

## Chapter 5

# Illustrations on Civil Society and the Paris Declaration

*This chapter looks at examples of aid effectiveness practices involving CSOs, including the following:*

- 1. how CSOs contribute to more democratic ownership in government-led programmes, and apply the ownership principle in their own programmes;*
- 2. alignment with priorities of CSOs and their constituents;*
- 3. harmonisation efforts in which CSOs and governments play complementary roles;*
- 4. CSO approaches to results management that promote iterative learning and accommodate indicators of social and institutional change; and*
- 5. CSO initiatives to promote social accountability or their own accountability.*

The AG-CS' over-arching recommendations on the Paris Declaration are that all stakeholders should:

#### Recommendation 4a

Recognise the character of the Paris Declaration as a historic agreement between donors and developing countries at a particular point in time, to address a particular set of issues and mutual obligations.

#### Recommendation 4b

Deepen understanding and application of the Paris Declaration principles in ways that emphasise local and democratic ownership, social diversity, gender equality and accountability for achieving results of benefit to poor and marginalised populations as essential conditions of effectiveness.

This recommendation to adopt an enriched understanding of the Paris Declaration principles is one that numerous groups had already begun to apply well before the Accra HLF-3 as they strived to make sense of the Paris principles for their work. Examples include reflections on the pertinence of the Paris Declaration principles for vertical or global funds (World Bank, 2006), discussions in Dublin and London on crosscutting issues (OECD-DAC, 2008), and the work of the Global Donor Platform on Rural Development (GDPRD, 2008). Some CSOs, such as World Vision and the CSOs involved in the Uniterra programme, have used an enriched understanding of the Paris principles when assessing or demonstrating their own aid effectiveness (Phillips, 2008; Example 76).

Worthy of note is that there was considerable debate within the AG-CS about the applicability of even the enriched principles to the activities of CSOs. CSO members recognised the value and importance of the Paris principles, but left to their own, would not necessarily have adopted the same set of principles for CSOs or prioritised them in the same way. Recommendation 4 suggests that effectiveness principles are context specific: they depend upon the purposes for which they are devised and the context in which they are applied.

This idea is well illustrated in a CSO discussion paper on the determinants of civil society aid effectiveness that proposed the following guiding principles for North-South partnership relationships. As readers can attest for themselves, these are very distinct from what one finds in the Paris Declaration (Tomlinson, 2006):

- **A shared vision**, negotiated in a context of mutual support and solidarity, beyond specific programmes or projects.
- **A respect for diversity** that also clearly identifies shared roles and objectives, while negotiating differences arising from respective organisational mandates and the autonomy of each counterpart.
- **Respect and honesty** in working relationships, based on a continued commitment to understand and appreciate each others' potential and limits.

- **Transparency**, with a clear commitment to work in ways that maximise accountability to each other for the commitments and obligations undertaken together (financial and otherwise).
- A **climate of mutual trust** that is the result of both striving for equity in the practice of the relationship and the commitment of time, through multiple forms of engagement with each other.
- A **sharing of knowledge** that is built on a commitment to devote human and financial resources to appropriate forms of mutual learning.”

A second illustration of how the choice of principles is context-specific comes from work that was done from a field perspective on donor support for civil society in Tanzania (Ingelstam and Karlstedt, 2007). Described in Example 61, this exercise arrived at its own set of principles, which are consistent with those of the Paris Declaration, yet quite different, including such principles as the need to encourage diversity of funding strategies, mainstreaming support for civil society, adopting a human rights approach, engaging in a long-term commitment and encouraging innovation and learning. Clearly, even the “enriched” Paris principles can be complemented by general or operational principles covering other aspects of aid effectiveness.

## Local and democratic ownership

### Recommendation 5

A return to basics is in order regarding the ownership principle, including a change of vocabulary away from the commonly used expression “country ownership”, which is misleading. More accurate would be an expression such as “local and democratic ownership” which emphasises ownership not just by central government agencies, but also by parliaments, local governments, citizens, communities and CSOs.

Recommendation 5 calls for a broader understanding of the ownership principle, and suggest a change of vocabulary, away from the expression “country ownership” which the AG-CS associates with a centralised view of ownership. Common alternatives are “democratic ownership”, “local ownership”, or a combination of the two as recommended by the AG-CS. Others avoid the problem by using the word “ownership” in a stand-alone fashion.

Examples of ownership involving CSOs are of two types: those illustrating more democratic ownership in government-led programmes, and those showing how CSOs apply the ownership principle in their own programmes. These are covered respectively under Recommendations 6a and 6b. Considerably more attention was paid to the former of these two applications under the AG-CS process, because of the Paris Declaration’s emphasis on government-led poverty reduction programmes.

### Recommendation 6a

The range of stakeholders engaged in the design, implementation and assessment of development strategies, programmes and initiatives should be significantly broadened to include parliaments, local governments, citizens, communities and CSOs.

What follow are examples of more democratic ownership through CSO engagement with government in the design, implementation and assessment of such programmes and initiatives.

According to a seven-country study of African Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), processes of public engagement in PRSP development have helped to open democratic space for domestic policy dialogue (Booth, 2003). However, civil society critiques of PRSP processes suggest that further progress is needed (e.g. Christian Aid, 2001; Whaites, 2002). The World Bank has acknowledged that, “significant constraints to meaningful participation remain in many countries” (World Bank, 2005:26).

One of the challenges in broadening participation in national development agenda-setting and monitoring is how to make these policy processes inclusive of a broad range of civil society actors and social movements, including representation from sub-national levels and traditionally marginalised sectors. Geography, social, cultural, economic and political factors, and different levels of organisational capacity, all have an inevitable impact on the degree to which different segments of civil society are represented in policy dialogue. CSOs have tried to overcome such constraints through the organisation of networks and coalitions, capable of harnessing and synthesising the inputs of a relatively broad range of civil society actors. Some of the cases below illustrate how networks and coalitions play this role.

We begin with a case of women’s organisations involvement in Kenya’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process (Example 21), and follow with three cases of civil society involvement in the design and implementation of government-led national sector policies and plans in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Indonesia (Examples 22 to 24). The last case illustrates decentralised efforts to engage a broad range of stakeholders in local development planning under the United Nation’s ART programme (Example 25).

