU (WTO document WT/REG296/1/Rev.1)

<sup>33</sup> Indeed, Pakistan liberalizes 66% of its agricultural tariff lines in its RTA with Malaysia, 91% with Sri Lanka (both notified under the Enabling Clause), and 29% with China (notified under GATT Article XXIV).

<sup>34</sup> The impact of reductions of duties can be captured by looking at margins of preference.


**Table 3: Overview of TRQ Liberalization Modalities in RTAs**

In-Quota Quantity	In-Quota Duty	Out of Quota Duty
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- fixed</li> <li>- progressively increasing (subject to an annual growth factor)</li> <li>- dependent on previous year's quota being fully used</li> <li>- subject to review or negotiation at a future point</li> <li>- dependent on trade surplus in that product with countries other than the RTA partner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- duty-free</li> <li>- a fixed percentage of the MFN rate</li> <li>- a progressively declining percentage of the MFN rate</li> <li>- specific duty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- MFN rate</li> <li>- percentage of MFN rate or decreasing percentage thereof</li> <li>- specific duty</li> <li>- mixed duty</li> </ul>

Source: WTO Secretariat.

## F. PRODUCTS EXCLUDED FROM LIBERALIZATION


An analysis of products excluded from liberalization can be drawn by looking at the frequency of exclusions in the 65 RTAs analysed (162 tariff schedules) across all HS Chapters, broken down by HS Chapters 1-24 (agricultural products) and 25-97 (industrial products). Results in Charts 13-14 show the number of tariff schedules in which one or more products are excluded from liberalization at the end of the implementation period, by HS chapter. Thus, for HS Chapter 1, almost 50% of the 162 tariff schedules analysed exclude one or more product(s). In 16 HS Chapters, more than half the tariff schedules analysed exclude one or more products from liberalization. HS Chapters subject to the most frequent exclusions from liberalization are Chapters 17 (sugar), 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations), 22 (beverages), 10 (cereals), 4 (dairy products), and 2 (meat).

**Chart 13: Frequency of Excluded Lines (HS Chapters 1-24)**

Source: WTO Secretariat.

For industrial products (HS Chapters 25-97), exclusions from liberalization are less frequent. Products in HS Chapter 35 (albuminoidal substances) - most of which are classified as agricultural products in the WTO definition - are the most frequently excluded (in more than 40% of the tariff schedules analysed), followed by Chapters 29 (organic chemicals), 38 (miscellaneous chemical products), 33 (essential oils), 87 (vehicles) and 25 (salt).

**Chart 14: Frequency of Excluded Lines (HS Chapters 25-97)**



Source: WTO Secretariat.

A further analysis of product exclusions can be drawn by looking at exceptions to full liberalization of agricultural products on an HS Chapter basis, horizontally across selected RTAs, particularly those in which disparities in the provision of agricultural concessions are evident. Table 4 shows the results for Canada, Chile, China, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Switzerland and Turkey (using the 3-letter ISO country code for each bilateral relationship).<sup>35</sup>

For Canada (four tariff schedules analysed), HS Chapters 1 (live animals), 2 (meat), 4 (dairy produce), 15 (animal and vegetable fats), 16 (preparations of meat and fish), 17 (sugar), 18 (cocoa), 19 (preparations of cereals), 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations), 22 (beverages, spirits and vinegar), and 23 (residues and waste) are subject to exclusions across all its RTA partners.

For Chile (13 tariff schedules), no single HS Chapter is subject to exclusion across all the RTA partners analysed, though HS Chapters 10 (cereals), 11 (products of the milling industry), 17 (sugar) and 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations) are subject to exclusions across most. With India there are exclusions across all HS Chapters 1-24, and for Japan in all but five. In its RTA with EFTA, all but one HS Chapter (3, fish) has product exclusions in the case of Switzerland and Norway, and seven Chapters in the case of Iceland (which may reflect Iceland's more limited agricultural export potential).

For China (4 schedules), four HS Chapters, 10 (cereals), 11 (products of the milling industry), 15 (animal and vegetable fats) and 17 (sugar) are subject to product exclusions across all four RTAs. All

<sup>35</sup> These countries were selected given the asymmetries in treatment across a number of RTAs.



HS Chapter	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	
CHN-PER			•						•	•	•				•	•	•			•	•			•	
KOR-CHL	•	•		•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
KOR-SIN	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
KOR-ISL	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
KOR-NOR	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
KOR-CHE	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
MEX-CRI		•		•	•		•	•	•							•	•			•	•	•	•		•
MEX-SLV	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•			•	•	•	•		•
MEX-GTM	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•
MEX-HND	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•
MEX-NIC			•					•	•			•	•				•	•			•				•
MEX-JPN	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
PAK-MYS	•	•		•	•				•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•
PAK-LKA				•				•	•					•	•							•	•		•
PAK-CHN	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
CHE-JPN	•	•		•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
CHE-CHL	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
CHE-KOR	•	•		•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
CHE-TUN	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
CHE-EGY	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
CHE-SACU	•	•		•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
CHE-CAN	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
TUR-MAR	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
TUR-TUN	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
TUR-EGY	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
TUR-ALB	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
TUR-GEO	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
TUR-MNE	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
TUR-SRB	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

Source: WTO Secretariat.

## G. ANALYSIS OF MFN VERSUS REMAINING DUTIABLE PREFERENTIAL RATES

In this Section we compare MFN versus dutiable preferential rates on those products still subject to duties at the end of the implementation period in those HS Chapters subject to the most frequent exclusions in a subset of tariff schedules.<sup>36</sup> These are Chapter 2 (meat and edible meat offal), 4 (dairy produce), 7 (edible vegetables), 10 (cereals), 15 (animal or vegetable fats and oils), 16 (preparations of meat and fish), 17 (sugars), 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations), and 22 (beverages, spirits and vinegars). A summary shows that reductions in preferential rates have been made most often in HS Chapters 21 and 16, while in HS Chapters 10, 15 and 22 tariff reductions have been made in only a few schedules suggesting little progress in the liberalization of these products even in a preferential context (Table 5). Detailed results are shown in Annex Charts A1-A9 using the 3-letter ISO country codes for each bilateral relationship.

**Table 5: Summary of MFN versus Remaining Dutiable Preferential Rates, selected RTAs**

	HS Chapter								
	2	4	7	10	15	16	17	21	22
No. of schedules where duties remain	39	39	36	38	36	38	41	40	31
Schedules where reductions are made vis-à-vis MFN rate	7	8	7	4	6	10	7	16	6

Source: WTO Secretariat.

<sup>36</sup> There are a total of nine HS Chapters where one or more product(s) are excluded in 60% or more of the 162 tariff schedules analysed. However, comparisons of MFN and preferential rates are only performed for those RTAs recently subject to the TM (such data are not readily available for other RTAs). A comparison is made for ad valorem rates only.

## H. RELATIVE MARGINS OF PREFERENCE

In this Section the relative margins of preference for RTAs not (or not yet) subject to the Transparency Mechanism are calculated. The information presented in this Section complements that presented in Sections E to G. The analysis is limited to those RTAs for which data were available.<sup>37</sup> For each bilateral relationship, the relative margins of preference are calculated for all goods, agricultural, and non-agricultural goods (WTO definition) at the latest year for which data are available.<sup>38</sup> Results are summarized at the country level by taking an average across the RTAs used in the calculation for each country represented (Table 7).

Data presented here is a snapshot of liberalization at a given point in time (2010 or 2011 in most cases). Given that many RTAs included in the sample are relatively recent, the implementation period may not yet be finished. We would expect therefore that the relative margins of preference to increase over time once the RTAs are fully implemented.

For some countries, RMPs are uniformly high: Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, the United States and Australia all show a relative margin of preference of above 90% in all products, based on the sample. For others, such as the EU, Mexico, Oman, Iceland, Israel, FYROM, Canada, Croatia, and Norway, liberalization of above 90% in non-agricultural products is accompanied by lower (or slower) liberalization in agricultural products, thus resulting in lower overall liberalization. For some developing and transition economies, the relative margin of preference is low for all products, which may result from recent entry into force of the RTAs in the sample or limited ambition.

