

ANNEX A

HRM Composite Indicators: Construction, Weighting and Theoretical Framework

Building composite indicators is a challenging task. There are important rules for the development of meaningful indicators including having a clear theoretical framework, respecting clear rules and proceeding with caution. The HRM composites presented in this document follow the steps identified in the *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators* (OECD and European Commission, 2008) that are necessary for building meaningful composite or synthetic indicators.


As can be concluded from the *Handbook*,¹ HRM in government is likely to be an area where composites are worth pursuing. Indeed, “there are some more narrowly defined areas however where, at least in principle, composite indicators could be considered [...]” but “[...] in each case the risks would need to be evaluated very carefully [...]”. The most likely area for development of composite indicators is in narrowly defined categories of public sector processes (degree of openness of human resource management arrangements to lateral entrants, degree of consultation in preparing regulations, etc.) or in equally narrow categories of output (quality of regulations in a particular sub-sector, etc.) [...]”.

All the data in the composites derive from the OECD (GOV) 2006 “Survey on Strategic Human Resources Management in Government” and all the composite indexes were built on a scoring methodology.² Statistical consistency measurement was implemented based on the calculation of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient³ to check the variables selection. A Cronbach’s alpha close to 0.6 or 0.7 indicates a high degree of correlation among a set of variables.

Delegation of human resource management in the public service

Most OECD countries have moved towards a decentralised model of HRM. One of the features of this reform is the transfer of responsibilities for the management of human resources to line ministries, departments and/or agencies. In other words, delegation refers to the transfer of responsibilities regarding the implementation of HRM principles to line ministries/ departments/agencies, defined by the central HRM body. This has meant a change in the role of the central HRM body which is now focused on policy formulation and line ministries on policy implementation.

Figure A.1. **Composite index of delegation of the management of the public service in central governments of OECD countries**



Notes: Index comprised between 0 (no delegation) and 1 (high level of delegation). Cronbach's alpha: 0.710 (computed with SPSS). A Cronbach's alpha close to 0.6 or 0.7 indicates a high degree of correlation among a set of variables.

Data missing or incomplete for Czech Republic, Greece, Poland and Slovak Republic.

Source: Survey on Strategic Human Resources Management in Government, OECD, 2006 (questions 20, 21, 24, 27, 30, 36), and GOV (OECD) estimates (missing data estimated by mean replacement).

The variables

The following items have been used in the construction of this index:

- Existence of a central HRM body (question 20).
- Delegation of establishment⁴ (question 21).
- Delegation of compensation levels (question 24).
- Delegation of position classification, recruitment and dismissals (question 27).
- Delegation of conditions of employment (question 30).

- Impact of delegation for pay/terms and conditions of employment across government organisations (question 36).

Scoring

Existence of a central HRM body (question 20): Is there a central agency/department in charge of human resources at central/national/federal government level?

- Yes: 0.000.
- No: 1.000.
- Not responsible, but a central agency/department aims to co-ordinate the HR policies across departments: 0.5.

Table A.1. **Delegation of establishment (question 21)**
(the overall score for question 21 was calculated by averaging the sub-scores)

| Primarily determined by: | Central HRM body (which sets the rules and is closely involved in applying them)/ Ministry of Finance | Central HRM body but with some latitude for ministries/ departments/agencies in applying the general principles | Ministries/ departments/agencies, within established legal and budgetary limits | Unit/team level | Other/variable, depends largely on departmental/ functions |
|--|---|---|---|-----------------|--|
| Numbers and types of posts within organisations | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Allocation of budget envelope between payroll and other expenses | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |

Table A.2. **Delegation of compensation levels (question 24)**
(the overall score for question 24 was calculated by averaging the sub-scores)

| Primarily determined by: | Central HRM body (which sets the rules and is closely involved in applying them)/ Ministry of Finance | Central HRM body but with some latitude for ministries/ departments/agencies in applying the general principles | Ministries/ departments/agencies, within established legal and budgetary limits | Unit/team level | Other/variable, depends largely on departmental/ functions |
|---|---|---|---|-----------------|--|
| General management of pay systems (fixed portion, progressions,...) | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Management of the variable portion of pay: – benefits – performance-related pay | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |

Table A.3. Delegation of position classification, recruitment and dismissals (question 27)
(the overall score for question 27 was calculated by averaging the sub-scores)

| Primarily determined by: | Central HRM body (which sets the rules and is closely involved in applying them) | Central HRM body but with some latitude for ministries/ departments/agencies in applying the general principles | Ministries/ departments/agencies, within established legal and budgetary limits | Unit/team level | Other/variable, depends largely on departmental/ functions |
|---|--|---|---|-----------------|--|
| Post classification system – grades | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Original individual recruitment into the civil service | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Individual recruitment of casual staff | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Individual duration of employment contract in the civil service | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Individual duration of contract in specific posts | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Individual career management | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Individual dismissal | | | | | |
| – following lack of performance | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| – following organisational restructuring | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| – following misconduct | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |

Impact of delegation for pay/terms and conditions of employment

(question 36): Do the levels of pay/terms and conditions of employment vary significantly across government organisations for the same level of posts? For each item below, the weightings are:

- Yes significantly: 1.000.
- Yes to some degree: 0.500.
- Not at all: 0.000.

Within central/national/federal government across ministries/ departments/agencies: 1) basic pay; 2) other types of remuneration/social benefits; 3) duration of individual contracts in specific posts (mandates); 4) general duration of employment in the public service; 5) flexibility of working conditions (number of hours, etc.); 6) adjustments to working conditions (part-time, etc.); 7) performance appraisal systems; 8) code of conduct; 9) ethics, equal opportunity, equity issues.

Table A.4. Delegation of conditions of employment (question 30)
(the overall score for question 30 was calculated by averaging the sub-scores)

| Primarily determined by: | Central HRM body (which sets the rules and is closely involved in applying them) | Central HRM body but with some latitude for ministries/ departments/agencies in applying the general principles | Ministries/ departments/agencies, within established legal and budgetary limits | Unit/team level | Other/variable, depends largely on departmental/ functions |
|--|--|---|---|-----------------|--|
| Flexibility of working conditions (numbers of hours, etc.) | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Adjustments to working conditions (part time, etc.) | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Performance appraisal systems | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Code of conduct | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |
| Ethics, equal opportunity, equity issues | 0.250 | 0.500 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 0.625 |

Within the same ministries/departments: 1) basic pay; 2) other types of remuneration/social benefits; 3) duration of individual contracts in specific posts (mandates); 4) general duration of employment in the public service; 5) flexibility of working conditions (number of hours, etc.); 6) adjustments to working conditions (part-time, etc.); 7) performance appraisal systems; 8) code of conduct; 9) ethics, equal opportunity, equity issues.


The overall score for question 36 was calculated by averaging the sub-scores.

Intensity of separated group management for senior civil servants

There is a growing tendency in OECD countries to have a distinctive civil service for the senior members of the public service as their decisions are more influenced by political reasons than those made by civil servants at lower levels. Senior civil servants are in charge of the determination of general principles to improve government's efficiency and effectiveness. The establishment of a senior civil service – which is becoming part of the new civil service arrangements in terms of HRM – is in line with individualisation and a performance-oriented culture in the civil service as a whole.

Figure A.2 shows that most of the OECD countries have implemented reforms intended to improve the management of senior civil servants. The emphasis of the reform largely depends on the particular context of the country, but OECD countries have focused on at least four main areas:

Figure A.2. **Intensity of the institutionalisation of structured group management for senior civil servants at central level**



Notes: Index comprised between 0 (no management of SCS) and 1 (intense management of SCS level). Cronbach's alpha: 0.760 (computed with SPSS). A Cronbach's alpha above 0.6 indicates a high degree of correlation among a set of variables.

Austria, Denmark, Mexico and Switzerland reported having no SCS *per se* and not having special arrangements for the management of their senior management.

Data missing or incomplete: Greece, New Zealand and Sweden.

Source: Survey on Strategic Human Resources Management in Government, OECD, 2006 (questions 78, 82.a, 82.b, 83, 84), and GOV (OECD) estimates (missing data estimated by mean replacement).

a) leadership; b) the creation of a senior civil service; c) the creation of career opportunities; and d) cultural change towards more flexibility and individual accountability for performance.

The variables

The following items have been used in the construction of this index:

- Group of staff in central/national government widely understood to be the “senior civil service” (question 78).
- Identification of potential future leaders early in their careers, of the process (informal, formal, centralised or decentralised) and a defined skills profile for senior staff (question 82).
- The average age upon entering the senior management group (question 83).
- The difference between the employment framework of senior management and regular staff (question 84).

Scoring

Group of staff in central/national government understood to be the “senior civil service” (question 78): Is there a defined group of staff in central/national/federal government who are widely understood to be the “senior civil service”?

- Yes: 1.000.
- No: 0.000.

