

## Chapter 3

### Inclusive development partnerships

*The Busan Partnership agreement recognised that all actors have a different but complementary role to play in achieving development goals. It puts inclusiveness at the core of effective partnerships for development, bringing together the perspectives and contributions of all stakeholders, including governments, civil society and business. An inclusive approach to development also means that efforts are made to ensure that benefits reach all – both men and women. This chapter asks to what extent civil society organisations have been enabled to operate in an environment that maximises their contribution to development? How is the private sector participating in the design and implementation of policies and strategies to foster sustainable growth and poverty reduction? Do developing countries have systems in place to track allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment? This chapter presents the current state of play for the gender equality indicator. On monitoring the enabling environment for civil society organisations and private sector engagement, indicator construction has been challenging and is still ongoing. This chapter therefore provides a preliminary narrative for selected commitments on the enabling environment for civil society and private sector engagement, as well as an update on the status of indicator development.*

*Inclusive development partnerships drive better development outcomes and shared prosperity.*

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The benefits of development are not reaching large segments of the population in many developing countries. The exclusive focus on growth is not enough to end poverty; widespread inequality is the result. The need for specific policies and measures and the involvement of all actors to ensure that everyone can benefit from growth, particularly vulnerable groups, is embedded in the Busan Partnership agreement. The need for inclusion is reinforced by the United Nations' 2013 *Report of the High-Level Panel on Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda* (HLP, 2013). It calls for international development goals that leave no one behind and emphasises inclusive growth and social inclusion.

One legacy of the Busan Partnership agreement is its broadening of the development co-operation agenda to include a wider range of development actors and challenges. This broadening began at the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which encouraged the active participation of non-state actors as “full and equal participants” in shaping the agenda and developing the Busan Partnership agreement. Inclusive development partnerships form one of the four principles of the agreement, underpinning its common goals and differentiated commitments (Box 1.1). While the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) acknowledged the important role of non-governmental actors – particularly civil society organisations (CSOs), business, parliaments and local governments – the Busan Partnership agreement elevates these stakeholders to full development partners with an equal say in how to foster sustainable growth, reduce poverty and share prosperity. It recognises the different but complementary roles of all development stakeholders.

The Busan Partnership agreement aims to promote more effective development co-operation through inclusive partnerships. Relevant Busan commitments set out a bold agenda for civil society and private sector engagement, to enable them to fully contribute to development while encouraging greater accountability. CSOs need to implement their own effectiveness commitments embedded in the Istanbul Principles (2010)<sup>1</sup> just as much as they need support to operate in a conducive environment. The private sector is called on to help design policies that promote growth and reduce poverty, while governments improve the way they regulate their markets through greater engagement of private sector actors.

Beyond the question of who participates in the design and implementation of development policies, inclusive development partnerships aim to drive better development outcomes and shared prosperity. A key form of exclusion is gender inequality. Recognising that reducing gender inequality is both an end in its own right and a pre-requisite for sustainable and inclusive growth, the Busan Partnership agreement calls for appropriate targeting of public expenditure to ensure that development benefits both women and men.

The Global Partnership monitoring framework can only reflect part of these ambitions, and includes three indicators as the best proxies for measuring progress towards a more inclusive development agenda:

- Indicator 2: Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in – and contribution to – development

- Indicator 3: Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development
- Indicator 8: Gender equality and women’s empowerment

## **Indicator 2: Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in – and contribution to – development**

*CSOs play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in mobilising funds and in delivering services to citizens.*

The Busan Partnership agreement reaffirms that CSOs are “independent development actors in their own right”. CSOs are non-market and non-state organisations, in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. Though diverse, they play “a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation” (BPa, 2011: para 22). In addition, some CSOs – particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and foundations – contribute actively to development co-operation using funds raised from public and non-public sources, or implementing specific programmes and projects funded by official development assistance. Often they also complement the action of states by delivering services to citizens.