The following provides a few highlights from these cases:

- The case of the Gender Thematic Group in Kenya’s PRSP process in Example 21 shows how the involvement of women’s organisations in the PRSP process added value and legitimacy to the process and broadened ownership of the PRSP.
- In Burkina Faso, despite limited CSO engagement in the initial formulation of the education sector plan, the CSO coalition *Cadre de concertation en éducation de base* now routinely engages with government, especially at the regional level, on education sector issues, and has been doing so with increased effectiveness (Example 22).
- In the case of Senegal’s Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act, a membership-based CSO of agriculturalists managed, through an extensive, decentralised consultation process, to bring forward a policy proposal of relevance to smallholder farmers (Example 23).
- World Vision’s Fight Tuberculosis (TB) programme in Indonesia provides an example of a CSO’s efforts to support implementation of the government’s health strategy, through awareness raising and adaptation to community level realities in a bottom-up approach to building local ownership (Example 24).
- The UNDP-led ART Initiative illustrates how international co-operation and North-South partnerships can be organised to support locally-owned priorities based on participatory processes inclusive of local governments, CSOs and other decentralised actors (Example 25).

### **In practice: Local and democratic ownership**

#### **Example 21. Kenya's gender thematic group\***

As part of the process to develop its PRSP, the government of Kenya took a number of steps to increase participation by previously excluded groups, including women. One of the mechanisms for achieving this was the creation of thematic groups, the first of which was the Gender Thematic Group, established in response to lobbying from women's organisations in Kenya. The aim was to ensure that gender concerns were clearly and adequately addressed in Kenya's PRSP and Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

The Gender Thematic Group managed to influence the PRSP both in process and content. For the first time in Kenya, gender was identified as a crosscutting issue, and concerted efforts were made to engage women and women's organisations in the dialogue, including in Sector Working Groups, at the district level and at the community level.

Participatory poverty assessments were carried out in 10 districts, and reports of these assessments captured the voices of poor women and their experiences.

The role played by CSOs in the consultative process, including at the grassroots level, added value and legitimacy to the exercise, and contributed significantly to its eventual success and to broader ownership of the PRSP.

\* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Source: Extracted from: "Integrating Gender in the PRS Process in Kenya", case study (2008).

#### **Example 22. CSO coalition for basic education in Burkina Faso**

In Burkina Faso, CSOs were initially marginalised in policy discussions that led to the formulation of the education sector plan in 2002. Teachers' unions, in particular, were excluded, because of their opposition to aspects of the plan. However, the capacity and effectiveness of CSOs to engage has grown over time, due to the emergence of a relatively cohesive and effective coalition of education CSOs, the *Cadre de concertation des ONG/associations actives en éducation de base au Burkina Faso*.

This coalition is especially active at the regional level, which is where much education decision-making now resides. Its members co-operate to speak for civil society on issues such as gender, curriculum reform and regional planning. CSO consultation at the national and regional levels in Burkina Faso is now routine, and the coalition plays a role in linking regional and national levels of decision-making. The coalition faces some challenges, such as limited capacity for monitoring national educational quality and equity issues, and a limited ability to engage a wider public on education issues, but they are increasingly able to articulate demands.

In contrast to many other civil society coalitions, the coalition in Burkina Faso has not made universal free access to primary education a central part of its mobilisation efforts. Some critics have seized on this to argue that CSOs have been co-opted through participation, and that this has had the effect of legitimising educational policies determined by the central government and a cohort of international donors. However, the role of civil society in the governance of the Burkina Faso education sector is gradually increasing as a result of formal and informal mechanisms put in place since the government's education strategy was launched in 2002. A unique feature of the Burkina Faso education sector programme has been the formalisation of space for CSO initiatives through the establishment of a CSO-government pooled fund for non-formal education projects.

Source: Extracted from: "Education SWAps in Africa: Lessons for CSOs", case study (2008).

**Example 23. Public consultations on Senegal's 2004 Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act\***

Senegal's Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act was designed on the basis of a broad-based consultative process. In March 2003, the government made public a first version of the legislation, which met with considerable opposition. In response, the government put in place a consultative process to elaborate a policy engaging rural and peasant organisations, NGOs, elected officials and donors.

To help inform this process, the *Conseil national de concertation et de coopération des ruraux* (CNCR), a CSO of Senegalese agriculturalists, organised consultations with its members involving 3 000 agricultural producers in all regions of the country over a four-month period. Of note was the extensive, nation-wide, nature of the process, which began with village level meetings and proceeded through departmental and regional levels, to the national level.

CNCR's goal was to develop a counter-proposal to the draft legislation. Through the resulting counter-proposal and ongoing participation in the consultation process, the CNCR and others engaged in the process were able to influence the revised legislation. Among the changes secured in the legislation were the following:

- The land tenure component of the legislation was removed, to become part of a separate consultation.
- Agricultural reform is more explicitly focused on food security.
- All rural economic activities are addressed in the legislation, not simply agriculture.
- Small-scale household economic activities, such as animal husbandry, are fully addressed.

The participatory manner in which the Agro-sylvo-pastoral Act was developed represents a first in West Africa. Other countries, Mali and Burkina Faso in particular, have followed suit.

The large-scale mobilisation and consultation in rural areas served to empower the rural population, and strengthened the legitimacy of the CNCR to speak for smallholders. The government has benefited from a participatory process that was inclusive of more than the representatives of CSOs, networks and donors.

\* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Source: Extracted from: "Processus national de définition et d'application d'une politique publique sectorielle : le cas de la Loi d'Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale du Sénégal", case study (2008).

**Example 24. World Vision's Fight TB Programme in Indonesia**

World Vision's Fight TB Programme in Indonesia illustrates how bottom-up ownership by the community can help to enhance the success of government programmes. Tuberculosis (TB) control was a component of the government's health strategy in Indonesia prior to World Vision's initiative, but free TB services available through the local government health centres were not being used, due to a lack of public trust in them.

World Vision engaged with communities and found them receptive to learning about TB treatment as part of its Fight TB Programme. The organisation thus set up a system of "treatment partners", in which two volunteers from TB-affected communities were paired, through the local Ministry of Health, with newly detected TB patients to ensure they followed treatment correctly.

Over time, with sensitisation and increasingly successful rates of treatment, community members' confidence in the government's TB services grew, as did their ownership of it. The result was that fewer patients with full-blown TB were in need of hospital treatment.

Source: Based on: "Aid Effectiveness: The role of CSOs in making aid work for citizens – An Analysis based on World Vision's Experience", case study (2008).

**Example 25. Defining a shared vision for local development**

The UN's ART Initiative is a multilateral co-operation initiative that brings together programmes and activities of several United Nations agencies and other donors in selected countries. The country programmes associated with ART adhere to a vision of ownership which goes beyond that of national governments to include a wide democratic and public process involving national and local governments and CSOs. This vision is also based on the recognition that local communities should be the protagonists of their own development processes, determining their goals, agendas and aspirations for the future, in active dialogue with national actors.

A key element of the initiative is the creation of an operational planning mechanism in which all social actors present in a given territory (a municipality, district or province) come together to define a shared vision of their territory and set the priorities that the programme will address locally. As part of this process, ART helps put in place a participatory methodology to analyse needs, potential resources, problems and priorities involving even the most marginalised people. Several tools are used, including community needs mapping and resource mapping.

