The collapse in trade during late 2008 and early 2009 has been severe both in absolute terms and relative to the fall in GDP. This triggered concerns that there might be particular factors affecting trade during the crisis, including worries about protectionism. Evidence presented here shows that the severity of the 2008-09 trade “collapse” was not unprecedented after all. To a large extent the collapse in trade was a consequence of: (1) The collapse in domestic demand though the consequences of falling demand reached some economies because of their trade links; (2) the disproportionate fall in output and trade of capital goods that make up a larger share of trade than of GDP; and, (3) the temporary drying up (and subsequently lower availability and higher cost) of short-term trade finance. The paper argues that the increasing importance of intermediate inputs in world trade flows cannot explain why the fall in trade was much larger than the fall in GDP, though it can explain why the share of trade in GDP has increased. It also explains, at least in part, the highly synchronised nature of the trade collapse.