




The Architecture of Development Assistance

2012



The Development Assistance Committee: Enabling effective development

The Architecture of Development Assistance

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Foreword

The complexity and diversity of the architecture of development co-operation institutions, instruments and interventions mirror the multiplicity of global development issues that official development assistance (ODA) has addressed over the decades. The result today is a complex new pattern of relationships too often dictated by vested interests, and burgeoning fragmentation – too many donors scattering too little ODA across too many countries.

The global development landscape has also become more complex. It forms a patchwork of countries at different stages of development which have to contend with such major new challenges as food insecurity, climate change, and the effectiveness of efforts undertaken in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Since 2008 the financial and economic crisis has put further strain on this architecture, forcing donors to tighten their purse strings. This has raised the stakes for all providers of development finance to demonstrate to their stakeholders that they are getting their money's worth.

Ways of making the collective effort more cohesive, co-operative and better co-ordinated are exercising minds across the development community. A chief objective of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), held in Busan from 29 November to 1st December 2011, was precisely to strengthen the collective capacity of donors and their developing country partners to work together in effective, open partnerships.

The DAC has long advocated improving the quality of development partnerships, arguing that an effective development finance system is much more than the mere sum of individual funding decisions. It is a theme that runs through this publication. *The Architecture of Development Assistance 2012* brings together three separately published reports each of which examines a particular dysfunction in the current architecture. Part I, the *2011 Multilateral Aid Report*, calls for greater use of and investment in multilateral channels for ODA which, it argues, enables donors to pool their forces and meet today's development challenges more effectively than bilateral efforts. It is followed by the *2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour* which analyses the causes of fragmentation and makes a plea for much closer co-operation between donors. Part III, the *2011 OECD Report on Aid Predictability* analyses the DAC fourth Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans – the only global tool in existence to forecast future ODA flows to countries – and argues that, if ODA is to be truly effective, then freely available, predictable information on future levels of ODA disbursements is a critical requirement.

It is in the interest of member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee to address the failings of the current system which they both fund and benefit from. And, in keeping with the intertwined themes of partnership and information sharing that run through *The Architecture of Development Assistance 2012*, the DAC welcomes opportunities – like HLF4 – for development stakeholders beyond the DAC to join in building a robust development architecture that effectively answers the fast-evolving global challenges faced by development assistance today.



Brian Atwood, DAC Chair

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
AFD	French Development Agency
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfDF	African Development Fund
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
AsDF	Asian Development Fund
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CICID	France’s Inter-Ministerial Committee for International Co-operation and Development
CIFs	Climate Investment Funds
CommSec	Commonwealth Secretariat
COMPAS	Common Performance Assessment System
CPA	Country programmable aid
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (World Bank)
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAD	Development Assistance Database
DCD	Development Co-operation Directorate
DFID	Department for International Development
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
EC-DCI	European Commission Development Cooperation Instrument
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian aid Office
EDF	European Development Fund
EFW	Expanded Funding Window

EU	European Union
FOCEM	<i>Fundo de Convergência Estrutural e de Fortalecimento Institucional do Mercosul</i> (Mercosur's Structural Convergence Fund for Competition, Social Cohesion and Institution-Building)
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GFATM	Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GDFR	Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery
GNI	Gross national income
GPP	Global Partnerships and Programmes
HIP	Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries
HIPC CBP	Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Capacity Building Project
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICDO	International Civil Defence Organisation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFFIm	International Finance Facility for Immunization
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
IHME	Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MAEE	French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs
MAR	Multilateral Aid Review
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MIOMCT	French Ministry of Interior's immigration department
MINEFI	French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OCT	Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
PEPFAR	US President’s Plan for AIDS Relief
PIDG	Private Infrastructure Development Group
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
QuODA	Quality of Official Development Assistance
MINECOFIN	Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
UK	United Kingdom
UMIC	upper-middle income country
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UN-OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN-REDD	UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WP-EFF	OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness

Executive summary

Is the aid industry turning into a crumbling edifice? Growing complexity is certainly putting a strain on aid architecture. The sheer numbers of state and non-state actors have proliferated, giving rise to new patterns of development co-operation. The global development landscape has changed, too, forming a patchwork of countries at different stages of development.

To compound matters, the aftershocks and fiscal squeeze arising from the economic and financial crisis have seen donors tighten their purse strings: OECD surveys of donors forward spending plans point to reduced outflows of aggregate aid through 2013. In the words of the Busan Partnership Agreement issued at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in late 2011: “progress has been uneven and neither fast nor far-reaching enough”.

In order to reflect the multiple nature of the challenges to and shortcomings in the current aid architecture, this publication examines it from three viewpoints by bringing together three previous, separately published reports: the *2011 Multilateral Aid Report*; the *2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Cross-Country Fragmentation of Aid*; and the *2011 OECD Report on Aid Predictability: Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans 2011-2013*.

The *2011 Multilateral Aid Report* is the third of its kind on multilateral aid conducted by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It considers the latest trends in members’ multilateral development assistance, delves into why and how governments invest in multilateral aid channels, and argues that they meet today’s social, economic and health challenges more effectively than bilateral aid.

The *2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour* draws on country programmable aid (CPA) data¹ to analyse the nature and causes of fragmentation, recommend ways in which donors may rationalise their allocations, and propose targets as a way of reducing fragmentation.

The *2011 OECD Report on Aid Predictability* builds on the fourth annual Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans – the only global aid prediction tool in existence. The report analyses future levels of aid essential to achieving the MDGs, and provides an indication of the collective forward programming of bilateral and multilateral donors up to and including 2013.

Dim outlook for aid flows through 2013

The 2011 Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans estimates total CPA in 2010 at USD 91.6 billion, a decline of USD 1.3 billion in real terms from the peak reached in 2009. Looking ahead, CPA through 2013 is programmed to grow at a real rate of 2% *per annum*, well down on the annual average of 8% over the previous three years. Driven mostly by

outflows from multilateral agencies, this modest rate of increase is likely to be matched or outpaced by population growth, so resulting in a decline in aid *per capita*.

Donors' forward-spending surveys project that almost two-thirds of countries (98 out of 152) in all regions will receive lower aggregate levels of aid through both bilateral and multilateral channels by 2013. Of the 98 recipients of dwindling aid, 27 will be in the least-developed country (LDC) category. The projected slow-down in CPA growth will probably be particularly pronounced in Africa, where CPA is projected to rise by about 1% per year in real terms, compared to 12% over the previous three years. Recent decisions by donors to concentrate their aid on fewer partner countries may account for the decline in CPA, although it is offset by the significant increases allotted to a few large recipients.

Donors' medium-term aid predictability – as measured by the ratio of delivered to programmed CPA – points to an over-programming of 5% in 2010. In other words, the average donor country disbursed 5% less in 2010 than it had programmed at the beginning of the same year. If this cautious trend continues or strengthens in 2011-13, total aid disbursements will fall further, as the figure below shows.

Against that background of faltering volumes of aid both now and in the near future, multilateral ODA also fell as a share of total ODA. If contributions to EU institutions are excluded, the shrinking share of multilateral aid stands out even more starkly. Within that decline, however, different trends may be distinguished.

Between 2008 and 2009, earmarked bilateral ODA channelled through multilaterals increased from USD 13.4 billion to USD 15 billion, accounting for 12% of total ODA and showing an average annual growth rate of 3%, compared to total gross ODA's rate of 4%. Over the same period, core multilateral contributions – also referred to as unearmarked – actually fell as a share of ODA from a 33% peak to a low of 28%.

Earmarked funding through multilateral organisations, however, is growing faster than other components of ODA. Behind this trend are strong rationales. Like bilateral aid, earmarking allows donors to track results more easily, to have greater say over the use of their funds, and to raise the visibility of their contributions in the eyes of domestic constituencies. Some donors have also decided to concentrate their bilateral aid on a smaller number of partner countries, which encourages them to channel funds through multilaterals so as to maintain a minimum attributable footprint in a specific region. Some DAC member countries have started to refer to this practice as the growing “multilateralisation” of bilateral aid, while multilateral organisations perceive it as a growing “bilateralisation” of multilateral aid.

Multilateral or bilateral aid?

As donor countries continue to face severe budget constraints, value for money is becoming an increasingly decisive concern. In 2009, multilateral organisations received USD 51 billion in multilateral and bilateral ODA from DAC members, much of which falls under a kaleidoscope of accountability arrangements that very few ordinary citizens, and not many experts, fully comprehend. The *2010 Multilateral Aid Report* highlighted the persistent challenges of communicating to domestic audiences both the ultimate results that multilaterals achieve and the visibility and influence of individual donors' contributions. In this respect, bilateral aid has the edge, as it gives donors closer control over how resources are spent and the need to properly apportion credit or blame.

At the end of 2010, DAC conducted a questionnaire in which it asked its members about the ministries, departments, or agencies which decide allocations to the 29 different funds and organisations that receive over 90% of all DAC donor multilateral aid. Responses to the questionnaire reveal that few DAC countries offer much, if any, structured arrangement for stating the case for multilateral aid, however. Inevitably, therefore, citizens learn only incidentally of the rationale for choosing alternative channels. In the current environment of budget constraints, clearly setting out and publicising the national case for multilateralism is increasingly important if the general public, legislators, and civil society are to understand what they are getting in exchange for less direct control over funds.

On the other hand, there is a public perception of multilateral ODA as less politicised and more removed from the influence of domestic special interests. Multilateral aid also offers the wider benefits of pooling resources and burden sharing, greater presence in recipient countries, and expertise. Australia, for example, is increasingly using multilateral partners because it recognises their proven efficiency and effectiveness. The advantages it cites are expertise, reach and impact beyond what Australia can do bilaterally, and support for development in geographic areas where Australia has no presence.

In simple terms, then, the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid is about balancing the need to control and account for expenditure against the benefits of pooling resources, presence, and expertise. Yet no clear pattern as to donors' multilateral aid preferences appears to have emerged in recent years.

Multilateral aid that does not include contributions to EU institutions ranges from 29% of gross ODA in Korea, 28% in Italy, and 26% in Sweden to just 12% in Portugal and the United States and 11% in Greece. As for DAC members' multilateral aid as a whole (including to EU institutions), it accounts for the highest shares of gross ODA in Italy (73%), Austria (54%), and Greece (53%), and the lowest in Japan (19%), Australia (15%), and the United States (12%). While these figures alone may not allow any conclusions to be drawn as to donor preferences, donors on the right-hand side of the graph below have larger bilateral programmes in place than those on the left and/or contribute much less to non-EU multilateral development agencies.

Twenty DAC non-member countries reported their aid flows to the DAC in 2009, while some larger ones (Brazil, the Russian Federation, China, and India) did not. The eleven EU states that are not DAC members directed 66% of their total ODA to multilaterals (including EU institutions), while the average multilateral ODA of non-DAC donor states (excluding the Arab donors for which data are not comparable) was 31%. Larger regional players such as Brazil and the Russian Federation allotted substantial multilateral aid to regional organisations or funds. It is unlikely that multilateral aid accounts for high shares of China's and India's ODA: although they increasingly contribute to concessional funds like the International Development Association (IDA), they already have large and rapidly growing bilateral programmes.

Fragmentation – the bilateral bane

Bilateral aid is closely associated with fragmentation – too many donors contributing too little in too many countries. It can seriously impair the effectiveness of aid and is a particular challenge in the poorest countries of Africa and Asia and in fragile, conflict-affected states. Fragmentation puts a strain on governments' administrative capacities, increases donors' costs, duplicates their efforts, and is an inefficient use of aid resources. And it is spreading right across the development co-operation landscape. Since the 2005

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, fragmentation has grown everywhere except in the Americas.

Although fragmentation is easy to conceptualise, it is hard to pin down and measure. To that end, the 2011 *OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Cross-Country Fragmentation of Aid* uses a methodology first developed in the 2009 *Report on Division of Labour* for measuring aid fragmentation where the yardstick is the financial “significance” of an aid relationship. A “significant” relationship is one where:

- a single donor accounts for a higher share of aid to a partner country than the donor’s overall share of global aid, and/or
- the donor is among the largest donors who altogether account for at least 90% of the partner country’s aid.

Ideally, a partner country would have a low aid fragmentation ratio – where significant donor relations account for a high share of the total number of relationships. Similarly, donors would seek to build portfolios with as high a concentration as possible of significant aid relations with their partner countries. The higher the concentration ratio, the less fragmentation there is.

Fragmentation at the global level stems mostly from bilateral sources: 45% of bilateral aid relations are non-significant compared to 34% of multilateral aid relations. One cause is the lack of concerted, co-ordinated aid allocation practices as donors fail to communicate or consider each others’ allocation choices and practices when determining their own. In addition, many bilateral flows earmarked for specific countries, regions, sectors and themes are increasingly transiting through multilateral agencies, which may contribute to the growing fragmentation of aid at country level. Fragmentation even affects donors’ relations with their chosen priority partner countries which may be expected to be significant: in 2009, nearly one-fifth of CPA relations with priority partner countries were non-significant.

Although multilateral donors are less prone to fragmentation than bilaterals, their fragmentation ratios nevertheless rose between 2008 and 2009. Even though DAC donor members direct over 80% of their multilateral aid to five groupings of multilateral agencies – the European Development Fund plus European Union Budget (37%), International Development Association (21%), UN Funds and Programmes (10%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% and 3%), and the Global Fund (6%) – the 20% tail-end is scattered across 200 multilateral organisations and often consists of technical assistance or norm- and standard-setting.

The global fragmentation ratio in 2009 was 40% – *i.e.* two in five relationships between donor and partner country were non-significant. In Africa and Asia the figure was higher, with over half of all donor relations being non-significant. Lower-middle income countries (LMICs) tend to have the highest fragmentation ratios. Although they traditionally have a few large donors who provide most of their aid, they also have a long tail of small donors supplying the remainder.

The most worrying trend, though, is in low-income countries (LICs) whose institutions are ill-equipped for managing the growing number of financially less significant actors. More than 80% of all LICs have experienced a rise in donor numbers since 2004, with the increase exceeding 50% in some instances. Even more pronounced has been the rapid rise in the fragmentation ratios of fragile and conflict-affected states, where the growth in the number of non-significant donors between 2004 and 2009 was three times higher than in non-fragile states. In 2009, the most extreme case of fragmentation was still Iraq (92%), where one donor – the United States – supplied nearly 90% of all CPA and 25 others provided 10%.

Driven by the global economic and financial crisis and the fiscal squeeze it has spawned, many donors – and nearly all DAC EU donors – have nevertheless moved to rationalise their aid relations in the last four years. They are seeking to reduce the size of the aid portfolios and focus on fewer partnerships by gradually exiting from partner countries. Because exits are gradual processes that take place over years, it is difficult to assess their impact overall on fragmentation and development. The OECD's 2011 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans collected information on planned donor phase-outs from 2011 to 2015 – a total of 162 exits – and simulated their potential impact on 2009 CPA levels.

There are positive signs that planned exits are taking place where the aid relations are non-significant rather than significant. More than half of all donors' planned aid exits are taking place in countries where their aid relations were considered non-significant in 2009. In Africa and Asia, for example, two-thirds of all aid relations earmarked for phase-out were non-significant. However, although some donors who are planning to pull out of a country may not provide it with large aggregate volumes of aid, they may be important players in sectors or areas where only a few donors are present. Phase-outs of such aid programmes may therefore impact on certain countries. When phasing out programmes, donors should always consult closely both with their partners and other donors in order to ensure the transition does not lead to severe cases of under-funding.

According to 2009 data, there are 16 DAC donors who fall short of the DAC average aid concentration ratio. One option they could use to bring themselves into line with the average is to phase out some of their non-significant relations. Because of the long, drawn-out nature of phase-outs, however, it is important to set targets. Assuming that the average donor's project or programme cycle is 4-5 years, the DAC could set a realistic target date of 2015 to achieve progress.

To increase their concentration ratios, donors can also scale up their aid to countries with which they have non-significant relations – though doing so requires bigger aid budgets. That being said, aid exits may also free up resources which donors may then use to scale up aid in other partner countries. Donors should also be encouraged to have only significant aid relations in their priority partner countries.

With bilateral donors exiting or lacking the expertise to intervene, particularly in fragile states, there is growing pressure on the multilateral system to plug the gaps. This situation will give rise to difficult discussions on how far organisations, funds, and the whole multilateral aid architecture – built by members, shareholders and contributors – are fit for the purpose of assuming an increasingly broad, complex agenda.

Information sharing – for across-the-board improvements in aid effectiveness

A pilot study that drew on the 2011 OECD Survey on Donors' Forwards Spending Plans identified an effective, low-cost way of improving the overall effectiveness of aid. It found that making the currently confidential disaggregated survey data available to partner countries could lead to more effective planning at country level. If donors agreed to lift their data confidentiality requirement, they would not only foster country-level dialogue that would improve the accuracy and scope of their forward spending plans, they would also advance on their commitments under the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Partnership Agreement (2011). Increased transparency and predictability could also further co-ordination and division of labour among donors.

Another pilot scheme with Austria and Belgium explored how donors could provide more detailed information on ongoing and planned aid projects and programmes by

reporting their forward spending plans directly in the OECD Creditor Reporting System format. The scheme confirmed that it is indeed possible to strengthen the breadth and depth of the Survey. However, it also revealed that some donors' current medium-term planning has built-in structural limitations. These limitations, often explained by budgetary or legal constraints, cannot necessarily be resolved by technicians. They require political attention.

Not only would partner countries plainly benefit from more information on individual donors' future intentions, but closer co-ordination between donors when they make their aid allocation decisions would help reduce fragmentation. Bilateral donors' concentration strategies are typically inward-looking processes, involving very little co-ordination with other donors or partner country governments and leading to ineffective, uneven cross-country allocations. The international development community should draw on regular analysis of fragmentation with the aim of supporting co-operation and dialogue among development actors and, ultimately, of informing all donors' aid allocation decisions.

There is no ideal or "one-size-fits-all" model for determining aid allocation decisions at national level. Nor is there any single solution for reducing fragmentation and improving aid predictability. The current outlook on aid remains uncertain, even dim. Multilateral outflows, which generally distribute funds more evenly across countries than bilateral aid, could help mitigate falls in ODA. But their resource bases would need to increase much faster than currently appears likely in a period of fiscal constraint and austerity budgets.

Although it is not a solution *per se*, an open approach to information would bring across-the-board improvement in the current aid architecture. More and better analysis and information sharing (the OECD surveys on forward planning is still the only global-level tool of its kind) would further joint action across multilaterals and stakeholders inside and outside DAC and support more transparent decision-making and closer co-ordination between bilateral donors.

Stakeholders of the different multilateral agencies, funds and programmes have a collective responsibility to address the most important challenges of the multilateral architecture they fund and govern. The aid allocation landscape is evolving, reflecting the fast-changing nature of the global economy. This shifting situation and the attendant redistribution of aid underline the importance of sharing information as a key requirement for a more effective *Architecture of Development Assistance*.

Note

1. To estimate more accurately the volumes of ODA that donors grant to developing countries the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) introduced the concept of "country programmable aid" (CPA). CPA is the portion of aid that each donor (bilateral or multilateral) can programme for each recipient country and for which countries can have a significant say. It provides a low-cost basis for transparent forward planning by recipients and donors as required by the Accra Agenda for Action. CPA accounts for a little over a half of DAC members' gross bilateral ODA. CPA rose over the period 2005-08 at a rate of 4%, in line with gross ODA.

Part I

Multilateral Aid

Key messages on multilateral aid

The first part of Architecture of Development Assistance is devoted to the 2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid. These key messages provide an overview of recent trends in multilateral aid and how countries decide between multilateral and bilateral aid. The overriding trend is one of decline in aid volumes after the historic high of 2009, but the picture in reality is more complex depending on whether aid is earmarked or not. The overview also considers the five big groupings of multilateral organisations that account for the vast majority of aid and discusses non-DAC donor multilateral aid. Finally, it considers the case for multilateralism, and looks at examples of countries' multilateral aid decisions and the evidence they are built upon.

The present report is the third of its kind on multilateral aid produced by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It considers the latest trends in members' multilateral development assistance, delves into why and how governments invest in multilateral aid channels, and argues that they meet today's global social, economic and health challenges more effectively than bilateral aid

Trends in multilateral aid

Between 2000 and 2009, multilateral official development assistance (ODA) increased from USD 26.6 billion to USD 36.2 billion. The rise represents an average annual growth rate of 3%, compared to total gross ODA's rate of 4%. Over the same period, core – unearmarked – multilateral contributions actually fell as a share of ODA from a 33% peak to a low of 28%. It nevertheless stood at USD 36 billion in 2009. An additional 12% – USD 15 billion – was also earmarked by sector, country, region, or theme and channelled through multilateral organisations in 2009, even though it was scored as bilateral ODA. Taken together, core and earmarked multilateral contributions account for 40% of gross ODA, or USD 51 billion, a very large sum that falls under a kaleidoscope of accountability arrangements.

In simple terms, the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid is about balancing the need to control and account for expenditure against the benefits of pooling resources, presence, and expertise. Recent research indicates that the “principal-agent” model may best explain the decisions involved in choosing multilateral aid. In this model, an individual donor (principal) and multilateral agency (agent) are divided between control over funds and the benefits of burden sharing. The more closely the agent's preferences align with the donor's, the less the donor worries about loss of control over funds.

Earmarked funding through multilateral organisations is growing faster than other components of ODA. Behind this trend are strong rationales, introduced in the *2010 Multilateral Aid Report*. Earmarking allows donors to track results more easily, to have greater say over the use of their funds, and to raise the visibility of their contributions in the eyes of domestic constituencies. Some donors have also decided to concentrate their bilateral aid on a smaller number of partner countries, which encourages them to channel funds through multilaterals so as to maintain a minimum attributable footprint in a specific region.

Some DAC members refer to the practices of earmarking aid and concentrating it on selected partner countries as the growing “multilateralisation” of bilateral aid. Conversely, multilateral organisations may legitimately speak of the growing “bilateralisation” of multilateral aid.

Forward-looking trends

Donors' forward-spending surveys project that almost two-thirds of countries (98 out of 152) in all regions will receive lower aggregate levels of aid through both bilateral and multilateral channels by 2013. Of the 98 recipients of dwindling aid, 27 will be in the least-developed country (LDC) category. However, such a pessimistic outlook may be the result of over-cautious forward planning prompted by recent high levels of uncertainty. What is more, multilateral outflows, which generally distribute funds more evenly across countries than bilateral aid, could help mitigate falls in ODA – as long as their resource base increases much faster than currently appears likely.

Multilateral aid as a share of official development assistance

No clear pattern as to donors' multilateral aid preferences appears to have emerged in recent years. Multilateral aid that does not include contributions to EU institutions ranges from 29% of gross ODA in Korea, 28% in Italy, and 26% in Sweden to just 12% in Portugal and the United States and 11% in Greece. As for DAC members' multilateral aid as a whole (including to EU institutions), it accounts for the highest shares of gross ODA in Italy (73%), Austria (54%), and Greece (53%), and the lowest in Japan (19%), Australia (15%), and the United States (12%).

Concentration on multilateral clusters

Data from 2009 confirm that DAC members channel a high proportion (over 81%) of their core multilateral aid into five main clusters of multilaterals. They are the European Development Fund plus European Union Budget (37%), International Development Association (21%), UN Funds and Programmes (10%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% and 3%), and the Global Fund (6%). Only 18% of multilateral aid goes to the remaining multilateral organisations which number over 200 and often provide technical assistance or serve norm- and standard-setting purposes.

Contributions from other donors

Twenty DAC non-member countries reported their aid flows to the DAC in 2009, while some larger ones (Brazil, the Russian Federation, China, and India) did not. The eleven EU states that are not DAC members directed 66% of their total ODA to multilaterals (including EU institutions), while the average multilateral ODA of non-DAC donor states (excluding the Arab donors for which data are not comparable) was 31%. Larger regional players such as Brazil and the Russian Federation allotted substantial multilateral aid to regional organisations or funds. It is unlikely that multilateral aid accounts for high shares of China's and India's ODA: although they increasingly contribute to concessional funds like the International Development Association (IDA), they already have large and rapidly growing bilateral programmes. (This report includes brief case studies of the Russian Federation and Brazil's multilateral aid.)

How countries determine their multilateral aid allocations

A DAC questionnaire conducted at the end of 2010 asked its members to identify which ministries, departments or agencies were involved in deciding allocations to the 29 different funds and organisations that are the recipients of over 90% of all DAC multilateral aid. This report complements the questionnaire's results with case studies of the decision-making process in France and the United Kingdom, whose development agency recently published its *Multilateral Aid Review*.

Balance between bilateral and multilateral aid

Responses to the questionnaire indicate that just fewer than one-half of DAC member countries (11 out of 23) said they explicitly discuss the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid allocations within their government departments at least every three to five years. The majority of DAC countries offer little or no structured opportunity to state the

case for multilateral aid, however. Inevitably, therefore, citizens learn only incidentally of the rationale for choosing alternative channels. In the current environment of budget constraints, clearly setting out and publicising the national case for multilateralism is increasingly important if the general public, legislators, and civil society are to understand what they are getting in exchange for less direct control over funds.

Decision-making models

Nine members centralise their decision making, with a single ministry, department or agency determining allocations to almost all the 29 multilateral organisations and funds. In Nordic member countries and New Zealand, the body with the decision-making power tends to be the ministry of foreign affairs, while in the UK and Australia it is the international development agency. In contrast, 14 members have at least two separate ministries, departments or agencies responsible for deciding allocations to the 29 bodies. They can be considered to favour a more decentralised model in the sense that more than one ministry disburses aid. Co-ordination among lead ministries/agencies ranges from formal inter-ministerial bodies that meet regularly to *ad hoc* consultations between civil servants working on similar issues. Although the questionnaire did not include EU institutions in its question on decision-making models, their aid allocation practices are closer to the decentralised approach.

How donors allocate: a look at the health sector

In order to monitor how donors deliver aid, the OECD considered aid in the health sector. It examined six broad health sub-categories over a three-year period from 2007 to 2009. It found that nearly as much aid was channelled through multilateral organisations (41%) as was delivered bilaterally (44%) for the six sub-categories. The volume of bilateral aid for HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases was twice the volume delivered multilaterally. However, subtracting the contributions of the United States, which has a very large bilateral HIV/AIDS programme,¹ makes the multilateral channel larger (89% of HIV/AIDS multilateral aid was delivered by the Global Fund).

What next?

There is no ideal or “one-size-fits-all” model for determining aid allocation decisions at national level. The objective in highlighting donor practices is to explore whether any overall systemic inconsistencies – which may arise, for example, from the growing need for visibility and (apparent) control – require joint action across multilaterals and stakeholders inside and outside DAC. While the overall share of multilateral aid is not on the increase, there is growing pressure on the multilateral system to deliver in countries and regions where bilateral donors are exiting or less able to intervene (particularly in fragile states). This situation will give rise to difficult discussions on how far organisations, funds and the whole multilateral aid architecture – built by members, shareholders and contributors – are fit for the purpose of assuming an increasingly broad, complex agenda.

The eight good practices identified below are limited to the *whys* and *hows* of multilateral aid allocations. Their aim is to guide better co-ordinated, more transparent decision making within member governments. This report discusses and substantiates these good practices, building on the importance of collective action as a way of responding to the fragmented architecture of global aid – a need addressed in past DAC reports, high- and

senior-level discussions, and in Part II of this publication. Stakeholders of the different multilateral agencies, funds and programmes have a collective responsibility to address the most important challenges of the multilateral architecture they fund and govern.

The complexity and diversity of multilateral aid institutions should be considered primarily from the perspectives of the partner countries they are designed to serve. Does the multilateral aid system as a whole deliver less than the sum of its parts and is some rationalisation therefore urgent? Or do the benefits of greater choice and variety outweigh the cost? Part I of *Architecture of Development Assistance* (the 2011 *Multilateral Aid Report*) addresses these and other questions. The answers it proposes helped inform debates at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) held in Busan at the end of 2011.

Eight good practices for multilateral donors

1. Articulate, publicise and regularly revisit your specific national case for multilateral contributions.
2. Review the balance between your multilateral and bilateral programmes.
3. If fixed shares guide spending decisions, ensure they have broad coverage and are evidence-based.
4. Make maximum use of joint assessments, independent evaluation findings, and third-party analyses.
5. State clearly and publicly the indicators and ratings that influence your future multilateral allocations.
6. Assess multilateral performance against collective international, as well as national, priorities.
7. Periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if semi-automatic.
8. Have a dedicated body periodically review all public spending through multilaterals.

Note

1. U.S. President's Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).

Chapter 1

How countries determine multilateral aid allocations

This chapter considers how countries decide between multilateral and bilateral aid and what arrangements they have for determining multilateral aid. It looks at the pros and cons of multilateral and bilateral development assistance, considers the case for multilateralism, and looks at examples of countries' multilateral aid decisions and the evidence they are built upon – with value for money being an increasingly important factor. It also looks at multilateral organisations and fields of intervention to which donors make their contributions.

This chapter looks at the different ways in which aid providers allocate funds to bilateral and multilateral aid and to different multilateral agencies. It reviews the responses to a multilateral aid allocation questionnaire, considers the case studies of two countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and examines how members allocate aid in the health sector.

Discussion in the DAC last year of the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* highlighted the need to look in greater detail at members' different decision-making processes. To that end, DAC sent a questionnaire to member countries at the end of 2010 on how they determined their multilateral aid allocations. The questionnaire asked respondents whether their governments discussed bilateral and multilateral shares and to what they allocated those shares; whether there were limits on the share or amount of aid to all or some multilateral organisations; how decisions were made across government; and on what evidence governments relied to make their allocation decisions (see Annex I.2).

Why multilateralism?

In the current environment of budget constraints, proving that development assistance delivers value for money is more important than ever. Governments face increasing pressure from legislative bodies and civil society to scrutinise and even limit multilateral aid, which often appears too far removed from their financial oversight. Indeed, it frequently escapes their control as key decisions on what, where, and how it is actually delivered are taken at supranational level. However, governments may be able to offset concerns over accountability and control with the efficiency gains achieved from pooling resources across donors. Pooling resources spreads the aid burden and leverages experience, sector- and country-based expertise, geographic reach, and other assets which are arguably better deployed through joint efforts.

There is some evidence that providing multilateral development assistance limits the influence of domestic special interests that may otherwise seek to tie assistance to political or commercial ends (Keohane *et al.*, 2009).¹ A recent public opinion poll in EU member states,² for example, found that respondents in 26 of 27 EU member states considered large international organisations to be better positioned than their own bilateral programmes to support developing countries. Milner and Tingley (2010) conclude that the “principal-agent model” best reflects the decisions involved in choosing multilateralism. In this model, an individual donor (principal) and multilateral agency (agent) are at odds over the loss of control over funds and the benefits of burden sharing. How well the preferences of the agent fit with those of the principal determines to what extent loss of control is a concern for the principal (donor). As the example of the Russian Federation illustrates in Chapter 2, donors are pragmatic about the use of multilateral agencies when interests overlap. The fact that there is little or no structured opportunity to make the case for multilateral aid as such in most DAC domestic settings inevitably means that citizens learn only incidentally of the rationale for choosing alternative channels. Stating and publicising the national case for multilateralism is important: the general public, legislators, and civil society should know what they are getting in exchange for less direct control.

Balance between bilateral and multilateral aid

Just under one-half of DAC member countries (11 out of 23) said that they explicitly discussed the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid allocations every three to five years. Seven countries³ conducted cross-government discussions at least once a year, often in the context of broader inter-ministerial co-ordination or budget negotiations with finance

or other ministries. The 16 that held no discussions indicated that they allocated aid primarily on the basis of aid effectiveness, regardless of the channel used. A change of donor government may precipitate re-assessments of aid allocations. However, such re-assessment usually centres on re-examining the case for contributions to specific countries and agencies rather than overall shares of bilateral and multilateral aid or the marginal benefit of one channel over the other. Explicitly reviewing and revisiting the balance between multilateral and bilateral aid allocations helps inform public debate.

Limits on multilateral aid

Less than one-third of members cap their multilateral official development assistance (ODA) and those that do generally use their caps as guidelines rather than binding constraints. They include:

- **Portugal**, which expects to allocate 40% of its aid multilaterally. It also has guidelines for prioritising multilateral support, so the aggregate may be higher or lower than 40%.
- **Korea**, which plans to increase its share of multilateral ODA from the present 28% to 30% by 2015 and to maintain that share thereafter.
- **Spain**, which capped its funding of non-financial multilateral institutions until 2009. Since then, the ceiling has changed yearly according to the size of the general budget and applies only to grants the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides to multilateral institutions.⁴
- **New Zealand**, which decided on a 0% growth of allocations to international organisations this financial year.
- **The German BMZ** (development ministry), which has restricted multilateral aid to one-third of its budget, although the cap is not legally binding and does not cover the ODA component of its EU budget contribution (not directly attributed to BMZ).
- In December 2008, the **Swiss** parliament approved a law that placed a ceiling of 40% on multilateral development assistance until 2012. This cap does not apply to multilateral aid for humanitarian assistance, to aid for Eastern Europe, or to aid for economic and commercial measures (all governed by different legislation).

Such institutional arrangements are generally pragmatic ways of accommodating political pressure to target or limit all or part of the national resources flowing to multilaterals or to branches thereof. Some stakeholders see such caps as an obstacle to the funding of effective multilateral instruments (OECD, 2010b). Ceilings do not appear to be backed by any strong evidence on the relative effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral aid for which comparable information is still somewhat scarce. However, recent work by research institutes and think tanks, such as the Quality of ODA (QuODA) Assessment, gives multilaterals a clear edge when it comes to matching aid with partners' national priorities, supplying more predictable aid, and providing high levels of sector-specific specialisation.

Caps, or ceilings, on multilateral aid may lead to parts of the bilateral and/or multilateral budgets escaping budget arbitrage and efficient prioritising. Even non-binding caps that are poorly understood or not enforced may generate disproportionate transaction costs for little practical benefit. Because there could also be distortions within a budget between those multilaterals subject to a cap and those that are not, any cap adopted by governments and/or legislators for pragmatic reasons should cover as broad a spectrum of programmes as possible. Where a cap or limit already exists, it is important to provide legislators and civil society with a clear rationale as to why it exists and to amend it in light of any new evidence.

Burden-sharing principles

Burden-sharing principles can serve as guidelines for deciding how much to allocate to individual agency replenishments. The United States, for example, publicly aims to contribute 20-25% of the annual budget requirements of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). It has long held to the public stance that it will contribute half as much as the combined contribution of other donors (*i.e.* one-third of the total) to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. France indicated that consistent burden sharing is in principle a good method of ensuring predictable multilateral funding. However, some members argued that the effective value of the euro exchange rate, lower than in previous years, and the growing number of donors made the burden-sharing benchmark less relevant for 2010's concessional fund replenishments.

What evidence informs aid allocations?

Box 1.1 lists sources of evidence cited by members for making multilateral aid allocations, starting with the most common ones. The sixteen DAC members that also form part of the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) indicate that they use the common MOPAN approach to complement other assessments and criteria for determining multilateral aid allocations.

Box 1.1. Sources of evidence for multilateral aid allocations

DAC member countries rely on a variety of sources of evidence to help them decide how to make their aid allocations.

Factors or sources of evidence cited by **at least 9** members:

- relevance to donor priorities and interests;
- relevance to the aid architecture (importance of mandate, positioning, comparative advantage);
- performance assessments (*e.g.* Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network [MOPAN], Common Performance Assessment System [COMPAS]);
- evidence, which includes perceptions, of the organisation's effectiveness.

Factors or sources of evidence cited by **at least 4** members:

- donor influence and visibility within the organisation and ability to take part in governing bodies;
- reviews of multilateral aid portfolios;
- synergy with bilateral programmes;
- political considerations;
- partnership, dialogue, and consultation with multilateral organisations;
- feedback from multilateral agencies' own reports;
- efficiency criteria.