**Table 7: Relative Margins of Preference (selected RTA parties)**

RTA party	RTAs used in calculation	Relative Margin of Preference			RTA party	RTAs used in calculation	Relative Margin of Preference		
		all prods	WTO-ag	Non-ag			all prods	WTO-ag	Non-ag
Singapore	10	100.0	100.0	100.0	Honduras	2	42.6	37.8	44.3
New Zealand	2	99.9	100.0	99.9	Turkey	7	39.3	9.4	89.1
Chile	5	98.0	89.5	99.3	India	5	36.1	36.0	36.2
United States	7	97.0	93.2	98.8	Colombia	2	34.4	31.1	35.7
Australia	4	91.4	99.3	90.8	Benin	1	32.5	96.4	19.3
EU	21	84.8	63.7	95.0	Burkina Faso	1	32.5	96.4	19.3
Rwanda	1	82.4	83.8	82.0	Côte d'Ivoire	1	32.5	96.4	19.3
Mexico	6	80.6	40.9	98.9	Mali	1	32.5	96.4	19.3
Uganda	1	80.2	80.9	80.0	Niger	1	32.5	96.4	19.3
Oman	1	79.7	23.9	96.3	Senegal	1	32.5	96.4	19.3
China	4	73.5	68.2	74.8	Togo	1	32.5	96.4	19.3
Viet Nam	1	72.7	76.4	71.7	Norway	13	28.3	20.0	100.0
Cameroon	1	71.0	38.4	77.8	Sri Lanka	2	24.7	2.0	34.8
Iceland	11	68.1	40.1	100.0	Ghana	1	19.9	49.8	13.0
Indonesia	4	67.7	69.8	67.5	Papua New Guinea	1	17.1	30.3	10.2
Chinese Taipei	2	59.7	35.5	72.0	Bolivia	1	15.2	17.3	14.7
South Africa	1	58.4	75.1	54.4	Vanuatu	1	9.0	30.3	5.5
Israel	5	56.8	17.6	97.2	Ecuador	1	7.6	8.7	7.3
El Salvador	2	55.9	40.8	62.3	Peru	1	6.4	6.6	6.3
FYROM	2	53.6	6.7	91.8	Bangladesh	1	1.9	3.0	1.7
Japan	2	53.2	17.0	79.3	Kyrgyz Rep.	4	1.7	4.3	0.0
Morocco	2	52.5	9.6	71.6	Georgia	4	1.6	1.8	0.0
Moldova	2	50.1	50.4	50.0	Ukraine	10	0.9	2.4	0.0
Canada	4	48.6	21.0	97.8	Fiji	1	0.2	1.7	0.0
Korea	2	43.7	14.7	82.7	Russian Federation	4	0.1	0.7	0.0
Croatia	3	43.7	0.5	97.3					

Source: WTO Secretariat, based on data from COMTRADE, WITS and Trade Policy Reviews.

<sup>37</sup> Data sources used in this Section are IDB, TPR and WITS databases.


<sup>38</sup> The RMP is calculated by taking the difference between the average applied preferential tariff and the average applied MFN rate, divided by the MFN rate for a given year.

## I. TRANSITION PERIOD AND ASYMMETRY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCESSIONS

The implementation of tariff concessions under RTAs is subject to different liberalization modalities and timetables. In some, though few, RTAs a "big bang" approach is used, whereby all scheduled liberalization takes place upon entry into force of the Agreement. Such liberalization, though immediate, may be selective (i.e. not all tariffs may be liberalized with no foreseen phasing out of remaining tariffs). More common is a phased implementation of tariff concessions over an established transition period. Sometimes the transition period is explicitly stated in the text of the Agreement itself; if not, it can be deduced by consulting the tariff liberalization schedules contained in the annexes and protocols attached to the agreement. In this study, the transition period used for a given RTA is the date of final implementation of tariff concessions undertaken by the slowest liberalizing partner.

Chart 15 provides a breakdown of the transition period in the 192 RTAs studied. Immediate implementation of tariff preferences with no transition period occurred in 27% of the total. A further 38% of RTAs have transition periods of ten years or less. 31% of RTAs studied had transition periods ranging from 11 to 20 years and in 1% the transition period exceeds 20 years. In 3% of the RTAs studied, no transition period was defined, nor was it clear what timetable was foreseen for the implementation of tariff concessions in these RTAs.

**Chart 15: Length of the Transition Period in 192 RTAs surveyed**



Source: WTO Secretariat.


In 47% of 192 RTAs a degree of asymmetry is evident with one (or more) partner(s) being granted longer to implement concessions than the other(s). Although developing country members of the RTA typically benefit from a longer transition period, this is not always the case. Of the 192 RTAs analysed, six contain provisions allowing the developed partner a longer transition period to implement tariff liberalization commitments than its developing country partner.

The link between the length of the transition period and the degree of liberalization is explored for the 65 RTAs that have been subject to the Transparency Mechanism (Chart 16). Again, the implementation period used is that of the slowest liberalizing partner. Of the 65 RTAs, eight have no transition period while two have transition periods above 20 years; slightly more than half have a transition period longer than ten years. The percentage of tariff lines liberalized is an average of all parties to each RTA. In the sample analysed, for WTO non-agricultural products, a longer transition period results in a higher percentage of tariff lines liberalized. For agricultural products, if RTAs



which liberalize using a big-bang approach are put aside, again we see that a longer transition period results in a higher percentage of tariff lines. A larger sample size would allow us to draw firmer conclusions.

**Chart 16: Length of the Transition Period and Degree of Liberalization (Selected RTAs)**



Source: WTO Secretariat.

Note: The figure in parenthesis after the transition period indicates the number of RTAs in each group.

## J. MULTILATERALIZATION OF MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS

Much has been written about the potential for RTAs to contribute to liberalization at the multilateral level, thus reducing the inherent discrimination that liberalization on a preferential basis entails. The extension of RTA-negotiated market access and the reduction of MFN rates would reduce discrimination against non-RTA members and promote the global public good. A convincing argument is made by Hoekman that encouraging non-discriminatory liberalization, particularly in the case of North-South RTAs, would reduce the extent of discrimination against third parties which are often developing countries.<sup>39</sup> His proposal (which he concedes would only be feasible for newly formed RTAs, given that full liberalization is often not the objective of existing RTAs) is that the developed country would liberalize *all* its trade while its developing country partner would commit to lesser liberalization, but on an MFN basis, thus reducing the potential for trade diversion, lowering administration costs and benefitting the WTO membership at large.<sup>40</sup>

In this study we look at two areas relevant to market access in trade in goods where multilateralization of preferences might occur: (1) MFN-type provisions in RTAs; and (2) third country accession to existing RTAs.

### 1. MFN-Type Provisions in RTAs

MFN-type clauses which provide for the extension to RTA parties of more favourable treatment granted to other parties within a plurilateral RTA or to third parties, are a common feature in trade in services, but less common in RTAs containing provisions on trade in goods. This may be due to the

<sup>39</sup> Hoekman, Bernard, "North-South Preferential Trade Agreements", in *Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development*, World Bank, 2011.

<sup>40</sup> This would, however, require changes to GATT Article XXIV.

fact that there is less scope to differentiate preferential regulatory treatment granted in the context of trade in services to preferential partners (and thus an incentive to harmonize preferential treatment), whereas in merchandise trade countries can accord differing tariff treatment depending upon the import source (assuming they have the resources and capacity to administer multiple tariff schedules).

Clearly, there is a difference between the MFN provision in GATT Article I which has universal application among WTO Members (unless subject to permitted exceptions), and an RTA-specific MFN-type clause, which reserves subsequent liberalization to the parties (or a subset of parties) involved in the RTA, but not to the wider WTO Membership. For the RTA parties, such a clause is an avenue to promote further liberalization, while entrenching discrimination towards third parties.

In some cases, MFN-type clauses in RTAs covering trade in goods apply solely to intra-trade (only the case for RTAs involving three or more parties) or in relation to trade with third parties. Such clauses are rarely unconditional, but are frequently subject to conditions which restrict their scope and application, by, for example, limiting the scope to certain products or to agreements subsequently negotiated with certain parties. There is often a degree of asymmetry in that not all parties may provide more favourable treatment or only certain parties benefit from it.

MFN-type provisions on trade in goods limited to intra-trade among the parties were found in four RTAs (Table 8). A third-party MFN-type clause was found in 44 of the 192 RTAs studied. In five RTAs, the provision of more favourable treatment is unconditional (though in the case of COMESA, subject to reciprocity); in others, it is subject to conditions or restrictions, such as certain goods or third parties, with application limited to certain RTA parties. In some cases, the parties agree to negotiate to decide whether more favourable treatment is to be granted. The 44 RTAs containing third-party MFN-type clauses are broad in geographical scope. The EU's economic partnership agreements (with Cameroon, CARIFORUM and Côte d'Ivoire) contain such a clause (limited in the case of the ACP partner to RTAs signed with major trading partners). Many of EFTA's RTAs contain MFN-type provisions, but they are heterogeneous in scope: in some, more favourable treatment is granted only by the EFTA states (in processed agricultural products covered under the Agreement); in others, only the partner grants more favourable treatment (usually in industrial products) and in two (with Turkey and Singapore) all parties grant more favourable treatment (for EFTA-Turkey only on processed agricultural goods).

