OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism

ISSN :
2226-5848 (en ligne)
DOI :
10.1787/22265848
Cacher / Voir l'abstract
The Fiscal Federalism Working Paper series covers issues related to intergovernmental fiscal relations and local/regional public finance, such as: tax and spending assignment across government levels; intergovernmental grants; fiscal equalization; local and regional public service efficiency; inter-jurisdictional tax competition; and macroeconomic issues such as intergovernmental fiscal management and sub-central fiscal rules.
Note. Nos 1, 6 and 8 are available in OECD Economics Department Working Papers, as Nos 465, 626 and 705.
 

Fiscal Autonomy of Sub-Central Governments You or your institution have access to this content

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Auteur(s):
Hansjörg Blöchliger1, David King2
Author Affiliations
  • 1: OCDE, France

  • 2: Stirling University, Royaume-Uni

Date de publication
11 sep 2006
Bibliographic information
N°:
2
Pages
31
DOI
10.1787/5k97b127pc0t-en

Cacher / Voir l'abstract

State and local governments in OECD countries have access to a variety of fiscal resources. Discretion over these resources varies considerably, and so does sub-central governments’ power to shape public service delivery. The design of fiscal autonomy affects sub-central government’s behaviour and determines outcomes like public sector efficiency, equity in access to public services or the long term fiscal stance. This paper provides data and interpretation on the fiscal resources of sub-central government in OECD countries. It presents a set of fiscal autonomy indicators such as revenue and expenditure decentralisation, tax autonomy, intergovernmental grants and the stringency of fiscal rules. In sum, the statistics show that taxes are still the most significant revenue source for subcentral governments but that only a part is under their effective control. Fiscal autonomy is further reduced by a high percentage of earmarked grants. The design of fiscal federalism varies considerably across countries, and factor analysis reveals almost no correlation between different fiscal autonomy indicators. Indeed, "fiscal autonomy" appears to have several dimensions.
Mots-clés:
local taxation, fiscal autonomy, fiscal federalism, intergovernmental transfers
Classification JEL:
  • H71: Public Economics / State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations / State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
  • H74: Public Economics / State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations / State and Local Borrowing
  • H77: Public Economics / State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations / Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession