

Chapter 1

Migration in Sweden and the context of integration policy

Sweden has a long history of providing a home for migrants and offering shelter to those seeking international protection. As a result the country has a large immigrant population and advanced integration policies. Sustained output growth, robust productivity, and a sound fiscal position have ensured that Sweden is in a strong position to accommodate new immigrants. And Sweden invests heavily in integrating immigrants knowing that, in the context of an ageing population, if well integrated in society and on the labour market, immigrants can help alleviate the ageing-related challenges the country expects in the coming years. This chapter provides the context for the report outlining i) the labour market context, and the strengths and challenges this presents, ii) the integration context, and the characteristics and composition of Sweden's foreign-born population that influence their integration outcomes, and finally iii) the recent developments in integration policy within this context.

Among OECD countries, Sweden stands at the frontier of policy development in the field of integration. The country has a large immigrant population and longstanding and advanced policies. In recent years, much thought has gone into improving the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies. Sweden invests heavily in integrating immigrants knowing that, in the context of an ageing population, if well integrated in society and on the labour market, immigrants can help alleviate some of the ageing-related challenges. The country has a longstanding tradition of providing a home for migrants seeking international protection, and a significant part of the population – more than 7% – is made up of refugees and their families (Ruist, 2015). In all OECD countries these groups face substantial integration challenges, and refugees in Sweden are no exception.¹

A first OECD review of the Swedish system for labour market integration of migrants, conducted in 2004, found migrant outcomes to be unfavourable in an international context and recommended measures such as enhancing language and vocational training and giving a clearer labour market focus to integration policy (Lemaître, 2007; OECD, 2007). Since then, there have been many changes in Swedish integration policy. In December 2010, a dedicated introduction programme was created and resources are heavily targeted to the first two years following the issuance of a residence permit. Alongside this, in order to increase the labour market focus of the integration of newly-arrived refugees and their families, primary responsibility for the co-ordination of integration activities was moved to the PES (*Arbetsförmedlingen*).

These changes have ensured that policies are oriented towards the labour market and that Sweden's integration policy is well advanced relative to other OECD countries. However, the current arrival of an unprecedented number of asylum seekers is testing the system; testing its ability to assess the asylum requests and to meet the basic humanitarian needs of those who arrive, settle those who are granted international protection quickly and efficiently; to assess their competences and needs, and to channel them into productive work. The large numbers of recent arrivals are also testing, and will continue to test, the co-ordination between different stakeholders – in government and beyond.

Already in the decade prior to the current humanitarian migration crisis, on a per capita basis, Sweden accepted the highest number of asylum seekers of all countries in the OECD. In 2015, close to 163 000 asylum seekers arrived and sought shelter, by far the largest number of asylum seekers arriving in Sweden has strongly accelerated. This is almost double the number that came in 1992 during the war in the former Yugoslavia, and compares with 81 300 recorded in 2014. In the short term, these large numbers are putting pressure on housing (the Migration Board expects to need to find temporary accommodation for 150 000 asylum seekers), on processing

(processing times are expected to rise to a full year), and on care for unaccompanied minors, whose number totalled over 35 300 in 2015. Ensuring that the integration system is able to respond to this challenge in a coherent and cohesive manner is an urgent imperative in Sweden, while rapid and effective integration into the labour market and society will be crucial for long-term success.

Given the composition of Sweden’s foreign-born population, a simplistic inspection of immigrant outcomes is unlikely to get at the true implications of integration policy and policy developments. A thorough appraisal of the integration system, and an examination of how the efficiency of investments might be enhanced, must be closely tailored to the Swedish context. To this end, this report has benefited from the insights of Swedish practitioners, and is the result of a process that convened stakeholders from across the Swedish integration system – drawn from government ministries and agencies, social partners, regional actors and private sector employers. In the spring of 2014, a joint workshop, hosted by the OECD and the Swedish Ministries of Labour and Finance, brought together these stakeholders to work together on identifying the co-ordination challenges and bottlenecks in the Swedish integration system (see Box 1.1).

Box 1.1. Workshop on migrant integration, Stockholm April 2014

In April 2014 the OECD, together with the Swedish Ministry of Finance and the Swedish Ministry of Employment, hosted the first migrant integration workshop “Finding the way: A discussion of the Swedish Migrant Integration System” in Stockholm. The workshop, opened by the Minister for Integration and the State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance brought together participants from across government ministries and government agencies as well as social partners and regional and local actors.

