5. EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR A BETTER PERFORMANCE OF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS IN CHILE – 77

Chapter 5.

Effective management for a better performance of framework agreements in Chile

Effective framework agreements aim to deliver several benefits to the public sector: they generate economies of scale, avoid duplication and reduce red tape costs. Multidimensional assessment tools should be developed and used to ensure that these collaborative procurement instruments deliver on their initial promises. This chapter examines efforts undertaken by ChileCompra and other countries to monitor the overall performance of framework agreements. It analyses related challenges, notably in obtaining supporting information.
Effective procurement operations only exist when the contractor has been satisfactorily executing its assigned work. However, assessments of the effectiveness of strategic procurement should go beyond ensuring that suppliers deliver what they were asked for, it should also assess the efficiency of procurement in various dimensions.

As a strategic procurement tool, a framework agreement is meant to achieve a number of goals, such as generating economies of scale, limiting duplication and reducing red tape costs for demand and supply sides. The assessment of a framework agreement’s efficiencies should therefore examine their performance in all of these dimensions.

**Benefits of framework agreements are multidimensional, so should be their assessment**

The assessment of procurement performance necessitates developing processes and frameworks to retrieve transactional information. OECD member countries share a strong willingness to identify a set of relevant data that enables the measurement of how procurement operations perform, and the impact of procurement on broader policy objectives. However, in the OECD survey, countries also continuously reported significant challenges in terms of data collection and consistency (OECD, 2013). These impediments also exist for the assessment of how centralised framework agreements perform.

Due to their central role, central purchasing bodies (CPBs) offer a unique opportunity to analyse public procurement efficiencies when using framework agreements. With the increasing use of e-procurement platforms to manage orders under this procurement instrument, CPBs have readily accessible information that allows for the development of meaningful performance indicators adapted to framework agreements.

However, while being an important actor in public procurement, most CPBs lack visibility of the challenges of public procurement under framework agreements, ranging from purchase orders to supplier performance. These elements are important for a comprehensive performance assessment of framework agreements.

In an attempt to address this challenge, some countries, such as Korea, have tried to integrate e-procurement systems with broader public finance management systems, with the aim of providing visibility on the execution phase of purchase orders. Other countries, such as Italy, have put more emphasis on ad-hoc or institutionalised feedback on supplier performance from contracting authorities.

Data consistency is an additional challenge, particularly for performance assessments. Due to the specific operating environment of framework agreements, information is inputted into an electronic procurement system by different stakeholders, which poses the question of how to develop a common typology and agreed vocabulary.

Irrespective of the aspects measured, performance indicators are inherently dependent on data, and countries regularly report challenges in collecting procurement information from decentralised contracting authorities (OECD, 2014). Therefore, a consensus has to be found on the typology of data to be collected and the quality control processes in place to ensure comparability. Further attention should also be placed on definitions of procurement information that is to be collected. This should be widely communicated internally to ensure either the collection of standardised information across sub-national contracting authorities, or the availability of a correlation table.

Centralised framework agreements aggregate needs from different and heterogeneous contracting authorities. Therefore, the first dimension of the framework agreement’s efficiency to measure should be its level of adequacy in meeting end-user needs.
The impact of framework agreements on contracting authorities and the recurrence of purchases in a specific product category are among the main reasons cited by OECD countries for implementing a framework agreement. Therefore, the effectiveness of this instrument in achieving this goal constitutes the first step of measuring a framework agreement’s performance.

This assessment could be conducted in two ways: the subjective satisfaction of contracting authorities towards a specific framework agreement, and the objective matching of user needs against the offering provided in the instrument. While the first assessment could be subject to the issuance of periodic surveys or debriefing meetings with contracting authorities, the second assessment requires hard evidence from the analyses of transactional data.

The level of subjective satisfaction of contracting authorities is often high, since the general benefits of framework agreements are commonly acknowledged (NAO, 2010). However, strategically using this procurement tool entails purchasing decisions from contracting authorities that should rely on a series of information, from the existence of the framework agreements to the tangible benefits that can be reaped from its use.

**Box 5.1. Framework agreements in the United Kingdom**

The National Audit Office in the United Kingdom carried out a survey on the use of collaborative procurement across the public sector in eight product categories. To do this, an online questionnaire was sent to 291 heads of procurement across central government bodies, health trusts and local authorities. The questionnaire received a response rate of 64%.

Out of the responses, 93% of the public bodies had used a framework agreement during 2008-09. However, there was a wide variation in the amount of spending that individual bodies were channeling through these existing arrangements.

Among those bodies that had used framework arrangements in 2008-09, 84% of heads of procurement believed that these arrangements had always or often resulted in better value for money than could have been achieved by acting alone. And, 83% thought there was potential to improve value for money by increasing collaboration.

Analysis shows that there were a significant number of heads of procurement who felt the quality of procurement management information available to their body was poor or very poor. Around 5% did not know how to rate the quality of their procurement management information. Although 79% of bodies often compared product specifications to those in existing collaborative arrangements, there was a significant number that did not regularly make comparisons. A quarter of heads of procurement stated that they held poor, very poor or no information on both the overall supply market and their current suppliers’ performance.

Although more than half believed that there was sufficient information available about collaborative arrangements across six of the eight categories, a significant number thought that there was not sufficient information, or did not know.

More than half of the bodies did not produce, for any of their significant procurement exercises, key evaluation documents of a business case, supply option analysis or an evaluation of existing collaborative arrangements.

The level of public procurement expenditure channelled through framework agreements for each specific product category could be a first indication of the extent of response to user needs. Further analyses on procurement expenditure by voluntary users under framework agreements could give additional insights into whether framework agreements are globally appealing.

In addition to the global level of coverage of framework agreements, procurement trends for products available within each instrument could provide central purchasing bodies with a greater understanding of contracting authorities’ needs, powerful information that would help to design future procurement strategies. This analysis would also offer linkages with assessments of the performance of framework agreements in generating economies of scale and reducing red tape costs at central and local levels.

Greater aggregation of demand through a limited number of standardised products is understood as having the potential to generate economies of scale (Albano and Nicholas, 2016). However, as previously discussed, economies of scale are likely to be found in products where production costs comprise a sizeable fraction of fixed costs. Should these costs be less prone to variations of production volumes, the greater the aggregation of purchases, the lower the unit cost of each product.

The grouping of purchases has the potential to attract more competitive pricing from suppliers, as well as having a direct impact on processing costs. Analysing the costs deriving of issuing purchase orders would give a basis for calculations of administrative savings for contracting authorities that are generated by the use of the framework agreements. Parameters could encompass various dimensions, such as costs related to the absence of distinct procurement processes, the duration of these avoided steps, and the reduction of the ordering period.

While performance assessments of framework agreements often attempt to measure their impact on red tape costs for contracting authorities, a comprehensive evaluation of performance should also integrate the influence of framework agreements on operational management costs within the CPB. This is particularly true when centralised entities have discretionary decision powers over the implementation, typology and coverage of framework agreements. When the decision to implement or renew framework agreements lies with CPBs, it includes a cost-benefit assessment of its impact on centralised operational management activities.

However, factoring in the centralised administrative costs necessary to implement framework agreements would only provide a partial assessment of the impact of framework agreements on CPBs. There is also the cost of managing the electronic system where goods and services are available for ordering, and where products are updated. Post-award management activities often account for a significant share of CPB resources, both financial and human.

Time spent on managing awarded framework agreements depends on two major factors: the rules and procedures defined for the management of the product database, and the likely recurrence of request for changes submitted by awarded suppliers. Frameworks that provide guiding principles to suppliers for requesting modifications to their offering generate less flexibility in terms of changes requested by suppliers. However, they tend to reduce the amount of time allotted to this activity.

The number of suppliers awarded under a framework agreement also impacts the resources needed to manage updates of product information in the electronic system, hence the overall performance of framework agreements.
Assessing the impact and tangible benefits of framework agreements on the public demand side should be complemented by assessing its influence on the supply side. Analysing the performance of framework agreements through the prism of the performance of the suppliers in delivering satisfactory goods and services under framework agreements provides CPBs with comprehensive information on its overall functioning.