Building on the Accra Agenda for Action, the Busan Partnership agreement calls for an enabling environment in which CSOs can maximise their contributions to development (AAA: para 20c; BPa, 2011: para 22a). What does an enabling environment for CSOs look like? Broadly, the environment for civil society is viewed as “the conditions within which civil society works,” starting at the country level (CIVICUS, 2013a). There are international principles protecting civil society which are grounded in international and regional human rights law (World Movement for Democracy and International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2012). For example, in September 2013 the 24th UN Human Rights Council Session passed the “Civil Society Space” resolution which urges “States to create and maintain, in law and in practice, a safe and enabling environment in which civil society can operate free from hindrance and insecurity” (United Nations General Assembly, 2013).

While there is consensus on the importance of an enabling environment for CSOs to operate and engage in development, there is a range of views on what an enabling environment entails. To facilitate common understanding among Global Partnership stakeholders on what has to be done to promote an enabling environment for civil society, the Task Team on CSO Effectiveness and the Enabling Environment<sup>2</sup> proposes drawing on internationally agreed rights (also recognised in the Busan Partnership agreement). In this context, the enabling environment for civil society should include:

- law, policy and practice that respect freedom of association: the rights of all individuals to form, join and participate in an association, at national and international levels, with legal entity status if the founders so desire
- the right of CSOs to operate free from unwarranted state intrusion or interference in their affairs; and the right to pursue a broad range of self-defined objectives, including to seek and secure funding from national and international sources

- the respect of other basic rights, mainly the right to freedom of peaceful assembly; the right to freedom of expression; and the right to communication and co-operation with others in all sectors within and outside their countries, including through networks, coalitions and any media
- institutionalised, inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder dialogue fora for the active participation of non-state actors in determining, implementing, and monitoring development policy and programmes
- effective support from development co-operation providers to empower CSOs to be effective development actors in their own right.

### *What is the measure?*

Indicator 2: Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development.

Target for 2015: Continued progress over time.

The purpose of this indicator is to provide an entry point for a political discussion of broad trends. It draws on the CIVICUS<sup>3</sup> Enabling Environment Index (EEI),<sup>4</sup> a global composite index using secondary data to understand the propensity of citizens to participate in civil society (CIVICUS, 2013a). The index is organised around three dimensions (socio-economic, socio-cultural and governance environment), broken down into 17 sub-dimensions and 53 indicators. To date, the index covers 109 countries (those with data available for at least 14 of the 17 sub-dimensions). The index provides a good picture of the various factors affecting citizens' capacity to engage and participate in civil society.

It was initially envisaged that the Global Partnership indicator on the enabling environment for CSOs would focus on those sub-dimensions of the EEI relevant to the Busan commitment, namely those having a direct bearing on CSO activity. These relate to the legal and regulatory framework for civil society organisations and include (CIVICUS, 2013a):

- NGO legal context: legal conditions allowing NGOs to operate.
- Civil society infrastructure: the strength of organisational capacity, financial viability and support mechanisms for CSOs.

The lack of detailed data to date means it is too early to build an indicator to assess progress on a country-by-country basis. Both of these EEI sub-dimensions are based on a single source<sup>5</sup> with limited country coverage. This makes it difficult, at this stage, to use the EEI to construct an indicator that would alone provide a robust basis for meaningful dialogue on the state of the CSO enabling environment within the Global Partnership. In light of these challenges, the proposed way forward is to build on the work of CIVICUS with additional qualitative evidence to identify some trends and challenges on the path towards an enabling environment for CSOs, focusing on the following aspects: the legal and regulatory framework for CSOs, support from providers of development co-operation, and platforms for multi-stakeholder dialogue.

## *What is the state of play?*

*Examples by governments to facilitate the work of CSOs include improved legislation or institutionalised CSO engagement in national policy dialogue.*

Despite some positive examples (Box 3.1), evidence suggests that the conditions for civil society to engage in and contribute to development are far from perfect. Information from different sources shows that CSOs are facing constraints in many countries: CIVICUS has reported 413 threats to civil society in 87 countries between January 2012 and October 2013 (CIVICUS, 2013b). These vary from legal limitations on funding and on deploying political activities to threats, imprisonments and attacks (including assassination) against activists and individual members of CSOs in reaction to their activities. The International Trade Union Confederation lists seven countries as “at risk” due to extreme violations of trade unions and labour rights; less severe violations have been registered in another 80 countries (ITUC, 2013).