Box 1.1. Sources of evidence for multilateral aid allocations *(continued)*

Factors or sources of evidence cited by **at least one** member:

- historic contributions to multilaterals;
- Paris Declaration Survey results;
- ability to address MDGs or global public goods;
- credibility and likely effectiveness of institutional reform;
- success of organisations' annual humanitarian appeals;
- feedback from partner country;
- civil society feedback.

Source: OECD (2010d), Development Assistance Committee questionnaire on multilateral aid allocations, December, OECD, Paris.

Before considering additional analytical work, maximum use should be made of common and/or assessment databases and evaluations produced by institutions. The recent public release of the UK's *Multilateral Aid Review* and methodology (see Box 1.2) may signal a move towards making subsequent reviews and methodologies public, enabling other donors to use the same methodology but weighting it according to their own priorities. Australia, for example, conducted an aid review in 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) which built on some findings from the UK's analysis.

In recent years, Australia has increasingly based its provision of assistance through partners on evidence of effectiveness. The proportion of its aid that it now channels to and through multilateral partners has increased over the past five years and now stands at nearly 40% of its aid programme. This growing use of multilateral partners reflects Australia's recognition of their strengths – *e.g.* expertise; reach and impact beyond what Australia can do bilaterally; and support for development in geographic areas where Australia has no presence. As Australia continues to increase its aid programme, it plans to channel more funds through multilateral bodies because it considers the approach an effective, efficient use of its funds.

In 2011, Australia undertook an assessment of the effectiveness of its key multilateral partners and published the results in 2012. The assessment came in response to recommendations from the Australian government's recent independent review of its aid programme. It is designed to ensure that Australia's objectives are in line with its multilateral partners and that its partnerships are seeking to achieve results on the ground. The Australian government has committed to increasing support for multilateral organisations that are effective, achieve results for the poorest people, are in line with its objectives and priorities, and give value for money.

Australia is seeking a stronger voice in multilateral organisations through its increased contributions and intends to champion effectiveness and value for money. To that end, it also plans to increase senior management resources dedicated to multilateral issues and to fund only those organisations capable of delivering results and demonstrating effective, efficient use of resources.

Box 1.2. The United Kingdom's Multilateral Aid Review, 2010-11

Although the United Kingdom (UK) is not, of course, the only DAC member to conduct assessments of the institutions to which it grants multilateral aid, it is the first to publish such assessments and their underlying methodology fully. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) published its “Multilateral Aid Review: ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral organisations” on 1st March 2011 after a comprehensive, resource-intensive assessment exercise between July 2010 and February 2011. The review and the methodology it used are publicly available.

The review covered 43 multilateral organisations, of which 10 have a mainly humanitarian aid focus. It assessed organisations against a series of components under two broad performance dimensions, both of which it used to assess value for money:

1. multilaterals’ contribution to UK development and humanitarian objectives, as well as key cross-cutting issues of gender and development, conflict and fragility, and climate change and the environment;
2. organisational strengths and weaknesses.

Value for money delivered by multilateral recipients of UK aid



Source: Department for International Development (DFID) (2011), Multilateral Aid Review, DFID, London.

Box 1.2. The United Kingdom’s Multilateral Aid Review, 2010-11 *(continued)*

Findings

The headline conclusion was that, from the perspective of UK taxpayers, 9 of the 43 agencies were considered to provide very good value for money, 16 good, 9 adequate, and 9 poor (Figure 1.1).

Broadly speaking and despite some exceptions, rankings place most development banks, humanitarian organisations, and global funds in the good-to-very-good zone (north-east quadrant), and most specialised UN agencies in the adequate-to-poor range (south-west quadrant). The EU is split by the funding window, with the European Development Fund (EDF) and its intrinsic focus on the poorest countries, scoring much better than EC Budget programmes.

Although assessments are used as a guide for ministerial allocation decisions, they also depend on wider UK objectives, the likelihood of reform by the organisations themselves, the outcome of replenishment negotiations and the availability of funding from other sources. However, it is clearly stated that DFID’s response to the lowest ratings could well be to discontinue core funding or place it in a “special measures” category to demand urgent, closely monitored improvements in performance. In contrast, the highest ratings argue in favour of a significant scaling up of funding, albeit with continuing pressure for improvements in performance. Since the organisations delivering the poorest value for money typically receive much smaller core contributions than the best, realignment on the same scale would not necessarily be easy for many members and shareholders who do not benefit from such financial headroom.

The review confirmed that the multilateral system is a critical complement to what the UK government can do alone. It found many strengths across the system. Multilateral organisations marshal large-scale funding, bring specialist expertise, and play pivotal leadership roles with other donors. The review also highlighted a number of weaknesses. It showed that most multilaterals need to do more to demonstrate their specific contribution to development and humanitarian results. Most also need to cut unnecessary administrative costs, deliver efficiency savings, and place a greater emphasis on securing value for money in their programming choices. There is scope for improving transparency and accountability and focusing more on delivering for girls and women. Some have serious human resource management problems, particularly in filling posts in difficult countries, and quite a few need to improve their general performance in fragile contexts. Finally there is room for improvement in how the different parts of the international system work with each other. Reform of multilaterals in these areas is a high priority for the UK.


Methodology

DFID’s multilateral aid review drew on a wide variety of sources of evidence. These included documents from the multilateral organisations themselves, such as evaluations and reports to governing bodies on policies and performance, and submissions from UK civil society. It also made use of quantitative data from other sources, some of which were published just before it, *e.g.* the QuODA index, Knack *et al.* (2010), MOPAN assessments, the Aid Transparency Assessment 2010, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Capacity Building Project (HIPC CBP), and the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. These were complemented by a new component related to poverty-efficient aid allocations, the “Focus on Poor Countries”, which combines need, country performance, vulnerability, and human development indices. This initial evidence-gathering exercise was followed by a series of field visits and discussions with partner country ministers and officials, civil society organisations, and other stakeholders and donors. Organisations were then rated on a four-point scale in each of the components in two main areas: contribution to UK development objectives and organisational strengths.

The ratings were then subjected to a series of internal challenges (within DFID and by other UK government departments) and external review by two independent experts. This scoring system, much like the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), provides a package of rigorously quality-assured but ultimately subjective judgments, backed by varying degrees of quantifiable evidence and proof of cause-effect links between observed behaviour and results. A final element in each assessment estimates the likelihood (“very likely”, “likely”, “uncertain”) of positive change in the organisation under review.

Box 1.2. The United Kingdom's Multilateral Aid Review, 2010-11 (continued)

Assessing focus on poor countries for multilateral organisations that support development objectives



Source: Department for International Development (DFID) (2011), Multilateral Aid Review, DFID, London.

Lessons learned

DAC members and non-members clearly have some lessons to learn from the DFID review. The first is the value for donor countries of setting out clearly and publicly the principles and rationale that underpin their taxpayer-funded support to multilaterals. The second lesson is the importance of explicitly recognising that development and humanitarian objectives are not the only national interest at stake. So, for example, it may be perfectly possible for DFID to place a low value on contributions to a particular agency, while some other UK department may find the same agency important for different reasons. The third lesson is the need to be as transparent as possible – to publish all the empirical evidence so that other donors may repeat or upgrade the exercise with different assumptions or data based on their own priorities.

Nevertheless, concerns have been raised since the review was published, and not just by low-rated agencies who objected to specifics of DFID's assessment. The first concern is that a purely bilateral and value-for-money perspective in such assessments misses out on how multilateral organisations respond to collective international priorities and the public interest of all states, even if DFID did informally canvas some of them for their views.

The review did try to capture some of these global public goods by tracing them through to impact in poor countries. In that way, for example, it came to see the normative role of the World Health Organisation (WHO) as critically important, because its norms are clearly translated into changes in health practices on the ground. However, country-level data may not always have been rich enough to enable the review to adopt such an approach more widely.

The second, and related, concern is that it is unsustainable and inefficient for multiple bilaterals to launch parallel aid reviews. Finally, observers have noted that it is easier to demonstrate impact for organisations with a specific operational mandate at country level than for normative agencies, which the review did in part factor into its assessments.

Decision-making models

The 2010 DAC questionnaire asked member countries to identify which ministries, departments, and agencies were involved in deciding allocations to the 29 different funds and organisations that account for over 90% of all DAC multilateral allocations (see the questionnaire in Annex I.2). There was a 100% response rate to the questionnaire, which yielded a comprehensive view of how the major shareholders and funders of the multilateral system make decisions. Although findings indicate some variations, two broad, albeit contrasting, models emerge – centralised and decentralised. There is with no implicit judgement as to the superiority of one model over the other. Rather, the broad categorisation affords at-a-glance understanding of the range of officials involved in decisions in different member states. DAC complemented the survey results with a case study of France (see Box 1.3).

Centralised model

Nine members adopt a centralised approach to aid allocation, whereby a single ministry, department or agency decides allocations to almost all 29 entities, which range from international financial institutions to global theme-based funds and UN agencies. In Nordic member countries and New Zealand, the body with the decision-making power tends to be the ministry of foreign affairs, while in the UK and Australia it is the international development agency.

Decentralised model

Fourteen members have at least two separate ministries, departments or agencies responsible for deciding allocations to the 29 different entities: they can be considered to have adopted a more decentralised model. In eight countries the decision makers are the finance and foreign affairs branches of government, while in the other six they are the development department/agency and up to three or more ministries, departments or agencies that lead on specific allocations. Co-ordination arrangements among lead ministries and agencies range from formal inter-ministerial bodies that meet regularly to *ad hoc* consultations between civil servants working on similar themes. Although the questionnaire did not include EU Institutions in its question on the aid allocation model, their practices are closer to the decentralised approach. Box 1.3 looks at France’s overall structure and processes for aid allocation.

Box 1.3. France’s allocation of multilateral and bilateral aid

The French government takes a comparatively decentralised approach to implementing its development assistance. The Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry’s (MINEFI) includes expenditure for initiatives that fall under the umbrella programme of “economic and financial aid for development” in the development assistance budget. The Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs (MAEE), for its part, is responsible for the programme of “solidarity towards developing countries.” The Ministry of Interior’s immigration department (MIOMCT) also manages and allocates a smaller development assistance budget. There is no predetermined allocation of bilateral and multilateral aid within ministry budgets and all three allocate both kinds of aid.

Box 1.3. France’s allocation of multilateral and bilateral aid *(continued)*

Although aid is granted in a relatively decentralised manner, the principal allocation decisions are centralised since the ministries prepare their budgets within the ceilings determined by the Prime Minister. The Inter-Ministerial Committee for International Co-operation and Development (CICID) was created in 1998 and is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its cosecretariat meets on a regular basis with representatives from the MAEE, MINEFI and MIOMCT, as well as the French Development Agency (AFD). The AFD is a financial institution and the agency chiefly responsible for allocating France’s bilateral ODA and other development finance to developing countries. The cosecretariat helps steer strategic decisions and monitors the implementation of CICID decisions and the evolution of France’s development assistance.

The decentralised nature of responsibility for implementing ODA – shared by two large ministries for which ODA is only one of many budget lines – is said by some critics to obstruct the effectiveness of French development aid since no one institution is responsible for overseeing the direction and strategy of French development assistance. Nonetheless, an internal ten-year strategy, or *document cadre*, which incorporates the views of civil society and other stakeholders, was approved in 2010. It is too early to tell what impact this strategy will have on the overall coordination of aid, particularly multilateral aid.

Figure 1.3 illustrates the fungibility of competing components within different ministry budgets (for which the envelopes are determined by the Prime Minister according to government priorities). For example, bilateral grants, the large core contributions to the Global Fund and EDF, and contributions to most UN agencies all compete directly for funds from the MAEE budget, but only indirectly with the concessional windows of the development banks managed by the finance ministry. At the same time, there is no direct fungibility between bilateral loans and grants: though mostly implemented by the AFD, they are disbursed by two different ministries, the foreign affairs and finance ministries.

In many ways, France displays a high multilateral profile: it is among the top five donors to the Global Fund, European Development Fund and International Development Association, and a leader in innovative and multilateral financial mechanisms such as the international tax on airline tickets, levied to fund UNITAID (which supports treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis) and the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm).

France’s development assistance programmes

Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEIE) / “Bercy”	Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs (MAEE) / “Quai d’Orsay”	Ministry of Interior (MIOMCT)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral contributions to international financial institutions: IDA, AfDF, AsDF, IFAD, GEF, trust funds • Concessional loans (implemented by AFD) and tied aid. • Global budget support and French Global Environment Fund <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debt relief <p>• Budget: EUR 1.2 billion</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral contributions to Global Fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria, UN agencies, Francophonie • European Development Fund (EDF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bilateral grants (implemented by AFD) <p>• Budget: EUR 2.1 billion</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contributions to AfDB for migration and development • Relocation of migrants to countries of origin • Other bilateral initiatives <p>• Budget: EUR 30 million</p>

Source: The 2010 draft budget as communicated by the French government (figures are indicative).

Allocations to specific multilateral entities

Multilateral aid allocation decisions are made up of a variety of assessed contributions (required as a condition of membership) and discretionary choices. As the survey acknowledges from the outset, some multilateral organisations make contributions a required condition of membership. They include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), multilateral development banks, the EC Budget, and the United Nations Secretariat. Others lock contributions in for a number of years pending the outcomes of replenishment negotiations – e.g. the European Development Fund (EDF), the International Development Association (IDA), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Global Fund. Donors may also fund some multilateral organisations, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), on both assessed and voluntary bases or, as they do for most UN Funds and Programmes, entirely voluntarily.

Although there is often a degree of momentum from past arrangements, conventions, and implicit obligations, there is nonetheless room for discretion in most, if not all, cases. With this in mind, it may make sense to periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if they are “semi-automatic”.

Multilateral development banks

In around one-half of DAC member countries, finance ministries (or equivalents) determine capital subscriptions to and recapitalisations of the non-concessional windows of multilateral development banks – the Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Australia, Belgium, and Canada also involve their development ministries and agencies in such funding decisions. Authority in Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom lies exclusively with the development agency or the ministry whose mandate covers multilateral development banks, while in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden the ministry of foreign affairs decides. In response to the 2007-8 global financial and economic crisis, donors agreed to increase capital subscriptions to the IDB, the AfDB, and the IBRD.

The concessional windows of the development banks and funds – African and Asian Development Funds, IDB Fund for Special Operations, Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), trust funds for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and the World Bank’s IDA – operate on the basis of voluntary contributions, although some guides to burden sharing may be decided in advance. Decision makers in donor governments are the same as those for the non-concessional windows discussed in the previous paragraph.

EU institutions

EU member states negotiate replenishments of the European Development Fund every five years. Ministerial responsibilities vary across the 15 EU countries that are members of DAC. One-third of members lead negotiations from their development, finance and foreign ministries or government departments. In DAC-member EU countries, the share of the EU budget scored as ODA is a notional, or non-discretionary, amount that does not feature as a separate item in budgets. The United Kingdom, however, has reintroduced the ODA-eligible portion of its EU budget into the DFID budget for oversight purposes.

Other multilateral and multi-bi ODA allocations⁵

Table 1.1. details the lead agencies, ministries or departments which, according to findings from the DAC questionnaire, decide allocations to the remaining multilateral agencies or funds. The foreign ministries in DAC member countries are responsible for the budget lines to most multilateral organisations and funds in the table. Within governments, however, there are many examples of dispersed decision making, which complicates co-ordination. Interestingly, when it comes to earmarking funds channelled through multilaterals, the responsibility for allocation may lie with an entirely different ministry than the one responsible for core (un-earmarked) contributions to that organisation or fund.

In Sweden, for example, all multi-bi or non-core multilateral aid is determined by the development agency (SIDA), while in other member countries this type of earmarked funding is usually the responsibility of line ministries dealing with similar sectoral investments. Such a spread of responsibility for funding can lead to situations where there is no oversight of the different types of allocations that government bodies may be making to the same (or similar) organisations and entities. It is, therefore, important for cross-government discussions to take place in a single manageable body at sub-ministerial level to regularly review all contributions to multilateral agencies.

Table 1.1. **Agencies, ministries or departments that lead the allocation decisions made by 22 DAC member countries**

	Foreign	Development	Finance	Health	Agriculture	Environment	Economy	Education	Combination of different Ministries/ Departments
UNDP	14	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNDPKO	18	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
GAVI	9	7	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Global Fund	12	8	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
UNICEF	16	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WHO	6	2	-	9	-	-	-	-	6
FAO	7	3	-	-	9	-	-	-	4
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	6	6	7	-	-	2	-	-	2
Clean Technology Fund	3	3	4	-	-	3	-	-	1
Climate Investment Funds	4	4	4	-	-	2	1	-	1
UN-REDD	5	3	-	-	-	2	-	-	1
Education for All – Fast Track Initiative	7	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
UNESCO	14	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	3
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program	3	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNHCR	16	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WFP	12	7	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	157	91	22	12	11	9	1	4	24

Source: OECD (2010d), *Development Assistance Committee questionnaire on multilateral aid allocations*, December, OECD, Paris.

A special case: the EU

The EU itself is a member of DAC, as are 15 of its member states. It is also an individual donor in its own right with its own development policy and resources. The EU funds its aid from three main sources.

- It finances its budget wholly from its own resources in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – unlike some multilaterals that are fully reliant on contributions by their members. The European Commission proposes and the European Parliament and Council then decide on the Multi-Annual Financial Framework. In a similar exercise to that of bilateral donors, the annual EU budget process determines how much funding from the EU’s own resources is to be granted to development.
- The EDF is financed through extra-budgetary contributions from EU member states. In this way, the EU acts much like a multilateral agency, with member states periodically negotiating replenishments. Development co-operation activities are jointly programmed by European Commission departments and the European External Action Service. Implementation of EDF activities is the responsibility of the European Commission acting as an institution.
- The European Investment Bank (EIB), whose shareholders are the 27 EU member states, is active in about 150 countries outside the EU, where it provides long-term finance in support of EU external co-operation and development objectives. In the regions covered by the so-called “external mandate” of the European Parliament and the European Council, the EIB provides finance primarily under an EU budgetary guarantee that covers risks of a sovereign or political nature, although it also does so at its own risk. The EIB finances work in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) either through its own resources or the EDF’s. It is covered by a specific guarantee from the EU member states.

How donors allocate aid to health

Development assistance for health is characterised by a large number of different types of funders, channels, and decision makers. The DAC aid allocation questionnaire inquired as to the lead government ministry or agency in charge of allocating ODA to the main multilateral organisations and funds for health – namely the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), the Global Fund, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and WHO. However, it is also important to monitor how donors channel aid to sectors. The OECD therefore examined over a three-year period from 2007 to 2009 the ways in which multilateral aid was delivered to six broad health sub-categories.⁶ The “multilateral aid modality” in Table 1.2 was calculated by imputing the different sector codes of each multilateral organisation’s outflows back to donors’ core contributions to the same organisations.

Table 1.2 shows how DAC members deliver aid to health systems and disease-specific interventions. According to OECD-DAC data, the NGO category is not the preferred delivery channel of any DAC donors for any health sub-category. Nonetheless, a recent study into development assistance for health by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) suggests that most private funding goes through NGOs. They are certainly not to be ignored, therefore, in any overview of global health financing.

The volume of bilateral aid for HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases was twice the volume delivered multilaterally. However, if contributions from the United States with its very large bilateral HIV/AIDS programme⁷ are not counted, the multilateral channel is larger (89% of HIV/AIDS multilateral aid was delivered by the Global Fund). The bulk of

Table 1.2. **How DAC member countries deliver health aid by sub-sector**

	3-yr average by modality (USD constant 2009 millions)	3-yr average by modality (%)	Number of donors for which modality is most important
Health systems	4 984		
Bilateral	2 217	44%	15
Bilateral - channelled through Multilaterals	528	11%	0
NGOs	724	15%	0
Multilateral aid	1 515	30%	7
Infectious disease control	1 085		
Bilateral	328	30%	5
Bilateral - channelled through Multilaterals	413	38%	5
NGOs	102	9%	2
Multilateral aid	241	22%	10
Malaria control	945		
Bilateral	92	10%	0
Bilateral - channelled through Multilaterals	44	5%	0
NGOs	140	15%	0
Multilateral aid	669	71%	22
STD & HIV/AIDS	5 938		
Bilateral	3 220	54%	6
Bilateral - channelled through Multilaterals	125	2%	1
NGOs	1 025	17%	0
Multilateral aid	1 567	26%	16
TB control	457		
Bilateral	40	9%	0
Bilateral - channelled through Multilaterals	33	7%	0
NGOs	30	6%	1
Multilateral aid	354	77%	20
Nutrition	244		
Bilateral	65	27%	4
Bilateral - channelled through Multilaterals	66	27%	3
NGOs	47	19%	1
Multilateral aid	66	27%	14
Total Health	13 654		
Bilateral	5 962.3	44%	
Bilateral - channelled through Multilaterals	1 210.9	9%	
Bilateral - channelled through NGOs	1 725.8	13%	
Core funding to NGOs	341.9	3%	
Multilateral aid	4 412.9	32%	

Source: OECD, 2011b.

health assistance was delivered multilaterally for malaria (Global Fund and World Bank) and tuberculosis (Global Fund). Similarly, over 60% of funding for infectious disease control went through the multilateral system – either as earmarked funds channelled through UN agencies or core funding to the EU and the GAVI Alliance.

ODA to health systems – or to national systems of delivering services for disease prevention and treatment and the promotion of physical well-being – is primarily bilateral. Altogether, nearly as much aid (41%) went through multilateral organisations (multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA channelled through multilaterals) as was delivered bilaterally (44%) for the six health sub-categories identified in the report. Thirteen DAC member countries relied more on multilateral organisations and funds to deliver health development assistance than on their own bilateral assistance. They were Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The remaining ten (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) channelled more of their health ODA bilaterally.

Although the findings shown in Table 1.2 offer only a brief overview of health ODA, they could be the basis for future work and a more nuanced understanding of DAC members' allocation decisions.

Conclusion and good practices

There is no ideal or “one-size-fits-all” model for determining aid allocation decisions at national level. The different assessments and priorities assigned to specific multilaterals do not allow either hard-and-fast conclusions or purely scientific comparisons. The aim of throwing donor practices into relief is to explore whether the growing need for visibility and (apparent) control requires joint action across multilaterals and stakeholders both inside and outside DAC. It also suggests that governments may want a transparent multilateral ODA strategy and oversight, at least internally, of which organisations are being funded, in what way, and for what reason, so as to better communicate the advantages (and disadvantages) to enthusiastic (and wary) citizens.

While the overall share of multilateral aid is not increasing, there is growing pressure on the multilateral system to deliver in countries and regions where bilateral donors are exiting or unable to intervene. This pressure will give rise to difficult discussions as to whether organisations, funds, and the whole multilateral aid architecture – created by members, shareholders and contributors – are fit for the purpose of assuming an increasingly complex, broad agenda. Even if stakeholders and contributors extend well beyond OECD membership, the Development Assistance Committee could discuss the design of aid architecture and attempt to agree on best practices from which its members could learn, so capitalising on the momentum created by the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) held in Busan from 29 November to 1st December 2011.

Drawing on members' responses to the 2010 questionnaire and a review of their policies, eight donor good practices are listed below. They are limited to the whys and hows of multilateral aid allocation and ultimately aim to guide better co-ordinated, more transparent decision making within member governments. In addition, past reports and discussions at high- and senior-level DAC meetings have underscored the importance of collective action as a response to the fragmented architecture of global aid. The complexity and diversity of multilateral aid institutions should be viewed primarily from the perspectives of the partner countries they are designed to serve. Does the multilateral aid system as a whole

deliver less than the sum of its parts and is some rationalisation therefore urgent? Or do the benefits of greater choice and variety outweigh the cost? These were some of the questions addressed in the run-up to HLF4.

Eight good practices for multilateral donors

- Articulate, publicise and regularly revisit your specific national case for multilateral contributions.
- Review the balance between your multilateral and bilateral programmes.
- If fixed shares guide spending decisions, ensure they have broad coverage and are evidence-based.
- Make maximum use of joint assessments, independent evaluation findings and third-party analyses.
- State clearly and publicly the indicators and ratings that influence your future multilateral allocations.
- Assess multilateral performance against collective international, as well as national, priorities.
- Periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if semi-automatic.
- Have a dedicated body periodically review all public spending through multilaterals.

Notes

1. Another theory discussed in Lake (2009) suggests that a hegemon chooses multilateralism as a form of self constraint.
2. Special Eurobarometer 352, September 2010.
3. Finland, Germany, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and Spain.
4. This amounted to EUR 650 million in 2010.
5. “Multi-bi” aid, also known as “non-core multilateral” aid, is bilateral aid channelled through non-core contributions to multilateral systems. Box 2.1 supplies a succinct definition of multi-bi aid.
6. Creditor Reporting System (CRS) purpose codes were grouped for the purpose of this exercise as explained in Annex I.3.
7. US President’s Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).

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Chapter 2

General trends in multilateral aid

This chapter addresses recent trends in multilateral aid. The overriding trend is one of decline in aid volumes after the historic high of 2009. The picture in reality is more complex depending on whether aid is earmarked or not and the changing development landscape. The chapter then considers the five big groupings of multilateral organisations that account for the vast majority of aid. The final section discusses non-DAC donor multilateral aid, then concludes.

This chapter gives an update of the overall trends to emerge from the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* (OECD, 2010a). It confirms the continuing decline in the share of multilateral ODA as a percentage of total ODA and how it is concentrated within a few large clusters of organisations. The chapter also paints an up-to-date picture of the total use of the multilateral system and features the multilateral development efforts of two DAC non-members – Brazil and the Russian Federation.

Box 2.1. Multilateral ODA, outflows and non-core multilateral/multi-bi aid

As in the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, a distinction is made between (a) multilateral ODA, measured as the funding to multilateral organisations (*i.e.* inflows); and (b) outflows from those agencies to partner countries.

1. Multilateral ODA is official concessional contributions to multilateral agencies. To be classified as multilateral, a contribution must be made to an institution that:
 - conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development;
 - is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments or a fund managed autonomously by an agency, institution, or organisation;
 - pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets.

Multilateral ODA (also referred to as “core” multilateral ODA to distinguish it from “non-core” multilateral ODA detailed below) comprises assessed contributions – required as a condition of membership – and un-earmarked voluntary, or discretionary, contributions, or any combination thereof.

2. Over 20 multilateral agencies report their outflows to partner countries to the DAC.

Finally, contributions to multilateral organisations that are earmarked at any level – to a specific country, region, sector or theme – are reported as part of donors’ bilateral ODA and identified by channel of delivery. This type of aid is referred to as “non-core multilateral” ODA or “multi-bi” ODA.


Source: OECD (2010c), *DAC Statistical Reporting Directives*, OECD, Paris.

Figure 2.1 shows DAC member countries’ gross ODA over the past two decades during which multilateral aid has steadily declined as a proportion of gross ODA, excluding debt relief (as shown by the top dotted line). If contributions to EU institutions are excluded (the dotted line at the bottom of the graph), the share of multilateral aid in fact declined to 20% in 2009.

Twenty-eight percent (excluding debt relief) of total DAC gross ODA, *i.e.* USD 36 billion, is multilateral. An additional 12% of total ODA is routed through multilateral organisations as earmarked funding. The total is USD 51 billion. Figure 2.2 shows DAC members’ shares of multilateral ODA, while Figure I.1.1 (in Annex I.1) illustrates its volumes.

Figure 2.2 compares shares of multilateral aid in all DAC member countries, both including and excluding contributions to EU institutions, which not all members can make. Since EU member states alone grant multilateral ODA to the EU, comparing and contrasting the share of multilateral aid in DAC members’ gross ODA produces different


Figure 2.1. Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries, 1990-2009



Source: OECD (2011a), DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris.

results depending on whether the share includes or excludes ODA to the EU. For example, multilateral aid – excluding contributions to EU institutions and debt relief – accounts for the highest shares of gross ODA in Korea (29%), Italy (28%), and Sweden (26%), and the lowest in Portugal (12%), the United States (12%), and Greece (11%). In contrast, multilateral aid across DAC member countries that includes ODA accounts for the highest shares of gross ODA in Italy (73%), Austria (54%), and Greece (53%), and the lowest in Japan (19%), Australia (15%), and the United States (12%). While these figures alone do not allow any conclusions to be drawn as to donor preferences, donors on the right-hand side of the graph have larger bilateral programmes in place than those on the left and/or contribute much less to non-EU multilateral development agencies.

Figure 2.2. DAC multilateral ODA as percentage of gross ODA, 2007-09 average (excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD (2011a), DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris.

What is different about multilateral assistance spending

As donor countries continue to face severe budget constraints, they focus even more on value for money. Multilateral organisations receive USD 51 billion in multilateral and bilateral ODA from DAC members, much of which falls under a kaleidoscope of accountability arrangements that very few ordinary citizens, and not many experts, fully comprehend. The *2010 Multilateral Aid Report* highlighted the persistent challenges of communicating to domestic audiences both the ultimate results that multilaterals achieve and the visibility and influence of individual donors' contributions.

The past year has seen rising scrutiny of multilateral aid by bilateral contributors and their legislative bodies, although law makers are sometimes hampered by their lack of first-hand experience of multilateral operations on the ground. While evidence suggests that governments think that multilateral aid allocations could be more effectively spent by their own development organisations, it also points to the public perception of multilateral ODA as less politicised and more removed from the influence of domestic special interests. At the same time, the perceived or actual independence of multilateral aid makes it less attractive to powerful interest groups.

Decisions to allocate bilateral aid are driven by the desire for control over how resources are spent and the need to properly apportion credit or blame. Multilateral aid, on other hand, offers the wider benefits of pooling resources, presence, and expertise. DAC donors' multilateral aid allocation decisions and the evidence they take into consideration are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1.

Historic high in total use of the multilateral system


The “market share” of multilaterals – made up of both earmarked ODA channelled through multilateral organisations (non-core or multi-bi ODA) and core multilateral ODA – increased from 37% (USD 47 billion) in 2007 to 40% (USD 51 billion) in 2009, the highest in recent years. The aggregate volume of USD 51 billion of ODA channelled to and through multilaterals was also a historic high. The underlying reason for this recent surge is the large increase in non-core funding to the multilaterals which host Global Partnerships and Programmes (GPP) and to country-specific, regional, and sector-based trust funds. Figure 2.3 shows core and non-core contributions to multilateral agency groups in 2009. With a few notable exceptions, core multilateral aid has slowly fallen away in the past decade.

Decline in multilateral ODA

Multilateral ODA rose from USD 26.6 billion in 2000 to USD 36.2 billion in 2009 (at 2009 prices and exchange rates). The rise translates into a real average annual growth rate of 3%, compared to the 4% average annual growth in total gross ODA (excluding debt relief). Core multilateral contributions as a share of total ODA fell to a low of 28% in 2009 from a peak of 33% in 2001. If contributions to EU institutions are excluded, the declining share of multilateral aid stands out even more starkly, as shown by the steadily widening gap in Figure 2.4.

The European Union is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a DAC member in its own right and an individual donor, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications. This report seeks to reflect that duality: it reports on the EU both as a multilateral organisation and as a bilateral donor contributing to other multilateral organisations (see Annex I.4).

Figure 2.3. Total use of the multilateral system, gross disbursements in 2009 (excluding EU Institutions as a donor)




Notes: “UN Funds and Programmes” include those funds and programmes for which disaggregated data is available: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNRWA, UNHCR, and the World Food Programme (WFP).

“Other UN” includes all other UN agencies.

Source: OECD (2011a), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris and OECD (2011b), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure 2.4. Gross multilateral ODA provided by DAC member countries as share of total ODA, 1990-2009 (in constant 2009 prices, excluding debt relief)




Source: OECD (2011a), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Funding to EU institutions increased by 11% from 2008 to 2009, a slight increase in what was otherwise a flat overall multilateral share of ODA. Funding to United Nations agencies also rose a little in 2009, returning to 2005 real levels. Core contributions to the World Bank fell slightly below 2008, while contributions to the Global Fund climbed significantly. Other

global funds separately identifiable in DAC statistics include the GEF and the GAVI Alliance. Contributions to these agencies are no longer growing faster than total ODA (although it should be noted that their funding base extends beyond DAC ODA). Figure 2.5 illustrates the funding of the major agencies and agency groupings between 2005 and 2009, while Figure I.1.3 in Annex I.1 shows trends in five-year tranches for the past two decades.

Figure 2.5. Aid from DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals, 2005-09



Source: OECD (2011a), DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Rise in non-core multilateral aid

Bilateral ODA earmarked for a specific purpose, sector, region or country and channelled through multilateral agencies (non-core or multi-bi ODA) increased from USD 13.4 billion in 2008 to 15 billion in 2009 and accounted for 12% of total ODA. As pointed out in the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, which discussed non-core multilateral ODA in detail, some of the increase in non-core ODA was initially attributable to better reporting by members, although the effect diminishes over time. In 2009, close to 70% of funding channelled through multilaterals and attributed to specific countries went to fragile states.

Earmarked funding to multilateral organisations or funds may allow some donors to track results more easily and raising the visibility of their aid effort in the eyes of domestic constituencies. Several members have also decided to concentrate on fewer partner countries. They may therefore be encouraged to use multilaterals as service providers for specific bilateral programmes and to maintain a minimum attributable presence in specific countries or regions, thereby further raising the earmarked share of multilateral transactions. Some DAC member countries have started to refer to this practice as the growing “multilateralisation” of bilateral aid, while multilateral organisations perceive it as a growing “bilateralisation” of multilateral aid (Sagasti, 2005). The *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* considered the advantages and disadvantages of non-core funding through multilaterals. Table 2.1 summarises them from the point of view of partner countries, bilateral donors, and multilateral organisations.

It will be important to monitor in coming years the increase in bilateral and multilateral aid allotted to regions rather than to specific countries, possibly prompted by efforts to concentrate on fewer partner countries. Such monitoring will make a significant contribution to the aid effectiveness debate, particularly as regionally allocated aid is often less predictable at country level.


Table 2.1. Advantages and disadvantages of non-core multilateral aid (multi-bi ODA)

From the perspective of:	Advantages	Disadvantages
Partner country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trust fund steering committee may offer more representative governance arrangements for partner countries than organisation's board. Non-core multilateral aid, especially where it replaces parallel bilateral initiatives, improves co-ordination among donors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trust fund steering committee may offer less representative governance arrangements for partner countries than organisation's board. Blurred lines of accountability in disbursement.
Multilateral organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increases overall resource envelope of the organisation. If multi-donor, preferable to multiple parallel bilateral initiatives. For specific, critical and time-bound purposes, non-core multilateral aid is preferable to the creation of a new organisation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hollows out governance, bypasses board decisions. Increases transaction costs (including reporting). May conflict with the organisation's core policies or strategy.
Bilateral donor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allows for a focus on specific sectors, regions, countries (including fragile states) where multilaterals have more expertise or a stronger presence to complement bilateral programming. Can make contributions more visible. Can circumvent cumbersome board decisions. "Pilot" for setting up stand-alone funds or organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Core contributions from donors may subsidise non-core funds' administrative costs. "Multilateralisation" of bilateral aid.

Source: OECD (2010a), 2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid, OECD, Paris.

Figure 2.6 illustrates the magnitude of the total use of the multilateral system, while Figure I.1.9 (Annex I.1) shows that the non-core component of funding for six United Nations agencies exceeds the core component by a significant margin (United Nations, 2011). Illustrated in Table 2.2 are examples of the types of flows that are earmarked and channelled through the multilateral system, which includes a mix of trust funds, global programmes, and joint programming.

Figure 2.6. Gross ODA disbursements, 2009 (excluding debt relief, contributions from EU Institutions)



2009 Total ODA (excluding debt relief) = 128 bn

Source: OECD (2011a), DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris and OECD (2011b), Creditor Reporting System Database, OECD, Paris.