**Table 8: MFN-type Provisions applying to merchandise trade in RTAs**

RTA	Scope and Conditions of Application	Exceptions
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement	in matters of trade	bilateral FTAs, less advanced participating States, ESCAP, industrial co-operation agreements
ASEAN - Australia - New Zealand	Intra-trade only. The acceleration or improvement of tariff commitments on trade in goods between two or more parties is to be extended to all parties.	
ASEAN - China (G)	Intra-trade only. All commitments undertaken by each Party shall be applied to all the other Parties.	
ASEAN - India	Intra-trade only. Applies to all originating goods.	
ASEAN - Japan	Intra-trade only. Applies to all goods.	
Chile - Costa Rica	Marks of origin, products subject to price bands	
Chile - El Salvador	Marks of origin, products subject to price bands	
COMESA	Unconditional application, all goods, "on a reciprocal basis"	
ECOWAS	Unconditional application	
LAIA	Upon negotiation, goods covered by other partial agreements	
Andean Community	All goods	i) Agreements facilitating border traffic. ii) Ecuador and Bolivia exempted until adoption of a decision
ASEAN Free Trade Area	Upon negotiation, import duties	
Australia - New Zealand	Tariffs on goods	For NZ: Papua Guinea and LDCs; For Australia: Cook


RTA	Scope and Conditions of Application	Exceptions
		Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Western Samoa or LDCs
<b>Australia - Papua New Guinea (PATCRA)</b>	customs duties and charges, export and import rules and formalities, internal taxes and other internal charges, regulations and requirements affecting internal sales, restrictions and prohibitions on import or export of goods, the allocation of foreign exchange, administration of foreign exchange restrictions	i) advantages to facilitate frontier traffic, ii) tariff and preferences in other RTAs, iii) tariff preferences to developing countries v) multilateral commodity agreement
<b>CARICOM</b>	Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Member State shall, with respect to any rights covered by this Treaty, accord to another Member State treatment no less favourable than that accorded to: (a) a third Member State; or (b) third States.	
<b>EU - Cameroon</b>	Post signature, the EU grants any more favourable treatment applied in EIAs. Cameroon grants any more favourable treatment with "any major trading partner".	
<b>EU - CARIFORUM</b>	Post signature, the EU grants any more favourable treatment applied in FTAs. CARIFORUM grants any more favourable treatment with "any major trading economy", subject to consultations.	The Parties may deny the MFN treatment contained in the FTA to the EU.
<b>EU - Chile</b>	Limited to products subject to price band in Chile, in RTAs notified under GATT Art. XXIV	Only applied by Chile
<b>EU - Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Post signature, the EU grants any more favourable treatment applied in FTAs. Cote d'Ivoire grants any more favourable treatment with "a major trade partner", subject to consultations.	
<b>EU - Syria</b>	Applied by Syria only, "subject to the special provisions relating to frontier zone trade".	FTAs, Customs Unions; regional economic integration or developing countries
<b>ECO</b>	Tariffs, para-tariff, non-tariffs barriers. The third country should be a WTO member and the beneficiary Party should be a non-WTO Member	Only benefits non-WTO Parties to the Agreement
<b>EFTA - Chile</b>	Upon negotiation. For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA grants treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU, based on reviews that can be requested by either party. Any duty reduction granted by the EFTA states to be reciprocated by Chile.	
<b>EFTA - Croatia</b>	For industrial products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU.	Only offered by Croatia
<b>EFTA - Egypt</b>	For processed agricultural goods subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU, based on reviews requested by Egypt.	Only offered by EFTA
<b>EFTA - FYROM</b>	For industrial and processed agricultural products subject to concessions, FYROM accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. For processed agricultural products EFTA accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU (upon request of review).	
<b>EFTA - Jordan</b>	For industrial and processed agricultural products subject to concessions, Jordan accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. For processed agricultural products EFTA accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to EU (upon request of review).	
<b>EFTA - Korea, Republic of</b>	For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA offers treatment no less favourable than that accorded to EU on 1 April 2005, based on reviews that can be requested by either party.	Only granted by EFTA
<b>EFTA - Lebanon</b>	For industrial products, in the event Lebanon agrees on accelerated tariff dismantling with the EU, it shall, upon request by EFTA, provide adequate opportunity for negotiations with a view to providing the same treatment.	Only granted by Lebanon
<b>EFTA - Morocco</b>	For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA and Morocco accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU (for EFTA, upon request of review).	
<b>EFTA - Palestinian Authority</b>	For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU, based on reviews that can be requested by either party.	Offered by EFTA only
<b>EFTA - SACU</b>	For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA grants treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU.	Only granted by EFTA
<b>EFTA - Singapore</b>	Upon request. If a party concludes an RTA with a non-Party under Art. XXIV, it shall, upon request afford adequate opportunity to negotiate any additional benefits granted therein.	
<b>EFTA - Tunisia</b>	Upon request. For industrial and processed agricultural products subject to concessions, Tunisia accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU or other EFTA states (upon request of review).	
<b>EFTA - Turkey</b>	Upon request of a review. For processed agricultural products subject to	

RTA	Scope and Conditions of Application	Exceptions
	concessions, the Parties offer treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU.	
<b>EFTA (Stockholm Convention)</b>	For processed agricultural products, the Parties offer treatment no less favourable than that offered to the EU or to any FTA partner.	
<b>Iceland - Faroe Islands</b>	Unconditional application, all goods	
<b>India - Nepal</b>	Unconditional application. i) Customs duties and charges, ii) import regulations	
<b>India - Singapore</b>	Post signature to this agreement, upon request and negotiation	
<b>Japan - Singapore</b>	Pre and post entry into force, parties to favourably consider offering treatment no less favourable than that offered to a third party.	
<b>Lao - Thailand</b>	goods	Membership in customs unions, FTAs, regional integration agreements.
<b>Melanesian Spearhead Group</b>	goods	FTAs, customs unions, multi-lateral commodity agreements.
<b>MERCOSUR - India</b>	all goods, upon consultation	
<b>MERCOSUR</b>	Any advantage, favour, exemption, immunity or privilege granted to third countries (except members of LAIA) is extended automatically to MERCOSUR.	
<b>PICTA</b>	goods	Agreements to facilitate frontier traffic, tariff preferences through FTAs or customs unions, multilateral commodity agreements.
<b>SADC</b>	all goods	RTAs in force at entry into force of SADC
<b>Turkey - Albania</b>	For industrial products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU.	Offered by Albania only
<b>Turkey - Montenegro</b>	For industrial products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU.	Offered by Montenegro only
<b>US-Peru</b>	For some agricultural products, Peru offers the United States the lowest tariff rates that Peru provides to such goods pursuant to any preferential trade arrangement signed or modified by Peru after December 2005.	Offered by Peru only

Source: WTO Secretariat.

## 2. Accession provisions

Provision for a third party to accede to an existing RTA provides an indication of the RTA's openness and the potential for the extension of market access opportunities to acceding parties. In some RTAs, accession is restricted to countries in a certain geographical area or to those acceding to a pre-existing RTA which is itself a party to an RTA, e.g. EFTA's or ASEAN's RTAs. Of the 192 RTAs surveyed, 61% do not permit the accession of third parties or are silent on the issue, while 38% permit accession. Of those permitting accession, more than half provide for accession of any third party, though often subject to terms and conditions to be agreed upon by the RTA parties. Chart 17 summarizes the results.

**Chart 17: Summary of Accession Provisions in 192 RTAs surveyed**

Source: WTO Secretariat.

#### K. COMMITMENT TO FURTHER LIBERALIZATION

A number of RTAs contain provisions committing their parties to engage in further liberalization at some point in the future. In some RTAs the specific time period for negotiations is laid down, in others it is not. Sometimes provisions governing future liberalization apply only to specific products such as agricultural products where coverage tends to be lower; in others, a general evolutionary clause commits the parties to consider extending coverage of the agreement to areas not yet covered. Of the 192 RTAs considered in this study, 59% contain a provision providing for the parties to negotiate further market access or to expand the agreement to areas not already covered by the agreement. In 15 RTAs, the timeframe for negotiations is specified - usually two to five years after the date of entry into force, though in one case the timeframe given is 20 years after the entry into force (for dairy products only). In other RTAs no specific timeframe is laid out.

#### L. CONCLUSIONS

The negotiation, administration and implementation of RTAs demands considerable resources. A simple measurement of the number of RTAs in which a country engages is not sufficient to determine the complexity of the trading regime it faces. This can be complemented by measuring the number of preferential bilateral relations and the share and evolution of trade that takes place among preferential partners (bearing in mind that preference utilization data are not readily available). Taken together, these measures provide a more accurate picture of the complexity of the preferential trading landscape for individual WTO Members. A sample of the evolution of trade flows for the ten countries most active in RTAs indicates that trade shares with a majority of their preferential trading partners are negligible, thus suggesting that motivations other than a desire to increase market access may account for countries' participation in RTAs. Further work is necessary to explore this observation.

The analysis of trade and tariff liberalization at the harmonized HS 6-digit level for 65 RTAs already subject to the TM provides a horizontal overview of liberalization undertaken at both entry into force and the end of the implementation period. Some trends are evident. First, in many RTAs agricultural products are subject to lower and slower liberalization, frequent product exclusions in HS Chapters 1-24, and subject to systematic protection in some countries. Disparities in liberalization strategies are evident in some RTAs, suggesting that liberalization tends to be a negotiated and reciprocated outcome, depending on the partner. Once more RTAs are subject to the TM, these observations can be retested. Products subject to the most frequent exclusions in the 65 RTAs studied are sugar, miscellaneous edible preparations, beverages, cereals, dairy products and meat. An analysis of MFN

versus remaining dutiable preferential rates shows that tariff peaks remain in place, suggesting that little effort has been made to liberalize such products, even in a preferential context. Analysis of the relative margins of preference in RTAs not (or, not yet) subject to the TM confirms the observation that the liberalization of agricultural products, even in a preferential setting, is sensitive. This suggests that multilateral liberalization of these products may be more difficult.

The study also looked at certain regulatory provisions which have a bearing on market access. Two thirds of the 192 RTAs studied would satisfy the condition in the Understanding to GATT Article XXIV that liberalization should take place within ten years. A transition period of up to 20 years is applied for the other third. In 3% of RTAs, no transition period is stated in the agreement. A survey of those RTAs subject to the TM shows that a longer transition period results in general in greater liberalization of tariff lines. A larger sample size is needed in order to draw firmer conclusions.