Several performance indicators could be developed to measure the impact on suppliers, such as the ratio of suppliers being awarded under framework agreements and effectively receiving purchase orders, and the level of adherence to contractual obligations, including delivery times and payment terms. These indicators would provide helpful information to CPBs in guiding future procurement strategies towards the implementation of framework agreements. It will allow centralised entities to assess the appropriateness of the pool of suppliers, its geographical allocation and the relevance of evaluation criteria to identify committed suppliers.

In countries where suppliers awarded under framework agreements are not obliged to respond to subsequent purchase orders, the ratio of response could provide CPBs with an additional indication of how contracting authorities’ needs and market capabilities are matched.

Reducing red tape costs and generating savings

Measuring the performance of framework agreements in OECD countries principally aims to support the initial assessment of the cost benefits ratio that presides over the decision to implement or renew such an instrument.

Management activities under framework agreements impact CPBs as well as the suppliers awarded.

Figure 5.1. Modifications to the offerings allowed for suppliers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modification</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decrease prices (discounted price above certain annual revenue thresholds, etc.)</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase prices (discretionary or based on objective external factors)</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change the list of goods or services</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Chile responded yes to allow all three modifications listed in the figure.*

Almost all respondents to the OECD survey accept decreased prices proposed by suppliers, which is not surprising considering the overarching philosophy of collaborative procurement instruments. In some instances, bidders have provided initial price submissions without any revenue certainty. Therefore, when there is an aggregation of purchases in purchase orders, suppliers are incentivised to offer discounts. In most of the countries surveyed, CPBs accept other modifications to initial submissions, whether it is a price increase or a change in the offering. These modifications could be useful to keep goods and services provided under framework agreements in line with major market trends and products obsolescence. However, most of the respondents provide a structured framework for these modifications.

**Figure 5.2. Framework for modifications of offerings**

![Figure 5.2. Framework for modifications of offerings](image)

*Note:* Lighter blue colour indicates where Chile does not take part. Bars with diagonal filling indicate where it is only applicable to some framework agreements in Chile.


Structured processes to update or modify suppliers’ offerings, as part of the framework agreement’s operating environment, contribute to framing the overall performance of the agreement. This impacts the competitiveness of the offerings provided by suppliers, and CPB’s efforts on the administration of the electronic platform. While a vast majority of CPBs oversee the integration of modifications into the electronic platform, few countries allow suppliers to directly integrate changes into the system.

OECD countries could assess the effectiveness of processes that may lead to well-performing framework agreements, as well as evaluating their objective performance in a number of perspectives. The collection of evidence of how framework agreements are performing could serve various objectives, including shaping future procurement decisions.
Framework agreements are designed to yield a number of benefits, such as aggregating needs that generate economies of scale, reducing red tape costs and streamlining processes. It is therefore unsurprising that all respondents evaluate the coverage of framework agreements against a specific product category. The higher the coverage, the greater potential for generating savings from a consolidation of demand.

Although the methods of calculating savings differ across countries, the efficiency of framework agreements in generating financial benefits is assessed by the majority of respondents to the OECD survey. Evaluating the financial performance of frameworks could be realised from two different perspectives: exogenous or endogenous.

Exogenous performance is measured against either prices paid outside the framework agreement or historical prices. In France, savings relating to renewed framework agreements are calculated against historical prices. In Italy, savings are calculated by comparing the awarded value with the average cost paid by the contracting authorities. In Chile, financial savings are calculated on the basis of the difference of the price proposed by bidders awarded under framework agreements, and the average price proposed by at least three suppliers outside the procurement instrument. While this gives initial indications about the competitiveness of framework agreements compared to ad-hoc purchases, the sample size could pose questions on possible selection bias.

Endogenous performance involves evaluating the financial benefits achieved within framework agreements. Where a second stage competition exists, many countries calculate savings using the difference between the initial listed prices and those offered by suppliers after the mini competition.
Box 5.2. Challenges in evaluating the savings generated by framework agreements

The following challenges exist when trying to undertake a comparative evaluation of savings achieved with public procurement:

**Calculation methodology**: a broad range of calculation methods are applied across OECD countries depending on the nature of contracting mechanisms or the perspective identified, notably:

- Comparison between historical prices or reference price based on market analysis and final price proposed by the awarded supplier.
- Assessment of the total cost of ownership of products or services procured, and comparison with reference prices.
- Comparison between the price list proposed by the awarded suppliers in the first competition stage, or the average historical price paid by contracting authorities, and the discounted price obtained after second stage competition.
- Comparison between historical processing or labour costs and new processing or labour costs.

