OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers

ISSN :
1815-199X (online)
DOI :
10.1787/1815199x
Hide / Show Abstract
This series is designed to make available to a wider readership selected labour market, social policy and migration studies prepared for use within the OECD. Authorship is usually collective, but principal writers are named. The papers are generally available only in their original language - English or French - with a summary in the other.
 

Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement

Updating the OECD Employment Protection Indicators You or your institution have access to this content

Authors:
Danielle Venn1
Author Affiliations
  • 1: OECD, France

Publication Date
02 July 2009
Bibliographic information
No.:
89
Pages
56
DOI
10.1787/223334316804

Hide / Show Abstract

This paper presents updated estimates of the OECD employment protection indicators for 30 OECD countries and 10 emerging economies and considers important aspects of employment protection other than those provided in legislation. Collective agreements often contain provisions relating to employment protection, but in most OECD countries, severance pay and notice periods in collective agreements are similar to those set out in legislation. Where bargaining takes place largely outside individual firms at the national, regional or sectoral level and collective agreements include provisions substantially more generous to employees than those in legislation, they are incorporated into the OECD indicators. Many OECD countries exempt some groups of firms or workers from employment protection rules. Such exemptions have mixed success in promoting employment among exempted groups, but do not have a large impact on the accuracy of the OECD indicators. More than half of OECD countries have specialised courts or procedures to handle unfair dismissal cases, reducing the time taken to deal with cases and improving satisfaction with legal outcomes. Resolving disputes early (either through pre-court dispute resolution procedures or pre-trial conciliation) saves time and money compared with waiting for a court decision. More research and cross-country comparable data are needed on the efficiency of conciliation procedures and the cost of pursuing or defending dismissal cases.
JEL Classification:
  • J52: Labor and Demographic Economics / Labor–Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining / Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
  • J63: Labor and Demographic Economics / Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies / Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
  • J65: Labor and Demographic Economics / Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies / Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
  • K31: Law and Economics / Other Substantive Areas of Law / Labor Law