Table 2.2. Examples of earmarked funding channelled through multilateral organisations

Description	Multilateral channel
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund	World Bank
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	UNOCHA
Clean Technology Fund	World Bank
Congo Basin Forest Fund	African Development Bank
Consolidated appeal for Iraq and the region	UNHCR
DRC Humanitarian Pooled Fund	UNDP
Education For All - Fast Track Initiative	World Bank
Emergency Program in the Horn of Africa	World Food Programme (WFP)
Environment Transformation Fund	World Bank
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	World Bank
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program	World Bank
Jakarta Multidonor Trust Fund	World Bank
Law and Order Trust Fund - Afghanistan	UNDP
Polio eradication	WHO
Spain-ECOWAS	World Bank
Tropical diseases research	WHO
UN-REDD	UNDP
Water and Sanitation Fund	Inter-American Development Bank
Water Financing Facility	Asian Development Bank
West Africa regional market development	World Bank

Note: The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) was added to the list of ODA-eligible multilateral organisations in 2011. Non-earmarked contributions to this fund were, therefore, considered as multilateral ODA beginning in 2010.

Source: OECD (2011a), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Multilateral outflows

Core contributions to multilateral organisations are in turn disbursed to partner countries or regional organisations. These multilateral outflows can be compared to bilateral ODA as a way of getting a sense of the allocation patterns of bilateral and multilateral organisations at country level. The *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* compared the volume of bilateral aid and multilateral outflows with income levels, sectors, regions, and the fragility status of partner countries. In 2009, a higher proportion (40%) of multilateral than bilateral aid was delivered to LDCs (see Figure I.1.5 in Annex I.1) with more multilateral donors considered “significant” donors in the countries where they were present. Similarly, the report underscored the role of multilateral organisations in responding to country demands for crisis-related finance in 2009, when multilateral outflows increased by 19% over the previous year.

According to the *2011 OECD Report on Aid Predictability* (2011c), a modest increase of only 2% in country programmable aid (CPA) is expected up to 2013. The rise is driven primarily by multilateral donors, who account for one-third of CPA but two-thirds of aid increases. These aggregate trends mask the fact that almost two-thirds of countries in all regions (98 out of 152) are projected to receive lower aggregate levels of aid by 2013 (OECD, 2011c). In most cases, the projected decreases can be linked to phase-out decisions

Box 2.2. A definition of country programmable aid (CPA)

Country programmable aid (CPA), also known as “core” aid, is the portion of aid donors programme for individual countries, and over which partner countries could have a significant say. CPA is much closer than ODA to capturing the flows of aid that goes to the partner country, and has been proven in several studies to be a good proxy of aid recorded at country level. CPA was developed in 2007 in close collaboration with DAC members. It is derived on the basis of DAC statistics and was retroactively calculated from 2000 onwards.

Source: OECD website, Country Programmable Aid page, www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_46022758_1_1_1_1,00.html.

by DAC member countries as part of their efforts to concentrate aid on fewer partner countries. Multilateral outflows cannot be expected to mitigate declining ODA, especially if their resource base does not increase significantly.

In the light of allocation priorities, the past trend is expected to continue. The amount of CPA provided by multilaterals to LDCs is expected to increase by 1.6% annually through 2013, while DAC donor countries’ CPA to LDCs is expected to fall slightly (OECD, 2011c). The trend confirms last year’s finding that annual increments of bilateral ODA and multilateral outflows appear to be somewhat negatively correlated and work counter-cyclically.

Multilateral aid heavily concentrated

Data from 2009 confirm that DAC members channel most (81%) of their multilateral aid into five main clusters of multilaterals. They are the EDF-plus-EU Budget (37%), IDA (21%), UN Funds and Programmes (10%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% and 3%), and the Global Fund (6%). Only 18% of multilateral aid goes to the remaining 200 or more multilateral organisations which often provide technical assistance or serve norm- and standard-setting purposes. Tables I.1.2 and I.1.3 (Annex I.1) show the percentages contributed by each DAC member to the big clusters, both including and excluding contributions to the EDF and EU Budget.

Recent multilateral aid reviews reveal what donors already acknowledge today – that there is no single, rigorously scientific method of comparing the effectiveness or efficiency of multilateral organisations. Donors all have their own priorities for allocating aid to multilateral organisations (explored in greater detail in Chapter 1).

Non-DAC donor multilateral aid

Twenty countries that are not members of DAC reported their aid flows to DAC in 2009, although they did not include some of the larger non-members (Brazil, the Russian Federation, China, and India). From 2007-9, the eleven EU states that are not DAC members allocated 66% of their total ODA to multilaterals (including to EU institutions), while the average multilateral share of non-DAC donor states that reported, excluding Arab donors, was 31%. Because Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE reported primarily bilateral aid to DAC, the multilateral share in DAC statistics was not meaningful. Big regional players, such as Brazil and the Russian Federation, allot substantial multilateral aid to regional organisations or funds. It is unlikely that multilateral aid accounts for a high share

of China's and India's ODA: although they increasingly contribute to concessional funds like IDA, they already have strong and rapidly growing bilateral programmes. Recent replenishments of concessional and global funds have relied more and more heavily on contributions from non-DAC donors, which increases the need for obtaining more accurate information on their contributions to multilaterals. Boxes 2.3 and 2.4 discuss how and for what purposes the Russian Federation and Brazil fund multilateral organisations.

Box 2.3. The Russian Federation's multilateral development co-operation

The Russian Federation's policy on multilateral funding, which accounts for 70% of its ODA, is pragmatic: it adopts those multilateral channels that are present and able to deliver on the ground, in particular in the CIS region. An important objective of the Russian Federation's more recent development co-operation is to mitigate the adverse impact of the financial and economic crisis on its close neighbours, with the result that it directs nearly one-half of funds to poor countries in neighbouring regions.

The Russian Federation recently published its development assistance figures in the context of the G8 Deauville Accountability Report. Of the USD 472 million it devoted to development funding in 2010, close to 40% was spent on food security and health investments. Much of this was provided to or through multilateral organisations, including a USD 22 million core contribution to the Global Fund and USD 62 million for food security through earmarked contributions to the WFP, World Bank, and the International Civil Defence Organisation (ICDO). It directed its earmarked food security funding to support for smallholder farmers and to research and innovation to improve food security in the Eurasian region.

In the health sector, the Russian Federation also contributes to the World Bank-WHO Global Malaria Programme to control and eliminate malaria in Africa and CIS countries, and the Advance Market Commitment (AMC) to stimulate the development and manufacturing of affordable pneumococcal vaccines in developing countries. The Russian Federation raised its World Bank IDA16 replenishment commitment by 60% (USD 180 million) to 0.66% of total donor pledges.

Sources: Russian Federation (2011) "2011 Deauville Accountability Report: G8 commitments on health and food security state of delivery and results" (Russian Federation contribution); International Development Association (IDA) (2011), "Additions to IDA Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment: Delivering Development Results", Report from the Executive Directors of the International Development Association to the Board of Governors, World Bank, Washington, DC, February; and discussions with the Russian Ministry of Finance and World Bank.

Box 2.4. Brazil's multilateral development co-operation

A recent study of Brazil's development aid policy (*Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009*) featured data on its support for multilateral development. Brazilian contributions to international organisations reached USD 248 million in 2009, up from USD 189 million in 2005 (at 2009 constant prices and exchange rates). This was a 31% rise over five years and one that was slightly higher than the DAC increase over the same period.

Box 2.4. Brazil's multilateral development co-operation (continued)

Close to one-third (30%) of international development aid goes to Mercosur's structural fund for competition, social cohesion, and institution building (Fundo de Convergência Estrutural e de Fortalecimento Institucional do Mercosul [FOCEM]). FOCEM supports Mercosur members (Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina) according to their levels of development. In addition, Brazil directs close to one-fifth of its multilateral aid to the IDB's concessional window and 1% to the AfDB's concessional window. Regional development banks, the WHO, the Pan-American Health Organisation, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), UNHCR and WFP are the remaining multilateral recipients. Brazil's bilateral aid effort largely consists of knowledge transfer and long-term technical cooperation partnerships.

Since Brazil is a recipient and provider of development aid, its legal framework requires some adjustment to procurement functions and service provision for other developing countries. For this reason, the government often chooses to channel its bilateral contributions through multilateral institutions, primarily the United Nations system. The Ministry of External Relations makes all the government's multilateral allocation decisions, some of which are based on line ministry recommendations, while the Ministry of Planning disburses the funds. Brazil committed 0.38% (over USD 100 million) of the total donor pledges to the World Bank's IDA16 replenishment.

Sources: Cabral and Weinstock (2010), Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (Institute for Applied Economic Research) (2010), *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009* (Brazilian International Development Co-operation), Brasilia, December, and IDA (2011).

The role of non-DAC donors in IDA16 replenishment

Non-DAC members committed over 4% (USD 1.1 billion) of total donor pledges to the sixteenth replenishment of the World Bank's concessional window (IDA) finalised at the end of 2010. Seven new donors pledged to IDA16 and all 52 committed an aggregate USD 26.4 billion (17.6 billion special drawing rights [SDRs]), – a 6% increase over IDA15.

In addition to donor pledges, donor compensation of SDR 3.5 billion (USD 5.3 billion) was previously agreed under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) replenishment. Internal resources – repayments of IDA credits, investment income on IDA's liquidity assets, net income transfers from IBRD and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) – altogether accounted for SDR 11.7 billion (USD 17.6 billion). Such reflows will dramatically increase income for IDA16 (by 75% when expressed in SDR), with a significant contribution from former and current IDA borrowers through accelerated credit repayments from lower-middle-income countries¹ that had previously benefitted from interest-free loans.

Another new development is that borrowing terms are to be made more stringent for blend and gap countries. Such innovations, in addition to the donor pledges, will make it possible for IDA16 to provide a total of SDR 32.8 billion (USD 49.3 billion) to finance projects in the world's poorest countries over the three-year period ending 30th June 2014 – a 20% increase (expressed as SDR) over IDA15.

Table 2.3. Pledges to IDA16 replenishment by non-DAC members

	Share	SDR million	USD million
Cyprus	0.03%	4	7
Czech Republic	0.07%	12	18
Estonia	0.02%	3	4
Hungary	0.08%	13	20
Latvia	0.01%	2	3
Lithuania	0.01%	2	3
Poland	0.04%	7	10
Slovak Republic	0.01%	2	3
Slovenia	0.03%	6	9
EU non-DAC total	0.30%	52	78
Argentina	0.26%	45	68
Bahamas, The	0.01%	3	4
Barbados	0.00%	0	1
Brazil	0.38%	67	100
Chile	0.13%	23	34
China	0.61%	107	161
Egypt	0.01%	2	2
Iceland	0.04%	7	10
Iran, Islamic Republic of	0.07%	12	18
Israel	0.09%	16	25
Kazakhstan	0.01%	2	3
Kuwait	0.29%	52	78
Mexico	0.38%	66	99
Peru	0.06%	10	16
Philippines	0.04%	8	11
Russia	0.66%	116	174
Saudi Arabia	0.42%	74	111
Singapore	0.19%	33	49
South Africa	0.13%	23	35
Turkey	0.07%	13	20
Total non-DAC pledges	4.15%	729	1 096
Total DAC donor pledges	95.85%	16 832	25 287
Total (DAC + non-DAC) donor pledges	100.00%	17 561	26 383

Source: World Bank (2011), "Additions to IDA Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment: Delivering Development Results", Report from the Executive Directors of the International Development Association to the Board of Governors, World Bank, Washington, DC, February.

Main findings for trends in multilateral aid

- Total use of the multilateral system (multilateral ODA plus earmarked funding channelled through multilaterals) reached a historic high in 2009 at USD 51 billion.
- The share of core multilateral ODA has maintained its downward trajectory for the past decade if contributions to EU institutions are excluded. Contributions to the Global Fund increased, however, and funding to UN agencies regained 2005’s modest levels. Funding to EU institutions increased by 11% from 2008 to 2009.
- Bilateral ODA channelled through multilaterals and earmarked for a specific purpose, sector, region or country grew from USD 13.4 billion in 2008 to USD 15 billion in 2009 to account for 12% of total ODA. It is still growing.
- As donors cut budgets and decide to concentrate on fewer partner countries, there are incentives for the “bilateralisation” of multilateral contributions to maintain at least a presence a specific country, region, or thematic area. Some DAC members refer to this as the growing “multilateralisation” of bilateral aid.
- Future spending surveys point to declining amounts of country-programmable aid to most developing countries, particularly vulnerable groups such as LDCs, in the next three years. Multilateral outflows cannot be expected to mitigate declining ODA, especially if their resource base does not increase significantly.
- DAC members continue to channel over 80% of their multilateral ODA into just five organisations or clusters: IDA, EU, UN Funds and Programmes, African and Asian Development Banks, and the Global Fund.
- Non-DAC EU donors direct a high share of their aid to EU institutions, while larger regional players such as Brazil and the Russian Federation allot substantial multilateral aid to regional organisations or funds. China and India contribute lower shares of multilateral aid, usually preferring to use bilateral channels. China and other middle-income countries, however, played a key funding role in IDA16 replenishment by accelerating repayments of concessional loans, for example, and agreeing to tougher terms for future loans.

Notes

1. Albania, China, Arab Republic of Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and St. Kitts and Nevis. China made an additional voluntary prepayment of USD 1 billion in outstanding IDA credits.

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Annex I


Multilateral Aid

Annex I.1	Statistical overview of bilateral and multilateral ODA
Annex I.2	DAC 2010 Multilateral Aid Questionnaire
Annex I.3	Delivering multilateral aid in the health sector
Annex I.4	Core and non-core multilateral ODA

Annex I.1


Statistical overview of bilateral and multilateral ODA

Figure I.1.1. Gross multilateral ODA of DAC countries (3-year average, 2007-09)




Source: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2011.

Figure I.1.2. Total use of the multilateral system (2007-09 average)



Source: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics (2011) and Creditor Reporting System (2010).

Figure I.1.3. Average aid provided by DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals over five-year periods



Notes:

Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

The first contributions to GAVI and the Global Fund were made in 2002, so in the period 2000-2004, this is the 3-year rather than 5-year average.

"Other multilaterals" include GEF, Montreal Protocol, the IMF and residual multilateral ODA.

Source: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2011.

Table I.1.1. **Non-DAC members ODA, 2007-09**
(in 2009 USD million)

Non-DAC Donor	Total ODA	Multilateral ODA	Multilateral as share of gross ODA (%)
Cyprus*	39	17	44
Czech Republic	209	115	55
Estonia	19	15	79
Hungary	109	83	76
Latvia	20	17	87
Lithuania	44	28	65
Malta**	5	2	45
Poland	376	259	69
Romania**	92	72	78
Slovak Republic	78	49	62
Slovenia	64	39	61
EU 11 total	1 055	696	66
Chinese Taipei	454	19	4
Iceland	44	11	25
Israel***	124	17	14
Korea****	804	235	29
Liechtenstein	23	3	14
Thailand	95	8	8
Turkey	697	48	7
Non-DAC (excl. Kuwait, Saudi, UAE)	3 295	1 036	31
Kuwait	560	1	0
Saudi Arabia	3 325	85	3
United Arab Emirates	597	-	-

Notes:

* Footnote by the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document under the heading “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus” issue.


** Malta started reporting to the DAC in 2009 and Romania in 2008. Therefore, the data above includes no more than one or two years of reporting.

*** The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. Korea acceded to the DAC on 25 November 2009.

The Republic of Korea is included here since it also includes aid flows prior to 2009.


Source: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2011.

Figure I.1.4. Distribution of aid by sector




Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Figure I.1.5. Distribution of aid by partner country income




Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Figure I.1.6. Distribution of aid by region



Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Figure I.1.7. Distribution of aid by conflict/fragility status



Note: The allocations on the basis of conflict and fragility are based only on aid allocated by country.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Table I.1.2. **DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five year period 2005-09**
(constant 2009 USD million)

	Multilateral ODA 2005-2009	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA	EU budget + EDF	IDA	UN Funds and Programmes*	Global Fund	AfDB	AsDB	% allocated to six largest multilateral clusters
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>			15	23	23	22	18	22	
Non-EU members	45 562	28%		34%	13%	10%	6%	7%	71%
Australia	1 790	1%		41%	8%	5%	-	16%	69%
Canada	5 326	3%		28%	12%	11%	11%	6%	69%
Japan	16 553	10%		38%	10%	5%	5%	13%	71%
New Zealand	322	0%		15%	28%	0%	-	9%	53%
Norway	4 331	3%		15%	42%	5%	9%	1%	72%
Switzerland	2 465	2%		41%	21%	1%	11%	3%	77%
United States	14 778	9%		34%	8%	20%	5%	4%	70%
EU members	116 440	71%	51%	16%	8%	5%	4%	1%	86%
Austria	2 489	2%	57%	23%	3%	-	8%	2%	92%
Belgium	4 277	3%	56%	21%	5%	2%	4%	1%	89%
Denmark	4 641	3%	29%	11%	26%	3%	4%	1%	73%
Finland	2 187	1%	44%	11%	21%	0%	6%	1%	83%
France	21 800	13%	55%	12%	2%	8%	4%	1%	83%
Germany	21 346	13%	62%	19%	2%	4%	4%	1%	92%
Greece	1 464	1%	78%	10%	1%	0%	-	-	89%
Ireland	1 711	1%	40%	15%	21%	4%	-	3%	83%
Italy	13 712	8%	60%	12%	3%	6%	3%	1%	86%
Luxembourg	601	0%	27%	9%	18%	2%	-	7%	63%
Netherlands	8 049	5%	35%	10%	24%	5%	3%	1%	79%
Portugal	1 091	1%	71%	8%	2%	1%	6%	3%	91%
Spain	9 473	6%	55%	14%	6%	4%	4%	2%	84%
Sweden	6 612	4%	21%	19%	30%	5%	7%	1%	83%
United Kingdom	16 987	10%	47%	24%	7%	4%	4%	1%	88%
DAC Total	162 002	99%	37%	21%	10%	6%	5%	3%	81%
Korea	980	1%		31%	4%	0%	6%	16%	58%


Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Table I.1.3. **DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five year period 2005-09, not including contributions to the EDF and EU budget**
(constant 2009 USD million)

	Multilateral ODA, excluding to EU budget + EDF 2005-2009	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA, excluding to EU budget + EDF	IDA	UN Funds and Programmes*	Global Fund	AIIB	AsDB	% allocated to five largest multilateral agencies, excluding to the EU
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>			23	23	22	18	22	
Non-EU members	45 562	44%	34%	13%	10%	6%	7%	71%
Australia	1 790	2%	41%	8%	5%	-	16%	69%
Canada	5 326	5%	28%	12%	11%	11%	6%	69%
Japan	16 553	16%	38%	10%	5%	5%	13%	71%
New Zealand	322	0%	15%	28%	0%	-	9%	53%
Norway	4 331	4%	15%	42%	5%	9%	1%	72%
Switzerland	2 465	2%	41%	21%	1%	11%	3%	77%
United States	14 778	14%	34%	8%	20%	5%	4%	70%
EU members	56 566	55%	33%	17%	10%	9%	3%	70%
Austria	1 066	1%	53%	8%	-	18%	4%	82%
Belgium	1 880	2%	47%	11%	4%	9%	3%	74%
Denmark	3 318	3%	15%	37%	4%	5%	1%	63%
Finland	1 233	1%	20%	37%	0%	11%	2%	71%
France	9 722	9%	27%	4%	18%	10%	2%	62%
Germany	8 075	8%	49%	5%	11%	10%	3%	79%
Greece	319	0%	45%	4%	0%	-	-	49%
Ireland	1 026	1%	25%	35%	7%	-	5%	72%
Italy	5 459	5%	31%	8%	15%	8%	2%	64%
Luxembourg	441	0%	12%	25%	3%	-	9%	49%
Netherlands	5 262	5%	16%	36%	8%	5%	2%	67%
Portugal	319	0%	28%	7%	4%	22%	10%	71%
Spain	4 289	4%	30%	14%	8%	10%	4%	66%
Sweden	5 231	5%	24%	37%	7%	9%	1%	79%
United Kingdom	8 926	9%	45%	13%	8%	9%	3%	77%
DAC Total	102 128	99%	33%	15%	10%	7%	5%	71%
Korea	980	1%	31%	4%	0%	6%	16%	58%

Source: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2011.

Figure I.1.8. Multilateral ODA allocations (1990-2009) grouped by five-year averages

*Notes:*

* Only six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** The first contributions to GAVI and the Global Fund were in 2002, so the 2000-04 figure is a three-year rather than five-year average.

Source: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2011.


Table I.I.4. **DAC Gross multilateral ODA: three-year annual average (2007-09) disbursements**
(in 2009 USD million)

DAC country	EU Institutions	The World Bank Group	UN Funds and Programmes	Other UN	Regional Dev. Banks	The Global Fund	Other multilateral agencies	Multilateral ODA, total
Australia	-	160	35	49	54	16	65	378
Austria	295	131	17	25	50	-	17	536
Belgium	534	183	48	44	50	19	41	919
Canada	-	331	118	93	287	75	117	1 022
Denmark	262	150	230	99	55	31	113	939
Finland	202	49	91	40	43	-	34	458
France	2 539	577	95	163	227	416	590	4 607
Germany	2 733	1 095	93	218	244	228	163	4 773
Greece	251	29	2	12	15	-	11	320
Ireland	145	37	80	30	12	23	19	345
Italy	1 716	339	95	213	127	190	83	2 762
Japan	-	998	174	509	653	209	363	2 906
Luxembourg	37	20	27	35	6	3	7	136
Netherlands	592	239	392	173	86	93	92	1 666
New Zealand	-	11	21	15	6	-	18	71
Norway	-	131	331	138	89	56	107	853
Portugal	164	20	4	8	22	3	7	228
Spain	1 073	325	143	149	140	81	91	2 001
Sweden	307	311	394	149	128	77	56	1 423
Switzerland	-	213	107	49	64	7	73	511
United Kingdom	1 824	887	230	222	233	141	134	3 669
United States	-	1 066	233	509	257	690	469	3 224
Total DAC	12 671	7 222	2 953	2 904	2 774	2 359	2 658	33 541
Korea ^a	-	77	8	37	75	-	13	211
<i>Share of total multilateral ODA (%)</i>	38	22	9	9	8	7	8	100

a. Korea made its first contribution to the Global Fund in 2009, so this amount is not a 3-year average.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2011.

Figure I.1.9. **Core and non-core contributions**
(in 2009 USD millions)



Source: United Nations (2011), “Analysis of funding for operational activities for development of the United Nations system for 2009”, Report of the Secretary General, General Assembly Economic and Social Council, New York City, p. 19.

Annex I.2

DAC 2010 Multilateral Aid Questionnaire

Questionnaire for DAC members

One of the conclusions of the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* was that the next report should present updated information on how each member country allocates and manages its multilateral aid. Accordingly, DAC produced a questionnaire that it sent to member countries at the end of 2010.

Purpose

How do DAC member countries make aid allocation decisions – first, between bilateral and multilateral aid and, second, among multilateral organisations? In addition, in what contexts do decision-making processes take place and how much leeway do policy makers enjoy in deciding overall development assistance? The questionnaire was intended to help answer those questions. It is also hoped officials will be able to review and amend certain paragraphs on aid allocation that it collected for its 2008 and 2010 multilateral aid reports (see attached paragraph/s).

Managing multilateral aid

Some contributions to multilateral organisations are required (assessed) as conditions of membership. (The IMF, IBRD, regional development banks, the EC Budget, and the UN Secretariat are among those that make such a requirement). Others are locked in for a number of years pending the outcomes of negotiated replenishments (*e.g.* EDF, IDA, GEF, and the Global Fund), while others still, such as WHO and UNEP, operate on both assessed and voluntary bases. Finally, donors allocate some multilateral aid contributions completely voluntarily (*e.g.* UN Funds and Programmes), re-assessing their contributions on an annual basis.

The questionnaire consists of the following four questions. In addition, the country annexes from the *2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* and, where applicable, updates to the *2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, are attached to this survey as complements to your answers below. Please take a few minutes to review and edit those sections as necessary.

1. (A) Is the balance between total bilateral and total multilateral aid allocations explicitly discussed within your government?

(B) If yes, in what forum/committee does this take place and how frequently?

2. Are there any limits or restrictions (legal or discretionary) on either (a) the overall share or amount of multilateral ODA, or (b) contributions to specific multilaterals or categories of multilaterals (e.g. UN agencies)?

3. (A) What information or evidence does your government use to inform and determine multilateral aid allocations across multilateral agencies?

(B) If your country is a MOPAN member, how do (or will) results from the Common Approach impact your multilateral aid allocation processes?

4. Which ministry, department or agency has the final say on the level of core contributions to the multilateral organisations listed in the table showing bodies that decide multilateral ODA allocations.

Table I.2.1. **Bodies that decide multilateral ODA allocations**

	Ministry/Department/Agency responsible for ODA allocation		Ministry/Department/Agency responsible for ODA allocation
African Development Bank (AfDB)		FAO	
African Development Fund (AfDF)		UNDP	
Asian Development Bank (AsDB)		UNESCO	
Asian Development Bank Special Funds		UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)	
IBRD		United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	
International Development Association (IDA) – World Bank		UNHCR	
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)		UNICEF	
IDB Fund for Special Operations		World Food Programme (WFP)	
International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD)		World Health Organisation (WHO)	
IMF		Global Environment Facility (GEF)	
GAVI		Education for All – Fast Track Initiative	
Global Fund		Clean Technology Fund	
		Climate Investment Funds (World Bank)	
EC – Budget		The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)	
European Development Fund (EDF)		UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD)	

Annex I.3

Delivering multilateral aid in the health sector

The six broad health subcategories in Table I.3.1 were those identified by the OECD as part of a three-year project – from 2007 to 2009 – to monitor and examine how donors deliver multilateral aid in the health sector.

Table I.3.1. **Broad health groupings by different health purpose code**

Purposecode	Broad grouping	Description	Clarifications/Additional notes on coverage
12110	Health systems	Health policy and administrative management	Health sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to health ministries, public health administration; institution capacity building and advice; medical insurance programmes; unspecified health activities.
12181	Health systems	Medical education/training	Medical education and training for tertiary level services.
12182	Health systems	Medical research	General medical research (excluding basic health research).
12191	Health systems	Medical services	Laboratories, specialised clinics and hospitals (including equipment and supplies); ambulances; dental services; mental health care; medical rehabilitation; control of non-infectious diseases; drug and substance abuse control [excluding narcotics traffic control (16063)].
12220	Health systems	Basic health care	Basic and primary health care programmes; paramedical and nursing care programmes; supply of drugs, medicines and vaccines related to basic health care.
12230	Health systems	Basic health infrastructure	District-level hospitals, clinics and dispensaries and related medical equipment; excluding specialised hospitals and clinics (12191).
12240	Nutrition	Basic nutrition	Direct feeding programmes (maternal feeding, breastfeeding and weaning foods, child feeding, school feeding); determination of micro-nutrient deficiencies; provision of vitamin A, iodine, iron etc.; monitoring of nutritional status; nutrition and food hygiene education; household food security.
12250	Infectious disease control	Infectious disease control	Immunisation; prevention and control of infectious and parasite diseases, except malaria (12262), tuberculosis (12263), HIV/AIDS and other STDs (13040). It includes diarrheal diseases, vector-borne diseases (e.g. river blindness and guinea worm), viral diseases, mycosis, helminthiasis, zoonosis, diseases by other bacteria and viruses, pediculosis, etc.
12261	Health systems	Health education	Information, education and training of the population for improving health knowledge and practices; public health and awareness campaigns; promotion of improved personal hygiene practices, including use of sanitation facilities and handwashing with soap.
12262	Malaria control	Malaria control	Prevention and control of malaria.
12263	TB control	Tuberculosis control	Immunisation, prevention and control of tuberculosis.
12281	Health systems	Health personnel development	Training of health staff for basic health care services.
13010	Health systems	Population policy and administrative management	Population/development policies; census work, vital registration; migration data; demographic research/analysis; reproductive health research; unspecified population activities.

Purposecode	Broad grouping	Description	Clarifications/Additional notes on coverage
13020	Health systems	Reproductive health care	Promotion of reproductive health; prenatal and postnatal care including delivery; prevention and treatment of infertility; prevention and management of consequences of abortion; safe motherhood activities.
13040	STD & HIV/AIDS	STD control including HIV/AIDS	All activities related to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS control e.g. information, education and communication; testing; prevention; treatment, care.
13081	Health systems	Personnel development for population and reproductive health	Education and training of health staff for population and reproductive health care services.

Note: CRS purpose code 13030 (“family planning”) was not used in the exercise since only one multilateral agency identified and reported outflows in this category from 2006 to 2009.

Annex I.4

Core and non-core multilateral ODA

Table I.4.1. **2009 DAC gross multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA disbursements**
(USD million in constant 2009 prices, excluding debt relief)

Donor	Total bilateral ODA	of which channelled through multilateral agencies (non-core)	Total multilateral ODA	Total use of the multilateral system	Core multilateral as share of total ODA (%)	Core and non-core as share of total ODA (%)	Core as share of total use of the multilateral system
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(B+C)	(C/(A+C))	((B+C)/(A+C))	(C/(B+C))
Australia	2 309	542	450	992	16	36	45
Austria	461	75	635	709	58	65	89
Belgium	1 555	203	1 025	1 228	40	48	83
Canada	3 134	997	859	1 856	22	46	46
Denmark	1 906	106	904	1 011	32	36	89
Finland	791	222	499	721	39	56	69
France	6 690	49	5 525	5 574	45	46	99
Germany	8 208	417	4 983	5 400	38	41	92
Greece	297	14	310	324	51	53	96
Ireland	693	141	313	454	31	45	69
Italy	875	134	2 423	2 557	73	78	95
Japan	13 042	713	3 290	4 004	20	25	82
Korea	616	50	235	285	28	33	83
Luxembourg	266	48	149	196	36	47	76
Netherlands	4 913	957	1 628	2 585	25	40	63
New Zealand	226	23	83	106	27	34	79
Norway	3 152	977	918	1 895	23	47	48
Portugal	310	50	236	286	43	52	83
Spain	4 724	1 345	2 111	3 456	31	51	61
Sweden	2 993	838	1 539	2 378	34	52	65
Switzerland	1 598	246	559	806	26	37	69
United Kingdom	7 556	2 491	3 891	6 382	34	56	61
United States	25 736	4 345	3 667	8 012	12	27	46
Total	92 052	14 983	36 232	51 215	28	40	71
EU Institutions	12 863	2 498	422.2	2 920	3	22	14

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Methodology Note: The following pages include members' core and non-core multilateral ODA contributions as DAC members report them to the OECD. Data on non-core multilateral aid are taken from the Creditor Reporting System Database. Non-core multilateral aid is reported as bilateral ODA, with a multilateral agency identified in the channel code. It is impossible to compare and contrast core and non-core multilateral ODA contributions to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) since DAC statistics do not separately identify core contributions to this UN Office.

Australia

Table I.4.2. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-Core
World Bank Group	190	184
UN Funds and Programmes*	53	215
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	16	33
WFP	-	95
UNICEF	15	55
UNFPA	5	9
UNHCR	12	19
UNRWA	4	4
Other UN	63	63
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	4	9
IFAD	-	-
ILO	4	1
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	4	1
UN	6	-
UNOCHA	n/a	11
WHO	18	22
Regional Development Banks	45	35
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	45	35
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	100	45
Total	450	542

Figure I.4.1. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.3. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2009 USD million)

	Australia	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	128	24%
Country/region specific	414	76%
- of which regional allocations	2	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	43	10%
North of Sahara	0.02	0.01%
Africa, regional multi-country	1	0.34%
Middle East	45	11%
Far East Asia	142	34%
South & Central Asia	111	27%
Asia, regional multi-country	0.31	0.08%
Oceania	70	17%
South America	0.02	0.00%
North & Central America	0.02	0.00%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	0.16	0.04%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	8	1%
Developmental Food Aid	16	3%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	31	6%
Education	33	6%
Environment	25	5%
General Budget Support	16	3%
Government and Civil Society	60	11%
Health	51	9%
Humanitarian Aid	165	30%
Multi-sector	57	11%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	25	5%
Other Social infrastructure	11	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	14	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	26	5%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	3	0.51%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	177	43%
Other	235	57%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Austria

Table I.4.4. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	327	6
World Bank Group	159	26
UN Funds and Programmes*	15	12
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	9	2
WFP	0.37	2
UNICEF	2	1
UNFPA	2	1
UNHCR	1	1
UNRWA	1	5
Other UN	21	9
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	4
IFAD	-	-
ILO	2	-
OHCHR	0.09	0.28
UNDPKO	3	-
UNECE	0.04	-
UNESCO	1	0.09
UN	3	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	3	0.28
Regional Development Banks	102	13
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	92	0.33
Asian Development Bank	9	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	11	8
Total	635	75

Figure I.4.2. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.5. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Austria	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	15	20%
Country/region specific	60	80%
- of which regional allocations	3	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	12	20%
North of Sahara	0.24	0.40%
Africa, regional multi-country	1	1%
Middle East	7	11%
Far East Asia	-	-
South & Central Asia	5	8%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	1%
Oceania	-	-
South America	-	-
North & Central America	4	8%
America, regional multi-country	2	3%
Europe	28	47%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	5	6%
Developmental Food Aid	4	5%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	25	33%
Education	0.09	0.12%
Environment	1	1%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	8	11%
Health	1	1%
Humanitarian Aid	9	12%
Multi-sector	11	14%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	5	6%
Other Social infrastructure	1	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	2	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	4	5%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	-
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	13	23%
Other	44	77%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Belgium

Table I.4.6. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	591	-
World Bank Group	156	38
UN Funds and Programmes*	75	89
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	27	23
WFP	1	36
UNICEF	26	14
UNFPA	6	0.23
UNHCR	12	11
UNRWA	2	5
Other UN	67	52
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	3	18
IFAD	9	7
ILO	3	5
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	4	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	2	5
UN	4	-
UNOCHA	n/a	2
WHO	11	5
Regional Development Banks	66	4
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	37	-
Asian Development Bank	28	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	71	20
Total	1 024	203

Figure I.4.3. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.7. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2009 USD million)

	Belgium	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	19	9%
Country/region specific	184	91%
- of which regional allocations	7	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	145	78%
North of Sahara	0.25	0.14%
Africa, regional multi-country	4	2%
Middle East	10	6%
Far East Asia	3	2%
South & Central Asia	16	9%
Asia, regional multi-country	3	2%
Oceania	-	-
South America	1	0%
North & Central America	0.33	0.18%
America, regional multi-country	0.35	0.19%
Europe	2	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	16	8%
Developmental Food Aid	0.47	0.23%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	11	5%
Education	34	17%
Environment	3	1%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	20	10%
Health	3	2%
Humanitarian Aid	85	42%
Multi-sector	12	6%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	2	1%
Other Social infrastructure	9	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	8	4%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0.09	0.04%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0.00	0.00%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	131	74%
Other	46	26%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Canada

Table I.4.8. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	40	238
UN Funds and Programmes*	102	483
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	44	90
WFP	17	205
UNICEF	16	109
UNFPA	13	12
UNHCR	12	36
UNRWA	-	18
Other UN	108	117
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	8	3
IFAD	-	0.2
ILO	2	2
OHCHR	4	-
UNDPKO	10	2
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	3	0.03
UN	12	1
UNOCHA	n/a	7
WHO	20	63
Regional Development Banks	363	46
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	205	6
Asian Development Bank	65	19
Inter-American Development Bank	72	-
Other multilaterals	246	111
Total	859	997

Figure I.4.4. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.9. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Australia	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	128	24%
Country/region specific	414	76%
- of which regional allocations	2	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	43	10%
North of Sahara	0.02	0.01%
Africa, regional multi-country	1	0.34%
Middle East	45	11%
Far East Asia	142	34%
South & Central Asia	111	27%
Asia, regional multi-country	0.31	0.08%
Oceania	70	17%
South America	0.02	0.00%
North & Central America	0.02	0.00%
America, regional multi-country	-	0%
Europe	0.16	0.04%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	8	1%
Developmental Food Aid	16	3%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	31	6%
Education	33	6%
Environment	25	5%
General Budget Support	16	3%
Government and Civil Society	60	11%
Health	51	9%
Humanitarian Aid	165	30%
Multi-sector	57	11%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	25	5%
Other Social Infrastructure	11	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	14	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	26	5%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	3	0.51%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	177	43%
Other	235	57%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Denmark