This analysis leads to the identification of priorities for international co-operation as a complement to other public policy processes. As priorities are articulated, they are reflected in a "territorial marketing document", which then serves as a basis for UNDP and its partners to facilitate contacts with potential development partners (other municipalities or regional governments and elected bodies, or CSOs). In this way, the developing country partner has the opportunity to learn about different ways of addressing a specific challenge they are facing, and are able to establish a wide range of partners to resolve them.

Extracted from: "The ART Initiative (UNDP and other participating UN agencies)", case study (2008).

**Recommendation 6b**

Recognise that ownership of specific initiatives and programmes may involve leadership by different actors, including national governments, decentralised government bodies, or CSOs.

This recommendation draws our attention to initiatives that are led by CSOs as development actors in their own right, and to the application of the ownership principle in those cases. Ownership as understood in the aid effectiveness context is fundamentally about how Northern and Southern partners relate to each other, and we can see this principle in operation in all of the cases illustrated in this document that involve Northern CSOs in a donor capacity as part of a larger partnership effort.

Examples covered later in the paper include how volunteer-sending organisations are working with their partners in the Uniterra case study (Example 76) and the way a Philippine CSO is partnered with a Northern counterpart in the MASAI-Caritas Neerlandica case (Example 78). We have chosen not to belabour such examples here, except to note that this principle is a long-standing one for CSOs.

Of course, the principle of local ownership is also relevant to Southern CSOs and their relationship with their constituents and beneficiaries. While our case studies and examples do not particularly emphasise this dimension, this aspect of local ownership is clearly observable in the work of Southern CSOs such as IBON (Example 6), Butoke (Example 8), and BRAC (featured in the *Case Book*).

#### **Recommendation 6c**

Reinforce different stakeholders' capacity to exercise ownership through capacity development initiatives and support for democratic processes.

#### **Recommendation 6d**

Adopt a new approach to conditionality in which donors emphasise their role in facilitating policy options that are democratically developed and discussed, and invest in strengthening the capacity of governments, parliaments and CSOs to develop locally-owned policy solutions.

These recommendations call for investments in capacity strengthening for stakeholders to engage in democratic processes and develop locally-owned policy solutions. Our illustrations cover three cases of civil society capacity development. These include capacity building for CSOs to engage with government in the pursuit of human rights in Ghana (Example 26); an information programme for CSOs in Tanzania (Example 27); and macroeconomic policy capacity building in Africa (Example 28).

Readers will find additional examples of CSO capacity development efforts throughout the paper, and in particular under the title of Support for Civil Society Strengthening, in the Good Donorship section of this paper. These include the Ghana Resource Centre initiative (Example 56), PRIA's capacity development work in India (Example 57), and CHF's capacity development work in Guyana (Example 58). These cases are fully relevant as illustrations of Recommendation 6c, but also contain some important lessons about good donorship.

A topic alluded to in Recommendation 6c that is not covered in any of the cases here is government's capacity to constructively engage with CSOs, and how that capacity might be reinforced. In much of the world, the relationship between government and civil society wavers between suspicion and collaboration, and is often characterised by pragmatic acceptance rather than commitment to meaningful inclusion. Reinforcing government capacity would thus need to include efforts to build trust and understanding between government and CSOs.



## **In practice: Civil society capacity development for policy dialogue**

### **Example 26. The Rights and Voices Initiative in Ghana**

Ghana's Rights and Voices Initiative is a five-year grant-funding programme supported by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). Its objective is to strengthen the capacity and confidence of CSOs working with poor and marginalised people to engage with government on human rights issues. This is achieved by providing financial resources and capacity building support to CSOs. CSOs large and small are eligible for support, and small community-based organisations are reached through larger intermediary organisations. Topics covered include financial accountability and planning, rights-based approaches, monitoring and evaluation, people-centred advocacy and citizen-government engagement.

Extracted from: RAVI (2008).

### **Example 27. Pact in Tanzania**

Pact is a US NGO focused on strengthening the capacity of local organisations and leaders to influence policy to address the critical social and economic needs of vulnerable groups. Its work illustrates how capacity development efforts can be broadly targeted through the production of specialised information guides.

In Tanzania, Pact has produced a number of plain-language user-friendly resources, such as the *Legislative Roadmap: A Guide for Civil Society Organisations in Tanzania*. This guide was produced in collaboration with a Tanzanian partner, the Lawyers' Environmental Action Team, and addresses many aspects of the policy and legislative framework in the country, such as the distinction between civil and criminal law, rights and responsibilities enshrined in the constitution, and the policy-making process.

Another example is Pact's *Media Guide: A Handbook for Tanzanian Civil Society*, developed in collaboration with the Tanzania Media Women's Association, intended to help CSOs understand and use the media better to promote their work and policy recommendations.

Extracted from: Pact (no date a), Pact Tanzania (no date). For more information visit: [www.pactworld.org/cs/institutional\\_strengthening](http://www.pactworld.org/cs/institutional_strengthening).

Based on: Amoako (2008) and other sources.

## **In practice: New approaches to conditionality**

### **Example 28. Macroeconomic policy capacity building in Africa**

AG-CS Recommendation 6d, which advocates a new approach to conditionality, is not very radical, since donors, including the World Bank and many others, have worked for years to further the capacity of developing countries to develop their own policy options through research and support for independent or government-affiliated think tanks. Initiatives of this sort in Africa have included support for the African Economic Research Consortium, the African Capacity Development Foundation, and independent research centres. The think tanks mentioned in Example 7 and many others have all received considerable support from donors.

These various efforts have created a base upon which it is possible to build, as K.Y. Amoako (2008) argues, in the African context, in the following passage:

"We are at a point where good governance and the collaboration between governments and civil society organisations can accelerate growth and reduce poverty. This transformation

to sustainable development will not be possible if the work of governments and civil society organisations is not mutually supportive [...] For too long, Africa has relied on external advice, through international technical assistance or donor programmes. More and more, we need to apply home-grown solutions. Unlike 30, 20 or even 10 years ago, African professionals have broad experience and solid reputations as policymakers at the national level, as senior staff in international organisations and as first-class academics. It is time to seriously harness these existing domestic, regional, and continental capacities. It is time to mobilise both our domestic talent and the African Diaspora in developing civil societies that can help our governments push our transformation to another level. One cannot imagine these dramatic changes without think tanks and civil society organisations.”

Based on: Amoako (2008) and other sources.

## Alignment

### Recommendation 7

Alignment should be understood broadly to mean alignment with the priorities of developing country counterparts and emphasis on the use and strengthening of country systems broadly understood. Efforts to develop and use country systems should extend beyond centralised government mechanisms to other parts of government, decentralised authorities, and CSOs.