### **Box 3.1. Progress towards a better environment for civil society organisations**

The CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness was formed in 2012 as an open platform that unites CSOs from around the world around the issue of development effectiveness. It has reported some positive examples from governments making efforts to improve conditions for CSOs, including:

- Legislation in the Kyrgyz Republic for the establishment of public watch councils providing CSOs with a forum to monitor the implementation of government policies and the use of public resources (CPDE, 2013)..
- More participatory policy forums for policy dialogue in Cameroon and Kenya (CPDE, 2013).
- Improvement in the political environment for CSOs in Malawi following the swearing in of a new president in 2012 (CPDE, 2013).

Qualitative feedback from El Salvador as part of its Global Partnership monitoring data submission indicates that the country’s monitoring framework for its National Plan of Development Co-operation Effectiveness (2012-15) includes an indicator on the civil society enabling environment. El Salvador also highlighted the launch in 2014 of the Citizen Participation on Public Management Policy and the elaboration of a draft Law on Citizen Participation which was designed with the involvement of academia and CSOs.

## *Securing a legal and regulatory framework for CSOs*

*CSOs face important challenges in many countries: mandatory and/or complex registration processes, control and funding restrictions.*

Despite the fact that the rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression are protected in the constitutions of many countries, in reality these rights can be restricted by laws, regulations and practices. While these limitations are more widespread in

authoritarian political contexts, there are also examples from more democratic environments. Particularly sensitive are the introduction of mandatory and/or complex registration processes for CSOs (CPDE, 2013). The UN states that “the formation of associations should not be subject to a prior authorisation procedure, but rather regulated by a system of notification that is simple, easily accessible, non-discriminatory and non-onerous or free of charge” (United Nations, 2013). In other cases, CSOs have seen their field of activities limited by law. This is done by using vague terminology open to arbitrary interpretations.

The ability of CSOs to access funding and other resources from domestic, foreign and international sources is an integral part of the conditions for an enabling environment. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association highlights the increased control and restrictions on funding to civil society, particularly from foreign sources (United Nations, 2013). Governments frequently justify these limitations by citing security concerns (including protection against terrorism and prevention of money laundering), sovereignty issues (fear of foreign interference), transparency and accountability, and even aid effectiveness principles. Similar examples of limitations to CSO funding during the last two years have also been recorded by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2013).

### *Effective support from development co-operation providers*

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*Providers of development co-operation can do more to ensure that CSOs can exercise their role as independent development actors.*

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In countries that depend on external development finance, CIVICUS argues that providers could use development co-operation funding to improve conditions by working with governments or by directly supporting local civil society. There are examples of providers individually or jointly following good practice in their support to and engagement with civil society. However, the record is mixed, as “a number of donors have been stalled in their progress, while others have simultaneously implemented both enabling and more restrictive changes to their CSO support and engagement” (Multi-Stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, 2013). This is confirmed by other evaluations, which call for providers to do more to support the enabling environment for CSOs (INTRAC, 2013).

### *Institutionalised, inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder dialogue*

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*Involvement of non-state stakeholders in dialogue on national development strategies remains the exception rather than the rule.*

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The Busan Partnership agreement’s focus on democratic ownership of development opens up scope for CSOs to demand to be fully involved in development processes. The CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness has documented experience in this area based on 12 country case studies (CPDE, 2013). There are indications of “modest progress” in some sub-Saharan African countries, but in general the study concludes that multi-stakeholder consultation is “mostly episodic, at the discretion of governments and often involves limited numbers of CSOs, selected for their broad support of government policy. Inclusion of CSOs and other stakeholders within government bodies mandated to



co-ordinate and/or monitor country development strategies remain the exception rather than the rule” (CPDE, 2013). Reporting on mutual accountability (indicator 7, Chapter 4) shows only slow progress towards involving non-executive stakeholders (which are not limited to CSOs).