Identification of potential future leaders early in their careers (question 82): Question 82.a. Is this process of identification:

- Informal: 0.500.
- Formal: 1.000.

Question 82.b. Is there a centrally defined skills profile for senior staff?

- Yes: 1.000.
- No: 0.000.

The average age upon entering the senior management group (question 83): What is the average age upon entering the senior management group?

- 20-30 years: 1.000.
- 30-40 years: 0.750.
- 40-50 years: 0.500.
- More than 50 years: 0.250.

The difference between the employment framework of senior management and regular staff (question 84): Equal weighting (0.100) was attributed to the following items that can be combined with each other:


- They are recruited with a more centralised process.
- They are identified early on in their careers and more attention is paid to the management of their careers.
- More emphasis is put on the management of their performance.
- More emphasis is put on avoiding major conflicts of interest.
- The part of their pay that is not basic salary but not performance-related is higher than for regular staff.
- The part of their pay that is performance-related is higher.
- Their appointment contract for a post has a specific term.
- Their appointment term is shorter than for regular staff.
- Their appointment into the senior management group is dependent on the renewal of their contract for a senior management post.
- Other.

Intensity of the use of performance-related pay

In recent years, the use of performance-related pay (PRP) has been more widely accepted as a management tool to increase individual and team rewards for good performance.

Performance assessment is a form of individualisation of HRM. Performance is assessed individually or collectively (teams or groups) to define increases in salary or bonuses.

Figure A.3. **Composite index on the intensity of the use of performance-related pay in OECD member countries**



Notes: Index comprised between 0 (no PRP) and 1 (high PRP level).

Cronbach's alpha: 0.937 (computed with SPSS). A Cronbach's alpha above 0.6 indicates a high degree of correlation among a set of variables.

Austria, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Sweden reported not having a PRP system.

Data missing or incomplete for Belgium, Greece, New Zealand, Turkey.

The average for OECD countries includes the eight countries that have reported not having a PRP system.

Source: Survey on Strategic Human Resources Management in Government, OECD, 2006 (questions 76, 76.a, 76.b, 76.c), and GOV (OECD) estimates (missing data estimated by mean replacement).

The variables

The following items have been used in the construction of this index:

- The use of performance-related pay mechanism (question 76).
- PRP and staff categories (question 76.a).
- The use of one-off bonuses and/or merit increments (question 76.b).
- Maximum proportion of basic salary that PRP represent (question 76.c).

Scoring

The use of performance-related pay mechanism (question 76): Is performance-related pay in use in your country?

- Yes: 1.000.
- No : 0.000.

PRP and staff categories (question 76.a): If PRP implemented, for which category of staff?

- For most government employees: 1.000.
- For senior staff only: 0.666.
- Only in a few central/national/federal government organisations: 0.333.

The use of one-off bonuses and/or merit increments (question 76.b): Do organisations mostly use:

- One-off bonuses : 0.500.
- Merit increments: 0.500.

Maximum proportion of basic salary that PRP represents (question 76.c): What is the maximum proportion of basic salary that PRP can represent?


- 1-5 %: 0.250.
- 1-10%: 0.500.
- 1-20%: 0.750.
- 1-40%: 1.000.

HRM openness of the public service

The HRM openness index focuses on the possibilities individuals have to become part of the civil service throughout their careers. The modalities of entry into the public service vary from country to country and depend on the type of civil service system adopted. Whereas in career-based systems entry is based on academic credentials and examination with limited possibilities for entering at mid-career level, in position-based systems access is more open and lateral entry is more common. However, in the OECD area there is no pure example of either system since there is a tendency to adopt processes from both systems depending on the positions.

A system based on selection by competition early in the public servants' career (and managed as a group throughout their careers) with no posts open to external recruitment corresponds to a low degree of HRM openness of the public service. By contrast, a system with direct application to a specific post and interview (with minimum degree requirement) and with posts open to both internal and external applicants ranks high on the index.

Figure A.4. **Composite index of openness of the HRM system in central government**



Notes: Index comprised between 0 (no openness) and 1 (high openness level). Cronbach's alpha: 0.573 (computed with SPSS). A Cronbach's alpha close to or above 0.6 indicates a high degree of correlation among a set of variables.

Data missing for the following countries: Canada, Czech Republic, Greece and Spain.

Source: Survey on Strategic Human Resources Management in Government, OECD, 2006 (questions 37, 38, 39, 81), and GOV (OECD) estimates (missing data estimated by mean replacement).