**Aggregation of needs**: the level of coverage of CPBs varies greatly among OECD countries, and so to does the impact of its efforts in generating savings throughout the procurement cycle. Accounting for these differences in terms of the involvement of CPBs in carrying out public procurement is vital for ensuring a sound comparison of activities.

**Selection bias**: defining a common scope of analysis could support meaningful comparison. Information gathered on CPBs in OECD countries shows horizontal or vertical differences in terms of mandates.

Sources:

In addition to measuring the financial impact of framework agreements, one third of respondents also assess processing costs compared to ad-hoc procurement cost. Again, different methodologies exist. Chile calculates the savings by estimating the difference between costs related to the issuance of a purchase order under a framework agreement, and the costs generated by the issuance of a public tender or direct award procedure.

While the outcome of this exercise should provide CPBs with tangible information about the level of reduction of red tape costs, and therefore the processual efficiency of framework agreements, this methodology presupposes access to a range of information, which is reportedly not readily available in OECD countries. Assessing this performance perspective implies having information about direct procurement process costs (i.e. procurement officials salaries and standardised timeframes by type of procurement procedures), as well as a harmonised mapping exercise of roles and responsibilities within contracting authorities to ensure that indirect costs, such as hierarchical approvals or budgetary validations, are also taken into account.

Portugal measures processing costs by assessing the administrative impact of the aggregation of demands. Under the Portuguese framework agreement system, contracting authorities can group their orders into one single call-off. Although processual
information is needed to attach a financial estimate to this calculation, the initial exercise could provide a relative indication in terms of the percentage of processual costs saved through the use of framework agreements.

**Human resource needs for assessing the performance of framework agreements**

The implementation of a framework agreement will provide insufficient benefits if not coupled with strategies that aim to further ease the management of the agreement, incentivise the supply side to participate, and provide exhaustive procurement information that allows for the development of meaningful key performance indicators.

**ChileCompra could streamline product updates to seize tangible benefits from framework agreements**

Streamlining and rationalising the processes related to product updates in ChileCompra Express could be a powerful tool for augmenting the benefits of framework agreements. This will free up ChileCompra’s internal resources and allow for a more strategic focus on product category management, resulting in more tailored framework agreements and providing the potential for the development of further instruments.

As of the end of 2015, ChileCompra Express had more than 115 000 different products provided by around 6 000 suppliers. These suppliers can request modifications to their offerings at any point during the term of the framework agreement. They can either request a change in the product specifications and pricing, or add new products. In 2015, ChileCompra received about 436 000 requests for product updates, while almost half (49.3%) of the products under framework agreements were not ordered once. More than 250 000 requests were related to offers at a discounted price for a limited amount of time (Figure 5.4).

The number of requests has a dramatic impact on the human resources dedicated to the operational management of framework agreements, and can hinder the possibility of shifting towards more strategic procurement activities. It is estimated that in 2015, a total of 16 564 hours were spent in processing 436 000 requests, and 46.5 hours were spent, on average per day, in processing requests for new products. This work was mostly carried out by category managers, and required almost 10 full-time officials to process, on average, 22 requests per hour. This work almost prevents these procurement officials from concentrating on the market and demand analysis that would allow for strategic decisions on the development of framework agreements. It also leads to challenges for the creation of new framework agreements in other strategic areas that could provide potential for economies of scale through the aggregation of needs, such as in telecommunications, as it will automatically generate an unsustainable increase in operational management time.
ChileCompra should identify alternative means to help address these burdens. As a first step, it could consider revisiting how product modifications are requested by suppliers and validated by ChileCompra.

