OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism

ISSN :
2226-5848 (online)
DOI :
10.1787/22265848
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The Fiscal Federalism Working Paper series covers issues related to intergovernmental fiscal relations and local/regional public finance, such as: tax and spending assignment across government levels; intergovernmental grants; fiscal equalization; local and regional public service efficiency; inter-jurisdictional tax competition; and macroeconomic issues such as intergovernmental fiscal management and sub-central fiscal rules.
Note. Nos 1, 6 and 8 are available in OECD Economics Department Working Papers, as Nos 465, 626 and 705.
 

Promoting Performance - Using Indicators to Enhance the Effectiveness of Sub-Central Spending You or your institution have access to this content

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Author(s):
Lee Mizell1
Author Affiliations
  • 1: OECD, France

Publication Date
13 June 2008
Bibliographic information
No.:
5
Pages
63
DOI
10.1787/5k97b11g190r-en

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On average, one-third of public expenditures in OECD countries occur at the sub-central level, a figure that has risen slightly over time. This is due, in part, to the decentralisation of competences for public services in many OECD countries. Not surprisingly, the efficiency and effectiveness of spending for public services are a concern for both central and sub-central governments. Various mechanisms are used to affect the efficiency and improve the effectiveness of sub-central spending. This report examines one tool that aims to do so: indicator systems for measuring and monitoring sub-central service delivery. Specifically, the report aims to assess if and how central governments use such systems, the critical choices they face when designing and implementing them, and the constraints under which the systems operate.