This recommendation to enrich our understanding of the alignment principle follows from those on the subject of local and democratic ownership. Alignment refers to donor and external partner respect of locally defined priorities and reliance on country systems for the management of aid-supported initiatives. Enrichment of that principle as recommended by the AG-CS means adopting a broader interpretation of locally defined priorities and of “country systems.” From this perspective, locally defined priorities include those of CSOs and their constituents; and “country systems” include all country systems required to ensure the success of aid initiatives. Although the Paris Declaration focuses on central government agencies responsible for public financial management, the concept of country systems from this perspective is a broad one that includes government and non-governmental systems of service delivery, and systems of representation and accountability, in addition to central government systems.

While the Paris Declaration identifies local ownership with government leadership as expressed in a country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, the AAA is more nuanced, and recognises CSOs as independent development actors in their own right (paragraph 20). This implies that the priorities of CSOs may be distinct from those of the national government.

In some cases, CSOs may succeed in their efforts to enrich or modify government strategies. As we saw earlier, this is what happened with the gender equality message that the Gender Thematic Group brought to the PRSP dialogue in Kenya (Example 21).

In other cases, CSOs may be ahead of government, or simply have priorities of their own. CSOs working for social transformation, such as IBON Foundation (Example 6) provide a good illustration of this. Another illustration of CSOs leading the policy agenda is

seen in the Jubilee 2000 campaign (Example 18), where country-based CSOs successfully pushed the debt cancellation message onto the policy agenda at both the national and international levels.

The Butoke case (Example 8) as detailed in the *Case Book* provides a clear example of an official donor and Northern partner CSOs aligning their support to the priorities of a domestic CSO, and relying on CSOs' own management systems. Indeed, the role of Northern CSOs in this case was largely to act as a conduit for mobilising funds and support and ensuring financial accountability.

Some of the cases reviewed for this paper illustrate how CSOs can align their efforts simultaneously with government priorities and systems and with the priorities of beneficiaries, while experimenting with new approaches. The case of Progresso and CODE in Mozambique (in Example 29) is a good illustration of this. Examples 31 and 32, in the section on Co-ordination and Harmonisation, provide additional instances of this. These include the collaborative arrangements that exist between AKFC, domestic CSOs, and government in Mozambique's rural development sector (Example 31), and sharing of responsibilities in Afghanistan's micro-finance sector (Example 32).

Recognition of the complementarity of government and CSO systems has implications for donors, because civil society does not always receive the independent support it needs to play its role. Example 30 illustrates how the Education for All Fast Track Initiative has tried to fill this gap in its country-based approach to education by directing funds to CSOs.

### **In practice: Using CSOs as part of country systems**

#### **Example 29. CSOs and education in Mozambique: Issues of alignment and complementarity\***

This case of CSOs in the Mozambique education sector illustrates several aspects of alignment: CSO alignment with government systems and priorities, alignment with the localised needs of the beneficiary population, and alignment of a Northern CSO with the priorities and systems of a Southern CSO partner.

This case involves a partnership between Associação Progresso in Mozambique, and CODE, a Canadian organisation specialised in the promotion of quality primary education. Progresso and CODE have been working to increase the quality of education in the two Northern provinces of Mozambique for over 15 years. The activities in their joint programme, "Promotion of a Literate Environment in Mozambique", include the provision of reading and learning materials in Portuguese and local languages, skills development for primary teachers and adult literacy teachers, and training of education officers in specialised functions such as education planning, in-service training, and the monitoring of teaching and learning.

Progresso and CODE work in close co-operation with the Mozambican Ministry of Education and Culture at the national and provincial levels. Their experience and innovative practices have influenced government policy, notably through the inclusion of a bilingual curriculum in the Government of Mozambique's Education Sector Strategic Plan. Their programme activities are aligned with the government's sector strategy, but the project is funded through a bilateral agreement between CODE and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

Progresso and CODE work with communities and government to design and implement interventions that correspond to the identified needs and the institutional priorities and capacities of the government. However, they do so in a way that is more flexible than government structures alone can manage, adapting to local needs, realities and socio-cultural characteristics, while drawing on their own knowledge, skills and experience.

The division of labour between Progresso and CODE takes into account the comparative advantages of each partner. CODE brings international expertise to the project, reinforced by its long-term presence in Mozambique, and is responsible for the management of the contract with CIDA. This allows Progresso to focus on relations with its Mozambican partners, while retaining primary responsibility for activities in the field.

\*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Extracted from: "Lessons of a CSO Project and the Education SWAP in Mozambique", case study (2007).

### **Example 30. Education for all and support for national CSO coalitions**

The importance of CSO engagement in education has been increasingly recognised in global agreements such as the 2000 Dakar Framework for Action. However the emphasis of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative, a donor initiative established in 2000, was to facilitate joint funding of government's education sector plans. This left certain gaps, which the Fast Track Initiative is now trying to address through direct support of CSO coalitions in developing countries, so that CSOs may better contribute to the preparation and implementation of sector plans.

In late 2008, the Fast Track Initiative's Education Programme Development Fund approved the principle of a three-year, USD 22 million project, the main objective of which is to support national education coalitions of CSOs to more fully engage as partners in the pursuit of Education For All goals. Funds will be allocated to the Global Campaign for Education, a coalition of INGOs overseeing the project, which will on-grant funds to be managed by three regional CSO coalitions. The project will support national civil society coalitions in approximately 63 countries, and will cover co-ordination and strategic initiatives by CSOs, and capacity development in areas such as policy analysis and research.

National CSO coalitions will be assisted to create National Civil Society Education Funds to sustain their efforts in the long term. Future funding options for these Funds could include foundations, the private sector, international NGOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors. Bilateral and multilateral donors that support national governments' education plans through SWAPs or budgetary support will be encouraged to commit additional funding.

Extracted from: GCE (2008), Fyles (2008), Walter (2008).

## **Co-ordination and harmonisation**

### **Recommendation 8**

A balanced approach should be taken to co-ordination and harmonisation that emphasises the value of more comprehensive approaches to development programming, while also acknowledging the value of diversity and innovation.

This over-arching recommendation is multi-faceted with five specific sub-recommendations as follows:

**Recommendation 9a**

All actors should recognise the complementary roles played by governments and CSOs and the implications of this for enhanced co-ordination and harmonisation of government and CSO efforts.

**Recommendation 9b**

Greater efforts should be made by governments and donors to support the participation of CSOs in government-led sector programmes (independently or under contract), and greater efforts by CSOs themselves to engage in these programmes.

**Recommendation 9c**

CSOs should make greater efforts to co-ordinate and harmonise their activities with those of other CSOs.

**Recommendation 9d**

Recognise civil society strengthening as an objective that is itself worth pursuing in a more comprehensive way by all development stakeholders.