Processes defined for product updates are structured around the parallel assessment of requests: first from a technical perspective to ensure that technical specifications of changes can be seamlessly integrated into the platform, and second that the change is appropriate from a procurement perspective. These two processes are carried out simultaneously by the respective teams in ChileCompra, which could lead to a duplication of efforts. If the official responsible for assessing the appropriateness of the request concerning the typology of products refuses the modification, the team responsible for ensuring technical compliance will have had worked for nothing. Implementing a sequenced assessment of requests would mitigate the risk of duplicating effort.

Considering the number of requests related to discounted offers, and the relatively straightforward process required to implement these temporary changes, ChileCompra could consider removing the verification step in these cases. This decision would help to reduce the overall workload of teams responsible for product updates by nearly 25%.

Identifying technical solutions to ease product updates processes would provide ChileCompra with immediate tangible benefits.
Box 5.3. Integrating product catalogues and updates in GSA Advantage!

The US General Services Administration (GSA) selects suppliers under the Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) programme. GSA Advantage! is the online platform shopping site for government agencies and contains GSA approved products and services. Using this menu-driven database system, government buyers can search for the products they need, compare prices and product information (in cases where there is more than one supplier), and place their orders.

All GSA schedule contractors are required to submit electronic catalogues and price lists to GSA Advantage! no later than six months after the contract is awarded. They can be submitted using the Schedule Input Program (SIP) software, available for download at the GSA Vendor Support Center (VSC) web site at http://vsc.fss.gsa.gov, or by using the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) format.

Via those two distinct technologies, contractors under MAS are able to prepare their entire electronic catalogue in a format that will be directly integrated into GSA Advantage! GSA uniquely identifies each product using a combination of the contractor’s contract number plus the manufacturer part number. Each product submitted must have a unique manufacturer part number – even if two or more manufacturers carry the exact same part number.

Once the catalogue is uploaded it will be forwarded to the appropriate GSA contracting officer (CO) for review. Once the CO has reviewed the catalog, an email (or fax, phone call) is sent to the contractor stating whether the file was approved or rejected and the reasons for rejection, if applicable. A SIP response file will also be generated after the CO has reviewed the contractor’s file.

Files containing temporary price reductions will be immediately loaded onto GSA Advantage! without contracting officer approval.


ChileCompra could use enhanced technological tools to support and ease the processes related to product updates. To this end, a dedicated Supplier Advisory Board could be created to work on technological transformations to ensure that both ChileCompra’s operational constraints and suppliers’ technical capabilities are taken into account. This effort would contribute to safeguarding the overall inclusiveness of the system, while providing a more sustainable operating environment for products updates. Technological and processual answers to this challenge will decrease processing costs and burdens within ChileCompra, and unlock the potential to increase the global coverage of framework agreements by providing the opportunity to develop additional instruments.

**ChileCompra could develop structured supplier performance assessments to promote the effectiveness of framework agreements**

The performance of framework agreements should be assessed from both the supply and demand perspective. Considering the specific relationship implied by this procurement instrument, where suppliers are asked to abide by future and hypothetical requests, a performing environment should ensure that awarded suppliers are fit for purpose.

The satisfactory delivery of goods and services is central for helping contracting authorities to identify suppliers from whom products will be ordered. This component is crucial to the overall effectiveness of framework agreements (Racca, 2010). One of the
main duties of CPBs, therefore, is to design and implement contractual relationships with suppliers that are conducive to supplier performance.

Considering the existing limitations of ChileCompra Express, which does not seamlessly integrate information on the execution of orders, supplier performance assessments should be carried out using the electronic system. The source of information relating to order execution resides in the voluntary information provided by contracting authorities. When a purchase order has not been satisfactorily executed, contracting authorities can indicate to ChileCompra that sanctions were applied, and provide the underlying reasons.

This mostly takes the form of contractual penalties corresponding to a share of the total value of the contract. In this respect, a strong, yet proportionate, penalties system helps to ensure that providers will abide by their commitments. The system should be consistently applied across contracting authorities.

In addition to an assessment of supplier performance through sanctions, ChileCompra could develop an inspection process whereby the performance of selected suppliers is thoroughly and independently assessed against specific objectives.