Building on the in-depth knowledge and expertise of each participant, the workshop worked towards identifying the bottlenecks and shortcomings in the design and implementation of integration policy in Sweden. Supported by expert peer reviewers from other OECD countries, participants discussed the challenges facing immigrants along various integration paths – from school to work, from unemployment into work, and from arrival into high-skilled work – examining the support they could access, and the co-ordination of this support, during their transitions through the system, from agency to agency, and into the labour market.

The workshop focused on seven themes identified by the OECD and the Swedish authorities as critical issues facing migrants in their integration into the Swedish labour market:

- | | |
|--|-------------------------------|
| 1. Basic skills and Swedish language for adults | 5. Networks and job search |
| 2. Validation and recognition of foreign credentials | 6. School-to-work transitions |
| 3. Employer demand | 7. Co-ordination among actors |
| 4. Discrimination | |

Each of these seven thematic areas was discussed in small groups and the findings synthesised into a short note (see OECD, 2014).

In light of the current crisis, and the large number of refugees in total permanent inflows to Sweden, this report provides an in-depth analysis of some of the key issues that were identified during the workshop. To investigate the weaknesses of the Swedish integration system in more depth, the report is focussed primarily on the integration of refugees and their families and is structured as follows. It begins, in Chapter 2 with a discussion of settlement policy and introduction activities, and of the co-ordination issues these two policy domains inevitably involve. Chapter 3 proceeds with an analysis of the supply of skills among Sweden's immigrant population – examining the challenges facing Sweden's young immigrants and those who arrive as adults as they build new skills and learn the Swedish language. Chapter 4 then turns to the demand side and investigates how private employers can be galvanised into working more closely with migrants – how incentives can be strengthened and discrimination tackled. Finally Chapter 5 examines the challenges in matching supply and demand and smoothing transitions into work among the low-skilled migrants, and among those who bring existing skills and qualifications with them. Before turning to the specifics of policy, however, it is important to put these policy questions into context.

The labour market context

Employment has proven resilient to the financial crisis but large disparities exist

Sustained output growth, robust productivity, and a sound fiscal position ensured that Sweden entered the financial crisis in a strong position. And, in part due to structural reforms to the labour market that followed the recession of the 1990s, the labour market has proven largely resilient to the crisis and, following an initial shock in 2009, employment has since recovered to levels beyond those seen in 2008. Indeed, in 2015 unemployment rates in Sweden fell to levels not seen since the end of 2008.²



Alongside this, low wage dispersion, combined with strong safety nets, has kept inequality low relative to the OECD average. However, while employment levels among the native-born population have remained consistently above the OECD average – and have extended this gap in recent years – this pattern has not been seen in the employment levels of the foreign-born (see Figure 1.1). Sweden's foreign-born population has not experienced much improvement in employment since 2008 and levels remain substantially lower than those seen among Sweden's native-born population, and below even the OECD average. This underperformance, however, is partially reflective of the composition of Sweden's foreign-born population, as discussed below.

Figure 1.1. Employment and unemployment among native- and foreign-born individuals, 2004-14

Percentage of the working-age population, 15-64



Panel A. Employment rate of native population

Panel B. Employment rate of foreign-born



Panel C. Unemployment rate of native population


Panel D. Unemployment rate of foreign-born



Source: OECD International Migration Database.

Women are particularly struggling to enter employment. Figure 1.2 highlights the extent to which Sweden stands out in this regard, with fewer than 60% of foreign-born women in employment, the 17 percentage point disparity between native- and foreign-born women is the largest in the OECD. While this disparity is driven partially by the high employment levels of Swedish-born women, there is clearly much room for improvement on this front.

Figure 1.2. Employment disparities between native- and foreign-born individuals, 2014




Source: OECD Employment Database.

High entry level wages and limited low-skilled employment mean some groups struggle to find work

Collectively-bargained minimum wages are high in Sweden and, due to the high coverage of collective agreements, they effectively act as minimum wage floors (see Chapter 4 for a more complete discussion). As a result, production is relatively knowledge intensive and low-skilled employment is limited. The result is that very few native-born Swedes work in low-skilled employment – just 4% of women and under 3% of men. Indeed, alongside Switzerland and Norway, the proportion of employment that requires compulsory schooling only is the lowest in the OECD (see Figure 1.3). Among the foreign-born population the picture is somewhat different, and close to 14% of foreign-born women are working in low-skilled jobs.