### **Indicator 3: Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development**

*Effective public-private dialogue can lead to a better environment for private sector development and investment.*

The Busan Partnership agreement recognises the central role of the private sector in advancing innovation; creating wealth, income and jobs; mobilising domestic resources and in turn contributing to poverty reduction. This is the first time that non-state actors like the private sector are included in high-level discussions on development co-operation as equal development partners along with governments (BP, 2011: para 32).

The Busan High-Level Forum saw governments and more than 40 representatives from both the public and the private sectors endorse the Joint Statement on Expanding and Enhancing Public Private Partnership for Broad-Based, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth (2011). This sets out principles to guide co-ordinated action between public and private actors to ensure inclusive dialogue conducive to sustainable development. These principles seek a policy environment which sees consultation with the private sector in developing national and sector plans as a pre-requisite for broadening country ownership of the development process, ensuring inclusive growth, and expanding economic opportunity for all segments of the population. This vision is embedded in the commitments on the private sector and development underpinning the Busan Partnership agreement.

Measuring progress in private sector involvement through the Global Partnership monitoring framework is intended to strengthen incentives for developing countries and their development partners to scale up and deepen public-private dialogue and other forms of private sector engagement with the public sector. The indicator seeks to provide a basis for a better understanding of the nature, structure and sustainability of collaborative processes between public and private sector actors. It could also stimulate country-level dialogue on progress, challenges and institutional development needs.

The development of an indicator on private sector engagement has been challenging. Difficulties include the need to identify proxies for private sector engagement, drawing on existing methodology in such a complex area, while facing a relative scarcity of comparative data for creating this tool. Assessing private sector engagement comprehensively needs to involve a wide range of public and private sector actors (such as domestic and foreign companies, large companies and small- and medium-sized enterprises, and professional associations). This requires the development and implementation of an assessment methodology, including business surveys, which would require resources and capacity beyond those available to the joint support team of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. Further thinking and consultation are needed in this area to ensure that the indicator provides incentives for developing sustainable forms of structured public-private dialogue.

### *What is the measure?*

Indicator 3: Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development.

Target for 2015: Continued progress over time.

The indicator focuses on one of the five commitments related to the private sector laid out in the Busan Partnership agreement: “to enable the participation of the private sector in the design and implementation of development policies and strategies to foster sustainable growth and poverty reduction” (BPa, 2011: para 32b). This indicator is not designed to measure the full scope of private sector participation in development and does not attempt to capture other dimensions of public-private co-operation or interaction (such as public-private partnerships, the role of the private sector in alleviating poverty through job creation or inclusive business). Nor does the indicator intend to duplicate existing global rankings in this area (e.g. the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index).

The indicator consists of a multi-dimensional index to assess the quality of public-private dialogue as a proxy for measuring private sector engagement in developing countries. Dimensions to be assessed include:<sup>6</sup>

- existence of institutionalised mechanisms or formalised structures to facilitate dialogue
- representativeness of private sector actors engaged in the dialogue
- some basic indication on the outcomes of the dialogue (e.g. number of reform proposals and reforms enacted).

The indicator includes an assessment tool which draws on the good practice principles for public-private dialogue and the monitoring and evaluation methodology associated with this process (Herzberg and Wright, 2006). This methodology allows for a review of the organisational effectiveness of public-private dialogue (Box 3.2), focusing specifically on the nature, structure and sustainability of collaborative processes between public and private sector actors.

#### **Box 3.2. What is public-private dialogue?**

Public-private dialogue (PPD) is an engagement mechanism to ensure more inclusive and sustainable policy reforms through a structured and participatory reform process. It refers to the structured interaction between the public and private sectors in promoting the right conditions for private sector development, improvements to the business climate, and poverty reduction. Initiatives to promote PPD consist in most cases of establishing a combination of technical working groups, a secretariat and a high-level oversight structure. PPDs are diverse, with a broad scope of activity. For example, they address cross-cutting investment climate issues as well as sector-specific issues; they can focus on rural or urban, national or sub-national levels.

Examples of PPDs include: the Vietnam Business Forum and the Ethiopian Public Private Consultative Forum. For more information on public-private dialogue see [www.publicprivatedialogue.org](http://www.publicprivatedialogue.org).