**Recommendation 9e**

Recognise that responsive funding formulas continue to have an important role to play for tapping into the energy and innovative ideas of citizens and CSOs as agents of change and development.

The emphasis of this section is primarily on Recommendations 9a and 9b. Recommendations 9c to 9e overlap with Recommendations 13 and 14 in the CSO Effectiveness section, and will be dealt with in that section.

Central to these recommendations is the potential complementarity of government and CSO programmes in particular sectors. We saw a case of CSO-government complementarity in the last section, in the case of the *Progresso/CODE* initiative in Mozambique's education sector (Example 29). In Example 31, we look at another case from Mozambique – the work of AKFC in agriculture and rural development, which also complements the government's efforts.

Both the *Progresso/CODE* and AKFC initiatives are CIDA funded. This reflects an explicit CIDA strategy in Mozambique to invest in “a balanced combination of contributions to pooled funds with other donors, and support to decentralised projects that target the most vulnerable” (CIDA, 2004 in AKFC, 2007:2). This approach allows CIDA to support CSO-led initiatives that complement government-led programme-based approaches (PBAs), but are more closely aligned with localised needs and realities.

We have seen other examples of CSOs complementing government-led PBAs in other sections. In Burkina Faso, we saw how a CSO coalition helps to bridge regional and national decision-making processes (Example 22). In Indonesia, we saw how World Vision's Fight TB Programme complements that of the government, using a volunteer-based approach at the community level (Example 24). World Vision has played a similar role in extending health and nutrition initiatives to remote areas of Ghana in collaboration with government health staff.

The Microfinance Investment Support Facility in Afghanistan (MISFA) (Example 32) offers another case of CSO-government complementarity. MISFA was established under the Government of Afghanistan's Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development as a vehicle through which the government and donors channel technical assistance and funding to build up microfinance at the lower end of the financial sector, in collaboration with civil society and private sector microfinance service delivery institutions.

We conclude this section with an example illustrating what can happen when the CSO and government efforts are not sufficiently co-ordinated: the case of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique, where a lack of government efforts to harness the potential of CSOs working in this sector resulted in lost opportunities to achieve more effective government programmes of HIV prevention (Example 33).

### **In practice: Complementarity between government and CSOs**

#### **Example 31. Aga Khan Foundation Canada's Coastal Rural Support Programme in Mozambique\***

In the late 90s, AKFC launched its Coastal Rural Support Programme, in collaboration with the government, in the northern region of Mozambique. Initial funding for this effort was provided by CIDA's Canadian Partnership Branch. Based on strong results and support from Mozambique officials, this first initiative grew into a six-year AKFC programme funded by CIDA's bilateral desk for Mozambique and other donors.

The Coastal Rural Support Programme takes a long-term, multi-sectoral approach intended to address the many dimensions and causes of acute rural poverty at the household and community levels in the region. It has fostered an array of innovative measures, such as community-managed early childhood development, and block farming aimed at improving farming practices and preventing animal attacks. AKFC works actively to distil lessons from the programme and disseminate these to other stakeholders.

The programme contributes to the government's poverty reduction strategy and to relevant sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) in various ways by:

- building government capacity at provincial and district levels;
- supporting government's efforts to enhance service delivery;
- developing the capacity of grassroots civil society structures;
- supporting linkages between local CSOs and local government; and
- supporting government programme and policy reforms.

The programme is aligned with government priorities and allows government to extend the reach and depth of its work in ways that are aligned with the needs and realities of local communities. The programme thus harnesses the best of government and civil society initiative to enhance their joint effectiveness.

\*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Extracted from: "Aga Khan Foundation Canada Coastal Rural Support Program", case study (2007).

#### **Example 32. Pooled funding for microfinance in Afghanistan**

The Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan is a multi-stakeholder national programme launched by the Government of Afghanistan in June 2003. MISFA is now one of the world's largest microfinance programmes, and is incorporated as a

government-owned company. However, this company does not deliver microfinance services. It operates as a wholesaler, enabling donors to pool their resources to build up the microfinance sector in Afghanistan, in collaboration with international, regional, and local civil society and private sector microfinance service-delivery institutions.

MISFA now has over 400 000 active clients (70 per cent of whom are women), in 23 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. Research results indicate that the microfinance sector in Afghanistan has led to increased business activity and improved socio-economic status for its clients.

The programme's success can be attributed to many factors. These include:

- strong leadership by the government in the beginning, evolving to arms' length involvement;
- high quality staff;
- a pooled donor funding mechanism that offers capacity building support and funding for microfinance institutions;
- close alignment with local and national priorities; and
- growing local Afghan involvement.

Extracted from: "Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)", case study (2008).

### **Example 33. Lost opportunities in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Mozambique**

SALAMA, a local public health NGO in Mozambique addressing HIV and AIDS, has developed a national reputation for innovative awareness-raising programmes on HIV and AIDS in neighbourhoods and schools using theatre, skits, debates, films, radio programmes and talks at schools or during halftime at soccer games. SALAMA also runs a homecare programme that trains local people as volunteer caregivers to build the capacity of families to look after chronically-ill family members.

Unfortunately, SALAMA and other similar NGOs with extensive local knowledge have not been included in a meaningful way in the country's national health programming. The national health sector strategy gives government a virtual monopoly in implementing critical activities including HIV testing, distribution of condoms in rural areas, and anti-retroviral treatment. As a result, the space for CSOs to creatively explore and experiment outside of national policy frameworks has been considerably reduced.

This marginalisation of Mozambican public-health NGOs with specialised local knowledge and experience has represented a lost opportunity on a number of fronts. For instance, government, donors and INGOs alike have been slow to fully appreciate a key cause of HIV transmission, the practice of maintaining a small number of simultaneous, long-term partners. This has resulted in less effective government and INGO programmes and campaigns, because of the way that they associate the transmission of HIV with reckless behaviour such as drinking and prostitution. These campaigns have complicated the work of local NGOs whose messaging is based on a more subtle understanding of the moral rules of the game in Mozambique.

This case study argues that donors and governments would get greater traction in the AIDS struggle by harmonising, co-ordinating and aligning their efforts with more locally-designed and controlled programmes run by indigenous NGOs such as SALAMA.

Extracted from: Bastos and Librock (2008).

## Managing for results and accountability

The AG-CS makes seven specific recommendations on results management and accountability that can be divided into three groups: results management models (Recommendations 10a, 9b and 10b); systems of accountability, emphasising accountability to beneficiaries (Recommendations 10c to 10e); and standards of openness, transparency and access to information regarding aid flows (Recommendations 11a and 11b). We divide those into two groups for purposes of presentation here, dealing separately with Recommendations 10a and 10b.

### Recommendation 10a

Adopt results-based approaches and results-monitoring mechanisms intended first and foremost as management tools to promote iterative learning and adaptation, while empowering the ultimate beneficiaries of development programmes.