Figure 1.3. Low-skilled employment, 2013

Percentage of the working-age population, 15-64



Note: The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) drawn up by the International Labour Organization (ILO) describes the tasks and duties undertaken in some 400 jobs divided into families of jobs. ISCO enables jobs to be grouped by the levels of skills and qualifications required. This figure relates to those classed as low skilled (ISCO 1-3); those who work in elementary occupations. This definition of skill level draws upon respondents' self-reported ratings of their jobs and may therefore be over or underestimated.


Source: European Union Labour Force Survey 2013.

The integration context

Sweden has a large foreign-born population, many of whom arrived on humanitarian grounds

Sweden's large foreign-born population has been growing for many decades. In 2013, close to 16% of the Swedish population were born abroad and a further 5% of native-born Swedes had two foreign-born parents; both these figures are well above the OECD average (see Figure 1.4). The same year, close to 90 000 new permanent migrants settled in Sweden – accounting for an additional 0.9% of the Swedish population.

Figure 1.4. Immigrants and native-born offspring of immigrants, 2013 or most recent year



Source: OECD and European Commission (2015), *Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264234024-en>.

Sweden has a long history of migration (see Box 1.2 for more details) and as a result the foreign-born population is rather heterogeneous. While the most common country of birth remains Finland, a large proportion of Sweden's immigrants arrived for international protection. Between 2004 and 2013, over 20% of permanent migrant inflows into Sweden were made up of humanitarian migrants – by far the largest share of all OECD countries (Figure 1.5). A further 40% of migrants to Sweden over this period arrived to reunite with family members, many of whom themselves arrived as

humanitarian migrants in the past. In 2014, refugees and their family represented one quarter of permanent migrants to Sweden, and 2015 is likely to see this figure substantially increased.

Box 1.2. History of migration in Sweden


Sweden has not always been a destination country for migrants. Prior to the 1930s many Swedes left for the possibility of a better life in North America, and Sweden was an emigrant country. Between 1860 and 1930 approximately 1.4 million individuals left Sweden.

Migration to Sweden largely began after the Second World War when strong economic growth and low production costs led to a high demand for labour – particularly in the manufacturing sector – and prompted an essentially free migration policy. Previously dominated by Nordic citizens (who have, for many years, had free access to the Swedish labour market), migrants to Sweden came from Germany, Austria and Italy in the 1950s and from Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey in the 1960s.¹ In the mid-1960s, however, when competition from abroad hit sectors – such as shipbuilding and textiles – that had previously employed many migrants, the requirement of a work permit prior to entry into the country for work was re-introduced and Sweden became increasingly reticent to admit more workers from outside the Nordic countries. From the mid-1970s, following the oil crisis, labour immigration declined in importance and refugees – initially from Greece (1960s), but later from Latin America (1970s), from the Middle East (1980s), from Yugoslavia (1990s), from Iraq (1990s and 2000s) and most recently from Syria – began to dominate the immigrant inflows (see OECD, 2007 for more details). Alongside this, the numbers of humanitarian migrants fleeing from Africa (largely Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea) have been increasing throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Since 2000 humanitarian migrants from Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia have been among the largest recipients of residence permits. Most stark of all, however, has been the increase in the number of refugees fleeing the war in Syria. In 2014, close to 21 000 residence permits were been granted to Syrian nationals alone.

The result of these historical flows is a foreign-born population with diverse origins that mirrors, to some degree, the history of conflict across the world since the 1970s. While over 150 000 (or 10%) of the foreign-born in Sweden come from Finland, the Iraqi (8%), Polish (5%), Iranian, Syrian (4%), and Somali (4%) diasporas all make up a significant proportion. As do migrants from the Former Yugoslavia (4%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (4%). In 2014 immigrants born in Afghanistan accounted for just 2% of Sweden’s foreign-born population, however, with 41 564 new asylum seekers arriving from Afghanistan in 2015 (of whom 23 480 were unaccompanied minors) this number is set to increase.

1. Since 1954, according to the Agreement on the Nordic Common Labour Market, nationals of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have been granted the right to settle and work in each other’s countries, without the need to obtain a work permit. Together with the Agreement on the Nordic Passport Union and the Nordic Social Security Convention, the Agreement on the Common Nordic Labour Market is one of the three founding pillars of the Nordic co-operation, which was established in 1953 and was built on longstanding geopolitical and cultural ties among Scandinavian countries.