Table I.4.10. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	271	1
World Bank Group	126	16
UN Funds and Programmes*	216	58
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	62	6
WFP	36	5
UNICEF	37	19
UNFPA	43	-
UNHCR	24	19
UNRWA	13	7
Other UN	66	30
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	1
IFAD	4	-
ILO	0.40	6
OHCHR	2	-
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	0.14
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	14
WHO	3	-
Regional Development Banks	34	-
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	29	-
Asian Development Bank	5	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	192	1
Total	904	106

Figure I.4.5. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.11. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Denmark	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	24	23%
Country/region specific	82	77%
- of which regional allocations	17	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	43	52%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	17	20%
Middle East	10	12%
Far East Asia	0	0.15%
South & Central Asia	11	14%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	-
Oceania	-	-
South America	0.10	0.13%
North & Central America	-	-
America, regional multi-country	0.28	0.34%
Europe	1	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	2	2%
Developmental Food Aid	16	15%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	0.47	0.44%
Education	8	7%
Environment	22	21%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	6	5%
Health	4	4%
Humanitarian Aid	43	40%
Multi-sector	1	1%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	3	3%
Other Social infrastructure	1	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	-
Water Supply and Sanitation	0.10	0.10%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	-
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	60	93%
Other	5	7%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

European Union Institutions

Table I.4.12. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	-	383
UN Funds and Programmes*	92	1 104
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	-	391
WFP	-	308
UNICEF	-	124
UNFPA	-	7
UNHCR	-	118
UNRWA	92	122
Other UN	37	515
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	1	262
IFAD	33	40
ILO	-	20
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	0,06
UNESCO	-	9
UN	-	20
UNOCHA	n/a	16
WHO	-	41
Regional Development Banks	15	112
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	-	19
Asian Development Bank	-	23
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	279	201
Total	422	2 498

Figure I.4.6. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.13. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	EU Institutions	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	394	16%
Country/region specific	2 104	84%
- of which regional allocations	34	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	905	43%
North of Sahara	80	4%
Africa, regional multi-country	26	1%
Middle East	202	10%
Far East Asia	133	6%
South & Central Asia	407	19%
Asia, regional multi-country	8	0.38%
Oceania	5	0.25%
South America	38	2%
North & Central America	80	4%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	220	10%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	353	14%
Developmental Food Aid	283	11%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	144	6%
Education	47	2%
Environment	43	2%
General Budget Support	2	0.07%
Government and Civil Society	484	19%
Health	83	3%
Humanitarian Aid	664	27%
Multi-sector	130	5%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	104	4%
Other Social infrastructure	88	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	11	0.44%
Water Supply and Sanitation	60	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	2	0.06%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	966	47%
Other	1 103	53%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Finland

Table I.4.14. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	216	28
World Bank Group	61	33
UN Funds and Programmes*	103	62
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	26	10
WFP	8	18
UNICEF	23	8
UNFPA	29	3
UNHCR	10	16
UNRWA	6	3
Other UN	42	71
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	8
IFAD	4	1
ILO	0.31	-
OHCHR	-	1
UNDPKO	2	10
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	3
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	8
WHO	2	12
Regional Development Banks	48	7
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	41	-
Asian Development Bank	7	4
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	29	21
Total	499	222

Figure I.4.7. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.15. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Finland	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	73	33%
Country/region specific	150	67%
- of which regional allocations	27	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	45	30%
North of Sahara	1	1%
Africa, regional multi-country	18	12%
Middle East	13	9%
Far East Asia	12	8%
South & Central Asia	34	23%
Asia, regional multi-country	9	6%
Oceania	-	-
South America	2	1%
North & Central America	2	1%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	14	9%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	5	2%
Developmental Food Aid	-	-
Economic Infrastructure and Services	11	5%
Education	3	2%
Environment	8	4%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	61	28%
Health	6	3%
Humanitarian Aid	70	32%
Multi-sector	25	11%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	20	9%
Other Social infrastructure	6	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	2	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	5	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0,07	0,03%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	69	57%
Other	53	43%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

France

Table I.4.16. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-Core
EU institutions	2 900	3
World Bank Group	632	10
UN Funds and Programmes*	83	27
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	36	4
WFP	-	17
UNICEF	14	1
UNFPA	3	-
UNHCR	22	2
UNRWA	8	3
Other UN	179	4
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	16	-
IFAD	11	-
ILO	14	4
OHCHR	2	-
UNDPKO	32	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	14	-
UN	19	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	27	0.13
Regional Development Banks	216	4
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	180	4
Asian Development Bank	34	-
Inter-American Development Bank	2	-
Other multilaterals	1 515	1
Total	5 526	49

Figure I.4.8. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.17. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	France	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	1	1%
Country/region specific	48	99%
- of which regional allocations	6	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	18	37%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	6	12%
Middle East	10	22%
Far East Asia	1	2%
South & Central Asia	8	17%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	-
Oceania	-	-
South America	-	-
North & Central America	1	3%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	3	7%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	2%
Developmental Food Aid	30	62%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	5	10%
Education	-	-
Environment	-	-
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	5	11%
Health	-	-
Humanitarian Aid	2	5%
Multi-sector	-	-
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	1	2%
Other Social infrastructure	4	8%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	-
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	-
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	-
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	33	78%
Other	10	22%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Germany

Table I.4.18. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-Core
EU institutions	2 891	14
World Bank Group	1 030	50
UN Funds and Programmes*	95	154
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	38	46
WFP	-	89
UNICEF	9	1
UNFPA	25	3
UNHCR	11	6
UNRWA	11	2
Other UN	263	65
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	22	13
IFAD	33	-
ILO	19	7
OHCHR	4	1
UNDPKO	26	-
UNECE	0.43	0.09
UNESCO	18	1
UN	26	2
UNOCHA	n/a	21
WHO	53	5
Regional Development Banks	278	1
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	217	-
Asian Development Bank	53	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	426	133
Total	4 983	417

Figure I.4.9. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.19. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2009 USD million)

	Germany	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	136	33%
Country/region specific	281	67%
- of which regional allocations	10	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	78	28%
North of Sahara	15	5%
Africa, regional multi-country	10	4%
Middle East	27	10%
Far East Asia	13	5%
South & Central Asia	121	43%
Asia, regional multi-country	0.27	0.09%
Oceania	-	-
South America	2	1%
North & Central America	3	1%
America, regional multi-country	0.07	0.02%
Europe	12	4%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	35	8%
Developmental Food Aid	33	8%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	23	6%
Education	9	2%
Environment	19	5%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	126	30%
Health	7	2%
Humanitarian Aid	134	32%
Multi-sector	7	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	6	2%
Other Social infrastructure	8	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	7	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	1	0.17%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	-
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	182	67%
Other	89	33%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Greece

Table I.4.20. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-Core
EU institutions	286	-
World Bank Group	-	-
UN Funds and Programmes*	2	10
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	0.49	-
WFP	-	5
UNICEF	0.3	1
UNFPA	0.01	-
UNHCR	2	1
UNRWA	0.03	5
Other UN	11	1
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	1	-
IFAD	-	0.02
ILO	-	0.03
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	0.07	-
UNESCO	1	-
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	2	-
Regional Development Banks	1	-
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	-	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	10	2
Total	310	14

Figure I.4.10. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.21. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Greece	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	2	13%
Country/region specific	12	87%
- of which regional allocations	-	-
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	4	35%
North of Sahara	1	6%
Africa, regional multi-country	-	-
Middle East	5	45%
Far East Asia	-	-
South & Central Asia	1	12%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	-
Oceania	-	-
South America	-	-
North & Central America	0.06	0.46%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	0.3	2%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	9%
Developmental Food Aid	0.00	0.03%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	-
Education	3	19%
Environment	0.04	0.30%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	1	5%
Health	2	14%
Humanitarian Aid	6	43%
Multi-sector	-	-
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	1	5%
Other Social infrastructure	0.5	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	-
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	-
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0.15	1%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	9	73%
Other	3	27%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Ireland

Table I.4.22. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	163	-
World Bank Group	25	36
UN Funds and Programmes*	55	53
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	12	24
WFP	14	12
UNICEF	11	11
UNFPA	4	-
UNHCR	8	4
UNRWA	5	2
Other UN	21	43
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	1
IFAD	3	-
ILO	0.26	1
OHCHR	-	3
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	0.04
UN	2	2
UNOCHA	n/a	8
WHO	2	1
Regional Development Banks	15	-
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	15	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	32	9
Total	313	141

Figure I.4.11. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.23. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Ireland	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	28	20%
Country/region specific	113	80%
- of which regional allocations	11	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	80	70%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	8	7%
Middle East	4	3%
Far East Asia	11	10%
South & Central Asia	4	4%
Asia, regional multi-country	3	3%
Oceania	-	-
South America	0,14	0,12%
North & Central America	2	2%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	1	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	7	5%
Developmental Food Aid	2	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	-
Education	12	9%
Environment	0,07	0,05%
General Budget Support	0,03	0,02%
Government and Civil Society	15	10%
Health	12	8%
Humanitarian Aid	61	44%
Multi-sector	3	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	-
Other Social infrastructure	20	14%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	9	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0,35	0,25%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0,14	0,10%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	64	62%
Other	39	38%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Italy

Table I.4.24. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	1 862	-
World Bank Group	270	23
UN Funds and Programmes*	52	47
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	6	13
WFP	21	9
UNICEF	11	11
UNFPA	1	0.4
UNHCR	7	7
UNRWA	7	3
Other UN	153	10
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	14	2
IFAD	32	-
ILO	6	-
OHCHR	0.28	-
UNDPKO	15	0.15
UNECE	0.31	-
UNESCO	2	-
UN	14	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	27	2
Regional Development Banks	24	-
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	18	-
Asian Development Bank	-	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	63	54
Total	2 423	134

Figure I.4.12. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.25. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Italy	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	32	24%
Country/region specific	102	76%
- of which regional allocations	1	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	45	45%
North of Sahara	3	3%
Africa, regional multi-country	0.21	0.21%
Middle East	17	17%
Far East Asia	1	1%
South & Central Asia	26	25%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	1%
Oceania	-	-
South America	2	2%
North & Central America	2	2%
America, regional multi-country	0.00	0.00%
Europe	3	3%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	3	2%
Developmental Food Aid	1	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	4	3%
Education	45	33%
Environment	4	3%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	18	14%
Health	17	13%
Humanitarian Aid	30	22%
Multi-sector	2	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	1	1%
Other Social infrastructure	6	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	-
Water Supply and Sanitation	3	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	0.44%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	78	78%
Other	23	22%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Japan

Table I.4.26. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	1 404	0.3
UN Funds and Programmes*	160	539
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	76	50
WFP	7	233
UNICEF	15	122
UNFPA	31	1
UNHCR	28	81
UNRWA	3	14
Other UN	502	23
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	41	4
IFAD	34	-
ILO	36	-
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	71	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	31	-
UN	55	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	70	-
Regional Development Banks	751	-
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	180	-
Asian Development Bank	544	-
Inter-American Development Bank	25	-
Other multilaterals	472	151
Total	3 290	713

Figure I.4.13. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.27. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Japan	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	2	0.23%
Country/region specific	712	100%
- of which regional allocations	103	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	328	46%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	87	12%
Middle East	44	6%
Far East Asia	23	3%
South & Central Asia	182	26%
Asia, regional multi-country	16	2%
Oceania	17	2%
South America	6	1%
North & Central America	8	1%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	0.34	0.05%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	24	3%
Developmental Food Aid	215	30%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	0.14	0.02%
Education	40	6%
Environment	0.49	0.07%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	47	7%
Health	107	15%
Humanitarian Aid	167	23%
Multi-sector	4	1%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	91	13%
Other Social infrastructure	10	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	0.18%
Water Supply and Sanitation	6	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	-
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	497	82%
Other	111	18%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Korea

Table I.4.28. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	93	1
UN Funds and Programmes*	9	15
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	4	2
WFP	0.10	7
UNICEF	3	2
UNFPA	0.10	0.46
UNHCR	3	1
UNRWA	0.05	-
Other UN	47	13
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	5	0.33
IFAD	1	0.13
ILO	5	1
OHCHR	-	0.09
UNDPKO	6	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	4	1
UN	6	0.05
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	7	3
Regional Development Banks	69	6
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	14	5
Asian Development Bank	28	1
Inter-American Development Bank	25	-
Other multilaterals	17	13
Total	235	50

Figure I.4.14. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.29. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Korea	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	14	29%
Country/region specific	35	71%
- of which regional allocations	12	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	6	17%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	5	15%
Middle East	3	8%
Far East Asia	3	8%
South & Central Asia	7	20%
Asia, regional multi-country	6	17%
Oceania	0.30	1%
South America	0.09	0.24%
North & Central America	-	-
America, regional multi-country	1	1%
Europe	4	12%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	1%
Developmental Food Aid	-	-
Economic Infrastructure and Services	1	3%
Education	1	2%
Environment	5	10%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	6	12%
Health	3	7%
Humanitarian Aid	10	20%
Multi-sector	18	35%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	0.18	0.37%
Other Social infrastructure	2	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0.46	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	2.7%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	5	20%
Other	19	80%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Luxembourg

Table I.4.30. **2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	40	2
World Bank Group	24	1
UN Funds and Programmes*	36	33
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	10	8
WFP	4	8
UNICEF	8	3
UNFPA	7	4
UNHCR	3	8
UNRWA	4	2
Other UN	33	10
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	0.21	5
IFAD	0.32	1
ILO	-	1
OHCHR	-	0.12
UNDPKO	-	0.39
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	0.13	-
UN	-	0.26
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	11	1
Regional Development Banks	6	1
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	2	1
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	10	0.50
Total	149	48

Figure I.4.15. **2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.31. **2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**

(In 2009 USD million)

	Luxembourg	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	3	7%
Country/region specific	44	93%
- of which regional allocations	2	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	23	52%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	2	4%
Middle East	2	5%
Far East Asia	8	17%
South & Central Asia	4	8%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	-
Oceania	-	-
South America	1	2%
North & Central America	2	4%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	4	8%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	3	6%
Developmental Food Aid	1	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	-
Education	0.14	0.29%
Environment	3	6%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	3	7%
Health	5	10%
Humanitarian Aid	19	40%
Multi-sector	7	16%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	-
Other Social infrastructure	1	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	4	9%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	-
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0.03	0.06%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	14	33%
Other	28	67%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Netherlands

Table I.4.32. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	577	15
World Bank Group	219	270
UN Funds and Programmes*	409	433
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	129	204
WFP	56	20
UNICEF	50	125
UNFPA	87	51
UNHCR	58	20
UNRWA	29	0.21
Other UN	182	151
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	5	13
IFAD	27	4
ILO	14	9
OHCHR	12	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	7
UN	7	1
UNOCHA	n/a	85
WHO	27	0.09
Regional Development Banks	76	37
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	0.35	1
Asian Development Bank	-	33
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	166	52
Total	1 628	957

Figure I.4.16. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.33. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Netherlands	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	322	34%
Country/region specific	635	66%
- of which regional allocations	9	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	262	41%
North of Sahara	2	0,31%
Africa, regional multi-country	5	1%
Middle East	27	4%
Far East Asia	131	21%
South & Central Asia	151	24%
Asia, regional multi-country	4	1%
Oceania	-	-
South America	7	1%
North & Central America	13	2%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	33	5%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	23	2%
Developmental Food Aid	23	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	92	10%
Education	111	12%
Environment	16	2%
General Budget Support	13	1%
Government and Civil Society	206	22%
Health	20	2%
Humanitarian Aid	257	27%
Multi-sector	43	4%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	7	1%
Other Social infrastructure	7	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	58	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	78	8%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	4	0,40%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	377	60%
Other	249	40%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

New Zealand

Table I.4.34. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	12	1
UN Funds and Programmes*	25	8
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	5	6
WFP	8	-
UNICEF	4	2
UNFPA	4	1
UNHCR	4	-
UNRWA	1	-
Other UN	19	6
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	1	1
IFAD	-	-
ILO	0.18	0.15
OHCHR	1	-
UNDPKO	1	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	1
UN	1	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	1	3
Regional Development Banks	6	0.16
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	6	0.16
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	22	7
Total	83	23


Table I.4.35. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	New Zealand	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	1	3%
Country/region specific	22	97%
- of which regional allocations	0	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	-	-
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	-	-
Middle East	-	-
Far East Asia	6	26%
South & Central Asia	2	10%
Asia, regional multi-country	0.35	2%
Oceania	13	58%
South America	1	4%
North & Central America	-	-
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	-	-
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	4%
Developmental Food Aid	-	-
Economic Infrastructure and Services	1	6%
Education	3	12%
Environment	0.09	0.40%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	6	28%
Health	4	16%
Humanitarian Aid	2	7%
Multi-sector	1	4%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	3	15%
Other Social infrastructure	0.15	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0.15	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	-
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	3	15%
Other	18	85%

Figure I.4.17. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)



Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Norway

Table I.4.36. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	141	266
UN Funds and Programmes*	354	399
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	123	198
WFP	26	12
UNICEF	72	135
UNFPA	53	12
UNHCR	46	18
UNRWA	34	3
Other UN	150	191
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	2	24
IFAD	11	1
ILO	0.40	-
OHCHR	-	6
UNDPKO	-	1
UNECE	-	0.40
UNESCO	9	3
UN	2	0.31
UNOCHA	n/a	62
WHO	37	23
Regional Development Banks	89	46
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	80	22
Asian Development Bank	10	17
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	183	75
Total	918	977

Figure I.4.18. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.37. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Norway	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	504	52%
Country/region specific	473	48%
- of which regional allocations	63	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	149	31%
North of Sahara	0.21	0.05%
Africa, regional multi-country	49	10%
Middle East	68	14%
Far East Asia	16	3%
South & Central Asia	140	30%
Asia, regional multi-country	9	2%
Oceania	-	-
South America	9	2%
North & Central America	9	2%
America, regional multi-country	4	1%
Europe	19	4%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	20	2%
Developmental Food Aid	1	0.08%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	42	4%
Education	145	15%
Environment	84	9%
General Budget Support	60	6%
Government and Civil Society	198	20%
Health	63	6%
Humanitarian Aid	132	13%
Multi-sector	62	6%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	101	10%
Other Social infrastructure	30	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	18	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	19	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0.13	0.01%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	293	71%
Other	117	29%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Portugal

Table I.4.38. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	189	0.23
World Bank Group	3	-
UN Funds and Programmes*	5	0.10
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	3	-
WFP	-	-
UNICEF	0.32	-
UNFPA	0.35	-
UNHCR	2	-
UNRWA	-	0.10
Other UN	8	48
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	1	-
IFAD	-	-
ILO	-	-
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	1	46
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	-
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	2	-
Regional Development Banks	24	-
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	16	-
Asian Development Bank	7	-
Inter-American Development Bank	1	-
Other multilaterals	8	1
Total	236	50

Figure I.4.19. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.39. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Portugal	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	0.23	0.47%
Country/region specific	50	100%
- of which regional allocations	1	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	1	2%
North of Sahara	0.06	0.12%
Africa, regional multi-country	-	-
Middle East	9	19%
Far East Asia	13	26%
South & Central Asia	12	23%
Asia, regional multi-country	-	-
Oceania	-	-
South America	-	-
North & Central America	-	-
America, regional multi-country	1	2%
Europe	14	27%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	-	-
Developmental Food Aid	-	-
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	-
Education	-	-
Environment	0.06	0.11%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	48	97%
Health	-	-
Humanitarian Aid	0.10	0.20%
Multi-sector	1	3%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	-
Other Social infrastructure	0.00	0.01%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	-
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	-
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0.23	0.46%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	25	53%
Other	23	47%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Spain

Table I.4.40. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	1 235	37
World Bank Group	318	453
UN Funds and Programmes*	173	445
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	75	109
WFP	21	162
UNICEF	31	78
UNFPA	20	27
UNHCR	15	20
UNRWA	11	11
Other UN	202	173
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	7	63
IFAD	53	8
ILO	6	11
OHCHR	5	5
UNDPKO	10	-
UNECE	0.21	0.14
UNESCO	7	12
UN	11	-
UNOCHA	n/a	6
WHO	32	6
Regional Development Banks	117	89
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	78	4
Asian Development Bank	28	9
Inter-American Development Bank	11	-
Other multilaterals	66	148
Total	2 111	1 345

Figure I.4.20. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.41. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Spain	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	292	22%
Country/region specific	1 053	78%
- of which regional allocations	346	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	382	36%
North of Sahara	11	1%
Africa, regional multi-country	119	11%
Middle East	59	6%
Far East Asia	31	3%
South & Central Asia	105	10%
Asia, regional multi-country	15	1%
Oceania	0.15	0.01%
South America	50	5%
North & Central America	64	6%
America, regional multi-country	212	20%
Europe	5	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	46	3%
Developmental Food Aid	221	16%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	94	7%
Education	117	9%
Environment	82	6%
General Budget Support	26	2%
Government and Civil Society	164	12%
Health	35	3%
Humanitarian Aid	268	20%
Multi-sector	98	7%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	12	1%
Other Social infrastructure	53	4%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	41	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	88	7%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	0.05%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	390	55%
Other	316	45%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Sweden

Table I.4.42. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	298	28
World Bank Group	350	113
UN Funds and Programmes*	411	319
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	94	148
WFP	64	11
UNICEF	73	87
UNFPA	59	12
UNHCR	81	26
UNRWA	40	9
Other UN	168	156
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	3	19
IFAD	13	-
ILO	2	6
OHCHR	-	8
UNDPKO	3	8
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	2	5
UN	4	-
UNOCHA	n/a	34
WHO	4	22
Regional Development Banks	167	63
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	151	7
Asian Development Bank	13	29
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	145	160
Total	1 539	838

Figure I.4.21. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.43. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Sweden	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	258	31%
Country/region specific	580	69%
- of which regional allocations	73	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	192	33%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	37	6%
Middle East	35	6%
Far East Asia	36	6%
South & Central Asia	131	23%
Asia, regional multi-country	33	6%
Oceania	-	-
South America	15	3%
North & Central America	16	3%
America, regional multi-country	3	1%
Europe	82	14%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	10	1%
Developmental Food Aid	1	0.08%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	58	7%
Education	50	6%
Environment	43	5%
General Budget Support	18	2%
Government and Civil Society	238	28%
Health	60	7%
Humanitarian Aid	184	22%
Multi-sector	59	7%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	32	4%
Other Social infrastructure	15	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	25	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	30	4%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	15	2%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	276	54%
Other	231	46%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Switzerland

Table I.4.44. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	259	51
UN Funds and Programmes*	108	80
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	50	16
WFP	2	40
UNICEF	18	5
UNFPA	13	1
UNHCR	12	13
UNRWA	13	2
Other UN	49	49
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	3	4
IFAD	7	0.46
ILO	3	4
OHCHR	-	2
UNDPKO	4	2
UNECE	-	0.08
UNESCO	3	2
UN	3	-
UNOCHA	n/a	10
WHO	9	7
Regional Development Banks	66	17
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	54	0.48
Asian Development Bank	12	2
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	77	44
Total	559	246

Figure I.4.22. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.45. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	Switzerland	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	64	26%
Country/region specific	183	74%
- of which regional allocations	9	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	57	31%
North of Sahara	5	3%
Africa, regional multi-country	7	4%
Middle East	12	7%
Far East Asia	16	9%
South & Central Asia	53	29%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	1%
Oceania	0.07	0.04%
South America	6	3%
North & Central America	4	2%
America, regional multi-country	1	0.41%
Europe	21	11%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	9	4%
Developmental Food Aid	-	-
Economic Infrastructure and Services	24	10%
Education	7	3%
Environment	8	3%
General Budget Support	9	4%
Government and Civil Society	55	22%
Health	7	3%
Humanitarian Aid	70	29%
Multi-sector	17	7%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	14	6%
Other Social infrastructure	4	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	0.14	0.06%
Water Supply and Sanitation	21	9%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	1	0.47%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	71	41%
Other	103	59%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

United Kingdom

Table I.4.46. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
EU institutions	1 944	57
World Bank Group	867	826
UN Funds and Programmes*	211	801
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	43	437
WFP	-	118
UNICEF	33	182
UNFPA	66	22
UNHCR	30	13
UNRWA	39	9
Other UN	254	278
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	17	10
IFAD	21	3
ILO	18	4
OHCHR	-	0.05
UNDPKO	31	1
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	13	2
UN	19	3
UNOCHA	n/a	80
WHO	42	122
Regional Development Banks	269	33
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	217	16
Asian Development Bank	43	6
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	346	496
Total	3 891	2 491

Figure I.4.23. 2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.47. 2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status

(In 2009 USD million)

	United Kingdom	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	1 153	46%
Country/region specific	1 338	54%
- of which regional allocations	45	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	730	55%
North of Sahara	-	-
Africa, regional multi-country	44	3%
Middle East	78	6%
Far East Asia	124	9%
South & Central Asia	336	25%
Asia, regional multi-country	1	0.10%
Oceania	-	-
South America	0.09	0.01%
North & Central America	22	2%
America, regional multi-country	-	-
Europe	3	0.25%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	19	1%
Developmental Food Aid	4	0.16%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	247	10%
Education	72	3%
Environment	496	20%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	412	17%
Health	250	10%
Humanitarian Aid	531	21%
Multi-sector	54	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	36	1%
Other Social infrastructure	216	9%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	76	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	76	3%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	2	0.06%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	981	76%
Other	312	24%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

United States

Table I.4.48. **2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**

(Gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)

	Core	Non-core
World Bank Group	1 209	490
UN Funds and Programmes*	230	3 031
<i>of which:</i>		
UNDP	100	81
WFP	-	1 841
UNICEF	130	159
UNFPA	-	17
UNHCR	-	645
UNRWA	-	268
Other UN	614	406
<i>of which:</i>		
FAO	56	59
IFAD	18	-
ILO	48	49
OHCHR	8	-
UNDPKO	106	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	47	1
UN	54	0.33
UNOCHA	n/a	32
WHO	81	222
Regional Development Banks	283	5
<i>of which:</i>		
African Development Bank	153	0.35
Asian Development Bank	105	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	1 331	413
Total	3 667	4 345

Figure I.4.24. **2009 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**

(gross disbursements in 2009 USD million)




Table I.4.49. **2009 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**

(In 2009 USD million)

	United States	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	537	12%
Country/region specific	3 808	88%
- of which regional allocations	23	
REGIONS		
South of Sahara	1 971	52%
North of Sahara	14	0.37%
Africa, regional multi-country	-	-
Middle East	648	17%
Far East Asia	45	1%
South & Central Asia	791	21%
Asia, regional multi-country	6	0.16%
Oceania	0.33	0.01%
South America	71	2%
North & Central America	81	2%
America, regional multi-country	17	0%
Europe	163	4%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	75	2%
Developmental Food Aid	57	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	12	0.29%
Education	47	1%
Environment	31	1%
General Budget Support	-	-
Government and Civil Society	604	14%
Health	242	6%
Humanitarian Aid	3 001	69%
Multi-sector	3	0%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	6	0.13%
Other Social infrastructure	88	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	147	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	7	0.16%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	25	0.58%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	2 965	78%
Other	820	22%

Notes:

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2011.

Part II

Aid Fragmentation

Key messages on aid fragmentation

Part II of this report is the 2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Cross-Country Fragmentation of Aid. Drawing on CPA data, this part examines a growing threat to aid architecture – aid fragmentation. These key messages provide an overview of aid fragmentation. It looks at how it is measured, and introduces the notion of “significant” and “non-significant” aid relations. The overview discusses patterns in the growing fragmentation of aid, and examines which countries are most affected. It then addresses donors’ growing awareness of the need to rationalise aid practices and briefly considers how recipient countries will be affected by donor exits. Finally, it proposes ways of curbing aid fragmentation, and proposes relative targets to guide changes in this direction.

Fragmentation occurs when there are too many donors giving too little aid in too many countries, thus further complicating the architecture and delivery of aid. It can seriously impair the effectiveness of aid and is a particular challenge in the poorest countries of Africa and Asia and in fragile, conflict-affected states. Fragmentation puts a strain on governments' administrative capacities, increases donors' costs, duplicates their efforts, and leads to the uneven distribution of aid. And it is spreading right across the development co-operation landscape. Since the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, fragmentation has grown everywhere except in the Americas.

Drawing on 2009 country programmable aid (CPA) data, the *2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Cross-Country Fragmentation of Aid* analyses the nature and causes of fragmentation, recommends ways in which donors may rationalise their allocations, and introduces the idea of relative targets as a way of reducing fragmentation.

While the concept of fragmentation is easy to grasp – too many donors contributing too little in too many countries – it is more difficult to identify and measure. To that end, the Report uses a methodology developed in the *2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour* for measuring aid fragmentation – and concentration – according to the financial significance of each aid relationship. A “significant” aid relationship is one where:

- a single donor accounts for a higher share of aid to a partner country than the donor's overall share of global aid, and/or
- the donor is among the largest donors who altogether account for at least 90% of the partner country's aid.

Ideally, a partner country would have a high share of significant donor relations. Similarly, donors would seek to build portfolios with as high a concentration as possible of significant aid relations with their partner countries. However, this is not the case for most countries and donors.

The global fragmentation ratio in 2009 was 40% – *i.e.* two in five relationships between donor and partner country were non-significant. In Africa and Asia the figure was higher, with over half of all donor relations being non-significant. Lower-middle income countries (LMICs) tend to have the highest fragmentation ratios, where nearly half of all relations are financially non-significant. The most worrying trend, though, is in low-income countries (LICs) whose institutions are ill-equipped for managing the growing number of financially less significant actors. More than 80% of all LICs have experienced a rise in donor numbers since 2004, resulting in a rapid increase in the number of non-significant aid relations.

Even more pronounced has been the rapid rise in the fragmentation ratios of fragile and conflict-affected states, where the growth in the number of non-significant donors between 2004 and 2009 was three times higher than in non-fragile states. The most extreme case of fragmentation in 2009 was still Iraq (92%), where one donor – the United States – supplied nearly 90% of all CPA and 25 others provided the remaining 10%.

Fragmentation at the global level stems mostly from bilateral sources: 45% of bilateral aid relations are non-significant compared to 34% of multilateral aid relations. Fragmentation arises partly from the current lack of concerted, co-ordinated aid allocation practices as donors fail to communicate or consider each others' allocation choices and practices when determining their own. In addition, many bilateral flows earmarked for specific countries, regions, sectors and themes are increasingly transiting through multilateral agencies, which may contribute to the growing fragmentation of aid at country level. Surprisingly, fragmentation even affects donors' relations with their chosen priority

partner countries: in 2009, one-fifth of donors' relations with priority partner countries were non-significant.

Clearly there is a need for action to lower transaction and administrative costs both for donors and partner countries and to deliver more effective aid and stronger development outcomes. However, there is no single solution or ideal, across-the-board level of concentration.

Galvanised by the global economic and financial crisis and the fiscal squeeze it has spawned, many donors – and nearly all EU-member DAC donors – have nevertheless moved to rationalise their aid relations in the last four years. They are seeking to reduce the size of the aid portfolios and focus on fewer relationships by gradually exiting from partner countries. There are positive signs that most planned exits are non-significant aid relations – more than half worldwide in 2009 and two-thirds in Africa and Asia. Although the exiting donors may do not necessarily supply large aggregate volumes of aid to a particular country, they may be important players in sectors or areas where only a few donors present. Even phase-outs of “smaller” aid programmes may therefore have a significant impact on certain countries.

Sixteen DAC donors fall short of the DAC average aid concentration ratio. To increase their concentration ratios, donors can either phase out aid programmes from non-significant relations, or scale up their ODA, transforming non-significant relations into significant ones – though doing so requires growing aid budgets. Other forms of joint donor arrangements could also be used reduce transaction costs for partner countries, including joint programming, delegated cooperation, and joint financing arrangements.

High growth rates in developing countries have vastly reduced global poverty, and the aid allocation landscape is changing in a fast-evolving global economy. This shifting situation and the attendant redistribution of aid underline why analyses like the 2011 Report matter: analysing and communicating information on current and future aid allocations helps all development actors make better informed decisions.

Chapter 3

Identifying aid fragmentation

This chapter defines fragmentation of aid, puts it into context, looks at how it is measured, and introduces the notion of “significant” and “non-significant” aid relations.

Many developing countries differ greatly in their paths to development and in the challenges they face. In at least one respect, however, many share a common problem: too little aid from too many donors. This report addresses that challenge, often referred to as “fragmentation of aid across countries”. (It should be distinguished from fragmentation of aid within countries, usually measured by the donor spread across multiple sectors at country level and characterised by small projects.)

The fragmentation of aid poses critical challenges to the effectiveness and impact of development co-operation. This fact was acknowledged in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which called for a pragmatic approach to the division of labour in order to increase complementarity and lower transaction costs. The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) broadened the scope of international division of labour across countries and committed donors to using existing channels for aid delivery before creating any separate new ones.

Aid fragmentation arises partly from the current lack of concerted, co-ordinated aid allocation practices. All donors – both bilateral and multilateral – have their own priorities and incentive frameworks. They also decide unilaterally which countries, multilateral organisations, and global programmes to fund. In general, they do not take into consideration other donors’ allocation decisions when making their own. In addition, a single aid extending agency within donor countries may have different project or programme practices and procedures that partner countries sometimes actually perceive as the work of several separate donors. The complex, uncoordinated nature of aid allocation patterns creates gaps in the aid received by developing countries (with some receiving significantly less than others). What is more, it also causes overlaps in the numbers of donors present at country level, with some contributing relatively small amounts.

Fragmentation of aid entails transaction costs for both donors and partner countries. Donors have some fixed transaction costs, irrespective of programme or project size. Such costs include those associated with maintaining a minimum in-country presence and with certain phases in project or programme cycles, such as identifying and planning, negotiating and consulting with stakeholders, and monitoring, reporting, and evaluating interventions. As for partner countries, their governments have to contend with the strain on their administrative capacities caused by a large number of donors with different, often uncoordinated, management practices and the absence of lead donor arrangements (Knack and Rahman, 2007). The assumption in this report is that this administrative burden can be reduced and donors can achieve efficiency gains by rationalising their overall aid relations with partner countries.

In recent years, several donors have taken the decision to concentrate their aid on fewer partner countries. One reason for the move has been to rationalise aid to achieve better results. However, increased fiscal austerity brought on by the economic and financial crisis has also been a factor for some donors.

This report provides the evidence base for reducing fragmentation of aid through an updated picture of aid relations between donors and partner countries. It analyses the financial dispersion of donor allocations, preferring not to consider such non-financial value as knowledge transfer and diplomatic relations. This 2011 edition of the report on fragmentation is the third of its kind.¹ The first, the *Report on the 2008 Survey of Aid Allocation Policies and Indicative Forward Spending Plans*, informed the decisions taken in Accra on cross-country fragmentation and under-aided countries, where the signatories of the AAA committed to reducing “the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among countries and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources ... across countries”.

The second report, the *2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour*, provided insights as to where it might be possible to further rationalise the number of donors in each partner country. To that end, it proposed a methodology for scoring the significance of aid relations between donor and partner country aid in financial terms and presented indicators for monitoring fragmentation and concentration (see Box 3.2). The proposed methodology has been widely discussed since the 2009 Report was published, and there is growing consensus in the international community on its use.

Box 3.1. What is an aid relationship?

An aid relationship is defined as the sum of all aid activities by a donor or a multilateral agency in a country. Aid relations are measured by country programmable aid (CPA), *i.e.* aid that is attributed to a specific country and programmed in advance. For more information on CPA, see Annex II.1.

The 2011 Report provides an update on cross-country fragmentation based on the methodology presented in the 2009 publication. The updated analysis draws on data from 2009 relating to country programmable aid (CPA)² and examines the most recent trends in aid fragmentation. It also includes information on potential impacts of recent donor moves to concentrate their aid on fewer partnerships. The last section examines the potential options for rationalisation and proposes targets for reducing fragmentation.

How is aid fragmentation measured?