The paper examines two issues which may result in the multilateralization of preferences to a wider WTO audience. MFN-type provisions applicable to merchandise trade are found in about 15% of the RTAs studied. Such provisions are rarely unconditional, but are frequently subject to conditions which restrict their scope and application, thus providing little scope for the extension of preferences. Nonetheless, tariff liberalization in a preferential context, albeit with a limited number of partners, may foster a country's willingness to liberalize at a future point either multilaterally, unilaterally, or both. A time series analysis of WTO Members' MFN and preferential rates would allow us to explore this further. Provisions allowing for third-party accession to RTAs are found in about a third of the 192 RTAs studied. Such provisions are, however, frequently conditional on factors such as geographic location, thus limiting the potential to extend membership in RTAs to third parties.

A number of RTAs contain provisions committing their parties to engage in further liberalization or to extend the coverage of the agreement to other regulatory areas. Further study could be undertaken to determine to what extent such provisions have been used and the results achieved. The Transparency Mechanism makes provision for countries participating in RTAs to notify changes to an RTA and to submit an implementation report at the end of the RTA's implementation period.<sup>41</sup> Compliance with these provisions would provide a source of valuable information regarding subsequent liberalization undertaken by RTA parties.

---

<sup>41</sup> To date few notifications of changes have been received, nor has any implementation report been submitted. The issue of submission of implementation reports is currently under discussion in the WTO's Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.

## ANNEX

Table A1: Participation in RTAs and Percentages of Trade sourced from RTA Partners

WTO Member	Region	Accession year	No. of notified RTAs	No. of RTA partners	Data Year	Imports		Exports	
						Value \$m (total)	from RTA partners (%)	Value \$m (total)	to RTA partners (%)
Angola	Africa	1996	1	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Benin	Africa	1996	3	14	2006	1,003	24.5	225	36.4
Botswana	Africa	1995	3	18	2008	5,099	80.6	4,838	28.8
Burkina Faso	Africa	1995	2	14	2005	1,161	44.3	332	73.2
Burundi	Africa	1995	1	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Cameroon	Africa	1995	3	6	2006	3,150	39.7	3,576	76.8
Cape Verde	Africa	2008	1	14	2007	737	1.1	115	31.4
Cent. Afr. Rep.	Africa	1995	1	5	2003	100	11.6	66	3.7
Chad	Africa	1996	1	5	1995	215	17.2	n.a.	n.a.
Congo	Africa	1997	1	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Côte d'Ivoire	Africa	1995	3	15	2008	7,884	59.1	9,779	74
DR Congo	Africa	1997	0	26	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Djibouti	Africa	1995	0	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Egypt	Africa	1995	6	39	2008	52,752	46.8	26,224	64.9
Gabon	Africa	1995	1	5	2006	1,725	4.1	6,015	0.7
The Gambia	Africa	1996	1	14	2008	329	13.9	14	19.7
Ghana	Africa	1995	2	14	2008	9,058	11.9	4,033	6.9
Guinea	Africa	1995	2	5	2008	1,908	2.1	1,487	0.2
Guinea Bissau	Africa	1995	2	14	2005	112	42.9	23	0.1
Kenya	Africa	1995	2	19	2008	11,128	4.6	5,001	40.8
Lesotho	Africa	1995	4	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Madagascar	Africa	1995	0	25	2008	3,846	9.9	1,667	3.8
Malawi	Africa	1995	2	25	2008	2,204	61.3	879	26
Mali	Africa	1995	2	14	2008	3,339	33.4	1,918	13.1
Mauritania	Africa	1995	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Mauritius	Africa	1995	2	25	2008	4,670	11.4	2,401	10.7
Morocco	Africa	1995	6	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Mozambique	Africa	1995	2	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Namibia	Africa	1995	3	18	2008	4,689	70.6	4,729	47.5
Niger	Africa	1996	2	14	2008	1,247	17.6	503	17.8
Nigeria	Africa	1995	2	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Rwanda	Africa	1996	1	19	2008	1,146	38.7	398	54.1
Senegal	Africa	1995	2	14	2008	6,528	16.3	2,170	41.3
Sierra Leone	Africa	1995	1	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
South Africa	Africa	1995	4	19	2008	87,593	37.7	73,966	46.4
Swaziland	Africa	1995	4	30	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Tanzania	Africa	1995	4	25	2008	8,088	18.2	3,121	30.8
Togo	Africa	1995	2	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Tunisia	Africa	1995	6	23	2008	24,638	72	19,320	85.6
Uganda	Africa	1995	2	20	2008	4,526	14.4	1,724	43.7
Zambia	Africa	1995	2	25	2008	5,060	58.7	5,099	26.9
Zimbabwe	Africa	1995	3	25	2008	2,832	76.3	1,694	64.9
Algeria	Africa	NM	2	18	2008	39,475	55.6	79,298	55.1
Libya	Africa	NM	2	35	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Sudan	Africa	NM	3	34	2008	16,417	34.8	9,501	7.3
Antigua & Barbuda	Caribbean	1995	2	15	2007	573	20.8	99	34
Barbados	Caribbean	1995	2	15	2008	1,744	38.7	454	46.5
Cuba	Caribbean	1995	2	0					
Dominica	Caribbean	1995	2	15	2008	232	40.2	40	89.2
Dominican Rep.	Caribbean	1995	2	7	2008	16,353	52.4	5,617	76.3
Grenada	Caribbean	1996	2	15	2008	363	40.5	31	74.6
Haiti	Caribbean	1996	1	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Jamaica	Caribbean	1995	2	15	2008	8,465	25.4	2,439	32.7
St Kitts & Nevis	Caribbean	1996	2	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Saint Lucia	Caribbean	1995	2	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
St Vincent & Gr.	Caribbean	1995	2	15	2008	373	41.9	52	93.7

WTO Member	Region	Accession year	No. of notified RTAs	No. of RTA partners	Data Year	Imports		Exports	
						Value \$m (total)	from RTA partners (%)	Value	to RTA partners (%)
								\$m (total)	
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	Caribbean	1995	3	15	2008	9,591	14.5	18,650	32.5
Bahamas	Caribbean	NM	2	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Belize</b>	Central America	1995	2	15	2008	837	7	295	32
<b>Costa Rica</b>	Central America	1995	6	10	2008	15,289	53	9,745	61.6
<b>El Salvador</b>	Central America	1995	6	9	2008	9,754	56.4	4,549	88.5
<b>Guatemala</b>	Central America	1995	3	7	2008	14,522	57.3	7,737	77.9
<b>Honduras</b>	Central America	1995	5	9	2007	6,530	67.9	2,391	72.3
<b>Nicaragua</b>	Central America	1995	5	8	2008	4,744	43.7	2,538	69
<b>Panama</b>	Central America	1997	6	6	2008	9,022	7.6	1,145	12.2
<b>Armenia</b>	CIS	2003	8	11	2008	4,101	31.2	1,055	31.1
<b>Georgia</b>	CIS	2000	8	13	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Kyrgyz Rep.</b>	CIS	1998	9	15	2008	4,072	56.2	1,618	54.2
<b>Moldova</b>	CIS	2001	5	18	2008	4,899	35.5	1,591	39.4
<b>Ukraine</b>	CIS	2008	14	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Russian Federation</b>	CIS	2012	7	11	2008	267,051	13.7	467,994	14.9
Azerbaijan	CIS	NM	4	15	2008	7,162	45.4	47,756	5.6
Belarus	CIS	NM	4	11	2008	39,483	66	32,902	43.8
Kazakhstan	CIS	NM	8	11	2009	28,408	44.6	43,196	21.2
Tajikistan	CIS	NM	4	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Turkmenistan	CIS	NM	4	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Uzbekistan	CIS	NM	4	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Brunei Darussalam</b>	East Asia	1995	6	12	2006	1,676	61.2	7,636	58.3
<b>Cambodia</b>	East Asia	2004	4	12	2008	4,416	60	4,358	7.8
<b>China</b>	East Asia	2001	9	20	2008	1,132,562	24.8	1,430,693	30.5
<b>Hong Kong, China</b>	East Asia	1995	1	1	2008	392,962	46.1	370,242	48.2
<b>Indonesia</b>	East Asia	1995	6	13	2008	129,244	58.9	137,020	52
<b>Japan</b>	East Asia	1995	11	13	2008	762,534	16.4	781,412	15.4
<b>Rep. of Korea</b>	East Asia	1995	6	11	2008	435,271	23	422,003	29.4
<b>Macao, China</b>	East Asia	1995	1	1	2008	5,880	35.9	1,998	12.3
<b>Malaysia</b>	East Asia	1995	7	14	2008	156,203	52.4	198,846	51.2
<b>Mongolia</b>	East Asia	1997	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Myanmar</b>	East Asia	1995	5	13	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Philippines</b>	East Asia	1995	7	13	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Singapore</b>	East Asia	1995	17	24	2008	319,780	65.2	338,176	67.6
<b>Chinese Taipei</b>	East Asia	2002	3	4	2009	174,943	0.04	203,494	0.14
<b>Thailand</b>	East Asia	1995	9	13	2008	178,613	50	175,908	47.9
<b>Viet Nam</b>	East Asia	2007	6	13	2008	80,714	56.2	62,685	44.8
Laos	East Asia	NM	6	13	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Albania</b>	Europe	2000	3	9	2008	5,250	75	1,355	95.2
<b>Croatia</b>	Europe	2000	4	13	2008	30,727	72.4	14,124	86.3
<b>EU 27</b>	Europe	1995	28	41	2008	2,284,917	23.2	1,928,554	27.1
<b>FYROM</b>	Europe	2003	6	14	2007	5,228	69.2	3,356	96.6
<b>Iceland</b>	Europe	1995	19	25	2008	6,166	71.4	5,355	83.4
<b>Liechtenstein</b>	Europe	1995	18	24	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Montenegro</b>	Europe	2012	3	9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Norway</b>	Europe	1995	19	25	2008	89,002	76.6	167,812	89
<b>Switzerland</b>	Europe	1995	20	26	2008	183,516	83.8	200,615	71.6
<b>Turkey</b>	Europe	1995	16	26	2008	201,961	48.9	132,002	62.7
Andorra	Europe	NM	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Europe	NM	3	9	2008	12,189	82.2	5,021	92.3
Faroe Islands	Europe	NM	4	4	2008	988	86.6	852	83.6
San Marino	Europe	NM	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Serbia	Europe	NM	3	8	2008	22,875	61.2	10,972	87.4
<b>Bahrain</b>	Middle East	1995	3	18	2007	11,515	12.7	13,665	13.2
<b>Israel</b>	Middle East	1995	7	9	2008	65,171	56.8	61,337	68.3
<b>Jordan</b>	Middle East	2000	5	24	2008	16,872	60.8	7,782	62.5
<b>Kuwait</b>	Middle East	1995	2	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Oman</b>	Middle East	2000	3	18	2008	22,925	38.3	37,719	15.4
<b>Qatar</b>	Middle East	1996	2	17	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	Middle East	2005	2	17	2007	90,214	7.2	234,951	8.7