### Recommendation 10b

Adopt a more meaningful approach to results that includes greater attention to indicators of institutional and social change and to sex-disaggregated data of importance to CSOs operating as agents of change.

CSOs have adopted a range of results-based approaches. Some have found ways to make conventional approaches based on the use of the logical framework methodology work for them; others have turned to alternative or complementary approaches. We look here at a number of different approaches considered well-adapted to the needs of CSOs.

The first is an approach called “outcome mapping” developed by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in collaboration with partners in West Africa, India and Latin America. The emphasis of outcome mapping is on behavioural change, in recognition of the fact that development is ultimately “done by and for people” (CCIC, 2008b:5). An application of outcome mapping in Zimbabwe is featured in Example 34.

This example is followed by a description of approaches to monitoring used by the World Conservation Union in Asia, which has adopted a two-pronged approach for monitoring capacity development results. This includes one prong based on the conventional logical framework approach (LFA) to satisfy donor requirements, and another based on a more dynamic and flexible approach for organisational learning, management and planning (Example 35).

Example 36 describes two methods used by Keystone: Impact Planning and Learning System Design; and comparative constituency feedback. It is included here to help illustrate methods of results management and accountability that involve constituents and give them voice, ensuring greater downward accountability than might be the case under traditional approaches.

Another approach worth mentioning is the “most significant change method”, which emphasises testimonials of change from people directly involved in development programmes. It can be implemented without the need for advanced technical capabilities in data collection and analysis. By giving people a role in defining the changes that occur and their significance to them, this method “helps organisations to understand the



effects emerging from their activities, and how and why they are occurring” (Baser and Morgan, 2008:103).

Example 37 illustrates how IDRC has adopted an approach to monitoring and evaluation which marries attention to rigour with emphasis on the partner’s own management, accountability and learning needs.

We conclude with an illustration from Nepal which draws attention to the usefulness of systematic attention to data disaggregation as a tool for measuring change in areas such as social equality and inclusion, according to criteria such as gender, socio-economic status, or age (Example 38).

A review of these cases and of the literature suggests the following guidelines on meaningful and useful approaches to RBM (Baser and Morgan, 2008; CCIC, 2005; CIDA, 2002b; Lavergne, 2002):

- The costs of data collection need to be balanced against the benefits. This requires sensitivity to local workloads and competing priorities.
- Special attention is required to stories and indicators of qualitative results associated with institutional and social change. This requires a long-term perspective.
- Participatory, inclusive approaches have intrinsic value for promoting ownership and downward accountability, and generating information on results that are valued by participants.
- A sound approach to RBM should allow for uncertainty, iterative learning and non-linear forms of causality. These features are not easily captured by the LFA, which needs to be complemented with other forms of information, including evidence of strategic thinking that lays out how an intervention is expected to make a difference in a complex and uncertain world.
- Results-based approaches have high potential value for encouraging more rigorous attention to results, and as a capacity development tool. This requires an approach that is not excessively mechanistic and focused on upward accountability to donors.

### ***In practice: Results-based approaches that promote learning and empowerment***

#### **Example 34. Outcome mapping in Zimbabwe**

Since 2003, planning, monitoring and evaluation of a programme in Zimbabwe to integrate environmental education into teacher training has evolved from being merely an accountability exercise, into a structured, participatory, learning-oriented process. As with most development programmes, the original approach to results management was based on the LFA. However, as the programme progressed, it became clear that the LFA posed certain shortcomings and challenges:

- Accountability was directed mainly towards the donor’s head office.
- Planning, monitoring and evaluation seemed divorced from field realities because local partners did not contribute their perspectives or participate in decision-making and planning.
- The LFA did not allow for the identification and reflection of many types of results that the programme was seeking to achieve.

- The framework did not address the sustainability of the programme.
- It was not conducive to collective learning.

In responding to these challenges, programme partners decided to introduce a modified approach based on self-assessment and team building, to better accommodate the complexity and particularities of the programme. They turned for inspiration to a framework called “outcome mapping” developed by IDRC, which adopts a more dynamic, participatory, and holistic approach focused on behavioural change.

Implementation of this approach required considerable effort, but transformed the initiative’s approach to planning, monitoring and evaluation into something more endogenous, relevant and transformative. The approach has opened up new opportunities for examining the programme’s intended and unintended results, and actively refining implementation strategies in response to new challenges and opportunities. Outcome mapping has encouraged participants to look beyond the achievement of results, to explore how the results were achieved, and the lessons to be derived from that analysis.

Use of the LFA was not abandoned altogether, but has been retained primarily for use in meeting the programme’s upward accountability requirements, while outcome mapping is used for monitoring and evaluation at the operational level.

Extracted from: IDRC (no date) “Learning the Way Forward: Adapting Steep’s Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Process Through Outcome Mapping”, case study (2008). For more on outcome mapping, see: [www.outcomemapping.ca](http://www.outcomemapping.ca).

#### **Example 35. The World Conservation Union’s parallel capacity monitoring systems**

Results-based management based on the LFA has proved particularly inadequate in capacity development initiatives, where process dynamics, non-linear approaches, and qualitative results are important. To address such difficulties, the World Conservation Union in Asia manages two capacity monitoring systems in parallel.

The first of these is the monitoring system for reporting to donors, which is managed by a monitoring and learning officer. This system is seen as the cost of doing business with the international community, but is considered to be of limited interest or value for management and planning purposes.

The second, parallel system, is managed by the Executive Director, who follows it closely. It focuses on what is going right and what needs fixing, and provides spaces for learning in which power relationships are suspended. These include regular management and programme reviews, retreats to examine and self-evaluate programmes and financial achievements, and regional programme co-ordinators’ meetings. All of these subsystems feed into collective strategic thinking and into the real decision-making processes of the organisation.

Extracted from: Baser and Morgan (2008).

#### **Example 36. Keystone’s approach to impact planning and learning through constituency voice\***

Keystone is a specialised organisation that works with a wide range of funders, other CSOs, and social enterprises to design new ways of planning, measuring, learning, and communicating social change to foster accountability and learning. It emphasises two major techniques:

- Impact Planning and Learning System Design.
- Comparative Constituency Feedback.

The first of these, Impact Planning and Learning System Design, includes mechanisms such as the following whereby those most affected can meaningfully influence planning and measurement:

- developing a theory of change that is shared with project participants;
- identifying impact indicators of relevance to participants;
- gathering evidence of success with participants and learning from it;
- reporting of lessons learned in a way that is publicly available; and
- strategic reassessment of outcomes and approaches based on lessons learned.

Comparative Constituency Feedback involves anonymous surveys that capture the perceptions of an organisation's work by its constituents. This process allows organisations to assess the quality of their relationships and their performance over time and to compare their performance against that of similar organisations.