The global matrix of aid relations – defined as the sum of all aid activities by a donor country or a multilateral agency in one country – shows an increasingly complex picture (see Annex II.2). Today, the global landscape numbers just under 4 000 pairs of donor-country aid relationships that include all DAC members and major multilateral agencies. That figure, however, is just the tip of the iceberg, as it does not encompass the aid relations of the remaining 200-plus multilateral organisations, emerging donors, and other non-DAC donors. Furthermore, many donors have more than one aid agency, which this overall analysis does not take into consideration and adds to the complexity of the aid architecture.

The 2011 Report applies the same country-level threshold introduced in the 2009 edition for bilateral donors. The Report looks only at donor-country aid relations amounting to more than USD 250 000 in order to remove any “noise” generated by very small aid relationships, henceforth referred to as “micro-aid relations”.³ Micro-aid relations often take the form of non-project technical co-operation, which includes activities such as scholarships, voluntary work, trainee schemes, and minor grants channelled through NGOs or multilateral organisations that do not generally give rise to any significant transaction costs.⁴ While micro-aid relations represent 16% of all aid relations (four relationships per partner country on average), they account for just USD 50 million or 0.1% of all global CPA.

In 2009, donors were present in an average of 71 out of 152 ODA-eligible countries (73 for DAC countries and 69 for multilateral agencies). From the partner country perspective, each one hosted an average of 21 donors (11 DAC countries and 10 multilateral agencies). However, it is important to note that there are large variations across regions. Asia and Africa have the highest number of donors present (26 per country in Asia, 24 in

Africa), while the small island states lower the regional averages of the Americas (17) and Oceania (8). The map in Figure 3.1 provides the foundation for analysing fragmentation by illustrating the number of donors present across countries.

Figure 3.1. Map of total number of donors per recipient country (2009)



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

The methodology used to measure fragmentation of aid assesses the financial significance of each aid relation in the context of growing concern over too many donors contributing too little in too many countries. The methodology, comprehensively set out in the *2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour*, is summarised in Box 3.2.

Box 3.2. Defining the significance of aid relations and concentration and fragmentation ratios

When considering the significance of an aid relation, it is important to examine both the donor and partner country perspectives. The policy inference is that where aid relations are significant neither from the donor's point of view nor from the recipient's, there is a rationale for revisiting aid allocations. It is important, therefore, to define just what is meant by the terms "significance of an aid relation", "concentration ratio", and "fragmentation ratio".

Significance of an aid relation

An aid relation is considered significant in financial terms if "yes" is the answer to at least one of the following questions:

1. Does the donor provide a higher share of aid to the partner country than the donor's overall share of global aid?
2. Is the donor among the largest donors that cumulatively account for at least 90% of the partner country's aid?

Box 3.2. Defining the significance of aid relations and concentration and fragmentation ratios *(continued)*

In Question 1, there is a bias towards smaller donors based on the fact that they are usually involved in fewer partner countries, which makes it less difficult for them at country level to exceed their global share of aid. In contrast, Question 2 has a bias towards larger donors, who can more easily be among the top donors providing 90% of total aid volume at the partner country level. Combining the two criteria makes it possible to take both the small and large donor biases into consideration.

Concentration ratio

Defined from a donor's point of view, the overall aim is a concentrated portfolio with significant partner country aid relations. On this basis, the concentration ratio measures the number of donors' significant aid relations compared to all of its aid relations. The higher the concentration ratio, the less a donor's portfolio is fragmented.

Fragmentation ratio

Defined from a partner country point of view, the aim is to maximise the number of significant donor relations and minimise the number of non-significant relations. On this basis, the fragmentation ratio measures the number of non-significant donors compared to the overall number of donors. The lower the fragmentation ratio, the less fragmented are the donors' aid programmes in that country.

The concentration and fragmentation indicators are complementary at the global level, since the sum of the global concentration and fragmentation ratios is one.

Source: OECD (2009), 2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Fragmentation and Concentration of Aid Across Countries, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/52/44318319.pdf.

It is important to acknowledge that aid relations which score as financially non-significant may be well targeted and have significant impact at the country level. Nevertheless, such aid relations necessarily come with high transaction costs and some rationalisation may be worthwhile in order to ease such costs at both ends of the delivery chain.

Notes

1. The first two reports on the fragmentation of aid – the OECD Report on 2008 Survey of Aid Allocation Policies and Indicative Forward Spending Plans and 2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Fragmentation and Concentration of Aid Across Countries – are available at www.oecd.org/dac/aidarchitecture.
2. The 2009 data are the most recent figures available ahead of HLF4. In this report, unless otherwise stated, the figures are in 2009 US dollars. The data cover 46 donors: 23 DAC countries and 23 major multilateral agencies, covering development banks, global funds and major agencies of the United Nations (UN). Note that the European Commission (referred to as EU Institutions) is considered in this report as a multilateral donor.

3. Without applying a threshold, there were 3 860 aid relationships between 46 donors and 152 partner countries in 2009. Of this total, 603 were micro-aid relationships, resulting in 3257 aid relations being examined in this analysis applying the threshold.
4. The threshold of excluding aid relations below the level USD 250 000 is only applied to bilateral donors, as these types of activities are not applicable to most multilateral donors.

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Chapter 4


Current trends in aid fragmentation

This chapter discusses patterns in the growing fragmentation of aid. It examines which countries are most affected and how bilateral donors are mainly responsible. It then addresses donors' growing awareness of the need to rationalise aid practices and briefly considers how recipient countries will be affected by exits.

Where does fragmentation occur?

The global fragmentation ratio is 40%, meaning that two out of every five relationships between donor and partner country are non-significant. Fragmentation at the global level stems mostly from bilateral sources, since nearly half (45%) of bilateral aid relations are non-significant compared to one-third (34%) of multilateral aid relations. Figure 4.1 illustrates the proliferation of non-significant aid relations across countries.

Figure 4.1. **Opportunities for concentration (2009)**



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Countries shaded dark present the greatest opportunities for rationalisation and efficiency gains, and therefore merit particular attention. They are located mostly in Africa and Asia and have 12 or more non-significant aid relations and an average fragmentation ratio of 55% – *i.e.* over one-half of all donor relationships in the countries concerned are non-significant.

From 2004 to 2009, the average donor expanded its aid portfolio by three aid relationships, nearly all of which were considered non-significant. Since the commitments undertaken in the Paris Declaration, fragmentation has increased in all regions except the Americas.

Most recent data show that the number of partner countries with 12 or more non-significant aid relationships increased from 40 in 2008 to 44 in 2009 – a slight increase in the overall fragmentation ratio. As Table 4.1 shows, fragmentation among aid recipients in Europe, Asia, and the Americas further increased, while in Africa and Oceania it was stationary or fell slightly.

The most extreme case of fragmentation where a large number of donors provide relatively little aid remains Iraq (92%), as identified in the *2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour*. While one donor – the United States – supplied nearly 90% of all CPA, 25 others provided 10% in 2009.¹ In India and Pakistan in the same year, three donors were

Table 4.1. **Fragmentation ratio by region**

	Number of countries	Significant relations	Non-significant relations	Total relations	Fragmentation ratio B/(A+B)	For reference		
		A	B	(A+B)		2008	2004	
Europe	11	145	116	261	↑	44%	39%	43%
Africa	55	850	484	1334	→	36%	36%	33%
America	34	394	200	594	↑	34%	32%	35%
Asia	36	491	446	937	↑	48%	46%	46%
Oceania	16	85	46	131	↓	35%	38%	24%
Global	152	1 965	1 292	3 257	↑	40%	38%	38%

Note: The upward arrow illustrates a trend toward more fragmentation, the downward arrow a decrease, and the horizontal arrow no change in fragmentation between 2008 and 2009.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

responsible for 75% of all CPA, while the remaining 25% was spread across nearly 30 donors. In India, this pattern has prevailed since 2000, with the three largest donors (IDA, Japan and UK) regularly providing more than 70% of total CPA and the overall number of donors providing the remaining 30% continues to increase. From a country perspective, such fragmentation presents two sets of challenges. Firstly, managing the “long tail” of relatively small donors imposes additional costs. Secondly, there are risks associated with relying on only a few donors for the bulk of aid.

When examining fragmentation across country income groups (Table 4.2), lower-middle income countries (LMICs) continue to face the highest fragmentation ratio, which has remained roughly the same since 2004 (see Annex II.2 for a complete list of fragmentation ratios by partner country). While upper-middle income countries (UMICs) have relatively fewer donors operating in their countries (14 on average in 2009), LMICs traditionally have a few large donors who provide the majority of aid. However, they also have a “long tail” of several donors providing the relatively small remainder of aid. Since a number of bilateral donors have started to phase out aid relations with countries that are moving into a higher income group, the fragmentation ratio in middle-income countries as a whole may decrease over the next few years.

Table 4.2. **Fragmentation by income group**

	Number of countries	Significant relations	Non-significant relations	Total relations	Fragmentation ratio B/(A+B)	For reference		
		A	B	(A+B)		2008	2004	
LICs	61	985	557	1 542	↑	36%	34%	33%
LMICs	48	590	531	1 121	↑	47%	46%	46%
UMICs	43	390	204	594	↓	34%	35%	33%
Global	152	1 965	1 292	3 257	↑	40%	38%	38%

Note: The upward arrow illustrates a trend toward more fragmentation, the downward arrow a decrease.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

The most worrying trend is seen in low-income countries (LICs) which have the least institutional capacity for managing the growing number of financially less significant actors. More than 80% of all LICs have experienced a rise in the number of donors since 2004, with the increase exceeding 50% in some countries.² The result has been an increase in the average number of non-significant aid relations per country from 7.2 to 9.1, resulting in a fragmentation ratio in LICs that climbed from 33% in 2004 to 36% in 2009. Even more pronounced has been the rapid rise in the fragmentation ratio of fragile and conflict-affected states (see Table 4.3),³ where the average number of non-significant donors increased from 8 to 10.6 between 2004 and 2009. This was three times higher than in non-fragile states, where it climbed from 7.1 to “only” 7.7.

Table 4.3. **Fragmentation in fragile and conflict affected states**

	Number of countries	Significant relations	Non-significant relations	Total relations	Fragmentation ratio B/(A+B)	For reference	
		A	B	(A+B)		2008	2004
Fragile and/or conflict affected states	41	622	436	1 058	↑ 41%	39%	36%
Non fragile states	111	1 343	856	2 199	↑ 39%	38%	38%
Global	152	1 965	1 292	3 257	↑ 40%	38%	38%

Note: The upward arrow illustrates a trend toward more fragmentation, the downward arrow a decrease.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Understandably, it may be thought that adding humanitarian aid to the equation would change the fragmentation ratios in fragile and conflict-affected states. They have, however, followed similar trends since 2004 compared to when only CPA was considered. The 2009 fragmentation ratios that factored in humanitarian aid were only one percentage point lower in both fragile (40%) and non-fragile states (38%) than when only CPA was included in the analysis. While the fragmentation ratio that includes humanitarian aid has been stable for non-fragile states since 2004, it has increased by four percentage points in fragile states during the same time period.

Who are the “fragmenters”?

To engage in a process to improve cross-country division of labour, it is important to examine how donors allocate their aid. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the fragmentation problem originates to a large extent from bilateral sources of aid. The average concentration ratio of DAC countries fell slightly to 55% in 2009 from 56% in 2008. There are, nevertheless, wide variations between donors on either side of this average. Germany, Japan and the United States are significant in over 80% of their aid relations, while Canada and a number of Nordic Plus donors are significant in less than 40% of theirs. (Table 4.4 shows the 2009 concentration ratio for DAC countries.)

Bilateral donors may be expected to be more significant in the countries they have defined as “priority partners” and where they have declared a special focus and a long-term engagement. Yet, 2009 CPA figures show that DAC donors’ aid relations with one-fifth (19%) of countries they had designated as priority partners were non-significant. While

Table 4.4. **DAC countries' concentration ratio**
(countries listed by 2009 concentration ratio)

DAC countries	Significant relations	Non-significant relations Neither A, B and C	Concentration ratio (2009)	Concentration ratio in priority partner countries (2009)	For reference: Concentration ratio (2008)	—
	A	B	A/(A+B)		A/(A+B)	
Japan	112	19	85%	n.a.	77%	↑
United States	106	23	82%	n.a.	82%	→
Germany	91	21	81%	96%	78%	↑
Austria	24	6	80%	100%	86%	↓
Greece	21	9	70%	78%	67%	↑
Portugal	12	6	67%	100%	63%	↑
New Zealand	19	14	58%	88%	77%	↓
Australia	28	24	54%	75%	41%	↑
France	62	56	53%	65%	56%	↓
Netherlands	37	36	51%	82%	58%	↓
Switzerland	33	33	50%	73%	46%	↑
Korea	33	36	48%	54%	50%	↓
Belgium	21	23	48%	89%	48%	→
Spain	52	60	46%	72%	59%	↓
United Kingdom	43	51	46%	100%	44%	↑
Sweden	38	46	45%	86%	54%	↓
Italy	38	53	42%	62%	46%	↓
Luxembourg	19	29	40%	100%	50%	↓
Norway	36	58	38%	100%	37%	↑
Denmark	29	48	38%	100%	36%	↑
Finland	27	45	38%	100%	40%	↓
Ireland	17	29	37%	100%	56%	↓
Canada	18	37	33%	68%	30%	↑
Total bilateral	916	762	55%	81%	56%	

Notes: Japan and the United States do not use the concept of priority partner countries.

The highlighted countries are those above the DAC countries' average.

The coloured arrows on the right hand side of the table denote whether the concentration ratio increased or not between 2008 and 2009. The upward arrow shows an increase, the downward arrow a decrease, and the horizontal arrow no change.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

eight donors were significant in all their priority countries (with concentration ratios of 100%), seven donors – Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Korea, Spain, and Switzerland – were non-significant in 25% or more of their priority partner countries, with concentration ratios of 75% or less.

While DAC donors' concentration ratios deteriorated between 2008 and 2009, it is nevertheless important to note that many donors have taken measures to reduce the overall number of their partner countries. Because phasing out aid projects and programmes of a partner country is a long process, the impact of planned aid exits on overall fragmentation is difficult to estimate. Although there are limits to the figures available, the next section uses CPA statistics for 2009 to present the geographic distribution and initial

estimates of the financial impact of donors' decisions to rationalise aid by focusing on fewer partnerships.

What is the estimated impact of donors' concentration decisions?

In the past four years, many donors – which include nearly all DAC EU donors – have taken the decision to rationalise their aid portfolios by concentrating aid on fewer partner countries. At the same time, high growth rates in developing countries have resulted in reduced global poverty, with many graduating from low- to middle-income status, especially in South and East Asia. Together, these forces are contributing to a continuously evolving aid allocation landscape and to a redistribution of aid that reflects the rapid changes in the global economy. This situation underlines the importance of producing a comprehensive analysis of aid allocations in order to support better informed decision making by all development actors.

The OECD's *2011 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans* (2011b) collected information on planned donor exits from 2011 to 2015. Information received from 12 DAC EU countries pointed to an expected total of 162 exits – an average of 13.5 exits per donor. Acknowledging that phasing out aid projects and programmes is a long process as donors gradually reduce their volumes of aid, the survey simulated the potential impact of the exits using 2009 CPA levels.

From a partner country perspective, it is generally not the largest donors in terms of aid volume that are planning to phase out. However, it is worth noting that while a given donor may not provide large aggregate volumes of aid to a particular country, its aid may nevertheless represent a significant proportion of aid directed to a certain sector or area where only a few donors present. Phase-outs of such aid programmes may therefore have a significant impact at country level.

There seem to be positive signs that planned exits are focusing on non-significant aid relations. More than half of all donors' planned aid exits are taking place in countries where their aid relations were considered non-significant in 2009, although there are once again large variations across the regions (Table 4.5). In Africa and Asia, two-thirds of all planned exits were non-significant aid relations, whereas in Europe and the Americas two-thirds concerned significant relations. No DAC EU donor has announced that it will phase out aid operations from Oceania, a region with a traditionally limited presence of European donors.

Table 4.5. **Planned aid exits from significant and non-significant aid relations**

	Total number of planned exits	Total number of planned exits for significant relations	Total number of planned exits for non-significant relations	Significant relations as share of all planned exits
Europe	26	19	7	73%
Africa	67	22	45	33%
America	23	14	9	61%
Asia	46	17	29	37%
Oceania	-	-	-	0%
Global	162	72	90	44%

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

In total, the 162 aid relationships represented 8% of DAC EU global CPA in 2009. Europe is the region most affected, with 25% of all DAC EU aid relations to be phased out in the next few years. This is not surprising given that many partner countries are upper-middle income countries and some are already negotiating future membership of the European Union. In volume, CPA from DAC EU countries to Europe and the Americas is expected to drop by 16% (measured at 2009 CPA levels) as a result of donors' phase-out decisions. The 2011 OECD survey also shows that nearly 17% of all DAC EU aid relations in Africa – or 6% of all CPA from DAC EU countries to Africa in 2009 – are expected to be phased out in the next few years (see Table 4.6). However, the survey's estimated figures do not allow for the possibility of other donors compensating these exits by scaling up their aid to these countries.

Table 4.6. **Impact of planned aid exits on number of DAC donors and CPA**

	Average number of DAC countries per partner country	Average number of DAC EU countries per partner country	Average number of DAC EU exits per partner country	Total CPA provided by DAC countries	Total CPA provided by DAC EU countries	Total CPA of DAC EU exits
Europe	14.7	9.4	2.4	2 586	1 332	208
Africa	12.0	7.3	1.2	17 673	10 068	581
America	8.3	4.8	0.7	5 012	2 209	358
Asia	14.4	8.6	1.3	24 670	6 928	605
Oceania	3.5	1.4	-	1 156	128	-
Global	11.0	6.6	1.1	51 097	20 665	1 752

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

How fragmented are multilateral agencies?

On average, multilateral agencies have a higher concentration ratio than DAC countries. Many agencies have a regional mandate, which limits their aid allocations to a specific region and results in relatively high concentrations of funds in a limited set of partner countries. Regional development banks fall into this category and are often among a country's largest donors. Multilateral agencies with global mandates or specific thematic mandates, which include many UN agencies and global partnerships and programmes, are those with the lowest concentration ratios.

Although multilateral donors perform better than bilaterals, their concentration ratios nevertheless fell between 2008 and 2009 (see Table 4.7). In 2009 some agencies widened the scope of their operations, a move attributable to the multilateral crisis response initiative and expansion to address global public goods.

Insofar as a multilateral agency's mandate permits, its governing board's decisions on aid allocations should seek to ensure that it is significant in the partner countries where it is present. Where this is not possible, it is important to ensure that funding channels and arrangements are such that the administrative burden is kept to a minimum for all parties involved. Recent efforts by multilateral development banks and UN agencies to consolidate activities are a positive step in this direction.

Table 4.7. **Multilaterals' concentration ratio**
(donors sorted by 2009 concentration ratio)

Multilateral donors	Significant relations	Non-significant relations Neither A, B and C		Concentration ratio (2009)	For reference: Concentration ratio (2008)	
		A	B	A/(A+B)	A/(A+B)	
IADB	25	0		100%	96%	↑
UNRWA	4	0		100%	100%	→
CarDB	13	1		93%	100%	↓
IDA	69	11		86%	90%	↓
EU institutions	124	25		83%	88%	↓
AfDF	32	7		82%	87%	↓
IMF	30	7		81%	84%	↓
Nordic Dev.Fund	16	4		80%	73%	↑
UNTA	107	37		74%	69%	↑
IAEA	68	28		71%	69%	↑
UNFPA	75	43		64%	62%	↑
Global Fund	59	35		63%	64%	↓
UNAIDS	66	41		62%	70%	↓
IFAD	44	30		59%	69%	↓
GEF	68	48		59%	63%	↓
Montreal Protocol	7	5		58%	61%	↓
GAVI	38	29		57%	60%	↓
Arab Agencies	51	40		56%	62%	↓
UNDP	75	59		56%	58%	↓
AsDF	21	17		55%	49%	↑
UNICEF	57	63		48%	45%	↑
Total Multilaterals	1 049	530		66%	68%	

Notes: The coloured arrows on the right hand side of the table denote whether the concentration ratio increased or not between 2008 and 2009. The upward arrow shows an increase, the downward arrow a decrease, the horizontal arrow no change.

The highlighted donors are those above the multilateral average.

The Arab agencies are the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Fund.

The Global Fund provides financing to the health sector only. Global Fund disbursements may still, therefore, represent a significant contribution to the health sector even if the overall country relation is classified as non-significant.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

The way in which multilateral agencies are funded also impinges on overall aid fragmentation (OECD, 2011c). Data from 2009 confirm that DAC members channel most (81%) of their multilateral aid into five main clusters of multilaterals. They are:

- the European Development Fund (EDF) and EU budget – 37%;
- International Development Association (IDA) – 21%;
- UN Funds and Programmes – 10%;

- the African Development Bank (AfDF) and Asian Development Bank (AsDB) – 5% and 3%, respectively;
- the Global Fund (6%).

Only 18% of multilateral aid goes to the remaining 200 multilateral organisations which often provide technical assistance or serve standard-setting purposes. In addition, many bilateral flows earmarked for specific countries, regions, sectors and themes transit through multilateral agencies. Such flows are increasing and may contribute to the increasing fragmentation of aid at country level.

Notes

1. Iraq received USD 2.2 billion in CPA in 2009. Excluding CPA from the United States, Iraq received USD 232 million from the remaining 25 donors, roughly the same level of aggregate CPA that was extended to Moldova (USD 233 million) or Ecuador (USD 236 million) in the same year.
2. Between 2004 and 2009, the number of donors has decreased in 11 LICs: Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lesotho, Korea, Dem. Rep., Malawi, Mauritania, Sao Tome & Principe, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu and Uzbekistan. During the same period, the number of donors has increased by more than 50% in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti and Liberia.
3. These are countries classified as fragile and/or conflict-affected states according to the working definition of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and this is not an official DAC list or definition. This list compiles various measures for fragility, such as the World Bank CPIA bottom two quintiles and Fund for Peace Failed States Index. See OECD (2011a), “Ensuring Fragile States are not left Behind” (forthcoming).

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Chapter 5

Approaches to reducing fragmentation


This chapter proposes ways of curbing aid fragmentation, and proposes relative targets to guide changes in this direction. It closes Part II with some brief conclusions and recommendations.

The potential for rationalisation

Multilateral agencies have global or regional mandates and rely on their governing bodies for allocation decisions. Consequently, it is not an easy matter for them to withdraw aid to partner countries to further concentrate it on others. For this reason, this section focuses only on non-significant bilateral relations. However, it should be stressed that all actors have the opportunity to rationalise assistance within their own aid portfolios and make greater use of joint financing arrangements.

The global fragmentation ratio for both bilateral and multilateral agencies in 2009 was 40%. Bilateral donors' non-significant aid relations alone accounted for 23% of all aid relations. There were 762 of them, totalling USD 2.9 billion or about 3% of global CPA. The average non-significant bilateral aid relationship represented only USD 3.8 million per year, compared to USD 52.6 million for the average significant one.

Figure 5.1. **Distribution of aid relations**



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

How can donors reach average concentration ratios?

There is no single ideal concentration or fragmentation level for a donor or a partner country. It is important to emphasise that the degree to which an aid relationship is non-significant varies. Some non-significant aid relations are far from being significant from both donor or partner country perspectives, whereas others are closer to be considered significant from at least one of the two perspectives. There is no one solution and all non-significant aid relations merit close attention. The aim of this chapter is to provide the evidence required to spark discussion on fragmentation and incite donors to review their aid portfolios with a view to increasing the number of significant aid relationships and reducing their non-significant ones. Ideally, the result should be to lower transaction and administrative costs both for donors and partner countries and, ultimately, to contribute to more effective aid delivery and stronger development outcomes at country level.

Table 5.1. How DAC donors could reach the DAC average concentration ratio

Bilateral donors	Number of partner countries (2009)	Current concentration ratio	Reduction in number of non-significant aid relations to reach DAC average concentration ratio (assuming the number of significant relations is fixed)	New concentration ratio (if all donors are above or at the DAC average concentration ratio of 55%)	Financial impact of reallocation	
					Amounts reallocated (in USD million)	As percentage of donor portfolio
Japan	131	85%	0	85%	0	-
United States	129	82%	0	82%	0	-
Germany	112	81%	0	81%	0	-
Austria	30	80%	0	80%	0	-
Greece	30	70%	0	70%	0	-
Portugal	18	67%	0	67%	0	-
New Zealand	33	58%	0	58%	0	-
Australia	52	54%	-1	55%	5	0.4%
France	118	53%	-4	55%	24	0.6%
Netherlands	73	51%	-5	55%	20	1.2%
Switzerland	66	50%	-6	55%	19	4.0%
Korea	69	48%	-9	55%	23	4.7%
Belgium	44	48%	-6	55%	12	2.6%
Spain	112	46%	-17	55%	109	4.5%
United Kingdom	94	46%	-15	55%	46	1.2%
Sweden	84	45%	-14	55%	69	6.2%
Italy	91	42%	-21	55%	50	8.9%
Luxembourg	48	40%	-13	55%	11	6.2%
Norway	94	38%	-28	55%	146	11.5%
Denmark	77	38%	-24	55%	76	6.1%
Finland	72	38%	-23	55%	29	8.7%
Ireland	46	37%	-15	55%	12	3.4%
Canada	55	33%	-22	55%	168	16.3%
Total/average for all DAC countries	1678/73	55%	(-222/-10)	63%	(-819/-36)	1.6%
Total/average for countries below DAC average	1195/75	44%	-222/-14	55%	-819/-51	3.9%

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

One possible way to pursue this objective within the DAC would be to increase members' concentration ratios. To guide changes in this direction, relative targets could be introduced. The 16 DAC members that presently score below the DAC average could strive to reach the current DAC average concentration ratio. Donors above the current DAC average could also improve their concentration ratios, but without setting fixed targets. Theoretically, there are two basic approaches: either phase out or scale up existing non-significant aid relations.

Phasing out takes time and, to ensure predictability and sustainability, needs to be done in close consultation with partner country and other donors. At the same time, it is important to appreciate that, in many cases, existing memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and contracting arrangements may already be determined. Assuming that the average donor's project and/or programme cycle is 4-5 years, DAC could set a realistic target date of 2015 to achieve progress on cross-country allocations.

If donors decide to follow the phasing-out approach as way to increase their concentration ratios, 16 DAC countries would need to reduce their number of non-significant aid relations (on the basis of 2009 CPA data) in order to reach the current DAC average concentration ratio. This approach is illustrated in Table 5.1, assuming no increases in overall aid envelopes and no changes to the number of significant aid relations.

Table 5.1 shows that the theoretically necessary reduction in the number of non-significant aid relations varies significantly across donors. Canada, for example, would have to phase out 22 non-significant aid relations to reach the DAC average, whereas only one exit would be required for Australia. Altogether, the 222 non-significant aid relations scrutinised by this analysis represent USD 819 million or 3.9% of bilateral donors' aggregate CPA in 2009. The effect of all bilateral donors achieving at least the current DAC average concentration ratio would be a rise in the overall DAC concentration ratio from 55% to 63%. Furthermore, the phase-out of non-significant relations would theoretically free up resources that could be reallocated to other aid relations.

Alternatively, donors could increase their concentration ratios by scaling up assistance to the partner countries with whom they have non-significant aid relations. Theoretically, assuming growing aid budget and that the total number of aid relations is fixed, nearly USD 500 million in additional resources would be required to raise the 16 donors up to the DAC average concentration ratio by transforming some of their non-significant relations into significant ones. This represents an average increase in aid budgets of 2.1% per donor.

In addition to phasing out and scaling up non-significant aid relations, donors could also engage in other forms of joint arrangements to reduce transaction costs for partner countries, such as joint programming, delegated co-operation, and joint financing. They could also use targets other than the DAC average, such as absolute or relative targets, in order to incite change and to set milestones for the coming years. In addition to increasing their concentration ratios, donors should aim to increase the significance of their aid relations in priority partner countries (where these are defined) so that no relation with the selected focus countries are non-significant.

Conclusions and recommendations

- To stimulate international dialogue on cross-country division of labour, it is important to examine where donors allocate their aid, assess progress in reducing fragmentation, and propose solutions.

- Aid fragmentation is still on the increase, especially in low-income countries and fragile states. The trend is disturbing since such countries have the least administrative capacity for managing large numbers of non-significant donors. Aid fragmentation remains high across middle-income countries, but has not worsened since 2004 and may even decrease as donors rationalise their aid portfolios, specifically in countries that are moving to higher income brackets.
- Fragmentation stems to a large extent from bilateral sources. DAC countries' average concentration ratio is still falling, but with wide variation across donors. Many DAC countries have been taking action to fund less partner countries and are planning exits – mostly from those with whom they have non-significant aid relations. However, results will become visible only in aid statistics reported over the next few years. Some donors need to redouble their efforts to ensure that their aid relations with priority partner countries are significant. Multilateral agencies can also support efforts to ensure financially significant aid relations and minimise transaction costs for all development partners.
- In the current context of fiscal austerity, it is important to maximise efficient aid provision and minimise the burden imposed on recipient countries. Two out of five DAC countries' aid relations are non-significant. They account for no more than USD 2.9 billion, or only about 3% of global CPA. Phasing out aid programmes in these countries would theoretically free up resources for reallocation to significant interventions on a larger scale for more impact that and lower transaction costs. As an alternative to phasing out non-significant aid relations, DAC donors could seek to scale them up over time.
- There are no “ideal” concentration or fragmentation levels per donor or partner country. From a partner country perspective, the wider choice and risk diversification resulting from multiple partnerships should be balanced against extra transaction costs, specifically those that stem from the “long tail” of small additional donors. The most important objective is to bring about steady change in some of the least efficient aid allocation practices. This can be done by setting relative targets where, for example, donors below DAC average could commit to reaching the current DAC average concentration ratio, while those already above the average could commit to improving their existing levels without a fixed target. The target date could be 2015, by which time donors should be able to demonstrate progress. At the very least, the donor community should have stopped further aid fragmentation and be progressively striving to reduce fragmentation in line with mutually agreed targets.
- Bilateral donors are concentrating aid on fewer partnerships and many partner countries are now faced with donor exits. Concentration strategies are typically inward-looking processes, involving very little co-ordination with other donors or partner country governments. If they are uncoordinated, such unilateral decisions do not necessarily lead to improved cross-country allocations. To that end, the international development community should draw on systematically regular analysis of fragmentation with the aim of supporting co-operation and dialogue among development actors and, ultimately, to inform all donors' aid allocation decisions.

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Annex II

Aid fragmentation

Annex II.1 Country programmable aid

Annex II.2 Matrix of individual aid relationships between donors and partner countries

Annex II.1

Country programmable aid

The methodology of country programmable aid (CPA) was first discussed at the DAC Workshop on Scaling Up for Results and Aid Allocations in February 2007. It was developed in collaboration with members when defining the coverage of the DAC 2007 Survey of Aid Allocation Policies and Indicative Forward Spending Plans. CPA is a recent statistical concept and the basis of DAC work on past and future aid allocations.

In brief, CPA identifies the share of total ODA that can be programmed country level and for which donors generally prepare multi-year forward expenditure plans. CPA is defined by subtracting from total gross ODA aid activities that:

- are unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief);
- entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, and research and refugees in donor countries);
- do not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid from local governments);
- are not country programmable by the donor (core funding of NGOs).

CPA does not net out loan repayments, as they are not usually factored into aid allocation decisions. CPA is also a good proxy for what is recorded at country level and can thus be useful for partner country use. Total DAC CPA is estimated at USD 55 billion in 2009 and represents 58% of DAC countries' gross bilateral ODA.

Historical data series are derived from the standard DAC and CRS statistics. CPA data by donor and recipient were derived retroactively from 2000 onwards and are available online on <http://stats.oecd.org> and for full download in Excel or text format from www.oecd.org/dac/cpa.

CPA data become more robust from 2007 onwards thanks to donors' improved reporting to the CRS activity database. Since then the DAC has, in addition, worked closely with a number of member countries to refine the derivation of CPA and better reflect each donor's specificities and practices. For a more comprehensive description of the CPA concept, please refer to the development brief on CPA, available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/51/45564447.pdf.

Table II.1.1. CPA of DAC members in 2009

	Breakdown of bilateral ODA					CPA	CPA USD million
	Bilateral ODA	Debt relief	Humanitarian aid and refugees in donor country	Other non- CPA items and unallocated			
	USD million		%				
Australia	2 312	0%	14%	16%	70%	1 614	
Austria	517	11%	16%	52%	21%	107	
Belgium	1 664	7%	13%	50%	31%	515	
Canada	3 182	2%	18%	43%	38%	1 204	
Denmark	1 941	0%	12%	19%	69%	1 331	
Finland	791	0%	18%	30%	52%	412	
France	8 588	20%	5%	26%	49%	4 171	
Germany	8 360	2%	6%	36%	56%	4 675	
Greece	297	0%	14%	35%	52%	153	
Ireland	693	0%	15%	31%	55%	382	
Italy	1 053	17%	15%	13%	55%	581	
Japan	13 150	1%	5%	12%	82%	10 737	
Korea	616	0%	3%	12%	86%	527	
Luxembourg	266	0%	16%	16%	68%	181	
Netherlands	4 957	1%	13%	48%	37%	1 849	
New Zealand	226	0%	4%	24%	72%	163	
Norway	3 164	1%	21%	32%	46%	1 459	
Portugal	312	1%	0%	21%	78%	243	
Spain	4 873	3%	15%	25%	57%	2 791	
Sweden	3 013	1%	22%	31%	46%	1 372	
Switzerland	1 761	9%	28%	30%	33%	574	
United Kingdom	7 599	1%	10%	36%	54%	4 100	
United States	25 992	1%	22%	16%	61%	15 732	
Total DAC countries	95 327	3%	14%	25%	58%	54 873	
EU institutions	13 024	1%	16%	9%	74%	9 603	
Total DAC members	108 350	3%	14%	23%	60%	64 476	

Annex II.2

Matrix of individual aid relationships between donors and partner countries

Table II.2.1. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
 — coverage: DAC countries

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country). Please note that the figures in the table refer to the donor's share of CPA in each partner country.

