OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy

Frequency :
3 times a year
ISSN :
1609-7521 (online)
ISSN :
1560-7771 (print)
DOI :
10.1787/16097521
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This journal draws on the best of the recent work done for and by the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy. Its articles provide insight into the thinking a competition law enforcers, and focus on the practical application of competition law and policy. Here’s what Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission said about this new journal when it was launched: "Global competition is the wave of the future, and comparative analysis of the laws and practices of various members of the worldwide community of nations is a necessary corollary. This new OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, compiled from OECD Round Table discussions, summaries of recent developments, and articles on topics of special interest, will introduce regulators, practitioners, and scholars to different regulatory approaches around the world and will allow us to consider in a more informed way the strengths and weaknesses of our own systems."

Now published as part of the OECD Journal package.

Also available in: French
Article
 

Competition and efficient usage of payment cards You do not have access to this content

Authors:
OECD
Publication Date
22 June 2011
Pages
1
Bibliographic information
No.:
1,
Volume:
11,
Issue:
3
Pages
7–99
DOI
10.1787/clp-11-5kg9q0zk74vb

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The OECD Competition Committee debated competition and efficient usage of payment cards in June 2006. In recent years, debit and credit cards have become increasingly common as retail payment mechanisms and have increasingly displaced checks and cash. The roundtable discussed potential market power and pricesetting abuses related to payment cards, reviewed the regulatory (or self-regulatory) mechanisms that sometimes govern the operation of card networks and considered methods for increasing the role of competitive forces among payment cards. A market failure exists because costs for different payment mechanisms are rarely reflected in consumer prices. Consideration should be given to permitting merchants to form payment ventures, as this would promote system competition between owners with different incentives, and to promoting entry by potential new technologies that would not involve existing payment networks. Many other policy options are discussed.