The assessment tool, once fully operational, will enable development partners in a country to target their support to effective public-private dialogue (PPD) leading to a better business environment. Too often, PPDs have been developed in countries by development partners without an adequate appreciation of the operating environment.



Reviewing the quality of PPDs constitutes a critical step in enabling all development stakeholders to understand the role that the private sector is playing and to strengthen its contribution to development. Public-private dialogue often takes place in weak institutional contexts, but is it effective? And if it is, what are the success factors and what are the results?

Rather than focusing narrowly on existing PPD platforms, the indicator aims to provide a fuller picture of the wider environment, including private sector capacity and willingness to engage in such dialogue. In doing so, the tool can illustrate weaknesses that must be overcome before public-private dialogue can be effective. This should not, however, slow the pace of introducing PPD to high-risk environments. Rather it should enable development partners to better co-ordinate and allocate resources. This will ensure that risk is shared, skills and capacity are provided, and that implementation will have a direct and positive impact.

### *What is the state of play?*

The assessment tool was still being tested at the time of writing this report. Preliminary findings should, nevertheless, provide interesting lessons that will feed into the preparation of political debates for the Global Partnership's High-Level Meeting taking place in April 2014 in Mexico.

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*Public-private dialogue is most effective when supported by an administrative entity, technical working groups and a high-level oversight structure.*

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In the meantime, existing evidence provides some interesting findings, which suggest a strong correlation between the organisational effectiveness of secretariats supporting public-private dialogue structures, the PPDs and the results achieved. Where country demand drives PPDs, they are an entry point through which to implement broader and more ambitious development co-operation programmes. When focused and well supported, public-private dialogue can contribute to the improvement of the investment climate. A key piece of research has been the World Bank Group-sponsored assessment of the effectiveness of public-private dialogue fora (Toland, 2009). This review used the methodology underpinning the proposed assessment tool for this indicator, and has provided a benchmark for measuring the organisational performance of such structured PPD. The process has also improved the understanding of various implementation models and their associated risks, it also provided insights into success factors for effective public-private dialogue.

The World Bank review in 30 countries shows that well-targeted support has been linked to the implementation of 400 specific reforms encompassing more than 50 different areas within the financial and private sector development space/business environment (Toland, 2009). Less quantifiable outcomes demonstrate that the dialogue process itself has been positive for promoting the reform process. PPDs have opened communication and advisory channels which did not exist before. Governments have used PPDs to improve their own co-ordination and accountability frameworks. Trust between stakeholders and a willingness to engage have emerged in countries with little history or track record of dialogue.

There are also many examples of failure of PPDs in developing countries. PPDs tend to fail when they are not based on sound structures or if they do not take adequate care to ensure stakeholders are able and willing to commit to the process. PPDs pose special challenges in post-conflict environments where they test overall government implementation capacity. They also test the capacity of governments to openly engage with non-state stakeholders. Making PPDs work requires real investment in institutions and people and a realistic capacity assessment of both the private and public actors involved.

## Indicator 8: Gender equality and women’s empowerment

*Reducing gender inequality is both an end in its own right and a pre-requisite for sustainable and inclusive growth.*

Gender equality and the empowerment of women are critical for development. Reducing gender inequality is both an end in its own right and a pre-requisite for sustainable and inclusive growth. The Busan Partnership agreement calls for a redoubling of efforts to implement existing commitments in this area. This indicator focuses on the commitment to “Accelerate and deepen efforts to collect, disseminate, harmonise and make full use of data disaggregated by sex to inform policy decisions and guide investments, ensuring in turn that public expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men” (BPa, 2011: para 20a).

A well-tested means for making progress in this area is for governments to develop appropriate budget tracking and monitoring systems, and to make information about allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment readily accessible to the public (BPa, 2011: para 20a).

### *What is the measure?*

Indicator 8: Proportion of developing countries with systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Target for 2015: All developing countries have systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment.

This indicator fills an important accountability gap in allowing for the first comparable assessment of the existence of such systems. There are two parts to this indicator: the number of countries with a system in place to: 1) track allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment; and 2) make such allocations public.