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Partner countries	Row	Number of donors		Number of significant relations		Number of non-significant relations		Fragmentation ratio (in %)		CPA (USD million)		DAC countries		Grand total		No. of DAC countries		No. of multilateral agencies															
		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%												
Number of partner countries	1	Column 1																															
Number of significant relations	2	37	13	24	65	5263	0.6	0.0	0.1	3.0	1.4	0.3	0.8	4.7	0.3	0.0	1.9	0.1	19	0.2	1.3	1.2	0.3	6.0	53.1	100.0	23	16.5	14	14			
Number of non-significant relations	3	29	22	5	19	264	-	-	-	1.4	0.8	2.2	1.8	-	-	-	2.2	1.9	10.7	-	6.4	5.5	9.4	0.6	-	1.7	16.2	100.0	13	38.9	13	13	
Concentration ratio (in %)	4	27	8	28	1639	1.8	-	-	-	2.8	2.8	0.1	0.0	3.5	-	-	0.4	6.0	0.9	-	1.1	-	0.3	2.4	1.2	15.1	3.6	100.0	16	53.5	13	13	
Average CPA (USD million)	5	30	22	8	27	639	2.3	3.1	-	3.0	0.3	8.0	0.1	5.9	6.2	-	-	0.2	2.7	-	-	-	0.2	0.1	1.6	9.2	100.0	14	55.7	16	16		
Donors' share of global CPA (in %)	6	20	14	6	30	126	0.6	0.5	1.0	3.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.9	0.2	-	-	-	0.3	3.1	-	-	100.0	9	58.1	11	11		
	7	31	23	8	26	985	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	4.2	-	-	0.1	-	0.3	2.4	2.1	-	3.5	62.3	16	62.3	16	16	
	8	30	23	7	23	413	0.1	0.1	7.7	-	0.2	0.1	1.9	3.8	-	-	0.7	3.6	-	-	5.6	-	0.7	0.6	1.2	3.1	3.8	100.0	37.1	16	62.9	14	14
	9	33	24	9	27	692	6.4	-	0.8	1.0	2.4	1.1	3.7	4.2	-	-	0.1	0.1	17.9	2.4	0.2	-	4.0	3.4	0.4	4.7	10.1	100.0	19	36.3	14	14	
	10	22	14	8	36	179	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.3	0.9	-	0.4	-	1.0	-	-	9.3	100.0	23.4	9	76.6	13	13	
	11	25	20	5	20	259	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	-	0.4	0.3	3.6	-	-	100.0	27.8	11	72.2	14	14
	12	13	8	5	38	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	100.0	33.8	2	66.2	11	11
	13	34	16	18	53	1668	-	-	6.5	0.7	0.1	0.0	1.1	2.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	1.6	0.1	1.6	1.0	0.0	0.9	1.5	0.2	7.0	4.6	100.0	29.0	20	71.0	14	14
	14	21	14	7	33	123	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.0	14.6	-	0.7	-	0.4	-	0.4	-	-	100.0	52.6	7	47.4	14	14
	15	10	9	1	10	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63.2	-	-	-	-	100.0	69.3	2	30.7	8	8
	16	24	16	8	33	93	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	-	1.5	1.5	-	-	-	100.0	22.8	10	77.2	14	14
	17	36	20	16	44	2886	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.2	0.4	0.7	1.2	1.9	0.0	1.2	1.8	2.0	0.1	0.0	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	35.0	20	65.0	16	16
	18	22	16	6	27	126	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	12.9	8	87.1	14	14
	19	20	14	6	30	171	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	47.9	7	52.1	13	13
	20	20	14	6	30	131	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	4.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	26.4	8	73.6	12	12
	21	27	13	14	52	867	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	55.7	12	44.3	15	15
	22	8	5	3	38	27	37.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	81.2	3	18.8	5	5
	23	32	21	11	34	420	6.8	-	0.1	-	0.2	1.6	4.3	5.8	-	-	0.2	0.2	21.9	5.9	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	58.1	18	41.9	14	14
	24	21	17	4	19	129	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	7.5	0.3	3.7	18.9	-	-	100.0	47.8	8	8	

Table II.2.1. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
 – coverage: DAC countries (continued)

Partner countries	Number of donors		Number of significant relations		Number of non-significant relations		Fragmentation ratio (in %)	9 CPA (USD million)	%																		No. of DAC countries		No. of multilateral agencies	
	2	3	4	5	6	7			8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
1 Column 1	24	19	5	21	324	2.7	0.5	0.1	2.8	-	2.7	0.8	3.5	-	4.7	-	0.7	5.9	0.4	8.4	30.9	100.0	63.9	13	36.1	11				
Liberia	27	20	7	26	378	-	0.1	20.2	3.5	-	-	0.5	0.1	1.8	-	0.4	0.1	1.2	-	15.7	100.0	48.8	13	51.2	14					
Madagascar	27	19	8	30	672	0.6	1.5	1.1	0.2	4.0	-	2.4	0.2	9.4	-	1.3	0.7	-	15.4	11.3	100.0	52.7	14	47.3	13					
Malawi	15	12	3	20	33	5.4	-	22.4	-	-	-	13.8	-	1.5	-	-	-	-	1.2	-	100.0	44.4	5	55.6	10					
Maldives	30	19	11	37	913	-	1.7	7.4	2.0	6.8	4.8	0.4	2.8	1.4	1.4	1.7	3.2	1.0	-	10.7	100.0	54.6	15	45.4	15					
Mali	22	17	5	23	221	-	0.3	-	12.0	4.3	-	1.2	3.5	0.3	0.3	17.1	0.4	-	1.8	-	100.0	40.8	9	59.2	13					
Mauritania	36	24	12	33	863	0.2	0.5	0.6	3.0	5.6	2.2	3.2	1.2	4.1	3.4	2.8	5.2	1.0	2.9	11.2	100.0	61.6	20	38.4	16					
Mozambique	22	17	5	23	172	3.8	-	4.2	0.4	2.0	-	0.4	22.2	0.2	0.2	6.4	-	5.4	14.2	4.5	100.0	66.2	13	33.8	9					
Myanmar (Burma)	34	19	15	44	863	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	5.1	0.1	0.0	5.3	2.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	5.3	6.0	100.0	50.5	21	49.5	13					
Nepal	28	22	6	21	368	-	-	5.0	0.8	3.2	-	0.4	6.5	-	0.4	-	4.0	-	2.0	0.8	2.6	100.0	45.9	13	54.1	15				
Niger	35	20	15	43	868	0.0	0.1	8.3	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.1	1.4	0.3	0.6	6.2	0.4	0.1	2.5	1.4	0.4	100.0	52.5	20	47.5	15				
Rwanda	12	10	2	17	79	20.7	-	-	-	19.7	-	-	-	12.3	-	-	-	-	1.2	-	8	53.8	4	46.2	8					
Samoa	15	13	2	13	24	-	-	-	5.4	-	-	-	-	-	42.4	4.5	-	-	-	-	1.7	100.0	53.9	4	46.1	11				
Sao Tome and Principe	33	23	10	30	903	-	0.4	1.3	4.3	0.1	10.3	2.1	-	0.1	2.0	4.1	0.6	2.4	5.0	0.1	6.6	100.0	43.9	17	56.1	16				
Senegal	30	17	13	43	388	-	0.2	-	0.8	0.4	0.1	3.0	-	0.8	-	0.3	0.3	0.1	20.7	2.0	100.0	40.8	15	59.2	15					
Sierra Leone	10	2	8	80	206	81.0	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	-	12.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	96.1	3	3.9	7					
Solomon Islands	22	17	5	23	165	-	-	5.2	2.3	3.0	-	1.1	1.8	5.0	0.2	-	8.5	-	6.4	0.6	13.3	100.0	65.6	13	34.4	9				
Somalia	33	18	15	45	872	0.4	0.0	0.1	5.1	2.0	0.2	0.6	1.1	0.1	1.9	7.6	0.2	-	8.2	0.0	7.0	100.0	85.3	21	14.7	12				
Sudan	37	18	19	51	2813	0.1	0.0	0.5	2.8	3.8	1.9	0.3	2.7	1.8	0.2	4.1	0.3	0.0	2.2	0.0	4.2	100.0	46.5	21	53.5	16				
Tanzania	21	16	5	24	195	30.5	-	-	0.2	2.5	-	3.5	-	5.6	0.8	-	2.4	4.4	16.3	3.8	2.3	100.0	84.9	12	15.1	9				
Timor-Leste	21	15	6	29	215	-	-	0.6	-	13.8	1.4	-	-	-	5.4	0.3	-	-	0.5	0.2	-	100.0	23.9	8	76.1	13				
Togo	7	6	1	14	17	26.2	-	-	-	-	-	50.4	-	7.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.7	100.0	84.5	3	15.5	4				
Tuvalu	32	22	10	31	1535	0.1	0.7	1.2	6.0	0.2	1.0	3.1	-	2.5	3.2	3.5	0.5	2.7	0.1	5.6	19.9	100.0	53.2	17	46.8	15				
Uganda	9	7	2	22	103	38.7	-	-	5.9	-	-	12.2	-	14.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.2	100.0	92.9	5	7.1	4				
Vanuatu	24	16	8	33	379	-	-	0.9	-	1.2	14.9	-	-	7.9	0.1	2.4	8.4	0.1	-	8.1	5.8	100.0	50.2	12	49.8	12				
Yemen	32	18	14	44	1198	0.1	-	0.0	0.7	3.9	1.9	0.2	4.2	-	3.0	0.2	2.7	0.1	0.8	1.6	18.4	100.0	54.1	18	45.9	14				
Zambia																														
Other low-income countries																														
Cote d'Ivoire	29	12	17	59	791	-	-	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.1	2.0	1.6	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	8.3	100.0	13.6	14	86.4	15				
Ghana	32	17	15	47	1527	0.0	-	5.7	5.8	4.0	3.5	-	-	6.4	0.2	1.4	0.1	0.7	9.7	9.5	100.0	50.8	16	49.2	16					
Kenya	37	22	15	41	1506	0.2	0.1	1.0	0.6	3.6	0.8	3.4	4.5	-	0.1	0.3	4.9	0.3	0.0	1.2	0.0	100.0	60.9	21	39.1	16				
Korea, Dem. Rep.	13	11	2	15	25	-	-	-	1.9	-	2.1	-	-	1.9	-	3.7	-	-	3.6	10.1	14.8	100.0	47.1	8	52.9	5				
Kyrgyz Republic	26	16	10	38	278	-	-	-	0.3	0.5	6.4	-	-	5.6	0.3	-	1.2	-	0.5	2.7	5.6	100.0	42.5	11	57.5	15				
Nigeria	29	12	17	59	1650	0.0	-	0.8	1.9	0.0	0.4	1.1	-	0.3	-	0.0	0.1	1.7	0.1	0.1	11.3	100.0	40.3	15	59.7	14				

Table II.2.1. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
– coverage: DAC countries (continued)

Partner countries	Number of donors				9 CPA (USD million)		%																		No. of DAC countries		No. of multilateral agencies							
	2	3	4	5	Fragmentation ratio (in %)		Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Korea	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States	Grand total	%	No.	%	No.
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	21	13	8	38	183	-	1.6	-	-	-	-	-	0.9	7.8	0.8	-	0.8	13.2	-	-	9.9	-	3.8	-	0.9	5.2	5.6	1.1	16.5	100.0	68.2	13	31.8	8
Georgia	29	8	21	72	747	-	0.0	-	0.4	0.4	1.5	7.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	1.9	-	0.7	-	1.1	-	0.1	1.8	0.3	0.9	30.1	100.0	46.8	16	53.2	13	
Guatemala	30	18	12	40	311	-	0.5	-	0.9	0.5	0.1	0.8	4.4	-	0.1	0.8	10.6	1.2	0.1	9.0	-	2.4	-	22.7	8.1	0.2	0.2	19.7	100.0	82.3	18	17.7	12	
Guyana	17	7	10	59	173	-	-	-	0.9	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	2.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	-	1.2	15.1	100.0	20.9	6	79.1	11	
Honduras	30	19	11	37	412	-	-	-	4.2	0.7	0.2	0.3	3.4	-	0.4	0.6	9.8	1.1	-	0.2	-	0.3	-	8.4	1.9	0.6	-	29.7	100.0	61.9	15	38.1	15	
India	34	9	25	74	4016	0.2	0.1	-	0.2	0.1	0.4	7.9	-	0.0	0.4	30.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.2	14.1	100.0	57.5	20	42.5	14	
Indonesia	33	10	23	70	3313	9.9	-	-	0.7	0.3	0.0	9.0	3.0	-	0.0	0.0	42.4	0.9	-	3.9	0.1	0.4	-	0.6	0.2	0.2	1.1	5.6	100.0	78.5	18	21.5	15	
Iran	20	19	1	5	33	-	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.9	19.4	-	-	13.7	-	2.4	-	2.8	-	-	2.2	2.0	100.0	74.9	11	25.1	9	
Iraq	26	2	24	92	2237	1.3	-	-	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.1	0.3	-	0.0	-	0.2	-	0.1	0.3	-	1.6	89.6	100.0	96.2	17	3.8	9	
Jordan	26	8	18	69	836	-	-	-	0.8	0.1	-	7.8	7.2	0.3	-	1.4	5.3	0.5	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	1.1	-	0.1	0.2	47.3	100.0	72.2	14	27.8	12	
Kosovo	24	11	13	54	717	-	0.4	-	-	0.9	1.7	0.0	4.0	4.3	0.1	0.4	-	1.0	0.1	-	1.0	0.1	2.9	1.5	0.1	1.7	6.0	1.6	28.7	100.0	55.5	17	44.5	7
Marshall Islands	7	4	3	43	59	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83.3	100.0	98.3	3	1.7	4	
Micronesia, Fed. States	7	2	5	71	120	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	89.5	100.0	98.4	3	1.6	4	
Moldova	27	15	12	44	233	0.8	-	-	-	0.1	0.3	0.4	2.4	0.4	-	0.2	1.2	-	0.1	0.9	-	1.6	-	0.1	8.8	2.5	1.2	14.9	100.0	35.9	16	64.1	11	
Mongolia	28	16	12	43	363	2.1	-	-	-	0.2	0.2	0.4	5.3	-	-	-	24.3	8.8	0.4	2.7	-	0.4	-	0.1	0.4	2.5	0.1	6.4	100.0	54.2	15	45.8	13	
Morocco	27	9	18	67	1119	-	1.6	-	0.5	0.1	0.0	23.5	8.5	-	-	0.4	12.4	0.2	0.1	0.2	-	-	-	1.8	17.1	-	0.0	5.1	100.0	71.9	16	28.1	11	
Namibia	21	13	8	38	328	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	15.5	11.7	-	-	0.3	12.1	-	2.7	0.6	-	0.6	-	3.3	0.7	-	0.2	27.4	100.0	76.3	12	23.7	9	
Nicaragua	34	20	14	41	699	-	1.0	0.1	1.2	3.9	1.9	0.1	3.7	-	-	0.1	0.3	1.6	2.1	1.5	4.4	-	2.5	-	16.0	4.0	1.1	0.9	12.7	100.0	58.9	19	41.1	15
Niue	6	5	1	17	9	14.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62.2	-	-	62.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	76.5	2	23.5	4	
Palestinian Adm. Areas	31	15	16	52	1963	1.0	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.6	3.4	4.2	0.4	0.2	1.5	2.7	0.2	0.2	2.2	0.0	4.1	0.1	1.8	2.0	0.5	3.1	27.5	100.0	57.1	23	42.9	8	
Paraguay	19	12	7	37	197	-	-	-	-	0.5	3.8	-	-	-	-	0.5	41.3	2.5	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	15.3	0.8	-	13.3	100.0	78.4	9	21.6	10	
Peru	28	19	9	32	630	-	-	-	1.8	1.3	0.1	0.4	2.2	16.1	-	0.1	0.8	21.5	1.3	0.3	0.4	-	0.7	-	7.6	0.5	2.4	0.1	21.7	100.0	79.0	18	21.0	10
Philippines	31	12	19	61	1070	8.3	-	-	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.4	4.0	-	0.0	0.2	61.9	2.1	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.2	-	2.7	0.5	-	0.1	9.6	100.0	91.8	18	8.2	13	
Sri Lanka	32	15	17	53	982	1.5	-	-	1.4	3.2	0.4	2.1	1.9	-	-	0.2	34.6	1.9	-	0.3	0.1	2.2	-	1.4	1.2	0.1	0.4	1.7	100.0	54.5	17	45.5	15	
Swaziland	18	14	4	22	62	0.7	-	-	-	0.6	0.5	-	0.9	-	-	-	1.6	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	1.7	-	-	24.8	100.0	31.3	8	68.7	10		
Syria	21	14	7	33	197	-	0.1	-	-	0.6	-	4.8	9.2	1.3	-	6.5	9.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	0.2	0.5	0.3	100.0	34.5	11	65.5	10	
Thailand	24	16	8	33	226	1.8	-	-	-	1.3	-	5.6	5.5	-	-	0.4	49.3	0.9	-	1.6	-	0.4	-	2.0	0.5	-	0.6	10.1	100.0	79.9	13	20.1	11	
Tokelau	3	3	0	0	10	8.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.6	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	98.4	2	1.6	1	
Tonga	9	7	2	22	39	34.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29.5	-	-	-	89.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	98.4	2	1.6	1	
Tunisia	22	10	12	55	612	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	31.3	6.8	-	-	3.8	13.5	0.6	0.1	-	-	18.0	-	21.2	-	0.2	0.1	0.3	100.0	78.0	11	22.0	11	
Turkmenistan	14	11	3	21	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.4	-	-	-	-	4.1	-	-	-	-	2.2	-	-	-	-	-	1.2	38.5	100.0	50.4	5	49.6	9
Ukraine	25	14	11	44	567	-	0.2	2.8	0.5	0.1	1.6	13.8	0.3	-	-	-	10.7	0.6	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.6	6.3	1.3	0.5	19.5	100.0	59.4	15	40.6	10	
Wallis and Futuna	2	1	1	50	118	-	-	-	-	-	-	99.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	99.8	1	0.2	1	

Table II.2.1. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
 – coverage: DAC countries (continued)

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA, and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country). Please note that the figures in the table refer to the donor's share of CPA in each partner country.

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Partner countries	2 Number of donors		3 Number of significant relations		4 Number of non-significant relations		5 CPA (USD million)		6 CPA (USD million)		7 Average CPA (USD million)		8 Donors' share of global CPA (in %)		
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	
Anguilla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Antigua and Barbuda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Argentina	19	14	5	26	137	-	4.5	11.7	0.4	-	-	-	21.0	8.3	
Barbados	9	8	1	11	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.5	8.3	
Belarus	18	15	3	17	61	-	2.6	0.4	0.9	17.2	-	-	0.9	-	
Belize	14	12	2	14	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	
Botswana	18	7	11	61	287	0.1	-	0.2	0.2	0.5	-	-	0.7	-	
Brazil	29	17	12	41	484	-	-	0.2	5.5	32.6	0.1	0.1	2.7	19.1	
Chile	15	14	1	7	68	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.5	-	
Cook Islands	7	5	2	29	8	35.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Costa Rica	17	13	4	24	127	-	-	0.6	3.0	12.8	-	-	53.5	-	
Croatia	17	7	10	59	171	-	-	0.7	0.2	1.6	13.2	-	0.2	0.2	
Cuba	21	18	3	14	75	-	-	-	1.2	6.8	-	-	1.4	3.7	
Dominica	8	5	3	38	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.2	-	
Fiji	12	9	3	25	68	25.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.6	1.8	
Gabon	15	12	3	20	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.4	-	
Grenada	9	7	2	22	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	-	
Jamaica	18	13	5	28	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.9	0.6	
Kazakhstan	21	10	11	52	226	-	-	0.1	0.3	5.9	-	-	27.8	2.7	
Lebanon	30	14	16	53	489	-	-	0.2	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.1	4.2	2.1	
Libya	12	10	2	17	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.0	-	
Malaysia	19	7	12	63	279	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	86.2	0.4	
Australia	52	30	44	55	77	72	118	112	30	46	91	131	69	48	73
Austria	28	24	21	18	29	27	62	91	21	17	38	112	33	19	37
Belgium	24	6	23	37	48	45	56	21	9	29	53	19	36	29	36
Canada	54	80	48	33	38	38	53	81	70	37	42	85	48	40	51
Denmark	1465	85	469	1031	1237	337	3944	4087	117	354	5561	10569	495	172	1711
Finland	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
France	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
Germany	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
Greece	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
Ireland	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
Italy	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
Japan	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
Korea	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
Luxembourg	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
Netherlands	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
New Zealand	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
Norway	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
Portugal	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
Spain	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
Sweden	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
Switzerland	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
United Kingdom	28	3	11	19	16	5	33	36	4	8	6	81	7	4	23
United States	1.7	0.1	0.5	1.2	1.4	0.4	4.6	4.8	0.1	0.4	0.7	12.4	0.6	0.2	2.0
Grand total	3257	1678	3257	1678	3257	1678	3257	1678	3257	1678	3257	1678	3257	1678	3257
No. of DAC countries	1579	1049	1579	1049	1579	1049	1579	1049	1579	1049	1579	1049	1579	1049	1579
No. of multilateral agencies	530	66	530	66	530	66	530	66	530	66	530	66	530	66	530
%	34203	51097	34203	51097	34203	51097	34203	51097	34203	51097	34203	51097	34203	51097	34203
%	59.9	40.1	59.9	40.1	59.9	40.1	59.9	40.1	59.9	40.1	59.9	40.1	59.9	40.1	59.9

Table II.2.1. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD – coverage: DAC countries (continued)

Partner countries	Number of donors		Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	CPA (USD million)	DAC countries		Grand total		Multilateral agencies	
	2	3					%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
1 Column 1												
Mauritius	13	6	7	54	143	29.2	0.6	100.0	100.0	69.1	4	9
Mayotte	2	1	1	50	549	99.8	-	100.0	100.0	0.2	1	1
Mexico	19	10	9	47	239	6.7	9.5	100.0	100.0	18	10	9
Montenegro	20	16	4	20	71	1.2	25.5	100.0	100.0	0.6	13	7
Montserrat	4	2	2	50	43	-	-	100.0	100.0	86.9	1	3
Nauru	7	5	2	29	23	79.1	-	100.0	100.0	94.6	3	4
Oman	10	10	0	0	10	4.8	5.0	100.0	100.0	6.6	6	4
Palau	6	3	3	50	35	2.9	-	100.0	100.0	81.6	6	4
Panama	16	13	3	19	80	0.4	1.1	100.0	100.0	97.0	3	3
Serbia	30	12	18	60	566	0.5	0.4	100.0	100.0	85.4	7	9
Seychelles	8	7	1	13	26	0.7	0.1	100.0	100.0	45.0	20	10
South Africa	31	15	16	52	1002	8.8	1.2	100.0	100.0	43.9	2	6
St. Helena	2	1	1	50	31	0.3	0.2	100.0	100.0	79.3	21	10
St. Kitts-Nevis	4	4	0	0	7	0.3	0.1	100.0	100.0	95.5	1	1
St. Lucia	9	6	3	33	45	1.2	-	100.0	100.0	0.0	0	4
St. Vincent and Grenadines	8	6	2	25	33	-	-	100.0	100.0	15.3	2	7
Suriname	10	3	7	70	155	2.9	-	100.0	100.0	11.2	1	88.8
Trinidad and Tobago	9	9	0	0	5	20.7	-	100.0	100.0	78.3	3	7
Turkey	20	7	13	65	1634	10.3	6.1	100.0	100.0	39.0	3	6
Uruguay	15	14	1	7	59	3.8	5.4	100.0	100.0	50.9	11	9
Venezuela	17	17	0	0	45	6.0	9.0	100.0	100.0	65.8	6	9
						0.8	3.9	100.0	100.0	62.1	7	10
						11.7	-	100.0	100.0	37.9	7	10
						22.9	-	100.0	100.0	34.2	6	9
						8.3	0.4	100.0	100.0	49.1	11	9
						0.2	0.3	100.0	100.0	1.5	6	9
						8.1	10.2	100.0	100.0	61.0	3	6
						1.1	-	100.0	100.0	21.7	3	7
						4.5	52.1	100.0	100.0	52.1	1	6
						95.5	-	100.0	100.0	4.5	1	1
						-	-	100.0	100.0	100.0	0	4
						-	-	100.0	100.0	84.7	2	7
						14.1	-	100.0	100.0	15.3	2	7
						11.2	-	100.0	100.0	11.2	1	88.8
						-	-	100.0	100.0	21.7	3	7
						74.3	-	100.0	100.0	78.3	3	7
						0.0	-	100.0	100.0	39.0	3	6
						23.3	1.6	100.0	100.0	61.0	3	6
						26.1	6.2	100.0	100.0	49.1	11	9
						0.8	3.9	100.0	100.0	34.2	6	9
						11.7	-	100.0	100.0	37.9	7	10

Table II.2.2. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
— coverage: multilateral agencies (continued)

Partner countries	Number of donors				9 CPA (USD million)	Grand total																DAC countries		No. of multilateral agencies											
	2	3	4	5		Fragmentation ratio (in %)	AfDF	Arab Agencies	ASDF	CarDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev. Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	UNRWA	UNTA	%	No.	%	No.				
1 Row	Column 1																																		
Liberia	24	19	5	21	324	1.5				8.5	0.7	0.8				14.1	5.4						0.0	2.2	0.8	1.8			0.1	63.9	11	100.0			
Madagascar	27	20	7	26	378	9.0	3.1			11.9	1.4	3.3	4.6			0.1	9.6	2.1					0.2	1.7	0.7	3.2			0.3	48.8	13	100.0			
Malawi	27	19	8	30	672	7.2	1.1			11.6	1.0		9.9			0.0	12.2	0.5					0.1	1.7	0.5	1.4			0.1	52.7	14	100.0			
Maldives	15	12	3	20	33	6.0	17.8			2.3							17.5	0.2	4.8					2.6	1.3	3.0			0.2	44.4	5	100.0			
Mali	30	19	11	37	913	6.7	4.2			9.9	0.4	0.2	1.7			0.0	18.4	0.4	0.3					0.0	1.2	0.3	1.5			0.1	54.6	15	100.0		
Mauritania	22	17	5	23	221	11.4	12.1			12.1	0.4	0.2	0.2			0.0	17.4	2.3						0.1	0.8	1.1	0.9			0.3	40.8	9	100.0		
Mozambique	36	24	12	33	1863	4.1	0.9			10.4	0.3	0.2	0.5			0.0	11.5	0.3	8.2				0.3	0.1	0.4	2.2			0.1	61.6	20	100.0			
Myanmar (Burma)	22	17	5	23	172	2.6				11.6	0.3					0.1								0.0	0.1	0.2	0.8			0.0	33.8	8	100.0		
Nepal	34	19	15	44	863	0.0	23.6			3.1	0.2	0.1	0.7				18.2	0.4						0.3	4.9	3.3	9.8			0.7	66.2	13	100.0		
Niger	28	22	6	21	368	7.3	6.0			12.8	0.5	0.5	6.3			0.1	10.6	0.6	1.4					0.1	1.6	0.5	0.8			0.1	50.5	21	100.0		
Rwanda	35	20	15	43	868	7.7	0.4			12.0	0.4	0.2	9.3				13.1	0.9	0.4					0.4	0.1	0.9	0.3	1.1			0.1	52.5	20	100.0	
Samoa	12	10	2	17	79	0.5	13.8			11.4		4.2					4.2		11.4						0.7					0.2	53.8	4	100.0		
Sao Tome and Principe	15	13	2	13	24	3.5	5.5			12.5	0.9						4.6	5.9	2.4						4.7	2.3	2.9			0.8	53.9	4	100.0		
Senegal	33	23	10	30	903	4.6	4.8			14.6	0.5	0.4	2.6			0.0	15.1	0.5	11.1					0.4	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.7			0.1	43.9	17	100.0	
Sierra Leone	30	17	13	43	388	5.3	4.3			26.2	0.4	0.7	2.9			0.1	9.3	0.4	4.8					0.2	1.5	0.7	2.2			0.3	40.8	15	100.0		
Solomon Islands	10	2	8	8	206			1.0		1.6	0.2	0.4					0.4								0.2					0.0	96.1	3	100.0		
Somalia	22	17	5	23	165	0.6				20.4	0.1	2.6													0.3	3.6	1.3	5.5			0.0	65.6	13	100.0	
Sudan	33	18	15	45	872	0.2	2.2			5.2	1.6		0.7			0.1		1.3							0.1	0.7	1.0	1.5			0.1	85.3	21	100.0	
Tanzania	37	18	19	51	2813	8.6	0.4			4.2	0.2	0.4	3.8			0.0	22.3	1.3	10.9					0.0	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.7			0.0	46.5	21	100.0	
Timor-Leste	21	16	5	24	195			2.2		3.6			3.9				2.0								0.0	1.2	1.4	0.6			0.3	84.9	12	100.0	
Togo	21	15	6	25	215	1.1	7.6			18.7	1.5	1.9	6.8				13.1		19.2						0.1	3.2	0.7	2.1			0.2	23.9	8	100.0	
Tuvalu	7	6	1	14	17			12.2		0.2		3.0														0.2					0.0	84.5	3	100.0	
Uganda	32	22	10	31	1535	7.2	0.1			5.9	0.5	0.1	3.1			0.0	25.8	1.2						0.2	0.1	0.6	0.5	1.4			0.1	53.2	17	100.0	
Vanuatu	9	7	2	22	103			0.6		2.7		3.6														0.1					0.1	92.9	5	100.0	
Yemen	24	16	8	33	379			5.9		3.3	1.1	1.0				0.1	31.1	3.0						0.0	1.1	0.7	2.2			0.2	50.2	12	100.0		
Zambia	32	18	14	44	1198	2.9	0.2			12.1	0.3		4.6			0.0	3.6	0.3	20.3						0.3	0.1		0.3	0.7			0.1	54.1	18	100.0
Other low-income countries																																			
Cote d'Ivoire	29	12	17	59	791	8.1	2.3			8.2	0.7	0.1	2.2			0.0	24.0	0.5	38.0						0.1	0.4	0.6	1.0			0.1	13.6	14	100.0	
Ghana	32	17	15	47	1527	6.7	0.6			10.7	0.8	0.2	4.8			0.0	16.3	0.5	6.8					0.2	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.5			0.1	50.8	16	100.0	
Kenya	37	22	15	41	1506	4.1	1.5			2.1	0.8	0.2	2.9			0.0	10.9	0.6	13.9					0.3	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.7			0.1	60.9	21	100.0	
Korea, Dem. Rep.	13	11	2	15	25					7.1	13.2															4.7	22.2			5.8	47.1	8	100.0		
Kyrgyz Republic	26	16	10	38	278			3.3	16.5	10.3	0.4	0.4	0.5			0.1	13.9	0.2	9.2					0.0	1.5	0.2	0.5			0.5	42.5	11	100.0		
Nigeria	29	12	17	59	1650	1.1	0.0			4.7	0.3	1.3	17.5			0.0	30.1	0.4							0.1	0.9	0.3	2.9			0.1	40.3	15	100.0	

Table II.2.2. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD – coverage: multilateral agencies (continued)

Partner countries	Number of donors	Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	9 CPA (USD million)	Grand total																No. of DAC countries	No. of multilateral agencies							
						ATDF	Arab Agencies	AsDF	CarDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev. Fund	UNAIDS			UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	UNRWA	UNTA		
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	21	13	8	38	183	-	-	-	29.1	-	0.8	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.5	-	-	-	0.5	100.0	68.2	13	31.8	8	
Georgia	29	8	21	72	747	-	-	15.0	12.6	0.1	0.3	1.5	0.0	22.5	0.5	-	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	0.2	100.0	46.8	16	53.2	13	
Guatemala	30	18	12	40	311	-	0.8	-	7.4	-	0.1	1.5	5.2	0.1	1.3	-	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	-	-	-	0.1	100.0	82.3	18	17.7	12	
Guyana	17	7	10	59	173	-	-	-	0.9	30.3	0.2	4.3	36.9	-	4.8	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	100.0	20.9	6	79.1	11
Honduras	30	19	11	37	412	-	0.3	-	9.5	0.2	1.1	2.3	9.0	0.0	12.0	0.9	1.5	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.2	-	-	0.3	100.0	61.9	15	38.1	15	
India	34	9	25	74	4016	-	0.1	0.6	2.1	0.0	1.4	4.6	-	31.5	0.3	-	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	1.0	-	-	0.0	100.0	57.5	20	42.5	14	
Indonesia	33	10	23	70	3313	-	3.9	5.4	1.2	0.1	0.3	2.7	0.0	7.4	0.1	-	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	-	-	0.0	100.0	78.5	18	21.5	15	
Iran	20	19	1	5	33	-	1.9	-	1.3	-	5.6	-	1.5	-	-	-	-	0.7	2.7	4.5	5.2	-	-	1.7	100.0	74.9	11	25.1	9	
Iraq	26	2	24	92	2237	-	0.4	-	1.6	-	-	-	0.0	1.4	-	-	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	0.0	100.0	96.2	17	3.8	9	
Jordan	26	8	18	69	836	-	0.9	-	9.4	-	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.3	-	-	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	16.0	0.1	-	0.0	100.0	72.2	14	27.8	12	
Kosovo	24	11	13	54	717	-	-	-	43.0	-	0.2	-	-	0.9	-	-	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	-	-	-	-	100.0	55.5	17	44.5	7	
Marshall Islands	7	4	3	43	59	-	-	-	1.3	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	98.3	3	1.7	4	
Micronesia, Fed. States	7	2	5	71	120	-	0.7	-	0.7	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	98.4	3	1.6	4	
Moldova	27	15	12	44	233	-	-	-	45.4	0.0	3.3	-	0.2	10.9	2.2	-	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.4	-	-	-	0.0	100.0	35.9	16	64.1	11	
Mongolia	28	16	12	43	363	-	-	21.6	1.5	0.2	0.8	1.7	0.1	17.8	0.4	-	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.2	-	-	-	0.3	100.0	54.2	15	45.8	13	
Morocco	27	9	18	67	1119	-	1.1	-	25.2	0.4	0.5	-	0.0	0.3	-	-	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	-	-	-	0.1	100.0	71.9	16	28.1	11	
Namibia	21	13	8	38	328	-	-	-	9.8	0.4	11.7	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	-	-	-	0.2	100.0	76.3	12	23.7	9	
Nicaragua	34	20	14	41	699	-	0.3	-	4.0	0.2	0.1	2.0	16.5	0.0	10.0	0.4	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	-	-	-	0.2	100.0	58.9	19	41.1	15	
Niue	6	5	1	17	9	-	-	-	3.8	-	18.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	100.0	76.5	2	23.5	4	
Palestinian Adm. Areas	31	15	16	52	1963	-	0.3	-	18.8	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.2	23.2	0.0	-	0.0	100.0	57.1	23	42.9	8	
Paraguay	19	12	7	37	197	-	0.0	-	15.2	-	-	2.7	1.6	0.1	-	-	-	0.8	0.6	0.4	-	-	-	0.2	100.0	78.4	9	21.6	10	
Peru	28	19	9	32	530	-	-	-	13.0	-	1.7	4.2	0.9	0.1	-	-	-	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.2	-	-	0.1	100.0	79.0	18	21.0	10	
Philippines	31	12	19	61	1070	-	-	0.7	2.4	-	1.4	2.2	-	0.0	0.4	-	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.3	-	-	0.1	100.0	91.8	18	8.2	13	
Sri Lanka	32	15	17	53	982	-	0.0	18.5	3.6	0.3	0.1	0.9	-	0.0	19.9	1.4	-	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	-	-	0.1	100.0	54.5	17	45.5	15	
Swaziland	18	14	4	23	62	-	2.0	-	24.2	-	1.4	30.4	-	-	2.9	-	-	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.5	-	-	0.9	100.0	31.3	8	68.7	10	
Syria	21	14	7	33	197	-	2.8	-	23.1	-	2.4	-	0.5	-	3.5	-	-	0.8	0.9	0.4	30.5	0.7	-	0.7	100.0	34.5	11	65.5	10	
Thailand	24	16	8	33	226	-	-	0.6	2.2	-	0.3	13.4	0.2	-	-	-	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.4	-	-	0.5	100.0	79.9	13	20.1	11	
Tokelau	3	3	0	0	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	98.4	2	1.6	1	
Tonga	9	7	2	22	39	-	4.3	-	0.4	-	4.9	-	4.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	100.0	85.1	4	14.9	5	
Tunisia	22	10	12	55	612	-	1.0	-	17.7	-	2.2	0.5	0.1	-	-	-	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	0.1	100.0	78.0	11	22.0	11	
Turkmenistan	14	11	3	21	28	-	26.7	0.1	13.9	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	2.8	2.1	3.0	-	-	0.1	100.0	50.4	5	49.6	9	
Ukraine	25	14	11	44	567	-	-	-	31.2	0.0	2.5	5.7	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	-	-	0.3	100.0	59.4	15	40.6	10	
Wallis and Futuna	2	1	1	50	118	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	99.8	1	0.2	1

Table II.2.2. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
 — coverage: multilateral agencies (continued)

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country). Please note that the figures in the table refer to the donor's share of CPA in each partner country.