WTO Member	Region	Accession year	No. of notified RTAs	No. of RTA partners	Data Year	Imports		Exports	
						Value \$m (total)	from RTA partners (%)	Value	to RTA partners (%)
								\$m (total)	
<b>UAE</b>	Middle East	1996	2	17	2008	175,486	5.2	210,000	7.4
Iran	Middle East	NM	2	9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Iraq	Middle East	NM	2	17	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lebanon	Middle East	NM	3	22	2008	16,136	53.7	3,478	71.7
Syria	Middle East	NM	3	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
The Pal. Auth.	Middle East	NM	3	24	2008	3,569	13.8	558	9.8
Yemen	Middle East	NM	1	17	2009	7,556	18.5	5,594	7.8
<b>Canada</b>	North America	1995	6	10	2008	408,740	60	455,718	80.1
<b>Mexico</b>	North America	1995	14	15	2008	308,583	72.4	291,265	91.5
<b>USA</b>	North America	1995	11	17	2008	2,164,834	29.8	1,299,899	40.5
<b>Australia</b>	Oceania	1995	8	14	2008	191,584	38.1	186,853	20.8
<b>Fiji</b>	Oceania	1996	3	12	2007	1,780	0.4	746	11.4
<b>New Zealand</b>	Oceania	1995	7	13	2008	34,367	47	30,578	40.3
<b>Papua NG</b>	Oceania	1996	4	13	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Solomon Isl.</b>	Oceania	1996	3	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Tonga</b>	Oceania	2007	2	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Argentina</b>	South America	1995	4	4	2008	57,422	36.2	70,021	24.2
<b>Bolivia</b>	South America	1995	3	3	2008	5,006	9.7	6,899	7.2
<b>Brazil</b>	South America	1995	5	4	2008	173,197	10.7	197,942	11.5
<b>Chile</b>	South America	1995	18	20	2008	58,173	65.8	69,085	77.4
<b>Colombia</b>	South America	1995	4	4	2008	39,669	6.2	37,626	8.8
<b>Ecuador</b>	South America	1996	3	3	2008	18,686	12	18,511	13.5
<b>Guyana</b>	South America	1995	3	15	2008	1,346	38	830	45.5
<b>Paraguay</b>	South America	1995	5	4	2008	8,977	42.7	4,390	48.8
<b>Peru</b>	South America	1995	8	7	2007	20,464	50.4	27,800	41.3
<b>Suriname</b>	South America	1995	2	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Uruguay</b>	South America	1995	5	4	2008	9,069	44	5,942	27.1
<b>Venezuela</b>	South America	1995	3	0					
<b>Bangladesh</b>	West Asia	1995	5	9	2007	17,623	33.6	13,143	7.4
<b>India</b>	West Asia	1995	10	14	2008	315,712	17.1	181,861	20.3
<b>Maldives</b>	West Asia	1995	2	6	2008	1,388	16.7	126	11
<b>Nepal</b>	West Asia	2004	2	6	2009	3,754	57.1	885	71
<b>Pakistan</b>	West Asia	1995	8	17	2008	42,327	22	20,279	20.9
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	West Asia	1995	6	9	2008	13,629	32	8,177	7.9
Afghanistan	West Asia	NM	2	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bhutan	West Asia	NM	3	6	2008	543	75.1	521	98.8

Note:

1. Members of the WTO are shown in bold.
  2. EU(27) is counted as one. Figures for EU(27) do not include EU intra-trade.
  3. GSTP, LAIA, SPARTECA, and PTN are included in the number of RTAs, but not included in the number of RTA partners. This accounts in some instances, e.g. Cuba, Venezuela for a country having notified RTAs but no listed partners.
  4. Reflects current actual RTA membership (which may in some cases differ from membership notified to the WTO), for instance in the case of the membership of COMESA.
  5. In the event of overlapping membership in RTAs, the partner is counted only once.
- n.a. = no data available

Source: WTO Secretariat, based on data from UN COMTRADE.

Table A2: Percentage Share of Global Imports sourced from RTA partners (selected Reporters)

EIF	Reporter	Partner	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1997	Chile	Canada	3.06	2.62	2.07	1.69	1.39	1.23	1.24	2.03	1.54	1.69
1999		Mexico	3.70	3.30	3.08	2.48	2.49	2.32	2.61	2.86	2.82	2.78
2002		Costa Rica	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04
2002		El Salvador	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02
2003		EU	17.09	18.85	19.37	16.42	14.29	15.25	13.44	12.63	11.52	15.50
2004		US	19.69	18.44	16.57	12.47	13.30	14.19	14.34	15.24	17.50	16.77
2004		EFTA	0.91	1.01	0.82	0.69	0.69	0.62	0.53	0.60	0.57	0.66
2004		Korea	3.22	3.34	2.85	2.63	2.58	3.21	4.18	6.53	5.06	5.05
2006		China	5.71	6.28	7.16	6.27	7.04	7.41	8.74	10.07	10.74	11.78
2006		SEP	0.37	0.33	0.27	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.34	0.31	0.23
2007		India	0.42	0.47	0.53	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.75	0.64
2007		Japan	4.22	3.40	3.47	3.18	3.15	3.04	2.92	3.29	4.22	3.10
2008		Panama	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04
2009		Australia	0.65	0.52	0.63	0.45	0.55	0.50	0.52	0.45	0.49	0.52
2009	Colombia	1.23	1.17	1.34	1.05	1.19	1.06	0.95	1.87	3.44	3.21	
2011	Turkey	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.09	1.79	1.38	0.09	
1973	Iceland	EU	57.06	54.93	52.50	56.90	60.89	61.64	57.30	60.00	53.63	51.78
1973	Norway	EU	62.54	65.73	66.71	66.89	70.66	69.11	68.60	68.80	66.87	66.31
1973	Switzerland	EU	74.47	76.23	77.29	78.83	80.72	79.97	78.46	79.44	78.80	78.00
1992	EFTA	Turkey	0.30	0.32	0.39	0.43	0.48	0.52	0.48	0.54	0.50	0.52
1993		Israel	0.30	0.28	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.26	0.20
1999		Pal. Auth.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1999		Morocco	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.06
2001		FYROM	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
2001		Mexico	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.21
2002		Croatia	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
2002		Jordan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
2003		Singapore	0.21	0.33	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.31	0.35
2004		Chile	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09
2005		Tunisia	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04
2006		Korea	0.98	0.68	0.47	0.60	0.58	0.66	0.76	0.59	0.66	0.75
2007		Egypt	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.07
2007		Lebanon	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.10	0.09
2008		SACU	0.36	0.43	0.46	0.63	0.67	0.72	0.72	0.65	0.61	0.92
2009		Canada	1.13	1.06	0.83	0.86	1.02	1.15	1.28	1.82	1.30	1.04
2010		Serbia							0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
2010		Albania	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1973		EU	Switzerland	5.81	5.91	5.94	5.65	5.97	5.59	5.24	5.34	5.13
1973	Iceland		0.16	0.16	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18
1973	Norway		4.46	4.39	4.70	4.95	5.35	5.67	5.83	5.34	6.12	5.71
1977	Syria		0.33	0.40	0.41	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.19
1991	Andorra		0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
1996	Turkey		1.70	1.97	2.23	2.42	3.00	2.84	2.85	3.28	2.94	3.00
1997	Faroe Isl.		0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
1997	Pal. Auth.		-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1998	Tunisia		0.53	0.60	0.61	0.62	0.65	0.57	0.56	0.63	0.61	0.65
2000	South Africa		1.40	1.56	1.58	1.49	1.53	1.42	1.36	1.45	1.43	1.24
2000	Morocco		0.58	0.61	0.64	0.63	0.64	0.77	0.53	0.56	0.54	0.54
2000	Israel		0.96	0.93	0.86	0.75	0.83	0.81	0.72	0.79	0.72	0.74
2000	Mexico		0.68	0.72	0.63	0.62	0.67	0.77	0.77	0.84	0.88	0.83
2001	FYROM		0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.10
2002	San Marino		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
2002	Jordan		0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
2002	Croatia		0.21	0.24	0.25	0.27	0.38	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.33	0.36
2003	Lebanon		0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
2003	Chile		0.49	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.70	0.68	0.90	0.88	0.72	0.62
2004	Egypt		0.33	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.41	0.44	0.55	0.49	0.53	0.51
2005	Algeria		1.59	1.56	1.44	1.46	1.48	1.76	1.78	1.43	1.80	1.44
2006	Albania		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
2008	Bosnia & Herzegovina		0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.13
2008	Montenegro		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01
2008	CARIFORUM		0.32	0.31	0.35	0.31	0.30	0.34	0.34	0.28	0.35	0.33
2009	Cameroon		0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.16	0.14
2009	Côte d'Ivoire		0.19	0.20	0.25	0.25	0.21	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.20	0.25
2010	Serbia		-	-	-	-	-	-	0.10	0.20	0.25	0.27
1976	India		APTA	4.58	6.08	7.01	8.59	9.92	10.83	11.93	14.04	12.93
2001		Sri Lanka	0.08	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.34	0.40	0.28	0.20	0.17	0.12
2003		Afghanistan	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05
2005		Singapore	2.65	2.67	2.32	2.58	2.52	2.24	2.91	3.16	2.63	2.31
2006		SAFTA	0.90	1.12	0.83	0.84	0.88	0.94	0.82	0.75	0.65	0.52
2006		Bhutan	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.05