Figure 1.5. Composition of permanent inflows to OECD countries, 2004-13
Percent



Source: OECD International Migration Database.

As such, it is little surprise that, in a comparative context, employment outcomes do not look good


The large number of migrants arriving on humanitarian grounds has wide-ranging implications for integration outcomes. Humanitarian migrants are particularly vulnerable and face barriers over and above those experienced by other migrants in making the successful transition to employment. Alongside the trauma associated with forced migration and an often hazardous route to Sweden, their qualifications and experience have often been obtained in labour market conditions quite different to those prevalent in Sweden. Many humanitarian migrants arrive either with very low levels of education or with education, obtained overseas, which is not easily comparable to education in Sweden. In addition, having fled in a hurry, many have no proof of the qualifications they hold. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the challenges involved in qualification recognition.

As a result in all countries, refugees tend to take a significantly longer time to find employment than migrants arriving for work or for studies. In many cases they also require longer than those who came to unite with family. Indeed, as Figure 1.6 shows, while half of male family migrants are in work two years after their arrival in Sweden, the refugee population does

not achieve similar employment levels until close to five years have passed. Among female humanitarian migrants, employment rates in the early years after arrival are lower still and remain below 30% after three years in Sweden.³

Figure 1.6. Employment by duration of stay, 1997-99 cohort

Percent of population that migrated to Sweden 1997-99 and have been living in Sweden for 13 consecutive years




Note: Figures are moving averages over three years.

Source: Statistics Sweden.

The extent to which the composition of Sweden's foreign-born population is driving the country's poor performance in international comparisons is clarified when the foreign-born population is confined to those who originated from outside the European Union and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries. With this more restricted sample of foreign-born individuals, Sweden's foreign-born population does not perform too badly in international comparisons. Indeed, among this group, the employment population ratio of 25-64 year-olds has hovered around 65%, suffering in the aftermath of the financial crisis but experiencing a rebound thereafter (Figure 1.7).⁴ This figure is comparable to the employment population ratio among the equivalent non-EU/EFTA migrants living elsewhere in the EU15/EFTA area.

Figure 1.7. Employment disparities depend upon country of origin, 2008-14

Percentage of the working-age population, 25-64



FB: Foreign-born.


Source: European Union Labour Force Surveys (2008-2014).

Beyond the reason which prompted their migration decision (for work, to reunite with family, or for humanitarian reasons) the experience and education that migrants bring with them when they migrate also has a significant impact upon the types of hurdles they face on their path to integration. Those who arrive with very basic skills are likely to struggle to find stable work in the context of Sweden's high wages, heavy employment protection and paucity of low-skilled job. At the same time those who are highly-qualified may struggle to find employment appropriate to their skills and experience. By taking-up employment requiring less than their formal education level, these immigrants may create additional competition for low-skilled immigrants.

The resultant disparity in the employment levels of low-qualified migrants and their native-born counterparts is striking. Employment rates among the low-educated lag nearly 20 percentage points behind the native-born. This is by far the largest disparity across the OECD (Figure 1.8).⁵

Figure 1.8. Employment by educational attainment, 2014, or latest available year

Percentage point differences in the employment/population ratios between native- and foreign-born, 25-64 years old



Note: Data for the United States and Canada refer to 2012.

Source: European Union Labour Force Surveys 2008-2014.

Large inflows of asylum seekers in 2015 will raise new challenges for the integration system

The number of asylum seekers (individuals who have formally submitted a request for asylum but have not yet completed the asylum procedure) arriving in Sweden saw large increases throughout 2015. At the peak, in November 2015, up to 10 500 individuals (3 000 of whom were unaccompanied minors) lodged asylum-applications per week. Numbers have since fallen, nevertheless they remain high – both by historical standards and according to international comparisons. In practice, not all asylum seekers are granted international protection (and with it, a residence permit). However, with a recognition rate approaching 80% Sweden has, thus far, offered international protection to a large proportion of asylum seekers.⁶

Humanitarian migrants arriving in the current crisis are diverse in terms of country of origin and profile. Many of today's humanitarian migrants are skilled or highly skilled – according to Statistics Sweden, in 2014 over 30% of humanitarian migrants held some form of tertiary degree. While others bring only very basic levels of education and in the same year 37% of humanitarian migrants held only a primary or lower-secondary education.