Basing indicators of success on a shared theory of change helps participants to appreciate the complexity of change processes and helps to broaden local and democratic ownership of these processes, by creating a system wherein those most affected by change can meaningfully influence planning and measurement. Comparative Constituency Feedback can be used to improve decision-making, and helps to rebalance accountability for results in favour of beneficiaries.

\* Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Extracted from: "Impact Planning and Learning through Constituency Voice", case study (2008).

### **Example 37. IDRC's approach to monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation is serious business at IDRC. A recent report by the Auditor General of Canada noted the Centre's commitment to continuously improving the assessment of its programme's outcomes and impacts, and remarked on the elaborate set of mechanisms it has developed for this purpose.

As a research organisation, IDRC has found it necessary to adapt its systems to accommodate the dynamic and exploratory nature of its partners' programmes, where change processes can be slow and uncertain. Adapting to this reality, the Centre has adopted a flexible approach that does not impose any particular monitoring and evaluation approach on its partners. Though specific methods such as Outcome Mapping have been developed and are promoted, Outcome Mapping is seen as only one option of many.

IDRC emphasises three core principles with respect to monitoring and evaluation: utility, rigour and capacity development. This means that monitoring and evaluation should have a clear use and respond to a partner's needs both in terms of accountability and learning. At the same time, the Centre works with partners to ensure the monitoring and evaluation methods to be applied pass standards of scientific rigour. Finally, building partners' capacity is considered critical to ensure that a culture of monitoring and evaluation takes root in partners' management systems.

Extracted from: IDRC (2008).

### **In practice: Data disaggregation and social change**

#### **Example 38. Capturing social exclusion through data disaggregation in Nepal**

In Nepal, a World Bank-DFID initiative on social exclusion identified six categories of data disaggregation that capture key elements of social differentiation in Nepal. DFID is now co-operating with line ministries in Nepal to apply a disaggregated framework for monitoring results in different sectors.

Features of good practice that have emerged from this exercise include:

- investment in research to identify appropriate, feasible, and relevant categories for disaggregation;
- long-term commitment on the part of funders and implementers; and
- investment in capacity development at different levels, from the high-level managers overseeing implementation to the ground-level staff gathering data.

Where disaggregation is not feasible, qualitative data, stories, and case material can be used to track people's perceptions of change.

Extracted from: Ferguson (2008).

The AG-CS also recommends the following under Managing for Results and Accountability:

#### **Recommendation 10c**

Adopt an approach to accountability that emphasises a rebalancing of accountability for results in favour of beneficiaries.

#### **Recommendation 10d**

Reinforce accountability systems in country for all development actors (donors, governments, CSOs).

#### **Recommendation 10e**

Adopt a multi-stakeholder approach to monitoring and evaluation that includes the effective and timely engagement of CSOs and beneficiary populations, including representation from women's rights organisations and other socially marginalised groups.

#### **Recommendation 11a**

All stakeholders are encouraged to adopt the highest possible standards of openness, transparency and access to information: donors and international financial institutions should commit to delivering timely and meaningful information to other stakeholders on their aid flows and policies, including ODA flows to CSOs.

#### **Recommendation 11b**

Developing country governments should work with elected representatives and CSOs on how to achieve increased transparency of both official and non-official aid flows and improved accountability for development results.

The common thread of these recommendations is represented by Recommendation 10c, which emphasises “a rebalancing of accountability for results in favour of beneficiaries”. This is seen to require the reinforcement of accountability systems, greater openness and transparency and the adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach to monitoring and evaluation.

Governments and CSOs have recently introduced a number of innovative developments in the field of “social accountability”. These aim to strengthen accountability to beneficiaries in the spirit of openness and transparency. They include participatory budgeting, gender budgeting, public expenditure tracking and citizen monitoring and evaluation of government service delivery.

The following provides five examples of CSO engagement in social accountability. The first two are cases of CSO engagement in the analysis of public budgets, under South Africa’s Budget Information Service (Example 39), and One World Action’s Just Budgets programme (Example 40). A second category of social accountability mechanisms focuses on monitoring functions after the fact, as illustrated by Ghana’s HIPC Watch Initiative (Example 41), the use of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (Example 42) and an initiative for monitoring infrastructure projects in the Philippines (Example 43).

The last two cases illustrate examples of CSO accountability, including an NGO transparency and accountability initiative in Colombia (Example 44) and the efforts of CARE Peru to increase its own accountability to recipients (Example 45). Readers will find other closely related examples in the CSO Partnerships section of this book, which includes several cases of CSO standard-setting exercises designed to promote increased accountability for results (Examples 72 to 75).

Improved CSO accountability for results as called for in Recommendations 10d and 11b poses special challenges as it relates to the collective performance of CSOs or the overall performance of individual CSOs. While donors note the need for “effective, institution-wide, outcome-based monitoring and evaluation systems” in relation to their engagement with CSOs, there is little documented experience on how this can best be achieved (World Bank, 2005:14). The challenge for donors is how to aggregate results from the large number of relatively small-scale CSO projects that they fund. This remains an issue even when a donor’s support to CSOs is more programme-based, because programme-based support may itself support a series of project activities, the collective results of which are not easy to assemble. Further work and experimentation is needed to better define the problem, and determine how best to account for results emerging from myriad civil society initiatives.

A related area requiring further work is how to ensure greater transparency of aid flows, including those involving CSOs, as called for in Recommendations 11a and 11b. There may be lessons to learn from a database that the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) has put in place to track and publicise their funding to and through Swedish CSOs, which provides information on CSO projects by country and region and by sector or theme, along with information on local partners, and total project budget figures ([www.sida.se/ngodatabase](http://www.sida.se/ngodatabase)).

### **In practice: Social accountability**

#### **Example 39. South Africa's Budget Information Service\***

The Institute for Democracy in South Africa is a CSO working to support the consolidation of democracy in South Africa by building up civil society and governance institutions. Its Budget Information Service was established in order to provide timely and accessible public policy information on the impact of the budget on poor South Africans. The Service is divided into units covering Children, Women, AIDs, Sectors (covering health, welfare, and education budgets) and the Africa Budget.

The Budget Information Service is one of the most experienced budget groups around the world. In operation since 1995, this project has encouraged the creation of similar initiatives in over 50 other countries. It has contributed substantial methodological and conceptual innovations to the field and has served as an inspiration and source of advice and support for many other groups.

\*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).  
Extracted from: Hofbauer (2006).

#### **Example 40. Just Budgets: gender-responsive budgeting in Africa\***

Involving a partnership with CSOs in four African countries, One World Action's Just Budgets programme supports CSOs, developing country governments, and donors to track their commitment to gender equality through gender-responsive budgeting. Gender-responsive budgeting analyses the implications of public spending and taxation for women relative to men and can support advocacy for adjustments in public expenditure to match gender policy commitments. The Just Budgets initiative has identified key elements of a framework to ensure that gender analysis is systematically integrated into budget planning processes.