EIF	Reporter	Partner	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
2007		Chile	0.13	0.15	0.22	0.24	0.31	0.27	0.86	<b>0.86</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.33</b>
2009		MERCOSUR	1.05	1.45	1.18	1.22	1.18	1.09	1.09	0.74	0.56	<b>1.32</b>
2009		Nepal	0.49	0.70	0.46	0.40	0.34	0.27	0.18	0.21	0.20	<b>0.16</b>
2010		ASEAN	8.12	8.58	8.37	9.23	8.64	7.55	9.15	9.62	8.46	9.00
2010		Korea	1.54	2.24	2.19	3.33	3.40	3.13	2.74	2.49	2.65	3.09
2002	Japan	Singapore	1.69	1.54	<b>1.48</b>	<b>1.42</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>1.30</b>	<b>1.29</b>	1.13	1.03	1.11
2005		Mexico	0.63	0.57	0.53	0.46	0.48	<b>0.49</b>	<b>0.49</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.51</b>
2006		Malaysia	3.82	3.68	3.32	3.29	3.10	2.84	<b>2.67</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>3.04</b>	<b>3.03</b>
2007		Chile	0.75	0.70	0.64	0.69	0.92	0.99	1.25	<b>1.31</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>0.96</b>
2007		Thailand	2.79	2.97	3.11	3.10	3.10	3.02	2.92	<b>2.94</b>	<b>2.73</b>	<b>2.90</b>
2008		Indonesia	4.31	4.26	4.20	4.29	4.11	4.04	4.17	4.26	<b>4.28</b>	<b>3.96</b>
2008		Brunei Dar.	0.44	0.49	0.45	0.48	0.42	0.44	0.40	0.40	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.60</b>
2008		ASEAN	15.69	15.57	15.31	15.28	14.83	14.07	13.81	14.00	<b>14.03</b>	<b>14.11</b>
2008		Philippines	1.90	1.84	1.94	1.84	1.81	1.49	1.37	1.40	<b>1.11</b>	<b>1.16</b>
2009		Switzerland	0.87	0.94	0.98	1.01	1.06	0.98	0.88	0.84	0.84	<b>1.14</b>
2009		Vietnam	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.81	0.85	0.88	0.91	0.98	1.19	<b>1.26</b>
1994	Mexico	NAFTA	<b>73.41</b>	<b>70.26</b>	<b>66.04</b>	<b>64.41</b>	<b>59.24</b>	<b>56.42</b>	<b>53.96</b>	<b>52.46</b>	<b>52.24</b>	<b>51.24</b>
1995		Colombia	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.32</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.35</b>	<b>0.26</b>
1995		Costa Rica	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.26</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.39</b>
1998		Nicaragua	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.05</b>
1999		Chile	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.63</b>	<b>0.74</b>	<b>0.79</b>	<b>0.96</b>	<b>0.92</b>	<b>0.84</b>	<b>0.70</b>
2000		Israel	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.18</b>
2000		EU	<b>8.23</b>	<b>9.59</b>	<b>9.75</b>	<b>10.44</b>	<b>11.00</b>	<b>11.62</b>	<b>11.30</b>	<b>12.03</b>	<b>12.72</b>	<b>11.65</b>
2001		El Salvador	0.01	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>
2001		Guatemala	0.05	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.21</b>
2001		Honduras	0.01	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.08</b>
2001		EFTA	0.48	<b>0.54</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.60</b>
2005		Japan	3.60	4.80	5.54	4.45	5.38	<b>5.90</b>	<b>5.97</b>	<b>5.80</b>	<b>5.28</b>	<b>4.86</b>
1992	Singapore	ASEAN	<b>24.72</b>	<b>25.01</b>	<b>26.17</b>	<b>29.04</b>	<b>27.25</b>	<b>26.05</b>	<b>26.12</b>	<b>25.02</b>	<b>23.38</b>	<b>24.02</b>
2001		New Zealand	0.14	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.23</b>
2002		Japan	17.21	13.86	<b>12.52</b>	<b>11.30</b>	<b>11.00</b>	<b>9.61</b>	<b>8.35</b>	<b>8.19</b>	<b>8.11</b>	<b>7.62</b>
2003		EFTA	1.84	1.95	1.83	<b>1.67</b>	<b>1.49</b>	<b>1.35</b>	<b>1.00</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>1.22</b>	<b>1.62</b>
2003		Australia	1.71	2.07	1.85	<b>1.60</b>	<b>1.32</b>	<b>1.46</b>	<b>1.57</b>	<b>1.20</b>	<b>1.43</b>	<b>1.63</b>
2004		US	15.07	16.51	14.26	13.20	<b>11.93</b>	<b>11.72</b>	<b>12.68</b>	<b>12.43</b>	<b>11.85</b>	<b>11.89</b>
2005		India	0.80	0.96	1.00	1.06	1.60	<b>2.04</b>	<b>2.05</b>	<b>2.23</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>2.29</b>
2005		Jordan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
2006		Korea	3.58	3.29	3.69	3.64	4.04	4.30	<b>4.39</b>	<b>4.86</b>	<b>5.62</b>	<b>5.71</b>
2006		SEP	0.38	0.34	0.38	0.34	0.29	0.29	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.36</b>	<b>0.35</b>
2006		Panama	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>
2009		China	5.29	6.21	7.61	8.12	9.33	10.26	11.40	12.13	10.56	<b>10.55</b>
2009		Peru	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	<b>0.01</b>
1992	Turkey	EFTA	<b>2.12</b>	<b>3.58</b>	<b>4.84</b>	<b>4.90</b>	<b>4.01</b>	<b>3.80</b>	<b>3.24</b>	<b>3.40</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>1.97</b>
1996		EU	<b>48.86</b>	<b>44.16</b>	<b>45.42</b>	<b>45.71</b>	<b>46.62</b>	<b>42.19</b>	<b>39.48</b>	<b>40.38</b>	<b>37.06</b>	<b>40.19</b>
1997		Israel	<b>0.93</b>	<b>1.28</b>	<b>1.06</b>	<b>0.66</b>	<b>0.73</b>	<b>0.69</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.64</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.76</b>
2000		FYROM	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.03</b>
2003		Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.01	0.01	0.01	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.04</b>
2003		Croatia	0.05	0.04	0.02	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.08</b>
2005		Pal.Auth.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
2005		Tunisia	0.12	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.10	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.17</b>
2006		Morocco	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.12	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.17</b>
2007		Syria	1.01	1.12	0.99	0.60	0.37	0.23	0.13	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.32</b>	<b>0.23</b>
2007		Egypt	0.26	0.22	0.23	0.27	0.26	0.23	0.28	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>0.46</b>
2008		Albania	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.00</b>
2008		Georgia	0.29	0.31	0.27	0.40	0.31	0.26	0.25	0.17	<b>0.26</b>	<b>0.20</b>
2010		Montenegro	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2010		Serbia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.05
2011		Chile	0.17	0.18	0.15	0.23	0.18	0.28	0.32	0.31	0.16	0.14
2011		Jordan	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
1994	Ukraine	Russia	<b>41.65</b>	<b>36.63</b>	<b>37.11</b>	<b>37.56</b>	<b>40.19</b>	<b>35.55</b>	<b>30.62</b>	<b>27.79</b>	<b>22.72</b>	<b>29.15</b>
1995		Turkmenistan	<b>6.78</b>	<b>10.49</b>	<b>11.11</b>	<b>7.59</b>	<b>6.81</b>	<b>7.41</b>	<b>7.76</b>	<b>7.77</b>	<b>6.59</b>	<b>1.58</b>
1996		Uzbekistan	<b>1.27</b>	<b>1.22</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.70</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.93</b>	<b>0.90</b>	<b>2.48</b>	<b>3.61</b>
1996		Georgia	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.22</b>
1996		Azerbaijan	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.62</b>
1996		Armenia	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.06</b>
1998		Kyrgyz Rep.	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>
1998		Kazakhstan	<b>2.96</b>	<b>4.22</b>	<b>2.26</b>	<b>2.14</b>	<b>1.36</b>	<b>0.52</b>	<b>2.14</b>	<b>2.78</b>	<b>3.65</b>	<b>4.48</b>
2001		FYROM	0.01	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.07</b>
2002		Tajikistan	0.01	0.01	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>
2005		Moldova	0.25	0.41	0.33	0.25	0.23	<b>0.23</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.11</b>
2006		Belarus	4.31	2.58	1.55	1.49	1.88	2.60	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.39</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.73</b>
1985	US	Israel	<b>1.05</b>	<b>1.03</b>	<b>1.05</b>	<b>1.00</b>	<b>0.97</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>1.01</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>1.05</b>	<b>1.18</b>

