The Slippery Slope of Political Conditionality

The effectiveness of conditionality hinges in large measure on the willingness of donors to suspend aid in the case of non-compliance. Yet, for a multitude of reasons, donors often hesitate (Killick, 1998 Kanbur, 2000 Woods, 2007 Dreher, 2008). Donor governments have historical, foreign policy, security, investment and trading reasons to support particular recipient governments and to use their aid and their influence within the IFIs to secure lenient treatment for favoured clients. Economic and geopolitical considerations still go a long way in explaining the geographic allocation of aid flows. Indeed, the diplomatic use of aid undoubtedly received a boost from the terrorist attack of 9/11, with aid flows to the Middle East increasing four-fold between 2001 and 2004 (Lancaster, 2007, p. 7). Against this backdrop, donors are often reluctant to cut aid, regardless of how recipients have scored in achieving targets and objectives. As Kanbur puts it (2000, pp. 5-6), “When push comes to shove, all of the pressures, mostly from the donor side, are to look the other way when conditionality is violated.” Moreover, the instruments of donor co-ordination are only on rare occasions strong enough to maintain solidarity in the face of conflicting donor interests (Killick, 1998, p. 174). And clever recipient governments often adopt effective divide-and-rule strategies towards donors.