*Systems in place to track allocations for gender include: gender responsive budgeting guidelines, gender-specific indicators to inform budget decisions and budget classifiers to identify programmes and resources.*

In order to be considered as “having a system in place to track allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment”, countries are required to fulfil at least one of the following criteria:

1. An official government statement exists on a system for tracking allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment. Such systems may be defined as processes and procedures in place to plan, approve, allocate and monitor public expenditures at the national and sectoral level in a way that ensures that expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men. They can include gender budget statements, classifiers, gender markers, and even preliminary guidelines as outlined in call circulars.
2. Allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment are systematically tracked. For this to happen, the process must be officially planned and regularly conducted.
3. Leadership and oversight of the tracking system is carried out by the central government unit in charge of public expenditures (for example the ministry of finance or a sector ministry).

For allocations on gender equality to be considered as having been “made public”, the following criterion is mandatory:

4. Budget information that is gender equality-focused must be publicly available. This could be through parliamentary oversight, civil society scrutiny, publications, websites or other means.

### ***What is the state of play?***


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*Strong interest in the gender indicator demonstrates commitment to ensure that both women and men benefit from public expenditure.*

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This indicator was developed by UN Women and the OECD-Development Assistance Committee’s Network on Gender Equality. While the initial intention was to pilot the indicator in 20 UN Women programme countries in 2013, the methodology was made available for all interested countries. It is encouraging that the majority of countries that submitted data to the Global Partnership monitoring voluntarily reported on this indicator. This shows that countries are committed to gender equality and are making serious efforts to track allocations in support of gender equality. The indicator also seems to have the potential to prompt behaviour change, as many countries without such systems have taken steps towards setting them up (Box 3.3).

Country data for each of the criteria is available in Table A.6. Of the 35 countries that have reported on this indicator, 12 have a system in place to track and make public allocations on gender equality (Figure 3.1): Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kosovo, Mali, Nepal, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania. Five additional countries (Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, the Republic of Moldova, Niger and Togo) report having systems for tracking allocations on gender equality, but that these allocations are not made public. The existence of an official government statement or a system for tracking allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment is the most frequently observed out of the four indicator criteria.

Figure 3.1. **How many countries have systems in place to track and make gender allocations?**

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933003079>

There are various types of systems in place at the country level to track allocations for gender equality. For example, Ethiopia has developed national gender-responsive budgeting guidelines for mainstreaming gender in the programme budget process. Similarly in the United Republic of Tanzania annual budget guidelines provided by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs instruct sector ministries to take a gender-responsive budgeting approach. Additionally, the Performance Assessment Framework matrix, Public Expenditure Review and the Aid Management Platform are recognised government instruments in the United Republic of Tanzania, and include indicators for more systematically tracking allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment. In Guatemala, a budget classifier allows the identification of programmes and resources allocated to implement the National Policy for the Promotion and Integral Development of Women and Plan for Equal Opportunities.

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*Most participating countries are making serious efforts to track allocations for gender equality and make them public.*

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Of the 20 countries that submitted additional qualitative data, 8 are making efforts to use gender-specific indicators and data disaggregated by sex to inform budget allocation decisions at sectoral, local or district level. In Kenya, the government is in the process of developing sex-disaggregated data for all sectors; however, budget allocations are not gender responsive and expenditures are not disaggregated by sex. In Madagascar, sex-disaggregated data is used to determine sectoral budgets; however, the government indicates that this practice is not applied systematically. The government of Moldova has developed sex-disaggregated data in the areas of social protection, employment and education and updated a harmonised set of gender-sensitive indicators to facilitate the process of reporting and to contribute to the implementation of the National Programme on Gender Equality. Existing sex-disaggregated data, however, is not used fully in decision-making processes, especially at the sub-national level.

Two countries reported that they conduct impact assessments on how women and men benefit from government expenditure. In Kenya, attempts have been made in the education sector to report on how boys and girls benefit from university scholarships and loans. The government of Tanzania carried out gender-impact assessments during the review of the first phase of the implementation of the national development strategy. However, these assessments are not currently conducted annually.