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Partner countries	2 Number of donors	3 Number of significant relations	4 Number of non-significant relations	5 Fragmentation ratio (in %)	9 CPA (USD million)	ARDF	Arab Agencies	CarDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev. Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	UNRWA	UNTA	Grand total	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies
Row	1 Column 1																													
2	Number of partner countries	39	91	14	149	67	116	94	25	96	80	74	37	12	20	107	134	118	120	4	144	3257	1678	1579	3257	1678	1579	3257		
3	Number of significant relations	32	51	21	13	124	38	68	59	25	68	69	44	30	7	16	66	75	57	4	107	1965	916	1049	1965	916	1049	1965		
4	Number of non-significant relations	7	40	17	1	25	48	35	0	28	11	30	7	5	4	41	59	43	63	0	37	1292	762	530	1292	762	530	1292		
5	Concentration ratio (in %)	82	56	55	93	83	57	59	63	100	71	86	59	81	58	80	62	56	64	48	100	74	60	66	60	55	66	60		
6	CPA (USD million)	1800	902	2736	81	8366	338	566	2307	554	39	11776	399	2487	29	70	47	476	267	693	772	98	85299	51097	34203	85299	51097	34203		
7	Average CPA (USD million)	46	10	72	6	56	5	25	22	0	140	5	67	2	3	0	4	2	6	193	1	561	30	22	561	30	22	561		
8	Donors' share of global CPA (in %)	2.1	1.1	3.2	0.1	9.8	0.4	0.7	2.7	0.6	0.0	13.1	0.5	2.9	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.9	0.1	100.0	59.9	40.1	100.0	59.9	40.1	100.0	
Upper-middle-income countries																														
Anguilla	1	1	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	0	0	100.0	1
Antigua and Barbuda	5	5	0	0	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1	1	79.0	4
Argentina	19	14	5	26	137	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	9	9	39.9	10
Barbados	9	8	1	11	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60.1	6	2	93.7	7
Belarus	18	15	3	17	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73.5	10	26.5	8	
Belize	14	12	2	14	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.4	4	79.6	10	
Botswana	18	7	11	61	287	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	78.3	9	21.7	9	
Brazil	29	17	12	41	484	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	87.0	19	13.0	10	
Chile	15	14	1	7	68	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71.2	6	28.8	9	
Cook Islands	7	5	2	29	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70.5	2	29.5	5	
Costa Rica	17	13	4	24	127	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	85.6	8	14.4	9	
Croatia	17	7	10	59	171	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77.0	11	23.0	6	
Cuba	21	18	3	14	75	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75.6	11	24.4	10	
Dominica	8	5	3	38	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.5	2	86.5	6	
Fiji	12	9	3	25	68	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	69.3	6	30.7	6	
Gabon	15	12	3	20	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57.3	5	42.7	10	
Grenada	9	7	2	22	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	1	98.7	8	
Jamaica	18	13	5	28	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23.7	7	76.3	11	
Kazakhstan	21	10	11	52	226	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83.7	10	16.3	11	
Lebanon	30	14	16	53	489	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63.7	20	36.3	10	
Libya	12	10	2	17	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86.3	6	13.7	6	
Malaysia	19	7	12	63	279	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96.8	10	3.2	9	

Table II.2.2. Global fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2009 disbursements in current USD
— coverage: multilateral agencies (continued)

Partner countries	Number of donors	Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	9 CPA (USD million)	Aid from multilateral agencies		Grand total		DAC countries		No. of DAC countries		No. of multilateral agencies									
						AIDF	Arab Agencies	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%					
1 Column 1	2	3	4	5		6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15								
Mauritius	13	6	7	54	143	-	0.2	-	-	0.3	0.6	0.3	1.0	-	-	0.4	100.0	30.9	4	69.1	9		
Mayotte	2	1	1	50	549	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	99.8	1	0.2	1		
Mexico	19	10	9	47	239	-	-	-	-	2.5	5.0	2.8	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.4	100.0	88.0	10	12.0	9		
Montenegro	20	16	4	20	71	-	-	-	-	19.7	130	0.2	7.1	1.1	0.5	0.5	100.0	69.6	13	30.4	7		
Montserrat	4	2	2	50	43	-	-	-	-	0.1	130	-	-	-	0.0	-	100.0	86.9	1	13.1	3		
Nauru	7	5	2	29	23	-	-	-	-	2.7	2.2	-	-	-	-	0.2	100.0	94.6	3	5.4	4		
Oman	10	10	0	0	10	-	13.2	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	100.0	81.6	6	18.4	4		
Palau	6	3	3	50	35	-	-	-	-	2.0	0.2	-	-	-	-	4.2	100.0	97.0	3	3.0	3		
Panama	16	13	3	19	80	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.7	100.0	85.4	7	14.6	9		
Serbia	30	12	18	60	566	-	-	-	-	2.6	6.3	1.9	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.7	100.0	45.0	20	55.0	10		
Seychelles	8	7	1	13	26	-	4.2	-	-	50.1	0.4	1.0	2.9	0.1	0.1	0.2	100.0	43.9	2	56.1	6		
South Africa	31	15	16	52	1002	-	-	-	-	46.0	3.5	-	0.5	0.2	0.2	1.7	100.0	79.3	21	20.7	10		
St. Helena	2	1	1	50	31	-	-	-	-	15.3	0.9	3.6	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.0	100.0	95.5	1	4.5	1		
St. Kitts-Nevis	4	4	0	0	7	-	-	-	-	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	100.0	0.0	0	100.0	4		
St. Lucia	9	6	3	33	45	-	-	-	-	26.1	38.1	30.1	2.0	-	-	5.6	100.0	15.3	2	84.7	7		
St. Vincent and Grenadines	8	6	2	25	33	-	-	-	-	17.7	36.3	4.4	3.9	-	-	23.8	100.0	11.2	1	88.8	7		
Suriname	10	3	7	70	155	-	-	-	-	19.8	40.0	6.1	1.4	-	-	17.6	100.0	78.3	3	21.7	7		
Trinidad and Tobago	9	9	0	0	5	-	-	-	-	17.2	0.3	2.4	0.1	-	-	0.2	100.0	39.0	3	61.0	6		
Turkey	20	7	13	65	1634	-	-	-	-	0.9	30.7	-	-	-	-	8.3	100.0	50.9	11	49.1	9		
Uruguay	15	14	1	7	59	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.0	100.0	65.8	6	34.2	9		
Venezuela	17	17	0	0	45	-	-	-	-	5.1	21.9	1.8	0.7	1.3	3.1	0.9	100.0	62.1	7	37.9	10		

Part III

Aid predictability

Key messages on aid predictability

These key messages provide an overview of the important part aid predictability and transparency plays in making aid more effective. It looks at the results of the 2011 OECD-DAC Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans and examines where aid is likely to be allocated and which country groupings may expect to see major changes in aid volumes. It also examines the accuracy of donors' forward spending plans and looks at initiatives of how to further improve the Survey through better accessibility and comprehensiveness of Survey data.

The 2011 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans is the fourth annual survey of its kind. Like its three predecessors, it provides an indication of the collective forward programming of bilateral and multilateral donors up to and including 2013 – only two years before the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) milestone year of 2015. The Survey traces country programmable aid (CPA), a core subset of gross bilateral ODA and multilateral outflows essential to supporting the MDGs.

Total CPA in 2010 is estimated at USD 91.6 billion, a decline of USD 1.3 billion in real terms from the peak reached in 2009. The drop can be explained chiefly by the end of a sequence of extraordinary disbursements by multilateral agencies to help countries mitigate the impact of the 2008-9 global crisis. CPA through 2013 is programmed to grow at a real rate of 2% *per annum*, well down on the annual average of 8% over the previous three years. Driven mostly by outflows from multilateral agencies, this modest rate of increase is likely to be matched or outpaced by population growth, so resulting in a decline in aid *per capita*.

The projected slow-down in CPA growth is likely to be more severe for Africa, where CPA is projected to rise by about 1% per year in real terms, compared to 12% over the previous three years. Most countries across all regions are projected to have received lower aid levels by 2013, reversing the patterns in previous surveys. Recent decisions by donors to concentrate their aid on fewer partner countries partly account for this shrinking CPA, although it is offset by the significant increases allotted to a few populous countries. For most countries, aid dependency (CPA as a share of GNI) is also expected to fall, since income growth in developing countries looks set to outstrip the increase in aid.

Donors' medium-term aid predictability, as measured by the ratio of delivered to programmed CPA, points to an over-programming of 5% in 2010. In other words, the average donor country disbursed 5% less in 2010 than it had programmed at the beginning of the same year. This stands in contrast to the 2010 survey report, which showed an under-programming of 3% for 2009 flows due, most probably, to the fiscal squeeze in many donor agencies that occurred in 2010. If this cautious trend continues or strengthens in 2011-13, total aid disbursements will fall rather than rise slightly, as current intentions predict.

A pilot study to disclose the disaggregated survey data to partner countries confirmed the Survey's potential for improving aid predictability with very little additional costs. The Survey concludes that removing its confidentiality requirement would not only support country-level dialogue on the accuracy and comprehensiveness of donors' forward spending plans, but would also contribute to advancing the commitments undertaken by donors as part of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). In addition to enhancing transparency and predictability both globally and at the country level, disclosure of donors' forward spending plans could help improve co-ordination and division of labour between donors.

Another pilot scheme with Austria and Belgium explored how donors could provide more detailed information on ongoing and planned aid projects and programmes by reporting their forward spending plans directly in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) format. The scheme confirmed that it is indeed possible to strengthen the detail and comprehensiveness of the Survey. It also revealed that there are structural limitations to donor agencies' medium- and long-term planning.

A key step forward would be to remove the disclosure policy to enable information collected in forward spending plan surveys to be widely distributed to all stakeholders. Not only would partner countries benefit from more information on individual donors' future intentions, but donors could co-ordinate their aid allocation decisions more effectively.

Chapter 6

Overview of aid predictability and DAC surveys

Part III reports on aid predictability through an examination of the 2011 OECD-DAC Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans. This chapter considers the important part that predictability and transparency play in aid effectiveness and explains the origin of OECD-DAC Surveys on Donors' Forward Spending Plans.

The lack of transparency surrounding aid and the unpredictability of future aid flows have repeatedly been identified as critical obstacles to more effective aid. They featured prominently in discussions at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) held in Busan, Korea, in late 2011, and have been at the centre of post-HLF4 aid effectiveness efforts. In recent years, donors and organisations have launched initiatives to develop interactive tools that present information on aid data more transparently. However, the DAC Survey on Forward Spending Plans is the only instrument to regularly consider global bilateral and multilateral aid spending plans up to three years ahead.

The need to better understand donors' aid allocation policies originates from the pledge undertaken by the G8 at their 2005 meeting in Gleneagles to scale up aid and discussions on how to secure increases in aid agencies' budgets. Subsequently, members attending the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2006 agreed to conduct a survey on their multi-year budgeting and collect indicative information on future aid flows. In February 2007, the DAC Workshop on Scaling Up for Results and Aid Allocations explored which aid component such a survey should focus on. Workshop participants decided to use a subset of ODA, which came to be known as country programmable aid (CPA), or the part of aid that can be programmed to individual countries. The workshop also acknowledged that the survey would provide valuable input for helping to manage the issues of predictability and division of labour both collectively and individually (OECD, 2007a).

In late 2007, the DAC eventually conducted its first full annual Survey on Aid Allocation Policies and Indicative Forward Spending Plans. The subsequent DAC Senior Level Meeting (SLM) in December 2007 echoed the workshop's findings. It concluded that the survey yielded useful operational information for donor agencies planning their future aid allocations and provided valuable input for discussions on aid allocations and division of labour at the country level.¹ However, contrary to the Paris Declaration's emphasis on information sharing, members were prepared to reveal only the aggregate results (*i.e.* non-donor-specific country totals) of the survey to partner countries (OECD, 2007b). The non-disclosure of donor-specific indicative forward spending plans to partner countries is a critical obstacle to maximising use of the survey information. Full disclosure of this information would enable recipient countries to improve their own planning and promote bilateral discussions on aid allocation and division of labour. A 2011 pilot study into sharing disaggregated information with partner countries confirmed that regular access to survey information was important to country-level dialogue on future aid (see Chapter 8, "Initiatives to Enhance the Use of the Survey").

The 2011 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending plans is the fourth of its kind. It provides indications of the collective forward programming of bilateral and major multilateral donors up to and including 2013 – only two years before the MDG milestone year of 2015.² The 2011 edition also presents the results of two pilot initiatives undertaken in 2011 to further enhance the usefulness of the surveys. At the sixth DAC Technical Meeting for Aid Financing and Allocation Specialists in June 2010 it was agreed that the DAC could share donor-specific data from the Survey with two partner countries and the IMF on a pilot basis to determine whether it helped enhance transparency, predictability and accountability. Participants also agreed to test reporting of future aid plans in CRS++ format so as to provide more detailed information and better serve partner countries' information needs.

The 2011 Survey uses the same methodology as its predecessors. It traces CPA, a core subset of bilateral ODA and multilateral outflows critical for delivering international aid commitments in support of the MDGs. The report distinguishes between DAC countries and multilateral agencies. It is important to note that the European Union (EU) is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the

EU is a member of DAC and has its own development policy, contributions to it are considered multilateral ODA. (See Annex III.1 for further details on survey methodology and assumptions).

CPA tracks that programmable part of aid to partner countries over which they have, or could have, significant say (see Annex III.2 for further details on CPA). As the final section of this report argues, CPA also gives a good idea of the overall flows that may be expected to appear in country aid information systems. Over the past five years CPA has accounted for about 51% of DAC countries' gross bilateral ODA.

The 2011 Survey was conducted between December 2010 and February 2011. It covered all DAC members as well as the 23 largest multilateral agencies, which included multilateral development banks, UN agencies, and global funds. Overall, the 47 donor countries and multilateral agencies in the survey were able to provide forward information on 63% of their total CPA.³ The survey results were used to inform discussions at the DAC SLM in April 2011 on expected future trends in members' and major multilateral agencies' aid up to and including 2013.

Notes

1. The importance of aid predictability and regular access of donors' rolling indicative three-year planning figures was reaffirmed in the "beginning now" commitments of the Accra Agenda for Action.
2. The 2011 Survey aimed to collect forward spending plans up to 2015. However only one-third of all donors were capable of providing indicative spending plans five years ahead.
3. The same figures apply to the coverage as in 2010 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans. Annex II.2 presents coverage for all donors in the survey.

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Chapter 7

Outlook points to stagnating aid

This chapter looks at the overall results of the 2011 Survey results and how they differ from those of previous years. It also examines where aid is likely to be allocated and which country groupings may expect to see major changes in aid volumes.

The 2011 Survey gathered data which revealed that total CPA in 2010 could be provisionally estimated at USD 91.6 billion, USD 1.3 billion less in real terms than in 2009. The lower amount stands in contrast to the extraordinary counter-cyclical disbursements by multilateral agencies to help countries mitigate the impact of the financial crisis in 2009. For DAC countries as a group, however, CPA increased slightly from USD 55.8 billion in 2009 to USD 57.6 billion in 2010.

Significant slow-down in growth of global aid


Looking beyond 2010, the Survey findings indicate that the significant growth in CPA over recent years is decelerating dramatically. In sharp contrast to its 8% *per annum* growth over the previous three years, donors' forward spending plans point to a real annual growth rate of 2% between 2010 and 2013. If the plans fully materialise, *per capita* aid receipts will be flat or fall over the 2010-13 period.

The remaining growth is driven chiefly by higher planned outflows from multilateral agencies. They account for USD 3.5 billion, or 60%, of the total increase in CPA of nearly USD 6 billion between 2010 and 2013. CPA up to and including 2013 is expected to grow at a real rate of 3.4% per year for multilateral agencies and 1.3% per year for DAC countries. Figure 7.1 illustrates the trend in CPA from 2005 to 2013 broken down by type of agency, while Figure 7.2 presents the annual change in real CPA over the same period.

The 2011 Survey also collected estimates of future core funding to multilateral agencies. Like the previous year, results show no large changes in real terms for the next three years. Half of the donors providing estimates up to and including 2013 are expected to reduce their multilateral aid in the coming years, while the other half have programmed increased funding to the multilateral system.


Although core funding to multilateral agencies has not risen and there is no indication that it will, multilateral outflows have increased in recent years. The rise is due to the ability of some agencies to mobilise their own resources. Multilateral agencies' share of global CPA peaked in 2009 when 40% of CPA disbursements – up from 37% in 2008 – came from multilateral sources, reflecting the increase in concessional financing from the IMF and the regional development banks to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis. The IMF and African Development Bank, for example, nearly doubled their combined concessional flows from USD 2.8 billion in 2008 to USD 5.2 billion in 2009.

Figure 7.1. CPA from 2005 to 2013 – actual (2005-10) and programmed (2011-13)



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Figure 7.2. Annual percentage changes in country programmable aid




Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Focus shifts from Africa back to Asia

The 2010 report indicated that 2010 would be the first year Africa received a higher volume of CPA than Asia. This turned out to be true, as the preliminary estimates for 2010 indicate that CPA to Africa was USD 38 billion, while to Asia it slipped from USD 39.6 to USD 37.4 billion as aid to large recipients like Iraq, China and Vietnam fell. However, Africa’s higher share of CPA appears to be a one-off shift in the usual pattern: Asia is expected to outstrip Africa once more as the largest aid-receiving continent in 2011, primarily due to planned increases in multilateral outflows. Asia is projected to receive an increase in CPA of 3% in real terms and is the region where the top four absolute increases in aid volume (Bangladesh, India, Vietnam and Pakistan) are expected.

CPA to Africa is projected to increase at 1% per year in real terms, compared to a 12% annual growth rate over the previous three years. This modest rise in volume is expected to be outpaced by population growth, resulting in a fall in CPA *per capita* from USD 37.0 in 2010 to USD 35.5 in 2013. Aid recipients in Europe and America are also expected to

Figure 7.3. CPA by region, 2010-13



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

receive less aid in 2013 than in 2010, although the drop in those continents is more likely to be due to donor exits rather than to population increases. Figure 7.3 illustrates regional distribution of CPA in 2005, 2010 and 2013, while Table 7.1 shows the countries with the largest planned increases and falls in absolute CPA volume up to and including 2013.

Table 7.1. Changes in CPA, 2010-13

Largest 10 increases	Region	Income group	Change in CPA (USD million)	Largest 10 decreases	Region	Income group	Change in CPA (USD million)
Bangladesh	Asia	LIC	798	Afghanistan	Asia	LIC	-212
India	Asia	LMIC	629	Rwanda	Africa	LIC	-187
Viet Nam	Asia	LIC	502	Brazil	America	UMIC	-175
Pakistan	Asia	LMIC	429	Haiti	America	LIC	-175
Kenya	Africa	LIC	396	Indonesia	Asia	LMIC	-174
Ethiopia	Africa	LIC	176	Cote d'Ivoire	Africa	LMIC	-154
Zambia	Africa	LIC	176	Tanzania	Africa	LIC	-148
Uzbekistan	Asia	LMIC	157	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Europe	UMIC	-127
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Africa	LIC	153	Burundi	Africa	LIC	-123
Egypt	Africa	LMIC	143	Iraq	Asia	LMIC	-98


Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Population growth to outpace aid growth in low-income countries

The large increases in aid to the world's poorest countries in recent years are expected to slow down (see Figure 7.4). For low-income countries, the real annual growth rate is expected to be 1% up to and including 2013 – in sharp contrast to the 14% annual growth over the previous three-year period. With an expected annual population growth rate of 2% per year, CPA *per capita* in an “average” low-income country is expected to decrease from USD 39 to USD 38 between 2010 and 2013.

The projected slow-down in aid growth also applies to middle-income countries (MICs). Although India and Pakistan are projected to receive USD 1 billion more aid in 2010-13 than in 2007-10, the increase to lower-middle income countries (LMICs) is forecast to be only 1% compared to 3% over the three previous years. Projections for CPA to

Figure 7.4. CPA by income group, 2010-13



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

upper-middle income countries (UMICs) show a decline at a real rate of 1% per year. Aid to China is expected to remain at an annual USD 2.1 billion, 90% of which originates from bilateral sources. In *per capita* terms, the projections are that aid to both LMICs and UMICs is expected to fall as populations grow at a faster rate.


Lower aid levels linked to phase-out decisions

In recent years, the OECD has analysed aid fragmentation in order to encourage donors to examine their aid portfolios. The ultimate goal is to reduce transaction costs for countries with little capacity to manage many small donor relations and to achieve better cross-country division of labour. With stretched aid budgets and the greater focus on development results in recent years, many EU DAC members are rationalising their aid portfolio by concentrating aid on fewer partner countries.

The 2011 Survey collected information on planned donor exits. Acknowledging that phasing out aid to a partner country is a long process, usually marked by a gradual decline in aid volume, the Survey simulated the impact of phase-outs using 2009 CPA levels. From a partner country perspective, it is generally not the largest volume donors that are planning to pull out. However, while a given donor may not provide large aggregate volumes in aid to a country, it may nevertheless account for a significant proportion of aid directed to a sector or area where only a few donors are present. Phasing out such aid programmes may therefore have a significant impact at country level.

Nearly 80% of all countries in the Americas are projected to receive lower levels of aid in 2013 than in 2010. In 40% of them, phase-out decisions partly account for the fall in aid. Figure 7.5 shows the share of countries where CPA is projected to drop in 2010-13 and the share of those that can expect at least one donor exit in the next few years.

Figure 7.5. Share of countries with projected falls in CPA, 2010-13



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Over the next few years, EU DAC members expect to phase out 162 aid relationships with partner countries – 8% of DAC EU global CPA in 2009.¹ Partner countries in Europe are the most affected, with EU DAC members planning to exit 25% of their aid relations, representing 16% of the total CPA volume in this region. Similarly, EU DAC members are expected to phase out nearly 17% of all their aid relations in Africa in the next few years – representing 6% of all DAC EU aid to Africa in 2009. Table 7.2 presents the results of this simulation.

Table 7.2. Impact of planned aid exits on number of DAC donors and CPA


	Average number of DAC countries per partner country	Average number of DAC EU countries per partner country	Average number of DAC EU exits per partner country	Total CPA provided by DAC countries	Total CPA provided by DAC EU countries	Total CPA of DAC EU exits
Europe	14.7	9.4	2.4	2 586	1 332	208
Africa	12.0	7.3	1.2	17 673	10 068	581
America	8.3	4.8	0.7	5 012	2 209	358
Asia	14.4	8.6	1.3	24 670	6 928	605
Oceania	3.5	1.4	-	1 156	128	-
Global	11.0	6.6	1.1	51 097	20 665	1 752

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Aid dependency is expected to decrease

Aid dependency – measured as the percentage of CPA to gross national income (GNI) – varies greatly between regions and countries. Globally, CPA represented 0.6% of partner countries' GNI in 2010 (Figure 7.6). Across Africa the average CPA-to-GNI ratio was 2.4% in 2010, though in six countries it was over 20%.² In other regions, CPA accounts for such a high share of GNI only in Afghanistan and a few island states in Oceania. Of the 23 countries worldwide with a CPA-to-GNI ratio above 10%, 16 are in Africa.

Figure 7.6. CPA as a percentage of GNI, 2010




Note: These maps are purely illustrative and without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory shown.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Since 2005, large increases in CPA have outstripped growth in GNI, leading to higher CPA-to-GNI ratios in 53% of all countries (Figure 7.7). In Africa, the ratio has increased in 32 out of 51 countries since 2005 and, with the recent scaling up of aid, the continent's overall CPA-to-GNI ratio climbed from 2.1% in 2005 to 2.4% in 2010. It is, however, expected to slip back to 2.3% in 2013.³

Figure 7.7. CPA as a percentage share of GNI by region, 2005-13



Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.


Asia has experienced an opposite trend in aid dependency in recent years. Despite mounting levels of CPA since 2005, the region’s high GNI growth rates have seen a one-third fall in the CPA-to-GNI ratio, from 0.6% to 0.4%. The projected real annual increase of 3% in CPA to Asia over the next few years is not likely to change the trend, as GNI is expected to rise even more, driving the CPA-to-GNI ratio down to 0.3% by 2013. The same trends are observed even when China is excluded.⁴

While the 2011 Survey reveals slower growth levels in CPA over the next few years, many partner countries are still experiencing high economic growth with little indication of a significant slow-down. From 2010 to 2013, therefore, CPA-to-GNI ratios are expected to fall in most countries, with only 19 worldwide expected to see increases.

Wide variations in shares of aid to priority partner countries

The Survey also collects information on DAC donors’ priority partner countries,⁵ where they have long-term engagement strategies in place. Donors reporting to the Survey designate recipient country partners as “priority”. The number of priority partner countries range from a low of six (Portugal) to a high of 57 (Germany). The dotted line in Figure 7.8

Figure 7.8. Share of CPA allocated to priority partner countries, 2010



Note: the number of priority countries is shown in brackets.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

represents the average share of CPA granted to priority partner countries by DAC donors who use the concept. In 2010, the share was 67%, albeit with large variations across donors. For example, Australia's 33 priority partner countries received nearly 90% of all Australian CPA, while Spain disbursed less than half of its CPA to its 36 priority countries and Greece to its 18. Because some DAC donors concentrate aid on fewer partner countries and differ in the coverage they submit to the Survey, it is not feasible to estimate the share of aid that will be allocated to priority countries in coming years.

Notes

1. An aid relationship is defined as the sum of all aid activities by a donor or a multilateral agency in a country.
2. These countries are Burundi, Cape Verde, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe.
3. The aid dependency ratio for Sub-Saharan countries excluding South Africa increased from 4.1% in 2005 to 4.6% in 2010.
4. If China is excluded, CPA as a share of GNI for Asia decreased from 1.1% in 2005 to 0.9% in 2010 and is projected to further decrease to 0.8% by 2013.
5. Note that Japan and the United States do not define priority partner countries and that the list for Norway represents the nine countries which received the most aid.

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Chapter 8

Initiatives to make aid more predictable

This chapter looks at initiatives to improve the predictability of aid flows through better use of the Survey. The results of two pilot initiatives conducted in 2011 demonstrate the need to make survey data more accessible and comprehensive. It also examines the accuracy of donors' forward spending aid plans for 2010.

One condition on which the first survey in 2007 was conducted was that individual donors' indicative forward plans should remain confidential, since they are subject to appropriation through their sovereign budget processes. In the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), one year later, donors committed to “provide developing countries with regular and timely information on their rolling three- to five-year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations that developing countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macro-economic frameworks”.

Since Accra, partner countries have further emphasised the importance of having estimates of future available resources for use in their own budget planning and preparation processes. They have also repeatedly aired the same concern through the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF).

At the sixth DAC Technical Meeting for Aid Financing and Allocations Specialists in June 2010, members agreed to pilot two new initiatives:

1. Share underlying donor-disaggregated survey data with two partner countries and the IMF in order to determine whether disseminating the data to partner countries could enhance transparency, predictability and accountability.
2. Enhance survey depth and scope by reporting future aid projections in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) format, which would capture more detailed information and therefore respond more accurately to partner country needs.

The two test pilots not only show how the information currently collected through the surveys can assist partner countries when it is made available to them. They also point to ways in which developing the survey further could help address some of the challenges identified by partner countries (*e.g.* in accessing more detailed estimates of future aid flows).

Survey data proven useful for partner countries

At the biennial meeting of the Government of Rwanda and Development Partners held in November 2010, stakeholders identified medium-term predictability of aid as a key bottleneck to more effective aid in Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda emphasised the importance of ensuring that donors implemented their AAA commitments providing forward spending information over three to five years, stressing in particular the contribution that these efforts can make to:

- **Supporting strategic planning, policy making and service delivery.** Through a better understanding of available levels of aid in the medium term, more appropriate policy decisions and credible medium-term development strategies can be developed.
- **Strengthening national ownership and alignment.** By responding to Rwanda's needs and priorities in accordance with an agreed division of labour, fragmentation can be reduced.
- **Improve the comprehensiveness and credibility of its Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and annual budget.** Drawing up an MTEF and annual budget on the basis of short- to medium-term expected external resources could strengthen parliamentary oversight and domestic accountability.

As a result of this meeting, and as part of its engagement with the OECD as a “focus country” of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), the Government of

Rwanda asked the OECD to share information on donors' forward spending plans reported in the Survey. Rwanda was accordingly selected to be one of the countries in the pilot. Although Ghana, too, expressed interest, the timeframe and ongoing engagements with its development partners in a related exercise at country level, prevented it from actively participating in this particular initiative. Work nevertheless went ahead in Rwanda, where the Government and the OECD worked closely together in analysing data.

If the information provided by donor headquarters through DAC surveys of forward spending plans is to be useful to governments and development partners, it must provide a realistic measure of aid which they can use for development activities. CPA has frequently demonstrated its value in assessing overall flows recorded at country level (Petras, 2009). Table 8.1 compares historical disbursements of CPA to Rwanda with official estimates of aid flows collected at the country level through the Development Assistance Database (DAD) and shows that the OECD's figures closely match the government's aggregate estimates of aid disbursements.

Table 8.1. CPA compared with recorded disbursements in Rwanda, 2006-09

Year	CPA (USD million)	Rwanda's Development Assistance Database (USD million)	CPA/DAD (in %)
2006	513	508	101%
2007	658	612	108%
2008	870	793	110%
2009	873	845	103%

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris and Development Assistance Database (2011), Government of Rwanda.

The Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) and the OECD collaborated in comparing donor aggregates from the Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans with documentary evidence on donor commitments and indications of future aid available through a variety of instruments at country level (e.g. country assistance strategies, memoranda of understanding).

The comparison showed that while the OECD expects Rwanda to receive a slight increase in aid volume over the period 2010-12, the information supplied directly by donors to the Rwandan government was incomplete. Aid therefore appears to decline over the same three-year period, according to records at country level. There was significant variation in coverage of forward-looking aid information between donors. For example, while some donors provided consistent aggregates on forward spending plans to the OECD and in their multi-year country strategies agreed with Rwanda, others supplied the OECD or MINECOFIN with information that was inconsistent or provided no indications of forward spending in Rwanda despite sharing their plans with the OECD. Government and donors in Rwanda agreed to capture better information on forward spending information through the local aid information management system (DAD) to help overcome data management issues.

Feedback from government officials in Rwanda participating in the pilot initiative was positive. They noted that while regular dissemination of survey data by the OECD is no substitute for donors' provision of more detailed forward spending information in accordance with partner country needs (e.g. to include the composition and terms of anticipated

forward spending), it does contribute to building a relevant information base at the country level. More specifically, sharing survey data can help government officials to triangulate – and verify – the accuracy of estimates and forecasts gathered through other means.

Feedback received from IMF country teams – including representatives who attended the discussions on the surveys of forward spending plans in Rwanda – identifies wider dissemination of survey data as one important way to make better data available and, in turn, to contribute to more reliable macroeconomic forecasts.

The aggregate nature of the surveys is such that they cannot directly inform the preparation of budgets and plans in partner countries with any level of detail. They can, however, support country-level dialogue on donors' forward spending plans. In addition, the cost of making survey data available and providing basic support using the data is negligible. It would be a low-cost, practical way for donors to advance on their Accra commitments on aid predictability. The next section presents a parallel pilot designed to address some of the limitations arising from the aggregate data gathered by the 2011 Survey.

Collecting more disaggregated forward-looking data is feasible

At the DAC Technical Meeting for Aid Financing and Allocation Specialists it was agreed that Austria and Belgium would pilot the reporting of future aid plans for the 2011 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans in CRS++ format to provide more detailed information on the part of CPA that was already committed. Standardised “dummy” codes would be used to capture indicative future spending envelopes which were not yet committed.

The pilot confirmed that it is possible to provide additional information for ongoing committed and planned aid projects and programmes: good quality information was readily available and could be easily incorporated in CRS submissions. Most future disbursements were assigned a “purpose code” and a “channel code” that denoted a sector and channel of delivery for each aid activity. Detailed information was also entered in the description fields for nearly every aid activity. Such information could contribute to aid planning and co-ordination at country level and thereby help improve transparency, predictability and division of labour among donors. If this information is to benefit partner countries, however, a pre-condition for a reporting effort along the lines of the pilot would be the waiving of the confidentiality requirement of the Survey.

Austria and Belgium could not provide indicative spending figures for resources that had not yet been committed to a project or programme. As a result, the overall aid levels provided in the test declined rapidly over time, with 2013 aid levels only one-third of what was disbursed in 2010. This decline was a consequence not of the reporting format, but of the political and budgetary constraints on the provision of indicative expenditure data in the two pilot countries. This highlights the complexity of efforts required to make aid more predictable in a context not only of technical challenges, but of structural issues related to donor agencies' planning processes in the medium and long term. Not all donor agencies currently work with three- to five-year rolling budget frameworks and, even if they do, some may have strong political incentives to keep options open and not make long-term commitments. Overcoming some of the most critical obstacles to aid predictability of aid thus requires addressing both technical and political constraints in donor governments (For in-depth analysis of structural issues surrounding aid predictability, see Mokoro Ltd. [2011].) Doing so should not prevent donors from providing medium-term aid allocation information where it exists. In fact, most agencies do have medium-term aid allocation projections that could be shared openly with partner countries and other donors in place.

Indeed, Belgium is working to address political and technical constraints and expects to widen its future survey coverage.

Survey data provide reliable estimates of future aid flows

Surveys on donors' forward spending plans offer a unique opportunity to study the predictability and reliability of donors' aid allocation decisions over time. The *2010 OECD Report on Aid Predictability* introduced an indicator to measure medium-term predictability on the basis of forward-looking CPA plans collected through the forward spending surveys. The predictability ratio is calculated by comparing the CPA actually disbursed in a given year to programmed CPA estimates for the same year that were reported to the DAC in earlier surveys.

In 2009, the one-year predictability ratio was 103% – the average donor disbursed 3% more than forecasted one year earlier. The two-year predictability ratio for aid flows in 2009 was 108%, strongly affected by the front-loading of multilateral resources to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis on developing countries in 2009.

In 2010, the one-year predictability ratio was 95%, meaning that the average donor disbursed 5% less in 2010 than it had programmed and reported to the survey at the beginning of the same year. The three- and two-year predictability ratios for 2010 flows are estimated at 98% and 93%, meaning that the average donor disbursed less than it had programmed at the beginning of 2008 and 2009. While multilateral agencies' aggregate disbursements were almost exactly what they had planned, many DAC countries reduced the levels of aid programmed to countries. There is also wide variation in aggregate predictability across donors.

From the perspective of partner countries, variations are even greater depending on which donors are present. For some countries, such as Indonesia and Tanzania, actual disbursements in 2010 were roughly the same as the amount programmed three years earlier. At the same time, in other countries, actual disbursements were more than twice (*e.g.* Nigeria and the Central African Republic) or half (*e.g.* Angola and El Salvador) what was initially programmed three years earlier.

Table 8.2 presents aggregate predictability ratios for 2010, which once again reinforce the robustness of the forward spending survey: forward spending data can be a good predictor of actual overall disbursements. (For an exhaustive run-down of predictability ratios by donor and partner country, see Annex III.4).

Table 8.2. **Predictability ratios**

Region	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
	One-year predictability ratio	Two-year predictability ratio	Three-year predictability ratio
	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^a / programmed early 2010	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^a / programmed early 2009	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^a / programmed early 2008
DAC countries	100%	88%	90%
DAC members incl. EU	99%	95%	92%
Multilateral agencies	91%	97%	105%
All donors	95%	93%	98%

a. Provisional figures.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Conclusions and recommendations for enhancing surveys

- DAC survey on donors' forward spending plans are, to date, the only instrument with a global scope for regularly gathering bilateral and multilateral donors' aid spending plans up to three years ahead. Since 2007, the surveys have informed the development community about the future levels of aid it should consider when formulating development policies and aid allocations. In this respect, they constitute a unique foundation for further efforts to improve the transparency and predictability of future aid flows in the wake of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4).
- A key step forward would be to reconsider the disclosure policy so as to enable information gathered in the survey to be widely distributed to all stakeholders. Not only would partner countries benefit from knowing more about individual donors' future intentions, donors would co-ordinate their aid allocation decisions more effectively – at both country and global levels.
- Improvements to the survey itself can be made by seeking to broaden reporting in CRS++ format to the survey so as to meet partner country governments' need for more detailed information. This is also featured as a possible way of improving DAC statistics so that they address the transparency requirements of the DAC Working Party on Statistics. The two pilot studies conducted by Austria and Belgium have demonstrated how this work could move forward and further enhance the utility of forward spending plan surveys to the benefit of both partner countries and donors.