More striking still is the large number of unaccompanied minors among these recent arrivals. Since 2006 when the current regulations for unaccompanied minors were designed, the numbers have increased 15 fold and, in 2015 alone, more than 35 000 asylum seekers arrived as unaccompanied minors compared to just over 7 000 in 2014. These unaccompanied minors are largely male and, in 2015 only 8% were female. The vast majority – about two thirds in 2015 – were citizens of Afghanistan. Unaccompanied minors are generally defined as persons who arrive without parents, adult relatives or guardians, and have not yet reached the age of 18. These young migrants are particularly vulnerable; they frequently arrive beyond the age of compulsory schooling, with little education under their belt, and are often keen to join the labour market immediately. Their need for a solid support structure to compensate for lack of parental support and help them to focus on educational goals has significant budget implications. In Sweden, all unaccompanied minors, irrespective of whether they have applied for asylum or have been granted a residence permit, are appointed a guardian and offered housing. These housing units are staffed with counsellors and therapists with a staff to minor ratio (at 9-10 staff per 10-15 places) that is among the highest in the OECD (European Migration Network 2015). Statistics on unaccompanied minors are largely not consistent across countries, however, estimates for 2014 suggest that, on a per capita basis, Sweden receives the largest number of unaccompanied minors in all European countries (European Migration Network, 2014) and spending on unaccompanied minors alone reached SEK 10 billion (approximately EUR 1 050 million) in 2015. Over 3 000 unaccompanied minors were granted residence permits in 2015, with an average waiting time of 228 days from application.

Sweden has played an important role in providing a home for many of those migrants fleeing war and persecution but this role brings with it some challenges. Before turning to these challenges in more detail, in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, the next section will provide a brief overview of the evolution of Swedish integration policy.

Integration policy

Integration policy has a long history in Sweden and recent reforms have emphasised rapid labour market integration

The Swedish Immigration Board was established in 1969 and the introduction of free language training for all immigrants the following year is generally considered to be the beginning of Swedish integration policy. Over the following decade, the rights of immigrants were systematically extended to include access to most public jobs and (after three years of residence) the right to vote. With the emphasis primarily on labour market

integration, responsibility for the integration of immigrants into Swedish society lay, until 1985, with the Swedish Labour Market Board. In 1985 responsibility for integration was given first to the Swedish Immigration Board (also responsible for handling asylum applications) and later, in 1998, to the newly-created Swedish Integration Board.

Until 1991, municipalities were responsible for delivering integration and labour market activities. However, in 1991, in order to incentivise municipalities to integrate migrants rapidly, the funding of integration activities was altered. Rather than take full economic responsibility for integration as it had previously done, the state now provided municipalities with a lump-sum per capita disbursement calculated to cover the integration costs incurred by municipalities for the first years following settlement (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the current financing system).

The current integration policy landscape took form in 2010, when the introduction reform (“*Etableringsreformen*”) moved the primary responsibility for the integration of refugees and their families from municipalities to the PES.⁷ This brought widespread change to the way integration policy was managed in Sweden, and these changes are discussed in more depth in the following chapter. The primary goal of the change was to increase the labour market focus of integration policy, while at the same time addressing the geographic inequities that had emerged under the aegis of municipalities.

Most recently new initiatives have focussed on speeding up the integration of humanitarian migrants who arrive with skills, and building skills among those that lack them. The relatively high level of education among some migrants arriving during the current asylum crisis, and the fact that many others have vocational skills and experience in areas that are in high demand on the Swedish labour market, has prompted the authorities to step up the labour market integration of these individuals. To this end, increased resources have been directed to the PES, to bridging courses – including the creation of shorter bridging courses for new arrivals covered by the Introduction Act – and to Fast Track initiatives developed to speed up the integration of humanitarian migrants with experience in shortage occupations (see Chapter 5 for more details). Alongside this, in an effort to curb the large number of asylum seekers arriving in Sweden during the current crisis, in November 2015 Sweden announced the decision to temporarily adopt a new asylum policy under which asylum seekers will be granted, in the first instance, a temporary humanitarian permit renewable after three years – or after one year in the case of asylum seekers offered subsidiary protection (see Box 1.3 for further details).⁸