### Box 3.3. Promising plans for tracking gender budget allocations

Several countries that currently lack gender equality tracking systems have reported on initiatives to move forward in this area:

- Bangladesh plans to generate sex-disaggregated data at all levels to integrate gender into planning at the central government level and to incorporate gender responsive budgeting into the medium-term budgetary framework.
- Benin and Madagascar have appointed gender focal points trained in gender responsive budgeting in all sector ministries.
- Burkina Faso is planning programmes to raise awareness among government officials on gender-responsive budgeting.
- In Honduras, the National Women's Institute has proposed a gender budget classifier to track resources allocated to programmes, projects and activities that promote gender equality and for the inclusion of a Gender Equity Investment Index in the monitoring system of the country vision and national plan.
- Malawi wants to pilot programme-based budgeting, including the collection of sex-disaggregated data, to improve accountability for results.
- Peru has a monitoring system to track resources for gender equality in the public budget.
- Annual circulars from Senegal's Ministry of Economy and Finance call for sector ministries to integrate gender analysis in their budgets. These are bearing fruit in the health sector, where maternity infrastructure will be integrated into all new health facilities at the district or rural level.

## How to move forward?

- Having a common understanding of what is meant by an “enabling environment” for CSOs could help to determine the specific and feasible actions needed by Global Partnership members to enhance the effectiveness of development co-operation through more inclusive development partnerships. A clear definition, drawing on the initial proposal of the Multi-Stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and the Enabling Environment, would also provide some useful orientation on what should be measured to track progress in implementing Busan commitments, making monitoring easier both globally and nationally.
- More support and engagement from Global Partnership members is necessary to identify whether and how comprehensive and regularly updated primary data on CSO environment can be collected to monitor progress towards commitments. This data will need to be accurate and comparable across countries. Reporting could take place through countries' existing accountability frameworks with the help of tools for structured self-assessments on the enabling environment for civil society. Such an

approach would provide information for CIVICUS to use for the Enabling Environment Index and, more importantly, would promote a national dialogue among government, CSOs and other development actors.

- Measuring the private sector's contribution to sustainable growth and poverty reduction policies and strategies has been challenging. The indicator should also be designed in a way that encourages private sector actors to engage in the dialogue on development policies. A solution needs to be found so that this indicator can be used systematically to assess private sector engagement more comprehensively. A possible solution might be to work with organisations with a clear mandate and capacity to carry out this type of monitoring work.
- Gender equality and women's rights have long been recognised as essential components of sustainable development; and are likely to be central to the post-2015 development agenda. Advancing gender equality and women's empowerment requires not only political leadership, policies and funding but also institutions, systems and data. Evidence shows strong commitment by an increasing number of countries to ensure that public expenditure is targeting both women and men. Also encouraging is the number of countries that are setting up systems to track gender allocations. Global Partnership stakeholders are invited to support these efforts to ensure that more countries have these systems in place by 2015.

## Notes

1. The Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles were endorsed at the Open Forum's Global Assembly in Istanbul, on 29 September 2010. They are available at <http://cso-effectiveness.org/istanbul-principles.067>.
2. The Multi-Stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and the Enabling Environment is a group of representatives from governments of countries which are providers and recipients of development co-operation, and Northern, Southern and international CSOs. It was launched in 2009 to promote the implementation of civil society-related commitments in the Accra Agenda for Action. The mandate of the Task Team now is to follow Busan commitments in this area.
3. The World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) is an international alliance of civil society organisations and activists working to strengthen citizen action and civil society, especially in areas where participatory democracy and citizens' freedom of association are challenged. See [www.civicus.org](http://www.civicus.org).
4. Launched in October 2013, the EEI was developed under the guidance of a multi-stakeholder Advisory Group, with technical support from academia as well as in consultation with the CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness.
5. The United States' Aid Agency (USAID) CSO Sustainability Index, see: [www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/supporting-vibrant-civil-society-independent-media](http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/supporting-vibrant-civil-society-independent-media).



6. The indicator methodology and an update on piloting the indicator is available on the website of the Global Partnership for Effective Development <http://effectivecooperation.org/progress>.

## *References*

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