EIF	Reporter	Partner	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1994		NAFTA	<b>29.42</b>	<b>29.90</b>	<b>29.12</b>	<b>28.14</b>	<b>27.38</b>	<b>26.80</b>	<b>26.48</b>	<b>26.29</b>	<b>25.74</b>	<b>25.34</b>
2001		Jordan	0.01	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.06</b>
2004		Chile	0.29	0.35	0.36	0.33	<b>0.36</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.54</b>	<b>0.49</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.41</b>
2004		Singapore	1.55	1.29	1.26	1.19	<b>1.02</b>	<b>0.89</b>	<b>0.94</b>	<b>0.93</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.99</b>
2005		Australia	0.54	0.58	0.57	0.52	0.52	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.51</b>
2006		Morocco	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.03</b>
2006		CAFTA-DR	1.34	1.35	1.39	1.35	1.21	1.09	<b>1.01</b>	<b>0.98</b>	<b>0.94</b>	<b>1.23</b>
2006		Bahrain	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.03</b>
2009		Oman	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.04	<b>0.06</b>
2009		Peru	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.26	0.31	0.32	0.27	0.28	<b>0.28</b>

- no data

EU: 2000-2003 is for EU15; 2004-2006 is for EU25; and 2007 onwards is for EU27.

SEP - Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore.

SACU - Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.

CARIFORUM - Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, . Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.

APTA - Bangladesh, China, India, Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka.

SAFTA - Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.

MERCOSUR - Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay.

ASEAN - Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam.

NAFTA - Canada, Mexico, United States.

EFTA - Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland.

CAFTA-DR - Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua.

*Source* WTO Secretariat based on UNSD, Comtrade database and Eurostat (data for EU).

Table A3: Percentage Share of Global Exports destined for RTA partners (selected Reporters)

EIF	Reporter	Partner	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1997	Chile	Canada	1.34	1.52	1.51	1.96	2.47	2.62	2.23	1.83	2.09	2.22
1999		Mexico	4.48	4.89	5.22	4.32	4.02	3.86	3.90	3.48	3.33	2.71
2002		Costa Rica	0.27	0.33	0.37	0.34	0.30	0.28	0.32	0.25	0.29	0.28
2002		El Salvador	0.08	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.21	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.09
2003		EU	24.76	24.97	24.33	23.60	24.65	22.59	26.30	24.07	24.36	17.95
2004		US	16.51	18.58	19.99	17.66	15.21	16.09	15.87	12.92	11.96	11.28
2004		EFTA	0.92	1.16	0.78	0.50	0.57	0.23	0.26	0.33	0.45	0.80
2004		Korea	4.44	3.18	4.10	4.82	5.74	5.75	6.18	5.67	5.43	5.84
2006		China	4.95	5.68	7.03	8.75	10.08	11.58	8.76	15.01	13.96	23.24
2006		SEP	0.23	0.22	0.26	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.13	0.20	0.23	0.25
2007		India	0.68	0.63	1.03	1.11	1.39	1.51	2.75	3.39	2.07	2.05
2007		Japan	13.98	12.33	11.07	11.04	11.75	12.02	10.98	10.88	9.62	9.20
2008	Panama	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.45	0.50	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.45	0.20	
2009	Australia	0.26	0.24	0.34	0.39	0.28	0.23	0.21	0.40	0.74	0.80	
2009	Colombia	1.30	1.53	1.58	1.30	0.95	0.83	0.82	0.90	1.06	1.02	
2011	Turkey	0.42	0.40	0.47	0.55	0.49	0.66	0.69	0.66	0.39	0.39	
1973	Iceland	EU	67.9	68.5	70.5	72.1	75.2	74.6	70.9	74.6	76.2	77.7
1973	Norway	EU	76.8	75.7	74.3	75.6	75.7	78.0	82.1	80.8	83.7	80.4
1973	Switzerland	EU	58.9	60.1	59.4	59.9	62.4	62.4	61.0	62.0	61.0	59.7
1992	EFTA	Turkey	0.72	0.64	0.90	0.95	0.97	0.83	0.86	0.83	0.71	0.79
1993		Israel	0.65	0.58	0.35	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.32
1999		Pal. Auth.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
1999		Morocco	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.11
2001		FYROM	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
2001		Mexico	0.46	0.54	0.46	0.43	0.44	0.39	0.40	0.39	0.36	0.40
2002		Croatia	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10
2002		Jordan	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06
2003		Singapore	0.83	0.86	0.89	1.00	0.77	0.88	0.87	0.92	0.88	1.02
2004		Chile	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09
2005		Tunisia	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07
2006		Korea	0.76	0.69	0.85	0.75	0.85	0.76	0.77	0.90	0.92	1.38
2007		Egypt	0.25	0.24	0.22	0.19	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.24
2007		Lebanon	0.08	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.12
2008		SACU	0.28	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.25
2009		Canada	2.93	2.27	2.08	2.04	2.28	2.42	2.20	2.06	1.67	1.65
2010		Serbia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08
2010		Albania	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
1973	EU	Switzerland	7.51	7.58	7.09	7.01	7.74	7.69	7.39	7.47	7.49	8.07
1973		Iceland	0.18	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.17	0.12
1973		Norway	2.72	2.65	2.67	2.64	3.17	3.14	3.23	3.50	3.34	3.42
1977		Syria	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.28
1991		Andorra	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09
1996		Turkey	3.18	2.06	2.44	2.88	3.92	3.91	3.94	4.24	4.14	4.02
1997		Faroe Isl.	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03
1997		Pal. Auth.	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1998		Tunisia	0.77	0.81	0.76	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.77	0.76	0.82
2000		South Africa	1.24	1.27	1.25	1.37	1.66	1.69	1.68	1.64	1.55	1.47
2000		Morocco	0.82	0.76	0.77	0.82	0.92	1.10	0.88	1.00	1.10	1.09
2000		Israel	1.68	1.47	1.35	1.16	1.32	1.25	1.17	1.15	1.07	1.04
2000		Mexico	1.49	1.53	1.51	1.44	1.52	1.57	1.61	1.69	1.68	1.46
2001		FYROM	0.14	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.17	0.19	0.19
2002		San Marino	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
2002		Jordan	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.23
2002		Croatia	0.49	0.56	0.65	0.71	1.01	0.97	1.02	1.07	1.09	0.98
2003		Lebanon	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.34	0.33	0.28	0.26	0.27	0.30	0.38
2003		Chile	0.37	0.37	0.31	0.30	0.32	0.36	0.36	0.38	0.39	0.41
2004		Egypt	0.84	0.70	0.64	0.61	0.76	0.77	0.75	0.83	0.97	1.15
2005	Algeria	0.65	0.76	0.81	0.79	0.98	0.97	0.84	0.91	1.17	1.35	
2006	Albania	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.15	0.18	
2008	Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.24	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.29	0.27	
2008	Montenegro	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.05	0.07	0.05
2008	CARIFORUM	0.49	0.38	0.44	0.41	0.40	0.40	0.34	0.37	0.30	0.29	
2009	Cameroon	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	
2009	Côte d'Ivoire	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.14	
2010	Serbia	-	-	-	-	-	0.24	0.46	0.65	0.69	0.60	
1976	India	APTA	6.01	7.00	8.01	10.24	10.65	12.33	11.49	11.39	10.97	10.22
2001		Sri Lanka	1.40	1.42	1.66	2.01	1.84	1.93	1.74	1.78	1.56	0.98
2003		Afghanistan	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.19	0.22	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.20	0.27
2005		Singapore	1.86	2.11	2.76	2.87	4.50	5.41	5.06	4.38	4.87	3.86