Box 1.3. Permit duration for asylum seekers with a positive asylum decision

When refugee status is granted, and a residence permit is offered, there remains a question regarding the duration of the permit. Until recently, asylum seekers who have been granted international protection in Sweden obtained a permanent permit right away. In November 2015, however, in response to the unprecedented number of asylum applications, the Swedish Government announced its decision to apply the minimum required under the European Union's Qualification Directive, i.e. providing temporary but renewable three-year permits to those asylum claims processed after April 2016.¹ Asylum seekers granted subsidiary protection will be granted a temporary permit with a duration of one year. This group accounted for over 56% of all positive asylum decisions in 2015. Once the initial period of protection comes to an end, the situation in the country of origin is reassessed and in the case of renewal, the general rule will be that a second temporary permit will be granted. However, a permanent residence permit may be granted if the applicant can show that they have an assessed income that is sufficient to support themselves.

Sweden is not unique among the OECD countries in offering only temporary protection initially and many countries also offer only a temporary permit in the first instance. And, alongside Sweden, there is a discussion in several other countries to move towards temporary protection. It is hoped among countries offering that the temporary nature of the permit will reduce the inflows of asylum seekers and may also facilitate returns.

At the same time, there are possible drawbacks when it comes to integration, and it is important to be aware of the resulting trade-offs. If a temporary permit conveys the message to refugees that they are not expected to stay, they may not make the long-term investment in the skills – notably language skills – that are critical to long-run employability and integration. To strengthen the integration incentives facing migrants on temporary permits, many countries hinge the permit renewal decision upon the demonstration of paid employment or self-sufficiency. However, while this may increase the incentives to find work, it may also risk undermining incentives to invest in education.² There is also a certain inconsistency regarding the many who obtain subsidiary protection. They will receive a one-year permit, but will nevertheless be expected to begin an introduction programme lasting for two years.

From the perspective of employers, the knowledge that a job applicant holds only a temporary permit may deter hiring and could have a negative impact upon the extent to which employer led training is extended to refugees.

1. Temporary residence permits will be granted to all refugees apart from those relocated to Sweden under the resettlement quota scheme. Exceptions will also apply for children and their families who registered their applications before the agreement was presented. For these individuals, the previous rules will still apply, provided they remain in Sweden and the child is still under the age of 18 when the decision is taken.

2. There are also concerns, particularly in the context of high wage subsidies, that this condition may enable unscrupulous employers to take advantage of migrants wishing to maximise their chances for permit renewal.

Notes

1. This document uses the terms humanitarian migrant and refugee interchangeably to refer to all persons who have been a granted residence permit on humanitarian grounds or grounds of international protection.
2. The current favourable economic conditions are likely to have important implications for the long term integration prospects of recent arrivals. This puts the present situation in stark contrast with the early 1990s when a significant downturn saw unemployment rising beyond 10% and had long run implications for the integration of the large inflows arriving at that time (see Lemaître, 2007).
3. It is important, however, to put these figures in perspective, and while even after 12 years, the employment rates among refugee women still lag behind their Nordic counterparts, this is in part driven by the high employment rates among women in Sweden.
4. Referring to the population aged 25-64, in order to minimise the impact of those still in full time education, these figures are not directly comparable to those in Figure 1.1.
5. ISCED refers to the International Standard Classification of Education. People falling into ISCED groups 0-2 are described as having no, or a low level of education. Those with ISCED 0-1 have no more than a primary education and those with ISCED 2 have no more than a lower-secondary education. ISCED 3-4 describes those who have completed upper-secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education and those with ISCED 5+, described in this report as being highly-educated have completed at least the first stage of tertiary education.
6. The number of asylum applications granted has increased substantially in the last four years from a little more than 8 700 in 2010 to over 32 600 in 2014. The majority of these new residents are men, with women accounting for just over one third of newly-granted residence permits in 2014.
7. Municipalities still retain funding for Swedish language training and civic orientation.
8. As part of the most recent reforms in the field of integration, in the final quarter of 2015 it was decided that a temporary adjustment in the asylum regulations in line with the minimum level in the European Union. For a


period of three years refugees and persons eligible for subsidiary protection who are granted protection in Sweden will be granted temporary residence permits. Refugees will be granted a residence permit for three years, and persons eligible for subsidiary protection for one year. These permits will be renewable. In the case of extension, the general rule will also be that a temporary permit will be granted. A permanent residence permit may be granted when the first temporary residence permit expires if the applicant can show that they have an assessed income that is sufficient to support themselves.

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