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Annex III

Aid predictability

- Annex III.1 Survey methodology and coverage
- Annex III.2 Country programmable aid
- Annex III.3 CPA by region and income group
- Annex III.4 Predictability ratio
- Annex III.5 Future CPA Levels

Annex III.1

Survey methodology and coverage

The OECD 2011 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans collected information on 47 donors' forward spending plans in all ODA-eligible countries and for regional/multi-country programmes (Table III.1.1 lists the donors). It also recorded thematic aid yet to be

Table III.1.1. **List of donors**

DAC countries (23)	Multilateral Donors (24)
Australia	AfDF
Austria	Arab Agencies ^a
Belgium	AsDF
Canada	CarDB
Denmark	EU Institutions ^b
Finland	GAVI
France	GEF
Germany	Global Fund
Greece	IAEA
Ireland	IDA
Italy	IADB
Japan	IFAD
Korea	IMF
Luxembourg	Montreal Protocol
Netherlands	UNAIDS
New Zealand	UNDP
Norway	UNECE
Portugal	UNFPA
Spain	UNICEF
Sweden	UNRWA
Switzerland	UNTA
United Kingdom	WHO
United States	

Notes:

- a. The Arab agencies include: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Islamic Development Bank and OPEC Fund.
- b. The European Union (EU) is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this report as a multilateral agency since contributions to the EU are considered multilateral ODA. (See Box III.1.1 for an explanatory note on the special case of the EU).

programmed – *i.e.* unallocated funds not yet programmed at country level. It is expected the funds will be programmed and allocated at country level over the short term. Donors were also asked to supply information on their forward intentions in delivering budget support, to provide updates on priority countries, and to validate the 2008 and 2009 CPA data.

Box III.1.1. The European Union development assistance funding sources

The European Union (EU) is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. It funds its aid from three main sources.

- The EU finances its budget wholly from its own resources in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – unlike some multilaterals that are fully reliant on contributions by their members. In a similar exercise to that of bilateral donors, the annual EU budget process determines how much funding from the EU's own resources will be granted to development.
- The European Development Fund (EDF) is financed through extra-budgetary contributions from EU member states. In this way, the EU acts much like a multilateral agency, with member states periodically negotiating replenishments. Implementation of EDF activities is the responsibility of the European Commission as an institution.
- The European Investment Bank (EIB) provides long-term finance in support of EU external co-operation and development objectives. The EIB finances work either through its own resources or the EDF's, and is covered by a specific guarantee from the EU member states.

Although the EU is an individual member of the DAC in its own right with its own development policy, DAC countries' contributions to the European Union are considered multilateral ODA. On this basis, the EU is often presented as a multilateral institution in DAC publications, which includes this report.

The general approach in the methodology has been to maximise the use of the data collected through the Survey. However, when donor coverage was not complete, the DAC secretariat made estimates to extend the CPA series based on the latest available data (2007-10).

The estimates were made using the same methodology as in previous surveys. Based on the assessment of historical trends in donors' CPA disbursements at country or at the global level, several methods were used to estimate the truncated series. The methods used are described below:

- Where donors provided forward estimates for a partner country for any year to 2013, they were used.
- Where donors provided an estimate only to 2012, the DAC secretariat applied donors' projected CPA annual growth rate from 2010 to 2012 to estimate the 2013 figure.
- In all other cases, CPA series were estimated by applying the compound annual growth rate for that donor/partner's CPA between 2007 and 2009 to the latest data for that donor/partner, within the following limits to smooth out large fluctuations in growth rates observed for some partners:

- where the historical growth rate for a given partner country was higher than a donor's total CPA growth rate, DAC secretariat applied the growth rate in that donor's total CPA as a ceiling;
- where the historical growth rate for a given partner country was negative and/or the growth rate in that donor's total CPA was negative, the DAC secretariat applied a floor of zero change (*i.e.* the last observation was carried forward in real terms to 2013).

There were two additional qualifications to the compound annual growth rate methodology: (i) the USA's and Japan's 2010 CPA levels were carried forward in real terms; (ii) Greece's and non-responding multilateral agencies' 2009 CPA levels were carried forward in real terms.

Overall, by excluding the USA and Japan, estimates accounted for 20% of total CPA over the period 2011-13. In 96% of these cases, the last observation was carried forward in real terms up to and including 2013.

Table III.1.2 shows the share of donors' CPA for which they are able to provide forward programmed information. DAC countries provided forward information on 50% of CPA (compared to 52% in the 2010 Survey). Excluding the US and Japan, the coverage was 96% compared to 94% in the 2010 Survey. For multilateral agencies, the coverage was 82%, or the same as in the 2010 Survey.

Table III.1.2. Survey coverage

Coverage	Estimated share of CPA with forward plans up to 2011	Partner country coverage 2011	Estimated share in 2010 Survey ^c
	A	B	C
DAC COUNTRIES			
Australia	100%	All countries	100%
Austria	100%	Priority and major countries	90%
Belgium	98%	Priority and major countries	92%
Canada	100%	Priority and major countries	99%
Denmark	87%	Priority and major countries	64%
Finland	100%	All countries	100%
France	100%	All countries	100%
Germany	100%	All countries	100%
Greece	0%	Not Available	0%
Ireland	86%	Priority countries	96%
Italy	96%	Priority and major countries	84%
Japan	0% ^b	Not Available	0%
Korea	90%	All countries	100%
Luxembourg	74%	Priority countries	81%
Netherlands	91%	Priority and major countries	84%
New Zealand	100%	All countries	100%
Norway	100%	All countries	100%
Portugal	78%	Priority countries	78%
Spain	100% [2011] ^a	All countries	100%
Sweden	100%	Priority and major countries	94%

Table III.1.2. Survey coverage (continued)

Coverage	Estimated share of CPA with forward plans up to 2011	Partner country coverage 2011	Estimated share in 2010 Survey ^c
	A	B	C
Switzerland	97%	Priority countries	81%
United Kingdom	92%	Priority and major countries	90%
United States	0% ^b	Not Available	0%
Total DAC countries	50%		52%
Total DAC members incl. EU	58%		59%
MULTILATERAL AGENCIES			
AfDF	100% [2012] ^a	Not Available	0%
AsDF	100%	All countries	100%
CarDB	100%	Not Available	0%
EU Institutions ^e	100%	All countries	100%
GAVI	100%	All countries	100%
GEF	0%	Not Available	0%
Global Fund	100%	All countries	100%
IADB	0%	Not Available	0%
IAEA	100% [2011] ^a	All countries	100%
IDA	100%	All countries	100%
IFAD	100%	All countries	100%
IMF	0%	Not Available	0%
Montreal Protocol	0%	Not Available	0%
UNAIDS	100%	Not Available	0%
UNDP	0%	All countries	100%
UNECE	0%	Not Available	0%
UNFPA	100% [2011] ^a	All countries	100%
UNICEF	100%	All countries	100%
UNRWA	0%	Not Available	0%
UNTA	0%	Not Available	0%
WHO	0%	Not Available	... ^c
Arab Agencies ^d	0%	Not Available	100%
Total multilateral	82%		82%
All donors	63%		63%

Notes:

- The years in brackets are the years for which donors provided forward information.
- The DAC is in discussion with Japan and the United States about providing information on parts of their programmes for coming Surveys.
- Dotted lines (...) indicate donor did not participate in the 2010 Survey.
- The Arab agencies include BADEA, the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC fund.
- The European Union is also a DAC member.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Annex III.2

Country programmable aid

The methodology of country programmable aid (CPA) was first discussed at the DAC Workshop on Scaling Up for Results and Aid Allocations in February 2007. It was developed in collaboration with members when defining the coverage of the DAC 2007 Survey of Aid Allocation Policies and Indicative Forward Spending Plans. CPA is a recent statistical concept and the basis of DAC work on past and future aid allocations.

In brief, CPA identifies the share of total ODA that can be programmed country level and for which donors generally prepare multi-year forward expenditure plans. CPA is defined by subtracting from total gross ODA aid activities that:

- are unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief);
- entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, and research and refugees in donor countries);
- do not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid from local governments);
- are not country programmable by the donor (core funding of NGOs).

CPA does not net out loan repayments, as they are not usually factored into aid allocation decisions. CPA is also a good proxy for what is recorded at country level and can thus be useful for partner country use. Total DAC CPA is estimated at USD 55 billion in 2009 and represents 58% of DAC countries' gross bilateral ODA.

Historical data series are derived from the standard DAC and CRS statistics. CPA data by donor and recipient were derived retroactively from 2000 onwards and are available online on <http://stats.oecd.org> and for full download in Excel or text format from www.oecd.org/dac/cpa.

CPA data become more robust from 2007 onwards thanks to donors' improved reporting to the CRS activity database. Since then the DAC has, in addition, worked closely with a number of member countries to refine the derivation of CPA and better reflect each donor's specificities and practices. For a more comprehensive description of the CPA concept, please refer to the development brief on CPA, available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/51/45564447.pdf.

Table III.2.1. CPA of DAC members in 2009

	of which share of:					
	Bilateral ODA	Debt relief	Humanitarian aid	Other non-	CPA	CPA
			and refugees in	CPA items and		
USD million			donor country	unallocated	%	USD million
Australia	2 312	0%	14%	16%	70%	1 614
Austria	517	11%	16%	52%	21%	107
Belgium	1 664	7%	13%	50%	31%	515
Canada	3 182	2%	18%	43%	38%	1 204
Denmark	1 941	0%	12%	19%	69%	1 331
Finland	791	0%	18%	30%	52%	412
France	8 588	20%	5%	26%	49%	4 171
Germany	8 360	2%	6%	36%	56%	4 675
Greece	297	0%	14%	35%	52%	153
Ireland	693	0%	15%	31%	55%	382
Italy	1 053	17%	15%	13%	55%	581
Japan	13 150	1%	5%	12%	82%	10 737
Korea	616	0%	3%	12%	86%	527
Luxembourg	266	0%	16%	16%	68%	181
Netherlands	4 957	1%	13%	48%	37%	1 849
New Zealand	226	0%	4%	24%	72%	163
Norway	3 164	1%	21%	32%	46%	1 459
Portugal	312	1%	0%	21%	78%	243
Spain	4 873	3%	15%	25%	57%	2 791
Sweden	3 013	1%	22%	31%	46%	1 372
Switzerland	1 761	9%	28%	30%	33%	574
United Kingdom	7 599	1%	10%	36%	54%	4 100
United States	25 992	1%	22%	16%	61%	15 732
Total DAC countries	95 327	3%	14%	25%	58%	54 873
EU institutions	13 024	1%	16%	9%	74%	9 603
Total DAC members	108 350	3%	14%	23%	60%	64 476

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Annex III.3

CPA by region and income group

Table III.3.1. Total CPA by region

Region	CPA				
	Actual	Provisional	Planned		
	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013
	2010 USD million				
Europe	3 459	5 001	4 660	4 744	4 843
Africa	24 356	37 176	38 033	38 941	38 170
North of Sahara	3 019	2 905	2 887	2 888	2 939
South of Sahara	20 787	32 879	34 011	34 902	34 043
Africa, regional/multi-country	550	1 392	1 135	1 151	1 189
America	7 119	9 049	8 873	8 843	8 775
North and Central America	3 170	4 567	4 351	4 343	4 255
South America	3 505	3 894	3 606	3 549	3 574
America, regional/multi-country	444	587	916	952	946
Asia	35 598	37 118	38 648	39 532	39 997
Middle East	11 013	5 877	6 114	6 055	6 077
South and Central Asia	12 938	18 873	19 758	20 593	21 006
Far East Asia	11 217	11 982	12 264	12 367	12 394
Asia, regional/multi-country	431	386	511	516	521
Oceania	1 499	1 957	1 953	2 062	2 041
All developing countries	72 032	90 301	92 167	94 123	93 826
Thematic to be programmed			2 250	2 400	2 305
Grand Total	72 032	90 301	94 417	96 523	96 131

Note: Total CPA by region in 2005 slightly differed from total CPA by income group. This was because CPA by region included flows to Saudi Arabia and Turks and Caicos Islands. These countries graduated from the list of ODA recipients in 2008 and are now classified as high-income countries and are therefore not shown in Table III.3.2.

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Table III.3.2. **Total CPA by income group**

Income	CPA				
	Actual 2005	Provisional 2010	Planned		
			2011	2012	2013
2010 USD million					
LDCs	22 396	33 476	34 334	34 990	34 112
Other LICs	8 084	13 406	14 234	14 542	14 749
LMICs	32 550	29 503	29 079	29 628	29 532
UMICs	5 326	7 993	7 478	7 555	7 669
Un-allocated Income	3 660	5 923	9 292	9 807	10 070
Total	72 015	90 301	94 417	96 523	96 131

Source: OECD (2011), DAC Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Annex III.4

Predictability ratio

This section of Annex III supplies a comprehensive list of the predictability ratios of the flows of aid from the perspectives of donors and partner countries.

Table III.4.1. **Predictability ratio of 2010 CPA flows by donor**

		Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
		One-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2010	Two-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2009	Three-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2008
DAC countries	Australia	89%	102%	118%
	Austria	82%	n.a.	n.a.
	Belgium	95%	129%	67%
	Canada	79%	70%	102%
	Denmark	122%	97%	110%
	Finland	104%	102%	98%
	France	122%	146%	97%
	Germany	90%	152%	86%
	Greece	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Ireland	90%	76%	39%
	Italy	79%	36%	34%
	Japan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Korea	113%	126%	n.a.
	Luxembourg	109%	n.a.	92%
	Netherlands	89%	80%	83%
	New Zealand	85%	66%	82%
	Norway	110%	90%	83%
	Portugal	200%	159%	232%
	Spain	81%	45%	77%
	Sweden	101%	85%	94%
	Switzerland	92%	n.a.	n.a.
United Kingdom	111%	98%	95%	
United States	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
DAC countries total		100%	88%	90%
DAC members incl. EU		99%	95%	92%

Table III.4.1. Predictability ratio of 2010 CPA flows by donor (continued)

		Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
		One-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2010	Two-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2009	Three-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2008
Multilateral agencies	AfDF	n.a.	175%	160%
	AsDB	86%	94%	119%
	BADEA	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	CarDB	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	EU Institutions ^b	94%	114%	97%
	GAVI	84%	104%	n.a.
	GEF	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Global Fund	92%	69%	n.a.
	IAEA	99%	n.a.	n.a.
	IDA	88%	88%	102%
	IADB	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	IFAD	74%	n.a.	n.a.
	IMF	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Isl. Dev Bank	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Montreal Protocol	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	OFID	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	UNAIDS	79%	79%	n.a.
	UNDP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	UNECE	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	UNFPA	115%	114%	127%
	UNICEF	112%	112%	122%
UNRWA	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
UNTA	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
WHO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
Multilateral total	91%	97%	105%	
Grand Total	95%	93%	98%	

Notes:

a. Provisional figures.

b. The EU is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this report as a multilateral agency since contributions to the EU are considered multilateral ODA

Table III.4.2. Predictability ratio of 2010 CPA flows by partner country

Region	Partner country	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
		One-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2010	Two-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2009	Three-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2008
Europe	Albania	95%	70%	85%
	Belarus	204%	145%	167%
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	136%	115%	117%
	Croatia	179%	67%	63%
	Kosovo	151%	n.a.	n.a.
	Macedonia, FYR	152%	58%	68%
	Moldova	162%	157%	184%
	Montenegro	102%	64%	77%
	Serbia	96%	158%	89%
	States Ex-Yugoslavia	4%	2%	8%
	Turkey	96%	48%	55%
	Ukraine	108%	101%	122%
Europe Total		115%	91%	87%
North Sahara	Algeria	127%	67%	82%
	Egypt	89%	81%	91%
	Libya	65%	38%	36%
	Morocco	120%	77%	89%
	Tunisia	103%	90%	92%
North Sahara Total		97%	79%	87%
South Sahara	Angola	83%	41%	57%
	Benin	113%	125%	115%
	Botswana	137%	183%	256%
	Burkina Faso	119%	148%	132%
	Burundi	115%	144%	122%
	Cameroon	93%	131%	102%
	Cape Verde	196%	170%	270%
	Central African Rep.	210%	148%	237%
	Chad	116%	125%	84%
	Comoros	132%	154%	89%
	Congo, Dem. Rep.	109%	109%	99%
	Congo, Rep.	189%	124%	80%
	Cote d'Ivoire	123%	133%	169%
	Djibouti	109%	94%	231%
	Equatorial Guinea	95%	38%	26%
	Eritrea	77%	110%	60%
	Ethiopia	125%	86%	124%
	Gabon	96%	97%	154%
	Gambia	100%	98%	145%

Table III.4.2. Predictability ratio of 2010 CPA flows by partner country (continued)

Region	Partner country	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
		One-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2010	Two-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2009	Three-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2008
	Ghana	91%	111%	106%
	Guinea	95%	107%	154%
	Guinea-Bissau	81%	96%	121%
	Kenya	85%	93%	78%
	Lesotho	127%	178%	161%
	Liberia	171%	123%	146%
	Madagascar	87%	73%	63%
	Malawi	121%	111%	116%
	Mali	98%	101%	99%
	Mauritania	123%	74%	104%
	Mauritius	142%	199%	121%
	Mayotte	120%	n.a.	n.a.
	Mozambique	113%	97%	94%
	Namibia	79%	58%	83%
	Niger	84%	96%	115%
	Nigeria	83%	122%	196%
	Rwanda	119%	128%	141%
	Sao Tome & Principe	174%	84%	419%
	Senegal	90%	105%	141%
	Seychelles	73%	47%	420%
	Sierra Leone	116%	122%	115%
	Somalia	142%	111%	82%
	South Africa	112%	82%	73%
	St. Helena	0%	n.a.	176%
	Sudan	119%	92%	70%
	Swaziland	136%	119%	58%
	Tanzania	103%	100%	100%
	Togo	125%	113%	299%
	Uganda	100%	97%	106%
	Zambia	67%	73%	70%
	Zimbabwe	198%	177%	168%
South Sahara Total		102%	105%	105%
North and Central America	Anguilla	271%	n.a.	n.a.
	Antigua and Barbuda	1635%	1950%	1367%
	Barbados	147%	238%	49%
	Belize	244%	216%	48%
	Costa Rica	200%	120%	146%

Table III.4.2. Predictability ratio of 2010 CPA flows by partner country (continued)

Region	Partner country	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
		One-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2010	Two-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2009	Three-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2008
	Cuba	254%	102%	74%
	Dominica	275%	1051%	1036%
	Dominican Republic	164%	105%	112%
	El Salvador	121%	53%	54%
	Grenada	179%	473%	579%
	Guatemala	103%	50%	80%
	Haiti	104%	129%	201%
	Honduras	101%	52%	77%
	Jamaica	210%	320%	194%
	Mexico	102%	66%	88%
	Montserrat	468%	n.a.	101%
	Nicaragua	82%	45%	65%
	Panama	134%	41%	31%
	St. Kitts-Nevis	401%	1040%	82%
	St. Lucia	265%	1082%	1187%
	St. Vincent & Grenadines	159%	554%	508%
	Trinidad and Tobago	26%	17%	2%
North and Central America Total		118%	85%	104%
South America	Argentina	110%	62%	66%
	Bolivia	96%	62%	71%
	Brazil	179%	370%	120%
	Chile	147%	375%	381%
	Colombia	116%	61%	71%
	Ecuador	90%	37%	53%
	Guyana	282%	255%	77%
	Paraguay	92%	133%	100%
	Peru	83%	47%	50%
	Suriname	103%	109%	153%
	Uruguay	65%	102%	133%
	Venezuela	145%	59%	47%
South America Total		115%	85%	79%
Middle East	Iran	195%	124%	41%
	Iraq	90%	75%	291%
	Jordan	172%	99%	133%
	Lebanon	74%	123%	59%
	Oman	115%	44%	3642%

Table III.4.2. Predictability ratio of 2010 CPA flows by partner country (continued)

Region	Partner country	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
		One-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2010	Two-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2009	Three-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2008
	Palestinian Adm. Areas	91%	132%	137%
	Syria	78%	66%	88%
	Yemen	75%	83%	90%
Middle East Total		89%	99%	120%
South and Central Asia	Afghanistan	120%	123%	126%
	Armenia	110%	104%	118%
	Azerbaijan	88%	75%	74%
	Bangladesh	98%	80%	109%
	Bhutan	146%	181%	253%
	Georgia	150%	128%	203%
	India	83%	83%	104%
	Kazakhstan	73%	44%	23%
	Kyrgyz Republic	73%	112%	130%
	Maldives	231%	414%	378%
	Myanmar	162%	172%	145%
	Nepal	106%	116%	109%
	Pakistan	75%	92%	90%
	Sri Lanka	104%	110%	95%
	Tajikistan	106%	187%	223%
	Turkmenistan	168%	371%	485%
	Uzbekistan	116%	125%	252%
South and Central Asia Total		95%	97%	112%
Far East Asia	Cambodia	82%	78%	109%
	China	108%	93%	161%
	Indonesia	100%	107%	99%
	Korea, Dem. Rep.	352%	413%	229%
	Laos	101%	108%	118%
	Malaysia	192%	74%	120%
	Mongolia	86%	115%	151%
	Philippines	110%	77%	88%
	Thailand	138%	53%	535%
	Timor-Leste	99%	84%	119%
	Viet Nam	93%	83%	87%
Far East Asia Total		97%	87%	97%
Oceania	Cook Islands	85%	89%	124%
	Fiji	202%	139%	63%
	Kiribati	92%	96%	123%

Table III.4.2. Predictability ratio of 2010 CPA flows by partner country (continued)

Region	Partner country	Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows		
		One-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2010	Two-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2009	Three-year predictability ratio Predictability Ratio of 2010 flows 2010 Outturn ^{a/} programmed early 2008
	Marshall Islands	472%	1314%	940%
	Micronesia, Fed. States	23%	28%	57%
	Nauru	116%	115%	106%
	Niue	146%	92%	122%
	Palau	46%	268%	124%
	Papua New Guinea	99%	114%	122%
	Samoa	167%	275%	372%
	Solomon Islands	68%	102%	136%
	Tokelau	107%	98%	117%
	Tonga	132%	180%	214%
	Tuvalu	65%	107%	116%
	Vanuatu	113%	113%	152%
	Wallis & Futuna	115%	n.a.	6041%
Oceania Total		90%	105%	126%
Grand Total		95%	93%	98%

a. Provisional figures.

Annex III.5

Future CPA Levels

Table III.5.1. CPA by country, 2010-13

Partner/Region	CPA Actual	CPA Planned			CPA/GNI		CPA per capita	
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2013	2010	2013
	2010 USD million				%		2010 USD million	
Europe	5 001	4 660	4 744	4 843	0.5	0.4	33	31.5
Albania	264	264	275	285	2.1	2.0	82.5	87.6
Belarus	86	77	81	81	0.2	0.1	9.1	8.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	442	317	319	315	2.5	1.6	110.1	77.7
Croatia	136	113	120	154	0.2	0.2	30.7	34.8
Kosovo	538	445	461	470	9.2	6.9
Macedonia, FYR	149	132	133	138	1.7	1.4	71.9	66.4
Moldova	290	275	274	239	5.2	3.7	81.4	67.2
Montenegro	65	77	85	87	1.6	1.9	103.8	138.6
Serbia	566	534	562	565	1.3	1.1	76.5	75.9
Turkey	1 426	1 467	1 493	1 549	0.2	0.2	20	20.9
Ukraine	543	527	537	526	0.4	0.4	11.9	11.7
States Ex-Yugoslavia	7	26	23	23
Europe, regional	489	407	382	409
Africa	37 176	38 033	38 941	38 170	2.4	2.3	37	35.5
North Africa	2 905	2 887	2 888	2 939	0.5	0.6	17.9	17.2
Algeria	209	187	193	183	0.1	0.1	5.9	4.9
Egypt	959	1 060	1 073	1 102	0.6	0.6	12.3	13.3
Libya	29	37	29	30	0	...	4.6	4.3
Morocco	967	911	911	933	1.1	0.9	30.2	28.4
Tunisia	614	527	523	528	1.6	1.2	58.3	48.6
North of Sahara, regional	127	165	159	165
South of Sahara	32 879	34 011	34 902	34 043	3.3	2.9	39.1	37.7
Angola	314	332	373	398	0.5	0.5	17.6	20.4
Benin	634	690	662	625	9.4	8.2	65.8	59.7
Botswana	164	162	162	155	1.3	1.0	89.2	81.1
Burkina Faso	1 017	995	1 023	949	12.7	10.0	69.2	60.3
Burundi	508	476	462	385	41.2	27.2	61.4	43.8

Partner/Region	CPA Actual	CPA Planned			CPA/GNI		CPA per capita	
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2013	2010	2013
	2010 USD million				%		2010 USD million	
Cameroon	659	709	702	675	2.8	2.6	32.3	30.7
Cape Verde	305	228	224	218	20.1	11.9	583.5	394.4
Central African Rep.	169	163	169	160	8.6	7.0	37.5	33.1
Chad	255	267	276	265	3.8	3.4	25.0	24.1
Comoros	40	38	48	41	7.5	7.0	58.7	56.8
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1 441	1 486	1 566	1 594	13.6	12.3	21.6	21.9
Congo, Rep.	109	117	122	121	1.4	1.3	28.3	28.8
Cote d'Ivoire	560	446	440	407	2.5	1.7	25.4	16.9
Djibouti	128	131	133	131	11.6	10.1	155.2	148.1
Equatorial Guinea	22	25	27	26	0.3	0.3	16.8	18.3
Eritrea	131	157	111	101	8.1	5.3	24.7	17.3
Ethiopia	2 341	2 418	2 491	2 517	8.6	7.3	27.6	27.6
Gabon	101	103	104	103	0.9	0.9	67.3	65.7
Gambia	112	99	107	107	15.1	12.2	65.5	57.6
Ghana	1 584	1 614	1 651	1 561	5.6	4.2	66.8	61.1
Guinea	216	210	222	210	5.7	4.9	19.7	17.6
Guinea-Bissau	94	134	139	128	11.4	13.6	56.7	70.8
Kenya	1 515	1 783	1 860	1 911	5.0	5.2	41.5	49.8
Lesotho	250	188	196	181	12.3	7.9	98.2	67.4
Liberia	417	353	349	336	64.0	41.1	109.0	79.7
Madagascar	470	571	619	597	5.5	6.3	22.1	26.0
Malawi	891	848	910	868	20.1	16.6	62.7	58.1
Mali	1 079	1 177	1 175	1 109	12.2	10.7	77.2	74.1
Mauritania	205	194	198	192	6.3	5.0	64.5	56.1
Mauritius	136	107	107	124	1.5	1.2	105.5	94.1
Mayotte	608	608	608	608	3 054.5	2 841.4
Mozambique	1 729	1 766	1 752	1 744	17.3	14	80.1	76.1
Namibia	280	330	338	334	3.0	3.2	133.6	155
Niger	461	499	527	485	8.9	7.3	31.5	30.2
Nigeria	2 125	2 055	2 190	2 190	1.2	1.0	13.6	12.9
Rwanda	986	841	890	799	20.1	13.4	98.6	75.1
St. Helena	52	56	56	55	11 747.4	12 891.2
Sao Tome & Principe	43	47	35	29	23.5	13.3	263.1	166.1
Senegal	842	894	857	811	6.4	5.4	64.2	57.6
Seychelles	17	17	17	16	2.3	1.9	195.9	186.5
Sierra Leone	361	336	338	346	18.6	15.1	58.2	51.8
Somalia	245	257	233	292	26.1	28.8
South Africa	1 065	1 046	1 078	1 030	0.4	0.3	21.3	20.0
Sudan	1 015	1 117	1 126	1 084	2.0	1.8	25.3	25.0
Swaziland	92	71	79	76	3.1	2.5	89.1	73.4
Tanzania	2 579	2 579	2 657	2 431	12.0	9.3	62.4	55.4

Partner/Region	CPA Actual	CPA Planned			CPA/GNI		CPA per capita	
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2013	2010	2013
	2010 USD million				%		2010 USD million	
Togo	184	171	176	162	6.4	5.0	26.4	21.6
Uganda	1 501	1 549	1 548	1 457	9.9	7.9	43.6	38.1
Zambia	821	990	1 022	997	6.6	6.5	67.3	77.2
Zimbabwe	478	377	401	407	40.7	34.7
South of Sahara, regional	1 528	2 186	2 347	2 494
Africa, regional	1 392	1 135	1 151	1 189
America	9 049	8 873	8 843	8 775	0.2	0.2	15.7	14.7
North and Central America	4 567	4 351	4 343	4 255	0.4	0.3	24.5	22.2
Anguilla	8	4	4	4	542.6	250.9
Antigua and Barbuda	22	15	15	15	2.1	1.3	256.3	165.7
Barbados	17	9	9	10	62.7	37.4
Belize	33	28	29	32	2.8	2.5	98.4	89.1
Costa Rica	145	125	125	124	0.5	0.4	30.4	25
Cuba	98	64	68	68	8.7	6.0
Dominica	33	22	23	28	9.1	7.1	448	377.7
Dominican Republic	246	215	220	209	0.5	0.4	26.8	22.5
El Salvador	303	268	273	271	1.5	1.2	51.6	45.3
Grenada	34	29	27	26	5.8	4.1	326.6	249.4
Guatemala	293	290	270	270	0.8	0.7	20.4	17.5
Haiti	1 009	929	850	834	14.7	9.6	110.8	91.2
Honduras	376	426	419	384	2.8	2.6	47.0	45.2
Jamaica	195	152	145	152	1.6	1.1	71.6	55.6
Mexico	538	565	573	581	0.1	0.1	4.9	5.2
Montserrat	29	26	26	25	4 793.9	4 133.4
Nicaragua	508	505	471	423	8.9	6.6	78.5	64.1
Panama	144	142	142	142	0.6	0.5	40.8	38.1
St. Kitts-Nevis	17	10	9	11	3.4	2.1	315.4	194.6
St. Lucia	52	27	21	28	5.8	2.8	298.2	157.3
St. Vincent & Grenadines	23	13	13	19	4.0	3.1	211.7	172.6
Trinidad and Tobago	5	9	9	9	0	0	4.2	6.6
West Indies Unallocated	122	161	248	244
North & Central America, regional	320	316	354	347
South America	3 894	3 606	3 549	3 574	0.1	0.1	10	8.9
Argentina	172	152	150	149	0.1	0	4.3	3.6
Bolivia	607	616	620	595	3.8	3.2	58.2	56
Brazil	638	427	448	462	0	0	3.3	2.3
Chile	120	99	113	124	0.1	0.1	7	6.9
Colombia	789	755	766	771	0.3	0.3	17.3	16.4
Ecuador	192	248	214	211	0.4	0.4	13.4	14.1
Guyana	173	170	173	183	8.5	7.7	223.8	235.2
Paraguay	156	136	141	145	1.1	0.9	24.4	21.3

Partner/Region	CPA Actual	CPA Planned			CPA/GNI		CPA per capita	
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2013	2010	2013
	2010 USD million				%		2010 USD million	
Peru	664	674	680	680	0.5	0.5	22.5	22.0
Suriname	104	81	58	57	4.2	2.0	197.2	104.4
Uruguay	47	54	39	39	0.2	0.1	13.9	11.4
Venezuela	41	36	33	36	0	0	1.4	1.2
South America, regional	192	160	114	123
America, regional	587	916	952	946
Asia	37 118	38 648	39 532	39 997	0.4	0.3	9.7	10.1
Middle East	5 877	6 114	6 055	6 077	0.7	0.6	34.5	33.5
Iran	36	33	35	34	0	0	0.5	0.4
Iraq	1 624	1 576	1 547	1 527	2.3	1.6	50.7	44.4
Jordan	824	794	795	821	3.5	3.1	134.4	125.2
Lebanon	531	515	509	511	1.6	1.3	135.8	125.7
Oman	7	7	7	7	0	0	2.4	2.2
Palestinian Adm. Areas	2 062	2 139	2 126	2 168	467.6	450.3
Syria	200	237	230	227	0.4	0.4	9.6	10.1
Yemen	432	551	549	527	1.7	1.9	17.7	19.8
Middle East, regional	162	263	257	255
South and Central Asia	18 873	19 758	20 593	21 006	1.0	0.9	10.7	11.4
Afghanistan	5 376	5 136	5 176	5 164	59.4	45.6	181.3	160.9
Armenia	318	358	387	366	3.3	3.4	96.3	107.7
Azerbaijan	195	187	192	193	0.5	0.4	21.6	20.8
Bangladesh	1 938	2 490	2 770	2 735	2.1	2.4	11.6	15.5
Bhutan	139	127	131	113	9.9	6.7	203.9	158.2
Georgia	549	464	500	496	4.9	3.9	125	112.8
India	4 454	4 612	5 016	5 083	0.3	0.3	3.7	4.0
Kazakhstan	165	158	163	159	0.1	0.1	10.6	10.2
Kyrgyz Republic	235	367	306	291	5.1	5.3	43.2	51.6
Maldives	102	70	71	58	8.3	4.0	294.7	166.9
Myanmar	222	246	239	267	1.2	1.2	3.6	4.1
Nepal	837	935	935	975	6.4	6.6	29.7	33.6
Pakistan	2 582	2 810	2 748	3 012	1.5	1.6	15.5	17.2
Sri Lanka	877	842	849	842	2.2	1.7	43	40.4
Tajikistan	358	318	292	294	7.4	5.2	54.8	44.2
Turkmenistan	36	35	35	34	0.2	0.2	6.6	6.0
Uzbekistan	217	263	352	374	0.7	1.0	7.7	12.8
Central Asia, regional	135	155	159	163
South Asia, regional	30	89	176	286
South & Central Asia, regional	108	97	96	101
Far East Asia	11 982	12 264	12 367	12 394	0.2	0.2	6.3	6.4
Cambodia	747	784	776	806	7.7	6.9	52.5	53.4
China	2 036	2 002	2 075	2 100	0	0	1.5	1.5

Partner/Region	CPA Actual	CPA Planned			CPA/GNI		CPA per capita	
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2013	2010	2013
	2010 USD million				%		2010 USD million	
Indonesia	3 303	3 180	3 163	3 129	0.7	0.6	14.1	12.8
Korea, Dem. Rep.	38	21	21	18	1.6	0.8
Laos	447	417	421	419	8.1	6.2	68.8	61.0
Malaysia	181	178	178	178	0.1	0.1	6.4	6.0
Mongolia	294	302	322	291	6.7	4.6	107.4	101.7
Philippines	1 116	1 063	1 087	1 091	0.7	0.6	11.9	10.9
Thailand	367	356	369	365	0.1	0.1	5.4	5.2
Timor-Leste	231	236	223	224	8.5	6.5	208.8	194.7
Viet Nam	3 164	3 631	3 644	3 666	3.6	3.4	35.8	40.1
Far East Asia, regional	59	92	88	106
Asia, regional	386	511	516	521
Oceania	1 957	1 953	2 062	2 041	11.1	10.6	222	223.4
Cook Islands	15	21	15	14	777.2	715.3
Fiji	82	58	57	58	2.5	1.7	92.1	64.9
Kiribati	26	35	38	40	14.2	20.0	255.9	396.6
Marshall Islands	92	81	84	82	1 458.4	1 215.0
Micronesia, Fed. States	127	134	136	132	1 147.6	1 172.7
Nauru	21	20	19	19	2 012.6	1 844.5
Niue	17	17	14	14	12 046.2	10 460.7
Palau	26	28	25	25	1 256.5	1 216.8
Papua New Guinea	549	550	638	618	6.9	6.8	84.6	91.1
Samoa	139	90	87	83	27.4	15.2	765.9	452.3
Solomon Islands	200	168	183	181	41.8	32.6	361.7	328.3
Tokelau	15	12	11	11	12 269.6	9 311.5
Tonga	71	69	64	63	21.0	17.7	689.0	603.7
Tuvalu	14	17	14	14	1 388.2	1 373.3
Vanuatu	117	108	112	114	18.7	16.1	474.5	437.2
Wallis & Futuna	159	156	156	156	10 276.4	9 867.3
Oceania, regional	287	389	408	417
Thematic aid to be programmed	-	2 250	2 400	2 305
				
Total	90 301	94 417	96 523	96 131	0.5	0.5	16.2	16.6

Note: Barbados, Croatia, Mayotte, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago will be removed from the DAC list of ODA recipients starting in 2012 with reporting on 2011 flows.

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The Architecture of Development Assistance

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