EIF	Reporter	Partner	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
2006		SAFTA	4.00	4.72	4.72	6.33	5.81	5.23	5.00	5.23	5.37	3.90
2006		Bhutan	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
2007		Chile	0.24	0.20	0.16	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.23	0.15
2009		MERCOSUR	0.76	0.81	0.87	0.83	0.90	1.27	1.45	1.55	2.06	1.19
2009		Nepal	0.33	0.43	0.53	1.02	0.98	0.83	0.76	0.85	0.93	0.75
2010		ASEAN	6.28	7.56	8.99	8.54	9.95	10.25	10.21	9.48	10.69	10.13
2010		Korea	1.04	1.04	1.24	1.12	1.28	1.51	1.92	1.69	2.07	2.13
2002	Japan	Singapore	4.34	3.65	3.41	3.15	3.18	3.10	2.99	3.06	3.40	3.57
2005		Mexico	1.09	1.01	0.91	0.77	0.92	1.16	1.43	1.44	1.27	1.18
2006		Malaysia	2.90	2.73	2.64	2.39	2.22	2.11	2.04	2.11	2.10	2.22
2007		Chile	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.16	0.17	0.22	0.35	0.23
2007		Thailand	2.84	2.95	3.16	3.40	3.58	3.77	3.54	3.59	3.77	3.82
2008		Indonesia	1.58	1.59	1.50	1.52	1.60	1.55	1.14	1.27	1.61	1.61
2008		Brunei Dar.	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
2008		ASEAN	14.29	13.46	13.38	12.98	12.90	12.70	11.79	12.20	13.24	13.84
2008		Philippines	2.14	2.03	2.03	1.91	1.70	1.52	1.39	1.33	1.28	1.42
2009		Switzerland	0.44	0.49	0.39	0.42	0.39	0.36	0.37	0.42	0.56	1.08
2009		Viet Nam	0.41	0.44	0.51	0.56	0.56	0.60	0.64	0.79	1.00	1.12
1994	Mexico	NAFTA	90.31	88.16	87.70	89.58	90.07	87.80	86.94	84.57	82.70	84.32
1995		Colombia	0.30	0.35	0.41	0.40	0.33	0.72	0.85	1.08	1.04	1.08
1995		Costa Rica	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.18	0.20	0.21	0.25	0.32	0.28
1998		Nicaragua	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.15	0.21	0.27	0.13	0.10
1999		Chile	0.33	0.29	0.20	0.23	0.30	0.31	0.36	0.43	0.54	0.46
2000		Israel	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.04
2000		EU	3.40	3.50	3.46	3.68	3.54	4.27	4.40	5.30	5.89	5.08
2001		El Salvador	0.18	0.21	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.22	0.20	0.19	0.28	0.20
2001		Guatemala	0.34	0.38	0.34	0.36	0.32	0.40	0.37	0.42	0.48	0.52
2001		Honduras	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.16
2001		EFTA	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.43	0.07	0.06	0.10	0.22	0.21
2005		Japan	0.67	0.80	0.74	0.71	0.29	0.69	0.64	0.70	0.70	0.70
1992	Singapore	ASEAN	27.39	26.97	27.16	32.38	31.54	31.32	30.85	31.74	32.07	30.26
2001		New Zealand	0.27	0.33	0.33	0.36	0.48	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.57	0.50
2002		Japan	7.55	7.67	7.14	6.06	5.82	5.46	5.47	4.81	4.93	4.55
2003		EFTA	0.47	0.65	0.46	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.43	0.40	0.35	0.48
2003		Australia	2.33	2.60	2.69	2.92	3.33	3.67	3.75	3.74	4.10	3.92
2004		US	17.34	15.39	15.25	12.85	11.73	10.39	10.17	8.91	7.15	6.56
2005		India	2.02	2.23	2.11	1.93	2.10	2.57	2.82	3.34	3.53	3.43
2005		Jordan	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
2006		Korea	3.57	3.85	4.16	3.79	3.72	3.51	3.22	3.54	3.63	4.66
2006		SEP	0.65	0.70	0.72	0.66	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.78	0.87	0.84
2006		Panama	0.73	0.80	0.84	0.72	0.65	0.83	0.99	1.28	1.93	2.22
2009		China	3.90	4.38	5.48	6.33	7.74	8.60	9.75	9.66	9.19	9.75
2009		Peru	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
1992	Turkey	EFTA	1.18	1.01	1.13	1.14	1.04	1.12	1.39	1.24	2.47	4.24
1996		EU	52.48	51.44	51.26	51.82	55.30	53.29	52.50	57.17	48.83	46.76
1997		Israel	2.26	2.57	2.38	2.29	2.08	2.00	1.79	1.55	1.47	1.50
2000		FYROM	0.39	0.29	0.28	0.26	0.24	0.22	0.20	0.25	0.22	0.28
2003		Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.10	0.09	0.12	0.13	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.41	0.43	0.22
2003		Croatia	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.22
2005		Pal. Auth.	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
2005		Tunisia	0.59	0.45	0.34	0.47	0.40	0.40	0.38	0.49	0.59	0.63
2006		Morocco	0.25	0.31	0.38	0.38	0.52	0.50	0.64	0.67	0.73	0.59
2007		Syria	0.66	0.90	0.74	0.87	0.63	0.75	0.71	0.74	0.84	1.39
2007		Egypt	1.35	1.35	0.91	0.73	0.75	0.94	0.83	0.84	1.08	2.56
2008		Albania	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.23	0.27
2008		Georgia	0.48	0.46	0.29	0.33	0.32	0.37	0.48	0.60	0.76	0.73
2010		Montenegro	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03
2010		Serbia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.41	0.56	0.56	0.57
2011		Chile	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.04
2011		Jordan	0.36	0.38	0.32	0.32	0.36	0.39	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.45
1994	Ukraine	Russia	23.96	22.38	17.56	18.69	17.83	21.88	22.55	25.70	23.50	21.40
1995		Turkmenistan	1.02	0.65	0.62	0.77	0.69	0.55	0.35	0.40	0.56	0.82
1996		Uzbekistan	0.78	0.67	0.37	0.36	0.39	0.44	0.55	0.70	0.89	1.02
1996		Georgia	0.26	0.22	0.32	0.44	0.42	0.58	0.81	1.07	0.98	1.00
1996		Azerbaijan	0.25	0.28	0.57	0.62	0.66	0.85	1.10	1.28	1.36	1.38
1996		Armenia	0.08	0.14	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.28	0.36	0.44	0.39	0.42
1998		Kyrgyz Rep.	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.14	0.12	0.21
1998		Kazakhstan	0.52	0.72	1.11	1.33	1.90	1.95	2.16	2.91	2.74	3.57
2001		FYROM	0.29	0.16	0.11	0.19	0.15	0.10	0.18	0.20	0.28	0.11
2002		Tajikistan	0.67	0.21	0.24	0.14	0.09	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.20
2005		Moldova	1.21	1.68	1.68	2.11	2.02	1.98	1.75	1.85	1.75	1.75

EIF	Reporter	Partner	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
2006		Belarus	1.86	1.50	1.45	1.48	1.68	2.60	3.19	3.17	3.14	3.17
1985	US	Israel	<b>0.99</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.08</b>	<b>1.06</b>	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>0.91</b>
1994		NAFTA	<b>36.92</b>	<b>36.28</b>	<b>37.26</b>	<b>36.89</b>	<b>36.66</b>	<b>36.65</b>	<b>35.14</b>	<b>33.11</b>	<b>31.73</b>	<b>31.58</b>
2001		Jordan	0.04	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.11</b>
2004		Chile	0.44	0.43	0.38	0.38	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.65</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.93</b>	<b>0.89</b>
2004		Singapore	2.28	2.42	2.34	2.29	<b>2.40</b>	<b>2.28</b>	<b>2.38</b>	<b>2.26</b>	<b>2.22</b>	<b>2.11</b>
2005		Australia	1.60	1.50	1.89	1.81	1.74	<b>1.74</b>	<b>1.71</b>	<b>1.65</b>	<b>1.73</b>	<b>1.85</b>
2006		Morocco	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.15</b>
2006		CAFTA-DR	1.73	1.84	2.03	2.08	1.92	1.86	<b>1.89</b>	<b>1.93</b>	<b>1.95</b>	<b>1.89</b>
2006		Bahrain	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.04	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.06</b>
2009		Oman	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	<b>0.10</b>
2009		Peru	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.28	0.35	0.48	<b>0.47</b>

-no data

EU: 2000-2003 is for EU15; 2004-2006 is for EU25; and 2007 onwards is for EU27.

Source: WTO Secretariat based on UNSD, Comtrade database and Eurostat (data for EU).

Chart A1: HS Chapter 2, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates




Chart A2: HS Chapter 4, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates




Chart A3: HS Chapter 7, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates






Chart A4: HS Chapter 10, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates




Chart A5: HS Chapter 15, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates




Chart A6: HS Chapter 16, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates




Chart A7: HS Chapter 17, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates




Chart A8: HS Chapter 21, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates





Chart A9: HS Chapter 22, MFN versus remaining dutiable preferential rates



### **Bibliography**

World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects", 2005

World Bank, "Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook", 2011

OECD, "Trade Impacts of Selected Regional Trade Agreements in Agriculture", 2007

IDB, "The Treatment of Agriculture in Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas", 2009

Estevadeordal, Shearer and Suominen, "Multilateralizing RTAs in the Americas" in *Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading System*, edited by Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low, 2009

Fulponi, L., M. Shearer and J. Almeida (2011), "Regional Trade Agreements – Treatment of Agriculture", *OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing

World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011, "The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence"

Carpenter, Theresa and Andreas Lendle (2010), "How Preferential is World Trade?", Graduate Institute Geneva