This form of assessment, while not covering the entire pool of suppliers, could provide ChileCompra with detailed evidence about suppliers’ commitment to the execution of purchase orders under framework agreements. This type of analysis would also offer ChileCompra the flexibility to focus on issues of particular importance. Depending on strategic orientations, ChileCompra could apply this scheme to vendors in a specific product category, or to high volume vendors across product categories.

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**Box 5.4. Performance assessment of suppliers in Consip**

Consip, the Italian central purchasing body, assesses the performance of its suppliers according to a structured mechanism.

1. Technicalities

   The monitoring of service qualitative levels delivered by suppliers is based on the analysis of five macro-categories (for each framework agreement):

   - Order’s execution process quality
   - Sold products and services quality
   - Management services quality
   - Suppliers’ call center quality
   - Assistance service quality

   Every macro-category will be divided in elements that are object of the analysis, to perceive and measure the quality of the services level supplied.
Box 5.4. Performance assessment of suppliers in Consip (continued)

2. Tools

The Supplies’ Monitoring Team employs the following three tools:

- Inspections: supplier performance inspections aim to verify the meeting of service levels required in the contract agreement (technical requirements). An external inspection body is accredited every two years to develop this activity. Monitored suppliers pay inspection costs.

- Survey: the surveys are finalised to measure the perception of the suppliers’ service levels. This activity is developed by an external call centre.

- Claims: collection and analysis of public administration claims is undertaken in order to identify agreements performing below requirements in terms of supplied quality services.

3. Inspection financing

Each agreement generates a specific budget to finance the inspections. This budget is calculated proportionally to the amount of money spent through the agreement (the maximum amount paid by the supplier is equal to 0.5% of the sum spent). Consip authorises the supplier to pay the external inspection body. To guarantee the inspections payments, Consip requires a specific guarantee from the supplier.

4. Methodology

The results of surveys and inspections are used according to different weights to produce an indicator that shows the performance of suppliers under existing framework agreements.

The monitoring team draws on survey and inspection findings to score each component in the indicator. Final assessment is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of service % indicator</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Warning</td>
<td>On target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Alert** when the score is equal or smaller than 50%
- **Warning** when the score is between 51% and 74%
- **On target** when the score is equal or bigger than 75%

*Source: Adapted from OECD (2016), Improving ISSSTE’s Public Procurement for Better Results, OECD Publishing Paris*
In implementing a structured qualitative assessment of supplier performance that takes into account existing technological limitations, ChileCompra will create room for improved efficiency in the management of framework agreements. By further communicating about these efforts, ChileCompra could strengthen commitment from the supplier community, thereby minimising the application of contractual sanctions and fostering supplier relationship management. This will represent a shift from contract compliance towards contract management.

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**Integrated procure-to-pay system would provide ChileCompra with a greater visibility of the overall procurement cycle**

The various efforts undertaken by ChileCompra in managing framework agreements would be greatly simplified by the implementation of an electronic platform covering the entire procurement cycle. This will provide the central authority with information relating to the execution of purchase orders, therefore providing readily accessible insights of effective procurement operations under framework agreements.

While the implementation of such a system would represent a financial investment for ChileCompra, it could provide tangible benefits that offset the initial costs. An integrated system would offer integral spend visibility and harmonised procurement information. It would also help to address one of the main challenges of e-procurement systems reported by OECD countries: data consistency and reliability (OECD, 2014).
Integrated procure-to-pay systems provide ChileCompra with greater visibility on the entire procurement cycle under framework agreements, from historical spending to the execution of purchases orders. In addition, they can also minimise suppliers’ participation costs, since the administrative documents and certifications necessary for participation in public procurement are retrieved directly from the electronic systems of other public or private institutions.

In Korea, 477 document forms have been converted into digital equivalents. A 2009 study conducted by Hanyang University indicated that these changes led to an estimated USD 8 billion in annual transaction-cost savings – primarily for the private sector in reduced costs for visiting public entities, obtaining required certificates and proof documents, and registering and updating accounts in multiple systems.
Note

Based on the estimated total hours spent in 2015 provided by ChileCompra, this number was calculated on the assumption of 21 working days per month, on average.
References


NAO (2010), A Review of Collaborative Procurement Across the Public Sector, National Audit Office, UK.