The variables

The following items have been used in the construction of this index:

- Becoming a public servant in general (question 37).
- Merit-based appointment at entry in the selection process (question 38).
- Allocation of posts (question 39).
- Recruitment of senior civil servants (question 81).

Scoring

Becoming a public servant in general (question 37): How does one become a public servant in general?

- Through a competitive examination that provides for entry into a specific group of the public service: 0.000.
- Through direct application to a specific post and interview (with minimum degree requirement): 0.666.
- It varies depending on the post: 0.333.

Question 37.a. Are the rules different for casual employees?

- Yes: 1.000.
- No : 0.000.

Merit-based appointment at entry in the selection process (question 38): If your system does not include competitive written examination, how is merit-based appointment at entry guaranteed in the selection process? Equal weighting (0.200) was attributed to the following items that can be combined with each other:

- All vacancies are published.
- Recruitments are made with panels.
- Recruitment firms are used.
- Shortlist of possible candidates prepared jointly by the HR department and the recruiting department.
- Other.

Allocation of posts (question 39): How does one individual get a specific position/post?

- All posts are open to internal and external recruitment and applicants apply to the different posts: 1.000.
- Most posts are open to internal and external recruitment and applicants apply to the different posts: 0.666.
- Some posts are open to internal and external recruitment and applicants apply to the different posts: 0.333.
- No posts open to external recruitment: 0.000.

Recruitment of senior civil servants (question 81): How are the rest of senior managers recruited?


- Originally selected by competitive examination early on in their careers and managed as a group after: 0.000
- Through career progression within the public service only: 0.000.
- All senior management positions are open to external recruitment: 1.000.
- A good proportion of management positions are open to external recruitment: 0.500.

Use of performance assessment in HRM decisions for government employees

The institutionalisation of performance assessment in the culture of the public sector contributes to the development of public servants' careers. Assessing performance constitutes an important motivator as it allows rewarding "good" performance under a more objective and fair perspective, recognising both individual and collective efforts. However, performance assessments are also a recognised way of making the goals of the organisation clearer to staff, recognising their contribution and roles of the organisation, and helping implement changes in an organisation.

The results show a relative dispersal of OECD member countries around the average but along a continuum.

Figure A.5. **Composite index on the use of performance assessment in HRM decisions for government employees (perception index)**



Notes: Index comprised between 0 (no use of performance assessment) and 1 (high performance assessment) level).

Cronbach's alpha: 0.639 (computed with SPSS). A Cronbach's alpha close to 0.6 or 0.7 indicates a high degree of correlation among a set of variables.

Data missing for the following countries: Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and United States.

Source: Survey on Strategic Human Resources Management in Government, OECD, 2006 (questions 74.1, 74.2, 74.3, 74.4), and GOV (OECD) estimates (missing data estimated by mean replacement).

The variables

The performance assessment index encompasses the following items:

- Career advancement (question 74.1).
- Remuneration (question 74.2).
- Contract renewal on the same job/remaining in the same job (question 74.3).
- Employment contract renewal in the public service (question 74.4).

Scoring

Importance of performance assessment in relation to career advancement (question 74.1):

- High: 1.000.
- Medium: 0.666.
- Low: 0.333.

Importance of performance assessment in relation to remuneration (question 74.2):

- High: 1.000.
- Medium: 0.666.
- Low: 0.333.

Importance of performance assessment in relation to contract renewal on the same job (question 74.3):

- High: 1.000.
- Medium: 0.666.
- Low: 0.333.

Importance of performance assessment in relation to employment contract renewal in the public service (question 74.4):

- High: 1.000.
- Medium: 0.666.
- Low: 0.333.

Notes

1. Please see Manning *et al.*, 2006, page 48.
2. A scoring methodology is a statistical analysis according to objective criteria through the establishment of an overall index built on a selection of sub-indexes. The final index is the sum of each individual notation.
3. Cronbach's alpha is not a statistical test but a coefficient of reliability based on the correlations between indicators: a high value implies that the indicators are measuring the same underlying construct. A value of 0.6 or 0.7 is an acceptable reliability threshold. It is generally used to investigate the degree of correlation across a set of variables.
4. Ability to decide on staff members and the types of staff that are employed (i.e. HRM strategy).

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From:
The State of the Public Service

Access the complete publication at:
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264047990-en>

Please cite this chapter as:

OECD (2008), “Annex - HRM Composite Indicators: Construction, Weighting and Theoretical Framework”, in *The State of the Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264047990-9-en>

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