\*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).  
Extracted from: "Just Budgets: Increasing Accountability and Aid Effectiveness through Gender Budget Analysis", case study (2008).

#### **Example 41. The Ghana HIPC Watch Initiative\***

In 2001, the Government of Ghana challenged CSOs to serve as watchdogs with respect to the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). The Ghana HIPC Watch Initiative was launched by the Social Enterprise Development Foundation of West Africa in response to this invitation. In 2002, the initiative covered the country's 24 poorest districts; by 2005, this was scaled up to 42 districts. The initiative uses Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation to promote good governance, accountability and equity in the implementation of the GPRS.

The approach involves three interrelated components:

- economic literacy and training of civil society groups and District Assemblies around the principles of partnership, participation, good governance and equity that are at the heart of the GPRS;
- monitoring and evaluation of projects implemented with HIPC funds at the local level; and
- advocacy, aiming to influence Parliament, ministries, donors, and INGOs, based on the findings and the policy recommendations generated by the project's monitoring and evaluation activities.

At the end of each district-level training workshop, a multi-stakeholder District HIPC Monitoring Committee is elected, representing farmers, women, youth, persons with disability, and local government. These members are then trained on how to conduct Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation.

These same groups are also involved in advocacy work. Lobby teams are organised in three groups: women, people with disabilities, and Northern Ghana; and lobby events are organised once a year for each of these groups. Activities include television appearances, radio programmes, newspaper articles and face-to-face meetings.

As a result of this initiative, civil society and government collaboration has been institutionalised at district and regional levels for the first time. The approach has also democratised the implementation of the GPRS, by involving previously excluded groups. By 2004, HIPC Watch was a recognised civil society voice in the GPRS process, championing accountability and transparency.

\*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Source: Extracted from: "Ghana HIPC Watch: Holding Government Accountable to Poverty Reduction Strategies", case study (2008).

#### **Example 42. Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys in Uganda and Tanzania**

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) are a mechanism for pursuing transparency and accountability from governments. These surveys track the flow of public funds and material resources from the central government, through the administrative hierarchy, and out to the frontline service providers. The aim is to improve the quality of service delivery at the local level. The key question that a survey sets out to answer is whether public funds and materials end up where they are supposed to, or why they do not.

The dramatic impact of PETS in Uganda's primary education sector has been one of the most cited successes of this approach, leading to a reduction of leakage in primary education capitation grants from an average of almost 90% in 1991-95 to less than 20% in 2001. However, PETS should not be seen as a silver bullet. What made the Ugandan experience special is that PETS formed part of a larger initiative involving several components, including the publication of financial transfers to local government in newspapers, awareness-raising campaigns; and capacity development of local-level stakeholders to understand and demand their rights.

By comparison, the implementation of PETS in Tanzania was not part of such a comprehensive initiative, and due to the absence of political-level acceptance of the findings, CSOs and communities have been limited in their ability to use the results to pursue improved services.

Based on: Sundet (2007).

#### **Example 43. Monitoring infrastructure projects in the Philippines**

Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government is a CSO that monitors government infrastructure projects in Abra Province, Philippines. It was formed in 1987, in response to the new government policy to increase community participation in development programmes, and received training from the government's National Economic Development Authority.

The organisation works from government documentation, including approved plans and drawings, work programmes, financial information and technical specifications, and holds community meetings to inform citizens about projects in their area. Using local volunteers, experts and staff, Concerned Citizens of Abra visits construction sites and documents progress, which it compares against reports submitted by the contractor on project completion. They then submit an audit report and recommendations to the appropriate authorities. Government responses have included ordering a contractor to replace poorly constructed sections of a roadbed at his own expense, and recovering overpayment from another contractor.

Concerned Citizens of Abra's growing expertise in monitoring led to a partnership with the National Commission on Audit in 2001 to conduct participatory audits. Their collaborative efforts involved assessing road repair projects, interviewing project officials, examining available records, making site visits, and holding group discussions with local residents. Community involvement played a key role in verifying the accuracy of expenditures and helped to prove that early completion of work on one project was due to poor quality construction. The Commission incorporated lessons from the audit process into its Manual on the Conduct of Participatory Audits. Unfortunately, the participatory audit exercise was terminated after a change in the Commission's administration.

Extracted from: Ramkumar (2008).

### **In practice: CSO accountability**

#### **Example 44. NGO transparency and accountability in Colombia\***

In Colombia, NGOs for Transparency and Accountability is an initiative led by NGO associations and networks to develop and implement minimum standards of information sharing with the public, both individually and on a common web page. Through this initiative, NGOs describe who they are, what they do, how they do it, what resources they use, who the beneficiaries of their actions are, and what they are achieving.

This transparency and accountability exercise has been very effective in highlighting lessons learned and continuing challenges faced by CSOs in Colombia, and has provided the incentive to continue improving CSO effectiveness, while strengthening democracy in the country.

An important lesson learned is that it is easier for CSOs to submit to public scrutiny as part of a collective initiative like a federation or association than individually. In a country where distrust is the rule and the discovery of hidden ties between individuals and institutions with illegal groups has become a common occurrence, the fact that there is a group of CSOs that voluntarily subject themselves to public scrutiny has had a positive impact on public perceptions and confidence.

\*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Extracted from: "Transparency and Accountability: Building Public Trust in Colombia", case study (2008).



**Example 45. Accountability to beneficiaries by CARE Peru\***

CARE Peru put accountability towards disaster-affected people into practice following the earthquake of 15 August 2007 by putting together an accountability framework, including principles and standards, a statement of purpose, and a statement of desired outcomes (to contribute to the well-being and empowerment of women, men and children affected by the earthquake and to the protection of their rights).

Application of this framework involved four elements:


- provision of public information through public meetings and workshops, messages on national and local radio, flyers and posters;
- mechanisms for the participation of affected people in decision-making;
- mechanisms for systematic feedback from affected communities; and
- application of Sphere humanitarian standards in their programme.

All these aspects helped to ensure that the response was based on genuine needs as expressed by the affected populations.

That CARE Peru was able to establish this system was facilitated by the fact that one of their main funders, DFID, has incorporated a section on accountability to beneficiaries' into its humanitarian funding guidelines. This gave CARE Peru an entry point for explaining accountability and justifying the costs. Donors were supportive in other ways as well, by providing the budget flexibility to cover the costs of implementing the accountability framework and responding to suggestions raised by beneficiaries.

\*Available in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book (2008).

Source: Extracted from: "Making Accountability to Disaster Affected People a Reality", case study (2008).



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